Robert Schuett

Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations

The Resurrection of the Realist Man

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International Relations

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Political Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations

The Resurrection of the Realist Man

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Preface

This book seeks to contribute to the growing body of literature discontent with how realist international-political theory is often portrayed in International Relations. Recent scholarship has provided insightful accounts of the philosophy of political realism, its timeless virtues, and its ethical depth. Although still considered the politico-theoretical tradition advocating pure and crude *Machtpolitik*, it has been shown that such power apologetism has nothing to do with the moral imperatives of the genuine realist international-political theories of the likes of Morgenthau or Herz (the same applies, I shall think, to Waltz and Mearsheimer). In this thriving revisionist literature, however, one of the most controversial concepts in the sciences and humanities haunting humankind at least since the Greek Sophists as well as its perhaps greatest demystifier have been neglected: human nature and Sigmund Freud.

To lay the cards on the table, this book's reexamination of the concept of human nature in twentieth-century/contemporary realist international-political theory, with special reference to Freud, is broadly sympathetic to all three themes concerned. In light of the rise of structural accounts of international relations or the third image, in light of what appears as the strange death of the concept of human nature in political realism, my argument is that realist international-political theory should not be severed from its ancient and intelligent concern with human nature. More positively, the concept of human nature should be the sole philosophical basis of political realism and its analytical and normative forays into social reality, that is, the political reality of international relations. This anthropological turn must not be seen as a conservative endeavor. For the genuine political realism à la Morgenthau is neither immoral, crudely naturalist, fatalist nor inherently politically conservative; the almost Pavlovian equation of political realism with conservatism seems the falsest of all prejudices since realist international-political theory is certainly compatible with the moderate left.

Still, political realism must not be based on the more or less hollow concept of the international-political structure; and the several otherwise distinctive realist international-political theories flourishing under the broader and flexible roof of the realist Weltanschauung should recognize the intimate philosophical and politico-theoretical relationship between the concept of human nature and the international-political.

In the context of the increasing proliferation of different realist international-political theories or political realisms, I argue that what should define the realist Weltanschauung is the philosophical belief that any theorizing of the actualities and potentialities of international relations must be based on the more prior theorizing of the actualities and, of course, potentialities of human nature as it is shaped by powerful historical socioeconomic forces. The classical realists knew all too well what Alexander Pope captured elegantly (which is of even more contemporary relevance given the global rise of faith-based politics).

Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
The proper study of mankind is man.

That political realism and its classical-style variant rooting in Morgenthau is enjoying a renaissance in International Relations is to be welcomed, particularly since the irrationalities of political reality—ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism, moral universalism—continue to thrive with full force. Despite all efforts, in seeking argumentative assistance from these earlier political realists (take Iraq and the analogies with Morgenthau's critique of Vietnam), the concept of human nature, long *the* philosophical basis of political realism and classical realists like Morgenthau, has escaped much attention; even more, it has become a largely discredited idea in the study of international relations.

Sympathetic not only of political realism but also of the concept of human nature and Freud, this book aims at reviving what used to be the rule rather than the exception in realist international-political theory: theorizing the international-political based on the concept of human nature. Making special reference to Freud, one of the truly consequential figures of Western thought yet awkwardly neglected in International Relations, two important questions are explored: First, is the concept of human nature really dead in contemporary realist international-political theory? And, second, ought human nature to be dead in political realism? Examining a variety of realist international-political theorists commonly invoked as the foremost proponents of classical and post-classical realism, I argue that contemporary political realism has not eliminated the concept of human nature from its study

of international relations. Assumptions about human nature, though often hidden, are widespread; and several leading realists have used a Freudian conception of human nature as their philosophical backdrop for theorizing the tragedies of the international-political. This, then, leads to the ought-question. If the concept of human nature is not as dead as post-classicals would have us believe, should we seek to wipe it off realist international-political theory? The concept of human nature, as I argue, ought not to be dead. Political realism requires a sophisticated theory of human nature as the basis of its Weltanschauung. Developing a philosophical anthropology for political realism, I see Freud as offering a most appropriate starting point for bringing back the concept of the Realist Man into contemporary realist international-political theory and that of human nature into the wider study of international relations.

Philosophically, this book's line of argument grew out of my dissatisfaction with how, and why, an increasingly large number of realist international-political theorists have moved post-classical political realism away from its original philosophical roots. This is not to denounce post-classical realist international-political theory—no doubt, Waltz's achievement is beyond measure and Mearsheimer's offensive realism is truly fascinating—but, still, post-classical realism's disavowal of the concept of human nature has helped to impoverish political realism, which is not so much a technical social science of international relations but an ethics of social and political reality. More technically, my argument for a central role of the concept of human nature in realist international-political theory and, more generally, in International Relations, albeit understood not in crudely naturalistic terms, grew out of my doctoral work at Durham University's School of Government and International Affairs. More or less intact in its original form of 2009, I hope the claims of this book will be of interest to scholars of International Relations, social and political theorists, historians of political thought, as well as scholars of Freud and Freudianism.

Farideh Koohi-Kamali and Robyn Curtis as well as the editor of this series, Peter Wilson, LSE. Further, I cordially thank Susanna Morgenthau, New York, for allowing me to use previously unpublished material from her father, Hans J. Morgenthau, as well as the Freud Museum, London, for permissions to use one of their Freud portraits.

Yet, I do owe my biggest debt of gratitude to my dear wife whose unwavering support, refreshing optimism, and unbending tolerance has helped me pursuing my project(s) during both good and difficult times. I dedicate this book to Susanne.

Durham/La Jolla, 2010   Robert Schuett

The Human-Nature Question

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Political Realism and the Strange Death of Human Nature

For realist international-political theory, international relations are the arena of the eternal struggle for power and peace. Political realists of all provenience agree that the relations among nations are, as Martin Wight famously declared, the "realm of recurrence and repetition."[1] Here, however, their consensus ceases. Over the course of the past five decades or so, the practice and underlying logic of international relations may, indeed, not have changed dramatically. But what certainly has changed is the way how political realists theorize and explain the broad patterns of politics among nations and the underlying reasons and causes of its tragedies. This change of politico-theoretical perspective within realism has led to the division of political realism into dichotomous camps: classical realism versus neorealism, human-nature realism versus structural realism, evil realism versus tragic realism, and so forth.

Throughout the book, I will refer to this ideal-typical division of realist international-political theory as the politico-theoretical struggle between "classical realism" and "post-classical realism" for the scientific high ground, for better explanations, better predictions, and better prescriptions. This continuing scientific battle among political realists is, of course, healthy. It, nevertheless, signifies a profound rift that runs down the middle of realist international-political theory. On the one hand, there are the Morgenthauians/ Niebuhrians who base their analytical arguments about the underlying origins of international conflicts as well as their prescriptive arguments for the necessities of prudent interest-led politics on an *animus dominandi,* human sinfulness, or on other human imperfections. On the other hand, there are

the post-classicals such as Herz, Waltz, and Mearsheimer who keep arguing that it is irrelevant whether the nature of Man[2] is good or bad, social or asocial, peaceful or aggressive, for it is not Man but rather the security dilemma inherent in an anarchical international environment that makes the *bellum omnium contra omnes* a primary fact of the relations among separate political communities. Save for a few exceptions, the sociostructural or third-image approach of the post-classicals has eclipsed the human-nature or first-image approach of classical realism. As was put succinctly: realist international-political theory "got rid of the first image."[3]

Despite our maneuvering of political realism into a post-classical realist era, this book challenges the view that we really did get rid of the human nature–based theorizing of the international-political that was so characteristic and defining of realist international-political theory since its birth in ancient Greece. Is the concept of human nature really as dead in post-classical realism as its protagonists would have us believe? The argument put forth will be that it is not dead, that post-classical realism does rely on hidden assumptions about human nature, that it does root in underlying (if vague) conceptions of human nature. If, however, that is the case and the concept of human nature is not dead in contemporary post-classical realism, should we, then, continue the Herzian/Waltzian quest to purify realist international-political theory from the tutelage of human nature? Or, alternatively, should we seek to bring back the concept of human nature and make it, again, the central philosophical starting point from which all analytical and normative realist international-political theorizing derives? Seen in this light, the human-nature question touches upon the issue of the philosophical nature of realist international-political theory. Again, I will argue in the negative. The concept of human nature ought not to be dead in political realism, for a realist(ic) conception of human nature is its defining element.

This book, however, is concerned not only with the past and present of the concept of human nature (is-question) but also its future role in realist international-political theory (ought-question). The theoretical concern with the concept of human nature vis-à-vis political realism is tied to Sigmund Freud. Although some of my analytical and normative arguments regarding the role of the concept of human nature in political realism are independent of a Freudian or any other conception of human nature, my focus on Freud can be justified on many grounds, at the least because he is, surprisingly, a terribly understudied and neglected figure in International Relations.[4] In light of its scope, analyses, and arguments, this book is a study in international-political theory (International Relations theory) lying at the intersection of now two separate intellectual endeavors whose distinctive concerns, methods,

and subjects the classical realists (and the English School) once considered as intrinsically interwoven: Political Theory and International Relations. Trying to do justice to all three subjects under consideration, the book concerns itself with one of the most fascinating and controversial political philosophies of international relations (political realism) taken together with one of the equally fascinating and controversial politico-theoretical concepts (human nature) giving special attention to Freud.

I will now expand on the origins and nature of the two main questions—Is Human Nature Dead? Ought Human Nature to be Dead?—and this book's special reference to Freud. Subsequently, I will provide a brief outline of its structure and arguments.

Is Human Nature Dead? Ought It To Be Dead? Where's Freud?

Despite post-classical realists' arguments that they do not rely on the concept of human nature, even a cursory look at the relevant literature suggests that we do have every reason to doubt whether human nature is really dead in contemporary realist international-political theory. Seen from the viewpoint of the history of realist international-political theory, the neat division of political realism into the human-nature camp and the international-structure camp seems rather questionable. For much too long have political realists based their analytical and normative theories upon the concept (controversial or otherwise) of human nature. Yet, not only realist international-political theorists have used assumptions about human nature or Man as their philosophical backdrop; for, indeed, no scholar of political theory would seriously challenge what Martin Wight noted aptly: "All political theory presupposes some kind of theory about human nature, some basic anthropological theory."[5]

We have seen that, across the millennia, political realists in particular have been very fond of the explanatory and argumentative strategy to base their theorizing upon assumptions about the nature of Man. They were not only making these assumptions; these were more often than not rather well-specified and well-accessible to friends and foes. It is correct when Roger Spegele writes that political realists have been "traditionally committed to some concept of human nature will hardly come as a surprise to international relationists familiar with the writings of Thucydides, St. Augustine, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, or of such modern realists as Morgenthau, Butterfield, Niebuhr, and Isaiah Berlin."[6]

The issue, then, is that the ancient, intimate, and almost symbiotic relationship between realist international-political theory and the concept of

human nature has come under severe strain. Political realism may even have been cut off entirely from its philosophical rooting, which only adds weight to why classical-style political realists should be concerned with what happened to their politico-philosophical home. The committers of this politico-theoretical crime are easy to find. It is the post-classicals who have kept repeating that human nature is an irrelevant, antiquated, and useless concept. The turn-away from political realism's concern with human nature is predominantly one of Waltz's accomplishments (or mistakes). Both his *Man, the State, and War* and *Theory of International Politics,* two intriguing texts that transformed the perspective of international relations, have helped to push to the margins of (realist) International Relations theory the once thriving Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style political realism, which was already ailing due to the behavioral revolt of the 1950s/1960s. As a consequence, over the course of a few decades, the concept of human nature got replaced by the concept of the international structure.

The implications of post-classical realism's move away from the concept of human nature toward the concepts of the security dilemma and international structure, however, have been more profound than the quarrels about different loci of causation or different images suggest. The shift is a fundamental one in terms of the philosophical basis of realist international-political theory. Gone were the times when political realists readily agreed with Morgenthau's *dictum* that "[p]olitical realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature."[7] Whereas classicals were certain to have found in our nature the causes of the evil side of the relations among nations and were, therefore, skeptical of placing too much faith in Man's moral capacities, a new generation of political realists came up with an innovative (analytical and moral) explanation why the world is filled with all these tragedies: as the argument runs, because of the anarchical structuring of the international system. This led to an almost abstruse situation within realist international-political theory. For what used to be recognized as the genuine political realism is now being dismissed as the unscientific playing field of a handful of antiquated so-called human-nature realists or biological realists.[8] In other words, from being considered as one of the main ingredients of any genuine realist international-political theory, the concept of human nature has now become an essentially discredited notion.

Yet it seems strange that a meager half-century of post-classical realism was able to rid itself of a concept that was the main philosophical backdrop of political realism for more than two millennia. And to hypothesize that human nature is not really dead seems not really wide of the mark; particularly not when we catch leading post-classical realists in flagrante. None

other than Waltz, the "father of structural realism,"[9] confesses some intellectual ties to Niebuhrian assumptions about human nature.

> The influence behind my preference [balanced-power] is partly Immanuel Kant and partly Reinhold Niebuhr. ...Niebuhr drew the conclusion from his *dim view of human nature* that domestically and internationally the ends of security and decency are served better by balanced than by concentrated power.[10]

Preferring a balanced-power system over a hegemonic system is a matter of politico-theoretical taste and is, in itself, of no concern here. But what other conclusion than that human nature still matters in post-classical realism shall we make of the fact that Waltz brings in the concept of human nature in order to justify a fundamental normative politico-theoretical proposition?

Waltz, however, is not an isolated case. It appears that other post-classicals, too, turn to the concept of human nature when it seems expedient. For example, Randall Schweller, one of the most outspoken neoclassical realists, argues that

> no one really believes that the "haves" will voluntarily hand over their riches to the "have-nots." There is no historical precedent for such altruism on a global scale, and, no matter how much we all communicate with each other in the future, *I cannot imagine that human nature will change so dramatically in my lifetime*.[11]

Once again, we are being presented with a rather unusual argumentative strategy. Unusual not so much in itself, but to hear from a scholar of international relations of the post-classical realist camp. This further indicates that the concept of human nature is not as dead in contemporary realist discourses of international relations as post-classicals usually claim.

That Waltz and Schweller, however, are not some high profile statistical outliers within the post-classical camp has been the argument of a recent book-length study on the nature, function, and effect of the concept of human nature in realism from Thucydides to the present.[12] Its author has shown that post-classicals still make assumptions about human nature and that these assumptions are constitutive of theses realists' respective international-political theories. It is an impressive account of how political realists have conceptualized human nature across the millennia and it marks a substantial contribution to our understanding of realist international-political theory and its intellectual psychological/anthropological substructure. It is, moreover, a long overdue study, for Annette Freyberg-Inan is more than correct when she writes

that "[g]iven the vast amount of material published that employs, defends, or criticizes realist theory, it is striking how few authors ever even address the psychological foundations of realism."[13]

Though covering an impressive range of realist international-political theorists from all ages, giving the concept of human nature its fair share of intellectual treatment, and directing anew the attention of our discipline to this ancient and controversial concept, Freyberg-Inan's account of the assumptions about human nature put forth by classical and post-classical realists should be taken with a pinch of salt. This for two reasons.

First, the analytical account of individual political realists seems, at times, superficial. This may be explained away by referring to the large number of political realists under analysis. Spanning the analytical net this wide, it seems unavoidable that analytical depth must give way to analytical breadth, but this does not exempt from some criticism. For example, Waltz is quoted for holding the view that "our miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. The root of all evil is man, and thus he is himself the root of the specific evil, war."[14] This seems misleading; not the least, because, in the cited passage, Waltz is merely referring to the line of argument put forth by first-image pessimists such as St. Augustine and Niebuhr. This form of (perhaps unintended) misinterpretation leads to a second concern. Her reading of these political realists is a damning indictment of political realism; attacked are both the realist conception(s) of human nature as well as the realist tradition as a whole. The reasoning is straightforward: bad conceptions of human nature lead to bad realist international-political theories. Across the millennia, critics have said that political realists have shown a profound bias in favor of "destructive" aspects of human nature. This bias, in turn, it is argued, has helped to create overly pessimistic and blind realisms that now stifle, once put into foreign policy practice, the chances for the peaceful coexistence of the world's nations.[15]

Particularly the latter point is, of course, a strong claim. And it recalls Robert Gilpin's honest confession that he, by virtue of being one of the "card-carrying members of an insidious and rather dangerous conspiracy," feels rather "helpless" in light of being accused of the many "heinous and common crime[s]" that have been apparently committed by political realists.[16] So, what does it really mean that political realists are biased in favor of "destructive" aspects of human nature? And is it even fair to speak of "destructive" aspects? No one seriously doubts that political realism has always emphasized that we cannot and must not lose sight of the more problematic aspects of Man, but are these aspects really "destructive"? In this light, it is vital that we raise the human-nature question, for only this may prevent that those critical of political realism can point toward

the bad assumptions about human nature put forth by both classical and post-classical realists as a welcome (and easy) means to continue with, what Mearsheimer rightly called, "realism bashing."[17] This reengagement is even more pressing, if political realists continue to remain agnostic vis-à-vis the concept of human nature leaving them as easy prey for others.

The peculiar causa Freud, too, requires us to raise anew the human-nature question. We know that political realists since the ancient Greeks have based their international-political theories on certain conceptions of human nature; this also applies, of course, to the classicals of the twentieth century, to Morgenthau, Niebuhr, and so forth. Further, there is every reason to believe that post-classicals still rely on assumptions about the nature of Man, however hidden and conceptualized these assumptions may be. Against this background, it seems not too hypothetical that the nature and intellectual origins of some of these political realists' assumptions about human nature are of Freudian provenance.

Such a line of enquiry, however, has not been taken up yet. The literature on classical realism is thriving. Due to an increasing (1) interest in our disciplinary history; (2) awareness of the fruitful relationship between Political Theory and International Relations; and (3) dissatisfaction with Waltzian-style structural realism, we have recently seen a steady and profound renaissance of interest in the classical or pre-Waltzian figures of twentieth-century political realism. Morgenthau has received the most attention, followed by Herz and Niebuhr.[18] This renewed engagement with these almost buried thinkers has shown how these political realists help illuminate a wide range of analytical and moral/ethical dilemmas that occupy the minds of post 9/11 theorists of international relations as well as foreign-policy makers. Yet, unfortunately, this otherwise insightful body of literature has left some gaps. It has not looked into the potential intellectual relationships between these political realists and Freud. For example, to remain with the "group leader"[19] of twentieth-century political realism, the literature devoted to Morgenthau's intellectual family-tree is truly impressive. Recent studies have shown how Morgenthau's political realism was influenced by thinkers such as Aristotle, Epicurus, Kelsen, Lincoln, Niebuhr, Nietzsche, Schmitt, Sinzheimer, the Sophists, and Weber.[20] I do not question these intellectual trajectories, but the hypothesis is that Freud, too, had some influence upon Morgenthau's political realism.

It seems both puzzling and understandable why Freud has escaped much attention. Indeed, as the relevant literature demonstrates, every now and then, Freud does crop up in the context of a potential connection between political realism and human nature, particularly against the background of a potential Morgenthau/Freud connection. There has been some interest

regarding the Freudian nature and origin of Morgenthau's manuscript on the derivation of the political from the nature of Man written in Frankfurt in 1930 but never published.[21] This (vague) link between Morgenthau and Freud, however, has led not to any substantial commentary or wider engagement with the causa Freud vis-à-vis Morgenthau and political realism. This derives perhaps partly from Morgenthau's own autobiographical verdict on Freud. Morgenthau said that he toyed with Freudian concepts but that he soon realized "the impossibility of accounting for the complexities and varieties of political experience with the simplicities of a reductionist theory."[22] If Morgenthau himself did the work and declared Freud for only little helpful in matters politics, why, then, bother about Freud?

Despite Morgenthau's disavowal of any deeper Freudian influence, however, it seems somewhat strange that Morgenthau, a widely educated thinker who was steeped in the tradition of German and Continental thought, who was well aware of the intricacies of the nature of Man, and who worked in the wider progressive Frankfurt milieu that was almost obsessed with Freudian psychoanalysis in the late 1920s and early 1930s, shows no intellectual ties to Freud or his psychoanalytic revolution of the concept of human nature.[23] And since much of the similar (especially the Continental intellectual heritage) applies to several other classicals and post-classicals, too, this book starts from the hypothesis that the concept of human nature is not only not dead in contemporary political realism, but also that the assumptions about human nature employed by these political realists are—to varying degrees—of Freudian intellectual provenance. Although largely scattered, cursory, and brief, some hints in the literature suggest that there may well be some Freudian elements or traces in the realisms of Carr, Herz, Kennan, Lippmann, and Weber.[24] I examine such potential intellectual links to Freud in greater depth.

This book's special focus on Freud in the context of the human-nature question within political realism requires to dwell a bit further on what seems to be the strange neglect of Freud in International Relations. It is somewhat puzzling and unlikely that twentieth-century classicals as well as post-classicals have had no intellectual ties to the father of psychoanalysis. For the entirety of these political realists were born, raised, educated, and have worked in what has been rightly called the "Freudian century" or "era of Freud."[25] Despite all controversies surrounding Freud, only few seriously disagree that Freud has had an "enormous impact on Western culture in the twentieth century."[26] And in allusion to the (in)famous 1993 *Time* cover story, "Is Freud dead?",[27] there is hardly any doubt that most of us are still fascinated with, as well as haunted by, the revolutions that Freud and, later, Freudianism ignited. Needless to say, Freud, many claim, is long dead; some of us recently celebrated his 150th birthday; and witnessing the first decade

of the twenty-first century unfold, which is (or, at least, seems to be) characterized by Obamanian-style politics and global twittering, some have been tempted to regard Freud as an intellectual relic of a bygone era.

This, however, is shortsighted. As if changes in rhetoric, style, technology, and communication were a sign that the basic underlying structure and nature of the human condition of which Freud (and, of course, Marx) spoke, has been fundamentally altered. Freud is not dead. To the contrary, indeed, the academic, professional, and cultural interest in Freud and Freudianism remains high. And the body of literature devoted to, or dealing with, Freud and Freudianism, massive as it already is, becomes ever larger as part of a recent resurgence of interest in Freud across the sciences and humanities. For example, in a recent and fascinating work on the social and cultural history of psychoanalysis, Eli Zaretsky has traced the impact, virtues, vices, and residual ambiguities of Freud and Freudianism from the Viennese beginnings up until the present.[28] Others, too numerous to mention, have also shown that we still cannot dispense with Freud and that the "conquistador of the unconscious"[29] is, at any rate, much too important to neglect; in other words: the psychological, medical, cultural, and political implications that derive from Freud, his psychoanalysis, and the whole body of Freudianism are as perceptible and present as before.[30]

With Freud being anything else than dead, it is, therefore, rather peculiar why he is such a terribly understudied figure in International Relations. And this puts our discipline in a puzzling situation compared with other academic endeavors. Across the sciences, social sciences, arts and humanities, the impact of Freud has been enormous. Easily comparable with the pathmakings and path-breakings of Darwin and Marx, Freud's intellectual and cultural impact was, already two decades after his death, virtually "beyond description."[31] To the present day, Freud's ontogenetic and phylogenetic insights continue to "influence our everyday thinking about ourselves, others and the world in which we live."[32] Nor is it too wide of the mark that "No one thinker of the twentieth century…has so impregnated contemporary consciousness, permeating every facet of economic, social, and intellectual life."[33] Save International Relations, the ascent of Freud and Freudianism has provoked major controversies and debates in virtually all academic disciplines. From very early on, Freud has been celebrated, debated, and ridiculed by anthropologists, art, literary, and film theorists, economists, historians, legal theorists, philosophers, ethicists, sociologists, and theologians.[34] As a consequence, the engagement with Freud led to fascinating subdisciplines such as psychoanalytic sociology and jurisprudence, psychohistory and psychobiography, and to a psychoanalytic approach dealing with international relations.[35]

It would be wrong, however, if this implied that Freud has been a figure on the margins of various disciplines. Freud may be marginal in International Relations (unjustified as this is), but this does not apply to other disciplines, including academic subjects traditionally close to International Relations such as political science, economics, jurisprudence, and sociology where the impact of Freud has been wide and thorough. The Frankfurt School—particularly Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Fromm—amalgamated Marx and Freud using psychoanalysis as one philosophical and methodological backdrop of their intriguing socioeconomical and political critique.[36] We also know that Lasswell, one of the most noted political scientists, was one of the earliest importers of Freud to American political theory.[37] Basing his political theorizing upon Freudian assumptions about human nature, Lasswell recognized early on that the "spectacular and influential nature of Freud's work . . . is of more general application to practical problems of political research and political practice than is usually understood."[38] In economics, Keynes made extensive use of Freudian insights, and largely concealed as economists were not showing a too great (overt) appreciation vis-à-vis Freud in these times.[39] However, Kelsen overtly drew from Freud's individual and group psychology. The founder of the Viennese school of law was both intellectually and personally close to Freud.[40]

Parsons, too, drew from Freud. One of the most influential sociologists, Parsons completely understood Freud's significance.[41] Recognizing that Freud is one of the "great founders of modern social science theory," he once rhetorically asked whether "the sociologist can do without the insights of psychoanalysis."[42] To paraphrase Parsons, no, sociologists could not do without Freud; and Freud has become a central part of what Immanuel Wallerstein, protagonist of structuralist world-systems theory, called the "culture of sociology":

> Freud has in fact been well incorporated into the culture of sociology. Freud's topology of the psyche—the id, ego and superego—has long been something we use to provide the intervening variables that explain how it is that Durkheim's social facts are internalized inside individual consciousnesses. We may not all use Freud's exact language, but the basic idea is there. In a sense, Freud's psychology is part of our collective assumptions.[43]

Thus, be it Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Fromm, Lasswell, Keynes, Kelsen, or Parsons, Freud's impact upon philosophers, political scientists, economists, jurists, or sociologists, among many others, transformed modern science and led to new methodological and psychological foundations;[44] further, Freudians can be found among liberals, Marxists, conservatives, feminists, and

postmodernists.[45] Against this background, Freud may well be part of the collective assumptions of International Relations scholars or, as is my concern here, of classical and post-classical realists. The causa Freud, therefore, is a promising reference point regarding the wider question whether the concept of human nature is really dead in contemporary realist international-political theory and, if not, what these conceptions' nature and intellectual origins are.

This brings us to this book's second main question. Ought the concept of human nature to be dead in political realism? It is the natural follower of the is-question. Based on my reading of a variety of political realists commonly invoked as classical realism's and post-classical realism's foremost proponents, I will argue that the concept of human nature is not as dead in political realism as is often claimed and that these assumptions have their origin in Freud. Yet, even if these political realists' intellectual substructures were by no means Freudian or near-Freudian, the answering of the is-question would raise a series of follow-up questions. If human nature really is not dead, political realists must ask themselves where political realism should go from there. Should we continue the Waltzian quest and seek the development of realist international-political theories that are truly purified of the concept of human nature? Or, alternatively, should we, rather than attempting to perfect the Waltzians, recognize the impossibility and/or undesirability of theorizing the international-political without an explicit conception of human nature as the philosophical base?

Once we have posed these two ideal-typical questions, we cannot but ask anew whether the attempt of post-classicals to rid political realism of the concept of human nature was a sensible, that is, a philosophical and politico-theoretical viable, endeavor in the first place. We must ask whether it is really possible and/or desirable to detach the political and, *mutatis mutandis*, the international-political from the thorough and intelligent concern with the nature of Man as that was so characteristic of realist international-political theorists across the ages. Shouldn't realists overtly and proactively defend the concept of human nature? Isn't exactly the concern with the nature of Man, taken together with the concern with how it is shaped by a historical cobweb of socioeconomic forces, one of the defining features of political realism? Hence, regardless whether the ought-question is finally answered in the positive or negative, any attempt to answer this question bears a distinctive normative statement about the future of political realism, about its nature, about its philosophical basis, and about how we wish to understand political realism. I will answer the ought-question in the negative. The concept of human nature ought not to be dead. Put positively, the philosophical basis for political realism must be the concept of human nature or, as I will refer to it, the concept of the Realist Man.

Quite clearly, however, any argument that proactively defends the continuing significance of the concept of human nature in political realism and that proactively defends, and calls for the resurrection of, the intimate philosophical and politico-theoretical relationship between realist international-political theory and human nature, that is, between the concept of the international-political and the concept of human nature, raises a further question. If the Realist Man ought to be the sole philosophical basis of political realism, we need a substantive account of the nature of this Realist Man, a realist(ic) conception of human nature: of what nature ought this Realist Man to be? In this regard, we do not suffer from a shortage of conceptions or ideas as to what the nature of Man is; it used to be the philosophers and theologians who told us, then came the psychologists and sociologists, and now it seems to be the heyday of the neurosciences.[46] Despite this menu of choice, this book sticks to Freud arguing that a Freudian conception of human nature offers a most appropriate starting point for attempting to solve political realism's human-nature problem. Put differently, the philosophical backdrop of realist international-political theory, that is, the main ingredient of a philosophical anthropology for political realism, should be Freudian Man.

Though it will be dealt with the virtues of a Freudian philosophical anthropology for political realism later (see chapter 5), Freud seems a more than appropriate starting point, particularly because he is some sort of Nietzschean *Seher* who freely trespassed the boundaries of neurology/psychology and entered the realms of social and political philosophy.[47] Sure, Freud is not a genuine political philosopher like Hobbes or Locke, but his concern went far beyond the usual confines of a qualified neurologist. In *Totem and Taboo*, for example, he presents a social contract theory-style explanation of the nature and origins of political communities. Though he did not concern himself at greater length with archetypical politico-philosophical concepts such as justice and legitimacy, he was, indeed, fascinated with the "sources of social order"[48] and its psychological, social, and political intricacies. As mentioned earlier, Freud has proven to be useful for social and political theorists; and he may, therefore, be helpful to political realists, too. Above all, of course, there is the Freudian psychology. With this, however, Freud offered us not merely a conception of human nature. Instead, he gave us a genuine and profound theory of Man, a theory of civilization, a philosophy of the human condition. As Marcuse aptly wrote, Freud developed a "'psycho-logy' in the strict sense. With this theory, Freud placed himself in the great tradition of philosophy and under philosophical criteria."[49]

Freud went far beyond the study of mental processes and the creation of the psychoanalytic treatment for mental disorders (itself the path-breaking

achievement). The "great unriddler of human enigmas"[50] also sought to demystify the most perplexing questions of humankind as the nature and origins of political communities, morality, religion, social order, war, and of civilizational development. Further to his clinical-medical work, Freud left us a psychology, or psychoanalysis, of primitive cultures in *Totem and Taboo*; of religion in *Moses and Monotheism* and *Future of an Illusion*; of group formation and group behavior in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*; of war in "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death" and "Why War?"; and of civilization in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, which remains one "of the most distinctive statement[s] in the philosophy of existence and civilization."[51]

Listing (some of) his achievements, however, does not imply that Freud is uncontroversial. Nevertheless, he seems an appropriate starting point for political realism's search for its own human-nature foundation. True, Freud's theory of Man, which explains human behavior in terms of biological, economical, and structural instinctual dynamics, has been condemned as biologist-reductionist.[52] True, Freud's proclamation that "the ego is not master in its own house"[53] has earned him the reputation as a biologically reductionist fatalist (which is, of course, wrong). And, true, Freud's psychological/sociophilosophical axiom that "there are present in all men destructive, and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural, trends"[54] has been criticized. Yet, it is exactly Freud's skepticism—peculiar skepticism—vis-à-vis human nature why Freudian Man seems an appropriate candidate for providing political realism with a useful and badly missing philosophical anthropology. Political realists never believed in purely Kantian *animalia rationabilia*. Across the millennia, they warned that we must always reckon with the harsh sociopolitical implications of the profound flaws and irrationalities of Man.[55] Though briefly, Martin Wight already hinted at a potential political realism/Freud connection.[56] And Abraham Kaplan noted that Freud is "possibly the most thoroughgoing realist in western thought."[57] This book's theoretical concern with Freud and Freudian Man may, therefore, yield rewarding results, both in terms of the is-question and political realism's search for a proper human-nature substructure.

Now, the final point. I have dwelled on Freud's significance in Western thought and impact across the sciences to demonstrate how understudied Freud is in International Relations. It seems, for example, awkward that Waltz's *Man, the State, and War*—a powerful critique of dozens of political philosophers, behavioralists, sociologists, historians, and psychologists—mentions Freud merely in three footnotes and one epigraph.[58] True, Freud receives some attention in International Relations, occasionally with reference to his 1933 essay "Why War?"[59] But this has not led International

Relations to engage with Freud in greater depth. To the contrary, Freud's Einstein letter seems a Pyrrhic victory, for many consider it as "in many ways peculiarly unsatisfying."[60] Such criticism may not even be entirely wrong. "Why War?" is, for sure, not Freud's best piece. In fact, Freud himself confessed that he was not expecting a Nobel Peace Prize for this "sterile so-called discussion with Einstein."[61] In Freud's defense, however, scholars of International Relations should recognize that Freud's œuvre fills twenty-four volumes.[62] The actual impact and potential usefulness of Freud for the study of international relations can, therefore, hardly be judged on the basis of a thirteen-page letter.

My study of the actual significance, and potential usefulness, of Freud for twentieth-century classical realism as well as for contemporary realist international-political theory also seeks to illuminate an exciting but hitherto neglected moment in the intellectual and cultural history of Freudianism. The intellectual scenery of the death of human nature and the neglect of Freud in political realism and International Relations laid out, I will now provide a brief outline of the book and its main arguments.

Plan of the Book

Against the alleged death of the concept of human nature in political realism, I argue that human nature is not dead, and that it ought not to be dead in realist international-political theory. These two main contentions will unfold along the book's two-part structure, helping to separate the is-question (chapters 2 and 3) from the ought-question (chapters 4 and 5). In chapter 6, I will conclude that we should bring back the (Freudian) Realist Man into contemporary realist international-political theory as well as Freud and the concept of human nature into wider International Relations.

In chapter 2, "Classical Realism on Human Nature and Freud," I present a rereading of classical realism and examine how five truly consequential classicals have conceptualized human nature. I look at Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr. These five thinkers do not exhaust the list of leading twentieth-century classicals. But a selection must be made, a balance between analytical depth and breadth struck. All five realists chosen are, to borrow Kenneth Thompson's phrase, "masters"[63] of international-political theory who have been very influential in the theory and practice of international relations.

Morgenthau is "the most distinguished and articulate exponent of political realism in the twentieth century."[64] Kennan earned his reputation as the creator of containment policy and is perhaps the U.S. foreign service's "most highly esteemed scholar and shaper of foreign policy."[65] Lippmann

ranks as the "most influential American journalist ever."[66] Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis* sits among "the three most influential realist works of the twentieth century."[67] And Niebuhr was not without justification called realism's "father" and "the greatest living political philosopher of America."[68]

These thinkers represent the intellectual broadness and richness of twentieth-century classical realism. My successive arguments will prove that their conceptions of human nature, save Niebuhr's, are—to varying degrees—Freudian or that there are striking similarities to Freudian psychology. This has two implications. First, it rescues these political realists from widespread criticisms concerning their assumptions about human nature. Second, it helps understand that these political realists cannot be taken without their human-nature baggage, a point all too often forgotten in the recent renaissance of classical realism.

Yet, what happened to classical realism's human-nature baggage? This is the underlying question of chapter 3, "The Human Nature of Post-Classical Realism." Here, I examine various post-classical realists and uncover hidden assumptions about human nature. Specifically, I explore Herz's realist liberalism, Kaplan's systemic-scientific realism, Waltz's defensive structural realism, Mearsheimer's offensive structural realism, and neoclassical realism. I have focused on these post-classicals because they have been among the most outspoken critics of Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style realism.

Herz is one of the most fascinating political realists. His concept of the security dilemma has helped a new generation of political realists (largely from the United States) to "systematize political realism into a rigorous, deductive systemic theory of international politics."[69] Kaplan, a somewhat enigmatic figure, spearheaded the post-classical realists' scientific revolution.[70] Waltz's work represents a distinctive turning point in the evolution of realism in that the "fountainhead of an egoist, evil, human nature as the causal source of all political action—a watermark of traditional realism—now disappears."[71] Mearsheimer's *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* is widely seen as "the definitive work on offensive realism."[72] Finally, neoclassical realism is post-classical realism's latest invention.[73]

Despite their overt preference for the concept of the international structure over the concept of human nature, my examination shows, these post-classicals make assumptions about human nature. Notwithstanding their "human-nature lie" and the fact that these realists are less reflective about the concept of human nature than the classicals, I defend them against unwarranted criticism. It's true that post-classical realism has led contemporary political realism into a serious theoretical cul-de-sac. That is why we are forced to ask again a question that was thought answered long ago: Ought human nature to be dead?

We have two ideal-typical solutions to the human-nature problem. Either we purify political realism of the tutelage of human nature. Or we proactively defend the concept of human nature as the philosophical basis of realist international-political theory. In the two chapters of Part II, "Ought Human Nature to be Dead?," I argue in favor of Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style political realism.

Chapter 4, "Human Nature and the Political: Criticism and Countercriticism," marks the first step of the argument pro the central role of the concept of human nature in realism. Its analytical-argumentative strategy is essentially negative. On the basis of a critical engagement with the main forms of criticisms of the concept of human nature, I discuss that we must take the concerns of the human-nature critics with a pinch of salt. For, ultimately, their arguments against the admissibility of the concept of human nature in the realm of the political and international-political are too weak and pose no serious threat to human nature-sympathetic Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian realists.

I begin by presenting what is being referred to as the six sins of the concept of human nature. These sins represent the most common and perhaps most powerful concerns that are raised against the application of the concept of human nature in matters social, philosophical, and political. But those sympathetic to human nature must not be deterred. Human-nature critics often fail to recognize the hidden complexities of assumptions about human nature. True, some have made mistakes while applying the concept of human nature, but human-nature critics have failed to produce convincing arguments why human-nature theorizing is, per se, as evil as they claim. Further, according to the argument of the hidden omnipresence of human nature, human-nature criticism is virtually meaningless, for these human nature-critical philosophies, theories, and Weltanschauungen, too, are based upon certain sets of assumptions about human nature. It appears impossible to construct international-political theories that have no basis in underlying conceptions of human nature.

This helps to take the wind out of the sails of the human-nature critics, but it is not a fully satisfying answer to the ought-question. Human-nature criticisms may be flawed and we all may be human-nature sinners. Yet, this does not lead to the conclusion that we *ought* to make human nature the central concept again in realist international-political theory. The analytical-negative argumentative strategy, therefore, must be complemented by a positive set of arguments in favor of the concept of human nature.

In chapter 5, "Human Nature, the Political, and the Virtues of Freudian Man," I provide such proactive arguments and make the case for Freud. A Freudian conception of human nature helps to solve several problems

associated with contemporary realist international-political theorizing. I provide political realism with a philosophical anthropology that explains and legitimizes the realist Weltanschauung and its analytical and normative claims. I argue that Freud has three virtues for political realism. His conception of human nature helps to demystify its defining themes, principles, and concepts. Freudian Man helps to resolve into their individual-psychological elements many of post-classical realism's anthropomorphological projections and hypostatizations; helps political realists to understand the underlying psychological mechanics of group formation and internal and external group behavior vis-à-vis other political communities. Freud explains the link between human nature and the nature of the political community and offers political realism a powerful statement of the nature and inner workings of the (international) human condition and international relations; and serves as a timeless reminder for realist international-political theorists never to expect too much, but also not too less, from the nature of Man. Freudian Man helps political realists to define both the possibilities and limits of international relations and to maneuver steadfastly between reality and utopia.

Over the course of four chapters, I will have argued that the concept of human nature is not dead in political realism and that Freud has—to varying degrees—influenced the assumptions about human nature of leading classical and post-classical realists. I will have also argued that the concept of human nature ought not to be dead in political realism and that Freud ought to play a major role in the process of retransforming and reconfiguring realist international-political theory along Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian lines. The implications for contemporary political realism as well as contemporary International Relations are manifold.

In chapter 6, "Resurrecting the Realist Man, Freud, and Human Nature," I discuss what I regard as the three main tasks that derive from the fact that not only the Realist Man but also Freud and the concept of human nature have never been really dead and ought never to be really dead. First, we should bring the Realist Man back into political realism and help make it again the philosophical backdrop of realist international-political theorizing. Second, we should bring Freud back into political realism and study further his potential intellectual impact and the virtues of his psychology and social/political philosophy. Finally, we should bring Freud and the concept of human nature back into International Relations. Contemporary International Relations should engage more thoroughly with one of the most intriguing thinkers, both from a historical but also politico-theoretical viewpoint. As regards the concept of human nature, I suggest that we become less dismissive and more sincere and reflective vis-à-vis the concept of human nature in International Relations.

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PART I

Is Human Nature Dead?

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CHAPTER 2

Classical Realism on Human Nature and Freud

Morgenthau's realist international-political theory is based upon a distinctive conception of human nature. Morgenthauian Man is possessed by an *animus dominandi*, a will to power that inclines him to dominate fellow Men. It is neither a perfectible saint nor a Kantian *animal rationabile.* Consequently, Morgenthau warns us of reposing too much faith in Man's moral capacities. With such skepticism toward Man in the social, political, and international-political sphere, Morgenthau placed himself firmly in the realist tradition, which has, despite all its diversity and different degrees of pessimism/optimism, always been genuinely wary of the natural Man. In this regard, Morgenthau can be compared with Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr. They, too, never bought the Rousseauian assumption of the presocietal noble savage. To hit the nail on its head, such "treatment of human nature, reaching back to Thucydides, informs every facet of realist analysis."[1]

Yet the almost symbiotic relationship between political realism and skeptical assumptions about human nature has always provoked criticism. International Relations theorists from the liberal, Marxist, feminist, and postmodern camp have criticized classical realists' conceptions of human nature. Their assumptions about human nature have been denounced as being too universal, fixed, flawed, and too mythical and speculative. One critic argued recently that political realists are biased toward destructive assumptions about human nature, portraying Man as an antisocial, fearful, self-interested, and power-driven animal; that these assumptions are false, because they are scientifically untenable; that political realists' pessimism

about human nature has sinister effects on theory construction and foreign-policy making; and, finally, that these assumptions cause policies of distrust, promote paranoia, increase the probability of international violence, and stifle chances for peaceful coexistence.[2]

But political realists, too, became increasingly wary of Morgenthau's *animus dominandi* or of Niebuhr's Augustinian-style Man. Herz was among the first who argued against a human nature-driven Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian political realism and made clear that

> [w]hether man is "by nature" peaceful and cooperative, or aggressive or domineering, is not the question. The condition that concerns us here is not an anthropological or biological, but a social one. It is his uncertainty and anxiety as to his neighbors' intentions that places man in this basic dilemma, and makes the "homo homini lupus" a primary fact of the social life of man.[3]

Herz's sociostructural reasoning that states are trapped in what he called the "security dilemma" had a profound impact on subsequent generations of predominantly U.S. political realists, particularly on the formulation of structural realism (neorealism) as epitomized by Waltz and Mearsheimer.[4] The notion that the vicious circle of security and power accumulation among states does not stem from an innate urge for power but rather from the social fact that states must provide for their own security in an anarchical environment has allowed these structural realists a comfortable opt-out from the internecine scientific and philosophical debates about whether Man is good or bad, perfectible or improvable, fact or fiction, or naturalistic or socially constructed.

Neoclassical realists have done likewise. Although they have incorporated first- and second-image (intervening) variables, they have remained committed to the third image. Human-nature realists or biological realists, also wary of sociostructural explanations of international politics but skeptical of metaphysical speculations, have turned to biology and the neurosciences to buttress their claims.[5] Human nature-based classical realism had to endure harsh attacks. One critic argued, for instance, that Morgenthau "had some rather unflattering and unsophisticated views of human nature, and an embarrassing habit of parading them as the philosophical basis of Realism."[6] These are damning indictments from both within and without realist international-political theory.

The critics' claims, however, are not always justified. The stakes are high in the controversy surrounding classical realists' assumptions about human nature. Most of these critics not only challenge the underlying assumptions about human nature but also attack the whole body of political realism

that has based its analytical and normative international-political theory on calculations about human nature since its birth in ancient Greece. It is essential to revisit the assumptions about human nature of classical realism. Morgenthau is of prime interest, and this chapter also examines Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr. I will focus on these five classical realists' assumptions about human nature, paying special attention to potentially Freudian elements.

Based on my successive readings of each political realist, this chapter argues that their conceptions of human nature are—to varying degrees—of Freudian provenance or show striking similarities to Freudian psychology. This has profound implications. First, the widespread criticisms from both within and without realist circles against these political realists' assumptions about human nature are misleading. These assumptions are neither unsophisticated theories nor merely metaphysical speculations. Second, this reinterpretation of classical realists' assumptions about human nature helps us to understand that any (re)engagement with these classical realists and/or political realism is necessarily accompanied by the making of a particular set of assumptions about human nature. One cannot take classical realism without its human-nature baggage.

Morgenthau, the animus dominandi, and International Politics

No other classical realist (save Niebuhr) is as outspoken about the intimate relationship between the concept of human nature and realist international-political theory as Morgenthau. In fact, Morgenthau considers human nature to be the philosophical starting point of political realism. His first principle of political realism as laid out in *Politics among Nations* has become both famous and infamous; it states that—to quote again—"[p]olitical realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature."[7] Dividing political theory into two camps, Morgenthau argues that while idealists believe in the "essential goodness" and "infinite malleability" of human nature, political realists presume that the world is "the result of forces inherent in human nature"; he, therefore, warns us that we must not work *against* but always *with* these "forces."[8] Having too much faith in our nature driven by primordial forces is, to use Butterfield's words, not only "a recent heresy" but also "a very disastrous one."[9]

Despite the central role of human nature in political realism, Morgenthau remains vague in *Politics among Nations* regarding his assumptions about human nature. He merely says that Man is driven by "elemental bio-psychological drives," that is, the drives "to live, to propagate,

and to dominate."[10] Further, he makes no direct or overt references to Freud. This is unsatisfactory on two accounts: first, because it does not reflect properly the significance of the concept of human nature vis-à-vis his political realism; second, because it does not reflect the significance of a *Freudian* human nature vis-à-vis Morgenthau's political realism. To remedy these two deficiencies, this section takes a wider focus. In order to receive a fuller picture of Morgenthau's conception of human nature, his *Politics among Nations* must be read alongside Morgenthau's *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, the earlier and neglected 1930 manuscript "On the Derivation of the Political from the Nature of Man" (henceforth: "Freud-Script"), and his Commentary essay "Love and Power." Such a reading reveals the Freudian dimension of Morgenthauian Man.

The most fruitful starting point for studying Morgenthau's Man is *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, his fundamental critique of the prevailing (largely Anglo-American) wisdom of the time and its belief in behavioral scientism, liberal Enlightenment rationalism, pacifism, and a largely optimistic view of human nature.[11] It is in this work where the (in)famous *animus dominandi* appears. Morgenthau argues that Man is not only truly selfish but also possessed by a lust for power. The selfishness refers to the natural concern of human beings to preserve their life. It involves Man's striving and yearning for food, shelter, and physical security. As a result of such selfishness, "individual egotisms, all equally legitimate, confront each other" and Man is, therefore, confronted by a Hobbesian *homo homini lupus* situation.[12] The societal consequences of Man's inclination to selfish behavior may be harsh, but it would be misleading to read some other forms of selfishness into the primordial desire seen by Morgenthau—for instance, to lead a "comfortable life"[13]—because Man is not so much concerned with luxury or any other surplus values but rather with preserving his life. Man is selfish in that he wants: to live.

Morgenthau's assumption that Man is driven by an *animus dominandi* is more complex and more controversial. Even fellow political realists are not convinced by and thus do not believe what they deem as Morgenthau's "simple assumption" that "states are led by human beings who have a 'will to power' hardwired into them at birth."[14] The *animus dominandi* must be distinguished from Man's selfishness; it constitutes an independent motivational force. The will to power "concerns itself not with the individual's survival but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured."[15] The *animus dominandi* inclines Man to the proactive yearning and striving for power. Man lusts for power: that Man is a power-seeker is an "all permeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence."[16]

The *animus dominandi*, however, is neither an unfounded chimera nor an irrelevant ingredient of Morgenthau's political realism. Instead, as I shall argue, it is central and represents one manifestation of Freud's *Eros* instinct. This interpretation takes its starting point in the 1930 "Freud-Script," Morgenthau's unpublished attempt to derive the nature of the Political from a Freudian human nature. Largely unknown and presently only available in an archival German version, the 100-page script was written by the young Morgenthau while still in Frankfurt in 1930, in his formative years between his doctorate and *Habilitation*.[17] Despite Morgenthau's autobiographical claim that this script is unsatisfactory, it is important because Morgenthau reused it in *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*.[18] The labels changed, but the basic (Freudian) assumptions about Man remain largely the same.

In the "Freud-Script," Morgenthau suggests that Man is driven by two instincts: the instincts of self-preservation and self-assertion. This instinct dualism corresponds to that of *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* that refers to an instinct of selfishness and an *animus dominandi* respectively. The instinct of self-preservation is rather straightforward; it describes Man's longing for physical survival. This primordial desire to live (avoiding death) is self-centered or inward-driven (though it has, obviously, social consequences). The instinct of self-assertion, by contrast, is outward-driven. It directs itself to others, to fellow Men. It urges Man to demonstrate his abilities and powers. By nature, Man seeks to assert himself by whatever means at his disposal ranging from impressing the other sex, expressing himself and impressing others through arts and sciences, participating in sports contests and any other physical and cognitive competition, to heroism. For only by these means can Man recognize his place in the cosmos among fellow Men, can he truly experience and feel what it means to live.[19]

This instinct dualism distinguishing between instincts of self-preservation and self-assertion follow the early instinct theory of Freud that assumes the existence of an ego-instinct and sexual-instinct. Morgenthau's instinct of self-preservation follows Freud's ego-instinct. Both represent Man's primordial desire for physical survival. Morgenthau's instinct of self-assertion follows what Freud called the sexual-instinct. Not confined to the reproductive organs but presupposing a Platonic notion of love, this instinct directs itself toward other humans or other objects. Freud referred to the ego-instinct and sexual-instinct as hunger and love respectively: "I took as my starting-point a saying of poet-philosopher, Schiller, that 'hunger and love are what moves the world.'"[20] Morgenthau follows Freud when he writes,

> If the striving for the preservation of one's life [instinct of self-preservation] arises from a deficiency, it is, figuratively speaking, a child of hunger—it

seeks to compensate for a lack of energy. Analogously, the effort to make good a surplus of energy seeking a release finds, again speaking meta-phorically, in love one of its most characteristic expressions. The appearance of love corresponds both in the narrower physiological sense as well as in the more comprehensive meaning of *Eros* to the striving to prove oneself [instinct of self-assertion].[21]

That Morgenthauian Man's instincts of self-preservation and self-assertion follow Freud's early instinct theory suggests that Morgenthau's instinct theory of *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* distinguishing between the primordial inclination to selfishness and the *animus dominandi*, too, has roots in Freudian psychology. For, as shown, Morgenthau kept his instinct theory largely intact between the "Freud-Script" and *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, changing merely the labels. Whether Morgenthau calls it instinct of self-preservation or selfishness, the primordial desire to live stems, ultimately, from Freud's ego-instinct.

