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Introduction

Muslim Americans and the Post-9/11 Security Environment

One afternoon in the Queens neighborhood where he grew up, Jawad Rasul, a film major at City College of New York, picked up a fellow student on his way to a whitewater rafting trip. They were meeting with several other Muslim Student Association (MSA) members on one of their regular outdoor excursions. Unbeknownst to Jawad at the time, the fellow student he picked up was actually an undercover New York Police Department (NYPD) agent. The agent had followed the group on several trips before, carefully recording their activities. These were not the only students being watched. Adeela Khan, a student 300 miles away at the University at Buffalo, ended up under NYPD surveillance after forwarding an email announcing an upcoming Islamic conference in Toronto to a group of friends at her school. This simple act landed Adeela on a secret document for NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly.

Why did the NYPD find these students threatening enough to commit such resources to track their activity? Adeela and Jawad were among thousands of Muslim Americans that were under surveillance by a secret NYPD program from 2007 to 2014. The program monitored Muslim neighborhoods, mosques, businesses, and student activity groups across the Northeast, with dozens being infiltrated by undercover officers and hired informants. They were monitored not because of crimes they had committed, or for having close associates involved in illegal activity. Simply put, they were deemed potential threats because they were Muslim. Though Mayor Michael Bloomberg defended the NYPDвЂ™s actions as necessary preventative measures, the NYPD acknowledged in 2013 that since its inception, the program did not produce a single lead or terrorism investigation (Apuzzo and Goldman 2013). The program was terminated in 2014.

Page 2 →After learning that she was the target of such surveillance from an *Associated Press* reporter, Adeela said she empathized with the NYPD trying to get ahead of future terrorist threats, though she classified the wide-reaching program as вЂњa waste of resourcesвЂќ (Hawley 2012). Jawad said that as an American citizen he was disheartened. вЂњWe are in America, not in Syria or Egypt. WeвЂ™re not supposed to expect these kinds of things.вЂќ He said he was willing to work with the NYPD to more genuinely engage Muslim youth because he believes such broad-brush surveillance tactics hurt the NYPDвЂ™s efforts to fight homegrown terrorism by creating animosity toward law enforcement agencies and вЂњdestroy[ing] the trust that youth might have developed with the governmentвЂќ (Rasul 2012). In other words, the tremendous amount of resources put toward tracking these Muslim American communities may have actually been counterproductive in making the country safer and eroded confidence in American institutions.

The Inadvertent Outcomes of Security Policies

Political and academic discourse in the West on national security and the fight against terrorism has focused largely on understanding and stopping extremistsвЂ”with a particular focus on Muslim extremistsвЂ”who have committed or may commit violent or criminal actions. What these discussions about U.S. national security largely miss is how some of the negative externalities of post-9/11 security policies impact the majority of nonviolent, noncriminal Muslim Americans, and can actually undermine the efficacy of counter violent extremism (CVE) and counterterrorism (CT) policies. Though most Americans likely understand that these policies cast a much wider net than the actual risk posed, some are willing, due to the gravity of the perceived threat, to justify any fallout, while others argue for more targeted approaches that limit negative repercussions. More precise policies, however, require a fuller and more nuanced understanding of the Muslim American population in all its diversity. In order to discern the full impact of CVE and CT policies, one must first examine both the premises and assumptions about Muslim Americans that underlie the policies on the one hand, and the actual circumstances, features, and attitudes of this diverse population in the United States on the other.

The goal of this book is to offer a better and more accurate picture of the Muslim population in AmericaвЂ”a set

of communities the government has tried to co-opt to help fight terrorismвЂ”in order to highlight the gap betweenPage 3 → the policy premises and the reality and to help bring them into alignment. Using nationwide survey and interview data about Muslims in America, this study brings new empirical evidence to bear on the key assumptions commonly discussed in popular discourse. It examines the makeup of the Muslim American population and looks at how the securitized post-9/11 environment is viewed by more- and less-integrated segments of this population. How have Muslim Americans responded to the threat of violent extremism in the United States? How have MuslimsвЂ™ perspectives and past experiences shaped their views toward the government and in particular law enforcement? What can patterns observed under the Bush and Obama administrations tell us about the potential outcomes of policies under President Trump and future administrations? The views of this population and the answers to these questions have implications for government policy toward, and the treatment of, immigrant and U.S.-born Muslims and for U.S. national security policy into the future.

The ratcheting up of security measures following the 9/11 attacks changed the way of life for all Americans, restricting some civil liberties in exchange for security. While Muslim communities faced various challenges in America long before 2001, the concentration on radical Islam in discussions of violent extremism since that time has particularly put Muslim Americans under intense scrutiny and suspicion. In the effort to identify the small number of would-be terrorists among the millions of individuals living in or traveling to the United States, some U.S. law enforcement strategies introduced under the Bush administration and many continued under the Obama administration led to extensive monitoring, indefinite detentions, and other actions that violated the constitutional rights of nonviolent, noncriminal Muslim citizens, often without probable cause for suspicion or material benefit to national security. Such scrutiny has only been exacerbated under President Trump, and a significant number of Americans do not oppose these changes. By the end of 2016, nearly half of all Americans believed that Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence (Pew 2016c). A similar percentage of people believe Muslim Americans are anti-American, and a third feel that Muslims should be subject to more scrutiny than people of other religions (Pew 2016b; Pew 2015b).

At the same time that many Muslims face such scrutiny, they are being asked to do more to help stop the threat. Government officials have asserted that Muslim Americans play an important role in keeping the country safe (Mueller 2009; Jensen 2006; Obama 2015), and at times have Page 4 →accused Muslim communities of not doing enough. Beyond reporting criminal activity, Muslims in America are being asked to identify friends and family members who could *possibly* become violent but have not yet committed a crime. Predicting acts of violence, a daunting and risk-filled task even for the most well-resourced law enforcement agency, is even more so for average people.

Despite the burdensome and complicated nature of taking such an active role in securing the country, Muslim Americans have indeed been helpful to law enforcement; some scholars have cited Muslims as one of the largest known sources of initial information leading to disrupted terrorism plots in the United States since 9/11 (Bergen et al. 2014; Kurzman 2014; New America 2017).

By analyzing Muslim AmericansвЂ™ relationship with American law enforcement and MuslimsвЂ™ reactions toward violent extremism and the governmentвЂ™s efforts to counter it, this study empirically demonstrates that Muslim Americans support law enforcementвЂ™s goal of keeping Americans safe. Some government efforts to counter violent extremism, however, inadvertently alienate otherwise well-integrated segments of the Muslim population from law enforcement. As the study documents, laws and policies meant to enhance homeland security lead some Muslim Americans to adopt a more distrustful lens toward U.S. law enforcement efforts. Concerned about unlawful activity by security officials toward fellow Muslims, the countryвЂ™s most integrated MuslimsвЂ”second- and third-generation Muslims[1]вЂ”are more hesitant to engage in CT and CVE investigations despite their objections to violence.

This introduction sets the stage for the book by looking into some of the post-9/11 policies that placed large swaths of American Muslims under intense scrutiny, at times with little demonstrative benefit to national security. A chapter outline is then followed by a description of the methods and data used in this study. The findings are based on a nationwide survey of Muslims living in the United States, supported by in-depth interviews with

Muslims across the country. The chapter concludes with a brief portrait of the Muslim American population, highlighting its heterogeneity and diversity.

A Different Reality for Muslim Americans

During the 2016 U.S. presidential race, Donald Trump, on his campaign website and in several media appearances, called for вЂњa total and complete Page 5 →shutdown of Muslims entering the United StatesвЂќ (Trump 2015). In an apparent attempt to keep his promise of a вЂњMuslim ban,вЂќ within his first ten days in office President Trump signed an executive order indefinitely suspending the resettlement of Syrian refugees and temporarily preventing people from seven predominantly Muslim nations from entering the United States.

Such high-profile rhetoric and actionsвЂ”by casting suspicion on members of Muslim American communities and characterizing them as inherently вЂњun-AmericanвЂќ and violentвЂ”can foster anti-Islam sentiment more broadly (Das et al. 2009; Jamal 2008; Huddy et al. 2005; Sirin and Fine 2007). Indeed, in the campaign year leading up to the election, the country witnessed its highest levels of hate crimes against Muslims since 2001 (FBI 2015, 2016a), culminating in a spike of anti-Muslim incidents in November 2016 (SPLC 2016). Heightened anti-Muslim sentiment can work against government efforts to secure the country, such as in the Department of Homeland SecurityвЂ™s вЂњSee Something, Say SomethingвЂќ campaign introduced in 2010, which appeals to the public to be extra vigilant about possible terrorist plans and threats. A flood of tips based on stereotyping and anti-Muslim sentiment threatens to obscure truly valuable information and keep law enforcement busy tracking down false leads. Kurzman (2017) finds that very fewвЂ”less than 5 percentвЂ”of the FBIвЂ™s investigations into Muslim American links to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have resulted in indictments. WhatвЂ™s more, as the findings of this book confirm, in such environments where citizens are fearful of unfair treatment or being wrongly associated with criminal activity, they may hesitate to approach law enforcement or government officials with potentially helpful information.

Though Muslim Americans have been experiencing various forms of scrutiny since long before 2001,[2] the surprise attacks of September 11, 2001, which brought unprecedented changes in AmericaвЂ™s security apparatus, caused a key shift in how the U.S. government interacted with Muslim Americans. Several high-level policymakers recall the days following the attacks as a time of overwhelming preoccupation with trying to avoid another attack by a little-known foreign enemy, Al-Qaeda. Leaders did not know where the next attack might be coming from, and without the security institutions in place to deal with this new kind of threat, ad hoc arrangements filled the void.[3] As noted above, as government officials aimed to secure the country in the years following, Muslim Americans witnessed a series of pre-emptive security policies that inadvertently placed large swaths of noncriminal and nonviolent Muslims under government scrutinyPage 6 → due to their religious orientation. Though President Bush made concerted efforts to disassociate Islam with terrorism in public statements, some security programs that treated law-abiding Muslims as potential criminals have been criticized as an unfair overstep by the government and have spawned distrust among Muslim communities toward law enforcement.

In the days after the devastating attacks, as a safety precaution, the United States closed its borders completely and used federal immigration laws to detain thousands of вЂњspecial interestвЂќ immigrants from Muslim-majority countries until they were determined to have no links to or knowledge of terrorism. This вЂњhold until clearedвЂќ policy turned on its head the presumption of innocence. Hundreds were held without being charged within the prescribed window, without access to lawyers or the justice system, and often without being told why they were being detained. Their families were not informed of the charges and there were reports of physical and verbal abuse against some detainees (Office of the Inspector General 2003).

The Patriot Act amended more than 15 federal statutes, expanding surveillance laws permitting the government to spy on Americans to an unprecedented degree while diminishing checks and balances meant to prevent abuse of the system.[4] Numerous privacy and civil rights organizations have extensively critiqued the Patriot ActвЂ™s most troublesome provisions, including the expanded definition of вЂњmaterial supportвЂќ to terrorism.[5] The Patriot Act enabled a series of policies and programs, including the National Security Entry-Exit Registration

System (NSEERS) Special Registration Program, which scholars believe disproportionately affected Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim (Jamal 2008; Cainkar 2009; Zaman, Maznavi, and Samur 2011; Akbar and Narula 2011).

NSEERS operated as a tracking program that required nonimmigrant males arriving from 25 countriesвЂ”nearly all Muslim-majority countriesвЂ”to register annually with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Both entry into the country and activity while in the United States were monitored. The number of individuals who participated in the program or were removed on the grounds of participation in terrorism-related activities is unknown because information has not been made publicly available. A report from Penn StateвЂ™s Dickinson School of Law, however, presents evidence that of the 85,000 individuals who complied with the program, no terrorist suspects were convicted (Wadhia and Shora 2009). The *New York Times* reported in 2003 that only 11 individuals who Page 7 →complied with the program were found to have any ties to terrorist organizations (Swarns 2003).

Government scrutiny of Muslims is not limited to federal law enforcement. In a case that surfaced well after the 9/11 attacks, in 2007 the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), after an outcry from concerned community and civil liberties groups, scrapped a controversial plan to map its local Muslim population. In 2011 it was revealed that the NYPD, in an unprecedented collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency, had gone forward with building a similar secret human-mapping program, the same program mentioned above that implicated Jawad and Adeela.

The Obama administration, publicly distancing itself from the Bush administrationвЂ™s вЂњGlobal War on Terror,вЂќ oversaw a shift toward what was termed вЂњCountering Violent ExtremismвЂќ to emphasize the need to challenge the underlying ideologies and narratives that motivate recruits to join violent extremist organizations. These measures, however, have been criticized by some academics and practitioners for their reliance on controversial theories of radicalization that stigmatize Muslims by equating religious and political activity, which is constitutionally protected, with the propensity to commit violence.[6] Critics argued that while the Obama administration took care to avoid focusing explicitly and exclusively on Islamist extremists, President ObamaвЂ™s policies were largely a continuation of those under the Bush administration, and a number of the new CVE programs were speculated to single out Muslim youth for increased surveillance under the guise of community outreach. While these and similar policies were put in place in an attempt to protect the United States from threats of terrorism, few studies seek to assess, as this one does, the potential consequences of such broad-brush tactics, both on American security and on the often-stereotyped Muslim citizens they implicate.

Outline of the Book

Public discussions about fears of terrorism and the increased scrutiny faced by Muslim Americans often point to perceived fundamental differences between Muslims and other Americans and their lack of integration into the mainstream society. Although the connection between terrorism and integration is contested empirically,[7] Muslims have been accused of failing to integrate into Western societies, with the idea that such isolation can foster support for violent extremism.

Page 8 →The first two chapters in this book address the notions upon which some of the ideas about the inverse connection between integration and violent extremism are based: that Muslims are more likely than other immigrant groups to support violence and that Muslim Americans are failing or, worse, *refusing* to integrate into American society. Chapter 1 examines whether MuslimsвЂ™ tolerance toward violent political groups differs from other Americans and how these views vary within different segments of the community. The data suggest that, contrary to the beliefs of much of the American public, Muslims and Christians reject at the same rate the idea of resorting to violence for a political cause. The chapter also assesses available data on MuslimsвЂ™ views and involvement in violent extremism and CVE efforts in the United States and shows data demonstrating that Muslim Americans have played a significant role in helping law enforcement disrupt terror plots and have played an active role speaking out against such acts. Interviewees share their views on those who do choose to engage in violence, and they discuss the pressure they constantly face to explain that most Muslims share other

AmericansвЂ™ fear and contempt of violent extremism.

Chapter 2 then takes a look at observable data to gauge how well various segments of the Muslim population are integrating into the United States across a variety of dimensions: economic, social, civic, cultural, and psychological. The data reveal that Muslims reflect their non-Muslim counterparts across these measures, with a diversity of experiences across various segments of the population. Challenging public beliefs that Muslims are anti-American, the findings of the chapter reveal that Muslims express high levels of attachment to their American identity, a sentiment that grows across generations and matches that of native-born non-Muslims. Muslim economic performance mirrors that of the larger American population, as does their engagement with other Americans through interfaith friendships, marriages, and other institutions. Muslim American communities continue to debate the role of women in the home and in the mosque, with more progressive voices challenging traditional expectations. As with other American faith communities, the level of Muslim American involvement in religious practices and services varies widely from secular to extremely pious. Taken together, U.S.-born Muslims are largely indistinguishable from their non-Muslim counterparts, despite popular assertions to the contrary.