The *animus dominandi* seems equally Freudian, deriving from Freud's sexual-instinct. In the "Freud-Script," Morgenthau follows Freud in stating that the objects in which the instinct of self-assertion can find gratification are manifold. Here, he adopts from Freud the possibility for the instinct to direct itself toward various objects.[22] This object-based character of how instincts can find gratification as well as the deeply social nature of both Freud's sexual-instinct and Morgenthau's *animus dominandi* help us to shed light on the Freudian dimension of the *animus dominandi*. In line with political realism's ancient emphasis on human irrationalities as power, honor, and glory, Morgenthau emphasizes Man's desire to dominate fellow Men. For the act of dominating fellow Men brings Man the maximum of instinctual satisfaction.[23] This, of course, implies that Man requires and is reliant on the existence of social relationships. For isolated Man would not be able to find the objects necessary for the much needed instinctual gratification—who to impress and dominate in the solitary existence of the Rousseauian noble savage? The *animus dominandi*, therefore, is perhaps best seen as one of the most important manifestations or outlets of the instinct of self-assertion. This, however, makes the *animus dominandi*—because the instinct of self-assertion has already been identified as Freudian—an important manifestation or outlet of Freud's sexual-instinct. Not only is the desire to live (selfishness, instinct of self-preservation) of Freudian provenance, but also Morgenthau's (in)famous *animus dominandi* (instinct of self-assertion) has roots in Freud's early instinct theory. That Morgenthau's conception of human nature seems influenced by Freud's theory of Man is significant in its own right. Such intellectual relationship has long been suspected but

never really understood and it improves our understanding of the intellectual substructure of Morgenthau's political realism.

Even more importantly, however, it improves, as shown above, our understanding of Morgenthauian Man in *Politics among Nations* and the psychological mechanics and dynamics that change the *animus dominandi* into some sort of collective *animus dominandi,* which, in turn, drives political communities into often tragic situations vis-à-vis others. In *Politics among Nations*, Morgenthau mentions neither instincts of self-preservation and self-assertion, nor Man's selfishness and the *animus dominandi.* This seems confusing; for he refers to three biopsychological drives: to live, to propagate, and to dominate. This confusion, however, can be remedied. The new language signifies more a change in rhetoric rather than substance. What Morgenthau now calls the drive to live is merely another label for the instinct of self-preservation or Man's selfishness. It designates Freud's ego-instinct that seeks to embrace and prolong life. Likewise, the drives to propagate and to dominate—the *animus dominandi* by another name—are manifestations of Freud's sexual-instinct or *Eros.*[24]

Morgenthau's *animus dominandi* is not so much a child of God, of the devil, or of any other myth. Rather, Man's longing for power and assertion is a child of Freud's *Eros.* This may seem odd, for why should seeking power be related to *Eros* or love. But it is, if we recognize the transcendent meaning of *Eros.* As Freud showed, *Eros* seeks to "combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind."[25] But what may sound like a brotherhood of humankind has a darker element to it: namely, Man's yearning for power. Power is intimately connected with *Eros* as Man's desire to gratify the sexual-instinct, which goes hand in hand with Man's "urge for mastery," for power is but a "primitive form of striving for . . . the sexual object."[26] In short, *Eros* dictates to unite and power is its means.

Morgenthau agrees with Freud. In "Love and Power," Morgenthau argues that "power and love are organically connected."[27] Both drives share an essentially similar aim: to combine human individuals into relationships, to incline Man to enter relationships with his fellows. The difference between these two pertains to the means. Love seeks these relationships through "spontaneous mutuality," but power seeks to combine fellow Men via "unilateral imposition."[28] To paraphrase Clausewitz, the *animus dominandi* is the continuation of Man's longing for love by other means. But although both love and power long for uniting Man with other Men, human unions based solely upon power or unilateral imposition are of different depth and quality compared to those based upon love or spontaneous mutuality. The former are flawed and unstable and are not more

than a primitive master-servant relationship. Ideally, Morgenthau argues, the "power of the master is founded not upon the master's threats and promises but upon the subject's love for the master."[29] Since this, however, is hardly achievable, Man, by birth a potential master, seeks to compensate for the lack of the potential subjects' love for him by an accumulation of ever-increasing power. Man's yearning for power after power over fellow Men, of course, never secures him love in the sense of *Eros*. And, not securing love or being loved, Man is destined to frustration.

Arguing on the basis of such Freudian instinctual configuration, Morgenthau says that ultimately any search for power is a "fruitless search for love," and any relationship of power is a "frustrated relationship of love."[30] Surely, that Morgenthau presumes the existence of an *animus dominandi* does not make him a human-nature optimist. For the yearning for power—the "probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance"[31]—is not a reassuring character trait, particularly not when it is of primordial nature. But we must not gloss over the fact that Morgenthau's understanding of power and the *animus dominandi* is intimately intertwined with Man's longing for love, because it is exactly this perhaps paradoxical inner relationship that makes the *animus dominandi* such a central, puzzling, and lasting element of the human condition. Even if it was possible to eradicate the security concerns that derive from Morgenthauian Man's instinct of self-preservation or selfishness, the longing for power, a longing for love (*Eros*), would not be affected by changing social, economic, and political circumstances. In this light, then, Morgenthau's *animus dominandi* is neither metaphysical, embarrassing, nor the product of some form of inherent violence or pure self-interest; instead, the will to power derives from Man's social nature. Just as power cannot be dissociated from love and *Eros*, Morgenthau's instinct theory of *Politics among Nations* distinguishing between three biopsychological drives (live, propagate, and dominate) should be seen against the backdrop of Freud's early instinct theory distinguishing between an ego-instinct and a sexual-instinct (*Eros*).

The question is, then, how these Freudian assumptions play out in Morgenthau's political realism of *Politics among Nations.* Morgenthau argues that "international politics…is a struggle for power."[32] Political communities, he says, usually follow three ideal-typical policies. They seek either to keep power (status quo), to increase power (imperialism), or to demonstrate power (prestige). And, irrespective of which policy is pursued, the power struggle among nations, as it roots, ultimately, in the nature of Man, particularly in the *animus dominandi*, is "universal in time and space."[33] Unfortunately, however, Morgenthau's argument regarding how

the power-seeking nature of political communities derive from the power-seeking nature of Man is often misunderstood, partly because the Freudian dimension of Morgenthau's Man is overlooked. His reasoning, as is now argued, is actually fairly straightforward; he proceeds in, essentially, two steps. First, with Freud, Morgenthau recognizes one of the most profound facts of the human condition, the inherent antagonism between Man and society. And, second, following Freud's defense mechanisms of displacement and identification, Morgenthau translates Man's *animus dominandi* into the thirst for power of political communities.

Morgenthau recognizes that Man must pay a heavy price for gratifying his instinctual desire to enter social relationships. Groups, political communities, or civilizations (as Freud says) require from Man that he foregoes the psyche's biological, economical, and structural yearning for instinctual satisfaction. Man cannot do, act, or behave as he wishes, for the societal constraints are too great. Morgenthauian Man is confronted with a "network of rules of conduct and institutional devices for controlling individual power drives" that either "divert individual power drives into channels where they cannot endanger society" or "they weaken them or suppress them altogether."[34] The consequences are harsh. These societal devices (laws, cultural norms) force Man to suppress his power drives; they work against the laws of human nature: Man cannot satisfy his instincts. Man, however, is capable of seeking other channels in which he may find instinctual gratification. Man may project those unsatisfied instincts onto competitive examinations, sports contests, social clubs, fraternal organizations, and so forth.[35]

With this, Morgenthau follows Freud's argument put forth in *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Freud argued that there exists an irreconcilable and inherent antagonism between the demands of Man's pleasure principle for instinct gratification and society's inherent repressive and overarching demands for instinct renunciation.[36] Man is trapped in a dilemma. He longs for instinct satisfaction, but *Eros* demands love and the uniting with fellow Men that requires at least a minimum compliance with social norms. Morgenthau also agrees with Freud that Man is to a large degree an antisocial and anticultural being, a view based on the inherent instinctual incompatibility between Man and civilization. Man is not so much a purely self-interested, *homo-oeconomicus*–style rational machine that seeks to maximize its own share of material gains and utility, but his instinctual dynamics are not wholly compatible with societal requirements. This profound antagonism between Man and civilization, however, bears quite heavily upon the international struggle for power, peace, and prestige. And in order to make this argumentative connection between human nature and the domestic as well as the international domain, Morgenthau continues

using Freudian insights, recognizing this profoundly antagonistic character of the human condition and also referring to "channels" into which Man's unsatisfied instincts may be diverted; in this regard, Morgenthau follows two Freudian defense mechanisms (displacement and identification) that, in turn, presuppose Freud's tripartite structural theory of the psyche.

As laid out in *The Ego and the Id*, Freud presumes that Man's mental apparatus must be seen in terms of various structural-instinctual dynamics played out by three agents. The unconscious id follows the unpleasure-pleasure principle; it contains Man's instincts. The super-ego is Man's conscience and contains internalized norms shaped by parental and societal prohibitions; it follows the morality principle and punishes Man through guilt in cases of noncompliance with its demands. The id is in perennial conflict with the super-ego. To keep these two powerful forces in a healthy balance, the conscious ego (reality principle) brokers between the demands of the instinctual id and the societal super-ego, employing a variety of defense mechanisms such as repression, displacement, denial, projection, reaction formation, intellectualization, rationalization, and sublimation. Through these defense mechanisms, the ego aims at reducing the tensions caused by instinct suppression.[37] Thus, when Morgenthau suggests "channels" into which Man's unsatisfied instincts can be diverted, he adopts Freud's structural theory of the psyche and the theory of defense mechanisms. More specifically, Morgenthau uses displacement, a defense mechanism that allows Man to redirect those id-impulses that clash with societal norms toward outlets that conform with the super-ego.

To link, however, Man's *animus dominandi* to the power drives of political communities, Morgenthau must make use of another of Freud's defense mechanisms: identification. Morgenthau suggests several channels in which the *animus dominandi* may find gratification, including sports, arts, and science. But he singles out the sphere beyond the political community's boundary, the international. Since Man can hardly satisfy his instincts within society, Men "project those unsatisfied aspirations onto the international scene," for there, Morgenthau argues, they "find vicarious satisfaction in identification with the power drives of the nation"; as, he continues, the "power our representatives wield on the international scene becomes our own, and the frustrations we experience within the national community are compensated for by the vicarious enjoyment of the power of the nation."[38] What Morgenthau refers to as "frustrations" and presents as one of the cornerstones of his political realism—namely, the rooting of the power-drive of political communities in the *animus dominandi* of Men—is, then, Freudian reasoning stemming from a psychoanalytic conception of human nature.

Freud argues that members of groups such as families, castes, states, nations, or any other social-institutional regime can never act according to and comply with the imperatives of the pleasure principle. But in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Freud shows Man's solution to this eternal dilemma: namely, identification, that is, unifying with the object of pleasure or the subject capable of acting out the suppressed instincts. What is forbidden by societal norms and cultural values for individual Man may be pursued *as* political community or by its representatives. For there are virtually no societal restrictions on the international sphere, as international law and shared international morality are rather weak constraints. Since Man cannot but long for instinctual satisfaction, Freud unearths the psychological processes by which Man identifies himself with the group-leader (the powerful statesman) in order to overcome his frustrations and partake in the power, prestige, and glory that the nation and its leader wield in the international sphere. Via the process of identification, Man receives a share in the power of the nation and becomes powerful himself, thereby finding compensation for the lack of instinctual satisfaction within the society. The ego brokers the seemingly perfect (but potentially dangerous) arrangement between the instinctual id and the societal super-ego: Man represses his instincts domestically and acts them out internationally.

It is, then, against such a background of predominantly Freudian assumptions about human nature that Morgenthau sees international relations taking place. These instinctual dynamics help explain the broader patterns of international politics, which are but the manifestations of what Morgenthau calls the objective laws that have their roots in human nature. One of the most central parts of these laws is the inherent antagonism between Man and civilization. It is these instinctual dynamics, taken together with historical circumstances, that provide, as Morgenthau writes, the "explanation for the increasing ferocity with which foreign policies are pursued in modern time"; he continues with his (broadly Freudian) line of argument worth quoting at length:

> The growing insecurity of the individual in Western societies, especially in the lower strata, and the atomization of Western society in general have magnified enormously the frustration of individual power drives. This, in turn, has given rise to an increased desire for compensatory identification with the collective national aspirations for power.[39]

Thus, in line with Freud, Morgenthau's realist international-political theory repeats one of the core tenets of all genuine political realisms: that all social and political phenomena can, ultimately, be traced back to the nature of Man.

Surely, Freud is not the single intellectual influence upon Morgenthau's political realism. But Freudian elements are there. And my interpretation that central claims of Morgenthau's realist international-political theory root in Freudian assumptions about human nature is perhaps strengthened by a brief look at Morgenthau's academic biography. Morgenthau had close links to Freud-friendly intellectual circles throughout his life. Early in his career, Morgenthau worked with social-democratic lawyer Hugo Sinzheimer in the progressive, liberal-minded Frankfurt. There, Freudian psychoanalysis was in high regard among the left-leaning intellectuals, particularly the members of the Frankfurt School-inspired Institute for Social Research.[40] After Frankfurt, he went (fled) to Geneva. There, Morgenthau was influenced by social-democratic lawyer and legal philosopher Hans Kelsen from whom he obtained his *Habilitation.* Kelsen, who had personal and intellectual ties to Freud, become his lifelong mentor. And, later in life, already in New York, Morgenthau became friend and mentor of psychoanalyst Ethel Spector Person, who taught him, as Morgenthau's colleague John Stoessinger remembers, "a great deal about Sigmund Freud and those who stood upon his shoulders."[41] Freud's theory of human nature, it looks, accompanied Morgenthau throughout his intellectual life.

Kennan, the Cracked Vessel, and Nationalism

Kennan's realist international-political theory is based upon two core elements: the forces of nationalism and human nature. International conflicts are mainly the product of nationalist sentiments among political communities; and these sentiments are mainly driven by group psychological processes that root in the nature of Man. Kennan toyed with psychoanalysis throughout his life. In 1942, he lectured American officials in Germany proposing to "psychoanalyze" the Soviet Union; and two years later, he sought out Freud's daughter, Anna, in London.[42] Kennan's preoccupation with psychoanalysis seems to have had a lasting impact on how he conceptualized human nature, which have striking similarities to Freud's.

As classical realist, Kennan knew that international-political theory requires a theory of human nature as its starting point.[43] Kennan's Man is a "cracked vessel" that is driven by two primary impulses and that is entangled in profound and existential struggles on two fronts: both within his own self and vis-à-vis other Men. As Kennan writes, "Man, to the degree that he tries to shape his behavior to the requirements of civilisation, is unquestionably a cracked vessel. His nature is the scene of a never-ending and never quite resolvable conflict between two very profound impulses."[44] This description of Man being a "cracked vessel" signifies an intellectual proximity to

Freudian-style assumptions about human nature. Indeed, intellectual links between Kennan and his "cracked vessel" and Freud and his psychoanalytic Man can be established, albeit without raising the point too far; for it is not argued that Kennan's Man is Freudian Man or that Freud was a direct and/ or the sole intellectual influence upon Kennan.

Like Freud, Kennan recognizes and identifies Man's profound discomfort as member of civilized society or political community. Kennan emphasizes this essential fact of the human condition throughout his discussion of human nature. The "psychic makeup" of the cracked vessel, he argues, is

> the scene for the interplay of contradictions between the primitive nature of his innate impulses and the more refined demands of civilized life, contradictions that destroy the unity and integrity of his undertakings, confuse his efforts, place limits on his possibilities for achievement, and often cause one part of his personality to be the enemy of another.[45]

Here, he is in broad agreement with Freud's sociophilosophical argument that Man's impulses are irreconcilable with civilization.[46] Man is confronted, to use Kennan's words, with the profound conflict "between what the individual actually is and what the interests of civilization would ideally require him to be."[47] This antagonism, however, would not exist and remain to be irreconcilable if Man was not driven by two conflicting impulses that drag him in two different directions. On the one hand, Kennan's Man is driven by the need to preserve himself and by "self-regard, self-love, egotism, or whatever one wishes to call it."[48] But, on the other hand, Man is a compassionate "social animal" that wishes to comply with societal demands.[49] Such is Kennan's conception of Man's instinctual structure; and regardless of whether Kennan was inspired directly by Freud, the similarities between Kennan's "cracked vessel" and Freud's early instinct theory are striking.

Based on that instinctual structuring of Man, however, Kennan is, just as Freud was, deeply aware of the dilemma that neither the pure renunciation nor the pure gratification of the instincts is feasible and desirable. But Kennan also recognizes that some "people do better or worse in contending" with these contradicting instinctual demands.[50] In Freudian terms, Kennan means—thereby perhaps implicitly adopting Freud's structural theory of the psyche—that some Men balance more effectively the demands of the unconscious id vis-à-vis the demands of the semiunconscious super-ego than other Men, but that, ultimately, we all do make use of defense mechanisms. Yet unconscious motivations always lurk in the back of the psyche; and to those Men who think their egos are

(apparently) balancing the instinctual demands well, Kennan delivers a warning message:

> One would do well not to be too easily mislead by those impressive displays of a total personal autonomy. There are few who have not, at one time or another, had to do battle with the little troublemaker[s]; and if there is at the moment no outward evidence of its being a factor in their lives, don't worry: you may be sure it has been there in the past, or soon will be.[51]

Like Freud, Kennan recognizes that Man must permanently and prudently reckon and grapple with the amazing depths of his soul, the battleground for conflictual instincts and impulses—this not only for individual-psychological reasons or concerns of inner well-being, but also because virtually all social and (international-)political phenomena have, ultimately, their origins in Man's dualistic instinctual makeup. This includes one of the most powerful forces and profound problems of international relations: nationalism.

For Kennan, as for all classical realists and Freud, the force of nationalism, one of the most constitutive problems of international relations exacerbating the us/them *problématique,* roots not so much in sociostructuralist laws but in laws of human nature. Kennan argues that nationalist sentiments are the consequent and powerful forces of a "universal need for people to feel themselves a part of something larger than themselves, and larger than just the family."[52] The universal need to affiliate with fellow Men and to be a member of a group or political community is a "natural need."[53] Kennan's Man is a deeply social animal, a Man perhaps be described as some sort of Aristotelian *zoon politikon* with a Freudian spin.

First, even though the family constitutes Man's initial and primary social group, the aim of Man's instinctual configuration is that it (*Eros*) seeks to combine individuals into ever larger units.[54] Second, this drive to affiliate is like a natural program inbuilt into human nature in that Man's inclination and disposition to group formation is an "inherited deposit from the phylogenesis of the human libido."[55] And, third, Kennan seems to share the group psychological views of Freud that emphasize the impact of inner-group identification processes on the internal and external behavior of groups and political communities.[56] To Kennan, nationalism is "the greatest emotional-political force of the age."[57] But he does not consider all forms of nationalisms as equally problematic. Kennan distinguishes two forms: patriotism versus romantic nationalism. Although both are rooted in Man's social nature, it is only the latter that constitutes a "pathological form" of nationalism, a "mass emotional exaltation to which millions of people…appear to be highly susceptible."[58]

The reason why Man is highly susceptible to aggressive forms of nationalism roots in Man's dualistic instinctual structure. Its source is, ultimately, in Man's tension-ridden inclination to self-regard or self-love and in his social predispositions to affiliate with fellow Men. The perennial conflict of antagonistic drives within Man's self finds its outlet on the international scene by Freudian-style mass processes of "collective self-identification" within political communities.[59] Frustrated by his impotence, Man is capable of establishing and fuelling his self-regard by being/becoming a member of a nation. It is the nation that provides him with the necessary "reassurance as to his own worth"; in addition, by receiving a share of, and indulging in, the glory of the nation to which Man has become emotionally attached Man can compensate for his frustrations and also satisfy his natural need to affiliate with other Men.[60]

Against the background of such a conception of the nature of Man, Kennan formulated the profound skepticism vis-à-vis two political projects. The first concerns the role of the state. Kennan argues that the idea of the abolishment or retreat of the state—or any other Weberian-style form of political community—pertains to wishful thinking rather than to a realist(ic) assessment of the human condition and international-political life. Though he shares the hope that "these exaggerated concepts of national dignity and these excesses of collective self-admiration decline" in the not too distant future, the state will, Kennan argues, remain the "central entity" around which the struggle for power and peace takes place.[61] Kennan's second skepticism, which also comes directly from his assumptions about human nature, concerns Marxist political theory. Its philosophical and practical attempts that call for a major overhaul of the international-political status quo seem ill-founded to Kennan, for Marxists do not recognize that "a measure of tragedy is built into the very existence of the human individual" and that this "is not to be overcome by even the most drastic human interventions into the economic or social relationships among individuals."[62] On that point, Kennan also agrees with Freud, who argued against Marxism on many occasions.[63] Freud once confessed that he was a half-Bolshevist: a patient told him that the Bolshevist revolution would initially bring chaos and misery but then an ever-lasting period of universal peace and prosperity—to which Freud replied dryly that he "believed the first half."[64] More seriously, like Kennan (and so many other classicals), Freud derived such skepticism from the nature of Man and argued that

> the *psychological* premises on which the system is based are an *untenable illusion*. In abolishing private property we deprive the human love of aggression of one of its instruments, certainly a strong one, though

certainly not the strongest; but we have in no way altered the differences in power and influence which are misused by aggressiveness, nor have we altered anything in its *nature*. Aggressiveness was not created by property.[65]

Kennan's "cracked vessel" constitutes a rich and well-constructed conception of Man, which is a statement about the human condition, and shares many similarities with Freudian Man. This distinguishes Kennan from the post-classicals who, though often obsessed with philosophy of science and quantitative-statistical analyses of international politics, still see Kennan as one of their intellectual realist forefathers. But such implication is misleading, for Kennan, like the other classicals, approached international relations rather differently.

This can also be seen when looking at one of the most controversial yet important foreign-policy documents of the twentieth century—the famous Mr. X article based on Kennan's long telegram, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct"—in which Kennan argues for the political strategy of containment vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. There, Kennan derives his policy-strategic conclusion from rather different yet perhaps more revealing and fruitful theoretical premises. Rather than having purely focused on changing structures in the international system, Kennan draws from earlier results that derived from his attempts to psychoanalyze the political personality of the Soviet Union. Applying Freudian developmental psychology to the Soviet Union, Kennan explored the "childhood of the Russian people," the phase of "adolescent Russia," identified its regression, and diagnosed that the Soviet Union and its government suffered from a profound "mental pathology."[66] Kennan complements this result with another psychoanalytical theory. He argues that the Russian revolutionary movements "found in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalisation for their own instinctive desires" that include the "yearning for power," a "phenomenon as old as human nature itself."[67] Based on his (psycho)analysis of the Soviet Union, Kennan argues that too much faith in negotiations is unwarranted and that the U.S. government should implement a policy of firm containment.

That Kennan's realist international-political theory is, ultimately, based on Freudian-style assumptions about human nature is, unfortunately, often overlooked.

Lippmann, Infantilism, and International Irrationalities

Lippmann had personal and intellectual links to Freud. He met Freud at a meeting of the Psychoanalytic Society in Vienna; and he was fascinated by

him. As Lippmann wrote, "I cannot help feeling that for his illumination, for his steadiness and brilliancy of mind, he may rank among the greatest who have contributed to thought."[68] This fascination led to Lippmann's path-breaking *Preface to Politics* and it reached such dimensions that Harold Laski once lamented that he wished that "Walter Lippmann would forget Freud for a little, just a little."[69] But Lippmann did not forget Freud. Rather, together with Lasswell, he became one of the prime importers of Freud to American political theory.

Lippmann emphasizes the significance of human nature in international relations throughout his work. His realist international-political theory, too, is based upon two core elements: nationalism and Man. International conflicts are driven by nationalist sentiments; and these explosive sentiments Man holds in favor of his own political community and in inverse sympathy vis-à-vis others are driven by the laws of group psychology that, in turn, roots in human nature.[70] Lippmann's assumptions about human nature resemble Freud's Man. Lippmann's Man is driven by primary impulses yearning for pleasure and instinctual satisfaction. These immature drives lead to intraindividual and interindividual conflicts. Each Man is the psychological battleground of his own antagonistic drives. And, on a societal level, too, the rivaling and profoundly antagonistic instinctual demands interact with the instinctual demands of fellow Men. This allows for cooperation but also causes conflict. The nature of Man, Lippmann writes, is "a rather shocking affair if you come to it with ordinary romantic optimism" and Lippmann, therefore, urges us to come to terms with human nature as it is, not as we wish our nature to be.[71] In this regard, Lippmann's *Preface to Politics* is intended as a wake-up call for the political class to initiate a major overhaul of human regimes and political institutions. These reforms must not be based upon idealistic-romantic conceptions, Lippmann argues, but on brute facts about Man. Lippmann, it seems, derives these facts from Freud. He acknowledges that "The impetus of Freud is perhaps the greatest advance ever made towards the understanding and control of human character."[72]

Against this background, Lippmann faults the "taboo philosophers" on two accounts. First, that they have considered the drives of Man as essentially evil; and, second, that they have permanently and relentlessly sought to outlaw the lusts by which Man is driven. In the wake of his Freudian leanings, Lippmann disagrees and argues, instead, that "the energies of the soul" are "neither good nor bad themselves"; rather than "tabooing our impulses, we must redirect them"; rather than "trying to crush badness," he argues, "we must turn the power behind it to good account."[73] Here, Lippmann follows Freud's sociophilosophical argument of an inherent and profound

antagonism between Man and society, and Freud's concept of sublimation, a defense mechanism that allows Man to transform "evil" instincts into "approved" forms of behavior. Man is capable of becoming ever more-and-more liberated from the instinctual demands placed upon him. In *Preface to Morals*, Lippmann argues that Man must continually attempt to become as liberated as possible from his passions. Success or failure in this struggle against his own instincts will determine whether Man will lead a good humanistic life.

The critical phase in that struggle, Lippmann argues, thereby agreeing with Freud, is "the passage from childhood to maturity."[74] Infantile Man, he writes, does merely as he pleases. But mature Man is capable of revising most, if not all, of his "desires in the light of an understanding of reality."[75] It, therefore, is a prime goal to develop successfully from infantile to mature Man. Man must yearn to reach full maturity where, in Freudian terms, the reality principle replaces the pleasure principle and where reason provides a healthy balance between personal desires and societal demands. This psychoanalytic developmental perspective of Man, which underlies much of Lippmann's political realism, derives from his reading of Freud and Sandor Ferenczi.[76] Several psychological concepts Lippmann uses in his works relate back to Freud's theory of the unconscious as laid out in *Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud's groundwork Lippmann studied carefully and whose impact he compared with Darwin's *Origin of Species*.[77]

From these Freudian assumptions about human nature, Lippmann deduces the origins of nationalism, how these sentiments arise in political communities, how, and in what disguises, they are acted out. Nationalism, Lippmann argues, roots in the instinctual configuration of Man and represents one of their most basic outlets. From an etymological viewpoint, nationality derives from *natio*, birth. Without being apologetic, though, Lippmann emphasizes that one's nationality means much more to Man than a sober-minded legal-technical acknowledgment of citizenship. Nationality means more than holding this or that passport. Instead, Lippmann argues, nationality signifies and represents the first loyalties, profound impressions, and earliest associations of Men. Nationality and national sentiments are, as Lippmann writes,

> a cluster of primitive feelings, absorbed into a man and rooted within him long before conscious education begins. The house, the street, the meadow and hill upon which he first opened his eyes the reactions to family and strangers which remain as types of his loves and hates, the earliest sounds which brought fear and pleasure—these are the stuff out of which nationality is made.[78]

That Men hold such irrational feelings toward their nation that they indulge in such national sentiments, that nationality is such a powerful force, is but a mirror image of Men's instinctual struggles. It is such grounding of these national sentiments that makes them such a powerful force in the relations among political communities, whether they be tribes, states, nations, or empires. "This union with the sources of one's birth is," Lippmann argues, "the most powerful factor in all politics."[79] For Men's nationality and sensibility or emotionality toward their own political community comes more or less directly from the "deepest sources" and is the "essence of our being which defines us against the background of the world."[80]

Lippmann uses Freud's early instinct theory and the concept of identification. When Lippmann argues that nationalistic or patriotic sentiments represent nothing but Men's primordial "desire to have, to hold, to increase, to fortify whatever can be identified with our earliest hates and loves," he seems to suggest that nationalism and patriotism are merely outlets that help gratifying the sexual-instinct allowing Men to satisfy their infantile desires.[81] Part of these infantile desires is omnipotence, and by means of identifying with others, particularly with large groups and their leaders, the mass of Men are capable of realizing their desires. For Man "feels instinctively that his own importance is associated with the importance of his group"; or more succinctly, "if the nationality to which we belong is honored, we feel honored."[82] In their most intense forms, feelings of nationality are even capable of transforming a "group of people into one super-person" where "the group lives" and where individual Man is "lost in its greater glory."[83] Indulging in nationalist and patriotic sentiments toward Man's own and vis-à-vis other political communities, however, provides not only the necessary instinctual satisfaction required by Man's sexual-instinct, but also that of the ego-instinct longing for self-preservation. The sensations and symbolisms of nationalism and patriotism provide Man with some of the enjoyments of his early infancy, namely, feelings of omnipotence, but also with one very profound and primordial desire: security. As Lippmann writes in Freudian vein, "we love the security where we were born."[84] Nationalist and patriotic sentiments provide security helping to satisfy Man's survival instinct.

Lippmann, for the same reasons as Morgenthau and Kennan, warns of nationalism as one of the most powerful forces in international relations. We are being confronted with group psychological forces that have, ultimately, their roots in the nature of Man stemming from an antagonistic instinctual makeup that leaves Man torn apart between his instinctual demands and the requirements of civilization. Nationalism represents one of the most primitive and widespread outlets causing eternal tragedies in international relations.

The discussion of international trade by Lippmann confirms this. It further demonstrates how Lippmann's realist international-political theory has been shaped by Freudian assumptions. Lippmann argues—a point worth remembering today—that it is futile trying to neatly disentangle economic interests from patriotic or nationalistic sentiments. Contra the *homo-oeconomicus* hypothesis, Man is not a one-dimensional actor driven by purely self-interested and economic motives but rather a multicontoured human being whose wants and needs are merely transformed (sublimated) infantile desires. As Lippmann writes, "the doll house turns into a suburban villa, the dolls are the babies, the leader of the gang becomes president of the chamber of commerce."[85]

Business and trade, nationally and internationally, must, therefore, according to Lippmann, be seen in a different light. Both economic activities are intimately connected with the deepest (irrational) desires of Man. Consequently, international business and trade issues are intrinsically intertwined with matters of national prestige, with mass sentiments rooting in the instinctual structures of Man. International trade and (inter)national prestige motives reinforce each other; and the "export of bicycles or steel rails is no longer the cold-blooded thing it looks like in statistical reports of commerce."[86] Surely, trade does serve economic and material interests, but it serves instinctual interests, too. It is the latter element that is the cause of so much of the problems on the international sphere. For the inherent emotionalization of international commerce means that "when trade is attacked, we are attacked" and that matters of international trade are, therefore, often turning into some sort of "sporting event with loaded weapons."[87] Allegedly purely materialistic, international commerce and forms of economic patriotisms quite easily transform into an aggressive nationalism, particularly in times of crises during which we can usually witness "a swift retreat into our [instinctual] origins."[88]

Lippmann's warning seems as trivial as profound and, in any case, timeless. National sentiments cause distrust and hate vis-à-vis "them" beyond the borders. "Them" are portrayed and seen as potential enemies of "us," of one's own national identity. And the nature and roots of nationalism accentuate aggressive foreign policies, which must, by all means, be prevented.

These sentiments, emotions, irrationalities often lead to conflicts, crises, and wars. When it comes to crises, Lippmann warns, in a passage similar to Freud's argument in "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death," that Man's loyalty to his nation is so deep, strong, and powerful that it seems to "survive the breakage of everything else."[89] When his nation is under pressure or attack, Man feels emotionally and physically insecure,

his life endangered; and he reacts to this existential threat by virtually "disintegrat[ing] into an animal."[90] Yet even if there are no existential physical threats, international relations are plagued by instability and conflicts. For since international trade issues are intrinsically intertwined with patriotic and nationalistic sentiments, "specific disputes over specific trade opportunities become the testing points of national pride."[91] By all means should contemporary international-political theorists and foreign-policy makers, therefore, not lose sight of Lippmann's timeless warning that just as we are often (irrationally) prepared to fight emotionally and financially costly lawsuits for rather trivial sums of money, international relations remains the realm where we are faced with actors that "will risk war to score a diplomatic victory."[92]

That political communities broadly follow such behavioral patterns and that, Lippmann's classical realism, like that of Morgenthau and Kennan, roots in profound Freudian-style assumptions about human nature, should not be forgotten in a post-classical era, where international actors often are considered black-boxes or billiard balls.

Carr, Human Nature, and Freud

Carr is a very interesting case when it comes to the question of (potentially Freudian-style) assumptions about human nature. For it is the widely held view that Carr's fascinating and peculiar realist international-political theory has no underlying conception of human nature, be it Freudian or of any other kind.[93] A Carr without human nature, however, is hardly conceivable. Surely, he knew all too well that the study of international relations requires its own concepts and methodologies; and he did not "conceive it to be any part of the function of the Wilson Professor to…practise psycho-analysis," though he did not doubt that Freud had "profoundly influenced modern thought" or "deny that…psychological maladjustments…are contributory causes of war."[94] But this does not imply that his political realism is not based on assumptions about human nature.

Like that of other classicals, Carr's realist international-political theory, too, is based upon a conception of Man. In the early pages of his classic *Twenty Years' Crisis,* he has already pointed to a major reason why utopians have failed: because they have made "unverified assumptions about human behaviour."[95] This, of course, does not reveal much about his assumptions, but his disagreement with utopians suggests that Carr does hold (strong) views about the nature of Man. And, given his version of political realism, it seems not too speculative that Carr used a theory of human nature that would correspond to, and allow for, the politico-theoretical and practical

balancing of utopia and reality. Further, Carr's Man may bear traces of Freud. Although his biography says little about any thorough links to Freud, we know that the young Carr "had read Freud" and that "this had had a dramatic effect on his awareness of the subconscious world."[96] And this obviously led Carr to acknowledge and defend Freud.

Carr mentions Freud only once in the *Twenty Year's Crisis,* quoting from Freud's *Moses and Monotheism.*[97] But, elsewhere, he overtly acknowledged Freud's significance for Western thought. Though he warned his contemporaries not to take everything that Freud wrote as "gospel,"[98] he recognizes Freud's achievements: like Marx, Freud, the "great thinker," has "added a fresh dimension to reason"; like Darwin, Freud "helped to mould the climate of political opinion."[99] Carr agrees that Freud changed "the way in which we look at the world."[100] In his classic Trevelyan lectures, Carr singles out two major impacts. The first concerns our need for greater reflexivity in the academia. From Freud we learned, Carr says, to question ourselves, our backgrounds, our choosing of topics, our selection and interpretation of facts; we learned that the scientist "has no excuse to think of himself as a detached individual standing outside society and outside history."[101] Freud's second achievement concerns the nature and role of motives. Freud's theory of Man, Carr writes, "has driven the last nail into the coffin of the ancient illusion that the motives from which men allege or believe themselves to have acted are in fact adequate to explain their actions."[102]

And Carr continued to publicly defend Freud; especially, against two misleading charges that are, unfortunately, still widespread. First, Carr raised the problem of the "biological" Freud. Freud's theory of human nature had become under increasingly harsh attacks by Marxists; they deplored Freud's (allegedly) purely individualistic and ahistorical viewpoint and saw him as a liberal-bourgeois reactionary. Carr disagreed; he pointed out that most of the Marxist charges brought against Freudian Man are "valid only in part against Freud himself."[103] In a related theme, Carr's defense of Freud was even firmer. The argument that Freud enlarged the notion of the irrational in human affairs, Carr made clear, is "totally false," for such criticism "rests on a crude confusion between recognition of the irrational element in human behaviour and a cult of the irrational."[104]

The cult of the irrational stems from a deep-seated, ultraconservative pessimism, but, as Carr correctly noted, it "does not stem from Freud."[105] Freud is not the high priest of the irrational; he is a rationalist scientist who opened up the irrational to rational enquiry, who helped us increase our reflective ability to understand ourselves and our environment better. This represents not a conservative but a "revolutionary and progressive achievement."[106]

Thus far, Carr seems to be Freud-friendly; and, indeed, sounds almost like him when he writes:

> To unmask the irrational by stripping from it its hypocritical fig-leaf of false reason is a salutary and necessary task. But this does not entail a panic flight from reason into the anti-rationalism of Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky or into the irrationalism of Nietzsche; on the contrary, it is an essential part of the movement towards understanding and overcoming the irrational. Reason is an imperfect instrument: it is good to recognize and study its imperfections.[107]

This brings us back to Carr's assumptions about human nature as they seem to appear in his realist international-political theory.

The concept of human nature is an important element of Carr's political realism. In the early pages of *Twenty Years' Crisis*, Carr introduces the antithesis of utopia and reality by elaborating on several dichotomies: theory/practice, intellectual/bureaucrat, left/right, ethics/politics. Carr introduces the utopia/reality problem of international relations, however, with yet another theme: that of free will versus determinism, a timeless problem concerning the nature of Man. Utopians, Carr argues, are Kantian voluntarists who believe that Man can change the course of history by acts of free will, that Man can conquer nature, can conquer his own nature. Realists, on the other hand, are said to believe in natural laws approaching both human history and the nature of Man in terms of causalities. Carr finds both views wanting; the "characteristic vice of the utopian is naivety; of the realist, sterility."[108] We must, Carr argues, avoid both naivety and sterility. And this requires the careful balancing of utopia and reality that, in turn, requires us to find a middle ground between the optimism of the free-will voluntarists and the pessimism of the determinist tradition. Only such balancing act will lead, as Carr puts it, to "healthy thought" and "healthy human action."[109]

Carr's yearning for the middle ground suggests that his realist international-political theory requires a conception of human nature that is neither purely voluntarist nor purely determinist. Further, Carr's language when he speaks of "healthy" thought and "healthy" action perhaps reveals a Freudian substructure; for he seems to imply that failed balancing acts lead to pathological thoughts and pathological human actions. Such reasoning is broadly compatible with Freudian psychoanalytic psychology telling us that an imbalance between the degrees of instinctual satisfaction (as determinism requires) and instinctual renunciation (as voluntarism may provide) leads to psychological pathologies. All this may or may not stem directly from Freud; but Carr's assumptions about human nature appear reminiscent of Freudian Man.

Carr conceptualizes human nature as he conceptualizes his realist international-political theory. Or, the other way round, since political theory usually follows a certain conception of Man and not vice versa, Carr conceptualizes his political realism according to his assumptions about human nature—as a predominantly antagonistic affair that transcends time and place. Carr's Man is egoistical and has a will to assert himself among his fellow Men; he also displays signs of sociability, including a desire to cooperate with others. Making the human condition a complex and challenging affair, in "every society," Carr argues, "these two qualities can be seen at work."[110] The state, or any other group or political community, is essentially "built up out of these two conflicting aspects of human nature."[111]

Failing to recognize such Janus-faced psychic makeup of Man will lead, as Carr reminds us, to disastrous results. Utopians wishing away the egoistical side of Man and preferring to hide behind an admirable though unrealistic belief in Man's earnest moral capacities will achieve nothing. But crude realists ridiculing Man's altruistic side to the (almost shameful) breaking point and viewing all political action in the light of universal egoisms and power considerations are "just as wide of the mark."[112] It is one of the basic premises of Carr's political realism to warn utopians and realists not to fall prey to too simple conceptions of human nature. Although politics, both on the domestic and international plane, is inherently bound up with considerations of power, the "homo politicus who pursues nothing but power is as unreal a myth as the homo oeconomicus who pursues nothing but gain."[113] Thus, like Morgenthau, Kennan, and Lippmann (and Freud), Carr rejects crude one-dimensionality and emphasizes the multifaceted nature of Man.

Human nature, according to Carr, is characterized by antagonism, a deep-seated Freudian-style antagonism. We must reckon with the egoistical instincts of Man, but we must never overlook that Man cannot dispense with fellow Men; for Man is, Carr argues, capable of thriving only in a social context.[114] The affiliation with groups or political communities ensures that Man's more antisocial instincts are being tamed. Group norms regulate the relations among their members. These relations, therefore, are mostly peaceful following a more or less shared common morality. Relations among political communities, however, are different. States remain largely hostile vis-à-vis each other displaying only very few signs of a shared morality. Carr explains this paradox of peaceful societal relations and hostile intersocietal relations in a way that seems similar to Freudian group psychology and is, after discussing Morgenthau, Kennan, and Lippmann, only all too familiar.

Man ascribes to the state a different set of moral principles than he does to himself and fellow Men in a societal context. Man does not demand the state to adhere to the same moral principles, Carr argues, but he "expects" from it "certain kinds of behaviour which he would definitely regard as immoral in the individual."[115] This paradox derives from Man's yearning for self-assertion that leaves him with only two options. First, he becomes extremely powerful that would allow him to lead fellow Men according to his ends. This, however, is unrealistic. And, therefore, Man is left with the other option: accepting his place in the cosmic order. But even if he accepts his societal or cosmic impotence, he still can be powerful. For, thanks to psychological dynamics reminiscent of Freud, he can still find "compensation for his own lack of power to assert himself in the vicarious self-assertion of the group."[116] By means of projection and identification, Carr's Man overcomes his frustrations: "If we cannot win ourselves, we want our side to win. Loyalty to the group comes to be regarded as a cardinal virtue of the individual."[117]

In this light, then, it seems fairly certain that Carr's political realism is based upon profound assumptions about human nature. And these assumptions may stem directly from Freud; but, in any case, Carr's Man shows striking similarities to that of Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann.

Niebuhr, the Christian Man, and the Struggle with Freud

All classicals concerned themselves with the nature of Man in their political realisms, but Niebuhr went furthest in basing realist international-political theory on assumptions about human nature. Niebuhrian Man is a complex affair; and, therefore, it should be stated that this section does not argue that Niebuhrian Man derives from Freud. Clearly, Niebuhrian Man is an Augustinian-style Christian Realist Man informing Niebuhr's Christian realism.[118]

Yet, I will point to Niebuhr's intellectual struggle with Freudian anthropology as it helps understand the similarities between Niebuhrian Man and Freudian Man. This is not a trivial point, for it may help to further clarify the intellectual substructure of classical realism in an interesting way. It may help to establish the argument that the assumptions about human nature of several classical realists are broadly Freudian. Michael Smith argued insightfully that leading classicals adopted Niebuhr's Christian realist assumptions about human nature, but that they secularized these assumptions for their realisms.[119] If it can be shown that Niebuhr's Man is in some ways similar to Freudian Man, the argument could be made that Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, and Carr did, perhaps, not so much secularize Niebuhrian Man but used,

instead, Freudian Man. In this regard, revisiting Niebuhr's intellectual struggle with Freud is important; even more so, because, as Paul Tillich remarked, "it is [im]possible…to elaborate a Christian doctrine of man…without using the immense material brought forth by depth psychology."[120]

Like many mid-century intellectuals, Niebuhr showed great interest in Freud's psychoanalysis referring to him on a number of occasions.[121] Niebuhr surely was unconvinced by Freud's theory of Man, but this does not apply to the clinical dimension of psychoanalysis. As Niebuhr writes,

> The position of Sigmund Freud as one of the great scientific innovators of our era is now generally acknowledged. The therapeutic efficacy of his disciplines and discoveries has been amply proved. By laying bare the intricate mechanism of the self's inner debate with itself, and its labyrinthian depths below the level of consciousness, he enlarged or indeed created new methods of healing "mental" diseases.[122]

Still, Niebuhr finds Freud's theory of human nature wanting, criticized it as too simple, too biological, too Nietzschean.

Dividing the history of human nature into classical, biblical, and modern thought, Niebuhr places Freud in the modern camp; not, however, as a modern rationalist; he regards Freud as a Nietzschean-Rousseauian romanticist. Romanticists emphasize Man's affinity to nature; and this, according to Niebuhr, is their mistake. For they "ascribe to the realm of the biological and the organic what is clearly a compound of nature and spirit, of biological impulse and rational and spiritual freedom."[123] As Niebuhr continues, "[i]n this interpretation of human vitalities in purely biological terms, Freudian psychology is in perfect accord with romanticism."[124] Further, Niebuhr reads Freud as an ultrapessimist. Referring to *Civilization and Its Discontents,* Niebuhr faults Freud for indulging in a form of Nietzschean nihilism because Freud would neither deny the disciplinary necessities of civilization nor would find a cure for Man's neurotic aberrations that originate in these societal constraints. Niebuhr criticizes "Freudianism" for not being capable of providing satisfactory solutions to the problems it discovered and for being unable to "understand the paradox of human creativity and destructiveness."[125] Freudianism is one of modernity's blind alleys, a "cul-de-sac of pessimism" that "despairs not of a particular civilization or culture but of civilization itself."[126]

Recognizing Freud's medical-therapeutic achievements, Niebuhr displays a thorough incredulity toward Freud's Man and philosophy of civilization. In matters social and political, the Christian doctrine of original sin, Niebuhr says, is a far better starting point than Freud. Again, Niebuhr gives

Freud credit. First, for providing "the first scientific realist account of human behaviour"; second, for breaking with the Renaissance and Enlightenment optimism that discredited the Christian doctrine of original sin as too pessimistic, dogmatic, mythical; and, third, for shattering the "simple mind-body dualism" of much of Western thought and the Kantian notion of an "intelligible and sensible self."[127]

Although he acknowledges Freud's "therapeutic efficacy," Niebuhr claims that Freud failed, in the sense of suffering badly from "political irrelevance."[128] The problem lies with Freud's structural theory of the psyche, which, Niebuhr thinks, is seriously flawed. It would not distinguish sharply enough between the ego and the id. Niebuhr rejects the Freudian self as being some sort of "id-ego" representing an "ego, which is bedeviled, not by organized and coherent ambitions in conflict with other interests and ambitions, but with the anarchy of passions within and below the level of selfhood."[129] To Niebuhr, the Freudian ego is too close to nature, instincts, infantile desires; and the super-ego relates too much to societal necessities. The Freudian conception of Man's ego, Niebuhr criticizes, is too weak representing a psychic entity with too little agency as it is straitjacketed between society and nature. This form of Freudian naturalism, the misconstruction of a too bounded ego, makes Freud, according to Niebuhr, useless for social and political theory.[130]

Niebuhr's reading of Freud is harsh. And a bit awkward, too. As a minor perhaps, it seems odd to claim that Freud is useless for social and political theory. Intellectual history clearly shows that quite more than a handful theorists were influenced by Freud directly. More importantly, Niebuhr's criticism seems unjustified in light of Niebuhr's own, later appreciation of neo-Freudian psychology.[131] He reviewed neo-Freudians already in *Nature and Destiny of Man;*[132] and does so in his Freud essay. There, Niebuhr compliments neo-Freudians such as Sullivan, Horney, and Fromm that they "have sought to correct what was regarded as a too purely 'biological' approach of Freud" by opening up Man's self to historical and cultural influences.[133] The price, according to Niebuhr, was high as the neo-Freudians had to eliminate "the virtue of the Freud concept of the universality of the self-seeking or pleasure seeking inclination of the self."[134]

Niebuhr, however, seems to have misread the neo-Freudians (and Freud). He was particularly interested in Erik Erikson. His ego-psychology, Niebuhr argued, corrected the crude and unhistorical biologism of Freud. Compared to Freud, it ascribed to the ego a greater autonomy from both nature (id) and society (super-ego). This form of greater human agency helped to make the self more historical and relevant for social and political theory. But Niebuhr may have misunderstood the neo-Freudians, the result of what John Irwin

called Niebuhr's "personalized" and "politicalized" reading of Freud.[135] Niebuhr is correct that Eriksonian ego-psychology emphasizes the notion of the autonomy of the ego. The problem, however, is that Niebuhr suggests an intellectual dividing line between the "biological" Freudians and the "cultural" neo-Freudians, which does not exist in such strictness. Neither is Freud as biological (and unhistorical) as Niebuhr claims, nor are the neo-Freudians as cultural (and self-transcendent and historical) as Niebuhr makes them. Failing to recognize that Freud was, so to speak, the first neo-Freudian, Niebuhr seems to ignore that neo-Freudians do not simply substitute culture for nature but that they integrate both. An Eriksonian ego, too, cannot and does not negate nature, the nature of the id.[136]

That Niebuhr seems to have misread Freud and neo-Freudians regarding human agency, however, is of significance for understanding the intellectual substructure of classical realism. Surely, neither Niebuhr's recognition of psychoanalytic therapy, nor his positive engaging with neo-Freudians and Eriksonian ego-psychology turn Niebuhr into a Freudian or neo-Freudian. Niebuhr remains a Christian realist basing his realist international-political theory on the original sin doctrine. Yet, he displays argumentative trajectories about the nature of Man and the human condition that seem broadly similar to Freudian lines of arguments. First, he recognizes psychoanalysis as an effective treatment method; but one can hardly take psychoanalytic therapy without adopting at least a broadly Freudian perspective (just like how one cannot take Niebuhr without its theologian content). Second, Niebuhr recognizes neo-Freudian perspectives; but, similarly, one can hardly take neo-Freudians without their Freudian content. Further, from his classic, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, we know that Niebuhr read Freud, Jung, and Adler. And, there, we find a passage about a psychological dynamic with social consequences that was already found in the realist international-political theories of Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, and Carr. Much of the international tragedies, Niebuhr argues, results from the seemingly universal fact that "The man in the street, with his lust for power and prestige thwarted by his own limitations and the necessities of social life, projects his ego upon his nation and indulges his anarchic lusts vicariously" leading almost invariably to international instability as the "nation is at one and the same time a check upon, and a final vent for, the expression of individual egoism."[137]

Informed by Augustinian-styled Christian realist assumptions about Man, Niebuhr argues that Man's will to power, will to assert himself, and feelings of impotence lead to problematic group-behavioral patterns on the national and, consequently, international sphere. The secular-scientific Freud argued similarly. The international tragedy results from the outburst of repressed human instincts causing, by means of powerful individual and

group psychological dynamics, political communities behave in ways often unimaginable in a domestic context. Thus, rather than suggesting that Niebuhrian Man is Freudian Man or that the former derives from the latter, Niebuhr's struggle with Freud suggests that it is possible to broadly substitute Niebuhrian Man for Freudian Man. Coming back to the argument, then, that several classicals used secularized Niebuhrian assumptions about human nature, it is, therefore, possible that they have not so much secularized Niebuhr but, instead, used a genuinely secularized theory of human nature. And, taken together with the discussions of Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, and Carr, this theory seems to have been, consciously or not, Freud's.

In Defense of Classical Realism

Focusing especially on Freud, I have argued that both friends and foes of political realism should revisit the assumptions about human nature that underlie the realist international-political theories of five consequential and timely twentieth-century thinkers. My analysis proves that some of the widespread criticisms that have been directed against the assumptions about human nature of twentieth-century classical realism are misleading, if not wrong. Defending these classicals is important in its own right, but, in light of increasing attacks against these assumptions and the recent renaissance of classical realism, it becomes even more important.

To begin with the criticisms mentioned above, we should remember that using the concept of Man as starting point for their forays into international relations has always been controversial. Waltz criticized the classicals for committing the "error of psychologism: the analysis of individual behavior used uncritically to explain group phenomena."[138] Soon thereafter, Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian political realism was almost dead; the structural realisms of Waltz and Mearsheimer were rising. Political realism's critics, too, have taken their shots. They argue that realist assumptions about human nature were wrong, embarrassing, biased; that they were scientifically untenable; that they portrayed Man as antisocial, fearful, self-interested, power-driven; that realists' pessimistic human-nature views had sinister effects on theory construction and foreign-policy making; and, finally, that these assumptions about human nature were causing policies of distrust, promoting paranoia, increasing the probability of international violence, and stifling chances for peaceful coexistence.[139] This is strong criticism. Directed against classical realists, it helped diminishing the standing of each political realist and of classical realism itself.

Criticism, however, must be countered. The argument that these classicals' assumptions are unsophisticated reflections on Man put forth by biased pessimists seems unjustified. These political realists do not indulge in naive-romantic conceptions of Man and the human condition; to paraphrase Lippmann again, the nature of Man can be a "shocking affair." Further, it is, perhaps, legitimate to criticize, for instance, that Carr did not make his assumptions about human nature more explicit. Save for Niebuhr and Lippmann, all of them should have said more about Man in appropriate places to avoid the impression that they are trying to hide some sort of illegitimate influx of assumptions. But engaging with these political realists' assumptions quite clearly reveals the high degree of knowledge and reflectivity of Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr vis-à-vis the nature of Man and the individual and group psychological processes that are constitutive of the human condition.

It's worth remembering that these political realists do not portray Man as a physiological-biological animal driven only by power. All five classicals have constantly reminded and warned us about human hubris and Man's inclination to assert himself vis-à-vis his fellows. But they were knowledgeable and reflective enough not to commit the error of one-dimensionality. Upon closer inspection, we can conclude that critics must recognize that these political realists surely emphasize Man's longing for assertion, prestige, and power, and that such character traits do merely represent a few aspects of Man among several others such as that Man is a deeply social creature partly driven by instinctual needs to affiliate with others.

Further, these political realists do not portray Man as a fixed, purely biologically determined animal whose nature must lead to fatalistic pessimism. They are aware of the individual-psychological and social/political tensions that stem from the eternal struggle between Man's instincts and his fragile ego, between some form of slight biological determinism and ego autonomy. Surely, Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr believe in a universal Man who transcends time and place; and they do reject idealistic notions of complete malleability toward perfection. They are, after all, political realists. But these political realists' assumptions about human nature do not imply crude naturalistic determinism. These five wrestled with this issue and made clear that Man's ego does have a certain degree of autonomy from the unconscious demands of the instinctual id and the societal super-ego. Man may not be entirely perfectible, but these political realists recognize some elements of improvability. None of them has bias toward the purely destructive or aggressive aspects of Man. Their assumptions have led them to become high priests not of fatalism but rather of political realism.

This raises a second point of criticism waiting for refutation. Save Niebuhr, who never hid his Christian realist background, Morgenthau, Kennan, Carr, and, to a lesser extent, Lippmann were not very outspoken in terms of their assumptions about the nature of Man. The same applies to the intellectual origin of their assumptions. This has led many International Relations theorists to believe that their assumptions are merely speculations or introspections. This chapter's analysis of their assumptions about human nature, taken together with its special reference to Freud, helps to rescue these political realists from the charge of metaphysical speculation. Regardless of whether Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, or Carr was directly influenced by Freud's Man or whether we "merely" can see some striking similarities, the analogies between these political realists' assumptions and Freud's theory of Man make it hard to simply dismiss their assumptions as metaphysical speculations.

In this regard, it is, of course, true, that the scientific credentials of Freud have always been disputed. Well known is Popper's verdict that psychoanalysis is some form of pseudoscience or Eysenck's claim that psychoanalysis is a myth.[140] But we must also point toward Popper's misreading of Freud or to neuroscientists who now use neuroimaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography to demonstrate the neural bases of psychoanalytical theories and concepts.[141] This helps us to understand that, despite all legitimate criticism, Freud's theory of Man cannot be shrugged off as a myth or speculation. This raises again the point of crudeness. Even Freud's critics concede that he revolutionized our understanding of mental life, ourselves, others, and the world around us; and that Freud provided extraordinarily coherent theories about unconscious psychological processes, the structure of the psyche, instinct configurations, and the irrationality of human motivation. To denounce these realists' assumptions about human nature as unsophisticated and embarrassing, seems misleading.

Yet revisiting the assumptions of these classical realists is timely and significant in two further ways. The first concerns the recent renaissance of classical realism. Whenever we turn to these thinkers for help or inspiration in our dealings vis-à-vis some contemporary foreign policy or international relations issues, we must never forget the human-nature baggage that they are carrying. These five classical realists cannot be taken without their human-nature content. Doing otherwise would be oversimplifying and lead to misunderstandings of their theories, meaning that their answers to the problems and issues we asked them for are more or less meaningless.

Second, the realist tradition is a philosophy with many breaks in its intellectual trajectory. But there are also some continuities. Part of that continuity

is that classical realists had been committed to the concept of human nature as the starting point of their respective international-political theory for over two centuries, before Waltz appeared on the scene and attempted to drag political realism away from human nature toward the concept of international structure. The philosophy of science may agree with such a turn of events; classical realists, however, cannot. For post-classical realism (if it deserves to be called "realism") has robbed political realism its core intellectual and philosophical content. Classical realists, the true or genuine realists, such as Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr, knew all too well what has been beautifully captured recently, namely, that political realism is not "merely pragmatism or enlightened self-interest" but that it derives "from a grand conception of human nature in history that leads to tough conclusions about what's possible in politics."[142]

CHAPTER 3

The Human Nature of Post-Classical Realism

This chapter that deals with post-classical realism must be seen against the background of its deliberate move away from human nature toward billiard balls. The transformation from Morgenthauian/ Niebuhrian-style political realism to post-classical realism was the outcome of an increasing dissatisfaction with the former's reliance on what post-classicals considered unscientific and crude human-nature speculations. Post-classicals set out to supersede the older (genuine) political realism with a newer, more scientific realism.

Yet, what happened to the (partly Freudian) human-nature baggage of the classicals? Is the concept of human nature really as dead as post-classical realists would have us believe? This chapter discusses some of the most significant post-classicals. The analysis includes Herz's realist liberalism, Kaplan's systemic-scientific realism, the two main structural realist theories, that is, Waltz's defensive variant and Mearsheimer's offensive realism, and the latest post-classical innovation, neoclassical realism. I argue that the post-classical realist endeavor must be seriously reconsidered and draws three conclusions.

First, these post-classicals have not freed their respective international-political theories from assumptions about human nature. The concept of human nature is not dead. To the contrary, assumptions about human nature still play a central role in these post-classical realisms. Second, despite these post-classicals' "human-nature lie," a closer look at their hidden assumptions about human nature, however, suggests that these post-classicals should still be defended. They must be rescued from some of the criticisms that have

been used to destroy their realisms. Third, although these post-classicals can be defended, they cannot escape criticism, for their assumptions about human nature are weak, that is, by no means as reflective and profound as those of the classicals. This is one of the factors why the post-classical realist project led political realism to a politico-theoretical cul-de-sac. This reinforces the need to search for fruitful ways to deal properly with the concept of human nature in contemporary realist international-political theory.

Herz, the Security Dilemma, and Human Nature

Herz's realist liberalism can be regarded as one of the spearheads of post-classical realism. Yet, putting Herz in the post-classical camp may be controversial. First, because Herz is recognized as a Kelsen-educated German-Jewish émigré who was part of a wider post–World War II group of political realists such as Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr, who warned policymakers of legalist utopianism. The second objection would be that Herz's European-style realist liberalism is, although it moved away from Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian human-nature theorizing, quite different to American-style political realisms à la Waltz or Mearsheimer.[1] And Herz's intellectual project surely is closer to classical than post-classical realism. Still, Herz is the perfect *entrée* into the post-classical world. For its politico-theoretical heart—the security dilemma—became the foundational conceptual framework within which subsequent generations of post-classicals constructed their realist international-political theories. Both Waltz and Mearsheimer explicitly draw from Herz's security dilemma.[2]

The attraction of the concept of the security dilemma for post-classicals is easily recognizable. It seems to allow an opt-out from Morgenthauian/ Niebuhrian human-nature theorizing that runs counter to the strictures of much of contemporary philosophy of the social sciences and fits ill with the Anglo-American liberal intellectual heritage.[3] The Herzian logic seems to allow an opt-out from all sorts of speculations about human nature. Why bother about Man's nature? Can't we see the sociological logic? As Herz explains, whenever actors (Men, groups, or states) face structurally anarchical conditions, they realize that they must provide for their own security, for there is, speaking with Mearsheimer, "no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911."[4] Aware of their profoundly insecure situation, actors seek to acquire necessary capabilities. Yet, even if power is merely sought for defensive purposes, however, any increase of power poses a threat to the security of other actors since anarchy dictates that actors seek relative capabilities. This, then, leads to the vicious

circle of security and power competition, to some sort of Hobbesian *homo homini lupus* situation.[5]

This seems a wonderful sociostructural explanation of the basic patterns of international relations. Not the *animus dominandi*, a human drive, inclines nations to seek power; but the anarchical structure forces us. This, however, is a half-truth. As now argued, the conceptualization of international relations in terms of the security dilemma, too, presumes certain assumptions about human nature. Regardless of Herz's insinuation that "the condition that concerns us here is not an anthropological or biological, but a social one";[6] regardless of the number of post-classicals building upon Herzian foundations, the concept of the security dilemma is infused with assumptions about human nature. It seems, in fact, somewhat odd that this has been neglected by post-classicals, for the very first chapter of Herz's *Political Realism and Political Idealism* has a rather illuminating title: "Psychological Bases."[7] Before examining the origins of the security dilemma, however, it seems clear that the distinction between Morgenthauians and Herzians is misleading. Just as Morgenthau recognized that the universal struggle for power and peace among nations roots, ultimately, in anthropological traits receiving its actual force by historical circumstances, so must Herz (and his post-classical followers) recognize that international relations cannot be explained by allegedly purely sociological concepts, that they must presuppose assumptions such as fear and the urge for survival.[8] Showing where the disagreement really lies, Arnold Wolfers writes succinctly that both political realisms make assumptions about human nature but that the Herzians do make "statesmen and people look less vicious than the animus dominandi theory," for what security-dilemma theory does is to "substitute tragedy for evil and to replace the 'mad Caesar' ... with the 'hysterical Caesar' who, haunted by fear, pursues the will-o'-the-whisp of absolute security."[9]

That the distinction between Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian classicals and Herzian post-classicals pertains to their underlying assumptions about human nature rather than their philosophical bases opens up these enquiries: What is the nature of post-classicals' assumptions about human nature? And, what are their intellectual origins? Where are the differences to the classicals? Concerning Herz, the literature tells us that Herz's Man derives from Hobbes;[10] an alternative intellectual source is said to be Burke.[11] I present a different reading suggesting (cautiously) that Herzian Man is of some sort Freudian Man. This seems not wide of the mark. Richard Ashley pointed out that Herz's Man seems "somewhat reminiscent of an 'idealized' Freud."[12] Further, we know that Herz was a student and *protégée* of the Freud-friendly Kelsen. And, Herz himself told us that he was influenced

by the group psychologies of LeBon and Freud.[13] These are prolific starting points for a closer examination of Herzian Man.

According to Herz's *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, Man is a through-and-through ambivalent creature driven by a dualistic instinctual-psychological nature. On the one hand, he is driven by an instinct of self-preservation that makes him yearn for power. Possessing power helps to be secure against violent death potentially inflicted by fellow Men; it causes the viciously dynamic cycle of security/power competition.[14] There is, however, also a more benign side. Man is a thoroughly compassionate creature possessing a "basic feeling of pity … provoked by the observance of the suffering of another human being."[15] Such dualistic instinctual structure seems widespread among realists given classical realists' conceptualizations of human nature; its externalized effects follow broadly similar lines: conflict, cooperation, conflict, cooperation, and so forth. And, like classicals, Herz's conception of Man and human condition seems largely compatible with Freud's early instinct theory. Instincts push Man into conflict as well as cooperation, and he remains caught in the middle.

If Herzian Man was a purely self-interested survival-seeker, the pure *homo homini lupus* situation would be unavoidable. But such condition does not materialize. For Man is driven equally by pity and compassion. However, this more compassionate side does not imply peace and tranquility. The instinctual antagonism transcending time and place cannot be wished away. And Man suffers; Herzian Man is a constant sufferer. The ever-present "necessity for acting counter to what one's basic feeling bids one do must thus lead to an awareness of discrepancy and a feeling of uneasiness"—and, rather illuminatingly, Herz refers to these feelings of uneasiness stemming from the struggle between the antagonistic instincts: "bad conscience" and "guilt."[16] Herz does not depict Man as a purely rational security seeker. To the contrary, Man "is not usually born or reared as a coolly calculating being."[17] Rather than a *homo oeconomicus*, Herz's Man is a predominantly instinctual and emotion-driven Man suffering from his distinctive instinctual-psychological structuring. Congenial to Freud, Herz argues: the "individual human soul is itself usually the theatre of divergent and often antagonistic trends and traits which fight each other, frequently without result, until death intervenes to settle the issue or leave it forever unsettled."[18]

This intrapsychic struggle, however, does not remain within Man. Its effects are externalized. Man, Herz argues, "is born into a world of fundamental antagonism."[19] The human condition is characterized by intense struggles. These struggles derive, ultimately, from the nature of Man. The dualistic and largely antagonistic instinctual-psychological structure of Man causes fierce intrapsychic tensions and affects the relations among Men.[20]

Herz insightfully reminds us of the social dynamic of Man's instinctual-psychological configuration as he considers it a brutal but basic fact of the human condition that Man is "at the same time foe and friend to his fellow man, and that social co-operation and social struggle seem to go hand in hand, and to be equally necessary."[21] Following such a conception of Man (that seems not too different to the classicals), Herz warns us that we should never mistake group solidarity or "common social action of men" for some sort of genuine human sociality, for these social facts do "merely reflect the transfer of the survival struggle to the higher level."[22] This transfer, in turn, follows a psychological dynamic that is all too familiar by now. Herz explains it arguing that it is Man's natural inclination to identify with the interests of surrounding social entities be it the familial nucleus, certain social groups, or, ultimately, nations. And, similarly to classicals (save Niebuhr), Herz seems to borrow from Freud's defense mechanism identification.

Thus it happens that impotent, anxious, guilt-ridden Man finds security in a profoundly insecure environment by identifying with either powerful Men or powerful social entities as nations. And likewise, again akin to classicals, Herz recognizes the social force of otherwise atomistic entities in times of crises. As Herz argues,

> [c]ompetition for security and power goes on all the time among the individuals and groups that comprise a nation; but a man may identify his own interests with that of the nation to which he belongs if it is a question of defending his country as an entirety against threats deriving from competing nations, or if it is a question of increasing its power and influence against other nations.[23]

Taking now Herz's instinctual-psychological assumptions about Man together with how he sees them being played out in the various social spheres that include the anarchical environment of the relations between nations, it seems misleading, if not mistaken, to think of Herz's concept of the security dilemma in purely sociological-structural terms. Instead, a picture of Herz's realist international-political theory emerges that is as filled with assumptions about human nature as are the political realisms of the classicals. The security dilemma, whether intragroup or intergroup, does not derive from anarchical structures. It cannot. How else could Herz (or any other post-classical) explain why such an anarchical international environment arises in the first place and why anarchy is such a profound and powerful element in human history? Anarchy reinforces anarchy, but it cannot be caused by anarchy. Only Man causes anarchy. And the roots of the security dilemma is, therefore, ultimately be found in human nature.

A picture of Herzian Man, therefore, emerges that seems similar not only to the descriptions of the classicals but also to Freudian Man. Compared with the classicals, Herz is not as outspoken about the nature of Man, but the concept of human nature is certainly as significant for his realism as for the Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian realists. Briefly coming back to Herz's usage of the Freudian notion of guilt helps show this significance. Herz argues that the eternal conflict between the survival instinct and the urge for compassion leads to feelings of profound guilt. And, although he remarks that he does not wish to overly concern himself with the psychological mechanisms leading to guilt, Herz makes an interesting point when he writes in *Political Realism and Political Idealism* that he is concerned with Man's "types of reactions" to the complexities of guilt.[24] For this, in fact, elevates or pushes human psychology and the concept of human nature to the very center of international-political theory, as Herz seems to suggest that the various international-political theories put forth in the history of political thought are "merely" representing or mirroring different intellectual efforts seeking to cope with one of the most universal and profound of all human sentiments haunting Man: his feelings of guilt.

Kaplan, the International System, and Human Nature

Putting Herz in the post-classical camp required brief explanation. This does not apply to Kaplan, a prolific writer in the philosophy and science of international politics and an intellectual heavyweight in International Relation's traditionalist versus science debate.[25] Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics* is correctly considered as one of the five major theoretical advances in the history of realist international-political theory.[26] As will be argued, Kaplan's hyperscientific post-classical realism, however, failed to meet its promise as it is infused with (Freudian-style) assumptions about human nature.

This criticism must be seen against the background that Kaplan was part of a wider American intellectual movement responsible for why Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian political realism got wiped off International Relations' intellectual map. Post-classicals' aversion against human nature–based theorizing is intimately connected with the behavioral revolution that swept through Political Science departments in the 1950s and 1960s. Triggered by dissatisfactions with the then-prevailing modes of enquiry, this revolt was a confrontation of two different methodological approaches: traditionalism (classical approach) versus scientism. This intellectual quarrel was spearheaded, respectively, by English-school theorist Hedley Bull and post-classical realist Kaplan.[27] Contra the classicals,

Kaplan argued that we should pay attention to the philosophy of sciences, adopt theories and conceptual frameworks from physics and the social sciences, apply mathematical and statistical analyses, focus on proper methods of data collection, and examine the nature of a theory.[28] Against this "scientific" background, Kaplan sought to construct a realist international-political theory that is methodologically far superior to what political realism had to offer at a time when Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* was still the definitive work in International Relations. And, in this regard, Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics* was path-breaking. First, it provided the theoretical foundation upon which Waltz later built his systemic-structural realism.[29] Second, Kaplan attempted to design a political realism that, as Robert Keohane pointed out, did not rely any longer "on the nature of human beings to account for discord and cooperation in international politics, but focused instead on the competitive, anarchic nature of world politics as a whole."[30] The latter virtue, however, requires qualification.

Despite all systemic-scientific rhetoric, Kaplan's realist international-political theory did not abandon infusing international-political theory with assumptions about human nature. In the wake of Bertalanffy and Ashby, Kaplan brought general-systems theory to the study of international relations transforming the then-prevalent methodological-investigative strategies.[31] Classical realists approached international relations analytically; Kaplan, adopting the method of the general-systems theorists, conceived relations among nations synthetically meaning to "go beyond the parts and understand how complex systems are organized and how they operate as a whole."[32] In this light, Kaplan's approach is, as he said, "fairly simple." For contra Morgenthau who discerns general patterns and principles of international politics, Kaplan's theory is concerned with explaining variations:

> If the number, type, and behavior of nations differ over time, and if their military capabilities, their economic assets, and their information also vary over time, then there is some likely interconnection between these elements such that different structural and behavioral systems can be discerned to operate in different periods of history.[33]

Rather than focusing on the nature, attributes, and behavior of units (Man, states), Kaplan reverses the logic. He models various international-political systems and, in a second step, uses these models in order "to deduce what the characteristic behavior of the parts must be if the system itself was to be maintained in a certain operating state."[34] Kaplan provides a theoretical framework that formulates hypotheses "intended to express the types of actions which must characterize the system if it is to remain

in equilibrium rather than to predict that any individual action will be of such a character."[35]

This, however, did not prevent Kaplan from smuggling in (Freudian-style) assumptions about human nature. We can see these hidden assumptions fairly clearly by turning to Kaplan's equally hidden assumptions about state motives. In *System and Process in International Politics*, he examines six international-political systems: balance-of-power system, loose-bipolar system, tight-bipolar system, universal system, hierarchical system, and unit-veto system. The first two are idealized portrayals of Western eighteenth/nineteenth-century and post–World War II international politics, respectively; the latter four are purely hypothetical systems.[36] Focusing on the balance-of-power system, Kaplan posits six "essential rules," which, he says, "describe the characteristic behavior of the actors"[37] keeping the system in equilibrium. These six rules are as follows:

> 1) Act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight. 2) Fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase capabilities. 3) Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor. 4) Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the system. 5) Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizing principles. 6) Permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification. Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.[38]

When these six rules are spelled out in detail, however, we can find that they do have their distinctive flaws.

No other than fellow post-classical Waltz presented an insightful devastating critique of Kaplan's realist international-political theory; and exploring this criticism will help unveil Kaplan's hidden assumptions about human nature. Kaplan's error, Waltz demonstrates, lies in making state-motivational assumptions. Laying bare this theoretical mistake by reformulating the six rules, Waltz argues that the six rules are, actually, merely three:

1. Act as cheaply as possible to increase capabilities (Kaplan's 1 and 2).
2. Protect yourself against others acting according to rule 1 (Kaplan's 4 and 5).
3. Act to maintain the number of units essential to the system (Kaplan's 3 and 6).[39]

Reformulating the six rules, Waltz demonstrates that Kaplan smuggles in state-motivational assumptions that predetermine the outcome of the inter-actions among states. Kaplan's political realism, Waltz argues, is flawed because it turns a "dependent variable into an independent one" and because it still follows, although his "vocabulary, borrowed from general-systems theory, has obscured this,"[40] a Morgenthauian-style analytical reasoning. Waltz faults Kaplan for smuggling in three motivational assumptions: that states are power-maximizers (1), security-maximizers (2), and compassionate avoiding to kill other states (3).[41]

Building on Waltz's unearthing of Kaplan's hidden state-motivational assumptions, we can now, however, begin to see that these represent hidden assumptions about human nature endorsing a particular conception of Man. That Kaplan obviously conceptualizes states as power-maximizers, security-maximizers, and compassionate entities (creatures) provides us with a key to understanding the assumptions about human nature hidden in Kaplan's allegedly post-classical realism. For the use of anthropomorphisms, that is, the attribution of human motivations, characteristics, or behavior to inanimate objects such as states means "to treat as known what the properties of the human are."[42] For example, as Robert Kagan recently wrote, "Nations are not calculating machines. They have the attributes of the humans who create and live in them, the intangible and immeasurable human qualities of love, hate, ambition, fear, honor, shame…"[43] Kaplan's six rules, then, imply that his Man is a power- and security-maximizer in addition to being compassionate. Further, they demonstrate the significance of the concept of human nature for Kaplan's political realism; for were his beliefs about the nature of Man different, Kaplan would need to assume a different set of "essential rules" capable of explaining state behavior in a balance-of-power system. Put differently, without these underlying assumptions about human nature, his realist international-political theory would collapse or be different.

Yet, we can identify other elements in his allegedly human nature–free political realism, which actually illustrate the high degree to which Kaplan is infused with assumptions about human nature. His concept of the international system also reveals that these assumptions are Freudian. In the wake of Waltz's criticism, Ashley Tellis raised another problematic issue of Kaplan's realist international-political theory. Why do states comprising the balance-of-power system feel obliged to play by the six essential rules maintaining system equilibrium? Kaplan seems to resolve this problem with an animistic trick, by "reifying the universe anthropomorphically, that is, treating what is essentially a hypothetical construct for purposes of explanation as a true natural entity, a system 'invested with purpose, instincts and

something akin to reason.' "[44] Kaplan leaves no doubts about his political realism's holistic, and anthropomorphological, aspect:

> The needs of a system are set by the structure of the system. The objectives of a system are set by its needs in its environment as it understands that environment. The objectives of a system are values for the system. The objectives which, in fact, would satisfy the needs of the system are valuable for the system.[45]

In other words, according to Kaplan, the concept of the international system is a quasi-human entity thereby anthropomorphizing the international system. And analyzing Kaplan's conception of this quasi-human entity will help us to understand the nature and intellectual origins of Kaplan's Man.

The extent to which Kaplan anthropomorphizes the international system and its subsystems (states) is remarkable; the same goes for the anthropomorphizing of the international system along Freudian lines. People, social, or political systems, Kaplan argues, are confronted with the ever-changing environments. The international-political system, therefore, employs various regulatory processes by which it "attempts to maintain or to preserve its identity over time."[46] And in an interesting spin, Kaplan claims that all these different systems are being regulated by essentially identical processes. Also, these mechanisms are "analogs of those used by the individual personality system"; that "various psychological mechanisms are isomorphic with mechanisms manifested in the behavior of social organizations"; that any "system is motivated as truly as an individual human being."[47] Kaplan could not be more revealing about the hidden yet very real centrality of the concept of human nature within his realist international-political theory.

Yet, as if Kaplan's anthropomorphization of the concept of the international system is not remarkable enough, we may almost be amazed recognizing that Kaplan's "mechanisms of regulations" are none other than various Freudian defense mechanisms. Just as Freud argued that Man's ego employs various defense mechanisms when being unable to find instinctual satisfaction, Kaplan argues that the international system, when being unable to satisfy its needs due to environmental constraints, uses a variety of coping strategies. In Kaplan's political realism, these include the Freudian defense mechanisms sublimation and displacement as well as the repression, projection, introjection, identification, and isolation.[48] Picking up two examples of how these defense mechanisms are being played out in the international system, Kaplan argues that the "Japanese assimilation of American political institutions after the close of the war illustrates introjective behavior" in that "some goals or values of another system are adopted to ward off some threat

to the first system."[49] Second, Kaplan contends that substituting the production of consumer goods for capital/military goods constitutes a form of displacement as the original "activity is blocked and the regulatory capacity previously assigned to it is [even if only temporarily] diverted to some other activity."[50] Since defense mechanisms are Freudian deriving from the psychoanalytic theory of Man, Kaplan's usage of defense mechanisms suggests that he broadly works within the framework of Freud's structural theory of the psyche, where the ego employs various defense mechanisms to ameliorate the adverse effects of the perennial struggle between the instinctual id and the societal super-ego.

That Kaplan's realism is informed by assumptions about human nature and that these assumptions are Freudian can be also inferred by recognizing his use of psychoanalytic terminology throughout *System and Process of International Politics*. Further, Kaplan's Freudian-style beliefs about the nature of Man also shine through in his brief yet explicit and powerful remarks about Man and his human condition. It's worth quoting at length:

> [Man is] torn between two sets of sometimes conflicting needs which he must in some way reconcile…The very stuff of tragedy occurs when vital needs of the particular individual are in irreconcilable conflict with the needs of society…If a particular man represses his most psychological or biological needs, his regulatory mechanisms will become pathological. If he neglects basic social needs, he destroys his identity as an actor in society.[51]

With Freud, Kaplan recognizes two basic facts of Man's existence. First, Man is caught in the middle of severe instinctual-psychological struggles between biological drives and societal necessities. And, second, Man's ego must seek to become as autonomous as possible from unconscious demands helping him to navigate carefully through the essential battle of the human drives that are an ever-present factor in the human condition; Man's ego must use various coping strategies capable of gratifying evenly both the id and the super-ego, for if not, he will suffer from neurotic disorders. This, indeed, is Freudian.

In conclusion, then, we can say that with respect to the concept of human nature, Kaplan's post-classical intellectual project has failed. Setting out to move realist international-political theory beyond the Morgenthauians/Niebuhrians and to end their reliance on (allegedly) unreliable and unscientific notions of human nature, Kaplan presents us with a political realism as infused with (Freudian-style) assumptions about

human nature as are many classical realisms and Herz's political realism. This adds weight and gives a different spin to Waltz's remark that Kaplan's realist international-political theory is Morgenthauian political realism cloaked in systems theory language. But did Waltz succeed where Herz and Kaplan failed?

Waltz, Defensive Structural Realism, and Human Nature

With Waltz, the human nature–based theorizing of the classicals found its harshest critic. Replacing the concept of structure for the concept of human nature, structural realism argues that the nature of how the international system is structured determines general patterns of state behavior. Despite all structural rhetoric, this section argues, Waltz's structural realism is infused with certain assumptions about human nature.

For many decades, Waltz has argued that international politics cannot sufficiently be explained by making references to the nature of Man (and states); international outcomes must be deduced from the nature of the international-political system. In *Man, the State, and War*, a path-breaking classic, Waltz presents "three images" lumping together first-image theorists who hypothesize the causes of war in the individual or Man (Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Spinoza, St. Augustine), second-image theorists who ascribe explanatory power to attributes of states (liberals, Marxists), and third-image theorists who argue that the constraining and permissive effects of the international-political system cause war (Rousseau, Thucydides).[52] Waltz's conclusion is unambiguous. The first image fails, for it equals "the simple statement that man's nature is such that sometimes he fights and sometimes he does not."[53] The second image is equally flawed, for political history proves that both "good" and "bad" states fight wars.[54] And, introducing the division of labor between theories of foreign policy and international politics, Waltz argues for the third image: "The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy."[55]

Theory of International Politics is Waltz's attempt of a quasieconomic, parsimonious, systemic-structural, human nature–free post-classical realism. Reiterating the fallacies of first/second-image explanations, lumping them together as "reductionist theories," Waltz argues that "reductionist explanations of international politics are insufficient and that analytic approaches must give way to systemic ones."[56] And, tearing apart the systemic international-political theories of Rosecrance, Hoffmann, and Kaplan as being reductionist, Waltz is certain that a genuine systems approach to international politics can be successful only "if structural effects are clearly defined and displayed."[57] With

the concept of international structure, speculations about human nature are obsolete. Whether national or international, Waltz argues that the structures of political systems can be defined along three layers. First, the ordering principle. Structural questions are "questions about the arrangement of the parts of the system."[58] In political systems, units are arranged hierarchically; the ordering principle in international-political systems is anarchic. "Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey."[59] From the ordering principle derives the second dimension of the international-political system's structure, the character of the units. Hierarchy in political systems is based on the various units' functional differentiation; however, the units of the international-political system cannot be differentiated according to their functions as anarchy "implies their sameness"; as "long as anarchy endures, states remain like units."[60] Though differing politically, economically, and culturally, anarchy makes states face similar tasks: providing for their own security. International structures, therefore, vary only "through a change of organizing principle or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units."[61] And leaving only the distribution of capabilities among the international-political system's units as independent variable, the following picture of Waltz's human nature–freed structural realism emerges.

The international-political system is ordered anarchically. States are like-units having to perform similar functions, defending themselves against external threats. States are distinguished solely "by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks"; and since history shows the effects of differing capabilities of great powers and small states, Waltz discriminates "between international-political systems only according to the number of their great powers."[62] Capabilities are measured in terms of power; and what seems a unit-level variable is a structural variable. For Waltz is not concerned with the unit's capabilities in isolation, but with the distribution of power within the international-political system. The third layer defining the international-political structure is a "system-wide concept"; and analogously to economic theory, Waltz declares that "Market structure is defined by counting firms; international-political structure, by counting states."[63] Where economic theory predicts economic outcomes according to the dictates of monopolistic, oligopolistic, or polypolistic market structures, Waltz's post-classical realism predicts international outcomes based on unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar structures of international-political systems. Elegant, parsimonious, nonreductionist, and systemic-structural, Waltzian structural realism got rid of the concept of human nature.

This, however, is a half-truth. For digging more deeply will show that Waltz's realist international-political theory is no less infused with assumptions about human nature than are the political realisms of Herz and Kaplan

(and the classicals). To begin with, take Waltz's state-motivational assumptions. Jack Donnelly convincingly showed that despite Waltz's admission of abstracting from any state motives such as a state *animus dominandi*, his political realism is based upon the fundamental assumption that states want to survive.[64] As Waltz writes, "I built structural theory on the assumption that survival is the goal of states"; states are "unitary actors with a single motive—the wish to survive"; "I assume that states seek to ensure their survival."[65] Clearly, Waltz talks about states, not Man. From Waltz's anthropomorphological language, however, we get insights into the assumptions about human nature inbuilt in his political realism. First, Waltzian Man seems a survival-seeker. But, further, it is remarkable when Waltz writes that states are "unitary actors who, at a minimum seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination"[66] and the need for recognition and pride:

> Yet when a country receives less attention and respect and gets its way less often that it feels it should, international inhibitions about becoming a great power are likely to turn into public criticisms of the government for not taking its proper place in the world. Pride knows no nationality.[67]

Obviously, Waltz makes more than one unit-level assumption, provoking Donnelly to speak of neorealism's "structural dodge."[68] And in light of Waltz's reference to survival, domination, and pride, it does appear that Waltz assumes an underlying conception of human nature that may not be all that different from Morgenthau's (and other classicals').

Deriving from the state-motivational assumption of survival, Waltzian Man wants to preserve his life. Yet, further, Waltzian Man seems driven by acquisitive motives, longing for universal domination, recognition, and pride. This proves that Waltz seems to have an implicit conception of human nature inbuilt into his realist international-political theory; and his conception seems broadly similar with how classicals described Man: namely, as driven by two primary impulses, the drives to self-preservation and self-assertion. This seems remarkable for two reasons. First, because Waltz went to great length to disconnect international-political theory from the tutelage of human nature. Second, because Waltz denounces Morgenthau's assumption of a universal *animus dominandi* as a normative assertion that "one may accept or reject according to his inclination."[69]

In this light, then, Waltz seems no utopian in matters human nature. Nor does he seem a thorough conservative or Augustinian,[70] a claim that seems far-fetched, partly because Waltz seems too unreflective on the human nature issue. Still, there are similarities to first-image pessimists.

As mentioned earlier, Waltz revealed that behind his distrust of hegemonic power, and preference for balanced power, lies Niebuhr's "dim view of human nature."[71] Further, Waltz claims that he is deeply aware of "man's passion and irrationality."[72] Contra first-image optimists, he acknowledges that first-image pessimists "have expertly dismantled the air castles of the optimists."[73] Waltz credits the first-image pessimists for providing "a valuable warning, all too frequently ignored in modern history, against expecting too much from the application of reason to social and political problems."[74] This, of course, does not make Waltz an Augustinian or ultraconservative. But it helps understand that Waltz has not accomplished his mission of removing the concept of human nature from the International Relations discourse; also that Waltz's assumptions about human nature—however unreflective they may be—fit broadly with the assumptions of the classicals and post-classicals examined thus far. Waltzian Man wants to preserve his life and seeks to assert himself striving for domination, recognition, and pride.

This raises the question whether Waltz's realism shows any deeper implicit or explicit intellectual links to Freud's theory of human nature. According to my analysis, it seems far-fetched to establish such an intellectual relationship. Still, as is now argued, Waltz used Freud. The argument that Freud's theory of human nature plays even a little role in Waltz's political realism may seem peculiar, particularly because Waltz mentions Freud only rarely. But since quantities of references are not reliable indicators of possible intellectual links (this applies particularly to Freud), Waltz's comments on Freud should be examined. It will tell us that Waltz turns to Freud for argumentative assistance with regard to at least three timeless themes of international politics. The first issue concerns the widely held belief that authoritarian governments enjoy a strategic advantage over democracies when formulating and executing foreign policies. Waltz rejects this as myth on many grounds, and one of his arguments is particularly interesting. For it is purely psychological. It is a popular myth that authoritarian governments are capable of, or are perhaps better equipped to, ensure the unity of (foreign) policy, Waltz argues, because "the ruler is prey to the ills of the mind, perhaps the more so as his power approaches the absolute"; and this, he claims, is a basic psychological fact that is now fully known with the "advent of Freud."[75]

Regarding the question of how feasible it is to reduce international conflicts and wars by means of the logic of first-image optimists, Waltz turns to Freud again for argumentative support. In line with realist international-political theory, Waltz makes clear that he finds the analytical and prescriptive accounts of the causes of war and the causes of, and preconditions for, peace put forth by most first-image optimists wanting. First-image optimists,

Waltz writes, are "naive" and "idle dreamers."[76] Even if it was possible to eradicate, reduce, or divert the more aggressive of the human drives through either some large-scale efforts in humanistic education or by altering socio-economic and political injustices around the globe, it would, Waltz argues, "take generations before our efforts would affect the course of international relations."[77] And, in order to strengthen this particular argument, Waltz turns to Freud (quoting from his "Why War?") who warns us that the philo-sophical and practical sociopolitical strategy of waiting, or hoping, for Man to go through significant alterations of his psycho-instinctual configuration would remind him of the "ugly picture, of mills which grind so slowly that, before the flour is ready, men are dead of hunger."[78]

It is on another occasion in *Man, the State, and War,* however, where Waltz's explicit reference to Freud is perhaps most striking and reveal-ing. Waltz's skepticism of first/second-image explanations of, and ideas for, international politics is well-known. Equally well-known is one of the central tenets of his structural realism: that we must never fail to recognize that as long as the structural condition of international anarchy prevails, states always must be prepared to use military force in order to protect themselves and to help prevent the occurrence of war.[79] In other words, however the nature of Man or that of states may actually be, if there is anarchy, prepare for conflict. Quoting Freud in the epigraph of the chap-ter that does not deal with the first image but with the implications of the third image, Waltz turns again to Freud's "Why War?" referring to his argument that "so long as there are nations and empires, each prepared callously to exterminate its rival, all alike must be equipped for war."[80]

I have presented these three points of contact between Waltz and Freud for three reasons. First, to show that, like all the other classical and post-classical realists discussed here, Waltz, too, has read and used Freud in his international-political theory, though to a far lesser degree. Second, to show that, even though the Waltz/Freud connection is weaker than previous political realists' intellectual relationships with Freud, Freud seems to be at least part of Waltz's intellectual assumptions about the nature of Man and its effects vis-à-vis the international-political. And, third, to set the stage for putting forth an argument that is surely speculative: that the entirety of Waltz's intellectual project may have been the—conscious or unconscious—result of an underlying Freudian understanding of Man.

It seems puzzling that in *Man, the State, and War*, which is a critical examination of dozens of philosophers, social theorists, psychologists, behavioralists, and so forth, Waltz is somewhat neglecting Freud. Perhaps, Waltz simply forgot about Freud or found him unworthy discussing. This seems unlikely, for Waltz read Freud quoting him occasionally. An

alternative reason for Freud's omission is the exact opposite: rather than forgetting or loathing Freud, Waltz's realist international-political theory may be too aware of Freud. True, Waltz does not discuss Freud in the first-image chapters of *Man, the State, and War*, nor anywhere else; and this may suggest a potential indifference toward Freud. But, perhaps, Waltz omitted Freud because he realized that Freud does not fit in the picture that he attempted to paint of the naively dreaming first-image optimists. It may also well be that Waltz could not but omit Freud because he was some sort of hidden ally in Waltz's endeavor to move political realism from the first to the third image; perhaps Freud's ascent triggered Waltz's conclusion that the first and second image are a dead end for international-political theorists. This requires some explanation, which is as follows.

Waltz conceptualizes Man as a survival-seeker longing for universal domination, recognition, and pride, as passionate and irrational creature. Man, Waltz argues, has "many motives."[81] This is very important, for it is the "assumption of a fixed human nature, in terms of which all else must be understood," that makes it imperative, as Waltz argues, to "shift attention *away* from human nature."[82] It appears that it is none other than the assumption of a fixed irrational nature of Man that led Waltz to recognize the following dilemma: "How can a theory of international politics, which has to comprehend behavior that is indeterminate, possibly be constructed?"[83] How can we explain and predict (!) the behavior of irrational actors? This question is, ultimately, that of the locus of rationality and rational behavior. The internal logic of Waltz's political realism follows the internal logic of Freud's theory of Man. Similar to Freud, Waltz derives the rationality and rational behavior of actors from the nature of the structures, that is, from the structural conditions constraining the behavior of the actors exposed to such structure. In international politics, like "in societies of all sorts," Waltz argues, structural constraints affect unit behavior through, essentially, two mechanisms: socialization and competition.[84] These two "pervasive" and "fundamental processes" exert a powerfully constraining influence upon the actors who must "accommodate their ways to the socially most acceptable and successful practices."[85] We can see that Waltz's notion of rationality is not attached to actors; but being largely irrational, they often act rationally. Waltz's logic, therefore, does not need to assume the nicely calculating and utility-maximizing *homo oeconomicus*, but must simply assume that some actors, however irrational they may be, are capable of coping more effectively with the constraints of the overarching structure than others.[86]

This allows, then, to reconsider Waltz's sociostructural endeavor from a perhaps peculiar, Freudian perspective. Though Waltz did not consciously borrow from Freud, the similarities of Waltz's structural logic and Freud's

structural theory of the psyche are nevertheless striking. However, the difference is that Waltz raises it to a different level. Just as Freud argues that the rationality of Man and groups does not derive from a bundle of irrational drives (id), Waltz recognizes that significant top-down influences must be at work. And these sociological constraints are so powerful that they can make the behavior of both Man and groups rational (or appear to be intrinsically rationally). Just as Freud argues that those incapable of adapting to the demands of the super-ego (cultural norms) are punished by the system, Waltz argues that the international-political system punishes those states failing to comply with the prevailing international principles (political norms). Freudian Man suffers from guilt and neuroses; Waltzian states risk war and death. The ways how the system punishes its actors may be different; the general underlying logic of irrational rationality deriving from nature and society, respectively, is the same.

Upon closer inspection, then, Waltz's realist international-political theory, too, is infused with assumptions about human nature. The assumptions of self-preservation, self-assertion longing for recognition and pride, and irrationality are central ingredients of his allegedly human nature-purified structural realism. In comparison with other classicals, Herz and Kaplan, the question of a Freudian intellectual influence upon Waltz seems more ambiguous. We can see several points of contacts between Waltz and Freud, but the case for some sort of profound intellectual influence cannot be made. Though Waltz seems to be aware of the intricacies of human nature (on many levels), his political realism appears, ultimately, fairly unreflective about the nature of Man.

Mearsheimer, Offensive Structural Realism, and Human Nature

Mearsheimer tells us that "great powers seek to maximize their share of world power" with "hegemony as their final goal."[87] The locus of the power drive of states, however, rests not with Man or states, but with the prevailing structure of the international system. Similarly to Waltz, Mearsheimer argues that "[s]tructural factors such as anarchy and the distribution of power...are what matter most for explaining international politics," that offensive realism "pays little attention to individuals or domestic political considerations such as ideology," and that it "treat[s] states like black boxes or billiard balls."[88] But Mearsheimer also says that "the aim of states is to be the biggest and baddest dude on the block. Because if you're the biggest and baddest dude on the block, then it is highly unlikely that any other state will challenge you, simply because you're so powerful."[89] Is this some innocent

colloquial language or anthropomorphological language? Mearsheimer's offensive realism is equally hostile to the concept of human nature, but is, as I now argue, equally infused with hidden assumptions about the nature of Man; and these assumptions are equally unreflective when compared with the classicals, Herz and Kaplan.

Mearsheimer does not say much about the appropriate place of the concept of human nature in realist international-political theory. Unlike Waltz, Mearsheimer barely touches the surface of this complex issue, perhaps reckoning that Waltz already said all there was to say. His offensive structural realism is truly impressive, but Mearsheimer's remarks about the concept of human nature are meager. Acknowledging the variety of contemporary realist international-political theories, presenting his own broad typology, he distinguishes between his own offensive structural realism, Waltz's defensive structural realism, and human-nature realism.[90] Mearsheimer argues that human-nature realism, a terribly misleading term for classical realism, has its roots in Morgenthau. Influential from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, what is distinctive of human-nature realism is, according to Mearsheimer, that it is "based on the simple assumptions that states are led by human beings who have a 'will to power' hardwired into them at birth."[91]

Surely, Mearsheimer is skeptical about Morgenthauian human-nature realism. He agrees with Morgenthau on the question of how much power states seek, but the question why states seek power causes much of the disagreement; and this quarrel involves the concept of human nature. According to Mearsheimer, offensive structural realism "reject[s] Morgenthau's claim that states are naturally endowed with type A personalities."[92] This seems an interesting statement. First, it seems striking that Mearsheimer seriously lumps together Morgenthauian Man and Type A personalities; as if Morgenthau's Freudian-style assumptions about human nature have got anything to do with what psychologists consider individuals prone to heart diseases displaying behavioral patterns of extreme ambition, competitiveness, impatience, anger, and hostility.[93] Here, Mearsheimer seems, indeed, sloppy or unreflective vis-à-vis the concept of human nature and Morgenthauian-style political realism. Second, his dismissive comparison of Morgenthauian Man with Type A personalities makes his readers wonder whether Mearsheimer's move to the concept of the international structure stems from disagreeing with Morgenthauian realists over the nature of Man. This, however, is not the case. For Mearsheimer's realist international-political theory is built upon assumptions about human nature that fit nicely with classical realists.

As with all post-classicals, the tension in Mearsheimer's political realism stems from its claim to be a structural international-political theory. The independent variable is the distribution of capabilities across the international

system; the "structure of the international system, not the particular characteristics of individual great powers, causes them to think and act offensively and to seek hegemony."[94] This signifies its main difference to defensive realism and its pseudostructuralism. Mearsheimer, too, thinks that defensive realism suffers from a "status-quo bias."[95] This is a major rift between offensive and defensive realists pertaining to the empirical-analytical and normative realm. Given their analytical differences, offensive and defensive realists "generate radically different prescriptions for military doctrine, foreign economic policy, military intervention, and crisis management."[96] Despite these differences, Mearsheimerian and Waltzian political realisms agree on the explanatory locus for international-political outcomes. "For structural realists, human nature has little to do with why states want power. Instead, it is the structure or architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power."[97] This helps understand why Mearsheimer's political realism may be a theoretical cul-de-sac. It seems peculiar why like-units would display different behavioral patterns when being exposed to similar structural anarchical conditions: why would state A long for a considerable amount of power and state B seek the largest share of power? This paradox can be explained only by examining unit-level assumptions that are inbuilt into Mearsheimer's realist international-political theory. That great powers seek hegemony rather than the status-quo or considerate shares or surpluses of power derives from "five assumptions about the international system."[98] And Mearsheimer thinks highly of these assumptions. "Sound theories," he argues, "are based on sound assumptions" providing a "reasonably accurate representation of … life in the international system."[99]

Mearsheimer calls this the "911 problem," and his basic assumption is anarchy in the international-political system.[100] Anarchy does not mean chaos, disorder, war, but merely the absence of a centralized international authority. This does not reveal much about potentially hidden assumptions about human nature. But this changes when Mearsheimer assesses the future of anarchy. He sees a bright future for anarchy arguing that "both nationalism and the existing states in western Europe appear to be alive and well."[101] And even if states disappeared from our maps, other political entities such as city-states, tribes, or feudal principalities would emerge as the primary units of the international system.[102] The European Union, too, often hailed as the role model for transferring legal, economic, and cultural loyalties to larger governmental institutions, merely reflects, as Mearsheimer argues, the dynamics of the security and balance-of-power logic in an anarchical world. For such transformation owes less to transformed human consciousness and more to artificially suppressed balance-of-power concerns thanks to America's role as the European pacifier.[103] Without hesitation, he writes that "anarchy looks like it will be with us for a long time."[104] The primary reason

for this is nationalism; and the prevalence of national sentiments reveal a first facet of Mearsheimer's assumptions about human nature. If the group, regardless of whether it appears as tribes, city-states, or nation-states, seems a quasinatural entity, and Mearsheimer obviously holds the view that Man is some sort of group animal. Mearsheimerian Man appears like a deeply sociable creature but rather unsociable vis-à-vis members of the out-group.

Mearsheimer's realist international-political theory, however, displays further assumptions about human nature. Like Waltz, Mearsheimer emphasizes that states try to survive in the international-political system. Survival is "the primary goal of great powers."[105] States "seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order."[106] This is tantamount to saying that the primary goal of Man is to preserve his life. Some sort of innate drive to self-preservation, uncontroversial as it is, seems a significant assumption; for although Mearsheimer argues that states "can and do pursue other goals," they do make survival and, hence, security "their most important objective."[107] That Mearsheimerian Man seems a group animal driven by self-preservation does not explain sufficiently the causes of the intense security competition among states. Mearsheimer, therefore, adds two further assumptions: that great powers "inherently possess some offensive military capabilities" and that states can "never be certain about other states' intentions."[108]

Though not entirely unjustified, this appears almost ultrapessimistic. Regardless of their actual capabilities in terms of military, technology, or economic power, states, Mearsheimer argues, cannot avoid possessing offensive or aggressive capabilities. Mearsheimer refers to the truism that every weapon, even if designed for defensive purposes, may be used for aggressive endeavors. And Mearsheimer raises this point to the almost extreme arguing that even if there were no weapons available, Men "could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state"—an argument to which he somewhat menacingly adds: "After all, for every neck, there are two hands to choke it."[109] But it would be misleading that Mearsheimerian Man is some sort of violent butcher. For Mearsheimer explicitly argues that to arrive at a picture of international politics where states compete offensively for power, all of the five assumptions must be cumulatively present.[110] Still, Mearsheimerian Man seems no saint; and this raises the fourth assumption inbuilt into offensive realism: that states continually worry about the intentions of other states. As Mearsheimer argues,

no state can be sure that another state will not use its offensive military capability to attack the first state. This is not to say that states have necessarily hostile intentions. Indeed, all of the states in the system may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be sure of that judgment because

intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty. There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them.[111]

This seems odd, for it may now appear that international-political dilemmas result from (mis)interpreting each others' intentions. Unveiling real intentions of other actors is hardly possible, but Mearsheimer recognizes that the uncertainty-dilemma alone cannot sufficiently explain why the international-political system displays broad patterns of offensive realist state behavior. Hence, he makes (requires) another significant hidden assumption.