Chapter 3 delves into the personal stories of Muslims in America and their post-9/11 experiences. The themes uncovered through interviews Page 9 →suggest that MuslimsвЂ™ socialization experiences in their countries of originвЂ”whether that country be the United States or another country abroadвЂ”shape how they are affected by and respond to the post-9/11 security environment. The chapter takes a close look at the differing perspectives of native versus foreign-born Muslims and how the values, norms, and laws under which they were raised shape how they interpret the intentions of U.S. government security measures and their sense of identity with the broader Muslim American community. Interviewees suggest that U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ greater level of sensitivity and attachment to the broader Muslim American community is *because of* their greater integration into American society. With more experience and knowledge of the American system, Muslims, like other Americans, hold higher expectations of the American government and American values of fairness, equality, and good governance. Moreover, with greater investment in U.S. politics and the American Muslim community, later-generation Muslims are better able to recognize when the government is treating Muslim citizens less well compared to other Americans. Such perceptions of mistreatment further heighten the salience of a Muslim American identity.

Chapters 4 and 5 more systematically assess how the post-9/11 scrutiny has affected MuslimsвЂ™ relationship with U.S. law enforcement. Chapter 4 examines how Muslim AmericansвЂ™ expectations of fair police treatment change based on whether the suspect is a Muslim or not. It explores the reasons for the variance in MuslimsвЂ™ levels of trust in the police and attitudes toward government, including the effect of immigrantsвЂ™ experiences with law enforcement in their country of origin. The data suggest that U.S.-born Muslims have internalized negative beliefs of government behavior toward Muslims and are more likely to anticipate that police behavior toward Muslims will be discriminatory. Foreign-born Muslims do not necessarily believe that the police treat Muslims differently than non-Muslims, and instead base their judgments of American law enforcement on their experiences in their country of origin. Specifically, immigrant Muslims whose home countries had corrupt institutions expect similar bad behavior from American police forces.

Chapter 6 discusses how these judgments of law enforcementвЂ”as well as recent events deterring Muslims from interacting with policeвЂ”in turn affect MuslimsвЂ™ comfort levels and inclinations to approach law enforcement with information on a criminal suspect or even a hate crime against their community. Even while Muslims actively support the fight against terrorism and have a track record of assisting authorities in investigations, Page 10 →our interviews also revealed hesitation among immigrant Muslims to engage with law enforcement due to past policies that have broadly implicated noncriminal immigrants. Weighing the personal risk to themselves and families, as discussed above, many Muslims avoid law enforcement to avoid being wrongly accused or associated with criminal activity. U.S.-born Muslims hesitate to engage with the police when they believe the investigation will not be legitimate and that the suspect will not be treated fairly.

These findings suggest that the large majority of the Muslim American population is no different than other segments of the American population, eager to assist the government when they believe that government representatives will uphold citizensвЂ™ rights and not discriminate against them.

Contributions of the Book

Given all the attention, from academics and policymakers alike, to fears of violent extremism and reactions to the growing Muslim populations in the United States and Europe, it is surprising that so few studies have assessed the effects of the post-9/11 security environment on various segments of this population or have looked, in turn, at the impact of these effects on the efficacy of the very policies that created them. This study demonstrates how policy changes toward Muslims have shaped not only their views of the U.S. government as a whole, as discussed above, but how they see themselves in relation to the broader American society. By offering a rare assessment of Muslim American attitudes toward post-9/11 security changes, this book adds to our understanding of the unintended consequences of new security policies and the effectiveness of various CVE efforts involving Muslim community assistance. As noted above, the study finds that Muslims who understand their legal protections the best are among the most offended and concerned by policies that appear to violate concepts of equal treatment under the law, and their trust in AmericaвЂ™s police and criminal justice system is eroded. Such sweeping policies thus impede the success of programs that rely on ever-important Muslim American community assistance.

The book also offers a number of contributions to the current literature on immigration, integration, and identity. It places the Muslim American experience in an analytical framework that relates the formation of Muslim American attitudes and identity to that of other ethnic and racial Page 11 → groups in American society. Similar to those of African Americans and other racial minority groups, experiences of discrimination based on oneвЂ™s Muslim identity creates a sense of commonality and closeness among individuals who otherwise might have relatively little in common in terms of cultural or socioeconomic background, and even religious belief. This heightened sense of identification with other Muslim Americans has created greater incentive for political mobilization on behalf of issues of common concern to Muslim communities.

Furthermore, the data presented here goes beyond most previous research on Muslim Americans, which tends to focus primarily on Arab Muslims, who make up only a quarter of the total Muslim American population (Pew 2011). Highlighting the vast diversity of the American Muslim population, this study includes perspectives from Muslims across the varying ethnic and national communities, from African Americans to those of Pakistani, Iranian, or Eastern European descent. African American Muslims, in particular, are an understudied population with a complicated history; this book offers a rare and nuanced picture of the various communities that make up this group, how they relate to other American Muslim communities, and how they fit into national security policy calculations.

This study also looks across at least three generations of Muslim Americans by including Muslim immigrants, their children, and grandchildren. This allows us to assess how these segments of the Muslim American population respond differently to U.S. security policy changes and events in the years since the terrorist incidents of 9/11.

The findings help us to understand more broadly how immigrantsвЂ™ experiences in their country of origin shape how they view and relate to the U.S. government, as noted above, as well as to other Muslim Americans. The data allow for an assessment of how immigrantsвЂ™ attitudes toward the government vary across generations. As discussed above, immigrants differ from Muslims born and raised in the United States in terms of how fairly they expect the government to behave toward criminal suspects, with later-generation Muslims perceiving greater amounts of discrimination.

In a departure from most other studies in this realm, which focus on the Muslim American population in isolation to others, this book compares Muslim American beliefs and behaviors to other segments of American society. Without such comparisons, our understanding of how different (or similar) Muslims are to other Americans in terms of their attitudes toward American identity and values, national security and political violence remains open to interpretation and manipulation. Such comparisonsPage 12 → are particularly important at a time of heightened scrutiny toward Muslim Americans by the government and the American populace.

Finally, the findings of this study are based on a large sample of Muslim and non-Muslim Americans, drawn from across the United States. Most recent studies of Muslim Americans are based on small samples from limited

geographic regions, typically focused on a single ethnic group. Access to systematic, nationwide data allows us to see meaningful correlations that have previously been theorized but not tested. It also makes it possible to simultaneously examine how other featuresвЂ”such as time lived in the United States, generation, gender, and raceвЂ”can shape Muslim AmericansвЂ™ views of the post-9/11 environment.

Data Sources and Methods

One reason that few studies have systematically assessed the features and attitudes of Muslim Americans is that reliable data on Muslim Americans is so difficult to come by. This is because the U.S. Census does not solicit information on religious affiliation and the Muslim American community is believed to make up a relatively small percentage of the overall American population, about 1 percent (Mohamed 2016). As a result, most of what is known about the Muslim American community is based on small sample sizes in concentrated segments of the overall community.

Muslim American National Opinion Survey (MANOS)

This book provides what is arguably one of the most comprehensive pictures available of the Muslim American community by using data from an original and nationally representative survey, the Muslim American National Opinion Survey (MANOS). This survey was designed specifically for this study and was administered online by the international Internet-based market research firm, YouGov. YouGov administered the survey to individuals living around the United States from a sample of millions of Americans who had previously been surveyed and had identified themselves as Muslim.[8] The ability to survey those who had independently self-identified as Muslim was beneficial to this study, because MANOS participants did not know they were given the survey *because* of their religious affiliation. This limits the degree to which individuals may either refuse to engage in the survey due to suspicion or might respond to certain questions in a way that aims to provide a particular representation of Muslims. Page 13 → The bulk of the survey made no mention of Islam, and respondents were only asked about their religious beliefs at the end of the survey.

MANOS was fielded from February 2, 2013, through March 19, 2013. The dataset captures 501 self-identified Muslims living in 45 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia, including foreign-born respondents from 46 different nations. The survey included standard political questions as well as randomized survey experiments. Because there is no census data on the Muslim American population, for sample weighting YouGov relied on the American Social Survey, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, as well as the Pew Research CenterвЂ™s 2011 estimates on the composition of the Muslim American community.[9]

The attitudes of Muslims are compared to the broader American population in certain sections of the book by assessing the MANOS findings side-by-side with a representative survey of more than one thousand non-Muslim Americans, also collected through YouGov for the purpose of this study in August 2013.[10]

The MANOS survey was administered in English. Foreign-born Muslims in the United States are believed to have similar, if not higher, levels of English acquisition compared to other American immigrant groups; upwardsPage 14 → of 80 percent or more are fluent in English.[11] This limits the degree to which the sample composition would be skewed by being administered in English only. While the MANOS surveyвЂ™s proportion of U.S.-born Muslims is about 15 percentage points higher than that of PewвЂ™s (2017), the respondents look remarkably similar to PewвЂ™s across other major demographic factors that were not weighted, including the proportion of Shias to Sunnis, and they match on attitudinal variables such as religiosity.

Table 1. MANOS Summary Statistics Muslim American National Opinion Survey (MANOS)

Foreign-Born	34%
Second Generation	22%
Third Generation	44%
Female	49%
Average Age	36
Arab	17%
Asian	19%
Black	23%
White	32%
N	501

Note: Table 1 presents weighted MANOS respondent demographic features. All respondents are self-identified Muslims. Second-generation Muslims are those born in the United States with foreign-born parents, third-generation are those born in the U.S. with U.S.-born parents. MANOS respondents were able to identify with multiple racial categories. Thirty-two percent of Muslims in the MANOS survey identified as white only. Among white-only respondents, 57 percent identify as third-generation, 11 percent as second generation, and 33 percent as foreign-born. Among white-only second-generation respondents, about 38 percent are of Arab descent and 25 percent are of Turkish descent. Among white-only respondents who were born abroad, 45 percent indicate that they were born in Arab countries, 25 percent in Turkey, and the remaining from various parts of Europe. Seventy-one percent, 13 percent, and 16 percent of respondents who identify as black are third-generation, second-generation, and foreign-born, respectively.

Limiting the analysis to English speakers eliminates concerns of question comprehension and comparability, but, as suggested above, it also runs the risk of skewing the results. Yet, given the key questions and findings of this study, including non-English speakers would likely make the findings more pronounced, if anything. One of the central findings throughout this study is that U.S.-born Muslims tend to hold relatively more critical feelings toward government than immigrant Muslims. Several existing studies find that immigrants in the United States and Europe who speak a different language from the official language of their host country have more positive attitudes toward government than immigrants who speak an official host country language at home (Correia 2010, Wortley and Owusu-Bempah 2009, Roder and Muhlau 2012). Including non-English speakers in the dataset would only strengthen this relationship. Even so, the absence of even a small group of non-English speaking Muslims in the survey limits the degree to which this survey can capture the full range of experiences in the Muslim American population.

Interviews

In addition to large nationwide surveys, this project includes descriptive fieldwork in several major U.S. cities with sizable concentrations of American Muslims, including (but not limited to) Chicago; Detroit; Los Angeles; Newark, NJ; New York; San Francisco; Seattle; and Washington, DC. Additional interviews were conducted by phone or through online communication. Interviews were conducted between April 2011 and February 2017. The one-on-one interviews ranged in length from 30 minutes to three hours. These interviews consisted of a series of semi-structured, open-ended questions about the everyday lives of the participants, as well as new issues facing them or the broader community in the years after 9/11. The topics included news consumption and political activity, ethnic, national, and religious identification, immigrant experience, discrimination, security issues, policing, and government policy. All interviews were Page 15 →conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. Throughout the book, the interviewees are referred to as an вЂњanonymous intervieweeвЂќ (AI) with a corresponding reference number.

Though I compile a diverse set of intervieweesвЂ”representing Muslims from different ethnic communities, geographic regions, and socioeconomic backgroundsвЂ”the interview data, unlike the survey data, is not necessarily statistically representative of the population. It serves as a supplement to the survey data, providing

illustrative stories of Muslim American experiences. Interview participants were identified on two tracks. On track one, I identified Islamic organizations as well as ethnic-based political and social organizations with substantial Muslim membership across the country for interviews. I aimed to find individuals and leaders who represented diverse segments of the community and had varying relationships with government entities. These interviewees were then asked to refer other prospective interviewees within and outside their organization. On track two, my research assistantвЂ”herself a Muslim AmericanвЂ”identified individuals in her extended network for interviews and similarly used snowball sampling to identify other interviewees.

One limitation of this method of identifying interviewees is the risk that it will not represent people from Muslim backgrounds who choose not to publicly identify with Islam or associate with other Muslims. This might include both the most secular Muslims as well as the most isolated. By potentially limiting participation by secular Muslims, the interviewees may on average appear more religious than the broader community. Leaving out isolated individuals risks excluding those with viewsвЂ”religious or otherwiseвЂ”that are outside the mainstream within the community.

This study also incorporates qualitative data from more than 15 conferences, meetings, or working groups put on by various Islamic and government organizations discussing issues pertaining to the community. These ranged from large conferences with national organizations to security meetings with both Muslim American leaders and top law enforcement officials from the White House and the Department of Homeland Security. While several of these meetings were off the record or conducted under Chatham House Rules, the information is used to inform a variety of insights, including the governmentвЂ™s perspective on the relationship between law enforcement and the Muslim American community and ways it could be improved.

One-on-one interviews were also conducted with high-level governmentPage 16 → officials from several government agencies, including the White House, the U.S. Congress, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department, and the Justice Department.

A total of 182 individuals are included in the qualitative interviews and working groups. Fifty-nine percent of the interviewees were born in the United States and 29 percent were female. Ages ranged from 18 to about 65 years old. The single largest ethnic group represented was Arab (32 percent), followed by Southeast Asian (28 percent), white[12] (16 percent), and African American (13 percent).

Who Are Muslim Americans?

Before turning to the substantive chapters, the following section provides a brief picture of the diversity of the Muslim American population.

The number of Muslims in the United States is expected to more than double over the next few decades. While estimates on the composition of the Muslim American population vary due to the lack of official census data on religious affiliation in the United States, as noted above, the size of the community is projected to increase from an estimated 3.3 million in 2015 to nearly 7 million in 2050 (Mohamed 2016). This growth is expected to come not only from this groupвЂ™s higher birth rates, but also from immigration. Muslims are now believed to represent approximately 10 percent of all legal immigrants arriving in the United States, and a significantly smaller percentage of unauthorized immigrants (Mohamed 2016).

Pew (2017) reports that Muslim American immigrants have come from at least 75 different countries, with no single country accounting for more than one in six Muslim immigrants. This stands in contrast to many Muslim communities in Europe that have large concentrations of specific national groups. For many Muslim immigrants, life in the United States provides their first encounter with Muslims from a wide range of ethnic and cultural backgrounds, making for unique community dynamics and relations.

Perhaps the most commonly referenced community of Muslims in America is located in a suburb just outside DetroitвЂ”Dearborn, Michigan. Dubbed the вЂњArab capital of North America,вЂќ the city of Dearborn is

believed to have the largest concentration of Arabs outside of the Middle East; more than 30 percent of its residents trace their ancestry back to the region Page 17 →(AAI 2011). While an estimated two-thirds of the Arab population in the United States is Christian, the concentration of Muslims in Dearborn is high relative to other metropolitan areas of the United States. The Dearborn Muslim community, however, differs significantly from the majority of Muslims living in the United States in that the majority of its members are Shia, a minority in the Muslim world, and mostly Arab (mainly Lebanese, with smaller pockets of Iraqis, Palestinians, and Yemenis).