States may be treated as billiard balls, but Mearsheimer concedes that the dilemma lies with the nature of states, problematic political entities made up of problematic individuals. Mearsheimer argues that nonsecurity factors also play significant roles in international relations; "Security concerns alone cannot cause great powers to act aggressively. The possibility that at least one state might be motivated by non-security calculations is a necessary condition for offensive realism."[112] He sees two major nonsecurity motivations, one economical, the other psychological. With regard to the economical factor, Mearsheimer agrees with the strategic-trade theorists that states must assist domestic firms in gaining comparative competitive advantages over foreign firms to ensure national economic prosperity. The second nonsecurity factor why Mearsheimer finds liberal-institutionalist theories unpersuasive relates, ultimately, to the nature of Man. We must always reckon with "a psychological logic, which portrays individuals as caring about how well they do (or their state does) in a cooperative agreement, not for material reasons, but because it is human nature to compare one's progress with that of others."[113] Allowing psychology a place in his arguments, in *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Mearsheimer could not be more explicit on his general view on Man. To quote Butterfield, "[w]ars would hardly be likely to occur if all men were Christian saints."[114]

This brings us to Mearsheimer's fifth assumption. It concerns the question of rationality. Mearsheimer argues that "great powers are rational actors"; states "think strategically," they "consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival."[115] This seems to contradict his claim that intentions "can change quickly, so a state's intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next."[116] But, like other realists, Mearsheimer does not portray the state as a soberly minded rationally calculating *homo oeconomicus*. Instead, he seems to follow Waltz's thinner notion of rationality seeing rationality not as an innate quality of political entities, but rather flowing from the anarchical

structure of the international-political system. It is the international-political system, Mearsheimer argues, that "forces states to behave according to the dictates of realism, or risk destruction."[117] Hence, states are irrational acting rational. But although they may act rationally, we must not forget that they do so because the nature of the international-political system taught them so to avoid death. Mearsheimer does not assume bottom-up rationality, but a top-down rationality inclining states to maximize power.

The structure dictates actors to maximize power. This may well be. But this does not mean that Mearsheimer's realist international-political theory can dispense with making profound unit-level assumptions, that is, assumptions that are related, implicitly or explicitly, to a certain underlying conception of human nature. On balance, then, Mearsheimer's Man fits nicely with how classical and post-classical realists have conceptualized human nature. Man is a group animal seeking to preserve his life. Indeed, Man has many motives, but securing survival remains the primary concern; it is such a drive to self-preservation that causes the profound fear of death. As Mearsheimer writes, "Great powers fear each other."[118] This fear inclines states to long for the maximum amount of power; and, consequently, Mearsheimer does not allow for much change in international politics. Like with all political realists (and all political theory), any skepticism of the feasibility of a profound transformation of human affairs must derive, ultimately, from some sort of residue assumptions about human nature so powerful that they will not allow for such a change. Mearsheimer is no exception.

Neoclassical Realism, Prestige, and Human Nature

The latest theoretical innovation of realist international-political theory, neoclassical realism considers itself as the legitimate heir to classical realism representing a fascinating body of work by a new generation of realists increasingly dissatisfied with purely Waltzian-style accounts of international politics. These political realists retain structural realism's emphasis on international-political anarchy, balance-of-power considerations, and systemic constraints, but move beyond it as they argue that any empirical analysis of international politics must not leave aside first-image and second-image variables. They seem right in conceptualizing the international-political system as the realm where "flesh-and-blood officials actually make foreign policy decisions";[119] further, the relations among nations are, indeed, merely "politics writ large."[120] Still, neoclassical realism differs significantly from its classical ancestors, for neoclassicals are, as they say, closer to structural realism than classical realism in that they do not base their international-political theorizing upon the concept of human nature. As is now argued, however, this does not mean that their

political realisms are purified of assumptions about human nature. Instead, neoclassical realism is infused with such assumptions; and these are not only similar to those of the classicals and post-classicals but also fairly fundamental to neoclassical international-political theory. This can be shown by examining one of its core concerns: the role of prestige in international politics.

That the relations among nations are characterized by not only a profound (rational) struggle for power and security, but also a profound (irrational) struggle for prestige, is known not only since the neoclassicals. That political communities (and Men) are longing for prestige has been a theoretical corner-stone of the philosophy of political realism since its birth. Whether we look at Thucydides' motivational assumptions of actors striving relentlessly for security, self-interest, and honor; at Machiavelli's triadic set of assumptions security, liberty, and glory; or at Hobbes's tripartite motivational scheme of competition, diffidence, and glory, we can identify that one particular theme of human affairs, one underlying motivational assumption, has been recurrent in the history of realist international-political theory: the prestige motive, the "individual or collective desire for public recognition of eminence as an end in itself."[121] Classical realists, too, recognized the ubiquity and force of the prestige motive inherent in international politics. As Morgenthau argued, "Actually, the policy of prestige, however exaggerated and absurd its uses may have been at times, is as intrinsic an element of the relations between nations as the desire for prestige is of the relations between individuals."[122] Man strives for prestige, lusts for the tribute by fellow Men recognizing his moral goodness, education, and physiological or psychological force. And so do political communities. Following the same internal psychological logic, raised merely to a different level, the policy of prestige seeks to "impress other nations with the power one's own nation actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses."[123]

In the wake of classical realism, neoclassicals, too, recognize the force of the prestige motive in international politics; and it is this emphasis that helps understand how infused their political realisms are with underlying assumptions about human nature. Skeptical of purely structural explanations of international politics, neoclassicals criticize structural realism for regarding the role and nature of its state-motivational assumptions. As mentioned (and refuted), Waltz says he built defensive structural realism on the single unit-level assumption that states seek survival. This is problematic. For, as Randall Schweller points out, there is no direct causal pathway linking the survival motive to intense security and power competition: "What triggers security dilemmas under anarchy is the possibility of predatory states existing among the ranks of the units the system comprises. Anarchy and self-preservation alone are not sufficient to explain the war of all against all."[124] This calls the

attention to these predatory states—and their nature; the point is straight-forward: predatory states cannot be driven by security concerns alone, they are after revisionist or nonsecurity goals as well. Conceptualizing states as mere security-maximizers is flawed, for this fails recognizing that aggression derives not so much from the dictates of anarchy and security dilemma but has its roots in often nonsecurity matters such as satisfying greed, longing for cultural hegemony, following divine right, seeking revenge.[125]

This line of argument is not new. Not many have believed that states are merely security-maximizers. Recognizing that states are security-maximizers and are driven by expansionist nonsecurity goals is widespread among classical realists who distinguished between status-quo and imperialistic powers, status-quo and revolutionary states, status-quo and revisionist states, or between "haves" and "have-nots."[126] That neoclassicals recognize these basic distinctions between states and move beyond the simple survival-assumption, is important. For the fact that neoclassicals seem to have a more realist(ic) understanding of the nature of political communities recognizing that we deal with largely irrational entities helps unearthing their hidden assumptions about human nature.

Compared with Waltzian state-motivational assumptions, following classical realists, neoclassicals recognize the irrational element of political communities emphasizing the significance of matters prestige in international politics. Waltz's argument that states would not strive for additional increments of power or profit once such behavior could compromise their security situation is convincingly criticized. Defensive structural realism, it says, privileges concerns for security over concerns for maximizing power, but this contradicts the historical record:

> History is replete with examples of states whose first concern was to maximize . . . their power; who risked their security to improve, not maintain, their positions in the system. Alexander the Great, Rome, the Arabs in the seventh and eighth centuries, Charles V, Philip II, Napoleon I, and Hitler all lusted for universal empire and waged all-or-nothing, apocalyptic wars to attain it.[127]

This argument is significant suggesting that in international politics, we must always reckon with "very hungry states" that are, just as "terminally ill patients," very willing to "take great risk—even if losing the gamble means extinction–to improve their condition, which they consider intolerable."[128]

More importantly, the condition states consider intolerable and seek to change by whatever means possible is not necessarily a material condition characterized by lack of security or prospering economy. Instead, that states

choose the revisionist path often relates to the distribution of prestige within the international-political system governed by a "hierarchy of prestige"; as Robert Gilpin argues, "prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency of international relations."[129] States having their prestige recognized enjoy a greater amount of bargaining and leverage than those that can lay little claim to prestige. It is, then, the ensuing hierarchy of prestige that leads to dynamic dangerous international-political processes when the actual and potential world order is at stake. It is the discrepancies between the actual hierarchy of prestige and the actual distribution of power that cause the prevailing order "to break down as perceptions catch up with realities of power."[130] Neoclassical realism agrees. But there remains a crucial difference regarding the conceptualization of prestige. For, as neoclassicals point out, such understanding of prestige is somewhat instrumental implying that "states pursue prestige so as to demonstrate their power rather than as an end in itself."[131]

Against the political-realist ancestors, neoclassicals see the prestige motive, its nature and force, differently. States do not merely long for prestige as means to an end. Rather, they seek prestige as an end itself. This is a significant difference that demonstrates that the political communities are not some sort of rationally sober security and power-maximizers but somewhat irrational entities often acting against all the reasonable dictates provided by the international-political system. According to neoclassicals, it is a historical fact of international-political life that states are driven by security concerns and driven equally—if not often even to a greater degree—by prestige concerns. Like Men, states long for security, and for recognition and respect as well.[132] And this pursuit of prestige is necessarily relative, perpetual, social, and—above all—irrational: relative because it is a zero-sum game; perpetual because the "thirst for prestige" is limitless; socially constructed because the drive for prestige comes in varying degrees of rigor.[133]

However, the longing for prestige is irrational. Just as Man strives for prestige-displaying behavior that appears from a material-rationalist standpoint entirely irrational compromising even his primordial drive to live by means of choosing death, states, too, often behave utterly strange in light of what would be suggested by any reasonable risk or loss/gain assessment.[134] Purely structural explanations fail, for they downplay the irrational element in human affairs. In this regard, Randall Schweller points to the 1980s Iran-Iraq crisis:

> Iran fought not for survival but for total victory in a Holy War against the infidels. In the eyes of Shi'ite fundamentalists, God demands Holy Wars and, in such wars, sanctions the gratification of aggression without

guilt. Since the infidel, too, benefits from his own death, war is not only a blessing for the world and all nations: it is a form of cultural therapy.[135]

This case may not perfectly capture the prestige problem in international politics as this conflict was also one of intense religious-theological rivalry. But, as we know, the longing of prestige, that is, for recognition and respect, rarely appears in isolation. More important is the fact that Ayatollah Khomeini decided to continue fighting against Iraq in 1985 when chances for victory were extremely thin; from a strictly rational point of view, in light of hard facts, Khomeini's decision seems nonsensical, irrational.

Like classicals, then, neoclassicals tell us that many of the problems for international-political theorists and foreign policy makers derive from the fact that we deal with political entities that are, frankly, irrational, often dangerously irrational. It is interesting, however, how neoclassicals explain the often irrational actions of states; namely, by what structural realists would denounce as "reductionist" arguments that, in turn, reveal a lot about hidden assumptions of human nature. Attempting to make sense of the seemingly irrational decision by Khomeini to continue fighting, Schweller, for example, turns to psychoanalytic material drawing from psychoanalyst Vamik Volkan's insightful *Need to Have Enemies and Allies* that argues that war is some sort of collective therapy.[136] When we leave aside all the specifics, it becomes clear that by drawing from the psychoanalytical literature, Schweller has implicitly or explicitly taken up particular assumptions about human nature in his discourse on international relations. That war is some form of psychological group therapy, not merely the rational Clausewitzian continuation of politics by other means due to structural balance-of-power constraints, derives from an understanding that Man is obviously inclined to define his identity against the other, to define as enemies those belonging to the out-group. Such psychological dynamics, found in much of classical realism, derive from a particular set of psychoanalytic assumptions about human nature relating, ultimately, back to Freud.[137]

This does not necessarily imply that all neoclassical realists are Freudians in disguise. They may or they may not be, to confirm which would require a more thorough examination expanding the analytical focus. We can, however, say that like in the cases of Waltz and Mearsheimer, these post-classical realists present intriguing international-political theories but appear fairly unreflective vis-à-vis the concept of human nature in realist international-political theory as neoclassical realism is infused with hidden assumptions about human nature.

Neoclassical Man is not a one-dimensional creature merely seeking survival. The drive to self-preservation is, of course, a significant motivational

assumption. But, alone, it cannot explain why states often behave differently than Waltzian realism would suggest. Expansionist state behavior cannot merely derive from a survival concern. Instead, Men and states are driven by multiple motivational forces: "The general point is that interests, values, ideology, and strategic beliefs are...just as important as imbalances of power or threat in determining how states choose sides and why they wage war."[138] These interests, values, ideologies, and beliefs, however, are not always of purely materialistic-rational origin. On the contrary, they derive from a mixture of concerns for security and prestige, honor, glory, respect, and recognition. But the longing for prestige, that is, the drive for collective recognition, is conceptually not too distant to what Morgenthau called the instinct of self-assertion. As was the case with the classical realists, the fact that states place such a high value on prestige is, ultimately, the outgrowth of implicitly or explicitly underlying assumptions about the nature of Man that help explain not only why Man longs for security and self-assertion (prestige, recognition, honor, glory), but also why these motivational concerns are raised to a different level, the level of the state. In short, international tragedies do not derive from anarchy but from Man, the nature of Man.

Neoclassical Man, then, fits well with how classical and post-classical realists have conceptualized human nature. Man is neither a utility-maximizing *homo oeconomicus* nor inherently aggressive or sadistic. Neoclassicals portray Man as driven by concerns for his own self-preservation and by concerns for prestige or self-assertion. They seem to recognize that Man's inclination to survival is not sacrosanct and often overridden by impulse discharges that seem, prima facie, irrational. This is a significant turn of events; for even though neoclassicals are not as reflective about human nature as the classicals, these political realists seem to have returned to a more realist(ic) set of assumptions about human nature.

In (Partial) Defense of Post-Classical Realism

In the wake of examining and reinterpreting the assumptions about human nature of several leading classicals realists, this chapter's analysis of the post-classicals suggests that we should seriously reconsider their intellectual projects as well as the post-classical realist project itself. This implies criticism, but also sympathetic defense. First, even from a largely realist-sympathetic perspective, we cannot wish away that these post-classical realisms are infused with hidden assumptions about human nature. Second, despite post-classical realism's "human-nature lie," we must defend these post-classicals against some unwarranted human nature–related criticism. But, third, despite this defense, one cannot but be struck by these post-classicals' degree of unreflectiveness

vis-à-vis the concept of human nature. And this, unfortunately, has helped to put contemporary realist international-political theory into a rather unpleasant politico-theoretical situation requiring to be dealt with.

The post-classical realist project to free political realism from the tutelage of the concept of human nature has failed. Despite all rhetoric to the contrary, virtually all of those who were presented as the most prominent exponents of post-classical realism smuggle in certain assumptions about the nature of Man. This is odd, particularly because these post-classicals have blamed the classicals for relying on such assumptions denouncing them as if these classical realists were a bunch of prescientific crude pseudo-international-political storytellers; in this regard, let us recall Waltz who once said rather snappishly that "what Morgenthau did was translate [Friedrich] Meinecke from German to English."[139]

Thus, we must recognize that post-classical realism is still dominated by underlying assumptions about human nature. And, similar to some of the classicals, these assumptions are partly inspired by Freudian psychology. Despite all their intellectual efforts stemming, save Herz, from their deep-seated concerns with the philosophy of sciences, post-classical realists fail to meet their promise leaving behind the days of Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style theorizing about international politics. Though perhaps the closest to the classicals, this is true of Herz's realist liberalism. Herz does not present us with an international-political theory where it is irrelevant whether Man is naturally peaceful or cooperative or aggressive or domineering. Herz makes his arguments through the concept of the security dilemma, a prima facie sociostructural concept. But if one takes a closer look, it is easily recognizable that Herz cannot avoid making assumptions about the nature of Man. Without human nature, he cannot explain the roots and dynamics of the security dilemma, both societal and international. The security dilemma does not derive from *extra*-human international-political structures but rather from the nature of Man. If Herzian Man was not some sort of Freudian-style ambivalent group animal that is driven by both self-preservation and other-regard, the international-political scene could not be explained in terms of a dynamic and profound cycle of intense security and power competition among the actors. The systemic-scientific international-political theory of Kaplan, too, cannot avoid making assumptions about the nature of Man. Kaplan smuggles in a set of state-motivational assumptions (power maximizing, security maximizing, compassion) that are, after all, assumptions about the nature of Man. Further, Kaplan anthropomorphizes the concept of the international-political system and ascribes to it human qualities; and these are taken from Freud.

Among post-classical realists, however, Freud does now begin to fall out of the picture. But the concept of human nature does not. Like Kaplan,

the defensive structural realism of Waltz does equally work with profound state-motivational assumptions. Taken together with his other, though rare, thin and indirect comments about the nature of Man, a picture emerges of a Waltzian international-political theory that is by no means freed from the concept of human nature. The picture of a Waltzian Man emerges who, not entirely unlike Morgenthau's Man, is far from being a *homo oeconomicus*–style creature. Instead, it is driven predominantly by both self-preservation as well as self-assertion (recognition, pride). Mearsheimer's political realism, too, is built upon assumptions about human nature. Mearsheimerian Man is a group animal placing utmost value on his longing for self-preservation and is much more fearful than Waltz's Man seeking somewhat frantically to obtain the maximum share of power. If not in terms of profound assumptions about the nature of Man, Mearsheimer could not explain why state A longs for a reasonable amount of power and state B for a maximum share of power being both exposed to the same international-political structural conditions. The neoclassical Man, too, fits with how both classical and post-classical realists conceptualize the nature of Man. Part of the neoclassical assumption about human nature is that Man is neither a mere utility-maximizer nor inherently sadistic or violent. Rather, we are dealing with an irrational creature concerned with self-preservation and prestige (self-assertion) vis-à-vis his fellows.

These post-classical realists reveal to be profoundly informed by assumptions about human nature. Their international-political theories make use of assumptions about the nature of Man that are not only essentially the same as those used by the classicals. They also make assumptions of such kind and strength that, as they had argued when formulating their realisms, would and should never appear any longer in realist international-political theory. Despite their "human-nature lie," these post-classicals must be rescued from some of the charges being brought against them by critics standing outside of political realism; most of these charges seem unfair, and similar counter-arguments that already saved most of the classical realists apply—though to a lesser degree—when it comes to the assumptions about human nature of post-classical realists. The popular charges by critics should be refuted.

The common charge that post-classicals share a tendency to overemphasize Man's longing for power seems misleading. Surely, power does play an important role; and these political realists surely emphasize that Man seeks power, either as means to an overarching end (survival) or in the form of a profound longing for prestige (or what Morgenthau called self-assertion). One should not overlook, however, that all these political realists, from Herz to the neoclassicals, share an understanding of human nature that does not consider Man to be some sort of *homo oeconomicus*–style one-dimensional Lasswellian *homo politicus* seeking nothing but power. Instead, all these

political realists, and particularly Herz, share the view that Man is driven by a variety of physiological-psychological forces. Prominent among those forces is the innate inclination to affiliate with fellow Men and form and enter groups causing, ultimately, the in-group/out-group dynamics of much of international relations.

The second prominent criticism also needs qualification. Post-classicals are being confronted with the charge that they rely on an image of Man that is utterly oversimplified and unsophisticated. This, however, seems only partially correct. We should distinguish carefully between the earlier and later post-classicals. When we look at, for example, Mearsheimer, part of the criticism is not entirely unjustified. What he offers us is, in comparison with the classical realists, an extremely thin account of human nature that does not really move much beyond the mere quoting of Butterfield's assertion that Man has never been a saint. But the critics cannot, and must not, lump together a Mearsheimer with a Herz or a Kaplan. In contrast to the later post-classicals, Herz and Kaplan seem quite reflective when it comes to the nature of Man and the human condition. Herz, in particular, offers us a fairly lengthy treatment of the psychological bases of the security dilemma, that is, of the assumptions about human nature that inform his international-political theory. In this sense, oddly enough being the inventor of the security dilemma, Herz's approach is reminiscent of how classicals theorize the international-political. No other post-classical is as careful, open, and reflective vis-à-vis the nature of Man as was Herz.

The need for distinguishing between the earlier and later post-classicals is also warranted when it comes to the charge that these political realists' assumptions about human nature are not only one-dimensional but also the product of purely metaphysical speculations. All these post-classicals make assumptions about the nature of Man that inform their respective international-political theories. But only the assumptions of Herz and Kaplan can be considered as being attributable to an intellectual source. This source seems Freudian psychology and this helps to defend them from the charge of metaphysical speculation. This changes when we turn to Waltz, Mearsheimer, and the neoclassicals. Their assumptions about human nature are much harder, if not impossible, to defend. For they appear to be too implicit, too scattered, too unsystematic.

This raises, and helps understand, the third implication of this chapter's discussion of post-classical realism. Several leading post-classical realisms are built upon some very profound assumptions about the nature of Man. And these assumptions become increasingly unreflective. This is to be criticized, particularly because the history of realist international-political theory almost mirrors the historical evolution of how we came to think of

the nature of Man. But this must not turn our attention away from recognizing one very fundamental dilemma of post-classical realism putting the whole of contemporary realist international-political theory in an awkward politico-theoretical position: namely, that post-classicals have smuggled in assumptions about human nature in spite of their explicit politico-theoretical aim to free political realism from the Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian tutelage of human nature. This profound failure of post-classical realism, then, means, of course, that the concept of human nature is not dead in the contemporary political-realist discourse of international relations. This may delight those who have always been critical of realist international-political theory. For the fact that contemporary political realism is still heavily reliant upon assumptions about human nature provides them with easy politico-theoretical ammunition helping them to repeat the same old intellectual story of how wrong political realists are drawing wrong politico-theoretical conclusions from false premises about human nature.

Post-classical realism led contemporary realist international-political theory into a theoretical cul-de-sac. And political realists must deal with this now. This implies focusing on the natural follow-up question that derives from the results and arguments of the two preceding chapters. I reinterpreted the assumptions about human nature of classical realism; unearthed the largely hidden assumptions about human nature of post-classical realism; defended both classical and post-classical realist assumptions about human nature against unwarranted criticism. Taking together my readings of classical and post-classical realists, I argued that the concept of human nature seems more alive than dead in contemporary realist international-political theory. This raises the normative follow-up question: if human nature is not dead, *ought* it to be dead?

PART II

Ought Human Nature To Be Dead?

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CHAPTER 4

Human Nature and the Political: Criticism and Countercriticism

The two preceding chapters argued that the concept of human nature is not dead. Whether classical realism or post-classical realism, almost all contemporary realist international-political theory is infused with (hidden) assumptions about human nature. Still, both classicals and post-classicals had to be defended against unsubstantiated criticism. Exposing the human-nature lie of post-classical realism, however, helped to shed light on how it put the philosophy of political realism in an intellectually uncomfortable and defensive position vis-à-vis its critics. This is unsatisfactory requiring realist international-political theory to deal anew with the human-nature question, a question that post-classicals thought was dealt with more than half a century ago: Does political realism require the concept of human nature? Does political realism require a conception of Man functioning as the philosophical basis of its forays into the international-political?

The ought-question is significant in its own right, but dealing with it seems a pressing and timely concern considering the negative implications for political realism stemming from neglecting the human-nature baggage of classical realism by classical-inspired International Relations theorists and their own human-nature baggage by post-classical realists. Political realism has maneuvered itself into a politico-theoretical cul-de-sac; and, as I see it, realist international-political theory has two options requiring choosing between two ideal-typical politico-theoretical positions. Either political realism reinvents itself and redesigns its international-political theory making it autonomous from assumptions about human nature; this implies

purifying realist international-political theory of the concept of human nature, making it a truly post-classical, purely structural-sociological body of international-political theories. Or, alternatively, political realism reinvents itself by reconstructing its international-political theories proactively allowing assumptions about the nature of Man inform realist international-political theorizing; this implies infusing political realism with assumptions about human nature taking it back to its roots, to an intelligent classical-style body of international-political theory dealing with Man, the human condition, and the international-political.

The first part of the chapter argues for the latter option, that the concept of human nature ought not to be dead in realist international-political theory. Recognizing, needless to say, that the concept of human nature can be extremely dangerous, that it often has been misused and abused in human affairs, there is nothing inherently wrong with theorizing the international-political by drawing from well-specified assumptions about human nature. In contrast to the next chapter, which presents a positive set of arguments why political realism cannot dispense with making assumptions about the nature of Man, the present argumentative strategy is largely negative criticizing those critical of the concept of human nature. This requires, to begin with, an analytical account of the various sets of criticisms arguing against the admissibility of the concept of human nature in matters human affairs, be they social, political, or international-political. What will be referred to as the six sins of human nature representing powerful arguments for cutting off human nature from realist international-political theory, however, must be taken with a pinch of salt. Most of the critics' concerns are legitimate, but, still, their arguments seem too weak for being capable of deciding the ought-question in the negative.

Two sets of countercriticisms stand out. First, as argued in the subsequent section, much of the human-nature criticism is unconvincing as it fails to recognize, or does not wish to recognize, the hidden complexities involved in the application of the concept of human nature in matters political and international-political. The concept of human nature is not, per se, bad. Being not some sort of the politico-theoretical A-bomb as it is sometimes painted by the critics, the complexity-argument does not allow the critics to decide the ought-question. Second, as argued in the then-following section critiquing the critics, we must not gloss over what will be referred to as the omnipresence-argument. The concept of human nature may be tricky, even dangerous, and at any rate complex. It can be shown, however, that not only realist international-political theory but virtually all other philosophies critical of the concept of human nature are, ultimately, based upon certain conceptions about the nature of Man.

In light of the six sins of human nature and the two sets of countercriticisms leveled at the human-nature critics, we may conclude, then, that the question whether the concept of human nature ought to be dead in political realism has certainly not been decided the way post-classicals and human-nature critics want it. To the contrary, it now seems as if it were, at any rate, impossible to construct international-political theories, realist or otherwise, that are truly purified from assumptions about human nature. From a classical-realist perspective, this is a valuable first step in a more promising direction. I am not hesitant, however, to say that in order to decide the ought-question in favor of the concept of human nature, an additional set of positive arguments is required, to gain of which is the task of the next chapter.

Six Sins of Human Nature

Dealing with the widespread criticism, this section presents what may be called the six sins of the concept of human nature. This is necessary. First, because it provides the backdrop against which the next two sections will present what may be the most striking vices of such human-nature criticism. Second, because political realists have not paid much attention to the (allegedly) problematic dimension of the concept of human nature: it was not really an issue in the pre-Waltzian era in which the concept of human nature was some sort of quasinatural element of realist international-political theorizing since ancient Greece; and it was neglected by most of the post-classicals who seem to have accepted, perhaps too readily, the relevant arguments brought forward by Herz, Kaplan, and Waltz. In the wake of the rising critical mood of early post-classicals, it seems that a new generation of political realists embarked on their projects constructing (allegedly) human nature-purified realist international-political theories without having reflected in greater depth about functions, virtues, and vices of what they learnt is an antiquated concept of a bygone prescientific era.

This neglect, however, is unsatisfactory. It helped stifling a proper debate about whether assumptions about human nature ought to be admissible in realist international-political theory. Yet exactly such debate seems more pressing than ever, given the continuing presence of assumptions about human nature in contemporary political realism; it cannot be avoided any longer. Needless to say, that a debate has been missing does not mean that there is nothing to debate. To the contrary, arguing in favor of the concept of human nature is not a straightforward affair. Classical-style realists professing themselves openly to be fond of the concept of human nature are almost automatically on the defensive side of the argument provoking all sorts of suspicions. And even though these Pavlovian-style hostile reactions can be shown to be largely unjustified (below), we cannot but recognize that

the question whether realist international-political theory ought to be based upon profound assumptions about the nature of Man is being asked against the background of a more or less deeply hostile intellectual scenery. This skepticism toward human nature, then, dictates the argumentative approach for answering the ought-question. As a first task, it requires coming to terms with the criticisms, suspicions, and (almost hysterical) fears. While the next two sections deal with defending the concept of human nature, this section provides an analytical account of human-nature criticism.[1]

To begin with, critics of human nature almost always argue that the conceptions of human nature used in (international-)political theories[2] are either too unscientific and/or futile as their philosophical starting points. This form of standard criticism, the critique of metaphysical speculation, is a prominent argumentative weapon used by natural/life scientists but also, in a related yet different form, by postmetaphysical theorists; both, however, raise it against social-scientific and humanistic-philosophical political theories. Enjoying ever greater popularity in the neuroscientific age, these critics' line of argument is fairly straightforward: What is gained from turning, let's say, to Rousseau's philosophy of history?[3] In the twenty-first century, to seek (neuro)scientific evidence, who cares that an eighteenth-century Rousseau tells us that Man is driven by *amour-propre*; that savage man wanders alone nourishing himself; is without foresight, curiosity, education, reason, contact; is independent and concerned with self-preservation only; envisions only most basic needs showing pity and compassion having no desire to harm fellow men? These critics deny that such Rousseauian account of Man counts as a proper theory of human nature, considering it, at best, as an interesting set of generalizations about the nature of Man largely based on observation and introspection—why use it, then, as the basis for contemporary political theorizing? Needless to say, the same criticism applies to almost the entire canon of Western (political) philosophy.

Perhaps quite naturally from their perspective, contemporary natural/life scientists are skeptical when analytical and/or normative links are established between political theory and something as complex as human nature. And this form of skepticism of what are deemed as purely metaphysical speculations received large parts of its impetus from the philosophy of the Vienna Circle. In their 1929 manifesto, its members called for a scientific world-conception aimed at "removing the metaphysical and theological debris of millennia."[4] Rejecting classical metaphysics, their empiricism and positivism "knows no unconditionally valid knowledge derived from pure reason, no 'synthetic judgments a priori' or of the kind that lie at the basis of Kantian epistemology and even more of all pres- and post-Kantian ontology and metaphysics."[5] One of its protagonists, Herbert Feigl, summed up nicely

the Vienna Circle's position admitting that we "were deeply imbued with the conviction that we had found a 'philosophy to end all philosophies.' "[6]

The project of the "philosophy to end all philosophies" helps understand part of the contemporary skepticism toward the (alleged) human-nature speculations by philosophers, theologians, and political theorists such as Morgenthau and Niebuhr. There is, of course, much disagreement within these antimetaphysical, empiricist-positivist scientific circles; it is hotly debated whether human nature may be best understood by focusing on genes, molecules, or neurons, the various approaches of the biological, physical, and neurosciences, respectively. Still, their skepticism unites them, creating a strong opposition against Aristotelian-essentialist approaches to human nature in political theory. And the same sort of skepticism is applied to classical-style political realism. International Relations theorists from within and without classical-realist circles say that these political realists' assumptions about human nature are too vague, too speculative, ergo useless. Morgenthau, perhaps, suffered the most being accused that he "merely asserts [his theory of Man] as correct";[7] that his realism is "based on *a priori* assumptions about human nature."[8] Political realists, too, faulted Niebuhr and Morgenthau for relying on theology and metaphysics, not on science, and turned to Darwinian evolutionary theory and neuroscience seeking scientific human-nature grounding.[9] Trying to defend classicals and post-classicals against such charges in the two previous chapters, these critics' argumentative strategy remains a powerful voice in the human-nature debate.

Yet, further, there is another dimension, a perhaps even more critical dimension, to the critique of metaphysical speculation concerning one of the most central and heatedly debated issues in contemporary political philosophy: the method of political philosophy, that is, the question of the analytical and normative relationship between theorizing the political, moral, and ethical ought and the present cumulative knowledge available about human nature. To what extent may the validity of fundamental political, moral, and ethical principles depend on the validity of our (scientific) knowledge about human nature?[10] In this regard, the criticism takes two forms. First, the concept of human nature falls victim in the context of a wider attack against fact-based or fact-dependent judgments of politico-philosophical and ethical principles. Contra Rawlsian constructivism, Scanlon's contractualism, Gauthier's contractarianism, and ideal observer theory, G.A. Cohen argues that the truth or validity of fundamental normative principles must be "fact-insensitive" meaning that principles must stand the philosophical test irrespective of the nature, truth, or validity of the facts on which they are based. The argument is that a principle "can respond to . . . a fact only because it is

also a response to a more ultimate principle that is not a response to a fact," and Cohen concludes that "accordingly, if principles respond to facts, then the principles at the summit of our conviction are grounded in no facts whatsoever."[11] This argument about fact-insensitivity, of course, applies particularly to facts about human nature representing often the central ingredient to, or assumption of, political, moral, and ethical theorizing.

The second point of criticism concerns the (allegedly) inherently normative character of the concept of human nature. To these skeptics, part of the problem with human nature stems from the political and moral philosophy of perfectionism (or naturalism, humanism, eudaimonism), that is, from the "fundamental idea that what is good, ultimately, is the development of human nature."[12] The perfectionist philosophy begins by presuming a well-specified account and, in a second step, deduces, designs, and legitimizes human, social, and political institutions that they think foster most effectively the conception of human nature assumed. Put differently, perfectionists hold the powerful view that the notion of the good, the conception of the good life, lies already in, or reveals itself through, the concept of human nature. Clearly, the perfectionist endeavor is powerful. But it is dangerously powerful, for perfectionists seem to suggest that the "order of the cosmos and human nature, the stages of secular and sacred history provided normatively laden facts that…could also disclose the right way to live."[13] In the context of their human nature-based theorizing, most perfectionists are led to argue against forms of state neutrality, in spite of all social facts of competing value-frameworks and life-projects.[14] Needless to say, much of liberalism and contemporary social-contract theory argues for state neutrality, precisely because of the fact to account for what Rawls' political liberalism has called "reasonable pluralism."[15] The concept of human nature, critics argue, does not fit well with competing conceptions of the good and the fact of pluralism; what is needed is a postmetaphysical theory of the ought, that is, a post-human-nature theory of the ought.

While the critique of metaphysical speculation takes issue with what is regarded as the more or less antiquated, static, and methodological problematic human-nature wisdom of Western philosophy, the second major criticism against using assumptions about human nature in political theory—the critique of ideological mystification—represents a much more radical attack. J. Roland Pennock has it right that "as long as men have speculated about the nature of politics, it has been common to relate it to the nature of man" and that even though different thinkers "focused upon the differences among kinds of human nature, whether of gold, of silver, or of bronze," there was hardly any dispute that one could identify a "common substratum."[16] This, however, changed. Largely thanks to the ascent of postmodern thought,

the focus of the human-nature debate has shifted away from the question of whether Man is, so to speak, of gold, silver, or bronze toward more prior questions: Is there something like a human nature? Is it sensible to speak of a "common substratum" using the concept of human nature?

Postmodernists answer these questions in the negative; and their criticism must be seen against the Enlightenment project. It used to be argued that transcendental social and political principles must, ultimately, be based on a sound knowledge of Man. The *dictum* was that sound conceptions of human nature provide sound foundations for sound political theories. Hence, what Lyotard called the "incredulity toward metanarratives,"[17] postmodernists are deeply suspicious of political theorizing based upon the concept of human nature and dislike the very idea of *a* nature of Man. Rather than seeing the concept of human nature as some sort of innocuous philosophical basis for political theorizing, they argue that "under the guise of a benevolent concern for the good of all humankind, the real purpose of the human-nature myth is to impose one particular set of male Eurocentric values on to the rest of the world."[18] And denouncing the very idea of *a* nature of Man, postmodernists follow Foucault's Nietzschean argument that "nothing in man, not even his body, is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men."[19] Postmodernists do not recognize a universal substratum of Man; they do not allow the concept of human nature be the basis for political theorizing. Advancing a similar argument contra foundationalist philosophers such as Plato, Aquinas, or Kant, Richard Rorty sees it as one of the most "important intellectual advance[s]" of twentieth-century philosophy that "we are much less inclined than our ancestors were to take 'theories of human nature' seriously," that "we are much less inclined to pose the ontological question 'What *are* we?.'" We have come to recognize, he argues, "that the main lesson of both history and anthropology is our extraordinary malleability"; in consequence, we were "coming to think of ourselves as the flexible, protean, self-shaping animal rather than as the rational animal or the cruel animal."[20]

To some extent, feminists share postmodernists' concerns. Like postmodernism, feminism has become a rich diverse body of thought. Uniting them, however, is their strong opposition against naturalistic theories of gender differences.[21] And even though not necessarily from a postmodern angle, with varying degrees of radicalism, feminists reject what they regard as some form of dangerous conservative ethnocentric Western-white-male universalism. They criticize androcentric human-nature universalisms that, they think, characterize much of political theory, including realism.[22] With postmodernists, feminists share the conviction that there is no such thing as a transcendental nature of Man arguing that putting forth theories of

human nature represents nothing but a "damaging form of ideological mystification,"[23] a vicious attempt by the powerful seeking to silence dissident voices as there seems no easier line of argument, or easier excuse, than hiding behind an assumed nature of Man causing all earthly evils.

Equally hostile arguments against the foundational role of assumptions about human nature in matters political are raised by another powerful group. Representing the third sin of the concept of human nature, these critics put forth what may be called the dogmatic-ahistoricism argument. Their line of argument against the concept of human nature is fairly straightforward. Even if it was possible to identify the universal essence of Man, such a theory of human nature would, nevertheless, be more or less useless for political theorizing. For even though it could provide us with a theory of the *nature* of Man, it would not necessarily help us understand more effectively human and social behavior, would not be capable of telling us whether human and social actions are, ultimately, purely determined by this or that *nature* of Man. Put differently, these critics argue that Man is a thoroughly historical creature shaped by the currently prevailing modes of production and social-environmental circumstances.

Representing an extremely powerful argumentative strategy against human-nature theorizing, this line of argument roots in Marxian historical-materialism and has, roughly from the 1960s onward, risen to exceptional prominence and popularity among students of human nature, life and social scientists, and social and political theorists. The nature-nurture or naturalist-culturalist debate, that is, the question to what degree Man is a purely natural creature and to what extent Man is capable of being nurtured has become a central issue of the culture wars stirring up much emotions and controversies. Lurking in the background of virtually all contemporary social and political issues, regardless of whether we talk about international politics, the educational system, or criminal justice, the nature-nurture controversy has helped to understand—more often than not entirely justified—that the purely naturalist position is more or less insufficient as it often fails to recognize how history and historico-material constraints have shaped the course of human affairs, social life, and political institutions. Further, it has helped laying bare the crudely conservative inclinations of many of these pure naturalists. In the nature-nurture debate, feminists have been very active and loud voices; so, too, have been the neo-Marxist critical theorists of the Frankfurt School.

The dogmatic-ahistoricism argument draws from a crucial notion of Marx. Often seen as some sort of "optimistic" conception of Man (as opposed to the "pessimistic" conceptions stemming from conservatism and realism), Marx's conception defines Man as an essentially social creature.

Part and parcel of Marxian materialistic philosophy of history, from Marx we get an antinaturalistic argument. In his sixth thesis of the *Theses on Feuerbach*, Marx argues that "the essence of man is no abstraction inhering in each single individual," that in "its actuality it is the ensemble of social relationships."[24] Denying the idea of a universal, transcendent nature or essence of Man, Marx argues that what may appear to us as instinctively or naturally or biologically is, dug deeper, human action socially determined. Human conduct is contingent from epoch to epoch, from society to society. But, moreover, and most importantly, it is principally alterable. As Marx famously proclaims, "the whole of history is nothing but a continual transformation of human nature."[25] In the wake of Marx's groundwork, then, culturalists have began to argue quite fiercely that societal conditions and societal malfunctions must not be deduced directly from something like a fixed human nature. Instead, human, social, political, and international-political affairs must always be interpreted against their respective historical contexts and structural conditions in which they take place: "nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design."[26] Failing to distinguish cause and effects, to recognize Marxian philosophy of history has, according to Horkheimer and Habermas, dramatic conservative effects.

Arguing against the background of earlier warnings against the blind naturalization of Man,[27] Horkheimer criticizes the ahistorical approach toward Man and the human condition widespread in much of social and political theory. Concerned with the social and political effects, Horkheimer argues forcefully that ahistorical interpretations of Man are intellectual misconstructions. They are, in fact, dangerous misconstructions as they stifle social and political progress. "The attempt to comprehend men as fixed or nascent entity is vain," he argues, for "the human character is engulfed in the course of history."[28] And Horkheimer, therefore, demands that the age-old and almost knee-jerk reaction against possible alteration of historical structures and processes "must, at last, be silenced."[29] Habermas agrees with Horkheimer's criticism of the conservative inclinations and implications of social and political theory based on human nature, agrees that it confuses cause and effects. In doing so, he raises the problem of the structural power stemming from the concept of human nature. Rather than being proper, critical, and progressivist, emphasizing the allegedly fixed, constant, and universal aspect of human nature will lead to some sort of a sorry social and political theory representing not much more than a simple "dogma with political consequences, which is so much the worse, where it appears with the claim of being a value-free science."[30] According to Habermas, we must always remind ourselves that Man is a historical creature; but likewise are

our theories, conceptions, and assumptions about Man historical as they emanate from particular historical circumstances representing particular sets of historical interests.[31] Failing to recognize this historical element of our theoretical endeavors, we will simply perpetuate the existing; we will perpetuate the existing by drawing from wrong premises: the assumption of a universal concept of human nature.

This brings us to the fourth prominent objection against the concept of human nature in political theory. The argument of objectified-determinist essentialism, the fourth sin of human nature, derives largely from Sartre. In many respects, it represents a radicalization of the criticisms put forth by postmodernists and Marxists; but, likewise, its line of argument is the complete opposite of the metaphysical-speculation argument. Part of the latter criticism by natural/life scientists was that the assumptions about human nature of much political theory are often too vague arguing that the only reliable date in matters human nature are provided by the biological, physical, and neurosciences. Political theorists, they claim, should turn to science rather than relying on theological and philosophical speculations, observations, and introspections; this would put their respective political theories upon firmer—because more scientific—grounds.

On that point, existentialists disagree. Opposing the corresponding claims by these natural/life scientists to scientific objectivity and universalism, skeptical of their methodological approach, existentialists criticize that the sciences treat Man as a mere object of study. This largely external and objectified approach toward Man, however, is deemed wrong, for it has degrading effects. Humans are complex creatures. They are so complex that what defines us as humans cannot be comprehended through the technicalized-scientific study of outer, external, physiological characteristics. Instead, our defining characteristics lying deep in humans must be sought within each of us. This suggested turn from the external to the internal perspective goes hand in hand with existentialists' strong belief in Man's complexity, subjectivity, and freedom from any form of physiological and psychological determinism. Sartre is a case in point. And although both Heidegger and Arendt make similarly strong claims regarding the essentially antiessential "nature" of Man, it is Sartre "who gives the now 'classic' argument here."[32] Contra the Platonic-Aristotelian essentialist conception of human nature, Sartre argues that there is no such thing as an objectified nature of Man. There is no human essence. As Sartre says, "man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards."[33]

According to Sartre and the existentialists, we cannot say that Man is of gold, silver, or bronze. Such statements are meaningless, for "Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself."[34] Representing, perhaps, the most

radical of all human-nature criticisms, Man is neither solely driven by his "nature," nor can the "nature" of Man ever be an excuse for the darker sides of human and social existence and practices. For Man is, in the strongest possible sense, free; free from nature. We can neither identify any universal givens nor recognize any universal oughts. Worth quoting Sartre at length is this passage:

> Man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does. The existentialist does not believe in the power of passion. He will never regard a grand passion as a destructive torrent upon which a man is swept into certain actions as by fate, and which, therefore, is an excuse for them. He thinks that man is responsible for his passion.[35]

Thus, like postmodernists and Marxians, the existentialists, too, are utterly skeptical of the concept of human nature, especially when it is applied in the realm of the social and political. Their criticism is, at least, equally, radical. They reject the Platonian-Aristotelian essentialist human-nature standpoint and also the crude and apologetic determinism of much conservative political theory. Further, existentialists are deeply imbued with a profound belief in the freedom of Man, that is, the freedom from nature and the freedom from God.

Completing the list of what are presented as the six major critical arguments against the application of the concept of human nature in political theory, I want to say that the naturalistic-fallacy argument as well as the rationalistic-fallacy argument are equally strong and sit, so to speak, on top of all the other four sins of human nature. For regardless of whether argued from a antimetaphysical, postmodern, feminist, Marxian, or existentialist angle, those skeptical of the concept of human nature may be able to subscribe to these two fallacies seeking to keep the concept of human nature away as far as possible from political theorizing.

The naturalistic-fallacy argument (is-ought-fallacy) goes back to Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, though it is G.E. Moore who, in *Principia Ethica,* coined the term "naturalistic fallacy." Still, Hume provided the very first description of this line of argument. Becoming one of the truly consequential statements in Western philosophy and one of the cornerstones of much of Kant's and post-Kantian moral philosophy, Hume's naturalistic-fallacy is worthy of being quoted at some length here:

> In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way

of reasoning, and establishes the being of a god, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions *is* and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought* or *ought not*. This change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought* or *ought not* expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others which are entirely different from it.[36]

The point Hume raised, significant particularly with regard to normative political theory, is fairly straightforward. His basic argument is that even though it is often done, it is logically inadmissible to deduce an ought-proposition from an is-premise. The historical denial of universal suffrage (ought), for instance, cannot be justified by, or deduced from, making any references to the (alleged) biological or physical inequalities between the genders (is). Or, in terms of international-political theory, the fact that Man is a Hobbesian lupus does by no means imply that we ought to act according to what Hobbes describes as the *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Following strictly the naturalistic-fallacy argument, any ought-proposition made on the basis of some set of is-facts, including the nature of Man, is futile and meaningless. Even if capable of demonstrating that this or that is-claim is epistemologically and ontologically valid, an ought cannot derive from an is.

The naturalistic-fallacy argument is simple but very powerful. Its user does not need to engage with some of the most pressing questions regarding the concept of human nature raised by postmodernists, existentialists, and feminists, such as the nature-nurture debate. Whether human nature exists or not, whether it is good or bad, whether purely natural or cultural, the concept of human nature can simply be dismissed on this is-ought-fallacy. More or less the same applies to the last sin of human nature. Representing an equally strong and pragmatic attack, the rationalistic-fallacy argument provides, perhaps, the most effective argumentative bludgeon to kill political theorizing based on human nature by saying that all this talk about human nature is merely posthoc rationalization helping to make the respective politico-theoretical argument.

This argumentative strategy has often been used to tear apart social-contract theories. All political theories based on the social-contract idea follow more or less the same argumentative-methodological structure, the "argumentative triad":[37] the nature of the political community is deduced, via a particular type of social contract, from particular assumptions about the nature of the precivilizational state; this state of nature, however, is itself

deduced from a particular set of assumptions about the nature of Man. And if we add to that triad the international dimension as, let's say, in Hobbes's case, the nature and limits of the international system is deduced from the nature of the political communities inhabiting the system, we can see that, more often than not (international-)political theory, be it of Hobbesian provenance or otherwise, ultimately, has its roots in one source: the nature of Man. Recognizing what is often dismissed as reductionism, followers of the rationalistic-fallacy argument, then, claim that political theorists would not actually deduce their respective theories or principles from assumptions about the nature of Man. Instead, as the accusation goes, they would merely create their assumptions about the nature of Man in such a way that they can legitimize more effectively their politico-theoretical outcome. These critics take issue with what they regard as some form of inadmissible logical circularity, accusing human-nature theorists for not choosing respective conceptions of Man according to epistemological and ontological criteria, but according to what may work best in order to ensure the preset politico-theoretical outcome and coherence.

Yet, by the same token, then, we may wonder: How would these critics know whether human-nature theorists merely make posthoc rationalizations? Don't they commit similar sins? And don't they also use the concept of human nature merely substituting good for bad, cultural for natural? This signifies the end of this section as well as the task of the next. Critical questions must be raised against the six sins of human nature. Be it the metaphysical-speculation argument, the postmodern and feminist charge of ideological-mystification, the Marxian dogmatic-ahistoricism argument, the objectified-determinist argument of the essentialists, or the naturalistic-fallacy and rationalistic-fallacy arguments, these human-nature critics have raised harsh and powerful sets of criticisms against the concept of human nature in political theory. And these are the philosophical hurdles that any argument in favor of a positive role of human nature in realist international-political theory must reckon with, must overcome. In the next two sections, I argue that this is possible.

Countercriticism I: The Complexity of Human Nature

Thanks to the six sins of human nature, arguments favoring the concept of human nature in political theory are more or less on the defensive. The fierce exchanges in the nature-nurture debate provide ample proof;[38] and the rising skepticism of the idea of human nature also affected the fate of classical realism. Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian realist international-political theorists came under increasing pressure, both from rival philosophies and

from post-classical realism. Needless to say, arguments such as Morgenthau's that "[h]uman nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws"[39] did not go down well with an increasingly large section of political theorists.

Political theorizing based on human nature came to be seen as increasingly anachronistic in a post-Watsonian era that puts strong analytical emphasis and normative preference on culture over nature, an era where the (in)famous words of the father of behaviorism became a central argument of the culturalists' psychological and sociopolitical manifesto:

> Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select–doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors.[40]

Classical realism, Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style international-political theory, began to lose its appeal. Partly because of its (alleged) conservative implications. Partly because of the deep suspicion toward purely biological conceptions of human nature, a concern that seems, of course, legitimate in light of the eugenicist experiments of many Western European countries and the horrendous eugenicist Nazi policies of Hitler Germany. As a consequence, scientific investigations into the nature of Man declined in the post–World War II years: "Behavioural biologists retreated into the forest to study chimpanzees, ants, or monkeys, and the field of study of human behaviour was left to anthropologists and sociologists."[41]

Yet, perhaps quite naturally, neither sociologists nor anthropologists have been huge fans of the concept of human nature. Sociologists favor sociological explanations of human behavior, emphasizing societal effects and warning repeatedly of crude psychologism. Anthropologists, too, have turned to structural explanations; and they were joined by Watsonian/Skinnerian behavioral psychologists who "provided abundant evidence of human variety, feeding the mouths of both ethical and political relativism," creating an intellectual climate where "nurture has taken over."[42] Unsurprisingly—yet unfortunately—classical-styled realist international-political theory eventually fell out of the picture; it aroused too much criticism in the wider cultural-societal and sociopolitical climate of the 1970s, the aftermath of the unpopular Vietnam War, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and the oil shock.[43] Shifting moods in both theory and practice led to a

situation where, as Peter Corning rightly remarks, "the mere mention of the term 'human nature' evokes deep suspicion in some circles."[44]

These hostile reactions toward the concept of human nature, however, are not always justified. We can defend, and must defend, the classical-style intellectual marriage of human nature with political theory. For whether we emphasize the vices of human nature over its virtues depends largely on how we conceptualize the politico-theoretical relationship between assumptions about human nature and political theories. The potential strength and validity, or weakness and fallibility, of the six sins of human nature derive, in the first instance, from two questions: First, from the significance or place-value ascribed to these assumptions about human nature within political theories. Second, from the specific understanding of what we mean by human nature. This will help understand that the concept of human nature is a complex affair, and, ergo, defensible.

To begin with the first question, we should recognize that the question of the admissibility of concept of human nature in political theory is not an all-or-nothing affair. To consider so would be misleading, for we know that different theorists ascribe different degrees of significance or place-value to human nature. Despite these differences, the history of Western (political) philosophy shows four ideal-typical approaches. The first group consists of some of the most influential twentieth-century existentialists, neo-Marxian critical theorists, and postmodernists such as Heidegger and Sartre, Horkheimer and Habermas, and Foucault and Rorty, respectively. As mentioned above, they argued fiercely that any intimate relationship between the concept of human nature and social and political theory is, for various reasons, meaningless, damaging, and dangerous. Seeking to avoid and wishing to ban dangerous human-nature talk, theorists of this group ascribe no (positive) significance whatsoever to the concept of human nature calling for a political theory freed from human nature.

Of exactly the opposite opinion is another group of Western philosophers and theorists. The Continental philosophy of the eighteenth century, in particular, was widely and deeply attracted to the concept of human nature. Both the study of human nature and its usage in matters social and political were, as Edward Keene points out, "such a hallmark of eighteenth-century thinking about politics and society that it almost seems to have been impossible for a scholar in that period to try and analyze anything without first saying what 'human nature' was."[45] In this regard, Hume, the political realist, is a case in point.[46] Among the loudest demanding a proper treatment of human nature, Hume called for a new science of Man arguing that it should become the new single foundational source for *all* scientific and philosophical subjects including political theory.[47] In the twenty-first century, Hume's

position seems perhaps rather extreme, if not entirely anachronistic, but in the eighteenth century, the emphasis on human nature was nothing out of the extraordinary. In *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, Feuerbach argued along similar lines calling for a "new philosophy" that would make "man—with the inclusion of nature as the foundation of man—the unique, universal and highest object of philosophy" and "anthropology, with the inclusion of physiology, the universal science."[48] He stressed that "[a]rt, religion, philosophy, and science are only manifestations or revelations of the true human essence."[49] Where the first group cannot wait to get rid of human nature, this group could not get enough of Man.

In light of these polar positions, however, we must not forget that (realist) international-political theorists may have two other options in deciding how much significance they wish to ascribe to the concept of human nature in their respective political theories. The history of Western philosophy has shown that in-between these two ideal-typical poles, two middle-positions do exist as described below.

The first of these more moderate approaches is perhaps best represented by Kant. Theorizing about the social and political must not be grounded completely in this or that conception of Man, but we cannot completely dispense with making references to human nature either. With the ascent of Kant, as Leo Strauss put it, "reason replace[d] nature."[50] Kant almost radicalized the belief in reason rejecting any conceptions of morality grounded in natural law. As Kant argued, "it is clear that all moral concepts have their seat and origin in reason completely a priori."[51] Despite the widely professed Kantian autonomy from nature, however, we must not forget Kant's great interest in matters human nature.[52] And this interest did, of course, inform his political philosophy providing the backdrop for possibilities, dangers, and limits in human affairs. Often neglected in International Relations are Kant's politico-anthropological remarks about Man's "unsocial sociability" that is "obviously rooted in human nature" and his famous crooked-timber thesis: "Nothing straight can be constructed from such warped wood as that which man is made of."[53] Together with Kant, Hegel is perhaps another spearhead of this group of thinkers who have drawn some inferences from, and have taken into account, certain assumptions about human nature without, however, making or allowing their respective theories and principles become a slave of the concept of human nature.[54]

Equally less extreme than the radical positions on each pole, compared to the Kantian/Hegelian human-nature position, the adherents of the second middle-position put greater emphasis on human nature arguing that assumptions about human nature must certainly be a constitutive component of, and play a central active role in, political theory. Here, Hobbes is

perhaps an archetypical exemplar. Like Kant, Hobbes pays great attention to human nature; and his *De Homine* probably represents his fullest views on the subject.[55] Further, his own methodological-philosophical premises forced him to make Man the central concern of his whole political theory. Take his *Leviathan.* In contrast to Aristotelian-style natural explanations, Hobbes sought to create the ideal state by applying the Galilean resoluto-compositive method, that is, by resolving the political association into its components, the individuals. Influenced by the then-prevailing natural-science revolution on the Continent, believing that a thing is best known and understood through its constituting parts, Hobbes argued that it is imperative to analyze or resolve the whole into its components, reveal the nature and causes of its properties and relations among them, and, once the causes and relations are discovered, recompose the parts into a whole.[56] As Hobbes writes, "to describe the Nature of this Artificiall man [commonwealth], I will consider First, the *Matter* thereof, and the *Artificer*; both which is *Man*."[57]

These are the four ideal-typical politico-theoretical responses to the significance or place-value question derived from the history of Western philosophy. Unfortunately, however, these four ways of how we may deal with the concept of human nature in matters political are often overlooked or neglected. And this, in turn, has often led to criticism that seems fairly unreflective, often unfair, as human-nature critics lump together all theorists more or less sympathetic to the idea of human nature. Failing to discriminate between the various positions and nuances, critics often apply, then, the whole set of the six sins to these human-nature theorists trying to silence them with one stroke of a brush. Showing some greater reflectivity, some critics discriminate between various human-nature positions recognizing their individual nuances and establish some sort of hierarchy of criticism: the less human nature, the better; the more, the greater are our sins. In this light, then, existentialists, critical theorists, feminists, and postmodernists, all imbued with the belief that assumptions about human nature are useless, dangerous, dispensable, are the politico-theoretical angels. Those like Hume and Feuerbach come close to politico-theoretical devils. And the two more moderate positions sandwiched in-between are criticized according to their respective degrees of significance ascribed to the concept of human nature.

This, however, seems too simple, particularly since the power and validity of human-nature criticism is equally dependent on the question of how the political theory questioned conceptualizes the concept of human nature. In this regard, it is not so much the question whether human nature is assumed to be essentially good or bad. Instead, criticism, suspicions, and fears leveled against assumptions about human nature must take into consideration

what is actually meant by the term "human nature." Surely, the history of Western philosophy and political theory shows that the concept of human nature is a malleable and flexible concept. Yet, we can establish some sort of ideal-typical order discriminating between two dimensions.

First, referring to human nature implies that we can speak either of its actuality or of its potentiality. Like Hobbes, Burke, and Freud, some theorists think of human nature and use it in a descriptive sense attempting to reveal the recurring and essential about the nature of Man. Their respective political theories must be read and approached in terms of their human-nature conceptions that, they believe, are empirical descriptions of what human beings are like, of what humans have in common such as instincts, interests, needs. Others, by contrast, such as Marx and critical theorists, particularly Marcuse, focus on Man's potentialities. When talking about Man in their political theories, they often refer to what they believe that Man actually is once the material-structural curtain is being lifted or what Man may be capable of becoming, either in terms of capacities or possibilities.[58] On this first level, then, speaking of human nature refers to the actuality or the potentiality of human nature.

But there is a second dimension to the question of how the concept is understood and used in political theory. And, broadly, it refers to the free will versus determinism problem. To bring the variety of the meanings of human nature to the point,

> Some ... take a mechanical (whereas others take a teleological) view of nature. For some what is natural must be unchanging; others think that it can be modified within certain limits. For some, again, to say that a particular tendency is natural to human beings is to say that it determines them to behave in a relevant way. Others take a weaker view of nature and think that the tendency in question only disposes or inclines them to behave in a certain manner.[59]

To this description, not much must be added, save that it is vital that we distinguish carefully between political theories based on human nature emphasizing determinism, teleology, natural law and those that have at their basis an understanding of Man enjoying a greater autonomy from nature, instincts, passions.

This, then, signifies that we must be careful vis-à-vis much human-nature criticism. For the history of Western philosophy and political theory reveals a great deal of variety on how the concept of human nature is understood. Some refer to the actuality of Man, others to his potentialities. Some think of human nature in terms of some sort of biophysiological determinism,

others assume certain instincts, drives, passions, still believing in a great degree of autonomy of the rational. And, if we now add the question of the significance of place-value of the concept of human nature, our approach toward the question of the (in)admissibility of the concept of human nature in political theory may slightly begin to alter; perhaps not to the point where human-nature critics become human-nature sympathetics denying the validity of their own sets of criticisms, but perhaps it may change our attitude toward the present terms of the debate requiring a renewed debate within International Relations about the concept of human nature in (realist) international-political theory. Such a renewed debate seems necessary.

First, because it should now be obvious that if we tested all (international-)political theories for their respective assumptions about human nature, the result would be a huge tableau or multidimensional matrix running along three axes: the degree of significance or place-value of human nature; the first level of human-nature conception, actuality versus potentiality; and its second level, the degrees of determinism versus free will. Such matrix would reveal that we use assumptions about human nature in immensely different ways and styles, with immensely different politico-theoretical foci and aims. Second, we need a renewed debate, because these multifaceted occurrences of assumptions about human nature in political theory tell us that we must be more careful. Whether critical, agnostic, or sympathetic toward human nature, we should be more attentive vis-à-vis much human-nature criticism. For some sort of one-size-fits-all criticism will not only have started from wrong premises, but also have produced unwarranted and unfair, if not useless, results. Such an intellectual effort has not been made in International Relations; respective research into the most important classical and contemporary international-political theories, however, would surely produce interesting, unexpected, eye-browsing results. Still, in any case, we must recognize the different degrees of place-values of assumptions about human nature as well as the different first/second-level human-nature conceptualizations, for doing so provides us with a (more) fruitful analytical background against which respective political theories and, even more importantly, the six sins of human nature can be tested. Further, it helps understand and underscore this chapter's argument that some of the alleged sins of human nature must be taken with a pinch of salt, partly because the complexity of the concept of human nature requires more care than often applied by the critics.

The naturalistic-fallacy argument is a case in point. Though almost always part of the crusade against the concept of human nature, it is relatively weak and incapable of deciding whether assumptions about human nature should be admissible in political theory. To begin with, the proposition that

an ought cannot have, must not have, any basis whatsoever in an is-premise implying that, in the domain of the international-political, we must not draw politico-theoretical ought-conclusions from is-facts such as human nature is by no means uncontroversial. John Searle developed the counter-concept of the "naturalistic fallacy fallacy," the "fallacy of supposing that it is logically impossible for any set of statements of the kind usually called descriptive to entail a statement of the kind usually called evaluative."[60] Yet even if we continued to stick to the naturalistic-fallacy argument, found it convincing, and appreciated its main concerns (as I think we should), its effectiveness as a weapon against human nature in political theory would remain low, partly because even though it may occasionally hit its targets, it does not provide convincing a priori arguments why political realists or political theorists of any other provenance should turn away from an intelligent concern with human nature.

Take, for example, Hume. The intellectual father of the naturalistic-fallacy argument, Hume also spearheads, as mentioned, the philosophical position arguing that a new science of Man, the concept of human nature, should be the single foundational source from which all the sciences and philosophies, including political theory, should draw as starting points for their respective endeavors. Surely, Hume holds a fairly extreme view demanding that we should recognize the great significance of the concept of human nature in matters scientific and philosophical, in human, social, political affairs. And, no doubt, his own views of Man and the politico-theoretical significance ascribed to the concept of human nature stand in complete contradistinction with the likes of Marxists and postmodernists seeking to disentangle political theorizing from human nature. As Hume writes,

> Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour.[61]

From the standpoint of the human-nature critics, equally controversial has been Hume's argument that it is Man's essentially self-interested nature that necessarily informs the "political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave."[62] His are strong claims, surely not to everybody's liking.

Yet, for the present purpose, it does not matter how good or bad, realist or idealist, naturalist or culturalist, optimist or pessimist, determinist or

autonomous, Hume's assumptions about human nature may be. Important, however, is that here we have a Hume who is the father of the naturalistic-fallacy argument, who is, at the same time, one of Western philosophy's leading spokespersons arguing for the strongest possible role for human nature in our intellectual endeavors, and who obviously does not belong to the idealists in the human-nature debate. This, then, tells us the significant but often neglected fact that there is no quasiautomatical linkage between, or logical transmission belt linking together, the Humean is-ought-fallacy and the use of assumptions about human nature in political theory. And, therefore, matters seem straightforward: If human-nature theorists, regardless of whether their assumptions about human nature found in their political theories are constitutive or merely of peripheral concern, do commit the is-ought sin (Hume is said to have done it himself),[63] the respective line of criticism is, of course, valid; and it discredits all political thought deriving ought-principles from is-premises. Equally easily recognizable, however, should be the fact that the naturalistic-fallacy argument seems unsuitable for deciding the broader human-nature question as it cannot simply be used to discredit the entire politico-theoretical position that considers allowing assumptions about human nature informing political theorizing fruitful, essential, even indispensable. Certainly capable of catching those fallen prey to the fallacy, the Humean is-ought argument cannot be applied unreflectively to all human nature–informed political theories, namely, not to those strictly separating ought-principles from is-facts derived more often that not from assumptions about human nature. In this light, then, the naturalistic-fallacy argument seems ineffective, perhaps overrated, posing no intrinsic threat for realist international-political theory to go back to its classical roots and bring back the concept of human nature.

Turning now to Kant and, then, to Kelsen—two consequential figures of Western thought—too, help understand why the is-ought fallacy fails deciding the human-nature question; further, they help building the argumentative bridge to the next section. As mentioned, together with Hegel, contra Hume and Feuerbach, Kant belongs to those arguing that the concept of human nature is a necessary though more or less peripheral *additivum* to philosophy and political theorizing. But, in the wake of Hume, Kant is one of the perhaps most fervent advocates of a strict separation between is-facts and ought-principles. Like Hume, Kant is just another example demonstrating that adhering to the naturalistic-fallacy argument does not necessarily imply that one has to be hostile regarding assumptions about human nature in political theory. Much the same we derive from Kelsen.

Kant's radicalism in the is-ought question finds its equivalent in the neo-Kantian legal/state philosophy of Kelsen.[64] Presenting a pure science of law, Kelsen's pure theory of law and state is a theory of positive law attempting to

"answer the question, What is the law? but not the question, What ought it to be?"[65] Further, Kelsen sought to purify jurisprudence from all "foreign elements" such as psychology, sociology, biology, and ethics; though acknowledging the temptation to incorporate all these elements into a theory of law as all these disciplines "deal with subject matters that are closely connected with law," Kelsen argued:

> The Pure Theory of Law undertakes to delimit the cognition of law against these disciplines, not because it ignores or denies the connection, but because it wishes to avoid uncritical mixture of methodologically different disciplines (methodological syncretism) which obscures the essence of the science of law and obliterates the limits imposed upon it by the nature of its subject matter.[66]

The pure theory of law's object of cognition is the norm, an ought-proposition. And the law is a system of norms, that are, "acts of will that are directed toward the conduct of others"; only "human acts of will," not the will of God or any natural law, qualify as "legal norms."[67] All well and good, as Kelsen's pure theory of law is surely one of the most fascinating endeavors in legal/state philosophy, a revolutionary achievement.

Yet, for the present purpose, we must look to the "other" Kelsen, the political philosopher. We will see that even though Kelsen's pure theory of law is freed from the concept of human nature, he did not dispense with making assumptions about the nature of Man in his political theory. Kelsen must not be read from a jurisprudential angle alone; this would be a significant undervaluation of Kelsen's œuvre doing injustice to one of the most thorough democracy theorists.[68] Turning to his political theory of pluralist democracy, we can see that it is based upon the concept of human nature, informed by some profound assumptions about the nature of Man. Usually considered an idealist,[69] a pigeon-hole requiring some qualification in light of Kelsen's depth and subtlety, Kelsen thinks of the political in terms of power; politics is a struggle for power. With the likes of Nietzsche, Freud, Weber, Kelsen recognizes that Man and the political cannot be understood without comprehending that the ubiquitous struggle for power cannot be dissociated from the nature of Man seen as a bundle of Freudian-style drives.[70] At least on two occasions criticizing Marxism, Kelsen argues that we cannot, must not, neglect that we are confronted with indestructible drives fueling Man's lust to dominate fellow Men; that it is not capitalism that corrupts Man but is merely the societal outgrowth of an inherently conflictual drive-structure seeking to gratify its desires and interests.[71] That Kelsen stood intellectually under Freud's influence adds to the picture of a Kelsen whose political

theory is based upon the recognition of the power-element in human affairs as well as upon a conception of Man emphasizing Freudian-style irrational drives. None other than Kelsen, then, a neo-Kantian par excellence recognizing the is-ought fallacy, did not refrain drawing from the concept of human nature. And, again, the Humean naturalistic-fallacy and the concept of human nature coexist in political theory; more importantly, they can coexist in political theory.

Placing some emphasis on Kelsen, however, serves another purpose. Not only does it help to put the naturalistic-fallacy argument in proper relation vis-à-vis its actual effectiveness as a popular means trying to tear apart political theory based on the concept of human nature. Further, Kelsen proves to be an elegant bridge to the concern of the next section dealing with the omnipresence of assumptions about human nature in virtually all political theories. Coming back to Kelsen's assumptions about human nature, regardless of how Freudian these may be, we know that Kelsen went at great length attempting to free legal/state philosophy from what he deemed as alien elements, including the concept of human nature. In defense of Kelsen, then, one may respond that we need to distinguish carefully between Kelsen's legal/state philosophy purified from assumptions about human nature and Kelsen's political theory making some such assumptions. This is, prima facie, correct. Yet, Kelsen was not brought into the discussion in order to denounce his pure theory of law and claim that it roots in this or that conception of human nature. Far from it; I raised the causa Kelsen because of its dualistic treatment of the concept of human nature. The very same Kelsen who is so unwilling to allow assumptions of human nature (or of any other kind) influx legal/state philosophy seems to have skipped his reservations against the concept of human nature when concerned with matters political. Does this dualistic treatment of human nature, then, perhaps tell us that it may be impossible or unavoidable to theorize the political and international-political without recourse to the nature of Man?

Countercriticism II: The Omnipresence of Human Nature

Continuing with the task of critiquing the human-nature critics, it is now argued that although it may not, so to speak, de jure impossible, it seems de facto impossible to theorize the political and international-political without the concept of human nature.

In light of a Kant, the great apostle of the a priori and of human autonomy from nature, recognizing the natural unsocial sociability and crookedness of Man; of a Kelsen, the great apostle of the purification of law from all foreign elements, recognizing in his political theory that Man is driven

by certain Freudian-style drives seeking for gratifying power-interests; of a Kant and Kelsen, both great apostles of the strict is/ought-separation, using the concept of human nature within their respective political theories, then, the hypothesis that some human-nature critics, too, may not be able to avoid assumptions about human nature seems not wide of the mark. And, indeed, neither neo-Marxian critical theorists, postmodernists, feminists, nor post-metaphysical theorists are as purified from the concept of human nature as they would have us believe, as their fierce opposition to human-nature theorists such as classical realists would suggest. This omnipresence of the concept of human nature in Western philosophy and (international-)political theory means that these human-nature critics are caught in the same traps they set for the (realist) human-nature sinners; that this whole set of the six sins of human nature is sort of worthless (though not meaningless) in deciding the ought-question.

Beginning with neo-Marxian critical theorists, they argued that Man is a historical creature shaped by prevailing modes of production and social circumstances criticizing fiercely (quite rightly) purely naturalistic accounts of Man and society; their dogmatic-ahistoricism argument also has been used to tear apart classical-style realist international-political theorists. Their set of human-nature criticisms, however, provokes a threefold response.

First, political realists' assumptions about human nature are not necessarily ahistorical. Here, Rousseau's realist Man is a case in point.[72] In fact, taking perhaps greatest offense at Hobbesian Man, Rousseau faulted the then-prevailing conceptions of human nature. As Rousseau argues, "all of them, continually speaking of need, greed, oppression, desires, and pride transferred to the state of Nature ideas they had taken from society; They spoke of Savage Man and depicted Civil man."[73] Contra Hobbes's *bellum omnium contra omnes* and Machiavelli's state of license, Rousseau's state of nature is more benign; he argues that the presocietal state was "the most conducive to Peace and the best suited to Mankind" as Man's *amour-propre*, the relational sentiment that "inspires men with all the evils they do one another" is not an inherent characteristic of presocietal Man.[74] Instead, savage Man lived in, enjoyed, environmental circumstances where physical inequalities did not matter. Roaming independently through the woods; concerned only with self-preservation; showing pity, compassion, no desire to harm fellow Men, the savage man was a noble man, was by *nature* peaceful, but obviously malleable to the worse;[75] and, still, based on that historicist conception of human nature, Rousseau's political theory carries an important message: "Madmen! know that all your evils proceed from yourselves!"[76]

The Rousseauian case, then, signifies a second and third reason why the neo-Marxian dogmatic-ahistoricism argument requires qualification.

It is not that a historical-materialist philosophy of the social and political makes no assumptions about the nature of Man. Let's take Marx. Marxian Man, of course, differs from how classical and post-classical realists describe Man. Upon closer inspection, however, it seems unquestionable that Marxian political theory is as informed by the concept of human nature as is political realism or any other political theory. True, Marx faults human-nature essentialists, particularly Feuerbach, for speaking of "Man" rather than "real historical men."[77] True, Marx presents us a methodological approach requiring that we start from "real premises," namely, "men, not in any fantastic isolation and fixation, but in their real, empirically perceptible process of development under certain conditions."[78] True, Marx proclaims the following politico-theoretical credo: "Do not let us go back to a fictitious primordial condition…Such a primordial condition explains nothing; it merely pushes the question away into a grey nebulous distance."[79]

Be that as it may. For it will not save Marx from criticism. His rhetoric does not belie the fact that we can identify a universal and fixed nature of Man informing his theory; indeed, Marx, as Ian Forbes writes, never claimed that "human nature did not exist."[80] The point is that, of course, Marxian Man bears natural characteristics. There may not be much "human nature" talk in Marx's works, but the "nature" of Marxian Man appears, as Norman Geras unearthed, under the disguise of "natural needs," "physically indispensable means of subsistence," and "physical needs"; and these natural needs constitutive of Marxian Man's sociohistorical existence are no fewer than

> [f]ood, clothing, shelter, fuel, rest and sleep; hygiene, "healthy maintenance of the body," fresh air and sunlight; intellectual requirements, social intercourse, sexual needs in so far as they are presupposed by "relations between the sexes"; the needs of support specific to infancy, old age and incapacity, and the need for a safe and healthy working environment ("space, light, air and protection against the dangerous or the unhealthy concomitants of the production process'—otherwise the 'five senses…pay the penalty").[81]

Further, we must not gloss over the fact that, together with Aristotle, Marx represents "the pole of political thought which assumes that man is *naturally* social."[82] Thus, Marxian Man may not be Hobbesian or so. And although Marxian philosophy is reminiscent of Rousseau's philosophy of history in that the conventional Hobbesian logic of a warlike state of nature deriving from the lupus is being reversed, it seems unquestionable that Marx did use the concept of human nature, presumed certain assumptions about the

nature of Man informing the central tenets of his philosophy and political theory.

Yet Marx is not an isolated case. Neo-Marxian critical theorists, too, use the concept of human nature. One of the philosophical cornerstones (and innovations) of the Frankfurt School was the amalgamation of Marx and Freud. So, what lies behind this (intriguing) philosophical mixture other than the amalgamation of Marxian historical-materialism and Freudian human nature? Since the early days of the Frankfurt School, Horkheimer has argued, as Martin Jay writes, "for the urgency of a psychological supplement to Marxist theory."[83] And this psychological supplement was provided by Freud, his psychoanalytic theory of Man. As Horkheimer made clear to Löwenthal who asked how to respond to the question about their attitude toward Freud,

> I think you should be simply positive. We really are deeply indebted to Freud and his first collaborators. His thought is one of the Bildungsmächte [foundation stones] without which our own philosophy would not be what it is. I have anew realized his grandeur during the last weeks.[84]

Be it Horkheimer, Adorno, Fromm, Neumann, Pollack, Löwenthal, Marcuse, or second generation critical theorists such as Habermas, all these neo-Marxian critical theorists have more or less strong intellectual links to Freudian Man.[85] Though having turned to Freud relatively late,[86] Marcuse is the spearhead, his *Eros and Civilization* still represents one of the most intriguing interpretation of Freud.

Surely, we cannot lump all of them together, must recognize the varying degrees of their respective Freudianisms, since there was no consensus among these neo-Marxians how they should read and go about Freud. The historiography of the Frankfurt School shows that sharpest debates were fought over Freud. And these disputes helped to divide the Frankfurt School into orthodox Freudians (Marcuse) and revisionist Freudians (Fromm) leading, eventually, even to the split with Fromm.[87] We need to mention these Freud quarrels as they help understand that these neo-Marxians, too, used assumptions about human nature. Not fully escaping the natural-instinctual Man, they chose Freud's theory of human nature as one of their philosophical cornerstones; however, they have taken aboard the "biological" Freud, that is, the Freud who emphasizes the biological-physiological Man. In light of these disputes, debates, twists, and turns regarding Freud, we can hardly think of these neo-Marxians as a group of theorists who left behind the concept of human nature. To the contrary, the concept of human nature is a central theme in their intellectual endeavors helping to understand how misleading and iniquitous their

criticism of the concept of human nature is. As the old proverb goes, "Whose house is of glasse, must not throw stones at one another!"

The same line of criticism, however, also applies to postmodernists, feminists, and existentialists. And their forms of human-nature criticisms, particularly their ideological-mystification and objectified-determinist arguments representing perhaps the most radical attacks on human nature, must be revised, too, as these critics have not succeeded where others have already failed: to purify political theory from the concept of human nature.

Rorty and Sartre proved to be loud voices in the philosophical and politico-theoretical struggle against the concept of human nature. But, upon closer analysis, neither Rorty's pragmatism nor Sartre's existentialism can escape relying on certain assumptions about human nature. In Sartre's case, we see this in his later works where he moved into a Marxist historical-materialist direction emphasizing more on physiological and psychological needs that root, ultimately, in the nature of Man.[88] And in Rorty's case (the same applies to Sartre), we see this hidden influx of the concept of human nature embedded in his argument that we are extraordinarily malleable and free human beings. Even if his antideterminist stance was correct, it would not rescue him from criticism, for Man could not be malleable and free if it were not assumed that Man is obviously of this or that nature allowing for such malleability and freedom. Surely, prima facie, both Rorty's pragmatism and Sartre's existentialism eschew to speak of "human nature," but in both cases, the concept of human nature "is dispensed with in name only" and "the concept remains."[89] As with neo-Marxian critical theorists, I do not make any critical claims or judgments vis-à-vis their wider intellectual endeavors; what is of concern, however, is the fact that both philosophical positions cannot exist without the concept of human nature, cannot avoid making respective assumptions.

On that score, feminists also fail. Needless to say, as with all philosophical theory, there is not *one* feminism, but there is a feminist body of philosophical and political theory that is bound together, more or less loosely, by an overarching theme: the gender-question dealing with all the historical injustices women have suffered. Unquestionably more than a legitimate intellectual endeavor, still, we cannot gloss over the fact that virtually all forms of contemporary feminism, regardless of whether we look at liberal, Marxist, radical, socialist, constructivist, post-structural, or postcolonial feminism, follow a politico-theoretical pattern of theorizing comparable to other philosophies and political theories, including realist international-political theory, namely: drawing from human-nature premises. In fact, feminists themselves have identified the various conceptions of human nature underlying their respective theories, have traced how these assumptions interact with their

criticism of really existing societies and inform their (legitimate) call for social and political change.[90] Naturally, these underlying assumptions about, and understandings of, human nature are of feminist-philosophical provenance emphasizing that we are not so much a product of nature than are socially constructed. Agreed, we may be (to some extent), but still assumptions of malleability presuppose assumptions about our nature.

Again, it should be emphasized that criticizing the human-nature critics is not intended to ridicule the intellectual efforts of neo-Marxian critical theory, postmodernism, existentialism, and feminism, all consequential strands of Western philosophy. And, again, the concept of human nature as well as unreflective human-nature talk in the theory and practice of matters social and political can be, and has at times proven to be, vicious. Not many disagree, let's hope, with Rorty's succinct and correct statement that "notions like 'the homosexual' and 'the Negro' and 'the female' are best seen not as inevitable classifications of human beings but rather as inventions that have done more harm than good."[91] Needless to say, human history is the history of profound human, social, political injustices deriving more often than not from competing notions of the nature of Man.

Still, we cannot wish away the fact that despite being so overtly critical, these human-nature critics themselves seem to have been incapable to rid philosophical and political theorizing from the concept of human nature. To the contrary, their philosophies and theories seem to be informed by underlying assumptions about human nature to no lesser degree than those offered by political realists. True, compared to political realists, these human-nature critics emphasize historicism over ahistoricism, culture over nature, and free will over determinism. But the concept of human nature is not tied to purely naturalistic-determinist accounts of Man. It equally refers to historicist and cultural conceptions of Man. And even if it was mentioned that these human-nature critics did not really speak of "human nature" but of "human being" to disentangle these two terms, that accusing these critics results, ergo, merely from an ingenious hocus-pocus over the meaning of the term "human nature," it would not seriously weaken the argument that these critics, too, base their respective endeavors upon profound assumptions about the nature of Man. The reasoning seems fairly uncomplicated.

Save some die-hard naturalists, not many deny that environmental, cultural, or historical-materialist circumstances have shaped human behavior and social action throughout human history. Thus, it is one of the crucial questions of all psychological, social, and political theorizing to what degree Man is autonomous of his primordial nature (however good or bad this nature may be thought to be). Naturally, some have seen, and allow for, a

greater autonomy from nature, others for less. Regardless of these different degrees, however, we should always remind ourselves that although we may want to ban "human nature" from our vocabulary preferring to speak of "human beings," "individuals," "persons," or of the "self," there is, at the ultimate point, always a *nature*—a *nature* of Man—to be reckoned with. For even though culture is, of course, significant in all matters of Man's existence, we must not forget that "culture could not exist without mental faculties that allows humans to create and learn culture to begin with."[92] Put differently, at some stage, it all comes down to nature, to the nature of Man. There cannot exist (for they would be meaningless) cultural, historicist, or environmentalist conceptions of Man not grounded, ultimately, in nature. Speaking of Man or human beings, we always, and of necessity, "speak" of the biological-physiological nature of Man (or assume or infer something about it). Regardless of realist, Marxian, postmodern, existentialist, or feminist (or any other) provenance; regardless of the varying degrees of malleability, perfectibility, improvability we may presume, any statement about Man, his behavior or his social existence is, ultimately, a statement about the *nature* of Man.

That some of the fiercest human-nature critics still rely on the concept of human nature allowing their philosophies and political theories to be informed by respective assumptions, has far-reaching implications. First, adding to the view that it may be impossible to construct political theories that can do underlying assumptions about human nature, it underscores the significance that we ask anew whether the concept of human nature should be dead in realist international-political theorizing (and in wider International Relations theory). Second, it seems that neo-Marxian critical theorists, postmodernists, existentialists, and feminists will have to face the charge that their respective criticisms are, frankly, more or less worthless.

The fact that the human-nature critics are, so to speak, human-nature sinners themselves puts the likes of Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian political realists in a comfortable intellectual position allowing them to raise two points: that it seems not clear (1) why these critics' political theories should, in any significant ways, be intellectually superior given their reliance on the concept of human nature and (2) why the six sins of human nature should not equally apply to these human-nature critics. Avoiding to ridicule human-nature criticism because human nature remains a complex concept requiring some care, classical-style political realists should now turn the tables on the human-nature critics pressing them hard why they believe they have not fallen prey to the six sins: How can they prove not committing the rationalistic-fallacy? Do their assumptions not also serve politico-theoretical and practical-political interests and purposes? Do they not also presuppose a

universal Man, be it a Marxian *homo faber* or Rorty's flexible, protean, self-shaping animal? Why is their universalism unproblematic? How can they disentangle the natural from the cultural? How do they know that Man is of gold, not of bronze? And so forth.

These questions must be raised. And leaving aside the question of the burden of proof, ideally they should be addressed by all parties involved. For the intellectual scenery vis-à-vis the concept of human nature remains unpleasant, may even have become worse: We now know that assumptions about human nature are still widespread exerting a powerful influence on various philosophies informing, in turn, the discourse on international relations; at the same time, in International Relations, the concept of human nature and its nature, function, role, effects, and complexity does not receive appropriate attention. Unless we raise anew the human-nature question, we remain stuck in an intellectual environment where the theme of human nature surfaces only when it seems expedient, when seeking to use ultimate force against a disliked politico-theoretical position: by claiming it is wrong because its underlying assumptions about human nature are wrong. Unless being content with what are often rather hollow debates (you fatalist, you dreamer) hampering progress in, and reducing utility of, International Relations discourses, questions must be raised, the concept of human nature debated.

The alternative to raising the human-nature question anew, putting it back to the center of contemporary International Relations, would be the immediate pursuit of the intellectual project, perhaps entitled "perfecting the Waltzians." Its task implies to make renewed attempts to construct (political) theories of international relations that will be truly purified from the concept of human nature. Neglecting questions regarding implicit or explicit assumptions about human nature would, some may think, perhaps allow us focusing on counting missiles, tracing international cash flows, unearthing foreign-policy ideologies, and so on. Surely, we have a certain autonomy from the concept of human nature as we can ascribe different degrees of significance or place-values to it. Still, neglecting or discarding the human-nature question seems short-sighted. It will forever haunt us lurking in the back of our discourse, for we may never be able to get rid of the concept of human nature meaning that the same sorts of problems and questions will remain. This relates back to an earlier suggestion: namely, that, in light of the failure of post-classical realists and human-nature critics to present political theories freed from the concept of human nature, the project of perfecting post-classical realism is likely to fail. Regardless of how International Relations theorists may approach the concept of human nature, it seems virtually impossible

to theorize the political and international-political without any recourse to the nature of Man.

That the concept of human nature is omnipresent in political theory, that it seems impossible to theorize the political and international-political without having an (intelligent) understanding of the nature of Man, seems to be the lesson of more than two millennia of Western political thought. It has shown that matters political are intimately tied up with questions of human nature; this connection is rather undisputed among historians of political thought as they have seen all too often that be it domestic, international, conservative, liberal, socialist, idealist, or political realist theories, virtually all political theories—from the Sophists to the present—are based upon, or derive from, implicit or explicit assumptions about human nature.[93] In this regard, we should not forget that several of the greatest political philosophers have presented us with the greatest treatises on Man; as examples, take Hobbes's *Leviathan* and *De Homine*, Hume's *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Rousseau's *Émile*, Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, and Kant's anthropology lectures.

Briefly touring through the ages, from the Sophists such as Protagoras, Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Critas, and Callicles, we learn that Man's virtuous behavior is taught. Not an innate quality, it largely derives from societal conventions constraining Man. Were these sanctions lifted, Man would show his true, natural, face. Thucydides brings this duality to the point: Man is capable of producing great art, literature, and sensible politics; but his nature also allows for their destruction, especially in times of war.[94] Driven by fear, honor, and self-interest, the lesson of Thucydides' Man is that "we must reckon in a human nature that will again and again, when given the chance, overpower the fragile restraints of law and justice."[95] Much of the same can be said of St. Augustine too. Perhaps the most important theologian, a major force during the transvaluation of classical anthropology, he had a lasting impact on Western philosophical, moral, and political thought.[96] The "first great 'realist' in western history,"[97] the "first Christian theologian to comprehend the full implications of the Christian doctrine of man,"[98] to St. Augustine, the Scriptural account of the Fall is not a myth, but the history of Man chronicling and symbolizing all earthly evil. Driven by pride, self-love, and exaltation, the sinning of Adam and Eve transcend time and space. "All men," he says, "are a mass of sin,"[99] Augustine's conception of Man, which ascribes the concept of human nature a central role and value. No doubt, "Augustine's theologically informed understanding of the human psychology is the jumping-off place for all his forays into political thought."[100]

Moving forward in the history of political theory, one cannot but recognize how habitual (natural) it was in pre-Waltzian times to openly relate questions

of the political to the nature of Man. Like Thucydides and St. Augustine, Machiavelli's political theory rests "on a conception of human nature as stable and uniform."[101] Assumptions equally dim, Machiavellian Man is a passion-driven creature with "insatiable desires for domination, wealth, and sexual gratification."[102] Though there is a second nature allowing him to act rationally, strategically, and cooperatively, this results merely from autocratic societal constraints implying that "as soon as constraint ceases, ambitious first nature begins to corrupt cooperative habits."[103] Machiavelli considers Man an immutable creature making possible generalizations about political behavior.[104] More or less, Hobbes agrees. His lupus is passion-driven requiring a sword-state to avoid the *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Hobbes, too, makes Man the starting point in matters political.[105] Similarly gloomy is Spinoza. His man is driven by fear of pain, hope for pleasure, and simple hatred, a deadly mix of passions requiring the state to curb Man.[106] Burke also argues that society cannot exist or sustained unless external provisions tame Man's passions.[107] As mentioned, Hume called for a new science of Man arguing it should become the foundation for all intellectual endeavors, including political theory. And Rousseau was also fascinated by the question of Man opening his *Second Discourse* with the programmatic statement characterizing his political theory: "It is of man that I am to speak."[108]

Finally, Rousseau is an elegant bridge to Rawls. Often neglected, Rawls's intellectual project also uses the concept of human nature. We can see that the Rawlsian accounts of the realistic utopia, political liberalism, and justice as fairness (intriguing as they may be) are fact-sensitive, namely, sensitive to the facts of human nature.[109] In *Law of Peoples*, he emphasizes his methodological debt to Rousseau. Constructing his realistic utopia, he writes:

> I shall assume that his [Rousseau's] phrase "man as they are" refers to persons' moral and psychological natures and how that nature works within a framework of political and social institutions; and that his phrase "laws as they might be" refers to laws as they should, or ought, to be.[110]

Following the procedural account of justice as fairness, Rawls uses the social contract to erect the society of peoples and to define the eight principles governing it. Every social-contract theory is based on the concept of human nature; and while being rather silent on this theme in his international-political theory, in *Theory of Justice,* Rawls presents an account of human nature helping him create justice as fairness and define the liberty-principle and difference-principle through the veil of ignorance lain over individuals in the original position: Rawlsian Man is a mutually disinterested, non-envious, limitedly altruistic, and moral, rational being.[111] Though arguing

that we must distinguish between the conception of the person, a normative conception, and the conception of human nature as provided by life-sciences and social theory,[112] Rawls cannot escape entirely from the tutelage of human nature. For although the conception of the person and the conception of human nature "are distinct elements and enter at different places," Rawls himself writes that the ideal of the person "presupposes a theory of human nature," that the "task of a moral doctrine is to specify an appropriate conception of the person that general facts about human nature and society allow."[113]

With Rawls, this brief tour through two millennia of Western political theory ends, presuming that, taken together with the discussions of classical and post-classical realism as well as the foregoing criticism of the human-nature critics, the point is sufficiently made. Surely, compared with the lengthy readings and discussions of these thinkers' assumptions about human nature offered by historians of political thought, my brief tour seems somewhat coarse; their respective assumptions are more nuanced than was allowed to describe here. Yet, there is equally no doubt that assumptions about human nature have been made since the day we began theorizing matters of politics and that these assumptions have been extremely powerful leading political theorizing toward either politico-philosophical optimism or, alternatively, politico-philosophical pessimism.

And, if we add this, then, to the argument that neither post-classical realists nor the human-nature critics managed to purify political theorizing from assumptions about human nature, it appears as if it is impossible for us to get rid of the concept of human nature. It seems that, until someone figures out how to theorize the political and international-political without the concept of human nature, we have to live with one of the most complex themes—the nature of Man—in International Relations.

In Defense of the Concept of Human Nature

Augustine held the view that Men are sinners, the Christian-realist view of Man informing Christian-realist international-political theory. This chapter, however, made no claims whether Men are Augustinian sinners, Kantian *animalia rationabilia*, Marxian *homines fabri*, Hobbesian lupi, and so forth. Instead, concerned with the question whether the concept of human nature ought to be admissible in (realist) political theory, it offered a critical engagement with human-nature criticism. After the discussion of the six sins of human nature, which did not deny their inherent legitimacy, the philosophies behind much of human-nature criticisms appeared in a different light; to paraphrase Augustine, the human-nature critics are sinners, too.

Seeking, like the post-classical realists, to get rid of the concept of human nature, they failed; together with classical realists, post-classical realists, and perhaps the entirety of Western political theorists, these critics belong now to the mass of human-nature sinners. Therefore, we must take their human nature–critical arguments with a pinch of salt. The six sins appear far too weak to substantiate any claims that the concept of human nature should be dead within realist international-political theory (and wider International Relations). Further, we should consider what may be seen as the two capital sins of human-nature criticism.

First, let us turn to the countercriticism of the hidden complexity of the concept of human nature. To relate somewhat back to my defense of realist international-political theory, that critics often underestimate the richness of political realists' assumptions about the nature of Man (save Waltz, Mearsheimer), it appears that human-nature critics often do not realize the hidden complexity of the concept of human nature. Surely, its use can be tricky, dangerous. After knowing the six sins of human nature, few would deny that assumptions about human nature found in political theories are often metaphysical speculations; that they can be used for ideological purposes; that they may be blind to the historicism of Man; that they may be too determinist; that they may lead to the confusion of is/ought; and that they may be posthoc rationalizations. Still, this set of criticisms cannot decide the ought-question. We should decry crude forms of determinist biologism, and decry deductions of politico-theoretical oughts from human-nature premises as this helps tearing apart respective political theories. Yet, these concerns themselves cannot (help) decide the underlying question, for we must not allow that (realist) political theories using assumptions about human nature are lumped together declaring the concept of human nature as some sort of persona non grata in political theorizing; doing so would imply glossing over its complexities.

The strength and validity, or weakness and fallibility, of the six sins of human nature depend on two questions: How significant is the concept of human nature in the political theory under scrutiny? And, how is it conceptualized? After examining (realist) international-political theories, the respective answers could be arranged in a three-dimensional matrix: The x-axis represents four degrees of place-value ascribed to human nature: critical theorists ascribe zero value; Kantians/Hegelians consider it a peripheral *additivum*; Hobbesians ascribe it a central role; Humeans consider it foundational. The y-axis represents two first-level conceptualizations of human nature: actualities (Hobbes) versus potentialities (Marcuse). And the z-axis captures its second-level conceptualizations, the varying degrees of Man's autonomy from nature: biologism versus culturalism. It remains a future

task in International Relations to examine a wide range of its most important political theories according to these characteristics; but, already now, it seems clear that the six sins cannot pose a serious threat to the concept of human nature. The reason is simple but profound. Some rely heavily on human nature, others don't. Some claim truth about the nature of Man, others don't. Some are crude determinists, others aren't. And so forth. Ergo, at times, human-nature criticism can be more than justified, but the actual or potential mishandling of the concept of human nature by a few does not allow for ultimate judgments regarding the ought-question.

The same derives from the second capital sin of human-nature critics: the omnipresence of the concept of human nature in their own intellectual endeavors. There is a triple irony at play here. First, human-nature critics criticize various political realisms for committing most horrendous politico-theoretical crimes, but they do so based on unfair readings. Second, these critics, informed by overtly human nature-critical philosophies raising the six sins, underestimate the complexity of their own object of study. And, third, these critics shooting wildly at political realists and others turn out to be no inch closer to a political theorizing ridded of the concept of human nature than their targets. Whether Marx, his Frankfurt School-followers, postmodernists, existentialists, or feminists, they have wished political realism the politico-theoretical death for relying on (what they consider too pessimistic and erroneous) assumptions about the nature of Man. Ironically, however, these critics, too, remain committed to the concept of human nature. Their theories being laden with (more benign) assumptions about human nature, these human-nature critics fall into the same traps they laid out for realists running the whole gamut from the metaphysical-speculation argument, over the ideological-mystification argument, to the naturalistic-/rationalistic-fallacy argument. Similarly, those critical of the concept of human nature in political theory should remember that language will not do the trick. Speaking of individuals, persons, human beings, emphasizing culturalism, environmentalism, historicism, and so on makes Man not less a natural creature since assumptions about his behavior are, ultimately, based upon assumptions about his nature. The nature of Man is the ultimate source that determines the varying degrees of human autonomy.

This brings us back to Augustine. Not because Men are sinners, but because human-nature critics are sinners. In light of the two sets of countercriticism, the complexity-argument and omnipresence-argument, the six sins of human nature appear not illegitimate, but simply weak; they appear too weak, unhelpful, and incapable of deciding whether human nature ought to be dead in realist international-political theory. This leaves the pursuit of an answer to the ought-question at the following: it seems we're all

human-nature sinners. Classical realists proactively used assumptions about human nature in political theorizing. Post-classical realists tried to purify political theory from the concept of human nature, but failed. And so have the human-nature critics. If we take this together with the fact that virtually all giants of Western thought (from Thucydides, Augustine, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, Hume, Rousseau, Kelsen, to Rawls) have used the concept of human nature as philosophical backdrop of their respective theories, we are led to believe in the impossibility of theorizing the political and international-political without making some profound assumptions about the nature of Man. It seems, then, that we are left with, and must deal with, the concept of human nature for a while to come.

Still, the ought-question remains more or less unanswered. From the fact that human-nature criticism must be taken with a pinch of salt, that we all use the concept of human nature, we cannot necessarily conclude that the concept of human nature ought to be the philosophical starting point for all realist international-political theorizing. So, then, what are the virtues of the concept of human nature?

CHAPTER 5

Human Nature, the Political, and the Virtues of Freudian Man

The concept of human nature is not dead in contemporary realist international-political theory; respective assumptions about the nature of Man are widespread. But ought human nature to be dead? The ought-question leaves us with two ideal-typical politico-theoretical options. To purify political realism from the tutelage of human nature, perfecting the Waltzians/Mearsheimerians. Or, alternatively, to bring back political realism to a more classical-style understanding of international-political theorizing defending proactively the concept of human nature, recognizing its virtues, making it the central concept upon which different political realisms are being built. In the preceding chapter, I unearthed the flaws and vices of much of human-nature criticism and argued that the sixfold set of the human-nature sins put forth by various strands of social and political philosophy is legitimate but represents, ultimately, merely a set of warnings that are too weak, too insufficient, and too unconvincing to make the overarching claim that the concept of human nature should not, must not, be used when theorizing the international-political. This marked the first step of the politico-theoretical *plaidoyer* in favor of classical-style political realism, of the intimate relationship between human nature and political realism.

The human-nature critics disarmed, however, to answer the ought-question, what is still required is a set of positive arguments remarrying realist international-political theory with the concept of human nature. And relating to a specific conception of human nature, Freudian Man, this chapter seeks to provide these proactive arguments. It deals not so much with the question whether we require the concept of human nature

in realist international-political theory in pure theoretical isolation (we know we cannot avoid making assumptions about human nature), but with what particular conception of human nature may be suitable for political realism, helping to make the argument that the concept of human nature seems not merely unavoidable but, in fact, indispensable. Recognizing that the respective menu of choice is impressively large and (largely) impressive, ranging perhaps from the Sophists to the latest innovations in the neurosciences, I argue for the positive, central role of a distinctively Freudian conception of human nature within political realism. As I understand it, Freudian Man helps to solve several problems associated with contemporary realist international-political theory. Seeking to bring contemporary realist international-political theory back to its original roots by providing political realism with a suitable intellectual substructure or philosophical anthropology, Freud helps political realists to explain and legitimize more thoroughly their distinctive conception of the world, their politico-philosophical realist Weltanschauung.

In this chapter, the argument is made that we should turn to Freud because his conception of human nature has, at least, three main virtues for political realism. First, as the next section argues, Freudian human nature helps us to demystify the defining themes, principles, and concepts of political realism. Freudian Man helps to resolve into their individual-psychological elements many of post-classical realism's anthropomorphological projections and hypostatizations. Second, as argued in the subsequent section, Freud's conception of human nature helps us to understand the underlying psychological mechanics of group formation and the dynamics of internal and external behavior of political communities. Explaining the link between the nature of Man and the nature of the political community, Freud offers us a nicely developed and powerful statement of the nature and inner workings of the (international) human condition and international relations. And, third, in this chapter's last section, I argue that the human-nature conception of Freud serves as a useful and timeless reminder for political realists never to expect too much—but also not too little—from Man. Freudian Man helps us to define the possibilities and limits of international relations, to maneuver consciously and steadfastly between the reality of international affairs and its utopia.

Freudian Human Nature and the Demystification of Political Realism

Political realism has always been a hugely controversial body of international-political theory being "loved" and "hated" in perhaps equal measures. As

Michael Williams hits the nail on its head,

> [t]o some, being a Realist represents the height of wisdom: the mark of a clear-sighted ability to understand the world the way it is, a willingness to confront the dynamics of power and interest that are held to govern world politics. To others, Realism is a mark of failure: morally obtuse and historically anachronistic, it represents a lack of political understanding and imagination that is misleading at best, pernicious and destructive at worst.[1]

As so often, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Yet, in any case, to this tension between political realism and its critics (often an unhelpful politico-philosophical "war"), we must add the internal tension between the Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style classical realists recognizing the significance of Man in matters international-political and the Waltzian/Mearsheimerian-style post-classicals committed to the concept of international-political structure. Taking the external "battles"[2] and internal tensions together, political realists cannot wish away, must recognize, that despite its continuing status as one of the most powerful Weltanschauungen in International Relations, realist international-political theory is being attacked in many ways and on many fronts.

Here, amidst these battles, tensions, debates, Freud can be of significant help to political realism. It is one of the main virtues of Freud, of Freud's conception of human nature informing his social/political philosophy, to help political realism tackle and solve several of its main analytical and normative weak points. Turning to Freud helps to demystify and strengthen political realism as Freudian Man helps us to explain several principles, themes, and concepts that, hitherto, have been explained either poorly or not at all. Freud's conception of Man provides political realism with a suitable and powerful human-nature basis or anthropological intellectual substructure and a much-needed form of philosophical anthropology for the realist Weltanschauung.

Of all the problems and mysteries currently associated with contemporary realist international-political theory, the perhaps most significant theme where Freud can help us relates to much of post-classical realism's, that is, particularly Waltzian/Mearsheimerian structural realism, rather superficial treatment of what political realism considers to be the primary unit of the international-political and, ergo, realist international-political theory: the state. More specifically, the concept of Freudian Man helps political realism to move beyond much of post-classical realism's unwillingness to open-up the "black box," move beyond its respective inability to explain the sources

of state motivations and state-motivational assumptions by means of deconstructing and resolving unexplained and/or anthropomorphized social wholes, such as the state, into their human-psychological elements. Making such a deconstructive and resolutive move, being part and parcel of Freud's own wider scientific, demystifying, and unraveling Enlightenment conception of the world, is a significant mandatory step for contemporary political realists, both from a methodological and a politico-theoretical standpoint.