Fig. 1. Estimated Muslim Adherents in the United States

(*Source:* 2010 U.S. Religion Census [Grammich et al. 2012])

While data on the concentration of Muslims around the United States is difficult to come by, Pew Research Center (2015a) estimates that the highest concentration of Muslims in any particular U.S. state is in New Jersey at about 3 percent of the total state population. This is followed by New York, Washington D.C., and Arkansas, each at 2 percent. All other states are estimated to have Muslim populations of 1 percent or less. At a more micro-level, Pew estimates that the *metropolitan* areas with the highestPage 18 → concentration of Muslims in the United States are Detroit and New York City, both with an estimated 3 percent Muslim population. In New York City, this compares with a 3 percent Hindu population and 8 percent Jewish population. While there are examples of large concentrations of Muslim refugees, such as Somalis in Minnesota and Iraqis in San Diego County, these communities are often concentrated around refugee resettlement programs that intentionally place people of the same national background together to help with acclimation.

Fig. 2. Racial Composition of American Religious Groups

(*Source:* Gallup 2009)

Muslim Americans are the most racially diverse religious group in the United States. Many Muslims acknowledge, however, that the American Muslim population is divided along geographic, racial, ethnic, and sectarian lines and that numerous Muslim mosques and organizations across the United States are organized along these lines as well (Cesari 2007). This is in part because American Muslims follow divergent beliefs and practices rooted in many countries (Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and more) and in many sectarian traditions (the dominant Sunnis, the various Shias, Ahmadis, Druze, and others). The decentralization of Islam and its lack of a single source of leadership means that much freedom and choice exists for individual Muslims and local faith communities.

Page 19 →In light of such diversity, boundaries along the lines of race, nationality, generation, religious beliefs, and levels of conservatism are particularly important in understanding the Muslim experience in the United States. To highlight some of its heterogeneity, I note, though not comprehensively, some key religious and demographics features of the Muslim American population.

African American Muslims

Of Muslims who were born in the United States, a substantial number are African American. By most estimates, the group is thought to be the largest single ethnic American Muslim group, making up anywhere from 20 to 40 percent of the entire Muslim American community (Pew 2017; Cesari 2007; Gallup 2009).

African American Muslims for the most part consider themselves to be among the earliest Muslims in America, or вЂњnative Muslims,вЂќ in part because scholars largely agree that the first Muslims arrived in America in the 17th century as enslaved Africans (Gomez 2005).[13] While the Sunni Islam of those early Africans largely did not survive in the United States after the Civil War (Curtis 2002; McCloud 1995), the early 20th century marks a time of growth for unorthodox Islamic movements within the African American community. The Nation of Islam (NOI), founded in Detroit in 1930, is considered the longest-lived institutionalized Black Nationalist movement in the United States, upholding Islam as the national religion of African Americans. The formation of the Nation of Islam, like the broader Black Nationalist movement, is understood вЂњas a mass protest against the state of race

relations in the United StatesвЂќ (Moore 1995) and was rooted in the discontent of lower-class black migrants from the Jim Crow South in northern industrial American cities (Lincoln 1994). Thirty-one percent of African Americans in the MANOS sample report being associated with the Nation of Islam.

While the NOI was particularly influential in the United States during the civil rights movement, the smaller offshoots that remain today are largely alienated from the larger Muslim community. Many Muslims consider these groups to be only nominally Islamic, with teachings that contradict the QurвЂ™an and Sunnah.

In 1976, Warith Deen Mohammed, who was handed leadership of the Nation of Islam by his late father, Elijah Muhammad,[14] structurally and theologically reformed the NOI to bring its beliefs in line with mainstream Page 20 → Sunni Islam and worked to build closer ties with other Muslim communities in the United States. The organization eventually disbanded in 1985 and allowed its several hundred *masjids* (formerly referred to as вЂњtemplesвЂќ) to go their own way (Allen 1996). Despite the organizational break, the Nation of Islam still exists today. Louis Farrakhan, after resigning from W. D. MohammedвЂ™s reformed organization in 1977, later worked to rebuild the original NOI upon the foundation established.[15]

Today the majority of black Muslims are believed to adhere to some form of mainstream Sunni Islam, and they won early legal victories that broadened the rights of all Muslims in America (Moore 1995). It is worth noting that despite common perceptions, not all black Muslims are converts. Many whose parents or grandparents converted to Islam before their birth, refer to themselves as вЂњsecond-вЂќ or вЂњthird-generationвЂќ Muslims. Even so, African Americans make up a sizable portion of those who identify as converts to Islam in the United States. Of the 30 percent of MANOS respondents who listed themselves as converts, 46 percent identified as white and 39 percent as black. Among white converts, 70 percent were women, whereas among blacks, nearly 70 percent were men.

As is discussed throughout the book, while they are an integral part of the community, African American Muslims stand out from other segments of the Muslim American population in several ways, including socioeconomic and attitudinal differences based on their unique history in the United States. These differences, where relevant, are discussed in more depth in each chapter.

Muslims from Immigrant Communities

Around 50 to 60 percent of Muslims in the United States today are believed to be foreign-born, first-generation immigrants, with the rest born in the United States (Gallup 2011; Pew 2017). While modern Muslim immigration to the United States began in the late 19th century, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 helped to open AmericaвЂ™s doors to Muslim migration by replacing AmericaвЂ™s previous quota system, based on national origin, with a new system based on the principles of family reunification and special occupational skills. The bulk of Muslim immigrants in the United States today arrived during or after the 1990s, with large majorities pursuing economic opportunities and advanced degrees.

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Arab American Muslims

The story of Arab immigration to the United States is generally characterized by three waves, the first of which took place between the 1880s and mid-1920s. These migrants were mainly Christians from the Levant, better known today as Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. The Ford Motor Company in Dearborn, Michigan, was a major employer of Arabs (and blacks), who were often the only people willing to work in the hot, difficult conditions of the factories (Hassoun 2005). Many Arabs during this time settled in midwestern states such as Michigan, Ohio, Iowa, and even the Dakotas, with their later Muslim counterparts to follow.[16]

The second surge of Arab migration to the United States, which occurred after the Second World War, was triggered by political unrest in the Middle East. This group differed from the first in that it consisted primarily of professionals and university students coming for educational and economic purposes (GhaneaBassiri 2010). The

third wave of migration occurred following the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed for a diverse group of immigrants, a higher percentage of which were Muslim. The Migration Policy Institute estimates that most immigrants from the Middle East arrived to the United States recently, increasing the size of the community fourfold between 1980 and 2010 (Zong and Batalova 2015).

The Arab American Institute, based on a 2002 Zogby International poll, estimates that 63 percent of Arab Americans are Christian, 24 percent are Muslim, and 13 percent belong to another religion or have no religious affiliation. The community is politically active and well-institutionalized, and it has benefited from a long presence in the United States, a shared language, and a history of community organization. Their first organizations included churches, mosques, and community centers, which allowed for the preservation of their ethnic and cultural identities and religious values (Hassoun 2005).

Asian American Muslims

Asians, representing many strands of Islamic beliefs and practices, make up the fastest-growing Muslim immigrant population in the United States. This group, composed of Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis, Afghans, and other Asian nationalities, accounts for about a quarter of the Muslim American population (Pew 2017).

Page 22 →As with other immigrant groups, small numbers of Asian Muslims arrived in America prior to the changes to immigration laws in 1965. South Asian Indian immigrants entered the United States as laborers following the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1885, though they too were eventually outlawed in 1917 when Congress declared India to be part of the Pacific-Barred Zone of excluded Asian countries.

In the midst of anti-Asian sentiment in the United States, it was Muslims from South AsiaвЂ”the Ahmadiyya Muslim community from Punjab, British IndiaвЂ”who first reached out to African American Muslims in the 1920s. The Ahmadis brought English translations of the QurвЂ™an, taught early African American groups about the five pillars of Islam, and directed their attention to Sunni teachings (Allen 1998; McCloud 1995).[17]

The much larger numbers of Asian Muslim immigrants who arrived in the first decade after the passage of the 1965 law were part of a large вЂњbrain drainвЂќ from the region. Physicians, engineers, scientists, nurses, and computer specialists were needed in the growing American economy. South Asian immigrants in the 1970s and 80s were among the best educated, most professionally advanced, and the most successful of any immigrant groups at the time. These immigrants were influential in Muslim American organizations started by earlier Arab migrants, and they also started several of their own. Leonard (2002) argues that Muslim leaders from South Asia went to great lengths to unite Muslims of various ethnic backgrounds in the United States.

Later waves of South Asian migrants, who began coming to the United States through the family reunification laws, are generally believed to be less affluent and less credentialed than their predecessors. These more recent immigrants generally live in urban areas within the United States, often in multiethnic communities, and work in service-sector jobs or in small businesses (Williams 1998).

Other Immigrant Muslim Communities

Iranians make up a significant portion of the Muslim community in the United States. Many Iranians living in the United States migrated following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, escaping the rule of the Islamic Republic. Los Angeles is believed to have the second-largest Iranian population of any city after Tehran, with the area of highest concentration dubbed вЂњTehrangeles.вЂќ In addition to seeking political asylum, some Iranians have Page 23 →come to the United States to pursue greater financial success, improved education opportunities, secularism, and gender equality (Cesari 2007).

In recent years, a higher percentage of Muslim immigrants have been coming from sub-Saharan Africa. Among Muslim immigrants to the United States in 2012, an estimated 16 percent were born in countries such as Somalia and Ethiopia; 20 years earlier only 5 percent of immigrants hailed from sub-Saharan Africa (Pew 2013c). Substantial numbers of Muslims of European and Central Asian descent (e.g., Turks, Albanians, Bosnians) live in

the United States as well, along with a growing number of white and Latino converts (Aidi 2003).

Muslim American Ideological Differences

SunnivЂ“Shia Divide

Within Islam, the historic sectarian division between Sunnis and Shias remains a source of tension and conflict in some parts of the world. While Sunni and Shia identities first formed around a dispute over leadership succession soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, the political divide between the two groups broadened over time to include theological distinctions and differences in religious practices. Practices and beliefs among Sunnis and Shias vary according to local culture, legal school of thought, and other factors. About 10 to 20 percent of the worldвЂ™s Muslims are believed to be Shia, the rest primarily Sunni. Countries where Shias make up a majority of the total population include Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, and Iraq. There are also sizable Shia populations in Pakistan, India, Turkey, Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan. In the MANOS sample, 17 percent of respondents self-identify as Shia and 59 percent as Sunni, with the remaining identifying as something else (primarily the Nation of Islam).

Schools of Thought

An important institution within Islam that influences social thought and practice among some believers is that of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), which is essentially the human interpretation of the QurвЂ™an and Sunnah (the way of the Prophet) by Islamic jurists. The most prominent schools of thought (*madhhab*, or plural *madhДЇhib*) guiding some Muslims today were developed and solidified in the classical period of Islamic civilization, which reflected the world at that time. Most individuals who strictly follow particular schools of thought tend to be traditionalists and thereforePage 24 → relatively conservative in their practice of Islam. Levels of conservatism also vary across schools. Bagby (2011) explains in practical terms that for Muslims in the United States, вЂњfollow[ing] a particular *madhhab*вЂќ is analogous to following вЂњthe traditional way of doing things like it was done back in the old countryвЂќ (Bagby 2011, 18).[18] Though schools of thought generally agree on the main issues of Islam, schools may differ in their interpretations of basic Islamic precepts.

The MANOS survey asks which Islamic approach best describes how the respondent makes an Islamic decision. A plurality of the Muslim American communityвЂ”about 46 percent of the sampleвЂ”do not believe it is required to follow a particular school of thought and do not use an Islamic approach in making decisions. These individuals follow a more flexible, liberal approach to Islam.[19] Another sizable portion of the sampleвЂ”39 percentвЂ”noted that they refer to the QurвЂ™an and Sunnah as their authority, as opposed to following traditional schools of thought. They generally believe that the QurвЂ™an and Sunnah are open to interpretations that consider the underlying purposes of the texts and modern circumstances, as opposed to the literal meaning. This is also a more flexible approach to Islam compared to traditional schools of thought. About 16 percent indicated that they look to all the *madhДЇhib* instead of just one, a slightly more flexible but still a conservative interpretation. Only a small fractionвЂ”about 8 percent of MANOS respondentsвЂ”indicated that they follow a traditional *madhhab*, or school of thought.

Salafism

Salafism, which emerged in the early 20th century, was a modernist reform movement and a reaction to religious innovation (departure from orthodoxy or traditional practice in the face of social change) and the spread of European ideas. (The word *salaf* is Arabic for вЂњancient oneвЂќ and refers to the companions of the Prophet Mohammed.) It claims that Islam has strayed from its origins and advocates a return to the traditions of the first three generations of devout ancestors, a more literal and strict understanding of Islam that rejects historical developments in Islamic thought.[20] Salafism represents a diverse community of individuals who carry out this goal differently but tend to be alienated from mainstream society. Individuals who indicated that they вЂњfollow the *Salafi minhaj*вЂќ (way of thought) made up about 9 percent of MANOS respondents. Kepel (2002) explains that the original Salafist movement was nonviolent, encouraged re-Islamization in day-to-day living, and did not

necessarily advocate violent Page 25 →revolts against government powers. But since 9/11, the term is often associated with the jihadi branch of Salafism that justifies violence to achieve political objectives (Wiktorowicz 2006).

Bagby (2011) reports that most Salafi mosques in the United States are African American. In the MANOS sample, however, only 39 percent of Salafis identified as black, accounting for 17 percent of the overall black Muslim population. In discussing why Salafi communities were attractive, one African American interviewee noted that many Salafi mosques offer a welcoming place for black Muslims, some of whom otherwise feel socially and culturally alienated at other mosques. He explained that in contrast to вЂњculturalвЂќ approaches to Islam (i.e., traditions transplanted from other countries and services conducted in foreign languages), Salafism is attractive to some U.S.-born Muslims and converts because it is more вЂњpurevвЂќ and does not require knowledge of practices or norms from other countries (AI 64). Twenty percent of Salafis in the MANOS dataset reported being converts to Islam and 74 percent were U.S.-born.

While Muslims in America are often erroneously cast as one homogeneous group, the wide diversity and histories of various Muslim American communities means that not all individuals who are Muslim view, and have experienced, the post-9/11 environment in the same way. Indeed while I refer to a вЂњMuslim American communityвЂќ throughout the book, I use it as a term to reference the Muslim population or signal identification with a group of people, but I do not wish to suggest that there is a single politically or religiously unified Muslim community in the United States. As the findings of this study demonstrate, individuals within the community do not agree on a wide range of religious, political, or social topics. Much less do they agree on the severity of the post-9/11 security environment or what if anything should be done to change MuslimsвЂ™ relationship with the government, law enforcement, or the broader American society. This book attempts to shed light on some of these diverse views by giving voice to a group that is the subject of much discussion and debate, but whose voices are less commonly heard.