The main problem of post-classical realism, especially of Waltzian/Mearsheimerian structural realism, is its tendency to simplify and/or anthropomorphize crucial concepts. As a consequence, post-classical realists' move away from the concept of Man meant a simplification of the understanding of the underlying basic nature of international relations; and this substitution of the security dilemma for Man, in turn, has had negative effects on post-classical realism's ability to explain and predict international-political outcomes and foreign-policy behavior. Seeking to avoid the concern with human nature, Kaplan turned to general systems–theory anthropomorphizing the international system. And Waltz dissatisfied with what he saw as the naive inductivist empiricism of earlier political realists turned to the concept of the international-political structure. To some, this form of "reductionism," the reduction of a rich body of international-political thought à la Morgenthau and Niebuhr down to an allegedly more scientific theory ridded of all unimportant content such as Man, has made Waltz a "realist giant," a "king of thought in IR theory."[3] Several others, however, have argued that this new form of political realism, the neorealism of Waltz/Mearsheimer, is a largely hollow realism, an "orrery of errors,"[4] a "parody of science."[5] For various reasons, Waltzian neorealism has been "shot at, embellished, misunderstood, and caricatured."[6] As was put succinctly, Waltz-criticism has become almost a "cottage industry."[7]

Though sometimes unfair, some main lines of criticisms are not unjustified. Waltzian/Mearsheimerian-style political realism cannot any longer hide behind methodological arguments that the explicit presupposition of a conception of human nature would reveal a rather antiquated and almost prescientific understanding of what the nature of a proper international-political theory is. For, in fact, the exact opposite seems the case. And the argument is that Freudian Man is an effective solution to what was identified as the problem of the "missing microfoundation."[8] A significant part of this problem is Waltz's concept, and conception, of the international-political structure. A major theoretical element of his structural realism, Waltz argues that

International-political systems, like economic markets, are formed by the coaction of self-regarding units. International structures are defined in

terms of the primary political units of an era...Structures emerge from the coexistence of states. No state intends to participate in the formation of a structure by which it and others will be constrained.[9]

Elevating the concept of international-political structure toward the center of his theoretical endeavor, however, Waltz adds—as a mere theoretical assumption–that states want to survive. Taking the concept of international-political structure and the state-survival assumption together, Waltz argues, suffices to allow international-political theorists to deduce, explain, and predict the general patterns of international politics. Broadly inspired by Durkheimian anthropology and economic theory,[10] Waltz explicitly constructs the concept of international-political structure akin to the concept of market structure in economics endowing it with immense explanatory power. Waltz's underlying logic is that changes within the international-political structure cause changes of international-political outcomes and foreign-policy behavior; and changes of the international-political structure may even cause radical or unforeseen changes in international relations.[11]

Innovative and nicely constructed, the concept of international-political structure is endowed with too much theoretical significance and explanatory power by Waltz. The problem is that his structural realism is largely based upon the abstract concept of the international-political structure, with the added help of yet another abstract concept, namely, the political unit (the state) and its survival motive. This is problematic. Partly because it is theoretically inconsistent in comparison with its role model because economic theory is based on a distinctive conception of human nature, more often than not (though not exclusively) on the conception of the *homo oeconomicus*.[12] The legitimate objection, then, is that Waltz created, as Markus Fischer correctly argued, a "theory without a microfoundation."[13] Rather than relying almost solely on the hollow concept of international-political structure and relegating the concept of the state to a black box by merely assuming that states seek survival, Waltz should have abided by the intellectual and methodological logic of economic theory that explains the general patterns of economic behavior and the nature and general behavioral patterns of firms in a market by making fundamental assumptions about the nature of Man. In this context, Waltz should have, *mutatis mutandis*, "generate[d] political units from assumptions about the elementary properties and propensities of individuals" making sure that structural realism is not "vulnerable to critics who argue from first principles."[14] Such critics dissatisfied with structural realism's reliance on unexplained and anthropomorphized concepts and mere state-motivational assumptions are plentiful including not only critical theorists of international relations but also classical-style political realists.

Seeking to correct these errors, as suggested in my Freudian-style philosophical anthropology developed below *en détail*, Freudian Man seems a suitable and powerful human nature starting point providing such a microfoundation for contemporary realist international-political theory.

Freud, however, provides us not just with a proper microfoundation. Further, the concept of Freudian Man helps political realism to explain and legitimize its state-centric approach to international relations. This signifies a second, related problem of Waltzian/Mearsheimerian-style realist international-political theory for which Freud may provide a solution. In a truly insightful and massive essay on the development of political realism since its birth, Ashley Tellis shows how Kaplan and Waltz shifted realism from a "historically based and inductively justified set of explanations" toward "a more abstract and deductively systematized body of causal hypotheses."[15] The implications of the Kaplanian/Waltzian project have been both positive and negative. Positive because of its increasing reflectivity vis-à-vis the philosophy of science, theory building, and its testing; but negative because Waltzian/Mearsheimerian structural realism is based upon abstract social wholes rather than upon "acting individuals as the theoretical primates."[16] As Mearsheimer readily concedes: "[s]tructural realists treat states as if they were black boxes."[17] But this is insufficient, as any meaningful legitimation and defense of these social wholes (that are, states) representing realism's prime analytical and normative units in the study of international politics cannot be, and must not be, based any longer, as Tellis argues, on mere affirmation, mere assumption, or on mere historical empiricism.[18] Instead, it seems vital that political realism defends the "privileged entitative and explanatory status" of the concept of the state recognizing that this can "only be based on a deduction generated from the solely visible unit of all social reality, namely, the individual"[19]—or, as I shall argue, from Freudian Man.

Such a theoretical defense is a laborious task requiring "standing Waltz's methodological approach on its head."[20] Yet, it is an imperative and fruitful task; and political realism must provide this defense, must seek to base its international-political theorizing on a proper microfoundation. It will enable political realists to defend realist international-political theory against those arguing from first principles and make political realism internally more coherent. Further, it will allow contemporary political realism to explain some of the basic yet hitherto neglected phenomena in international relations. A proper explicit conception of human nature (sensitive to the intricacies of the human condition it helped create) will help political realists to look inside the black box—the state—thereby helping to explain, among other things, why

it is necessary for political authority to be organized in mutually exclusive units such as city-states, empires, and nations; why a structural condition

of anarchy must exist among such units; and why they tend to pursue certain ends, ranging from mere preservation to world domination.[21]

A Freudian conception of Man helps us to bring contemporary political realism back to its roots, to defend it against legitimate criticisms saying that it follows pseudoanalogies with economic theory, and to emancipate it from relying on pseudoscientific rhetorical, theoretical, historical, and anthropomorphological assumptions and claims.

To the methodological imperative bringing back contemporary political realism to its classical-style roots, we must add the politico-theoretical reason. This, too, is an important line of argument, for post-classical realism's move to pseudostructural concepts such as the security dilemma meant a creeping depreciation and neglect of the genuine philosophical roots of political realism. In this regard, Freud helps political realists to regain confidence in theorizing the international-political through an underlying conception of the nature of Man. Providing a secure and powerful conception of human nature, Freudian Man helps contemporary realist international-political theorists to both reinvent and demystify the realist Weltanschauung. Reinventing and demystifying political realism are closely related tasks, but they must be dealt with separately. The argument is that political realism requires an explicit conception of human nature, specifically that Freudian Man is a suitable candidate for realist international-political theory. Needless to say, however, such Freudian or Freudian Man-based intellectual substructure seeking and helping to demystify and explain several key concepts and themes of the realist view of international relations cannot be constructed without offering an explicit understanding of what the nature and philosophy of political realism is (or is considered to be). This signifies the next two tasks. First, to explicate the nature of the Freudian philosophical anthropology for political realism. And, second, to explicate what is seen to be the nature of the philosophy of political realism.

Political realism requires an explicit conception of the nature of Man. Based on Freudian Man, as is argued in this specific instance, it requires a distinctively Freudian philosophical anthropology informing its central tenets. The central element of this intellectual endeavor is the concept of the "Realist Man";[22] so to speak, the Freudian Realist Man. As it is common practice, since Waltz's description of international-political theory in terms of the three images, to associate the concept of human nature with the first image, it seems vital to make clear the distinction between what is usually understood as first-image theories and my Freudian philosophical anthropology. Throughout this book, at the risk of being criticized for using masculine language, I have been speaking of "Man," not of "person" or "individual." The intention for doing so was not to perpetuate gendered language

in International Relations but rather to clearly distinguish between the classical politico-theoretical realm and the post-classical politico-scientific realm. As I understand it, "Man" belongs to the former, the "person" and "individual" to the latter. The Morgenthauians/Niebuhrians have spoken of "Man," the philosophical basis of all human, social, and political; political psychologists and diplomatic historians are concerned with "individuals," with presidents, prime ministers, leaders of administrations.[23]

Not making any (critical) claims vis-à-vis the first image, the Freudian philosophical anthropology is not a first-image theory. It does not seek to establish causal laws linking statesmen in the form of independent variables to foreign-policy behavior or international-political outcomes; further, it does not—and does not seek to—qualify as a social-scientific first-image theory, albeit Freudian Man, needless to say, may well be a suitable base for these endeavors (and already is, though often hidden.)[24] Further, needless to say, the Freudian philosophical anthropology presented is not *the* human-nature background theory for political realism. Having confessed Freudian leanings throughout the chapters, we can imagine as many background-theories as there are human-nature conceptions compatible with political realism. In other words, a philosophical anthropology for political realism is indispensable, but one of *Freudian* provenance is merely one possibility of many, though a particularly powerful possibility. This, then, is the nature and underlying rationale of the Freudian philosophical anthropology: Based on Freudian Man, it seeks to provide the much-required philosophical backdrop for actual social-scientific realist theories of international politics; providing them with an intellectual substructure, it helps to demystify, legitimize, and explain several key concepts and themes of their realist Weltanschauung.

Developing and explicating such Freudian philosophical anthropology is important. Doing so, however, is not a trivial endeavor. Even if agreed a priori that Freudian Man seems a suitable conception of human nature for political realism, difficulties arise as such a statement obviously presupposes not only a sympathetic understanding of Freud (as confessed) but also a certain conception or understanding of political realism, its nature, philosophy, claims, vices, and virtues. Linking Freud to realist international-political theorizing, how else could it be said (asserted) that Freudian Man helps to explain key tenets of political realism?

Claiming to know what the nature of political realism is, however, has become an increasingly difficult endeavor as, over the past few decades, we have seen a massive proliferation of, so to speak, various different political realisms deriving either from politico-theoretical innovations or from reinterpretations. Thus, it happens that we are now forced to distinguish

between no fewer political realisms than traditional and scientific realism;[25] classical, modern, and twentieth-century realism;[26] human-nature, defensive, and offensive realism;[27] complex, fundamentalist, structuralist, and constitutionalist realism;[28] structural, biological, radical, strong, and hedged realism;[29] and evil, tragic, and hybrid realism.[30] Further, we are offered structural realism,[31] willful realism,[32] ethical realism,[33] evaluative realism,[34] utopian realism (emancipatory realism),[35] reflexive realism,[36] empirical realism,[37] contingent realism,[38] specific and generalist realism,[39] aggressive realism,[40] and neoclassical realism.[41] Another typology distinguishes between hawkish and dovish realism, pessimistic and optimistic realism, second-image and third-image realism, structural and human-nature realism, amoral and moral realism.[42]

No doubt, political realism has become a diverse and pluralist enterprise. This, per se, is not problematic. Perhaps, it should be welcomed; as was pointed out correctly: "After all, cumulative knowledge is the sine qua non of scientific progress."[43] Still, it was more than correct when Glenn Snyder asked rhetorically whether it was "time to end the proliferation of labels and theories in the realist camp and add up what we all have in common."[44] Then, what is it that political realists may have in common, the specific nature, the common core of political realism?

Not seeking to provide an empirical analysis about the intersection of all these political realisms, I will now positivize the form of political realism to which the Freudian philosophical anthropology relates. I take it that Freudian Man helps us to demystify, legitimize, and explain realist international-political theorizing thus understood. First and foremost, the Freudian philosophical anthropology applies to political realism conceived as a Weltanschauung. This follows the suggestion of Michael Smith who has shown "the breadth of its vision."[45] Broadly synonymous with "intellectual construct,"[46] "philosophical position,"[47] "interpretative framework,"[48] "general approach to international politics,"[49] "school of thought,"[50] and "theoretical tradition,"[51] Weltanschauung emphasizes elegantly that political realism is perhaps best understood as a specific world outlook, or general conceptualization of the world, based on distinctive beliefs, values, and assumptions that "instil the world with significance, and facilitate the transition from thought to action."[52] More specifically, more substantive, from a politico-theoretical point of view, we may argue (save structural realists, perhaps) that the realist Weltanschauung defines itself along the following four basic principles.

The first—and most fundamental—basic principle is political realism's *dictum* that all analytical and normative tragedies and evils of the human condition and international-political life have their roots in the nature of

Man. The contribution of the Freudian philosophical anthropology is that it helps to make explicit and explain the source of the political by means of a distinctive conception of human nature trespassing the artificial boundaries between the psychological and the social. Though an essential part of political realism since its birth, this principle has often been neglected, forgotten, or wished away. It seems, therefore, even more pressing to explain and remind political realists of its nature as political realists, regardless of what particular provenance, should not forget that political realism is a Weltanschauung that conceives the nature of international relations in terms of the political, the concept of power. True, the relations among nations can be approached from a variety of ontological, methodological, and epistemological perspectives;[53] and Chris Brown put it nicely that International Relations is, first and foremost, "the study of 'international relations.'"[54]

Political realism, however, is a specific, distinctive approach to international relations. Political realists think of international relations not in terms of the economic or legal or religious or cultural, but they analyze and theorize it in terms of the political and power. As Morgenthau argues,

> The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept…sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion. Without it…we could not distinguish between political and nonpolitical facts.[55]

On this point, post-classical realists seem to agree. As Mearsheimer points out explicitly and succinctly: "Realists believe that power is the currency of international politics."[56] Hence, we can say, then, that although every realist theory of international politics is a theory of international relations, not every International Relations theory is an international-political theory. Not entirely indifferent to them, political realists usually do not approach international relations in terms of the economical, legal, sociological, psychological, theological, or cultural. Instead, as the name suggests, political realism is concerned with the distinctively *political* element thought to be ubiquitous in, and intrinsic of, international relations.

This explains why political realism bases—and cannot but base—its Weltanschauung on Man, the Realist Man. Often considered as such, Morgenthau's international-political theory is not some sort of crude *animus dominandi*–based first-image theory. Instead, it is, as Richard Little has shown, a very "subtle and complex"[57] balance-of-power theory.

Further, Morgenthauian realist international-political theory recognizes that the distinction between a political theory and an international-political theory is merely analytical-artificial than substantial. A "theory of international politics is but a specific instance of a general theory of politics," Morgenthau correctly argues: "What is true of the latter is, *mutatis mutandis*, also true of the former."[58] This means that any genuine political theory, whether domestic or international, is concerned, at the ultimate point, with what political realism considers to be one of the most basic, defining, and universal of all human action and social phenomena: the yearning for power or, once somewhat institutionalized, the "striving for a share of power or for influence on the distribution of power."[59] This preoccupation with power in all human affairs, in turn, implies that political realism must have an understanding of the locus in which the yearning for power has its roots.

This root, however, is not the international-political structure. Instead, the source inclining Man to seek power can be found only in Man himself. On that point, the genuine political realism is more than explicit and revealing. As Morgenthau argues insightfully, "Any attempt to comprehend the nature of the Political must begin with a fundamental awareness: the nature of the Political is, as to its source, object, and purpose, bound to the nature of Man."[60] Making clear that the political is of human origin and arguing that a beehive, the "state of the bees," is not in any meaningful sense political, the object and conveyor of the political can only be Man: the political, Morgenthau writes, "acquires its force and purpose exclusively from the nature of Man."[61] That the political, including the international-political, has its roots in the nature of Man, however, does not deny or neglect the intrinsically social nature of all political.

> The Political is a social concept. Its nature derives from the soul of Man but is not confined to the intra-psychic sphere, as are, for instance, the Ethical or the Religious which can possibly unfold their nature within the isolated soul of Man only. True, according to its conceptual nature, the Political requires, in order to exist as Political, the reaching-out from the depths of the isolated soul and the linking-up with an object that lies outside the conveyor's soul and that is, with conceptual necessity, the soul of another Man.[62]

Though they define the nature and basic underlying philosophy of political realism (as well as the nature of the human condition), these are strong claims arousing perhaps all sorts of suspicions by critical theorists of international relations as well as post-classical realists. But the Freudian philosophical anthropology helps contemporary political realists to understand

why the political has its source in the nature of Man and why it "belongs to the sphere of the real-existing interpersonal human associations."[63] Further, Freudian Man will help to explain the individual and group-psychological processes and underlying mechanics of why the social nature of the political turns the international sphere into the realm of potentially endless struggles for power and peace.

That genuine political realism grounds the international-political, its nature, tragedies, and evils, in the nature of Man signifies the second basic principle defining the realist Weltanschauung as well as one of the most pressing problems currently haunting much of contemporary realist international-political theory, the assumption/explanation dilemma. This second basic principle concerns what political realism considers to be the three building blocks of its analytical understanding of international affairs. Paraphrasing Waltz, we may say that these are Man, the state, and war. Of these three, Man is the most significant providing the philosophical basis for explaining both the nature and behavior of political communities as well as the seeming inevitability of conflictual international relations. In line with the philosophy of methodological individualism characterizing pre-Waltzian/Mearsheimerian genuine political realism,[64] Morgenthau argues forcefully that

> [w]e have…no other access to the knowledge of…social facts or social structures than through Man: for the political as well as the social is experienced by Man only—it would not exist without Man, just as society itself would not exist without Man—and all actualities which we call political lead to the soul of Man as conveyor of the political. Only through the knowledge of its nature can we come to the knowledge of the nature of the political.[65]

Thus, by all means, political realism requires a detailed understanding of the nature of Man, a conception of the Realist Man.

In this regard, I presume that Robert Gilpin's account of human nature forming part of his brief but widely cited discussion about the three core assumptions or building blocks of political realism is not too wide of the mark.[66] Characterizing political life, he argues that the striving for power and security are two major motivational impulses; though Man, of course, does value and pursue other objectives in life as beauty, truth, and goodness, too, political realism believes that these goals have a lesser meaning and significance and are not sought after unless a certain amount of security has been achieved. This seems a fair description of human nature. But, none-theless, it seems problematic. Because, for the most part, all this is merely

assumed and not explained, making this otherwise fine human-nature conception rather vulnerable to attacks. But Freudian Man is able to help political realism to explain rather than assume the nature of the Realist Man. And much the same applies to the other two building blocks of political realism: political community and international conflicts.

Political realism emphasizes the perennial forces of nationalism and group loyalties. Not the purely individualistic and self-concerned Man of much liberal social and political theory, the Realist Man is rather some sort of crowd animal that can thrive only in a social context. His sense of loyalty (and, perhaps, moral reasoning and behavior) presents itself in the form of concentric circles beginning with the familial nucleus, ending almost always at the "border" of tribal group, city-state, or, as today, the (nation-)state. It is the latter that is the visible and problematic unit, or object of much of Man's moral attachment, that characterizes, defines, and drives international politics. Ultimately based on, and fueled by, Man's group loyalty, these often emotionally supercharged political communities enter the international arena seeking to push through their rational and often irrational interests vis-à-vis other political communities, seeking to prevail by using all effective means available, often the determined use of power and force: the relations among sovereign political communities are conflictual; anarchy is an essential feature of the international system; justice and morality beyond borders are often secondary aims. Again, from a political-realist standpoint, this seems a fair description of international affairs. Yet, again, political realism faces the assumption/explanation dilemma. Often merely assumed, how can this bleak view of international relations be explained by, or deduced from, the Realist Man? It is the virtue of Freud that his theory of human nature can help political realism to explain and demystify its emphasis on the intimate human-nature/political connection, its conception of the nature of Man, and its underlying logic of the triadic and symbiotic relationship between conflictual Man, conflictual political communities, and conflictual international affairs.

Freudian Man can also help us to demystify, explain and legitimize two further basic principles of the realist Weltanschauung relating to the question of what the limits of international relations are. One of these basic principles concerns the role of morality. Genuine political realism is not, and never has been, indifferent to the moral problem(s) of international affairs. Particularly the classicals such as Morgenthau and Niebuhr have shown that political realism is not so much a technical science but rather an ethics or moral philosophy of international relations.[67] Closely related to the morality principle is the neutrality or ideology-critical principle. In itself, political realism is politically neutral, a "broad church."[68] Adopting the ideology-critical element largely from

Kelsen's construction of the pure theory of law and state,[69] Morgenthauian political realism displays a genuine and deep-seated skepticism of purely ideological foreign-policies containing a strong ideology-critical dimension.[70] Though unfortunately often done, political realism, therefore, must not automatically be associated with any sort of political ideology, particularly not with conservative-leaning ideologies. Favoring engagement and diplomacy, the realist Weltanschauung seems to make an awkward pair with much of the (neo)conservative right;[71] and its neutrality or ideology-critical element makes political realism compatible with moderates on both sides, including, of course, the pragmatic left.[72] Importantly, the realist Weltanschauung is, per se, neither naively progressivist nor fatalistically pessimist; its conception of the world characterized by a deep commitment to prudence, political realism does not sit uneasily between moderate streaks of elitism and idealist optimism.

Yet, in any case, then, if it is claimed that everything there does ultimately root in the nature of Man, political realism must be able to explain how their idealist realism or optimist prudence flows from their conception of the Realist Man. And, again, Freudian Man helps to explain more thoroughly why the political-realist world outlook seems justified.

"Man, State, War": Freud and the Human Nature of International Relations

The realist Weltanschauung believes that the ultimate source of all earthly evil (and earthly good) roots in the nature of Man. This includes the social, the political, the nature of all social facts, and the nature of international relations. In a first step, then, Freud helps political realism to explain and legitimize the analytical and normative primacy of the Realist Man when theorizing the nature, internal mechanics, and external dynamics of political communities in international relations.

In light of the post-classical realist project (and critical theories of international relations), political realists can learn from Freud about the superficiality of structural-sociological modes of thought. Freud's methodological individualism, both extreme and elegant, reveals itself through his famous assertion made in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* that "individual psychology…is at the same time social psychology [and sociology] as well."[73] To Freud, individual psychology concerns "individual man and explores the paths by which he seeks to find satisfaction for his instinctual impulses," concerns Man's psycho-physiological nature. Importantly, however, this does not mean that we can conceive of Man in pure isolation as Freud has shown that in Man's "mental life" others are "invariably involved." Be those parents, brothers, sisters, or other objects of love, all resulting relations are "social

phenomena" formed by individuals under the influence of, or are "enormously important" to, fellow Men. Raising the question of how we should approach these social relations, phenomena, and facts, Freud argued that just as we cannot explain the nature and behavior of Man without recourse to his relations to his fellow Men, we cannot explain the nature of social relations and phenomena as well as the behavior of social facts such as political communities without recourse to Man's psycho-physiological nature. Freud criticized structuralist psychology for committing a fundamental mistake: "to leave these relations [of individual Man to parents, brothers, sisters, objects of love, etc.] on one side and to isolate as the subject of inquiry the influencing of an individual by a large number of people simultaneously." According to Freud, social psychologists from LeBon through Trotter to McDougall, renowned thinkers still influential,[74] treated Man, falsely, as an isolated member-individual of a race, nation, caste, profession, institution, or any other organized group; and such black box thinking led them to assume the existence of a "special instinct that is not further reducible," some sort of "social instinct," "herd instinct," or "group mind."[75]

Helping political realists not to fall prey to crude structuralisms, anthropomorphological projections, and hypostatizations of political communities, Freud saw internal and external group-behavior as "basically irrational."[76] Freud, however, did not stop at what he considered almost obvious. Further, he did not accept the thesis "that in a crowd there comes into being a new and single mind differing from the minds of the individuals composing it."[77] Like others, Freud asked what it is that holds groups together. Unlike others, he did so by acknowledging that the only reality in the social world is Man: groups do not possess instincts, only Man does. Freudian Man derives from Freud's methodological individualism, so archetypical of his theory of human nature and the social/political.

I perceived ever more clearly that the events of human history, the interactions between human nature, cultural developments and the precipitates of primaeval experiences . . . are no more than a reflection of the dynamic conflicts between the ego, the id and the super-ego, which psychoanalysis studies in the individual—are they very same processes repeated upon a wider stage.[78]

Freud studied social phenomena and social facts through their parts, the psyche, and human nature. And political realists should follow Freud's approach, particularly because his Man explains the nature and internal and external dynamics of political communities without relying on unexplained or anthropomorphological assumptions.

In the context that international politics cannot be explained without recourse to the nature of Man, that political realism requires a proper conception of the Realist Man in the form of a philosophical anthropology capable of explaining the international human condition, Freudian Man seems an ideal source capable of explaining the underlying dynamics why political communities are being formed, how political communities are being structured, why relations among separate political communities are inherently conflictual. Since we cannot understand Man without recourse to his inner instinctual motivations and some societal pressures, since we cannot understand the nature and behavior of political communities without recourse to Man's tension-ridden existence, the explication of some sort of Freudian human nature of international relations requires focusing on the nature and behavior of political communities. This approach seems justified, as even though Man forms the sole philosophical basis of all realist international-political theorizing, political communities, groups, or states are the main, and most problematic, actors in international relations.

Political realism believes that international-political life revolves around groups. On what basis, other than the historical record, can political realism explain the primacy of the political community in the past, present, and future of international relations? On this point, Freudian Man offers realist international-political theory an intelligent explanation why political communities being formed are superior to, and more realist(ic) than, the usual *homo oeconomicus*–based models presuming some crude rational self-interest; it offers political realism a powerful and timeless statement on the burdens of civilization, the (international) human condition.

Freudian Man is a natural security-seeker; not exclusively, but to a large degree. One of the major stimuli to form groups is Man's natural inclination to avoid pain. In terms of Freud's metapsychology, the pleasure principle explains mental processes and general behavioral patterns from the economic viewpoint. As fundamental to Freudian Man as the duality of instincts (dynamic viewpoint) and motivational (un)consciousness (structural viewpoint), Freud shows that our mental processes are such that we relentlessly "strive towards gaining pleasure" or, vice versa, that "psychical activity draws back from any event which might arouse unpleasure."[79] As a defining and natural characteristic, Freudian Man seeks pleasure, seeks to avoid pain. As Freud argues in *Civilization and Its Discontents,*

> What do they demand of life and wish to achieve in it?…They strive after happiness; they want to become happy and to remain so. This endeavour has two sides, a positive and a negative aim. It aims, on the one hand, at an absence of pain and unpleasure, and, on the other hand, at

the experiencing of strong feelings of pleasure…As we see, what decides the purpose of life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle. This principle dominates the operation of the mental apparatus from the start.[80]

The underlying reasons why Man is a security-seeker taking efforts to avoid pain and suffering are of both physiological and social nature, stemming from essentially three directions: "our own body," the "external world," and "our relations to other men."[81] It is these three ever-present and imminent sources of actual and potential suffering and pain that explain why the (international) human condition is, and will remain, tragic.

The first source of suffering is Man's *physis*. Though "doomed to decay and dissolution,"[82] doomed to physiological and psychological pathologies as well as death, Man wishing to escape the plight of his earthly existence seeks as much protection and security as possible, recognizing that life in pure isolation further reduces the chances for sustaining a healthy body. Although it is perhaps the most implicit stimulus why Men form and enter groups, this source of potential pain is a significant motivational force as the fear of physiological decay and death represents a major constant in Man's mental life. By contrast, perhaps more important is the second source for seeking security: Nature. Throughout the ages, Man has feared Nature as it "rage[s] against us with overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction."[83] True, the threat, pain, and suffering deriving from the third source, that is, Man's relations vis-à-vis other Men, are the most profound meaning that the most obvious shield of protection would be to live in pure isolation somewhat akin to Rousseau's noble savage. But the powers of Nature make this virtually impossible. Even if not a priori reasoning, the unpredictable nature of Nature dictates Man to cooperate with fellow Men. For despite all scientific-technical progress, isolated Man remains more or less powerless against Nature's darker dimensions (natural disasters, climate change, diseases, famines, and epidemics). Only collective behavior, concerted actions, and science make it at least a possibility to "attack nature and subjecting her to the human will"[84] (needless to say, today, most of Nature's disasters are Man-made). Further, from a more economic perspective, still related to the dictates of Nature, scarcity or necessity (*Ananke*) also drives Man into cooperative forms of social behavior as human society is significantly motivated by "economic" reasoning meaning that it simply "does not possess enough provisions to keep its members alive unless they work."[85] Hence, when it comes to Man's socialization with fellow Men, Freud is very clear about its "actual *raison d'être,*" namely, "to defend us against nature."[86]

Even more imperative, however, is the search for defense and protection vis-à-vis the third source of pain: the relations among Men. To Freudian Man, the fear of decay and death inflicted by other Men represents perhaps the strongest motivational reason to form groups and enter communal relationships. On that point, Freud's theory of human nature and social/political philosophy of the human condition may appear reminiscent of the Hobbesian social-contract theory characterized by the transformation of individual violence into communal-political force by means of common consent. The precivilizational state of nature depicted by Freud comes close to Hobbes's description of a "condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man."[87] Freud argued that the underlying dynamic of human history has been essentially threefold. First, Man has decided conflicts of interests using violence; second, Man has followed the rules of the "whole animal kingdom, from which men have no business to exclude themselves"; and, third, over the course of civilization, the means of violence have changed: from purely physical strength to tool-making (weaponry) to intellectual superiority.[88] Yet, despite all superficial "changes" in the social practises, the underlying dynamics of civilization have remained the same as we still have to deal with a nature of Man that we cannot simply wish away. Reminding us forcefully that Men are not the gentle and soft creatures often painted, for

> their neighbour is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him. *Homo homini lupus*. Who, in the face of all his experience of life and history, will have the courage to dispute this assertion?[89]

Certainly, Freud's view of human nature and the human condition is not of naive romance—and, therefore, fits nicely with the realist Weltanschauung.

Freud's account of the state of nature as well as his argument about exiting this unpleasant state of fear, suffering, and pain broadly follows the Hobbesian logic. The profound fear of suffering and pain—the profound security-seeking—drives Man into cooperative forms of social organization. Fearful of fellow Men, exposed to the Hobbesian notion that "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest,"[90] reinforced by the fear of physiological decay, death, Nature, and *Ananke*, Freudian Man recognizes the "dangers and uselessness of these struggles" leading him to enter into a mutual agreement with fellow Men, into some "sort of social contract."[91]

Over the course of the civilizational process, the state of nature, the realm of the purely physical violence, power, and force of the one or few, was replaced by right, law, and the power of the many.[92] Well and good. Despite all civilizational progress and societal virtues, the contract between Men creating political communities came at great costs severely interfering with the nature of Freudian Man. The underlying dynamic still relevant, being a member of a political community means security and protection. But it also means compromising the instinctual dictates of seeking pleasure, instinct renunciation, and being exposed and subjected to powerful societal pressures and constraints. Helping realism understand one of Man's defining characteristics, we should not gloss over the fact that Man is not only driven by concerns for his well-being and for securing status among his fellows, not only driven by security and power, respectively. Freud shows that Man values beauty, cleanliness, and order.[93] Still, despite this more benign side of Man deriving as some sort of by-product from the necessities of civilization, the two main motivational forces of Man are self-preservation and power-accumulation, the latter helping to secure the former. And since these two forces cannot be achieved and gratified in pure isolation, Man is almost naturally drawn into political communities.

The virtue of Freudian Man for the realist Weltanschauung, however, further derives from the fact that Freud is more than some sort of Viennese neo-Hobbesian. Largely undisputed,[94] this qualification is very important as Freud's rich account of Man provides political realism with a more multifaceted and realist(ic) philosophical anthropology helping, in turn, political realists to understand and explain the primacy of political communities in social and political reality, why political communities will remain the primary units of international-political life to which irrational loyalties, sympathies, and emotions are attached. From Freud, political realists learn that Man is not merely a self-interested, security-driven, quasirational creature exhibiting an enlightened, rational, self-interested commitment to the Leviathan or any other historical form of political community. Rather, he is an instinct-driven, instinctively libidinal creature providing an intriguing human-nature foundation for political realism helping explain the intricacies of the inner workings of groups responsible for much of the hostile outward behavior vis-à-vis other political communities. As Freud argues, "[i]n consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration. The interest of work in common would not hold it together; instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests."[95] Hence, besides Man's fear of pain and suffering deriving from his *physis*, Nature, scarcity, and the hostility of fellow Men, there is another force at work driving Man into political communities: *Eros.*

The primacy, nature, and behavior of political communities in international relations cannot be understood without the *Eros* instinct. No doubt, Man's wish to avoid suffering, his security-seeking, is a universal driving force behind civilization. But it is not the strongest, for Man is, above all, a pleasure-seeking creature. Freudian Man is not merely "content to aim at an avoidance of unpleasure," but also yearns for positive fulfillment of pleasure and happiness.[96] Driven by *Eros*, Freudian Man gains most pleasure from "the way of life which makes love the centre of everything, which looks for all satisfaction in loving and being loved."[97] Since the longing for love and longing for being loved, however, cannot be achieved or gratified in pure isolation, Man cannot but work unceasingly toward civilization entering some forms of group relations. With the family being Man's first and most formative group,[98] the universal purpose of *Eros* is "to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity; the unity of mankind."[99] From a political-realist perspective characterized perhaps by the wider formula "Man, state, war," the rhetoric of a unity of mankind may seem strange. But thus is Freud's psychoanalytical reasoning. *Eros*, the instinct of life, joins the other forces resulting from Man's sources of fears of suffering that incline Man to form political communities. Group formation, as Freud argues, is "an inherited deposit from the phylogenesis of the human libido."[100]

The Freudian human-nature traits—fear, security-seeking, hostility, and power-accumulation—seem hardly controversial vis-à-vis political realism. Proposing, however, Freudian Man as a useful philosophical anthropology for the realist *Weltanschauung* may be puzzling as some sort of love-instinct or *Eros* seems perhaps incompatible with a political philosophy emphasizing the universal competition for security and power among Men and political communities. But, needless to say, all rhetoric aside, it is by no means awkward. Virtually all classical realists, from the twentieth century or earlier, knew only all too well that the universal fact that the human condition and the international-political are vicious, tragic, and complicated cannot be derived, or explained by, assuming a nicely calculating *homo oeconomicus* or *homo politicus* merely seeking to maximize utility or power, respectively. They knew of the irrationalities, that the universal struggles for security and power, the quarrels and wars over territory, religion, and culture, presuppose the existence and actions of Men equipped with motivational traits of more irrational nature and origins; and these traits are Man's longing for prestige, recognition, and, above all, love. And in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* Freud provides political realism with an astute metaphorical anthropology

comparing Men to the porcupines of which Schopenhauer had spoken earlier:

> A company of porcupines crowded themselves very close together one cold winter's day so as to profit by one another's warmth and so save themselves from being frozen to death. But soon they felt one another's quills, which induced them to separate again. And now, when the need for warmth brought them nearer together again, the second evil arose once more. So that they were driven backwards and forwards from one trouble to the other, until they had discovered a mean distance at which they could most tolerably exist.[101]

Accurately capturing the inner tensions of Man vis-à-vis fellow Men, that Freud quotes Schopenhauer's porcupines hardly astonishes as his whole theory of Man and philosophy of civilization revolve around the inherent ambivalence of Man. Be it families, marriages, friendships, businesses, associations, social and political institutions such as the state, or any other social phenomena or social facts, Freud showed that all these relations between Men contain sediments of both attraction and "feelings of aversion and hostility."[102] And, tragically, almost invariably, efforts to remedy the attraction/aversion tension prevalent in political communities worsen the tension and struggle with "them" outside the in-group.

Fundamentally characterizing Freudian Man, helping political realism to explain the nature and tragedy of the human condition and international-political life, the attraction/aversion tension roots in Man's dualistic instinct structure; and so does the universal, often subtle hostility political communities display vis-à-vis others. Often denounced reductionist, again, it is *the* virtue of Freud that cultural, social, and political phenomena can be explained by recourse to Man (albeit in the wider "sociological" sense characteristic of Freud, as mentioned earlier). Freudian Man is driven both by ego-libidinal drives, the ego-instinct, and by object-libidinal drives, the sexual-instinct (*Eros*). In perennial fierce battle, while *Eros* inclines Man to long for the group, the ego-instinct concerned with self-preservation inclines Man to withdraw from groups. The later Freud merged ego-instinct and sexual-instinct into *Eros* as both instincts are libidinal instincts, the only difference being that the former pertains to the self (self-love, ego-libido) and the latter to others (other-love, object-libido). Reinforced by the pleasure principle inclining Man to form groups in order to avoid suffering, the universal reality of social life is that Man is being dragged, like the porcupine, in two different directions: back and forth from fellow Men. This attraction/aversion tension is reinforced by Freud's (in)famous death-instinct

(*Thanatos*). According to the later Freud, Man's existence must be seen in terms of a perennial inescapable conflict between *Eros*, the amalgamation of ego-libidinal drives (ego-instinct) and object-libidinal drives (sexual-instinct), and *Thanatos*. As Freud argues, the "meaning of the evolution of civilization is no longer obscure…It must present the struggle between *Eros* and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species."[103] *Eros* aims for life and love; inclining Man to hostility and death, the aim of *Thanatos* is to "provide the ego with the satisfaction of its vital needs [self-preservation] and with control over nature."[104] Thus are the instinctual origins of Man's universal ambivalence vis-à-vis fellow Men.

It is the depressing though realist(ic) fact of the human condition that Man's attraction/aversion tension vis-à-vis fellow Men can never be completely resolved—only ameliorated. Even the proper balancing of the conflicting instinctual demands by the ego, however, would merely diminish, not make disappear, what the realist Weltanschauung considers a profoundly problematic phenomenon in international relations: that Man gives his ethical-emotional loyalty to his political community; that, therefore, the relations between political communities are inherently conflictual. *Eros* demands unity with fellow Men. At the same time, Man wants to satisfy his ego-instincts (the demands of *Thanatos*) dealing with truly powerful demands as Man is both a primordial security-seeker and power-seeker. Showing that the history of Man's psychosexual development is the history of yearning for pleasure and power, the child is "polymorphously perverse" meaning that all objects represent sources of pleasure; the child is also a power-seeker as only power provides the necessary means to annex and indulge in objects of pleasure. The child's yearning for pleasure and power, however, comes to an abrupt halt, not voluntarily but because of the transformation from the pleasure principle to the reality principle.

The essential fact of life is that, on the one hand, Man's libidinal drives seek the pure gratification of pleasure. On the other hand, an essential fear of death, Nature, and other Men plus socioeconomical necessity (*Ananke*) require Man to cooperate with fellow Men meaning that Man must adapt his instinctual demands in light of reality (reality principle). Largely a pleasure-driven creature, Man's ego representing the conscious reality principle assumes great responsibility seeking to balance the instinctual demands arising from the ego-instincts of the id (pleasure principle) with the demands stemming from *Ananke* and *Eros*. This balancing act, managing the attraction/aversion tension, however, comes at a heavy price as it costs substantial instinctual renunciation. "[I]t is impossible to overlook

the extent," Freud argues,

> to which civilization is built up upon a renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction…of powerful instincts. This 'cultural frustration' dominates the large field of social relationships between human beings…it is the cause of the hostility against which all civilizations have to struggle.[105]

This equation of civilization with instinctual renunciation is one of Freud's most important social/political philosophical tenets; and it is important for the realist Weltanschauung as it helps explain why the political community is both the solution to Man's existential dilemmas and, at the same time, the cause of much international tragedy.

The primacy of the political community in international-political life derives from the fact that it is not only the enemy of Man but also his "savior." The political community is of such significance to Man, because it helps him to solve some of his instinctual-based existential problems. Creating and entering political communities provides Man with the much-needed means to gratify the societal demands of Man's *Eros* and with the protective demands deriving from the sources of sufferings. Further, political communities help Man to cope with the attraction/aversion tension. The underlying dynamic is explained by Freud's defense mechanism of identification representing one of the earliest expressions of emotional ties with libidinal objects, such as the father in the Oedipus Complex: the little boy attracted to his mother, aware that the father stands in his way, "will exhibit a special interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be like him, and take his place everywhere."[106] The father being too powerful, the boy knows he will never possess her. Trying to satisfy the longing for the mother by other means, the ego helps the boy identifying with the father as the latter possesses the mother. Through this, the boy partakes in the original yet unreachable source of pleasure.

The same underlying logic applies to the nature of political communities explaining why the political community is not only the ameliorative solution to Man's attraction/aversion dilemma but also the underlying cause that international relations are inherently conflictual. Regardless of whether we deal with families, artificial groups such as corporations, the army, the Church, or political communities, the inner dynamics of these groups are similar as all social facts, and both their nature and behavior relate back to Man's dualistic instinctual structure. Man knows his dilemma: he deplores the group, he needs the group. To him, the group represents security and instinctual satisfaction yet also instinctual renunciation. On a larger scale,

then, the ameliorative strategy of Man's ego inclines Man to identify with fellow Men erecting a group characterized by the fact that a "number of individuals...have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego."[107] In the social and political context, Men form political communities. The group and its leader help Man to compensate for the loss of instinctual satisfaction and power-accumulation that the necessities of the group forced upon him (norms). Being a member of a political community, being one of "us," Man retains profound feelings of omnipotence as he partakes psychologically in the power of the group members' shared object of libido. In political communities, the actual or perceived libidinal object is usually the leader (president, prime minister, and so forth). Identifying with the leader of a nation, Man feels powerful partaking in the power of the nation, feels as if he did not compromise his instinctual demands for pleasure, power, and security.

Helping to ameliorate the attraction/aversion tension is one of the virtues of political communities regarding Man's instinctual life. Yet, we must not neglect the other side of the coin. The strategy of Man's ego, seeking a reduction of the attraction/aversion tension through identifying with the powerful, can succeed only if there are other outlets for the instincts that have to be repressed within the group. The political community cannot allow too much satisfaction of the darker and hostile instincts of Man; this would risk its own dissolution and destruction as libidinal ties among members would be jettisoned. Hence, the required instinctual outlet is found in the realm between political communities. The individual and collective yearning for power, pleasure, and security as well as profound feelings of hostility and aversion are displaced onto the international sphere. This is hardly a matter of much choice as Man's instincts must find their gratification: *Eros* remains within the in-group and the love-harming instincts are directed to the out-group, to "them." As Freud argues succinctly, "It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness."[108] As all social and political, ultimately, roots in Man, in Man's instinctual structure, it is more likely than not that international-political life remains conflictual.

It is one of the many virtues of Freud that he provides the realist Weltanschauung with a well-developed conception of human nature that does explain, and not merely assume, that Man is a problematic and conflictual creature; that, ergo, political communities are problematic and conflictual entities; and that, ergo, the international human condition is inherently problematic and conflictual. Via deductive logic, Freud helps

to explain why Man is the root cause of tragedy in international-political life. The root element of a philosophical anthropology for political realism, Freudian Man provides a powerful account of the underlying human nature of international relations.

Freudian Human Nature and the Balancing of Reality and Utopia

The concept of human nature ought to be the sole philosophical starting point for international-political theory; and Freud seems to provide an elegant and powerful philosophical anthropology for the realist *Weltanschauung*. As argued, Freudian Man helps political realism to explain the underlying logic and dynamic of much of the tragedies of the human condition and international-political life.

Further, however, Freudian Man helps us drawing the boundaries between reality and utopia of human, social, and political affairs; helps us define, not to lose sight of, and work unceasingly toward, what may be reasonably expected from international-political life. Taken together with its explanatory power, Freudian human nature becomes a powerful concept for political realism requiring that the Freudian concept(ion) of human nature itself is powerful. On this point, it is safe to say that Freud provides a strong human-nature foundation, with wide recognition and acceptance. Needless to say, as with all concepts, theories, thinkers, and "facts," Freud, too, should be approached with a healthy scientific distance; avoiding some sort of worshipping (as is often the case with Freud, though this is not his fault) and despite Freud's wide-ranging interests in matters medical, social, political, and cultural, we cannot expect more than there is given that Freud was not, and never claimed to be, a genuine political theorist. Still, path-breaking and revolutionary at the time, Freud's theory of human nature, Freudian Man, is certainly comprehensive, useful, and elegant. And following Mearsheimer's metaphor concerning his offensive-realist theory of great power politics, political realism may use it as some sort of "powerful flashlight in a dark room": Freud may not be able to illuminate every nook and cranny political realism deals with, but Freudian Man provides an excellent tool helping navigate through the darkness of analytical and normative questions and dilemmas of the relations among nations.[109]

In this regard, any argument in favor of Freud cannot gloss over the fact that he is one of the most consequential and controversial thinkers in the canon of Western thought. Thus, it was one of the great strengths and virtues of Freud that he synthesized the scientific project (metapsychology; *Naturwissenschaften*) with the humanistic project (applied psychoanalysis;

Geisteswissenschaften).[110] This intriguing synthesis, however, has been under attack since the 1970s, when, as Eli Zaretsky elegantly traced, Freudianism began to dissolve into two different projects, the medical-therapeutical and the cultural-hermeneutical each following different underlying logics threatening Freud and orthodox Freudianism:[111] regarding the former, psychoanalysis has been challenged by psychopharmacology and neuroscience, two strands of innovations helping put wind in the sails of those already critical of its scientific status;[112] and regarding the psychoanalytic study of society and culture, orthodox Freudianism has become to be considered as too individualistic, and too Western-white-male.[113]

Freud, however, should be treated with, at least, a bit of fairness. Being impossible to engage with all the criticisms against Freud and Freudianism at greater length here,[114] to begin with, we cannot really blame Freud that psychoanalysis is increasingly misused as some sort of general life-coaching for the urban middle classes, for the *Stadtneurotiker* of Woody Allen's *Annie Hall*. Undoubtedly, "Freudianism has become a big business," but, as was rightly pointed out, the sort of "Freudian analyst, who is over-busy and who rather complacently uses his theory to explain everything, stands in rather sad contrast to that extraordinary thinker, Sigmund Freud."[115] Similarly, despite dissident Adlerian individual-psychology and Jungian analytical-psychology, despite various innovations and strands such as orthodox psychoanalysis, ego-psychology, object-relations theory, linguistic-structural approach, and hermeneutic approach, it is rather undisputed that psychoanalysis, unlike many other sciences and schools, can be traced back neatly to one original source—to Freud, who was utterly committed to a scientific psychoanalysis fearing nothing more than what he called "wild psychoanalysis."[116]

Further, we should also not forget that Freudian Man is not the Man of pure speculation, religion, or any other myths. Rather, he is, so to speak, a scientific Man deriving from Freud's scientific investigations into the nature of Man based on medical-therapeutic work with patients, with real Men. Making the defense of their conception of human nature stronger, political realists can capitalize on the scientific origins of Freudian Man. Explaining the underlying dynamics and tragedies of international-political life as well as legitimizing a particular world outlook against the backdrop of Freudian Man, the realist Weltanschauung can draw from a conception of human nature that has come to be one of the (if not *the*) most consequential and defining theories of Man. And—no!—the rise of the neurosciences has not made Freud obsolete. As Nobel laureate neuroscientist Eric Kandel reminded us only recently, "psychoanalysis still represents the most coherent and intellectually satisfying view of the mind."[117]

We can, however, defend Freud and Freudian Man also from another angle. Political realists wishing not to rely on the (heatedly debated) scientific credentials of Freud may turn to the other Freud, to Freud the philosopher. Even if it was accepted or assumed that Freud's theory of human nature was not a scientific account of Man, political realism could point to "philosophical" Freudian Man raising the respective philosophical argument defending Freud. On that point, the more than valid point was made by Rorty arguing that it is "a mistake to ask Freud for scientific evidence...Plato didn't have evidence for dividing up the soul in three parts, Aristotle didn't have evidence for making all sorts of distinctions which we still take as perfectly commonsensible."[118] Surely, such line of argument does not mean that Freud is all of a sudden completely uncontroversial, that a distinctively Freudian philosophical anthropology for political realism is entirely immune against attacks, or that Freud provides us with the Truth regarding the nature of Man, political communities, and international-political life. But it does mean that, by turning to Freud, political realism does not need to rely any longer on the assumptions about human nature of a Thucydides, Augustine, Hobbes, or Machiavelli whose antiquated theories of Man make them easy targets for effective criticism. Instead, political realism can furnish itself with a much stronger human-nature foundation in its quest for a proper theoretical explanatory substructure or philosophical anthropology: Freudian Man.

Based on what can be regarded as a powerful human-nature foundation, an explanatory powerful philosophical anthropology of international-political life as political realism sees it, it is a further virtue of Freud that his Freudian Man helps the realist Weltanschauung to explain and legitimize two of its major normative politico-theoretical positions: both its form of elitism and its rejection of moral universalism. The first concerns what has been called above political realism's neutrality principle, the second its morality principle. Yet both principles relate, ultimately, to the realist Weltanschauung's concern to steer prudently and intelligently between the two ideal-typical poles of international-political theorizing setting the politico-theoretical boundaries regarding the prospects, limits, and possibilities of international-political life, informing wider political action or specific program of foreign-policy: political realism versus idealism, reality versus utopia, or optimism versus pessimism.

Despite many recent and otherwise insightful efforts to reinterpret several key thinkers of the realist Weltanschauung (mostly classical realists, especially Morgenthau) attempting to make these political realists appear in a different light, say, less "realist," the defining feature of the realist Weltanschauung cannot be wished away: its profound skepticism vis-à-vis

the prospects of a major transformation of international-political life, the institutions and regimes of international relations. Rooting, ultimately, in the nature of Man, the main underlying logic behind political realism's "realism" is rather straightforward: the problematic nature of Man helps create the problematic nature of political communities that, in turn, help create the problematic nature of international affairs; the root cause found in the universal nature of Man, prospects for profound transformation are slim, are restricted by what Man allows for. More specifically, the Freudian philosophical anthropology provides the following portrayal of the underlying dynamics of international-political life.