1. How Do Muslims View Violent Extremism?

While it is widely known that many different ideologies and political motivations can inspire violent acts, scholars note that the association between violent extremism and Islam has deepened in the minds of many Americans since 9/11. Some academic studies have even purported that вЂњjihadistвЂќ violent extremism is a вЂњnewвЂќ and more dangerous phenomenon than past forms of terrorism and have turned their focus on Islamic ideologies to explain violence (Hoffman 2006; Benjamin and Simon 2003). This association, reinforced by media images and political rhetoric, has resulted in heightened suspicion toward Muslims in the United States (Das et al. 2009; Jamal 2008; Huddy et al. 2005; Sirin and Fine 2007). Indeed, 68 percent of Republicans in the year leading up to Donald TrumpвЂ™s election said Islam encourages violence more than other religions (Pew 2015b), and President Trump focused some of his earliest policies on curbing what he calls вЂњradical Islamic terrorismвЂќ (Ainsley, Volz, and Cooke 2017). At the same time, and perhaps partly as a backlash to this rhetoric, a growing number of non-Muslim Americans recognize that extremism does not characterize or represent Muslim groups in the United States and are not convinced of any natural or inevitable connections between the Islamic faith and acts of violence.

While there is no shortage of studies exploring the causes of violent extremism and the association between Islam and violence, few studies are able to offer empirical evidence toward the question of whether the Islamic faith inclines people toward extremism or violence, nor have they methodically asked how *Muslim Americans* themselves view violent extremists in the United States and whether their views differ from other Americans. This chapter provides insight on these issues by exploring three questions using a patchwork of observational, survey, and qualitative data: (1) Do Page 28 →Muslims pose a greater threat of violent extremism in the United States than other groups? (2) How do Muslim Americans view those who *are* willing to engage in various forms of violent extremism? And (3) Have Muslim Americans been active in countering violent extremism?

Addressing the first questionвЂ”whether Muslims pose a greater threat of violent extremism in the United States than other groupsвЂ”this chapter begins by acknowledging the difficulties of defining and measuring violent extremism. It then discusses our current understanding of the threat of violent extremism in the United States and uses databases of attacks in the United States since 9/11 to place violence associated with Muslims in the context of violence associated with other Americans. The data suggest that the threat posed by Muslim Americans is overblown, especially as it compares to other types of violence in the United States.

Next, addressing how Muslims view violent extremism, this chapter presents intervieweesвЂ™ thoughts on individuals who have been convicted on terrorism charges. This is followed by a more systematic examination of survey data comparing MuslimsвЂ™ and non-MuslimsвЂ™ attitudes toward individuals who support violent groups.

Finally, this chapter explores available data on Muslim AmericansвЂ™ role in countering violent extremism. Because such a small percentage of the Muslim American community has been involved in any kind of terror activity (less than 0.0001 percent), few Muslims have met anyone considering engaging in violence. Nevertheless, Muslim Americans have played a significant role in helping law enforcement disrupt plots by providing tips to police, and prominent Muslim organizations actively speak out against such acts. Interview data is used throughout to provide details on the various Muslim perspectives on these issues.

Do Muslims Pose a Greater Threat in the United States?

The Challenges of Measuring Violent Extremism and Terrorism

To assess whether Muslim Americans pose a greater threat of violent extremism in the United States compared to other groups of Americans, ideally we would analyze an official dataset of terrorist acts across the entire U.S. population. With this we could compare Muslims against other groups in terms of how many attacks have been attempted or carried out Page 29 →and how many Americans have been killed as a result. There are, however,

several challenges to such a strategy.

First, there is no agreed-upon definition of terrorism or violent extremism, much less an agreed-upon definition of what constitutes вЂњradical Islamic terrorism,вЂќ a term regularly used by President Donald Trump. Even slight differences in definitions of these concepts can significantly alter conclusions about who is most likely to engage in such violence and thus what possible solutions might be effective in countering such attacks. How does one distinguish between politically or religiously motivated attacks and вЂњtraditionalвЂќ violent crimes? Does the attacker have to claim to be conducting the attack on behalf of religion? Or does simply being an adherent to a particular religion qualify? Does the perpetrator have to be affiliated with a designated terrorist group, and how is affiliation defined precisely? Does it require having some kind of official membership within the group, having claimed allegiance to the group, or just having been inspired by the group? The list goes on.

Moreover, one of the reasons it is difficult to define and count incidents of right-wing violent extremism, for example, is that many right-wing extremists involved in incidents of violence are not prosecuted under terrorism statutes, but rather under other state and federal laws such as those governing weapons or as hate crimes. For example, after white supremacist Dylann Roof killed nine people at a historically black church in Charleston, South Carolina in June 2015, he was convicted of hate crimes, but never charged with terrorism.

The second challenge to analyzing violent extremist acts in the United States is that the Department of Justice and the FBI do not publicly list domestic terrorist organizations, nor does any U.S. governmental agency release any official lists of domestic terrorist incidents (although the State Department does compile a list of foreign groups judged to be terrorists). As a result, scholars often have incomplete information about the perpetrators, suspects, and criminal motivation. Details about any given attack are made public through the media, but much more detailed information is often kept classified or for вЂњofficial use onlyвЂќ and is not available to academics.

These challenges notwithstanding, it is still worth taking a look at the available data to put the threat of violent extremism posed by Muslims in the United States into context with extremist violence by individuals of different backgrounds. The following section compares data collected by various scholars and research centers on deaths related to violent extremism.

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The Threat of Domestic Violent Extremism and Terrorism

Comparing violent extremism to other causes of death and injury has led many academic researchers to argue that the threat of violent extremism, specifically by Muslim Americans, is exaggerated (Mueller and Stewart 2012; Brooks 2011; Mueller 2006; Lustick 2006). Though estimates of fatalities due to violent extremism of all types in the United States vary widely, even the highest estimates (34 deaths in 2017, ADL 2018) represent only a fraction of total homicides in the United States each year (averaging nearly 17,000 a year since 2001) or even the number who die in mass shooting incidents (433 in 2017, Gun Violence Archive 2018).[1]

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) estimates that over the past decade (2008вЂ“2017), 71 percent of the 387 deaths caused by violent extremism in the United States were at the hands of right-wing extremists such as white supremacists, sovereign citizens and militia adherents (ADL 2018). They note that murders committed by right-wing extremists other than white supremacistsвЂ”who are more easily identifiableвЂ”are likely underrepresented in their estimates.

In another count, a study by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point reports that 254 individuals were killed in 307 attacks by far-right domestic groups between 2002 and 2011 (Perliger 2013).[2] The toll has increasedPage 31 → since the study was released. This compares to estimates by Kurzman (2018) who identifies a total of 41 Muslim Americans who have engaged in violence against targets in the United States between 9/11 and the end of 2017, claiming 140 lives.[3] The bulk of these casualties occurred on June 12, 2016, when Omar Mateen killed 49 people at a gay nightclub in Orlando in what was the deadliest mass shooting in American history up to that date. Kurzman also includes in his assessment the 17 individuals killed in a series of attacks in 2002 by the

вЂњD.C. SniperвЂќ John Allen Muhammad, age 42, and his young accomplice, Lee Boyd Malvo, age 17. The next deadliest attack was carried out by Tashfeen Malik and Syed Farook, who killed 14 at the San Bernardino County health department in California in late 2015, followed by U.S. Army major and psychiatrist Nidal Hassan, who opened fire at the Fort Hood military base in 2009, killing 13 people. Together, these six individuals (including the two D.C. snipers) account for more than 75 percent of the casualties in the United States by Muslim Americans. More commonly, plots have resulted in fewer than 5 fatalities, as in the case of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing by Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, age 19, and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, age 26, which resulted in the deaths of 3 civilians.

Table 1.1. Estimated Annual Casualties by Violent Extremism, by Type

Average # U.S. Casualties per Year

Source	Right Wing Violent Extremism	Islamist Violent Extremism	Dates Included
Charles Kurzman	вЂ”	8.8	9/12/2001вЂ“12/31/2017
New America	3.3	6.3	9/12/2001вЂ“12/31/2016
Extremist Crime Database	9.8	4.9	1990вЂ“2/2017
U.S. Government Accountability Office	7.1	7.9	9/12/2001вЂ“12/31/2016
Anti-Defamation League	27.5	8.9	2007вЂ“2016
Terrorism Center at West Point	25.4	вЂ”	2002вЂ“2011

Note: Table 1.1 displays estimates of the average number of casualties in the United States each year due to violent extremism. Averages are calculated by dividing the total number of deaths in a given study by the number of years examined in the study. These figures compare to an average of 16,922 deaths by homicide in the United States each year in the 2001вЂ“2016 timeframe (FBI 2016a).

The International Security Program at New America, offering a relatively conservative estimate, identified 149 total deaths by all вЂњhomegrown extremistsвЂќ of various ideologies in the United States between September 11, 2001, and the end of 2016 (New America 2017). Prior to the Orlando shooting, the killings in these attacks were split about equally between right-wing attackers (50) and people inspired by jihad (45). If we include Orlando in this count, however, jihadists are responsible for 94 deaths. Highlighting the importance of definitional differences, New America does not include the D.C. sniper case and others with unclear motives.[4]

For additional points of comparison, Parkin et al. (2017), using their вЂњExtremist Crime DatabaseвЂќ (ECDB), note that between 1990 and 2017, 43 attacks motived by Islamist extremism killed 136 people, whereas 185 attacks motived by far-right extremism killed 272 people. (These figures exclude 9/11 and the Oklahoma City bombing).[5] Looking at a narrower time frame, a 2017 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office estimated that between September 12, 2001, and December 31, 2016, there were 23 violent radical Islamist attacks resulting in 119 fatalities, and 62 violent far-right attacks resulting in 106 fatalities (GAO 2017). As suggested earlier, two related reasons that the estimates of right-wing Page 32 →extremism vary so widely are (1) disagreement over an attackerвЂ™s motivation as it relates to the definition of terrorism and (2) the fact that many right-wing extremists are not prosecuted under terrorism statutes, but rather under other state and federal laws such as those governing weapons or as hate crimes.

While not always reflected in the media, studies have shown that many local American law enforcement officers perceive right-wing domestic violent extremism to be more of an immediate threat in their communities than Islamist domestic violent extremism. Indeed, a 2014 survey of law enforcement agencies reveals that 74 percent of law enforcement officials consider antigovernment extremism as the top violent threat in their jurisdiction, while only 39 percent consider Islamist extremism to be the top threat. Only 3 percent of agencies identified the threat

from Islamist extremists as severe (Kurzman and Schanzer 2015). Indeed, ECDB data suggests that between 1990 and 2015 (again, excluding 9/11 and the Oklahoma City bombing) far-right extremists have killed 57 law enforcement officers in 46 incidents, whereas Islamist extremists are responsible for killing 7 law enforcement officers during 5 incidents (Parkin et al. 2017).[6] These findings are consistent with a 2009 report by the Department of Homeland SecurityвЂ™s Homeland Environment Threat Analysis Division, which warned вЂњthat lone wolves and small terrorist cells embracing violent right-wing extremist ideology are the most dangerous domestic terrorism threat in the United StatesвЂќ (DHS 2009, 7). Similarly, a 2015 report funded by the Department of Justice concluded that вЂњwhile there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal recordвЂќ (Hamm and Spaaij 2015).

Whatever the definition, the frequency of terrorist attacks in the United States has declined dramatically since its peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when primarily left-wing groups such as the Weather Underground were responsible for nearly 500 attempted attacks in 1970 alone (Global Terrorism Database 2013).[7] Most of those attacks, however, were nonlethal.

To be sure, despite a relatively small number of deaths and the even smaller number of individuals involved with domestic violent extremism since 9/11, the psychological toll of such attacks on the American public is significant and the issue remains prominent in the national dialogue. In early 2016, in the midst of a U.S. presidential election cycle that unfolded on the heels of attacks in San Bernardino and Orlando, 75 percent of Page 33 → Americans placed defending the country from future terrorist attacks as a top priority, on par with the economy (Pew 2016a).

How Do Muslims View Violent Extremism?

To assess Muslim AmericansвЂ™ views toward violent extremistsвЂ”the second key question laid out in this chapterвЂ”this section employs two approaches. The first uses in-depth interviews in which respondents voluntarily commented on Muslims who had been convicted on terrorism charges. Interviewees share their opinions of these individuals and offer thoughts on the potential reasonsвЂ”including mental illness, personal trauma, grievances, or victimization at the hand of radical recruitersвЂ”for them to resort to violence. (While I do not focus here on MuslimsвЂ™ views of non-Muslim violent extremists, interviewees cited similar motivations for these perpetrators.)

To provide a more systematic look, and to compare Muslims to non-Muslims, the second approach analyzes survey data to assess respondentsвЂ™ levels of tolerance for individuals who support organizations that sometimes use violence as a means of achieving a political goal. For comparison purposes, the survey used generalized wording that can apply to both Muslims and non-Muslims.

MuslimsвЂ™ Thoughts on Violent Extremists

The issue of violence is a sensitive topic among Muslim Americans, largely because of a prevailing exasperation with associations between Muslims and violent extremism. Some interview subjects, however, raised the issue in the course of our conversation. IntervieweesвЂ™ viewpoints are not presented here as an attempt to theorize or provide empirical evidence as to why some individuals support violence, but to offer some perspective on how *Muslim Americans* view individuals who engage in violence.

While the interviewees did not, on average, think that Islamist violent extremism was as overwhelming a problem in the United States as is portrayed in the media, nearly all expressed disgust and sadness over attacks that had occurred and wanted the government to continue its work securing the country from future attacks. Several participants brought up the fact that worldwide, ISIS and other violent Islamist groups kill more MuslimsPage 34 → than any other religious group, and Muslim Americans want more than anyone to вЂњtake backвЂќ their religion from such radicals, who dominate the publicвЂ™s imagination of Islam.

The most common interview comment about those who engage in violence against civilians was that these people were either mentally unstable or not familiar with Islam, as they could not comprehend their religion being used to condone such violence (AI 9, AI 10, AI 36). In cases such as Omar MateenвЂ™s attack at an Orlando night club,

the lack of an obvious operational connection to the Islamic State, MateenвЂ™s rudimentary religious knowledge, and his history of mental instability led many to question the label вЂњterrorismвЂќ for this attack rather than a hate crime against homosexuals, for example. Indeed, studies have found that lone actors like Mateen are more likely to exhibit signs of mental illness than are extremists who act as part of a group (Hamm and Spaaij 2017; Gruenewald et al. 2014). Qualitative analyses of both Islamist extremists and right-wing extremists have also found that for some individuals, mechanisms other than religious adherencevЂ”such as trauma, intense feelings of injustice, outrage, revenge, or even lovevЂ”can potentially push people toward extremist violence (Simi, Windisch, and Sporer 2016).

Research on individual-level causes of radicalization leading to violent extremism provides multiple sufficient explanations for any given case (Sageman 2008; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, 2014). While religion is not known to be the primary motivator, it is sometimes used to legitimize personal and collective frustrations and to justify violent ideologies (Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015; Butler 2015). Similarly, mental illness, while not a вЂњcausevЂќ of radicalization, appears to contribute to violent extremism when combined with a host of other factors (Hamm and Spaaij 2017; James and Pisoiu 2016), including grievances, networks, ideologies, enabling environments (King and Taylor 2011; Moghaddam 2005), and a quest for significance and meaning in onevЂ™s life (Kruglanski et al. 2014; Kruglanski et al. 2009). People experiencing personal trauma, shame, humiliation, and perceived maltreatment by society may be attracted to perceived opportunities to restore a sense of self-worth and identity (Hogg 2014; Hogg and Adelman 2013; Hogg, Meehan, and Farquharson 2010; Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015).

The majority of terror-related charges against Muslims in the United States since 9/11 have involved leaving or attempting to leave the United States to fight with a designated militant group abroad (Kurzman 2018), an issue referenced by some interviewees. Several participants in this Page 35 → study suggested that people who were radicalized in the United States and attempted to leave home to fight with a militant group abroad had been exposed to negative influences and were deeply misguided, seeking excitement, purpose, and identity. These responses reflect insights by Kruglanski et al. (2014) and Hogg (2014).

One interviewee, a leader at a major national Islamic organization, said some youth who lack meaning in life may see how the вЂњIslamic caliphatevЂќ in Syria is growing and feel drawn to it. Uneducated Muslims, without access to youth organizations or mosques, he felt, were especially vulnerable to thinking that ISIS represents true Islam (AI 83). Interviewees also referred to individuals, including women, who left to fight in Syria on behalf of ISIS as naive teenage victims of online recruiting techniques that had sold them a false fantasy of what ISIS and Syria were really like.

More than one interviewee brought up the Somali community in Minnesota, which around 2006 began to witness the departure of dozens of young people to fight with the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The large Somali community in Minnesota, many of whom lived through years of war, famine, and harsh conditions in refugee camps, largely continues to face poverty. Many families lack fathers, some of whom died in conflict back home (Abdi 2011). Interviewees suggested that the many young men, who lived in Somalia only as very young children, were looking for ways to reconnect with their home country. Others believed that these young Somali men were vulnerable, lacked positive male influences, and were deceived by on-the-ground recruiters who provided the funds and logistics for them to leave. As evidence of this, one interviewee (AI 66) referred to Burhan Hassan, a young Al-Shabaab recruit. A senior in high school, Burhan and his friends were recruited to join Al-Shabaab in Minneapolis by a man claiming to be a relative. After changing his mind and deciding to come back home to the United States, Burhan was killed by the group less than a year after arriving in Somalia.

Several interviewees, while acknowledging that they did not possess all the facts, hypothesized that support for violencevЂ”particularly violence abroadvЂ”may be motivated by unfavorable U.S. foreign policies in those countries. Several individuals said a number of Muslims are upset by a perceived disregard for Muslim lives by the U.S. military, and some referenced the killing of thousands of Muslim civilians by U.S. drone strikes in places like Pakistan. Indeed, Crenshaw and LaFree (2017) found that many terror suspects in the United States explained their motive as opposition to the American use of military force against Muslims in civil conflicts Page 36

→abroad. Some of our interviewees, while condemning the use of violence, noted that in the context of war they could see why such вЂњretaliatoryвЂќ attacks against military personnel could seem justifiable to the perpetrators. One interviewee likened this tension of identifying with a grievance but not supporting violent methods to address the grievance to Americans who disagree with abortions but who would never support anti-abortion violence (AI 50).

Respondents also noted that the foreign policies of other countries around the world could inspire extreme behavior. One Somali interviewee suggested that at least some of the young men who left the United States to fight with Al-Shabaab were motivated by the Ethiopian invasion of their home country and the violence being carried out against Somalis; вЂњeven without caring for Al-Qaeda [Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2009], some saw Al-Shabaab as the most effective force fighting against the Ethiopians. Others, however, were radicalized and bought into Al-QaedaвЂ™s ideologyвЂќ (AI 42).

No American participants in this study said they had ever engaged in any kind of political violence themselves (or personally knew anyone who had). Two British interviewees, however, who are included in this study for additional insight on this particular question, had left their homes in the West to fight abroad and were willing to share their stories. These two casesвЂ”though not typical of cases reported in the media and distinct from those who choose to conduct violence against civilian targetsвЂ”provide some insight as to why one might вЂњunderstandвЂќ individuals who decided to support a designated militant group.

One British man in his late twenties left what he described as a very comfortable life in the United Kingdom to fight in Libya for several months, planning to return. He was not motivated by any American or British policies, he said, but by family members in Libya, who expected him to help fight off extremists who were trying to take over the country. While he was there (sometime in late 2013 and early 2014), he reported, the country was in sheer chaos, and he welcomed the help of Western forces there. Well-educated and having recently earned a masters degree, he had never fought or used military-grade weaponry in his life. вЂњBut there is a lot you can learn on YouTube. I figured it out. They need a lot of help out there.вЂќ He noted that there are likely other Libyan Americans or Syrian Americans who have left or tried to leave the United States for similar reasons: expectations of family or to fight against groups like ISIS or other factions in their home countries. Generally, though, he believed Page 37 →there is no single explanation for why these young people leave: вЂњEach one has their own reason,вЂќ from feelings of obligation, wanting a sense of purpose, looking for excitement, looking for an outlet for their frustrations, or simply coming under the wrong influences.

The other British participant, of Pakistani descent, briefly fought in Afghanistan in the early 1990s as a self-described вЂњradical Salafi activist.вЂќ He explained that at the time, as an undergraduate student, he felt the need to fight against the communist forces in Afghanistan. After observing violence in the West, such as the 7/7 bombings in London, however, he took it upon himself to start campaigning against extremism and for religious reform within Muslim circles. He believed that young people engaging in violence against civilians are misguided and that nonviolent SalafisвЂ”those who speak the same ultraconservative ideological language as Salafi jihadis but reject their violent activismвЂ”are likely more effective at challenging violent ideologies than more liberal or secular Muslim voices are.

Stories like these, while not conventional, offer some insight into why some Muslims abroad might engage in violence in their home countries and why other Muslims may find their actions justifiable. The vast majority of Muslims living in the United States, however, have not been associated with any type of violent extremism, despite any experiences of discrimination or grievance. Nevertheless, public perceptions of MuslimsвЂ™ association with violence remain. The following section takes a more systematic look at attitudes toward those willing to associate with violent groups.

Attitudes toward Violent Groups: Comparison of Muslims and Non-Muslims

There are few reliable representative surveys comparing American MuslimsвЂ™ attitudes toward violent behavior with those of other groups in the United States. Perhaps the most widely cited surveys of Muslim

Americans to date are those conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2007, 2011 and 2017. In 2011, Pew asked one thousand Muslim American respondents whether вЂњSuicide bombing/other violence against civilians is justified to defend Islam from its enemies.вЂќ One percent of respondents said it is вЂњoften justified,вЂќ 7 percent that it is вЂњsometimes justified,вЂќ 5 percent agreed that it is вЂњrarely justified,вЂќ and 81 percent said that it is вЂњnever justified.вЂќ While generally helpful in gauging attitudes, the public response to this survey varied widely. Some pointed out that the large majority of Muslim Page 38 → Americans reject Islamist terrorism, while others noted in alarm that nearly 20 percent of Muslim Americans believe terrorism can be justified.[8] One challenge with this question is that there is no equivalent way to compare the attitudes of Muslims and non-Muslims toward this very specific type of violence.

To compare Muslim and non-Muslim attitudes toward the use of violence for political causes, it is important to use survey questions that can apply equally to each group. The following section presents data on Muslim and non-Muslim AmericansвЂ™ attitudes toward organizations (of any ideological bent) that are willing to use violence for a social or political goal. While tolerance of violent groups is a difficult concept to measure, particularly across a mostly nonviolent population, not specifying the political goal (i.e., the defense of Islam) allows respondents to imagine various circumstances under which they could understand why a group might choose to use violence for a political cause.

This analysis does not attempt to predict who is likely to *engage* in violent political behavior, since it is not yet well understood how or when radical beliefs will lead to violence.[9] This analysis seeks instead to identify patterns among the broader group of individuals who may be understanding or tolerant of violent groups, a subset of which *could* be more likely to support these types of organizations.[10]

Measuring AmericansвЂ™ Tolerance of Violence

This analysis builds on an existing body of empirical research by administering a modified version of McCauley and MoskalenkoвЂ™s (2008) Activism and Radicalization Intention Scale (ARIS) scale.[11] The ARIS scale measures readiness to engage in various forms of political action. For the purposes of this study, the scale is shortened to focus only on violent political activity. Additionally, in an effort to attenuate the effect of social desirability bias, MANOS respondents were only asked about their *attitudes toward* a variety of violent political activities conducted by groups rather than about personal intentions to engage in or directly support violence. This avoids asking respondents to admit to illegal behavior in the process and increases the variation in how respondents answer the question.

Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following items:

> *The United States has a long history of individuals pushing for group rights when they feel they are being mistreated. Please tell us whether you* Page 39 → *agree or disagree with the following statements about political actions someone might take on behalf of a group that is important to him or her.*
>
> *I can understand someone who would continue to support an organization that fights for his/her groupвЂ™s political and legal rights, even if members of the organization:*
>
> > *вЂў Sometimes resort to violence.*
> > *вЂў Attack police or security forces if police are beating members of the group.*
> > *вЂў Retaliate against members of other groups who first attack his/her group.*
> > *(Strongly Agree (7)вЂ“Strongly Disagree (1))*

Each of the three items is rescaled to range between 0 and 1. Items are coded to equal вЂњ1вЂќ if the respondent agreed that supporting such a group is understandable and to equal вЂњ0вЂќ if the respondent was neutral or disagreed that supporting such a group was understandable. To create the index, the items are added together and divided by 3.[12] Unless otherwise noted, the analysis below assesses the percentage of individuals who scored higher than zero on the index or indicated that any of the three types of violence were at all

вЂњunderstandable.вЂќ

Findings: Comparing AmericansвЂ™ Tolerance for Violent Groups

The data show considerable heterogeneity in how individuals view potentially violent political groups. Taken together, the majority of Muslim respondents are indistinguishable from other American religious groups in their levels of tolerance toward those who support violent groups. While among non-Muslims, those unaffiliated with a religion hold the highest levels of tolerance toward those who support violent groups, among Muslims, the small percentage who claim a more literalist approach to Islam express higher tolerance as do those who affiliate with the Nation of Islam, a group that is open to self-defense. On the question of violence used in retaliation and against police or security forces, there is greater tolerance among U.S.-born individuals, both Muslims and non-Muslims.

Figure 1.1 displays the percentage of individuals across several subgroups of the broader American population who agree with each item of the political violence scale. As mentioned, atheists and agnostics express some of the highest levels of tolerance for individuals who support groups Page 40 →that resort to violence: 34 percent and 26 percent approving, respectively. These averages, however, are not statistically distinct from the scores of racial minority groups (25 percent) and Muslims (27 percent). Twenty-two percent of born-again Christians express tolerance of people who support violent groups, though upwards of 29 percent are understanding of those who retaliate against police. Averaging across the index, these figures compare to 14 percent of Jews, 17 percent of Protestants, and 17 percent of Catholics.

Fig. 1.1. Mean Levels of Tolerance for Political Violence among American Subgroups

Note: Figure 1.1 reports mean levels of agreement to the three items that make up the Political Violence Tolerance index. Standard errors shown. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

Ideological Divides

In trying to understand the support for political violence among Muslims, scholars and policymakers have focused on religious ideology and various sectoral divisions within the Islamic faith as they may pertain to the justification of violence against the government or other groups (Silber and Bhatt 2007; Sageman 2008; Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman 2009). These Page 41 →scholars, however, do not empirically examine the role of ideology. As self-identifying Muslims, respondents of the MANOS survey were asked a series of questions about their faith and to which variant of Islam they adhere. Figure 1.2 compares mean levels of tolerance across some notable ideological divides in the Muslim American community.

Fig. 1.2. Mean Levels of Tolerance of Political Violence among Muslim Subgroups

Note: Figure 1.2 reports mean levels of agreement to the three items that make up the Political Violence Tolerance index. Standard errors shown. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

Islamic Sects and Schools of Thought

As discussed in the introduction, two major sects of Islam are Sunni and Shia, under which are various schools of thought and other differentiating features. As reflected in figure 1.2, Sunni and Shia respondents do not differ significantly in their levels of tolerance for those supporting groups that are willing to engage in violence.

In order to place respondents approximately on a conservative-moderate continuum, the MANOS survey also asks which Islamic approach best describes how the respondent makes an Islamic decision. A plurality of the Muslim American communityвЂ”about 46 percent of the Page 42 →samplevвЂ”do not believe it is required to follow a particular school of thought and do not use an Islamic approach in making decisions. These individuals appear to have the lowest levels of tolerance toward those who support violent groups: less than 20 percent of these respondents can understand people who would support violent political groups.[13] In other words, the plurality of

the Muslim American community, which adheres to more progressive interpretations of Islam, rejects violent extremism at the same rate as non-Muslims. Only a small fractionвЂ”about 8 percent of MANOS respondentsвЂ”indicated that they follow a traditional *madhhab*, or school of thought.[14] The data show that about 40 percent of this subgroup expresses some level of understanding toward those who support groups that are willing to use violence for political causes, significantly higher than other segments of the Muslim community.

Why there is such a significant difference between those who follow a particular school of thought and those who do not is not entirely clear. As mentioned, though schools generally agree on the main issues of Islam, they may differ in their interpretations of basic Islamic precepts, jihad being one of them. The limited sample size of the survey does not allow for meaningful comparison across the small percentage of respondents who follow a *madhhab*, but it is possible that their more literal and conservative interpretation of religious text could be associated with a higher level of tolerance toward the use of violence in various circumstances.

Nation of Islam

Though the teachings of the Nation of IslamвЂ™s leadership promoted avoidance of violence, in the face of police violence and harassment by white supremacists, the NOI encouraged self-defense and a willingness to lay down oneвЂ™s life to defend a Muslim brother (Lincoln 1994). The groupвЂ™s paramilitary wing, the Fruit of Islam, was designed in part to defend the NOI and other members of the African American community against police abuse and other attacks. Given the NOIвЂ™s explicit acceptance of violence for self-defense, it is not surprising that those respondents who identified with this group expressed the highest level of tolerance for violence in some circumstances. More than 60 percent said they could understand those who support groups who use retaliatory violence against law enforcement or against those who attack fellow in-group members. About 47 percent said they could understand those who support groups who use violence for political purposes, high compared to most other Muslims but not statistically distinguishable from Muslims who follow a traditional *madhhab* or the Salafi way of thought.

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Salafism

Around 40 percent of individuals who identify as Salafi in the MANOS dataset expressed some tolerance for those who support violent groups. When breaking down those who identify as Salafi by race, we see that tolerance for violence among African American Salafis (34 percent) is lower than that of nonblack Salafis (44 percent). Foreign-born Salafis appear to be slightly more tolerant of those who support violence (46 percent) than those who are U.S.-born (36 percent). Because the number of observations for this group is so small, though, we cannot be confident in these differences.

Muslim Racial and Generational Divides

As mentioned previously, the Muslim American community is the most racially diverse religious group in the United States. Excluding members of the Nation of Islam, levels of tolerance for those who support violent groups does not vary significantly across racial groups within the community. But when asking about whether a respondent can understand someone who supports people who retaliate against those who attack fellow in-group members, Muslims who identify as a white were significantly more likely to express tolerant views toward such individuals.

Looking next at the generational divide, across all three measures, Muslims born in the United States do not differ significantly from foreign-born Muslims in their overall level of tolerance of violence. About 27 percent of U.S.-born and foreign-born Muslims said they could understand someone who would support a group that resorts to violence. When we remove individuals who identify with the NOIвЂ”48 percent of whom could understand someone who would support such a groupвЂ”only 24 percent of U.S.-born individuals agreed.