Man is a tension-ridden creature. Driven by the pleasure principle to seek pleasure and avoid pain, the gratification of instinctual demands is Man's raison d'être. Polymorphously perverse, satisfying the ego-instincts (self-preservation, ego-libido) and *Eros* (object-libido) reinforces the yearning for security and power, both individually and collectively. Fear and *Eros* drive Man into social relations, but the ego-instincts work against civilization as the group demands instinct renunciation. Being a Schopenhauerian porcupine, Man is torn between his striving for community and for being alone. An essential element of the human condition, this attraction/aversion tension can never be fully resolved but ameliorated. By identifying with fellow Men, the community, and its leader, Man can repress his ego-instincts within the communal context giving full loyalty (love) to the in-group. As these ego-instincts concentrated in the hands of the group and its leader(s), however, are merely repressed and not erased, these now-collectivized instincts continue to seek gratification. And as these hostile ego-instincts threaten the libidinal ties within the in-group, these unsatisfied instincts are turned to out-groups causing conflictual relations among separate political communities. The human condition and the nature of international-political life root in the nature of Man, a creature perhaps never capable of resolving the profound tensions it is struggling with: pleasure versus pain, ego-instincts versus sexual-instincts, *Eros* versus *Thanatos*, id versus super-ego, pleasure principle versus reality principle, attraction versus aversion. The existence of Man is characterized by struggle, a struggle on three intertwined levels: the individual, the societal, the international. Not without justification, then, can political realists agree with Hobbes's (in)famous dictum: "it's a jungle out there."[119]

In light of such "jungle" deriving, ultimately, from a not so heavenly rational Man (of Freudian provenance or otherwise), realist international-political theorists of all ages have wrestled with how effective foreign-policy can be conducted. Aware of the irrationality of Man and the resulting irrationalities of the masses, the realist Weltanschauung has answered this question somewhat elitist, arguing that the masses must be kept away as far as possible from

the levers of foreign-policy. On that point, the classicals were refreshingly frank: Kennan confessed an "extreme dislike of all masses."[120] Lippmann wrote that believing in the "omnicompetent, sovereign citizen" is as unrealistic as for "a fat man to try to be a ballet dancer."[121] Distinguishing between the enlightened intellectual and Man in the street, Carr spoke of the "limited capacity of the elephant for aviation."[122] And Niebuhr criticized that "collective man always tends to be morally complacent, self-righteous."[123] Whether we like it or not, some form of democratic elitism is characteristic of both classical and post-classical realist international-political theory.[124]

Morgenthau was particularly afraid of the Man in the street, of the influx of public opinion on foreign-policy. His reliance on the statesman and diplomatic practice as effective means to maintain peace derives directly from his skepticism vis-à-vis the masses. With public opinion as primary concern in *Politics among Nations*, Morgenthau put forth as one of the nine rules of diplomacy that "[t]he government is the leader of public opinion, not its slave."[125] Presenting this *dictum* as the ninth and final rule seems no coincidence as Morgenthau was aware that following the other rules will be futile and that a rational and responsible conduct of foreign-policy is hardly achievable if statesmen "do not keep this principle constantly in mind."[126] Arguing that the masses are more often than not incapable of sober judgments, wary of compromises, the task of the good statesman is "to strike a prudent balance" between the demands of good foreign-policy and those of the masses. As Morgenthau brings it to the point, "he must lead."[127] The *dompteur* of the masses, the statesman must lead. For the

> popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. The statesman must take the long view, proceeding slowly and by detours, paying with small losses for great advantage; he must be able to temporize, to compromise, to bide his time. The popular mind wants quick results; it will sacrifice tomorrow's real benefit for today's apparent advantage.[128]

True, when it comes to the role of public opinion in foreign-policy matters, political realism cannot hide its elitism.

The realist Weltanschauung, however, should not, and must not, hide its elitist attitude in the realm of foreign-policy. There are many good reasons for being cautious and prudent vis-à-vis the masses; and Freudian Man helps explain and legitimize such caution and prudence. Providing us with a more subtle understanding of the inner dynamics of political communities, it is one of Freud's virtues that social reality and social facts cannot solely be explained by

the motive of rational self-interest. A substantial (instinctual) element holding masses together, *Eros* may eventually lead to some sort of world-state as it seeks to bind ever more Men together, but the more problematic side is of imminent and permanent concern: for where libidinal ties are stronger than motives of self-interest, then, we are not dealing with the rational, but we are with human, social, and political affairs taking place in the realm of individual and collective irrationality. Put differently, rather than placing all our hopes in Kantian Man, we must reckon with Freudian Man, irrational Man, problematic Man. As Freud once (in)famously said, "I have found little that is 'good' about human beings on the whole. In my experience most of them are trash."[129]

Here, Freud went perhaps too far. Yet, Freud's elitism stemming directly from what he recognized characterizes the nature of masses seems not entirely unjustified. Man longs for the group; and this helps to tame some of his instincts making social life possible. But it does not lift Man from his instinctual structure making him some sort of more enlightened, less instinctual-driven, less irrational creature. The id does not disappear, it merely submerges in the group leading the "horde" to unhealthy forms of collective regression, more often than not to mere "mass madness."[130] Freudian Man serves as a useful reminder for political realism that "when individuals come together in a group all their inhibitions fall away and all the cruel, brutal, and destructive instincts, which lie dormant in individuals as relics of a primitive epoch, are stirred up to find free gratification."[131] In the process of being socialized, Man undergoes some psychodynamic transformations, but these must not be overestimated as "[t]he apparently new characteristics which he then displays are in fact the manifestations of [the] unconscious, in which all that is evil in the human mind is contained as a predisposition."[132] With the help of the realist(ic) theory of human nature, Freud explains the more unpleasant features of collective Man: "irrationality, intolerance, illogical type of thinking, and…deterioration in moral standards and behaviour."[133]

The important politico-theoretical and practical-political question is, then, how foreign-policy should be conducted in light of the collectively regressed Man, of masses reminding Freud of the "revival of the primal horde."[134] Aware of the darker sides of Man and mass dynamics, the realist Weltanschauung believes (perhaps, puts its hope?) in the enlightened rational-diplomatic statesman. Freud, too, saw good leadership as the main means to keep the masses at bay and divided society essentially in two parts: leaders versus led.[135] Worth quoting at full length, the following passage sums up nicely Freud's faith in leadership:

> It is just as impossible to do without control of the mass by a minority as it is to dispense with coercion in the work of civilization. For masses are

lazy and unintelligent; they have no love for instinctual renunciation, and they are not to be convinced by argument of its inevitability; and the individuals composing them support one another in giving free rein to their indiscipline. It is only through the influence of individuals who can set an example and whom masses recognize as their leaders that they can be induced to perform the work and undergo the renunciations on which the existence of civilization depends. All is well if these leaders are persons who possess superior insight into the necessities of life and who have risen to the height of mastering their instinctual wishes. But there is a danger that in order not to lose their influence they may give way to the mass more than it gives way to them, and it therefore seems necessary that they shall be independent of the mass by having means to power at their disposal.[136]

Save perhaps his coauthored study on President Wilson, whom he deplored for his "insincerity, unreliability and tendency to deny the truth,"[137] Freud did not concern himself too much with the psychology of leaders. Still, with collective Man being in an almost hypnotic state of mind, regressing into the Man of the primal horde, Freud felt strongly about leadership, seeing the leader of the mass in terms of the primal father, as its *hypnotiseur*.

He, at the very beginning of the history of mankind, was the "superman" whom Nietzsche only expected from the future. Even today the members of a group stand in need of the illusion that they are equally and justly loved by their leader; but the leader himself need love no one else, he may be of a masterful nature, absolutely narcissistic, self-confident and independent.[138]

Deeply aware of the individual and collective irrationalities of Man in the street, Freud's faith in the "horde leader" went as far as making him argue that, throughout human history, "breakthroughs to a higher and more rational cultural system had been initiated by outstanding individuals who devoted themselves to a higher purpose and managed to mesmerize the masses to do the same."[139] On occasions, then, Freud appears too elitist. But Freudian Man helps the realist Weltanschauung to explain and legitimize why the democratization of foreign-policy making—after all concerned with the "matter of life and death"[140]—seems problematic, if not dangerous: masses are almost intrinsically irrational, emotive, shortsighted, manipulable, moralistic, and uncompromising making realist(ic) foreign-policy conduct extremely difficult.

Collective Man such conceived, however, informs and reinforces a further fear of political realism or, more positively, a further normative claim: the

fear of moral universalism or tough stance against moral crusading, respectively. Often been painted as such, the realist Weltanschauung is not amoral vis-à-vis international-political action wrestling deeply with the complexities of moving international politics and foreign-policy beyond the dictate of crude all-justifying expediency. As Morgenthau once lamented, "I am still being accused of indifference to the moral problem in spite of abundance evidence…to the contrary."[141] Much has been written on the ethics of political realism showing its various philosophical and ethical-theoretical bases of its respective international-political theories.[142] Still, the ethics of political realism cannot be detached from the concept of the national interest. To put the political and moral imperative of the national interest nicely,

> [a]bove all, remember always that it is not only a political necessity but also a moral duty for a nation to follow in its dealing with other nations but one guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule for action: *the national interest*.[143]

Likewise, the realist Weltanschauung can be placed more or less securely within the Weberian-style ethics of responsibility.[144]

Concerned with one of the most pressing and timeless politico-theoretical, moral-ethical, and practical-political challenges of international-political life—moral universalism and moral crusading—Morgenthau reminds us that mid-twentieth-century international politics was haunted by a powerful moral force: "nationalistic universalism." Nineteenth-century nationalism wanted, Morgenthau writes, "one nation in one state and nothing else"; nationalistic universalism, however, claims "for one nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations and standards of action upon all the other nations."[145] Since Morgenthau's description, not much has changed. Save perhaps in Europe (if at all), tribes, states, nations remain people's moral reference points; and International Relations scholars and foreign-policy makers are no less confronted with the political, economical, social, and moral-ethical dilemmas of small-state nationalism and great power nationalistic universalism than they were half a century ago. In light of recent Western democracy–promoting crusading in Iraq,[146] the "return of history,"[147] premature proclamations of the "end of history,"[148] and *foedus pacificum*–style politico-philosophical reflections about "laws of peoples,"[149] David Clinton is right that the continual warnings of Morgenthau (and other realists[150]) not "to take the interests of our own group and make them into the moral law of the universe was never more timely."[151]

In this regard, Freudian Man helps political realism to explain and legitimize its sort of international moral relativism. Though instinct-driven, it

is not that Freudian Man is, per se, an immoral creature. To the contrary, Freudian Man acts morally; and "psycho-analysis has never said a word in favor of unfettering instincts that would injure our community."[152] The more important questions are, however, what the source of Man's morality is, why this source is incommensurate with the idea of a universal moral order, whether religious or secular. To Freud, morality is more or less synonymous with the super-ego, and authority as moral development is essentially a part of the child's psychosexual development. Senses of right versus wrong largely derive from what Man is taught by parents and other early influences; moral oughts largely derive from cultural socialization. By means of identification stemming from the child's fear of loss of love when instinctual urges are not satisfied, the "injunctions and prohibitions" found in, and displayed by, Man, as Freud argues, become and "remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in form of conscience, to exercise moral censorship."[153]

The implications of Freud's moral psychology are important in more than one respect. In a narrower sense, Freud's moral psychology guards against religious-driven moral universalism. In addition to his arguments in the critical psychoanalysis of religion,[154] Freud tells us that assuming "a moral world order" is merely a "pious illusion."[155] Arguing antithetical to theological and natural-law accounts of individual and collective morality, in line with his general approach to social facts and sociopolitical phenomena, Freud says that we must resolve into its psychological components— and must look beyond—the superficialities of the prevailing moral orders as this will lift the veil off much of the prevailing and supposedly God-given morality helping us understand the "purely human origin of all the regulations and precepts of civilization."[156] Further, if we could leave God aside, "these commandments and laws would lose their rigidity and unchangeableness" and "People could understand that they are made, not so much to rule them as…to serve their interests."[157] The same applies to secular universal moral orders such as Kant's deontological a priori ethics, meaning, in a wider sense, that Men's super-egos are largely contingent upon time and space. Further, it means that these moral codes do merely reflect the sanctioned moral obligations put in place as they are vital to ensure individual and collective survival. And, finally, we may consider Man as a creature that is not so much immoral as driven by an ego that, informed by the contingent demands of the super-ego, seeks "obtaining rewards and avoiding external punishments and internal guilt."[158] The crux, then, is that even though Freudian Man, particularly collective Freudian Man, is susceptible to moral and nationalistic universalism, the moral development and psychology of Freudian Man does not justify a moral-universalist political ethics. Freud's theory of human nature is universalist, but "universal" Freudian

Man is essentially particularist-historicist embedded in, and informed by, socioeconomic practices; and the same applies to, so to speak, "Freudian" political communities. Political realism, therefore, is right to focus on the concept of the national interest entertaining some form of cultural and moral relativism.

Above all, perhaps most importantly besides helping explain the realist(ic) and tragic dimension of international relations as it unfolds across time and space, Freudian Man helps political realism to avoid falling prey to irrationalism and fatalism. If we take optimism to mean that "reality is good, society basically harmonious,"[159] then, political realism is not an optimistic Weltanschauung. The belief in teleological and automatic progress is dangerously misleading; and so are the genuine peace projects envisaged by such consequential thinkers as Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Kant, and Rawls.[160] Defining political realism, it derives its skepticism from recognizing the nature of the Realist Man "seeing the self-interest and hypocrisy that lie behind all human (and therefore all collective) actions. Pride and self interest have not been cleansed from human behavior."[161] Or, as Morgenthau argued much earlier, political realism "believes that the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result from forces inherent in human nature."[162]

In this wake, political realism knows that the international-political cannot be severed from the concept of human nature, that is, from some constants or absolutes about the nature of Man; that it, therefore, must not lose sight of the inherent limitations placed upon radical efforts transforming international-political life. Yet, almost needless to say, nor must political realism lose sight of the utopia of international relations or, perhaps better, of what is reasonably possible in this world. The realist Weltanschauung is, *per definitionem*, neither power-apologetic nor fatalist. A major overhaul of the basic patterns of international relations may never materialize, may even be simply impossible. But, still, piecemeal improvement of the human condition is possible. As Weber famously argued,

> [p]olitics means slow, strong drilling through hard boards, with a combination of passion and a sense of judgement. It is of course entirely correct, and a fact confirmed by all historical experience, that what is possible would never have been achieved if, in this world, people had not repeatedly reached for the impossible.[163]

The political-realist perspective on the nature and limits of the political and international-political is in line with Freud's view of the human condition. His skepticism hardly contested, Freud, too, is neither a naive optimist nor a crude fatalist indulging in pessimistic irrationalism.

True, Freud emphasized the instinctual, spoke of the irrational, stressed the "strict determination of mental events,"[164] spoke of "the illusion of Free Will."[165] Still, he is not the high priest of the irrational and/or unconscious determinism.[166] He is a strict psychic-determinist, but this does not imply a belief in uniform chains of mental causation and mental and behavioral outcomes. Instead, it merely means that all mental activities and events are *caused* by Man's nature or his physiology as even the ego, the authority of reason or the reality principle, is part of Man's nature or physiology.

This does not mean, however, that the ego has no degree of autonomy from nature, from the instinctual demands of the id. And this, needless to say, is highly significant, both on an individual and collective level. The medical efforts of psychoanalytical psychotherapy aim at healing mental and emotional pathologies. They try to strengthen the ego vis-à-vis the unconscious id and semiunconscious super-ego demands. The methods and techniques have liberating effects: as Freud captured the raison d'être of psychoanalysis elegantly, "Where id was, there ego shall be."[167] Freudian Man allows, even if only cautiously, for change; from a Freudian perspective, we can uphold a cautious belief in the potentiality of human change and, ergo, social change. As one commentator put it, the "basic feature of the psychoanalytic viewpoint [is] that people are changeable."[168] Not merely the slave of the id, the ego can be, and ought to be, its master; a healthy, mature ego does possess enough intellectual power to keep the id at reasonable bay: "by gaining control over the demands of the instincts, by deciding whether they are to be allowed satisfaction, by postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favorable in the external world or by suppressing their excitations entirely."[169]

Yet, of course, there are limits. And Freud's autonomy of the ego must not be interpreted in a Kantian light. The ego cannot free itself or be freed entirely from instincts, emotions, and desires incapable of following the pure a priori reasonable. Freud argues:

> You [the ego] over-estimated your strength when you thought you could treat your sexual [and ego] instincts as you liked and could utterly ignore their intentions. The result is that they have rebelled and have taken their own obscure paths to escape this suppression...How they have achieved this, and the paths which they have taken, have not come to your knowledge. All you have learned is the *outcome* of their work—the symptom which you experience as suffering. Thus you do not recognize it as a derivative of your own rejected instincts and do not know that it is a substitutive satisfaction of them.[170]

The force of the ego or the autonomy of the ego has its limits vis-à-vis the instincts. Freudian Man, therefore, is perhaps best understood as some sort of "middle way between the British empiricist-utilitarian view that freedom is the absence of external coercion in the realization of desires and the contrasting Kantian conception of freedom as absolute moral autonomy."[171]

This middle-position between a Kantian and an utilitarian self, however, is a virtue as Freudian Man helps prevent political realism from committing two fallacies: naivety and fatalism. As regards naivety, we must not forget that Man bears within his instinctual structure the possibility of change and progress, at least to a certain degree. At the same time, we should be aware of the fact that both change and progress are neither easily achievable nor promptly attainable. In "Why War?" Freud argues at length that human nature

> makes it easy for us to find a formula for *indirect* methods of combating war. . . . the most obvious plan will be to bring *Eros* . . . into play . . . Anything that encourages the growth of emotional ties between men must operate against war. These ties may be of two kinds. In the first place they may be relations resembling those towards a loved object . . . The second kind of emotional tie is by means of identification. Whatever leads men to share important interests produces this community of feeling, these identifications . . .
>
> The ideal condition of things would of course be a community of men who had subordinated their instinctual life to the dictatorship of reason. Nothing else could unite men so completely and so tenaciously, even if there were not emotional ties between them. But in all probability that is a Utopian expectation. No doubt the other indirect methods of preventing war are more practicable, though they promise no rapid success. An unpleasant picture comes to one's mind of mills that grind so slowly that people may starve before they get their flour.[172]

No doubt, Freud is not an overly optimistic or naive thinker.

Nor, however, is he a fatalist. In fact, part of Freud's virtue for political realism is the ambivalence deriving from his theory of human nature. Freudian Man is a universal psycho-physiological instinct creature driven by a profound attraction/aversion tension, who is, at the same time, responding to, and informed by, socioeconomic practices, Freudian Man is a historical Man who is to some extent malleable, changeable, and improvable. Freud's dynamic theory of human nature allows for change and progress, even though these may come only iteratively and extremely slowly. In this context, Freudian Man is perhaps much too dynamic and, therefore, incommensurable with

some forms of crudely realist or pseudorealist international-political theory representing not more, or risking to become not more, than a "*historicism of stasis.*"[173] Political realism is deeply aware of human imperfection, but it does not lose sight of the "hope that reason may one day gain greater control over passions."[174] Freudian Man helps political realists explain and understand that their hope is realist(ic), that they must work unceasingly toward its realization. As Freud writes,

> We may insist as often as we like that man's intellect is powerless in comparison with his instinctual life, and we may be right in this. Nevertheless, there is something peculiar about this weakness. The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing.[175]

Not compromising the emphasis on human imperfection, the notion of skepticism, and the fear of naivety, Freudian Man helps political realism to ensure that their Weltanschauung will forever oscillate healthily between the reality and the utopia of international-political life, never losing sight, or forgetting the imperatives, of these two ideal-typical poles. Realistic about the inherent intricacies of the human condition and international relations, political realism is not pessimistic fatalist. In Weberian language, then, the Realist Man—here, the Freudian Man—is the very reason why international politics means the slow and strong drilling through hard boards, but the nature of Freudian Man is also the reason why it will be forever worth drilling with passion and realism.

In Defense of a Freudian Philosophical Anthropology

In this chapter, I argued that Freudian Man provides political realism with a powerful human-nature foundation, a powerful philosophical anthropology of the basic patterns of international-political life. This argument in favor of Freudian Man was the last element of a chain of arguments seeking to answer this book's second main question, whether human nature ought to be dead in political realism. The preceding chapter pursued a largely negative analytical-argumentative strategy; the present chapter changed the perspective, though not the argument. Identifying positive arguments vis-à-vis the concept of human nature in realist international-political theory, I argued that the concept of human nature ought not to be dead. Specifically, Freudian human nature ought not to be dead as Freudian Man provides realist international-political theory with a strong and much-needed intellectual explanatory substructure helping to explain, illuminate, and legitimize at greater depth central tenets of the realist Weltanschauung.

Freudian Man helps to bring back political realism to its classical variant, the genuine political realism. Contemporary realists must recognize the fact that the intimate relationship between the concept of human nature and the political does apply, *mutatis mutandis*, also vis-à-vis the international-political. The Waltzians/Mearsheimerians may be right in distinguishing analytically between politics within borders and politics beyond borders. This, however, must not imply that the nature and origins of the political pertaining to the international sphere are in any substantial sense different to those of the political pertaining to the domestic domain. Be it of political-realist or any other provenance, any international-*political* theory remains—after all—a *political* theory, a *political* theory of international relations. We, therefore, cannot, should not, and must not sever the international-political from the concept of human nature. Structural realists may be right that recurrent international-political outcomes and repetitive foreign-policy behaviors cannot be sufficiently explained by recourse to the personalities and childhoods of statesmen. But those are mistaken who imply that the root cause of why political communities yearn for power is the anarchical structuring of the international-political system.

Freud helps us to understand that the ultimate cause for the international-political is the Realist Man; that the universal struggle for power and peace is merely the reflection of a universalized human nature that causes not only the formation of political communities and spatial separation of international relations in "us" and "them," but also fuels these political communities' yearning for power with meaning in the first place. This does not necessarily imply a rejection, or unfair devaluation, of structural realism; its parsimony and locus of independent variables surely has its virtues. The profound problem, however, begins when post-classicals argue that the international-political, the universal longing for power, is caused by the concept of the international-political structure and that we, therefore, should distinguish carefully between some sort of scientific structural realism and some sort of classical-style human-nature or biological realism. Analytical-empiricist political realists placing the independent variable on the level of the individual can surely coexist side-by-side with structuralists emphasizing the structural level. Yet, the realist Weltanschauung, the philosophical home of these various analytical-empiricist scientific theories, cannot be divided into a structural and a human-nature camp. In a sense, political realism is, per se, "human-nature realism" as it is based upon the concept of human nature: every *realist* international-political theory is, to repeat the tautology, "human-nature realism" or it is nothing.

Structural realism cannot avoid the concept of human nature. Not only because it is infused with hidden assumptions about human nature, but also because it requires a proper human-nature microfoundation comparable to

that of the *homo oeconomicus* in economic theory. Part of a philosophy of international politics with a strong methodological-individualist heritage arguing from first principles, structural realism cannot continue to rely on assumptions of social wholes such as the state. Instead, it must provide itself with a proper human-nature foundation from which it can deduce the necessity of the existence of political communities as well as their conflictual relations vis-à-vis others. This forces structural realism to engage with the intricacies of the concept of human nature, a theme it thought dead long ago. Yet, needless to say, not only structural realism requires the concept of human nature but also, based on the central concept of the Realist Man, the entirety of the realist Weltanschauung requires a proper theory of human nature. This background theory, or philosophical anthropology, is not a scientific Waltzian first-image theory of diplomatic historians or political psychologists. Rather, it provides actual scientific realist international-political theories with a philosophical human-nature backdrop, that is, with a theoretical explanatory substructure helping political realism to explain rather than merely assume its major analytical and normative claims. Based on Freudian Man, the Freudian philosophical anthropology helps demystifying the realist Weltanschauung and resolve into their individual-psychological elements what otherwise appear to be either mere assumptions or mere anthropomorphological projections and hypostatizations.

Freudian Man helps political realism to explain why the international human condition is rooted in Man's tension-ridden instinctual structure. Further, Freud's theory of human nature illuminates, by means of deductive reasoning, why a conflictual nature of Man must of necessity lead to a conflictual nature of political communities that, in turn, must lead of necessity to inherently conflictual international relations. The skepticism of political realism vis-à-vis the prospects for large-scale changes and transformations of international-political life and Kantian-style peace plans, therefore, derives directly from the nature and behavior of Freudian Man. The same applies to political realism's form of elitism in foreign-policy matters, fear of the masses and public opinion, as well as its moral-relativist stance.

Freudian Man provides political realism with a powerful human-nature foundation also regarding the questions of naivety, fatalism, and the balancing of utopia and reality in international relations. Freud's theory of Man helps political realists not to forget that the positivization of a Realist Man, a conception of the nature of Man, must not lead to pessimistic fatalism. Political realists must not be naive optimists, but piecemeal improvement of Man, of collective Man, and, ergo, social and political reality is possible. The concept of the national interest, the main signpost, remains, and ought to remain, but our social and political dealings vis-à-vis "them" must not

be based on crude assumptions of Men as purely self-interested, destructive, and entirely irrational creatures enjoying being slaves of their instincts. According to Freudian Man, there is room neither for naivety nor for crude human-nature pessimism and power-apologetism. It is, then, another virtue that although Freud's theory of human nature is neither uncontroversial nor immune against attacks, it is Freud who has profoundly defined our age and how we think of ourselves. Political realism can capitalize on this powerful source. Freudian Man representing a strong human-nature foundation provides a powerful intellectual explanatory substructure for the realist Weltanschauung as it takes much more effort to attack political realism with regard to its human-nature foundation when this foundation is Freudian compared to when political realism continues to rely on Thucydidean, Augustinian, Hobbesian, Machiavellian, or, in the worst case, an entirely unidentifiable and unreflective assumptions about human nature.

To conclude this chapter, then, the virtues of the concept of human nature and, specifically, Freudian Man for political realism are plentiful. And so are the implications for political realism as well as for International Relations.

In Defense of Human Nature

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Resurrecting the Realist Man, Freud, and Human Nature

I n a recent Morgenthau *Festschrift*, John Herz recalled how Morgenthau
began his presentation on the given theme "Political Realism Revisited"
at the ISA 1980 annual conference by remarking with his usually wit:
"Revisited? I never left it."[1] Morgenthau, of course, was right. For he did
never leave realism, as he developed and understood it; he did never compro-
mise on its main analytical and normative claims and did never abandon its
main concepts and concerns. Recognizing its centrality, Morgenthau never
left the concept of human nature in his attempts to understand the social
reality of the human condition and the political reality of international
relations. It seems not merely coincidental that the essays on the derivation
of the political from the nature of Man and on the roots of narcissism—
two important pieces that are concerned with the nature of Man as it is
intertwined with, or better, as it helps to create, the social dilemmas of the
human condition—are one of Morgenthau's earliest and one of his very last
works.[2] Yet, when Morgenthau died, the unfortunate happened: genuine
realism died; what had informed, defined, and shaped realism for millennia,
the genuine and profound concern with Man died.

This, however, does not imply that the concept of human nature has fully
vanished from the intellectual vocabulary of contemporary realist internation-
al-political theory. As I argued in the preceding chapters, post-classicals have
merely and misleadingly claimed that they had left behind the concept of
human nature. For assumptions about human nature, hidden as they are in
post-classical realism, are still haunting these post-classicals and political real-
ism as criticism from within political-realist circles and beyond is mounting.

Though much of this criticism of the concept of human nature is more or less ill-founded, we can hardly wish away that human nature is a much more omnipresent (and omnipotent) concept than has been hitherto recognized by, particularly, post-classicals. It, therefore, fits to paraphrase Morgenthau here: "Human Nature Revisited?—We never left it!"

Yet, what does it mean to say that contemporary political realism never left one of the most ancient and most controversial concepts of political theory, philosophy, theology, and of the human sciences? It requires from us that we deal with what seems to be the overarching implication of the preceding chapters' line of arguments: namely, that we deal at greater depth, length, and breadth with the concept of human nature as it is now resurrected in contemporary political realism. In the following three concluding sections, I will discuss what such resurrection requires realist international-political theory and wider International Relations to embark on. First, to bring back the Realist Man into political realism. Second, to bring back Freud into political realism. And, finally, to bring back both Freud and the concept of human nature into wider contemporary International Relations.

Bringing the Realist Man Back into Political Realism

The present endeavor tried to answer two main questions: Is human nature dead? And, ought human nature to be dead? These questions took their starting point in what has been described as the strange death of the concept of human nature in realist international-political theory. Introducing and contextualizing the is/ought-questions, I raised a few concerns and presented some preliminary evidence that suggested that the main strands and proponents of post-Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian political realism may not be as purified of assumptions about human nature as they would have themselves and others believe. Further, I hypothesized that these assumptions about human nature that may lie hidden in post-classical realism may be broadly Freudian assumptions; likewise, but more forcefully, I suggested that the assumptions about human nature of several leading twentieth-century classical realists from Morgenthau to Carr may require substantial reinterpretation along Freudian lines. In light of these two hypotheses, I presented my own readings of five noted protagonists of classical realism and of five major strands of post-classical realism. Irrespective of my distinctive argument along Freudian lines (more on that below), my main take was that the concept of human nature is not dead in contemporary realist international-political theory.

This is an important statement in its own right; not the least because uncovering hidden assumptions about human nature helps to unveil powerful and

concealed ingredients of international-political theories that, in turn, pose as timeless "truths" and help to steer the practice of foreign-policy making in this and not that direction. Equally important, however, is that the answering of the is-question has paved the way for shifting the focus of the human-nature question. Even if post-classicals had been able to get rid of human nature, we could have asked anew whether this has really enriched political realism and its analytic and normative study of international relations. But once the post-classicals' human-nature lie was uncovered, taken together with my reaffirmative statement about how central and defining the concept of human nature was to classical realism, the ought-question became the imperative. For if human nature is not dead, what ought to be done? Ought the concept of human nature to be dead? With a detailed discussion of the various sets of criticism and countercriticisms regarding the concept of human nature, and a presentation of a set of proactive arguments in favor of human nature, the discourse was that contemporary political realism requires, as other forms of classical realism, a conception of human nature as its philosophical basis from which it could start its analytical and normative forays into the international-political. Contemporary realist international-political theory needs to bring back the concept of human nature. Political realists must recognize and appreciate anew the Realist Man as one of their core concerns and core concepts.

This, however, is not so much a question of individual choice as one of politico-theoretical and scientific necessity: namely, the necessity to protect and perfect the realist Weltanschauung. To not drag the point too far and underestimate the accomplishments of Waltzian/Mearsheimerian-style political realism, the intellectual project of the post-classicals is more than problematic. Many have—and not seldom unfairly—pointed to its ontological, epistemological, and methodological mistakes;[3] and this book adds to this literature another failure: the either blind or hypocritical approach of post-classical realism vis-à-vis the Realist Man. It concerns the blatant disavowal or neglect of the concept of the Realist Man while still using (though unreflectively) the concept of human nature. Post-classical realists cannot avoid recognizing that it has been uncovered that many of their international-political theories are, despite claims to the contrary, heavily infused with assumptions about human nature. Post-classicals share the conviction that the concept of human nature is some sort of antiquated relict of the pre-Herzian/Waltzian era. This is what distinguishes them from, and makes them, what they believe, also superior to, classical realism. They, therefore, also share what has been referred to as their human-nature lie—namely, attempting to substitute the concept of international-political structure for the concept of human nature while still falling back on certain hidden assumptions about the nature of Man.

Yet, the problem for contemporary realist international-political theory lies deeper; and the fact that the post-classical realists' human-nature lie has been uncovered itself cannot be of any satisfaction, neither to the post-classicals nor to the Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-inspired political realists. Even though we can defend post-classical realism and its hidden assumptions about human nature against some largely unwarranted points of criticism, we should be alarmed in view of these post-classical realists' degree of unreflectiveness when it comes to matters human nature. Their hypocrisy and unreflectiveness vis-à-vis the concept of human nature is problematic in its own right, but matters are worse, for it has helped that contemporary political realism, both of classical and post-classical provenance, is now facing an unpleasant intellectual situation. With the concept of human nature being considered a largely discredited idea among most scholars of International Relations, it is not only the classical realists who are an easy prey for critics; the post-classicals, too, for relying on the concept of human nature, are now in the critical spot of those critics who have always been wary (and almost hysterically critical) of the amalgamation of international-political theory and human nature, the whole idea of human nature, hidden assumptions, and of political realism.

The problem, therefore, is that contemporary realist international-political theory has not only become more vulnerable as a political philosophy of international relations (human nature as some sort of Achilles' heel of realism), but also that political realism will, most likely, continue to face such a hostile situation. What is required is that both classicals and post-classicals have their respective intellectual and argumentative share in rediscovering the concept of human nature as one of the most fundamental concerns and concepts of the realist Weltanschauung. Bringing back the Realist Man to the center of realist international-political theory will help to both protect and perfect political realism.

No doubt, the heaviest burden must be shouldered by the post-classicals. For they were the original critics who set out to raise political realism to an allegedly more sophisticated, scientific level. The Waltzs and Mearsheimers have kept repeating that mere "interpretations" and "explanations" of international relations are "plentiful" but that proper scientific "theories are scarce."[4] This sort of mantra in post-classical realism has always been directed against the classicals implying more often than not that classical realism was not much more than something like a sophisticated storytelling offering merely some sort of interesting bedtime reading on the international-political condition. And at the risk of appearing to be old-fashioned and/or stubborn, compared to Waltz's *Theory of International Politics,* Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* provides far better insights into the underlying mechanisms

of international politics (and although Waltz's parsimony certainly has its virtues, scholars of International Relations can, and should, handle more than one variable).

A central part of the quarrel between the classicals and the post-classicals has been the concept of the Realist Man; and the obvious failure by post-classical realists to get rid of assumptions about human nature in matters international-political provides them with their intellectual homework. Since too many post-classical realists have been caught smuggling in some fundamental assumptions about human nature without which their international-political theories would internally collapse, they must not only accept that they cannot any longer wish away the concept of human nature, but also reinvent their post-classical realisms and provide their respective theories with a proper human-nature foundation comparable to how economic theory is based upon a human-nature microfoundation. Post-classical realists cannot rely any longer on these or those unexplained and unreflective assumptions about the state upon which virtually the entirety of their respective international-political theories are currently being built. In fact, their assumptions about the nature and behavior of social facts such as the state may not even be entirely mistaken; nevertheless, they must explicate these assumptions in greater detail, explain the origins of these assumptions, and present us with the proper argumentative deduction as to how such assumptions as state-survival, power-maximizing, or security-maximizing do, ultimately, relate back to the nature of Man.

These post-classical realists must proactively bring back in the concept of the Realist Man and make it the genuine philosophical foundation upon which their respective international-political theories are being constructed. Unless post-classical realism makes this turn back to human nature or surprises the theoretical study of international relations with another philosophical basis that is more superior to the nature of Man (unlikely as this may be), Waltzian/Mearsheimerian-style political realism remains more or less defenseless vis-à-vis those critics who are (rightly) discontent with its human-nature lie and methodological flaws. It will, from a politico-theoretical point of view, largely remain a deficient body of realist international-political theory, a controversial set of theories of international relations that may have, save their concerns with power and prudence, almost nothing in common with genuine political realism.

The Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style political realists, by contrast, never had any reservations about the concept of human nature. They have perfectly understood what I see as their main task now in the post-classical realist age: namely, to proactively argue that realist international-political theory is inherently intertwined with the concept of the Realist Man. The

Morgenthauians and Niebuhrians among us must, despite all headwind from those still critical of the intimate relationship between the concept of human nature and international-political theorizing, defend what is not a controversial fact among historians of Western political thought and political theory of international relations: that virtually every political theory has been founded upon a certain conception of human nature, whatever this conception may be. Across the millennia, political theorists of international relations have used Man, and realists have used the concept of the Realist Man, as the starting point for their forays into the world of freedom and oppression, of human and social (in)justice, of violence, war, and peace.

The task of classical-inspired realists is to remind those skeptical of human nature that the intimate relationship between the political and human nature applies, *mutatis mutandis*, also vis-à-vis the international-political. There may be all sorts of good reasons that political scientists analytically distinguish carefully between a political theory concerned with the domestic and a political theory concerned with the international, until someone presents us with a comprehensive, unified general theory of politics that comprises both spheres. But this analytical distinction must not lead to the separation of the concept of human nature from the international-political, for even though it is states that are the main actors in international relations, the only visible actor of social reality, invested with life-instincts and creative purpose, is Man. Likewise, post-classical realists must be reminded that the nature and origins of the political pertaining to the domestic are by no means different to the nature and origins of the political pertaining to the international. Whether we are concerned with presidential elections or the UN, the underlying object of study is the same (the political), and in both spheres, its actors follow the same basic laws of politics (struggle for power). Further, though, in both spheres, the nature and origin of the political and the struggle for power have their roots in the same source: the nature of Man, or, from a political-realist perspective, in the Realist Man.

Since, in the post-classical realist age, many seem to have forgotten about the intimate triadic relationship between political realism, the concept of the political or international-political, and the nature of Man, it is the almost natural task of the Morgenthauians and Niebuhrians to defend, and make the case for, the Realist Man as the "new" core concept or the philosophical basis of realist international-political theory. Where political realism is the Weltanschauung that is concerned with the nature and the limits of the political and the international-political, the only way of knowing where to set the boundaries between reality and utopia, preventing us from both cynicism and air castles, derives from an understanding of the nature of the Realist Man.

Bringing Freud Back into Political Realism

As necessary as it is to bring back the Realist Man into political realism, it is to bring back Freud, his theory of Man and his philosophy of the human condition into realist international-political theory. Discussing several leading classical realists, I argued that the conceptions of Man that constitute the basis of the international-political theories of Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, and Carr are to varying degrees of explicitness and depths of Freudian provenance; Niebuhr remains a Christian realist and his Realist Man broadly derives from Augustinian theology rather than from Freudianism. Having, then, turned the analytical attention to the post-classical realists, I argued that, save Herz and Kaplan, who, like the classicals, also seem to have been under the broader influence of Freud regarding the nature of Man, the largely hidden assumptions about human nature found in the allegedly human nature–freed international-political theories of Waltz, Mearsheimer, and the neoclassicals are simply too unreflective to allow for more or less neat conclusions with respect to their intellectual sources.[5] My interpretation of some of these realists' accounts of human nature along Freudian lines is, of course, open for debate; textual interpretations almost always inherently risk either overstatement or, alternatively, failing the "so what?" test.

Putting my interpretation to the test is to be more than welcomed. First, how else would there be scientific progress? And, second, we all know that conceptions of human nature, hidden or not, lie around almost every corner of contemporary realist international-political theory informing both analytical and normative arguments about international politics and foreign-policy making. There is a justified concern, however, that a healthy debate about respective assumptions about human nature within contemporary political realism may not materialize, unless political realists of all provenances begin to draw at least some attention away from studying the world to studying human nature; unless political realists begin to engage more proactively with the concept of human nature and scrutinize more thoroughly the nature and origins of their assumptions about human nature that lie at the bottom of their respective political realisms.

Engaging more consciously and at greater length and depth with our own overt or covert assumptions about the nature of Man seems an imperative task. This task, however, seems, as found in my analysis, related to the causa Freud. Surely, we may not all be (hidden) Freudians, but the chances that a large proportion of us are seem not too small. In this book, I have been concerned with the concept of human nature vis-à-vis twentieth-century classical realism and post-classical realism. One of its reasons was

the seemingly strange fact that Freud has been such a ubiquitous figure of influence and theoretical concern in virtually all subjects across the sciences, social sciences, arts and humanities but such a terribly neglected and understudied figure in International Relations. I, therefore, hypothesized that Freud might be helpful in answering both the is-question and the ought-question. Respectively, I argued that several classicals and post-classicals have been influenced by Freud and that he offers a most appropriate starting point with regard to the imperative task of providing political realism with a proper philosophical basis in the form of a philosophical anthropology.

Despite this book's special reference to Freud (and admittedly overt intellectual sympathies with him), it would be far too premature, however, to close the causa political realism/Freud. What is necessary, instead, is to engage in greater depth with Freud's potential intellectual impact upon contemporary strands of political realism by expanding the analytical focus. In this regard, we should explore whether several other political realists, too, have been influenced by Freudian assumptions about human nature in addition to Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippmann, Carr, and Niebuhr as well as Herz, Kaplan, Waltz, Mearsheimer, and the neoclassicals. But we must not forget to examine the assumptions about human nature—their nature and intellectual origins—that underlie, more certain than not, the international-political theories of the likes of Aron, Berlin, Butterfield, Schwarzenberger, Wight, Weber, not to mention the contemporaries of the Gilpins, Krasners, or Zakarias. Doing so will tell us a great deal about the views and preconceptions of contemporary political realism and how these have informed realist international-political theorizing. These assumptions may not be Freudian; and we will, then, know what has taken Freud's place. Further, we will know why Freud, eventually, fell out of the realist picture. This will help us understand better the history and evolution of realist international-political theory.

Expanding the analytical net may also lead to a different picture of how political realists think about the nature of Man. Given Freud's colossal impact, we may be able to find more political realists influenced by Freud, more Freudian political realists, and more Freudian traces in the culture of political realism. Though it may seem far-fetched in the here and now, upon further exploration, being sensitive about human nature and Freudian human nature, historians and scholars of realist international-political theory may find out whether the emergence of twentieth-century political realism, as it is exemplified in particular by Morgenthau, can be seen as the politico-theoretical reaction to one of the greatest advances in our understanding of the nature of Man. We may find out whether twentieth-century political

realism should perhaps be seen as some sort of politico-philosophical mirror image of the Freudian Man and the Freudian revolution. Again, this "Freudian realism" may appear far-fetched. But we do not know—unless we start digging deeper.

This raises a second area of further research that should be pursued with regard to the actual and potential intellectual relationship between political realism and Freud. I did not hesitate to argue for a distinctively Freudian background theory for the realist Weltanschauung. Freud's theory of Man, it was claimed, offers a most appropriate starting point for the missing philosophical anthropology for political realism, for Freudian Man seems to be a powerful and strong foundation when it comes to the question what the nature of Man is. Freudian Man helps political realists to explain, demystify and also legitimize the core principles and core concepts of their Weltanschauung. Rather than relying on mere principle-turned assumptions about how the nature and behavior of Man causes and reinforces the hostile behavior of political communities vis-à-vis their counterparts on the world stage, Freudian Man helps explain the underlying individual mechanics and social-psychological dynamics that turn the relations among nations, as Morgenthau had it, into a perhaps endless and tragic struggle for power and peace. From Freudian Man, political realists can deduce their healthy skepticism of a too open and too public conduct of foreign-policy making, their fear of moral universalism and moral crusading, and their own notion of international moral relativism. Likewise, Freudian Man helps prevent political realists falling prey to the ills of pessimistic fatalism and retain the belief in both rational foreign-policy conduct as well as in piecemeal progress in international relations.

As mentioned before, Freud, his anthropology, and his version of the human condition and war are, of course, not immune to intellectual attacks from many sides. Further, as admitted freely, what was presented here as Freudian philosophical anthropology is not—and cannot be—the "full" Freud. Though largely sympathetic to Freud, this book may have not done justice in that, as remarked in the introduction, the œuvre of Freud fills no less than twenty-four volumes. Be that as it may, however, for this book was not so much a book on Freud or Freud's international-political theorizing than it was a book on the human-nature question in the philosophy of political realism of international relations, with a special reference to Freud. This book sought to raise the low profile of Freud in contemporary realist international-political theory and International Relations to a level that does justice to this extraordinary thinker. And I hope it has achieved its task by arguing how important Freud has

been among political realists and how useful Freud still is for the realist Weltanschauung.

Yet, this—surely—is not enough; it does not represent not much more than the first step of a hopefully much more thorough engagement with Freud in the context of the political-realist study of international relations. Political theorists and scholars of political science have long recognized the virtues (as well as the vices) of Freud and Freudian Man. But political realists seem to have been unduly neglecting Freud's insights into the nature of Man, communities, and of why the world seems more often than not such a tragic place despite being filled with an ever-increasing proportion of well-educated people (or, as Morgenthau had it, of Scientific Men). They do injustice not only to Freud, but also to the insights of one of the most profound psychological traditions that could help illuminate, explain, and understand at even greater depth several of the most important issues and timeless themes of international relations. Even if we did not agree with Freud's own social and (international-)political theory and the conclusions he derived from his own psychological premises, we should, nevertheless, study thoroughly his theory of Man. For Freudian Man provides a powerful foundation upon which realist international-political theory can address questions of the nature and origins of political communities, the prevalence and dangers of nationalism, and of the ubiquity of aggression, violence, and war in international relations. Further, Freudian Man can help us explain the psychological nature and origins of power, legitimacy, ethics, human agency, and of human progress in this world.

Particularly for Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style political realists, who wish to continue to approach the timeless dilemmas of international relations by means of an intelligent recourse to the dilemmas of Man and the human condition stemming from their awareness that the relations among nations are but a subtle yet brutal reflection of the nature of Man (as it is shaped by historical circumstances), Freud provides an insightful account of the intimate triadic relationship between Man, the human condition, and the international struggle for power and peace. As part of an analytical and explanatory endeavor, Freud can help these political realists to strengthen their case that international politics is, ultimately, merely the politics of the nature of Man writ large. And, as part of the normative and ethical endeavor, Freud can help these political realists to strengthen their case as to what is possible and desirable in international politics and what is not. A lengthy study and treatment of Freud's theory of Man and civilization vis-à-vis the realist Weltanschauung that is devoted solely to these questions and themes of the international-political, however, remains to be written.

Bringing Freud and Human Nature Back into International Relations

In this book, I attempted to establish an intellectual and politico-theoretical connection between realist international-political theory and Freud. Further, I argued in favor of such connection, both in terms of the is-question and the ought-question. Without any hesitation, however, must it be conceded that a thinker of the caliber of Freud (acknowledging his virtues, vices, and contradictions) cannot be intellectually hijacked by, or intellectually strait-jacketed into, political realism. True, whether we sympathize with Freud's theory of Man (like done here) or are critical-skeptical of it, whether we see Freud, to use Peter Gay's words, as a "genius, founder, master, a giant among the makers of the modern mind" or as an "autocrat, plagiarist, fabulist, the most consummate of charlatans,"[6] it is fair to say that no one seriously doubts that Freud has been one of the prime shapers of our age in matters human nature and human condition. And, in fact, several leading political realists have recognized the achievements of Freud and made use of them in one way or the other.

But liberals, Marxists, conservatives, and others, too, valued and used, and still value and use, Freud's ontogenetic and phylogenetic insights; we know, for example, that Freud influenced diverse thinkers such as Kelsen, Lasswell, Keynes, and Parsons. Further, we know that we cannot really understand modern social sciences, that is, their nature, methodologies, and philosophical foundations, without the ascent and impact of Freud. Also, we know that both Frankfurt School–inspired critical theorists as well as postmodern theorists have drawn from Freud, his theory of human nature, his psychoanalysis. Looking at Freud's impact across the faculties, it seems not too speculative to suggest that Freud has left his intellectual traces in several other philosophies, traditions, and schools of the study of international relations. It, therefore, seems vital to widen the analytical focus and explore in greater depth the potential influence that Freud may have had in International Relations; for we can reasonably expect that a fair number of its scholars and thinkers have—whether consciously or unconsciously, whether implicitly or explicitly—built their respective analytical and normative research and ideas upon at least some broadly Freudian foundations.

Such an endeavor seems necessary, but it will also face obstacles. First and foremost, studies in the history of social and political thought tell us that we can see more often than not an apparent tendency in our profession to be rather secretive about how our own thinking has been shaped and by whom. In other words, more often than not, intellectual traces and basic assumptions seem to get "covered up" rather than revealed. Save the usual

exceptions, this applies particularly to Freud; and several of those who have drawn from Freudian ideas have not admitted openly the Freudian portions of their analytical or normative endeavors.[7] Part of the problem is that, since Freud's theory of Man is such a pervasive part of our assumptions and belief-system about the social and political world, Freudian Man lurks secretly and quietly in the back of much international-political theorizing without Freud being ever explicitly mentioned. It is exactly these hidden Freudian themes, traces, or residues, however, that we should attempt to excavate. This will help us to determine in greater depth how various studies of international relations stemming from a variety of different scientific-theoretical, ontological, methodological, and epistemological backgrounds and perspectives have utilized, interpreted, and drawn politico-theoretical implications from the same Freudian source. Engaging with Freud on a larger scale will help us to establish a comparative analysis of Freud's impact, to comparatively study the different interpretations of, and conclusions that stem from, Freud, and to excavate the true nature and magnitude of an important, though unfortunately neglected, part of the intellectual history of International Relations.

Such wider and deeper politico-theoretical concern with Freud among contemporary scholars of international relations, however, should be seen as merely a specific instance of a much wider and deeper politico-theoretical concern with the concept of human nature in International Relations. I have sought to argue that the concept of human nature is not dead and that the intelligent concern with the nature of Man as it is shaped by, and confronted with, historically powerful socioeconomic forces ought not to be dead in realist international-political theory. But this must not imply that the human-nature question, that is, the questions regarding the politico-theoretical role, intellectual origins, and substantive nature of assumptions about human nature, should only be again, or become again, one of the core concerns of a handful of Morgenthauian/Niebuhrian-style theorists of international relations. Instead, it is imperative that the concept of human nature becomes again one of the core concerns of literally every single scholar, scientist, or political theorist of international relations. Regardless of different Weltanschauungen and regardless of different levels of analysis or images, we must deal with the concept of human nature, with the Realist Man, the Liberal Man, the Marxist Man, and so forth.

There should not be much quarrel over the fact that the main task of scholars of international relations is to explain and to predict foreign-policy behavior and international-political outcomes.[8] Another task, of course, is to examine and theorize the normative-ethical dimension of the relations among nations that still seem to be characterized largely by a relentless search for power, security, prosperity, prestige, as well as peace. But we must

not be blind vis-à-vis our own assumptions and preconceptions; must neither forget nor neglect what lies underneath most of our analytical and normative international-political theorizing—namely, the concept of human nature with this or that particular conception. The classical realists knew that Man is the ultimate source of all evil and tragedy in the social and political world; they knew that, ultimately, Man can be the bearer of progress in international relations and that the nature of Man sets the boundaries of what is achievable in this world. Post-classicals, by contrast, thought that they can meaningfully theorize the international-political without any recourse to assumptions about human nature, but they have failed; failed miserably, for they have not left the concept of human nature. Likewise, those arguing vigorously against the admissibility of the concept of human nature in international-political theory, those warning of the analytical and moral vicissitudes of assumptions about human nature, these proponents of such Weltanschauungen, too, have not left human nature and continue to assume certain characteristics and behavioral traits (not using, of course, the bad word), often entertaining ideas of the perfectibility of human nature.

The task, therefore, is that not only political realists but also, ideally, all International Relations scholars ask anew the analytical is-question and the normative ought-question. We can seriously doubt that the concept of human nature is dead in International Relations; and even if it was, its death would not have been to the advantage of International Relations leaving us with deprived understandings of the underlying mechanics and dynamics of international relations. Thus, in light of the resurrection of the Realist Man in contemporary realist international-political theory, the failures and weaknesses of much of human-nature criticism, and the omnipresence of assumptions about human nature throughout the history of Western international-political thought lead us to believe that, however hidden and vague they may be, particular ideas about the nature, behavior, and perfectibility of Man inform virtually every facet of our theorizing the international-political. Therefore, assumptions about human nature must be discussed, their relative significance to the respective claims assessed.

This theoretical interest in the concept of human nature concerns the whole theoretical spectrum found in the study of international relations. It concerns political realists. It concerns those coming from the allegedly human nature–critical Weltanschauungen such as Marxian, postmodern, and feminist International Relations theories. Further, the reengagement with assumptions about human nature is equally pressing with respect to the liberal, English school, and constructivist tradition of International Relations. Fortunately, the beginnings are made: political realism has been criticized for its alleged human-nature vices;[9] discussions of human nature,

particularly regarding the rise of sociobiology, have cropped up;[10] human nature-based theological and Augustinian-inspired approaches to international relations are still attractive;[11] so are theories of international relations based on ancient Greek theories of human motives;[12] the broader patterns of assumptions about human nature of realist, liberal, and constructivist International Relations theory are in the process of being examined;[13] and enquiries into the return of human nature in International Relations have appeared recently.[14] This body of literature, of course, is to be commended. But despite the fact that assumptions about human nature are still being made, the concept of human nature is widely neglected among contemporary theorists and scholars of international relations.