This lack of distinction between foreign-born and U.S.-born Muslims differs from theories that suggest Muslims born in the West are more prone to engage in terrorist activities (Silber and Bhatt 2007). It is consistent, however, with the observational data showing that among the individuals convicted on terror charges for violent plots in the United States, the number who were born in the United States and those born abroad is nearly equal (Kurzman 2017).

U.S.-born Muslims, however, express significantly higher levels of tolerance for those who would support a groupвЂ™s attack on police and groups that would retaliate against other groups. While only 21 percent of foreign-bornPage 44 → Muslims said they could understand this view, U.S.-born respondents showed more tolerance: 30 percent of U.S.-born Muslims (excluding NOI and other black Muslims), 24 percent of non-NOI black Muslims, and 57 percent of NOI. On the question of understanding support for people who would wage retaliatory attacks against other groups, 20 percent of foreign-born Muslims expressed tolerance, while 26 percent of U.S.-born Muslims (excluding NOI and other black Muslims), 22 percent of non-NOI black Muslims, and 57 percent of NOI could understand such people.

Finally, the data show that converts do not stand out in their average levels of tolerance toward individuals who support groups who use political violence.

Correlates of Tolerance for Political Violence

To help identify whether religious factorsвЂ”after taking into account demographic differencesвЂ”are significantly associated with tolerance of support for violent groups, ordinary least squares (OLS) multivariate analyses are administered on both the MANOS sample of Muslim respondents and on the non-Muslim sample that was collected for this study. The results are presented in table 1.2.[15] A multivariate analysis is helpful in identifying the strength of competing variables in explaining tolerance for violence across Americans of various backgrounds. Many of the findings in table 1.1 confirm what was discussed above regarding Muslim Americans, but some additional key takeaways are highlighted below. Notably, all else equal, Muslim respondents, with the exception of NOI, are no more likely to tolerate individuals who support violent groups than are Christians (the reference group in model 4).

As was suggested in figures 1.1 and 1.2, women are significantly less likely to tolerate individuals who support violent groups than men among both Muslims and non-Muslims. This relationship holds even when controlling for Islamic schools of thought in model 2, as well as in the combined sample in models 3 and 4. This is consistent with political science literature that finds that women are less likely to support violence than men in a variety of contexts, particularly retaliatory violence and war (Huddy et al. 2005, Eichenberg 2003). Similarly, across all models, younger individuals are significantly more likely to tolerate those who support violent groups. Interestingly, in the Muslim-only sample, those with higher incomes are more likely to tolerate individuals who support violent Page 46 →groups, as seen in models 1 and 2. This appears to mirror observational data collected by Parkin et al. (2017), who find that compared to far-right extremists, Islamist extremists are more economically well off. In the combined sample, individuals with lower levels of education are more likely to tolerate those who support violent groups.

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Table 1.2. Tolerance of Supporters of Violent Groups

	Muslims Only		Combined Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female	в€ ’0.10***	в€ ’0.09***	Female в€ ’0.08***	в€ ’0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	в€ ’0.00***	в€ ’0.00***	Age в€ ’0.00***	в€ ’0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)

Income	0.02**	0.02**	Income	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.00)	(0.00)
Education	в€ ’0.02	в€ ’0.02	Education	в€ ’0.03***	в€ ’0.03***
	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Black	0.03	в€ ’0.05	Black	0.09*	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Hispanic	в€ ’0.05	в€ ’0.07	Hispanic	в€ ’0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Asian	в€ ’0.04	в€ ’0.04	Asian	0.04	0.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Arab	в€ ’0.03	в€ ’0.02	Agnostic		0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.05)
U.S.-born	0.09*	0.07	Atheist		0.13**
	(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.07)
Convert	в€ ’0.06	в€ ’0.02	Other Religion		в€ ’0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.04)
Follows *Madhhab*		0.06	Jewish		в€ ’0.00
		(0.09)			(0.04)
Salafi		0.08	Muslim		0.04
		(0.10)			(0.03)
NOI		0.27***	NOI		0.26***
		(0.08)			(0.08)
Constant	0.47***	0.39***	Constant	0.49***	0.46***
	(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.06)	(0.07)
R^2	0.09	0.15		0.07	0.11
N	488	488		1,403	1,403

Note: Table 1.2 reports the unstandardized coefficients of an OLS regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable in each model is levels of tolerance for those who support violent groups. The dependent variable is an index constructed from three items asked to respondents about whether they could understand someone who would support an organization that *(1) Sometimes resorts to violence; (2) Would attack law enforcement in retaliation; and (3) Would attack members of a group that attacked her group*. See appendix 2 for coding. Models 1 and 2 include Muslim respondents only; models 3 and 4 include Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Interestingly, demographic features appear to explain higher levels of tolerance of violence among individuals who follow a particular *madhhab* or identify as Salafi. In the MANOS sample, young Muslims with high incomes are more likely to identify with a particular *madhhab* and young males are significantly more likely to identify as Salafi. Because of this, when these features are accounted for across the ideological spectrum, belonging to a

conservative school of thought no longer stands out as a key explanatory variable (model 2). Instead, gender, age, and socioeconomic status are more powerful in explaining tolerance for violence.[16]

The results reveal that those who identify with the Nation of Islam are driving the higher levels of tolerance for violent groups among U.S.-born Muslims and blacks in models 1 and 3, respectively. As discussed above, NOI members are more likely than others to understand groups that resort to violence and are also more likely to be black and to be born in the United States. Outside of the Nation of Islam, there do not appear to be significant differences between respondents who were born in the United States and those born abroad (model 2), or those who identify as white (the reference group) and those who identify as black, Hispanic, or Asian (model 4) insofar as their tolerance for violent groups.

The effect of belonging to a particular religious community across the broader American population was assessed by including a series of dichotomous variables in model 4, with Christians as the reference group. After controlling for basic demographics, the data showвЂ”echoing the results of figure 1.1вЂ”that individuals who identify as atheist or part of the Nation of Islam are significantly more likely to tolerate people who support violent political groups. (The effect of belonging to the NOI, however, is more than twice the size of the effect of being atheist.) This suggests that, NOI members aside, Muslims are no more likely to tolerate violence than are Christians (the reference group).

Do Muslim Americans Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism?

Finally, to address the last question laid out in this chapterвЂ”whether Muslim Americans have been active in countering violent extremismвЂ”I first Page 47 →lay out available data on terrorism plots that were disrupted with the help of a Muslim American and then offer specific cases and examples. Of the approximately 3.3 million Muslim Americans living in the United States, Kurzman (2018) reports that 176 have been charged with involvement or attempted involvement in a violent plot in the United States. As mentioned previously, this is less than 0.0001 percent of the Muslim American population. Given these figures, it is unsurprising that the large majority of the participants in this study reported that they had never met anyone who would consider carrying out an act of violence or joining a designated terrorist organization and thus never had the opportunity to directly help prevent terrorism. The second part of this section presents intervieweesвЂ™ thoughts on whether Muslims and Islamic organizations should and do speak out enough against violent extremism.

Fig. 1.3. Methods Used to Initiate Plot Investigation

Note: Figure 1.3 displays the initial sources of disruption for вЂњjihadist terrorism plotsвЂќ in the United States between September 2001 and the end of 2013. Two hundred thirteen disrupted plots are assessed. (*Source:* Bergen et al. 2014)

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Muslims Disrupting Plots

While the FBI has not published an official list of sources of disrupted terror plots, New America (2017) reports that among all jihadist plots between 9/11 and the end of 2016, 26 percent of plots involved a tip from friends and family members of the suspect or the community. This means that at some point during the investigation a community member assisted law enforcement by providing information on the plot or the individual and ultimately prevented the attack.

Even looking specifically at what *initiated* the investigation into a disrupted plot, Bergen et al. (2014) calculate that tips from family, friends, and community members make up the largestвЂ”19 percentвЂ”of the *known* initial sources of disrupted jihadist plots in the United States. This figure is similar to estimates by Crenshaw, Dahl, and Wilson (2017) who find that 17 percent of jihadist plots in the United States between 1993 and 2017 were initially disrupted by family and community tips.

Another 17 percent of investigations into disrupted plots were initiated through paid informants, often people who knew the perpetrator from within the community. (It should be noted that several interviewees expressed concerned over how some informants were used by law enforcement, a topic discussed in more depth in chapter 5.)[17]

Other methods of disruption identified by Bergen et al. (2014) include cases in which suspects were stopped through routine law enforcement (6 percent) and when suspects disclosed themselves through their online activity and statements (4 percent). About 9 percent were identified though a suspicious activity report and 16 percent by various sources of government intelligence. In another 29 percent of cases, involving 62 individuals, the initial source of the investigation is unclear or unreported. Among these, 37 percent involved an informant, though it is unclear whether the informant initiated the investigation or was used after the investigation was initiated.

Not counted, of course, are cases in which community outreach succeeded in turning individuals away from violent activity, or in which the prospect of exposure and arrest deterred potential offenders.

Cases of Plot Disruptions

There is a wide range of circumstances under which family and community members have helped to disrupt potential terror plots. In 2012, a father at the Islamic Center of Northeast Florida in Jacksonville was concernedPage 49 → with a new attendee of the center, Shelton Bell, age 19, who approached his son about inciting violence, conducting jihad, using weapons, and traveling overseas. Mosque leaders called the FBI, setting into motion a case that ultimately led to federal terrorism charges for conspiring and attempting to provide material support to terrorists.

Two other Muslim families from Colorado alerted police immediately after their three teenage daughters attempted to join the Islamic State in Syria in 2014. The teensвЂ™ school notified one of the fathers that she had skipped class, and he noticed she had taken her passport. He reached out to the father of the two other teens, who also discovered that his daughtersвЂ™ passports were missing along with $2,000. The three girls were detained at an airport in Frankfurt, Germany, on their way to Turkey.

Suspecting that her then 17-year-old son, Ali Amin, was becoming radicalized, Amani Ibrahim followed the advice of a local imam and reported her fears to law enforcement officials. In August 2015, Amin was sentenced to eleven years in prison for conspiring to provide material support to Islamic State by helping a schoolmate travel to join the extremist group.

A high-level FBI official interviewed for this study told me about the FBIвЂ™s interaction with the Somali American community after an unprecedented 27 young Somali men left the United States to join the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab beginning in 2007. He said that the flow of young men ultimately halted because family and community members stepped up to stop the recruiting that was happening. вЂњMothers did not want to see their children going overseesвЂќ (AI 178). In fact, in a 2010 study funded by the Department of Justice, researchers who resided for periods of two to three months in four midsized Muslim American communities found that the strength of their communal organizations and social networks rendered their members intrinsically resistant to radicalization. The communities made efforts expressly geared toward preventing and exposing any signs of militancy, efforts that included outreach programs and a variety of internal monitoring or self-policing practices (Schanzer, Kurzman, and Moosa 2010, 12вЂ“16).

Others have dedicated significant time and resources toward countering violent extremism among youth in an effort to save police intervention as a last resort. Imam Mohamed Magid of the All Dulles Area Muslim Society described working with a Muslim teenager who came to him in 2015, at his familyвЂ™s urging, to discuss how he was being wooed by online recruiters working for the Islamic State. вЂњThe recruiters wouldnвЂ™t leave Page 50 →him alone.B .B . They were on social media with him at all hours, they tweet him at night, first thing in the morning. If I talk to him for an hour, they undo him in two hours.вЂќ Though he said he was able to persuade five other young men to abandon plans to fight overseas, he noted dismally that the Islamic StateвЂ™s recruiting efforts had become even more disturbing, and nonstop (Goodstein 2015).

A former business consultant, Humera Khan, founded вЂњMuflehun,вЂќ a think tank that focuses on countering violent extremism online among Muslim youth. She gathers both high school and middle school students to events such as вЂњcyber safetyвЂќ workshops that cover issues from how to detect online pedophiles to how to detect Islamist extremists. вЂњThey are telling you, вЂLetвЂ™s go fight.вЂ™ They are asking you to share gruesome images.B .B .B . Be very careful. These people are not your friends.B .B .B . They will try to be your friend. They will be nice to you, spend lots of time with you. Some of them will be sending you giftsвЂќ (Goodstein 2015).

Of course, not all family or community members of individuals involved with violent extremism are themselves members of the Muslim American community. About a third of those who have faced federal terrorism charges in the United States are self-described converts, some not associated in person with a Muslim community (Kurzman 2017). In 2015, a Boston police captain reported his son, Alexander Ciccolo, age 23, who used the alias Ali Al Amriki online, to the FBI for his interest in ISIS. This initiated close surveillance and contact with undercover operatives working with the FBI and led ultimately to a charge for an ISIS-inspired plot to set off pressure-cooker bombs at college cafeterias. Similarly, in 2015 the father of Justin Sullivan, age 19, from Morganton, North Carolina, alerted authorities of his sonвЂ™s interest in ISIS and desire to kill Americans.

There are also several examples in which a friend of a plotter served willingly as an informant. Antonio Martinez, also known as Muhammad Hussain, was tipped off to the FBI in 2010 by a friend who saw his Facebook posts calling for violence to stop the oppression of Muslims. According to a Department of Justice Press release, the FBI then asked the friend to communicate with Martinez through Facebook about his plans to attack and kill military personnel in Maryland and to turn over the conversations to law enforcement. Martinez allegedly attempted to recruit at least three other people to join in the operation, all of whom declined; one expressly attempted to dissuade Martinez from committing violence (FBI 2010).

Another community member went to police in 2013 after he was approached by Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif about an attack against military personnelPage 51 → in Washington State. The member then ultimately spent weeks working with police as an informant, recording conversations with the conspirators (Pulkkinen 2013).

Despite the limited data provided to the public, this initial evidence suggests that Muslim Americans have contributed significantly to preventing terrorist attacks in the United States and that a meaningful portion of the Muslim American community is willing to reach out to law enforcement in the event they see an acquaintance, friend, or even family member who is preparing to commit a major crime.

On Speaking Out against Violent Extremism

President Barack Obama said on several occasions that Muslims have a responsibility to speak up and help prevent violent extremism, and indeed his 2015 Summit on Countering Violent Extremism centered on community-led intervention (Obama 2015). Muslim Americans have experienced criticism, however, from a variety of pundits and political leaders for not doing enough about terrorism.[18]

Muslim American interviewees in this study addressed their views toward Islamist violent extremists, noting such individuals angered them (AI 26) and that they saw no justification for violence (AI 13). One Pakistani American woman tried to explain how deeply ashamed she was that San Bernardino shooters were of Pakistani descent. She assured me that others in her community felt the same (AI 115). Several noted that terrorists do not represent the Islam they were taught and that they make all Muslims look bad (AI 34, AI 35). One interviewee lamented that itвЂ™s the extremist voices that get the most airtime in the media, saying that extreme ideas should be challenged by mainstream voices (AI 21).

A Muslim American community leader and tech entrepreneur explained that вЂњweвЂ™re [the American Muslim community] trying to put ourselves back into a framework that weвЂ™re like everyone else.вЂќ He recalled that the American public was relieved to see that the uncle of the Boston Marathon bombers was visibly angry at his nephewsвЂ™ actions. вЂњThe American people have to see that we are visibly angry. We all feel that emotion. WeвЂ™re all pissed off. ItвЂ™s important that we express this to other Americans to show them that weвЂ™re all in this togetherвЂќ (AI 176). Another Muslim American community leader and university

professor similarly expressed that вЂњour outrage is real and understandable. ISIS is dragging our religion through the mud. The world has to hear our rage. More than 70 percent of our fellowPage 52 → Americans do not know a Muslim firsthand. So we cannot blame them if they do not know us and do not know where we standвЂќ (AI 177).

Other Muslims interviewed in this study, while finding violent extremism abhorrent, were nevertheless frustrated with the expectation that they вЂњapologizeвЂќ continuously after every Islamist extremist attack. They felt they were assigned an unfair burden of collective responsibility to attempt to curb violent extremism inspired by Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other like-minded groups, while other communities were not being asked to address antigovernment sentiment, racism, and other forms of extremism. Indeed, Schanzer et al. (2016) find that American law enforcement agencies do not conduct similar outreach to other communities associated with various forms of violent extremismвЂ”even though they report these as being greater threats to securityвЂ”in part because those communities refuse to cooperate with police. Several respondents in this study said being singled out by law enforcement made them feel they were somehow taking responsibility for an act or a group that in no way represented them.

One interviewee, a product manager at a major U.S. corporation, was frustrated to note that when people of other religions commit terror, the media does not emphasize or even mention their religion (AI 19). A software engineer said he feels betrayed by the Muslims who make horrible decisions to commit violence, but is also frustrated by the media, which he thinks should be more вЂњknowledgeableвЂќ about Muslims and that extremists are isolated cases and the majority of Muslims do not share those views (AI 39).

The Role of Islamic Leadership and Organizations

Several interviewees particularly emphasized the role that Muslim American leaders played, not only in fighting against radicalization in mosques, but also in reaching out to the broader American public (AI 28, AI 29, AI 36). Consistent with the views of others, one male interviewee said he believes that Muslim leaders should continue to show that they are mourning with the rest of America when attacks happen and should not be silent (AI 1). Though several believed that Muslim leaders were already doing a good job of this (AI 26, AI 17), another womanвЂ”a substitute teacher of German and Jordanian descentвЂ”added that вЂњMuslim leaders should take more action and communicate and educate the public about Islam and Muslims. They should reach out to non-Muslims in discussions and show them how Muslims really are and what they believeвЂќ (AI 12). Another explainedPage 53 → that вЂњif Muslim leaders do not speak out, others will decide how Muslims should be portrayedвЂќ (AI 25). A Silicon Valley CEO said he believed it was also the duty of Muslim American leaders to educate fellow Muslims on how to actively protect their home in America (AI 33); others added that it is also Muslim leadersвЂ™ responsibility to do all they can to control extremists before they turn violent (AI 1, AI 25, AI 10, AI 18).

Several Muslim American organizations across the country have actively spoken out against violent extremist acts and have worked to prevent youth radicalization within their communities. In 2005, the Fiqh Council of North America issued a fatwa (an Islamic legal opinion) against terrorism to make clear the position of American Muslim leaders on the issue.[19] The fatwa has been endorsed by 145 Muslim organizations. National organizations that have endorsed this fatwa, such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), among others. These groups continue to speak out against extremism of all kinds through press releases, through social media campaigns, and on their websites, particularly after attacks occur.

A leader at the Islamic Society of North America (one of the largest Muslim American organizations, which draws more than 30,000 American Muslims to its annual conference) stated in an interview that Muslim American leaders need not deny the fact that the problem of terrorism exists and that there are cases of radicalization in the United States that need to be addressed. He explained that ISNA continues to work on developing counternarratives to violent extremism and have been cooperative with law enforcement. He believes in collaboration between the Muslim American community and law enforcement because the issue of terrorism is

pertinent to all Americans (AI 42).

To broadcast their repudiation of terrorism to a wider audience, Muslims have developed online national and international media campaigns in response to Islamist terrorism in the West. Angie Emara, the campaign director of the Chicago-based *MyJihad*, which aims to rebrand public perceptions of the meaning of вЂњjihad,вЂќ explains, вЂњThe *MyJihad* campaign specifically directs its efforts toward countering extremist groups like ISIS that call themselves вЂњMuslimвЂ™ to let the public know that their actions are not Islamic. They do not represent IslamвЂќ (#Myjihad.com 2014). Several interviewees explained that they supported the Obama administrationвЂ™s decision to stop using the terms вЂњjihadвЂќ or вЂњradical Islam.вЂќ They explain that terms favored by President Trump such as вЂњradical Islamic terrorismвЂќ Page 54 →are unhelpful because terrorist organizations like ISIS represent a perversion of Islam and are thus un-Islamic. One interviewee, a leader at a major Islamic organization in Washington, DC, said that labeling ISIS Islamic is exactly what ISIS wants and is tantamount to recognizing that ISIS is correct in claiming that it represents Islam. Labels are important, he explained, since the choice of words can affect the trust between Muslims and the rest of society, and avoiding these terms improves the potential for cooperation between law enforcement and the Muslim American community (AI 83).

Particularly under the Obama administration, several national Muslim American organizations began working to broaden their public safety partnerships to include community-led violence prevention and intervention programs. For example, the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) created a National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism and a Safe Spaces Initiative as an alternative approach to the governmentвЂ™s CVE programs. The campaigns included engaging with law enforcement officials locally and federally and offering expert testimony on Capitol Hill to assist policymakers (though federal funding for the program was later cut under the Trump administration [Hansler 2017; C-SPAN 2017]).

Smaller, more locally focused Islamic organizations have also developed efforts to prevent Muslim youth from radicalizing. An example of this is the large Somali community in Minneapolis. Abdi Bihi directs the Somali Education and Social Advocacy Center in Minneapolis, with the goal of linking youthвЂ”who face some of the highest unemployment and poverty rates in the countryвЂ”with jobs and extracurricular activities as an alternative to joining gangs or extremist groups. A Somali mothersвЂ™ group called Voice of East Africa Women regularly invite local FBI officials to their meetings to maintain engagement. The first East African Mental Health Conference, hosted by the Somali American Parent Association and sponsored by the Minnesota Department of Health, was held in 2015. The conference offered suggestions for how health professionals and social workers can best serve the East African community. The Center for Somalia History Studies hosts seminars to talk about combating radicalization through school-parent intervention programs. For years many Minneapolis Somalis have been asking for more resources to help their at-risk youth, and in 2015 the Justice Department began funding some of these grass-roots programs that focus on mentoring opportunities, higher education scholarships, and job opportunities and training. Nevertheless, Page 55 →some within the community fear that the government may use these programs for surveillance and may further stigmatize the community.

Not all Muslim American organizations have avoided controversy in the terrorism space. The Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), for example, was criticized for hosting Anwar al-Awlaki as a speaker in 2002, some years before he became a senior talent recruiter and motivator of Al-Qaeda. After evidence was brought against al-Awlaki in 2010, the ICNA Shariah Council strongly denounced al-AwlakiвЂ™s views, actions, and connections to terrorism, repudiating his ideology as a вЂњcall of hateвЂќ and calling upon American Muslims to reject al-AwlakiвЂ™s views.[20]

Discussion: Assessing How Muslim Americans Respond to Violence

This chapter has set the stage for examining various aspects of the Muslim American experience by looking at Muslim reactions to and management of the communityвЂ™s association with violence in the post-9/11 environment. While the focus of this book is not violent extremism itself, the issue has been the catalyst and continual motivation for the scrutiny Muslim Americans have experienced in the post-9/11 environment, and it is

part and parcel of the discussion.

Acknowledging the empirical challenges of studying terrorism in the United States since 9/11, the MANOS data reveal that Muslim Americans are no more likely than other Americans to tolerate individuals involved with violent groups; the exception to this trend are members of the Nation of Islam, who, while instructed to avoid violence, believe in self-defense. This finding is consistent with observable data that one of the largest sources of information that has disrupted terrorism plots involving Muslims since 9/11 has been community members, family members, or friends of the perpetrators. The sentiments expressed in interviews suggest that the large majority of the Muslim American community abhors violence and wants Americans to understand that most Muslim Americans strongly reject such extreme views and actions. Participants in this study made clear that Muslim Americans share the same fear as their fellow Americans of falling victim to a terrorist attack on U.S. soil and, similarly, want the government to be successful in protecting Americans from such attacks.

Despite these findings, about half of all Americans believe that Islam is Page 56 → more likely than other religions to encourage violence, and a third of all Americans believe Muslims should be subject to more scrutiny than people of other religions (Pew 2015b). Many Muslims I spoke with believe the mediaвЂ™s portrayal of Muslims and terrorist attacks is responsible for what they argue are skewed perceptions of their community.

The preceding discussions attempt to broaden our understanding of the largely overlooked experiences of nonviolent Muslim Americans in the securitized post-9/11 environment. The attitudes toward violence of the majority of the American Muslim population are important to understand and highlight because popular beliefs about the proclivities of Muslims have driven public scrutiny of the community. Moreover, American counterterrorism and CVE efforts have largely benefited due to their support and cooperation.

Chapter 2 addresses another area of potential scrutiny for Muslim Americans: their level of integration in the United States. The chapter empirically assesses how different (or similar) Muslim Americans are from their American compatriots on a variety of measures.

2. Muslim Integration in the United States

In the decades following the 9/11 attacks, public discussions about the causes of homegrown radicalization and violent extremism in Western countries have focused on the degree to which Muslim immigrants have integrated into their adopted countries.

This has been a particularly salient conversation in Europe, where some Muslim communities operate outside of the mainstream economy, have lower incomes, attend lower-quality schools, and are thought to be less secularized than their European counterparts (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016). As mentioned earlier, although the connection between integration and terrorism is contested empirically, Muslims have been accused of refusing to integrate into Western societies. For example, Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2016) find that an overwhelming majority of French society attributes MuslimsвЂ™ lack of social and economic integration to their *refusal to integrate themselves* for reasons of their religious affiliation.

Muslims in the United StatesвЂ”like their European counterpartsвЂ”also suffer from a perception that they have not fully integrated and are different from other Americans in a fundamental way. In a reference to the Muslim American community in 2015, Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal complained that вЂњpeople want to come to our country but not adopt our valuesвЂ”in some cases, not adopt our language, in some cases, want to set apart their own enclaves and continue to hold on to their own values. I think it is dangerous in America and itвЂ™s dangerous in EuropeвЂќ (Bhattacharyya 2015). A day after U.S. federal authorities arraigned three young men in Brooklyn, New York, on charges of plotting to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in 2015, borough president Eric Adams announced his office would launch a new effort to help integrate Muslim youth into New York and American society (Bredderman 2015), suggesting that the lack of integration was a key cause of support for violent extremism. Similarly, on Page 58 →several occasions President Donald Trump accused Muslim Americans of failing to assimilate: вЂњAssimilation has been very hard. ItвЂ™s almostвЂ”I wonвЂ™t say nonexistent, but it gets to be pretty close. And IвЂ™m talking about second and third generation. They comeB .B .B . for some reason, thereвЂ™s no real assimilation.вЂќ[1]

Are Muslims, on average, systematically distinct from other Americans? Are they significantly poorer? Are they locked out or refusing to engage with American institutions such as the political system, schools, or other social venues? Do they share American values? Do they have non-Muslim American friends? In other words, are Muslim Americans failing, or worse, *refusing* to integrate into American society? This chapter takes a look at observable data to gauge how well various segments of the Muslim American population are integrating and to determine whether Muslims are faring much worse than other segments of American society.

Measuring Integration

While вЂњintegrationвЂќ is commonly used in both academic literature and public discussions on immigrants, there is no single agreed-upon definition of the term.[2] Meanings vary from country to country, change over time, and depend on the interests, values, and perspectives of the user. Early American migration scholars studied the late 19th- and early 20th-century European newcomers to metropolitan American cities and focused on the notion of assimilation (Park and Burgess 1921), a process by which migrants take on the economic and sociocultural characteristics of the majority population. The civil rights movement and the 1965 immigration law reforms inspired studies on how race and ethnicity factor into the Americanization experience, challenging old assumptions of unidirectional change toward the dominant culture (see Chun, Organista, and Marin 2003). This led to studies of immigrantsвЂ™ acculturation strategies and psychological states (Berry 2003).

вЂњIntegrationвЂќ also clearly denotes a sociostructural state and outcome. Governments and policymakers have become increasingly interested in whether immigrants are able to occupy socioeconomic positions (e.g., employment, income level, social interaction, civic engagement) comparable with those of the majority population (Kurthen and Heisler 2008; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Page 59

→the European Union (EU) 2015; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Ager and Strang 2008).

For the purposes of this study, integration refers to the convergence between Muslims and non-Muslims across a variety of economic, social, civic, cultural, and psychological measures. This chapter will not only assess the integration of Muslims who arrive as immigrants themselves, but also their descendants who are born in the United States (the so-called second and third generations). Some of the most important questions about the integration of immigrants concern the fate of these later generations, how descending from Muslim immigrant parents or grandparents affects their life chances, and how they relate to the society in which they live.[3]

Integration is empirically measured by looking at the Muslim American community as a snapshot, at a particular point in time, to compare them to other Americans (both immigrants and natives) across various dimensions during the same point in time. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first examines the income, education, and employment levels of Muslims in the United States. The second section evaluates social dynamics, including English-language acquisition, social interaction with non-Muslims in neighborhoods, marriage and friendship, and schools. The third section examines MuslimsвЂ™ legal status as well as civic engagement through activities such as voting. Next, cultural differences are examined by focusing on religious beliefs and practices, and attitudes toward womenвЂ™s role in society. Finally, this chapter assesses the strength of MuslimsвЂ™ identification and attachment with the United States, as well as their own perceptions of discrimination and acceptance.

Unless otherwise noted, this chapter draws on data from the Muslim American National Opinion Survey (MANOS), 2013 U.S. Census data (the same year MANOS was administered) and survey data on the general American population that was collected for this study to compare Muslim Americans to their non-Muslim American counterparts. It should be noted again that because there is not census data available on religious affiliation in the United States, the survey data on Muslim Americans is not an exact representation of the groupвЂ™s demographic features, but rather an estimation. The survey and census data are supplemented by findings from in-depth interviews with Muslims from around the country and other available data on Muslims living in the United States, including that collected by Pew Research Center. In the absence of the means for a perfectPage 60 → comparison, however, comparing Muslim Americans to other sectors of the U.S. population on a variety of measures nevertheless reveals valuable information about their levels of integration.

Economic Integration

One of the most commonly cited measures of integration is that of economic integration, or the degree to which immigrants and their offspring are able to succeed in the labor market. While it is clear that immigrants overall potentially face higher barriers to entry into the labor market than natives, it is useful to compare the economic stability of Muslims to other non-Muslim groupsвЂ”both immigrants and U.S.-bornвЂ”living in the United States to get a sense of any difference in this regard. Looking at education levels, income levels, and employment data, the findings suggest that Muslims are performing well when compared with both foreign-born and native-born Americans in terms of their educational attainment and ability to earn income. There is evidence, however, that unemployment is higher among foreign-born Muslims and African American Muslims compared to their non-Muslim counterparts.

Education Levels

Data from MANOS suggest that MuslimsвЂ™ education levels mirror, if not exceed in some cases, that of the broader U.S. population. Forty percent of foreign-born Muslims report earning a four-year college degree or greater. This compares to only 28 percent of all U.S. foreign-born residents. Muslim immigrantsвЂ™ high levels of education are consistent with U.S. Census data, which shows that Middle Eastern and North African immigrants tend to have much higher educational attainment compared to the overall foreign- and native-born adult populations: 45.3 percent of foreign-born residents from the Middle East hold college degrees as do 49 percent of Asian foreign-born residents, groups that make up the bulk of the U.S. immigrant Muslim community.