This neglect, however, is problematic. It has helped to make appear contemporary analytical and normative theorizing of international relations as exactly what the post-Morgenthauians/Niebuhrians wanted to avoid desperately when they embarked on cleansing International Relations from assumptions about human nature: namely, as some sort of myth. The problem is not that we make assumptions about human nature and that these assumptions function as the philosophical backdrop against which we, ultimately, attune, adjust, and judge our theorizing of foreign-policy behavior and international-political outcomes. Surely, we must use—however depressing or utopian it may be conceptualized—the concept of human nature as the ultimate reference point and ultimate test against which international-political theories are to be judged; and the concept of human nature helps us to guard against building castles in the air; and only a full and frank dealing with the concept of human nature helps us to guard against turning the nature of Man into an outright "cliché" that

> can grease the wheels of a failing argument, polish the buttons of ignorance, and evoke pride or shame at the will of the orator. Why is there war? "Human nature." Why were you unfaithful to your wife? "Human nature." Why do we do anything? "Human nature." There is no easier explanation, no easier excuse.[15]

Surely, we all know that the concept of human nature is powerful, even dangerously powerful, and that it has often been misused. That the concept of human nature can be misused, is, of course, a problem, but we can cope with it when we deal with the theme of human nature in an intelligent and responsible way.

Yet, the real problem with the concept of human nature in International Relations lies elsewhere: namely, in the not-knowing. More often than not do we not know, do we not recognize, are we not fully aware, or are we kept

in the dark of what nature and origins various assumptions about human nature that are inbuilt in various International Relations theories actually are? We, therefore, are not able to link analyzes to conclusions, that is, to assess the soundness of conclusions put forth by theorists and scholars of international relations, for we do not know all the sources, assumptions, and premises on which these arguments and conclusions have been based. But this problem can be rectified fairly easily. We must explore in greater depth and breadth the underlying assumptions about human nature of contemporary International Relations theories. Most likely, despite all nuances, comparative analyzes of a variety of International Relations theories and their assumptions about human nature would bring about a fairly familiar ideal-typical picture: at the most abstract, international-political optimism derives from human-nature optimism and international-political pessimism derives from human-nature pessimism.

Still, scholars of International Relations should (must) lay the cards on the table when it comes to the question of the nature and origins of assumptions about human nature and how these assumptions inform our respective theorizing. Regardless of whether we work with or use psychoanalytical, theological, sociobiological, neuroscientific, or any other sets of assumptions about human nature, we must present, explain, and justify them. Surely, the subject matter of our field, the issues that are dealt with, and the potentially serious implications of International Relations research has helped turning the profession of theorizing about the international-political into an often emotional and ideology-driven endeavor. But, despite all our fierce differences, we should not forget about the nature and culture of science (Wissenschaft).

Science, as Kelsen put it, is the domain of truth, sincerity, and tolerance.[16] We, therefore, literally owe each other that we are truthful, sincere, and tolerant regarding all our assumptions and beliefs—which include, of course, assumptions and beliefs about the nature of Man—that we pour into our theories of international relations. And even if we were not that loyal, friendly, and fair, we would at least owe it to ourselves. We should not forget the timeless *dictum* given to us by one of the most innovative political scientists, Graham Wallas, that "[t]he student of politics must, consciously or unconsciously, form a conception of human nature, and [that] the less conscious he is of his conception the more likely is he to be dominated by it."[17] The scientific (and humanistic) dictate of truth and sincerity requires us to seek the highest possible degree of reflectiveness vis-à-vis ourselves, our preconceptions, and the nature and origins of the facts, data, and methodologies we are using. As Butterfield warned, "the blindest of all the blind are those who are unable to examine their own presuppositions, and blithely imagine therefore that they do not possess any."[18]

We, therefore, must not allow ourselves to be blind to our assumptions regarding the perhaps most perplexing question of humankind—the nature of Man. Instead, we must face and make explicit our assumptions about human nature, however pessimist-fatalist or utopian our individual or collective pictures of Man may be. The beginnings are made that International Relations can remedy its agnosia and peculiar renunciation of the concept of human nature: we should appreciate its virtues, its vices, and its inevitability in the study of international relations.

Notes

Chapter 1   Political Realism and the Strange Death of Human Nature

1. Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?", 26.
2. At the risk of being accused for perpetuating gendered language, I consciously use the term "Man" or, later in chapter 5, "Realist Man." I am, of course, aware that, for a variety of legitimate reasons, this raises serious issues, but, unfortunately, matters of practicability and conceptuality prevent its avoidance.
3. Guzzini, *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy*, 127.
4. As the convention has it, International Relations is the academic discipline, international relations refers to its subject.
5. Wight, *International Theory*, 25. On the intimate connection between political theorizing and the concept of human nature, see also Berry, *Human Nature*; Forbes and Smith, eds., *Politics and Human Nature*; Pennock and Chapman, eds., *Human Nature in Politics.*
6. Spegele, *Political Realism in International Theory*, 129. See also Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations*; Clinton, ed., *The Realist Tradition and Contemporary International Relations*; Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*; Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*; Forde, "Classical Realism"; Lieber, "Enduring Relevance of International Political Realism"; Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*; Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism."
7. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 4.
8. These (misleading) labels appear in Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 19, and in Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, 44–50.
9. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances*, 2.
10. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics," 341 (italics added).
11. Schweller, "Fantasy Theory," 148 (italics added).
12. See Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man.*
13. Ibid., 4n32.
14. Ibid., 73.
15. Ibid; see also Freyberg-Inan, "Rational Paranoia and Enlightened Machismo."

16. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," 301–02.

17. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 23.

18. On Morgenthau, see Scheuerman, *Morgenthau*; Williams, ed., *Realism Reconsidered*; other recent works on Morgenthau—in addition to those referenced throughout this book—include Bain, "Deconfusing Morgenthau"; Craig, *Glimmer of a New Leviathan*; Juetersonke, "Morgenthau on the Limits of Justiciability in International Law"; Mollov, *Power and Transcendence*; Molloy, "Truth, Power, Theory"; Neacsu, *Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations*; Pin-Fat, "Metaphysics of the National Interest and the 'Mysticism' of the Nation-State"; Rologas, *Morgenthau and the Crisis of Twentieth Century Politics*; Tjalve, *Realist Strategies of Republican Peace*; Williams, "Why Ideas Matter in International Relations"; Wong, "Morgenthau's Anti-Machiavellian Machiavellianism"; and the essays in Mazur, ed., *One Hundred Year Commemoration to the Life of Hans Morgenthau*; Mazur, ed., *Twenty-Five Year Memorial Commemoration to the Life of Hans Morgenthau*; Hacke, Kindermann, and Schellhorn, *Heritage, Challenge, and Future of Realism*; Thompson and Myers, eds., *Truth and Tragedy*. On Herz, see Stirk, "Herz"; and the special issue edited by Puglierin, "John H. Herz." On Niebuhr, see Lovin, *Christian Realism and the New Realities.*

19. Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists*, 12.

20. On Morgenthau and Aristotle, see Lang, "Morgenthau, Agency, and Aristotle"; Lang, ed., *Political Theory and International Affairs*. On Epicurus, see Molloy, "Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil." On Kelsen, see Koskenniemi, "Morgenthau's Books on International Law with Hans Kelsen." On Lincoln, see Ferrell, "Attraction of President Lincoln to Morgenthau"; Foner, "Rediscovered Essay on Abraham Lincoln by Hans Morgenthau"; Anastaplo, "Hans Morgenthau and the Greatness of Abraham Lincoln." On Niebuhr, see Stone, "Ontology of Power in Morgenthau and Niebuhr"; Shinn, "Continuing Conversation between Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr"; Shinn, "National Interest, Just War, and Nuclear Proliferation"; Wellman, "Moral Realism of Morgenthau and Niebuhr in Their Contemporary Relevance." On Nietzsche, see Frei, *Morgenthau*; Gismondi, "Tragedy, Realism, and Postmodernity"; Peterson, "Breathing Nietzsche's Air." On Schmitt, see Pichler, "Godfathers of 'Truth'"; Koskenniemi, *Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, 413–509; Scheuerman, *Carl Schmitt*, 225–51; Scheuerman, "Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau." On Sinzheimer, see Scheuerman, "Realism and the Left." On the Sophists, see Johnson, "Idea of Power Politics." On Weber, see Pichler, "Godfathers of 'Truth'"; Turner, "Morgenthau and the Legacy of Max Weber"; Turner and Mazur, "Morgenthau as a Weberian Methodologist"; Turner and Factor, *Max Weber and the Dispute over Reason*.

21. Morgenthau, "Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen" (On the Derivation of the Political from the Nature of Man). See Frei, *Morgenthau*, 130–36; Koskenniemi, *Gentle Civilizer of Nations*, 448–49; Lebow, *Tragic Vision of Politics*, 291–92; Molloy, "Truth, Power, Theory," 16; Scheuerman, *Morgenthau*, 37–38.

22. Morgenthau, "Intellectual Autobiography," 67.
23. On Morgenthau's German years and politico-philosophical rooting, see Frei, *Morgenthau*; Honig, "Totalitarianism and Realism"; Shilliam, "Morgenthau in Context"; Scheuerman, *Morgenthau*; Soellner, "German Conservatism in America."
24. See, respectively, Johnston, "E. H. Carr's Theory of International Relations," 878; Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 226; Costigliola, "Unceasing Pressure for Penetration," 1323; Christenson, "Kennan and Human Rights," 350n17; Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century*; Strong, "Weber and Freud."
25. Respectively, Thurschwell, *Sigmund Freud*, 1; Elliott, "Introduction," 3.
26. Billington, "Foreword," ix.
27. Gray et al., "The Assault on Freud."
28. Zaretsky, *Secrets of the Soul*.
29. Kurzweil, "Sigmund Freud."
30. For Freud's enduring relevance, and resurgence of interest, across the disciplines of the natural and social sciences as well as arts and humanities see, for example, DeBerg, *Freud's Theory and Its Use in Literary and Cultural Studies*; Dufresne, ed., *Against Freud*; Dufresne, *Killing Freud*; Elliott, *Social Theory since Freud*; Gomez, *Freud Wars*; Horrocks, *Freud Revisited*; Kaplan-Solms and Solms, *Clinical Studies in Neuro-Psychoanalysis*; Kramer, *Freud*; Lear, *Freud*; Manning, *Freud and American Sociology*; Mills, ed., *Rereading Freud*; Merlino et al., eds., *Freud at 150*. Further, see the special issue on Freud edited by Reppen, "The Relevance of Sigmund Freud for the 21st Century."
31. Kazin, "The Freudian Revolution Analyzed," 13.
32. Elliott, "Introduction," 2.
33. Johnston, *Austrian Mind*, 399–400.
34. See, for example, Wallace, *Freud and Anthropology*; Kaplan, "Freud, Film, Culture"; Goodwin, "Economic Man in the Garden of Eden"; Gay, "Psychoanalysis and the Historian"; Ehrenzweig, *Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence*; Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*; Wollheim and Hopkins, eds., *Philosophical Essays on Freud*; Grünbaum, *Foundations of Psychoanalysis*; Wallwork, *Psychoanalysis and Ethics*; Elliott, *Social Theory since Freud*; Manning, *Freud and American Sociology*; Homans, *Theology after Freud*.
35. See, respectively, Bocock, "Freud and the Centrality of Instincts in Psychoanalytic Sociology"; Ehrenzweig, *Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence*; Erikson, *Young Man Luther*; Volkan, Julius, and Montville, eds., *Psychodynamics of International Relationships*; Volkan, Montville, and Julius, eds., *Psychodynamics of International Relationships*; Volkan, *Blind Trust*.
36. Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*; Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*; Fromm, *Greatness and Limitations of Freud's Thought*. See also chapter 4.
37. Sunshine, "Freud's Influence on American Political Science."
38. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics,* 17–18. On Lasswell's Freudianism, see Birnbach, *Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy*, 156–76.

39. Winslow, "Keynes and Freud"; Winslow, "John Maynard Keynes's 'Poetical Economy.'"

40. Kelsen, "The Conception of the State and Social Psychology, with a Special Reference to Freud's Group Theory"; see also Jabloner, "Kelsen and His Circle."

41. Elliott, *Social Theory since Freud,* 22; Manning, *Freud and American Sociology,* 96–116.

42. Parsons and Shils, "Values, Motives, and Systems of Action," 52; Parsons, "Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure," 62.

43. Wallerstein, "The Heritage of Sociology," 9. For Wallerstein's world-systems theory, see Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis.*

44. See Rosenberg, *Philosophy of Social Science*; Ruitenbeek, ed., *Psychoanalysis and Social Sciences*; Taylor, "Sigmund Freud"; Weinert, *Copernicus, Darwin, Freud.*

45. See Abramson, *Liberation and Its Limits*; Anderson, *Freudian Anthropology and Political Theory*; Drassinower, *Freud's Theory of Culture*; Johnston, *Freud and Political Thought*; Rieff, *Freud*; Roazen, *Freud*; Roazen, "Freud and His Followers."

46. Useful discussions and/or collections of various conceptions of human nature are provided by Abel, ed., *Theories of Human Nature*; Coward, *Perfectibility of Human Nature in Eastern and Western Thought*; Loptson, *Theories of Human Nature*; Meyer, *Philosophy and the Passions*; Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. 1: Human Nature*; Pinker, *Blank Slate*; Rouner, ed., *Is there a Human Nature?*; Stephens, ed., *The Person*; Stevenson and Haberman, *Ten Theories of Human Nature*; Trigg, *Ideas of Human Nature*; Wells and McFadden, eds., *Human Nature.*

47. On Freud's life and work, see Elliott, ed., *Freud 2000*; Gay, *Freud*; Jones, S*igmund Freud*; Marcuse, *Sigmund Freud*; Roazen, *Freud and His Followers*; Roth, ed., *Freud*; Merlino et al., eds., *Freud at 150.*

48. Rieff, *Freud*, 222.

49. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 25.

50. Gay, *Freud*, 4.

51. Nelson, ed., *Freud and the 20th Century*, 8.

52. For systemic introductions into his thought, see Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*; *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*; *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis.*

53. Freud, "A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis," 143.

54. Freud, *Future of an Illusion*, 7.

55. See Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations*; Clinton, ed., *Realist Tradition and Contemporary International Relations*; Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*; Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace*; Forde, "Classical Realism"; Frankel, ed., *Roots of Realism*; Loriaux, "The Realists and Saint Augustine"; Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger.*

56. Wight, *International Theory*, 25.

57. Kaplan, "Freud and Modern Philosophy," 224.

58. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, 69, 71, 187.

59. See Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*; Coker, *War and the 20th Century*; Elshtain, "Freud's Discourse of War/Politics"; Elshtain, "Woman, the State, and War"; Forbes, "People or Processes?"; Gammon, "Affect and the Rise of the Self-Regulating Market"; Schuett, "Classical Realism, Freud, and Human Nature in International Relations"; Schuett, "Freudian Roots of Political Realism."

60. Forbes, "People or Processes?", 16.

61. Quoted in Jones, *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work*; *The Last Phase, 1919–1939*, 187.

62. Freud, *Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*; for his original German works, see Freud, *Gesammelte Werke.*

63. Thompson, *Masters of International Thought.*

64. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 39.

65. Guldin, "Mr. X Speaks," 13–14. On Kennan, see Lukács, *George Kennan.*

66. From the introduction of Lippmann's *Stakes of Diplomacy*, ix. On Lippmann, see Syed, *Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics*; Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century.*

67. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 14. See Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis.* On Carr, see Cox, ed., *E.H. Carr*; Johnston, "The Relevance of E. H. Carr's Realism in the Post–Cold War World."

68. Kennan quoted in Thompson, *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics*, 23; Morgenthau quoted in Merkley, *Reinhold Niebuhr*, viii.

69. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," 15.

70. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 51–66.

71. Ibid., 88–89. On Waltz, see Booth, ed., *Realism and World Politics* and the two-part special issue devoted to his thought edited by Booth, "The King of Thought: Theory, the Subject, and Waltz."

72. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," 328n52. On Mearsheimer, see Little, *Balance of Power in International Relations*," 213–48.

73. See Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*; Rathbun, "A Rose by Any Other Name"; Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy"; Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism."

Chapter 2   Classical Realism on Human Nature and Freud

1. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger,* 219.

2. See Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man*; Freyberg-Inan, "Rational Paranoia and Enlightened Machismo."

3. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism,* 3.

4. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics.*

5. See Thayer, *Darwin and International Relations*; Rosen, *War and Human Nature.*

6. Rosenberg, "What's the Matter with Realism?", 292.

7. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 4.

8. Ibid., 3 (italics added).
9. Butterfield, *Christianity and History,* 47.
10. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 31.
11. For a recent reinterpretation of Morgenthau's early, path-breaking work, see Scheuerman, "Was Morgenthau a Realist?". An impressive 300-year history of the concept of human nature in American thought is provided by Curti, *Human Nature in American Thought.*
12. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics,* 164.
13. Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man*, 93.
14. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 19.
15. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics,* 165.
16. Morgenthau, "Escape from Power," 312.
17. All translations regarding the "Freud-Script" are my own (save one exception as explained below). See also Morgenthau, *Internationale Rechtspflege* and *Réalité des Normes,* the doctoral and *Habilitation* theses, respectively.
18. Frei, *Morgenthau,* 136.
19. Morgenthau, "Freud-Script," 5–6.
20. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 117.
21. Morgenthau, "Freud-Script," 4–5. The script's first two sections have been translated into English, apparently by a friend of Morgenthau (Frei, *Morgenthau*, 136). The quotation is taken from this supplement.
22. Morgenthau, "Freud-Script," 25–26.
23. Ibid., 43.
24. To avoid potential confusion regarding Eros, in his early instinct theory of 1910, Freud distinguished between an ego-instinct and sexual-instinct, the latter of which Freud called Eros; in his later (third and last) instinct theory (see Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*), Freud merged the ego-instinct and sexual-instinct into one instinct, namely Eros, and presumed the existence of the (in)famous death drive (Thanatos), that is, the eternal biological-instinctual antagonist of Eros.
25. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 122.
26. Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," 139.
27. Morgenthau, "Love and Power," 247.
28. Ibid., 247–48.
29. Ibid., 249.
30. Ibid., 250.
31. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* 139.
32. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 25.
33. Ibid., 31.
34. Ibid., 98.
35. Ibid.
36. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 96.
37. On Freudian defense mechanisms, see Anna Freud, *Ego and the Mechanism of Defence*.
38. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 98–99.

39. Ibid., 100.
40. See Scheuerman, "Realism and the Left." On the wider (Freudian-inspired) Frankfurt milieu, see Jay, *Dialectical Imagination*; Wiggershaus, *Frankfurt School*.
41. Stoessinger, "Memories of Hans J. Morgenthau as a Fellow Survivor, Mentor, and Dear Friend," 145. See also Morgenthau and Person, "The Roots of Narcissism." A personal recollection of Morgenthau is provided by Person, "Hans Joachim Morgenthau and the New York Years (1964–1980)."
42. Costigliola, "Unceasing Pressure for Penetration," 1323.
43. Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill,* 17–36.
44. Ibid., 17.
45. Ibid., 27.
46. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 96.
47. Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill,* 27.
48. Ibid., 20.
49. Ibid., 23.
50. Ibid., 28.
51. Ibid., 29.
52. Ibid., 74.
53. Ibid., 78
54. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 99, 122.
55. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* 143.
56. Ibid.
57. Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill,* 76–77.
58. Ibid., 78, 77–81.
59. Ibid., 77.
60. Ibid., 79.
61. Ibid., 81.
62. Ibid., 36.
63. See Freud, *Future of an Illusion*; Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents.*
64. Quoted in Jones, *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work*; *The Last Phase, 1919–1939,* 17.
65. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 113 (italics added).
66. Costigliola, "Unceasing Pressure for Penetration," 1323.
67. Kennan, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," 567.
68. Lippmann, "Freud and the Layman," 10.
69. Quoted in Steel, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century,* 173.
70. This line of argument runs through Lippmann's *Preface to Politics* and *Stakes of Diplomacy.*
71. Lippmann, *Preface to Politics,* 47.
72. Ibid., 80.
73. Ibid., 54–55.
74. Lippmann, *Preface to Morals,* 183.
75. Ibid. 180.
76. Ibid., 176–79.
77. Steel, *Lippmann,* 46.

78. Lippmann, *Stakes of Diplomacy,* 60.
79. Ibid., 70
80. Ibid., 66–67.
81. Ibid., 70.
82. Ibid., 69, 68.
83. Ibid., 69.
84. Ibid., 61.
85. Ibid., 73.
86. Ibid., 76.
87. Ibid., 76–77.
88. Ibid., 61.
89. Ibid., 62.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid., 81.
92. Ibid.
93. Exceptions are Chong, "Lessons in International Communication"; Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger,* 68–98.
94. Carr, "Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace," 846–47.
95. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis,* 7.
96. Haslam, *Vices of Integrity,* 46.
97. See Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis,* 85.
98. Carr, "Autobiography," xxi.
99. Respectively Carr, *What Is History?,* 133; Carr, *New Society,* 72.
100. Carr, "Autobiography," xxi.
101. Carr, *What Is History?,* 135.
102. Ibid., 134.
103. Ibid., 133.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., 134.
106. Ibid.
107. Carr, *New Society,* 106.
108. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis,* 12.
109. Ibid., 11.
110. Ibid., 95.
111. Ibid., 96.
112. Ibid., 97.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid., 95.
115. Ibid., 159.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. See Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man*; Niebuhr, *Christian Realism.*
119. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger,* 130.
120. Tillich, *My Search for Absolutes,* 50.

121. See Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. 1: Human Nature*; Niebuhr, *Self and the Dramas of History*; Niebuhr, "Human Creativity and Self-Concern in Freud's Thought"; Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society.*

122. Niebuhr, "Freud's Thought," 255.

123. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. 1: Human Nature*, 42.

124. Ibid., 44.

125. Ibid., 55.

126. Ibid., 55–56.

127. Niebuhr, "Freud's Thought," 256.

128. Ibid., 261.

129. Ibid., 264.

130. Ibid., 264–65.

131. See Halliwell, *Constant Dialogue*; Irwin, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Critique of Freudian Psychoanalysis."

132. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. 1: Human Nature,* 45n1.

133. Niebuhr, "Freud's Thought," 266.

134. Ibid., 267.

135. See Irwin, "Niebuhr's Critique of Freudian Psychoanalysis."

136. Ibid., 247–8.

137. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society,* 93.

138. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War,* 28.

139. See note 2 above.

140. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations,* 34–35; Eysenck, "Psychoanalysis." The major critical voice remains Grünbaum, *Foundations of Psychoanalysis*; see also Grünbaum, "Reception of My Freud-Critique in the Psychoanalytic Literature."

141. See Grant and Harari, "Psychoanalysis, Science and the Seductive Theory of Karl Popper"; see also Kaplan-Solms and Solms, *Clinical Studies in Neuro-Psychoanalysis*; Kandel, *Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and the New Biology of the Mind.*

142. Quoted in Isola, "Everybody Loves Reinhold."

Chapter 3   The Human Nature of Post–Classical Realism

1. See Stirk, "Herz"; see also the special issue on Herz edited by Puglierin, "John H. Herz."

2. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 187; Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 35–36. See also Booth and Wheeler, *Security Dilemma*; Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited"; Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma."

3. See Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism."

4. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 33.

5. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism,* 3.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 1–16.

8. Osgood and Tucker, *Force, Order, and Justice,* 265n11.

9. Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," 84.

10. See Ibid., 84n5; Koskenniemi, *Gentle Civilizer of Nations,* 467.

11. See Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, 234n4; Stirk, "Herz," 306n134.

12. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 226.

13. Herz, *Vom Überleben.* See LeBon, *The Crowd*; Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.*

14. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism,* 4.

15. Ibid., 6.

16. Ibid., 7.

17. Ibid., 6.

18. Ibid., 8.

19. Ibid., 7.

20. Ibid., 7–8.

21. Ibid., 3.

22. Ibid., 11–12.

23. Ibid., 12.

24. Ibid., 8.

25. See Kaplan, *Macropolitics*; Kaplan, "New Great Debate."

26. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 4.

27. Bull's argument in this debate can be found in Bull, "International Theory."

28. See Kaplan, "New Great Debate"; Kaplan, *Macropolitics*; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations,* 542–43; Vasquez, *Power of Power Politics,* 40.

29. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 51, 66.

30. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," 13.

31. See Bertalanffy, *General Systems Theory*; Ashby, *Introduction to Cybernetics.*

32. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 53.

33. Kaplan, "New Great Debate," 8.

34. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 55.

35. Kaplan, *System and Process,* 2.

36. Ibid., 21–53.

37. Ibid., 23.

38. Ibid.

39. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 52.

40. Ibid., 52, 63.

41. Ibid., 52.

42. Johnson, "Anthropomorphism in Lyric and Law," 551.

43. Kagan, *Return of History and the End of Dreams,* 80. On the role of anthropomorphisms in International Relations, see Escudé, *Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina*; Jackson, "Forum Introduction: Is the State a Person? Why Should We Care?"; Lomas, "Anthropomorphism, Personification and Ethics"; Luoma-aho, "Political Theology, Anthropomorphism, and Person-hood of the

State"; Wendt, "How Not to Argue against State Personhood." The most careful and thorough critic of anthropomorphic conceptualizations of the state, however, remains Hans Kelsen (see his "Conception of the State and Social Psychology, with a Special Reference to Freud's Group Theory"; *Pure Theory of Law*; *General Theory of Law and State).*

44. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 62.
45. Kaplan, *System and Process,* 149.
46. Ibid., 89.
47. Ibid., 97, 253, 254.
48. Ibid., 253–70.
49. Ibid., 264.
50. Ibid., 258–59.
51. Ibid., 279–80.
52. See, respectively, Waltz, *Man, the State, and War,* 16–41, 80–158, 159–86.
53. Ibid., 29.
54. Ibid., 122.
55. Ibid., 238.
56. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 37, 18–37.
57. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 58, 38–59. See also Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics*; Hoffmann, "International Relations"; Hoffmann, *State of War*; Kaplan, *System and Process.*
58. Ibid., 88.
59. Ibid., 88, 88–93.
60. Ibid., 93.
61. Ibid., 93, 93–97.
62. Ibid., 97.
63. Ibid., 98–99. Waltz repeatedly acknowledges the influx of economic theory into his international-political theory; see his "Reflections on Theory of International Politics," 339; "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," 21–24; "Interview," 384.
64. Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations,* 50–56.
65. Respectively Waltz's "Evaluating Theories," 913; "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," 54; *Theory of International Politics,* 91.
66. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 118.
67. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 66.
68. Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations,* 51.
69. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War,* 37.
70. As misleadingly claimed, respectively, by Ish-Shalom, "Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and Conservatism," 454–60; Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man,* 10, 73.
71. See note 10, chapter 1.
72. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War,* 36.
73. Ibid., 39.
74. Ibid., 40.
75. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics,* 309.
76. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War,* 43, 76.

77. Ibid., 70.
78. Freud, "Why War?", 213; quoted in Waltz, *Man, the State, and War,* 71n65.
79. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War,* 187, 238.
80. Freud, "Why War?", 214; quoted in Waltz, *Man, the State, and War,* 187.
81. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," 27.
82. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War,* 41.
83. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 68–69.
84. Ibid., 74.
85. Ibid., 74, 77.
86. Ibid., 76–77.
87. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 29.
88. Ibid., 10–11.
89. Mearsheimer, "Through the Realist Lens," 2.
90. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 18–22.
91. Ibid., 19.
92. Ibid., 21.
93. On Type A personalities, see Friedman and Rosenman, *Type A Behavior and Your Heart.*
94. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 53.
95. See Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias."
96. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy," 130.
97. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," 72; also Mearsheimer's "False Promise of International Institutions," 9n20, and *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 10, 17, 21.
98. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 29.
99. Ibid., 30.
100. Ibid., 32.
101. Ibid., 366.
102. Ibid., 365.
103. Ibid., 366; also Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future."
104. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 365.
105. Ibid., 31.
106. Ibid., 31, 46–48.
107. Ibid., 31.
108. Ibid., 30–31.
109. Ibid., 31.
110. Ibid., 29.
111. Ibid., 31.
112. Ibid., 31n8.
113. Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institutions," 20.
114. Quoted in Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 31n8.
115. Ibid., 31.
116. Ibid.
117. Mearsheimer, "Realist Reply," 91.
118. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 32.

119. Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism," 40.
120. Schweller, "Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," 347.
121. Markey, "Prestige and the Origins of War," 126.
122. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 69.
123. Ibid., 70.
124. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," 91.
125. Ibid., 115.
126. See, respectively, Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*; Kissinger, *World Restored*; Wolfers, "Balance of Power in Theory and Practice"; Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis.*
127. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," 107.
128. Ibid.
129. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics,* 30–31.
130. Ibid., 33.
131. Markey, "Prestige and the Origins of War," 128.
132. See Markey, "Prestige and the Origins of War"; Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy"; Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit"; Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*; Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks*; Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism"; Wohlforth, *Elusive Balance.*
133. Markey, "Prestige and the Origins of War," 157, 158, 161.
134. Ibid., 159, 166.
135. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," 107–08.
136. Ibid., 108n61.
137. See also Volkan, Julius, and Montville, eds., *Psychodynamics of International Relationships*; Volkan, Montville, and Julius, eds., *Psychodynamics of International Relationships*; Volkan, *Blind Trust.*
138. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," 108.
139. Waltz, "Interview," 386.

Chapter 4   Human Nature and the Political: Criticism and Countercriticism

1. Perhaps surprisingly, relatively few books are devoted explicitly to the concept of human nature in matters political, but very useful are Berry, *Human Nature*; Budziszewski, *Resurrection of Nature*; Davies, *Human Nature in Politics*; Forbes and Smith, eds., *Politics and Human*; Pennock and Chapman, eds., *Human Nature in Politics*; Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics.*
2. The vices and virtues of the concept of human nature concerns all political theory, be it domestic or international. To avoid repeating the inclusive yet inconvenient term "(international-)political theory," I will now refer only to "political theory" that includes theorizing the international-political.
3. See Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men," part I.
4. "Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung" (Scientific World-Conception)," 317.
5. Ibid., 308.

6. Feigl, "Wiener Kreis in America," 57.
7. Smith, "War and Human Nature," 167.
8. Burchill, "Realism and Neo-Realism," 82.
9. See Thayer, *Darwin and International Relations*; Rosen, *War and Human Nature.*
10. Christiano and Christman, "Introduction," 3–5.
11. Cohen, *Rescuing Justice and Equality,* 229.
12. Hurka, *Perfectionism,* 3.
13. Habermas, *Future of Human Nature,* 2.
14. See Wall, "Perfectionism in Politics."
15. Rawls, *Political Liberalism,* 134–35; see also Gaus, "The Moral Foundation of Liberal Neutrality."
16. Pennock, "Introduction," 1.
17. Lyotard, *Postmodern Condition,* xxiv.
18. Wells and McFadden, "Introduction," 2.
19. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 153.
20. Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," 169–70.
21. Levitas, "Feminism and Human Nature," 116–17.
22. See, for example, Tickner and Sjoberg, "Feminism."
23. Wells and McFadden, "Introduction," 2.
24. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," 100.
25. Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy,* 160.
26. Ferguson, *Essay on the History of Civil Society,* 199.
27. See Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness,* 83–222.
28. Horkheimer, "Bemerkungen zur Philosophischen Anthropologie" (Notes on Philosophical Anthropology), 275 (my translation).
29. Ibid.
30. Habermas, "Philosophische Anthropologie" (Philosophical Anthropology), 108 (my translation).
31. Ibid., 110.
32. Berry, *Human Nature*, 122; see Heidegger, *Being and Time*; Arendt, *Human Condition.*
33. Sartre, "Existentialism Is a Humanism," 349.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., 353.
36. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature,* 43.
37. Kersting, "Kant's Concept of the State," 144.
38. See Pinker, *Blank Slate.*
39. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 4.
40. Watson, *Behaviorism,* 82.
41. Wells and McFadden, "Introduction," 15.
42. Pennock, "Introduction," 8.
43. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 19n32.
44. Corning, "Human Nature Redivivus," 20.
45. Keene, *International Political Thought,* 138, 134–59.
46. On Hume's political realism, see Lang, "Every Man Supposed a Knave."

47. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature* and *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.* See also Biro, "Hume's New Science of the Mind."

48. Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future,* §54.

49. Ibid., §55.

50. Strauss, "Three Waves of Modernity," 92.

51. Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals,* II: xx.

52. See Kant's anthropology lectures in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.*

53. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," IV: 44, IV: 46.

54. See Pompa, *Human Nature and Historical Knowledge,* 67–132.

55. Hobbes, *De Homine.*

56. Hobbes, *Leviathan,* xlvi: 458.

57. Ibid., Introduction: 10.

58. See Chapman, "Toward a General Theory of Human Nature and Dynamics," 295–97; Duncan, "Political Theory and Human Nature," 6; Gaus, *Political Concepts and Political Theories,* 60–66.

59. Parekh, "Is There a Human Nature?", 15.

60. Searle, *Speech Acts,* 132, 132–36. See also Rand, *Virtue of Selfishness*; Anderson, "Note on Searle's Naturalistic Fallacy Fallacy"; Kolnai, "Ghost of the Naturalistic Fallacy."

61. Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* 64.

62. Hume, *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary,* 42.

63. See Sturgeon, "Moral Skepticism and Moral Naturalism in Hume's Treatise."

64. Kelsen, *Pure Theory of Law*; Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State*; see also Klug, "Die Reine Rechtslehre von Hans Kelsen und die formallogische Rechtfertigung der Kritik an dem Pseudoschluss vom Sein auf das Sollen."

65. Kelsen, "Pure Theory of Law," 477.

66. Kelsen, *Pure Theory of Law,* 1.

67. Kelsen, "Function of a Constitution," 111.

68. Kelsen, "Foundations of Democracy"; Kelsen, ed., *What Is Justice?*; Kelsen, *Verteidigung der Demokratie (In Defense of Democracy);* see also Dreier, *Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen.*

69. See Bull, "Hans Kelsen and International Law."

70. Van Ooyen, *Staat der Moderne (Modern State)*, §4.

71. See Kelsen, *Sozialismus und Staat (Socialism and the State)* and "Die Politische Theorie des Sozialismus" (Political Theory of Socialism).

72. On Rousseau's (peculiar) realism, see Hoffmann and Fidler, eds., *Rousseau on International Relations*; Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace,* 137–60; Williams, *Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations,* 52–81.

73. Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men," Exordium: 132.

74. Ibid., part I: 151 and Rousseau's Notes: xv, respectively.

75. Ibid., part I.

76. Rousseau, *Confessions,* bk. viii: 280.

77. Marx, "German Ideology," 113.

78. Ibid., 112.

79. Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," 36–37.

80. Forbes, "Marx and Human Nature," 25.

81. Geras, *Marx and Human Nature,* 83; on Marxian Man, see also Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*; Sayers, *Marxism and Human Nature*; Sève, *Man in Marxist Theory and the Psychology of Personality.*

82. Masters, "Human Nature, Nature, and Political Thought," 91 (italics added).

83. Jay, *Dialectical Imagination,* 100.

84. Quoted in ibid., 102.

85. Ibid., 86–112; Elliott, *Social Theory since Freud,* 28–36; Geoghegan, "Critical Theory and Human Nature"; Stirk, *Critical Theory, Politics and Society,* 76–92; Wiggershaus, *Frankfurt School,* 265–73.

86. Arato and Gebhardt, eds., *Essential Frankfurt School Reader,* 388–89.

87. See Wiggershaus, *Frankfurt School,* 265–73.

88. See Rose, "Sartre and the Problem of Universal Human Nature Revisited"; Stevenson and Haberman, *Ten Theories of Human Nature,* 192–95.

89. Berry, *Human Nature,* 131, 122–131.

90. See Cahill, "Natural Law"; Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*; Levitas, "Feminism and Human Nature."

91. Rorty, "Phoney Science Wars."

92. Pinker, *Blank Slate,* viii–ix.

93. See Berry, *Human Nature*; Coward, *Perfectibility of Human Nature in Eastern and Western Thought*; Cumming, *Human Nature and History*; Davies, *Human Nature in Politics*; Forbes and Smith, eds., *Politics and Human Nature*; Fukuyama, *End of History and the Last Man,* 63; Gaus, *Political Concepts and Political Theories,* 60–66; Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 3–4; Pennock and Chapman, eds., Human Nature in Politics; Sayers, *Marxism and Human Nature*; Strauss and Cropsey, eds., *History of Political Philosophy*; Wight, *International Theory,* 25–29.

94. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War,* iii.81.82–85 and iv.47.83–84.

95. Bolotin, "Thucydides," 17. On Thucydides' Man, see Ahrensdorf, "Fear of Death and the Longing for Immortality"; Pouncey, *Necessities of War,* chap. 9; Reeve, "Thucydides on Human Nature."

96. See Dyson, *Natural Law and Political Realism,* 146–47.

97. Niebuhr, *Christian Realism,* 120.

98. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. 1: Human Nature,* 165.

99. Quoted in Stevenson, Jr., "What's 'Realistic'?", 64.

100. Loriaux, "Realists and Saint Augustine," 404. On Augustinian Man, see also Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. 1: Human Nature*; O'Connell, *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man*; Stevenson, "What's 'Realistic'?", 62–65.

101. Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man,* 40, 40–46.

102. Fischer, "Machiavelli's Theory of Foreign Politics," 253.

103. Ibid., 254.

104. Dyson, *Natural Law and Political Realism,* 253; on Machiavellian Man, see also Berridge, "Machiavelli"; Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations,* 93–95; Nederman, "Machiavelli and Moral Character."

105. On Hobbesian Man, see Ahrensdorf, "Fear of Death and the Longing for Immortality"; Gert, "Hobbes's Psychology"; Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man,* 46–57.

106. Rosen, "Benedict Spinoza," 464; on Spinoza's Man, see also Waltz, *Man, the State, and War,* 21–24; Wartofsky, "Action and Passion."

107. Gaus, *Political Concepts and Political Theories,* 65–66. On Burke's Man, see Stanlis, *Edmund Burke and the Natural Law,* 160–94.

108. Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men," 131.

109. See Freeman, "Constructivism, Facts, and Moral Justification."

110. Rawls, *Law of Peoples,* 7.

111. Rawls, *Theory of Justice,* §§ 3,4,25.

112. Rawls, *Political Liberalism,* 18n20.

113. Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism and Moral Theory," 534.

Chapter 5   Human Nature, the Political, and the Virtues of Freudian Man

1. Williams, *Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations,* 1.

2. One of these "battles" is fought in Mearsheimer, "E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On."

3. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 15, and Mearsheimer, "Conversations in International Relations," 109, respectively. See also Booth, ed., *Realism and World Politics* and the two-part special issue on Waltz's thought edited by Booth, "The King of Thought: Theory, the Subject, and Waltz."

4. Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism," 267.

5. Lebow, "Classical Realism," 53.

6. Buzan, Jones, and Little, *Logic of Anarchy,* 6.

7. Sullivan, "That Dog Won't Hunt."

8. Fischer, "Machiavelli's Theory of Foreign Politics."

9. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 91.

10. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics," 339; Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory."

11. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War."

12. On the human-nature foundations of economic theory, see Sen, "Rational Fools"; Nitsch, "Further Reflections on Human-Nature Assumptions in Economics (Part I)"; Nitsch, "Further Reflections on Human-Nature Assumptions in Economics (Part II)."

13. Fischer, "Machiavelli's Theory of Foreign Politics," 273.

14. Ibid.

15. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 51.
16. Ibid., 90.
17. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," 72.
18. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 92. See, respectively, Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," 304–05; Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics," 338–39; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 93–95.
19. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism," 92.
20. Ibid. For his own attempt, see Tellis, *Drive to Domination.*
21. Fischer, "Machiavelli's Theory of Foreign Politics," 273–74.
22. Term taken from Tellis' *Drive to Domination* and "Reconstructing Political Realism."
23. Along similar lines, see Cashman, *What Causes War?,* 14–76; Suganami, *On the Causes of War,* 17–22. On the political psychology of international relations, see Levy, "Political Psychology and Foreign Policy."
24. See Volkan's *Blind Trust* and his *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies*; Volkan, Julius, and Montville, eds., *Psychodynamics of International Relationships*; Volkan, Montville, and Julius, eds., *Psychodynamics of International Relationships*.
25. Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism."
26. Donnelly, "Twentieth-Century Realism"; Forde, "Classical Realism."
27. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics.*
28. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace.*
29. Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations.*
30. Spirtas, "House Divided."
31. Buzan, Jones, and Little, *Logic of Anarchy.*
32. Williams, *Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations.*
33. Lieven and Hulsman, *Ethical Realism.*
34. Spegele, *Political Realism in International Theory.*
35. Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice"; on what is now called emancipatory realism, see Booth, *Theory of World Security,* 90–91.
36. Steele, "Eavesdropping on Honored Ghosts."
37. Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations.*
38. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists."
39. Rosecrance, "Has Realism Become Cost-Benefit Analysis?".
40. Snyder, *Myths of Empire,* 11–12.
41. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy"; Schweller, "Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism."
42. Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case."
43. Schweller, "Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," 315.
44. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World," 173.
45. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger,* 226.
46. Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," ix.
47. Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist," 6.
48. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," 7.

49. Lynn-Jones and Miller, "Preface," ix.
50. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 3–4.
51. Walt, "International Relations," 31.
52. Scruton, *Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought*, 733.
53. See Baylis and Smith, eds., *Globalization of World Politics*; Booth and Smith, eds., *International Relations Theory Today*; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*; Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, eds., *International Relations Theory*; Smith, Booth, and Zalewski, eds., *International Theory*; Sterling-Folker, ed., *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*; Walt, "International Relations"; Wright, *Study of International Relations.*
54. Brown, *Understanding International Relations,* 1.
55. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 5.
56. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," 72.
57. Little, "Balance of Power in Politics among Nations," 137; see also Little, *Balance of Power in International Relations,* chap. 4.
58. Morgenthau, "Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations," 16.
59. Weber, "Profession and Vocation of Politics," 311.
60. Morgenthau, "Freud-Script," 1.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 2.
63. Ibid., 4.
64. Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*; Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism."
65. Morgenthau, "Freud-Script," 4.
66. See Gilpin's "Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism" (304–05) as the basis for my following discussion of realism's building blocks.
67. See Morgenthau's "Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil"; *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*; *Politics among Nations*; "Human Rights and Foreign Policy" and Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society.* See also Lebow, *Tragic Vision of Politics*; Lieber, ed., *War, Peace and International Political Realism*; Molloy, "Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil"; Molloy, *Hidden History of Realism*; Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists*; Russell, *Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft*; Russell, "Morgenthau's Political Realism and the Ethics of Evil"; Scheuerman, *Morgenthau*; Williams, *Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations.*
68. Buzan, "Timeless Wisdom of Realism?", 62.
69. See Morgenthau's "Letter to Hans Kelsen (October 4, 1971)."
70. Behr and Heath, "Misreading in IR Theory and Ideology Critique"; Cozette, "Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism"; Payne, "Neorealists as Critical Theorists."
71. Gelb, "Realist Rally"; Heilbrunn, "Republican Reckoning"; Muravchik and Walt, "The Neocons vs. The Realists"; Schmidt and Williams, "Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War."
72. On some sort of left/critical realism, see Scheuerman, "Theoretical Missed Opportunity?"; Osborn, "Noam Chomsky and the Realist Tradition."

73. The following quotations are from Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* 69–71.
74. See LeBon, *Crowd*; Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*; McDougall, *Group Mind*. For example, Waltz explicitly draws from LeBon's concept of the group mind (see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 75).
75. Freud, *Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* 69–71.
76. Birnbach, *Neo-Freudian Social Philosophy,* 27.
77. Rieff, *Freud,* 231.
78. Freud, *Postscript to an Autobiographical Study*, 72.
79. Freud, "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning", 219.
80. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 76.
81. Ibid., 77.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Part 3),* 312.
86. Freud, *Future of an Illusion,* 15.
87. Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Xiii: 89.
88. Freud, "Why War?", 204.
89. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 111.
90. Hobbes, *Leviathan,* xiii: 87.
91. Freud, *Moses and Monotheism,* 82.
92. Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents* and "Why War?".
93. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 92–94.
94. Along this non-Hobbesian interpretation, see Drassinower, *Freud's Theory of Culture*; Rieff, *Freud*; Wallwork, *Psychoanalysis and Ethics.*
95. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 112.
96. Ibid., 82.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., 99.
99. Ibid., 122.
100. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* 143.
101. Quoted in Ibid., 101n1. For the original, see Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena,* 651–52.
102. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* 101.
103. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 122.
104. Ibid., 121.
105. Ibid., 97.
106. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* 105.
107. Ibid., 116.
108. Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents,* 114.
109. Following Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 11.
110. On the hermeneutical problem of reading Freud, see Wallwork, *Psychoanalysis and Ethics,* 19–48.

111. On this dissolution, see Zaretsky, *Secrets of the Soul,* 332–44.
112. On Freud criticism, see Cioffi, *Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience*; Grünbaum, *Foundations of Psychoanalysis*; Gomez, *Freud Wars*; Levy, *Freud among the Philosophers.*
113. See, for example, Mitchell, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism.*
114. For more or less Freud-friendly arguments, see Horrocks, *Freud Revisited*; Levy, *Freud among the Philosophers*; Merlino, Jacobs, Kaplan, and Moritz, eds., *Freud at 150*; Mitchel, *Psychoanalysis and Feminism*; Kramer, *Freud*; Pribram, "Freud through the Centuries"; Rudnytsky, "Inventing Freud."
115. Kazin, "Freudian Revolution Analyzed," 21.
116. See Freud, " 'Wild' Psycho-Analysis."
117. Kandel, "Biology and the Future of Psychoanalysis," 505; for Kandel's thoughts on Freud, see his *In Search of Memory.*
118. Rorty, "A Good Use of Philosophical Pleasures," 3.
119. Quoted in Gilpin, "Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," 304.
120. Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill*, 82.
121. Lippmann, *Phantom Public,* 29.
122. Carr, "Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace," 854.
123. Niebuhr, *Irony of American History,* 169.
124. See Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists*; Ish-Shalom, "The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and Conservatism."
125. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 547.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid., 548.
128. Ibid., 142.
129. Quoted in Roazen, *Freud,* 245.
130. Ulman and Abse, "Group Psychology of Mass Madness," 650.
131. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* 70.
132. Ibid., 101.
133. Jones, *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work*; *The Last Phase, 1919–1939,* 362.
134. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* 123.
135. Freud, "Why War?", 213.
136. Freud, *Future of an Illusion,* 7–8.
137. Freud and Bullitt, *Thomas Woodrow Wilson*, xii.
138. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* 123.
139. Brunner, *Freud and the Politics of Psychoanalysis,* 168.
140. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," 1.
141. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* x.
142. See Bell, ed., *Political Thought and International Relations*; Lebow, *Tragic Vision of Politics*; Molloy, "Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil"; Murray, *Reconstructing Realism*; Rosenthal, *Righteous Realists*; Russell, *Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft*; Russell, "Morgenthau's Political Realism and the Ethics of Evil"; Wrightson, "Morality, Realism, and Foreign Affairs."

143. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest,* 242.
144. See Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger*; Williams, *Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations.*
145. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 323.
146. Schmidt and Williams, "Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War."
147. Kagan, *Return of History and the End of Dreams.*
148. Fukuyama, *End of History and the Last Man.*
149. Rawls, *Law of Peoples.*
150. See, for example, the *New York Times* ad signed by many leading realists ("War with Iraq Is Not in America's National Interest," *New York Times,* September 26, 2002) as well as Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War."
151. Clinton, "Relevance of Realism in the Post–Cold War World," 252.
152. Freud, "Resistances to Psycho-Analysis," 219.
153. Freud, *Ego and the Id,* 37.
154. See Freud, *Future of an Illusion.*
155. Quoted in Roazen, *Freud,* 126.
156. Freud, *Future of an Illusion,* 42.
157. Ibid.
158. Wallwork, *Psychoanalysis and Ethics,* 122; on Freud's moral psychology, see also Deigh, *Sources of Moral Agency.*
159. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War,* 19.
160. See Saint-Pierre, *Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe*; Kant, "Perpetual Peace"; Rawls, *Law of Peoples.*
161. Clinton, "Relevance of Realism," 252.
162. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* 3.
163. Weber, "Profession and Vocation of Politics," 369.
164. Freud, "Two Encyclopedia Articles," 236.
165. Freud, "The 'Uncanny,'" 236.
166. See Wallwork, *Psychoanalysis and Ethics,* 49–100.
167. Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis,* 80.
168. Nicholson, "Psychoanalysis and Human Nature," 113.
169. Freud, *Outline of Psycho-Analysis,* 146.
170. Freud, "Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis," 142.
171. Wallwork, *Psychoanalysis and Ethics,* 88–89.
172. Freud, "Why War?", 212–13.
173. Ashley, "Poverty of Neorealism," 289.
174. Gilpin, "Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," 321.
175. Freud, *Future of an Illusion,* 53.

Chapter 6 Resurrecting the Realist Man, Freud, and Human Nature

1. Quoted in Herz, "Letter to the Morgenthau Conference," 25.
2. See Morgenthau's 1930 "Freud-Script" and Morgenthau's and Person's 1978 "The Roots of Narcissism."

3. See, for example, the critical contributions scattered in Booth and Smith, eds., *International Relations Theory Today*; Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, eds., *International Relations Theory*; Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*; Smith, Booth, and Zalewski, eds., *International Theory.*

4. Waltz, "Interview with Ken Waltz," 386; Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 18.

5. That Waltz's account of human nature is perhaps broadly in line with contemporary evolutionary psychology has been argued recently by Brown, "Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature."

6. Gay, *Freud,* xvi.

7. A recent exception is, for instance, Gammon, "Affect and the Rise of the Self-Regulating Market."

8. Along these lines, see Walt, "Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations."

9. See Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man.*

10. See Bell, "Beware of False Prophets"; Goldstein, "Emperor's New Genes." For a recent statement on the evolutionary theory of war, see Gat, "So Why Do People Fight?"

11. See Elshtain, "Never Reaching the Coast of Utopia"; Elshtain, *Sovereignty*; Elshtain, "Woman, the State, and War"; Loriaux, "Realists and Saint Augustine"; Patterson, *Christianity and Power Politics Today*; Stevenson, Jr., "What's 'Realistic'?".

12. See Lebow, *Cultural Theory of International Relations.* On Lebow's work, see Little, "Still on the Long Road to Theory."

13. See Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man*, 162–68.

14. See Brown, "Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature"; Crawford, "Human Nature and World Politics"; Freyberg-Inan, "Rational Paranoia and Enlightened Machismo"; Hall, "Human Nature as Behaviour and Action in Economics and International Relations Theory"; Mercer, "Human Nature and the First Image"; Sterling-Folker, "Lamarckian with a Vengeance."

15. Budziszewski, *Resurrection of Nature,* 18.

16. Kelsen, "What Is Justice?", 23–24.

17. Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics,* 38.

18. Butterfield, *Christianity and History,* 46.

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