The high educational attainment among immigrant Muslims is due in part to updates in U.S. immigration law,

such as the Immigration Act of 1990 and the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, which aimed to attract more entrants with higher skills and education levels. Thus, not surprisingly, the majority of recent Muslim migrantsPage 61 → have come to the United States for high-skilled job opportunities or to obtain advanced degrees. This creates a disproportionately highly skilled Muslim immigrant class, compared with U.S.-born Muslims, who cover the whole spectrum of educational attainment. Nearly 30 percent of nonblack U.S.-born Muslims report that they have a four-year college degree or more, compared to 29 percent of the non-Muslim American population. Education levels among U.S.-born Muslims, while lower than immigrant Muslims, are similar to the levels of U.S.-born non-Muslims.

While Muslim immigrants on average constitute a well-educated group, there is a stark contrast between migrants coming for high-skilled jobs and those who come due to dire situations in their home countries. The Pew Research Center estimated in 2007 that one in five Muslims immigrants in the United States migrated due to economic hardship, conflict, or persecution in their home country. While 26 percent of these individuals emigrated from Iran, many of whom were liberal intelligentsia escaping the 1979 Islamic revolution, others came from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds that differed from other migrations. For example, while more than two-thirds of immigrants in 2013 from Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates had finished college, only 11 percent of those from Yemen had a bachelorвЂ™s degree or beyond (Zong and Batalova 2015).

The socioeconomic advantages that come with immigrant MuslimsвЂ™ high levels of educationвЂ”such as superior living conditions and greater potential jobs and opportunitiesвЂ”can increase socioeconomic advantages in each following generation. Not all native-born Muslims, however, are descendants of these highly educated immigrants. African American Muslims, whose forebears arrived to the United States enslaved, look more similar to their non-Muslim African American counterparts in terms of opportunities and educational attainment. Twenty percent of non-NOI black Muslims report earning a four-year college degree or higher, compared to 21.8 percent among blacks nationwide. Those who are affiliated with the Nation of Islam, however, report significantly lower levels of educational attainment, with 12.4 percent earning college degrees.

Income Levels

This study found Muslims to be equally as successful as non-Muslims in their ability to earn income, as reflected by the data in figure 2.1. In the MANOS dataset, 30 percent of foreign-born Muslims and 33 percent of Page 62 →U.S.-born Muslims reported annual incomes higher than $50,000, about the median income level for a full-time working man in the United States in 2013, the year the MANOS survey was taken.[4] Among the broader foreign-born and U.S.-born American population, however, only 23 percent and 29 percent,[5] respectively, reported higher-than-median incomes. The figures indicate that a similar portion of Muslim Americans and non-Muslim AmericansвЂ”both foreign- and native-bornвЂ”earn above the median income level.

Fig. 2.1. American Annual Incomes by Religion and Generation

Note: Figure 2.1 presents the percentage of individuals who earn (a) more than $50,000 annually and (b) less than $20,000 annually, respectively. Figure compares foreign-born Muslims and U.S.-born Muslims living in the United States to all foreign-born and U.S.-born individuals living in the United States. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013 and U.S. Census 2013)

On the lower end of the income scale, we look at the percentage of Muslims and non-Muslims who earn less than $20,000 a year, the national poverty level for a household of three.[6] The data show that 35 percent of foreign-born Muslims and 30 percent of U.S.-born Muslims reported having incomes of less than $20,000 a year, compared to 39 percent of all foreign-born residents and 35 percent of all U.S.-born Americans. This suggests that a similar portion of the Muslim American community is living in poverty, compared with the broader American population.

Despite the overall healthy income levels reported among Muslims, certain segments of the Muslim American community are clearly not doing as well financially in the United States. Refugees often arrive to the Page 63 →United States under dire circumstances and can struggle to make ends meet. As discussed in chapter 1, a sizable

Somali Muslim community continues to grow in the United States following war, famine, and the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. The United States has granted refugee status to about 100,000 Somalis since 1990, one of the largest U.S. refugee resettlement programs in American history. The majority of these Somalis arrived in the country with relatively low levels of formal schooling, limited English language skills, and credentials that can be difficult to transfer to American labor markets (Abdi 2011). The 2001 U.S. Census estimated that 80 percent of the Somali population living in the United States made less than $25,000 a year, and half of those earned less than $15,000 annually (Bernauer et al. 2011). The 2007 American Community Survey found Somalis to have the highest poverty rateвЂ”51 percentвЂ”of all newcomers to America. This is four times the national average and double the poverty rate of African Americans.

Somalis, despite high levels of poverty, are not outside of the U.S. labor force. Somalis receiving government assistance in Minnesota reportedly earn higher incomes than whites and African Americans on the same programs (Bernauer et al. 2011). The community is known to value mutual aid and operate informal systems of pooling resources in which members of a group contribute money and then each use the fund in turn. The tight-knit communities have established businesses, religious organizations, and social service agencies wherever there are large concentrations of Somalis across the United States.

Labor Force Participation

Muslim Americans, with the exceptions discussed below, have been as successful as the larger American population in taking advantage of labor market opportunities and are just as likely to start their own businesses as are other Americans. The Pew Research Center found in 2011 that the proportion of Muslim Americans employed in full-time jobs (41 percent) roughly mirrored the figure for the general public (45 percent). In addition, one in five Muslims reported being self-employed or a small business owner, about the same level as in the U.S. adult population at large, at 17 percent.

Immigrant women from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, however, participate in the U.S. labor force at a lower rate than the overall immigrant and native-born populations. In 2013, the Migration Policy Institute reported that only about 44 percent of female MENA immigrantsPage 64 → were in the work force, compared to the overall female foreign-born (56 percent) and U.S.-born (59 percent) populations (Zong and Batalova 2015). Male MENA immigrants, on the other hand, participate in the civilian labor force (70 percent) at a rate similar to the total foreign-born population, with the notable exception of Saudi Arabians. Only around 28 percent of male immigrants from Saudi Arabia were in the U.S. civilian labor force in 2013 (Zong and Batalova 2015).

While it is not entirely clear why the labor force participation rate among Saudis is so low, this could, in part, reflect the relatively higher number of Saudi students coming to the United States on F-1 student visas versus coming for work. After loosening the tough restrictions that kept Arab students away from the United States in the years following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States observed a spike in the number of Saudi students living in the country. In 2013, Saudi Arabia ranked behind only China, India, and South Korea in the number of students studying in U.S. colleges and universities. The vast majoritywвЂ”86 percentвЂ”of Saudi students who study abroad go to America (Fischer 2014). Most Saudi students during this time were supported by the King Abdullah Scholarship program, which brought more than $500 million in educational spending to the United States between 2008 and 2012.[7] Saudi government support means students do not need to work, and many Saudis return home after receiving their degrees.

Unemployment

According to MANOS and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment rates of Muslims living in the United States generally reflect that of the larger American population, although we see higher levels of reported unemployment among black Muslims and immigrant Muslim populations. Figure 2.2 presents unemployment figures for Muslims and non-Muslims in 2013. The reported unemployment rate of nonblack U.S.-born Muslims was 8 percent, compared to 7.5 percent of the general white American population. While blacks in the United

States consistently have double the unemployment rates of the general American population (black unemployment was 13.5 percent in 2013 [Desilver 2013]), black Muslims appear to be faring far worse: 23 percent reported to be unemployed in 2013. This finding appears to be driven by black Muslims without a college degree (27 percent unemployed). Only 2.2 percent of black Muslims with a four-year college degree or more report being unemployed,Page 65 → compared to just over 3 percent unemployment among college graduates in the general American population in 2013.

Fig. 2.2. 2013 U.S. Unemployment Levels

Note: Figure 2.2 presents the percentage of individuals who were unemployed in 2013 in the United States. It compares U.S.-born non-black Muslims and non-Muslims, black Muslim and non-Muslims, and Muslim and non-Muslim foreign-born individuals living in the United States. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013 and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013)

Reported unemployment rates among Muslim immigrants (12 percent) also appear to be higher on average than the official unemployment numbers of other foreign-born workers in the United States (6.9 percent). Unemployment rates among Arab and white immigrant Muslims (18 percent report being unemployed) appear to be driving this gap, regardless of education level. While it could be that some respondents marking вЂњunemployedвЂќ are not actually searching for work, even with prestigious degrees from abroad, some Muslim immigrants can have trouble finding a job or career commensurate with their education and experience from their home country. Studies show that immigrants typically experience downward mobility in terms of their earnings, employment, and occupational status upon arrival to their new home (Alba and Nee 2003). Immigrants face challenges when trying to validate their foreignPage 66 → academic credentials with various U.S. government and licensing bodies, not to mention their employersвЂ™ lack of knowledge and cultural competence in evaluating and hiring internationally trained professionals. More broadly, discrimination against visible minorities is a known factor in hiring decisions (Pager, Western, and Bonikowski 2009). Indeed, Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2015) found that Muslim Arabs in Detroit were more likely to experience disrespect and to fare less well in the labor market than Arab American Christians. Similarly, Wright et al. (2013), in a field experiment in which fictitious resumes were sent to employers, found that Muslim applicants received one-third fewer responses than the control group. Discrimination in hiring could be contributing to this gap in employment between Muslim immigrants and immigrants in the United States generally, and potentially to the gap among black Muslims and other American blacks as well.

This downgrade in occupational status tends to be most extreme for some groups of refugees, particularly those from countries with a different language, different occupational requirements, and a different labor structure from the host country. The U.S. State Department notes that most refugees begin in entry-level jobs even if they have high-level skills or education (U.S. Dept. of State 2017). While refugees typically receive cash and medical assistance upon arrival, they are expected to be self-sufficient within a year. Turning down any job available, no matter how overqualified they might be, could be used as a reason to deny benefits.

Despite facing many challenges, there is evidence that Iraqi refugeesвЂ™ level of economic integration is at least improving over time. Among a cohort of Iraqi refugees who arrived to the United States between 2007 and 2009, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimated their unemployment rate to be upwards of 46 percent in 2009. This figure dropped to 22.6 percent by 2012. While still nearly three times as high as the national average, the declining unemployment rate signals an improvement in workforce integration over time.

Social Integration

Another measure of integration, in addition to the ability to navigate the labor market, is social integration, including intermixing with the networks of the host society through friendship, intermarriage, associations, and other means.[8] This section briefly explores the degree to which MuslimPage 67 → immigrants and their descendants are exposed to American social life outside of Muslim communities. This includes information on what we know about the levels of English acquisition, the existence of Muslim ethnic enclaves in the United

States, and the extent of direct contact with other Americans through marriage, friendship, and nonreligious schools. Together the data suggest that most Muslim Americans are not socially isolated and have relatively high levels of interaction with non-Muslim Americans.

English Acquisition

While there is no reliable data on the overall level of English acquisition among Muslims living in the United States (a key requirement for socialization with most Americans), several pieces of data suggest that Muslim AmericansвЂ™ ability to speak English is on a par with other immigrant groups in the United States. The Pew Research Center has estimated that 83 percent of the foreign-born Muslim American community feels comfortable speaking English (Keeter and Smith 2009). Furthermore, 80 percent of Arabs in the 2003 Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS) said they speak English вЂњwell or very wellвЂќ (Baker et al. 2003).[9] An earlier study by the Migration Policy Institute similarly reported that 80 percent of immigrants from Persian Gulf countries like Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates spoke English вЂњvery well,вЂќ but that there were exceptions for individuals from countries such as Yemen, where only 37 percent of migrants could speak English very well. Evidence also suggests that Arab AmericansвЂ™ use of Arabic declines with more time in the United States (Goldwasser 2000).

For comparison, U.S. Census data reports that 72 percent of all foreign-born individuals living in the United States have strong English-speaking abilities. So while the available data on Muslim AmericansвЂ™ English acquisition is patchy, the group appears to fare well in English-speaking abilities relative to other immigrants living in the United States.

Marriage and Friendship with Non-Muslims in America

Another sign of cultural and social convergence, beyond mere exposure to the host society, is the degree to which migrants befriend and are accepted by members of the host society; this reflects a level of shared values and tolerance of another culture. Scholars have long considered intermarriage Page 68 →to be a key indicator of social integration into the larger society because it suggests that group boundaries are fading in importance (Alba and Golden 1986; Gordon 1964; Qian and Lichter 2007).

Muslim Americans engage in interfaith marriages at rates similar to other Americans, and in increasing numbers in later generations. In 2011, Pew found that 28 percent of U.S.-born Muslims live in a household with at least one non-Muslim, as do 16 percent of foreign-born Muslims. Similarly, Kulczyzki and Lobo (2002) found that the number of Arab Americans who marry outside their ethnic group increases with later generations. Comparatively, 28 percent of all Americans are married or living with a partner of another faith (Pew 2015a);[10] only 10 percent are married or living with a partner of another race (Bialik 2017).[11]

MANOS respondents reported having interfaith friendships at comparable rates to other American groups, and, like those of other immigrant groups, friendships with out-group members appear to increase across generations. As seen in figure 2.3, 26 percent of foreign-born Muslims say that вЂњnoneвЂќ or вЂњnot too manyвЂќ of their friends are Muslim. The portion of Muslim friends in oneвЂ™s social network appears to drop with later generations, as 37 percent of U.S.-born Muslims say that none or not too many of their friends are Muslim. On the other end, 39 percent of foreign-born Muslims say that вЂњmostвЂќ or вЂњallвЂќ of their friends share their Islamic faith. This percentage declines slightly among later-generation Muslims, with 31 percent of U.S.-born Muslims saying that most or all of their friends are also Muslim.

By this measure, Muslims appear to become more integrated sooner than some other groups: 64 percent of first-generation Hispanics and 49 percent of second-generation Hispanics said that most or all of their friends in the United States were from their country of origin. Among Asians, 49 percent of first-generation and 17 percent of second-generation Asians said that all or most of their friends in the United States come from their country of origin (Pew 2013b). Among Jewish Americans, 32 percent reported that most or all of their friends are Jewish (Pew 2013a).

In their study of Muslim integration in the San Francisco Bay Area, Senzai and Bazian (2013) found that many Muslim Americans express a desire for their community to continue to build more strategic, long-term engagement with non-Muslim communities. Some communities, however, have developed more of an isolationist attitude after 9/11. While the segregation of the Muslim community in the United States is understood to be less severe than in Europe, some Muslim Americans believe it is Page 69 → important to preserve religious beliefs and cultural practices by confining social interactions to oneвЂ™s national and religious community. Nevertheless, Pew (2011) found that Muslim Americans are no more likely to perceive a natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society than are American Christians to say there is a conflict between devotion to their religion and life in a modern society. This is consistent with Fish (2011), who found that there is nothing about being Muslim that inclines a person to be appreciably more or less likely to participate in organizational life or social connectedness. Hasan (2000) and Goldwasser (2000) similarly found that with more time in the United States, Muslims increasingly adopt customs more similar to those of their American peers. Muslim Americans thus reflect other religious groups in the United States in terms of their diversity of beliefs about how religious persons should engage with the world around them.

Fig. 2.3. Percentage of Muslims with Friends of the Same Faith, by Generation

Note: Figure 2.3 presents the percentage of Muslims, by generation, with social groups that are composed of fellow Muslims. Respondents were asked: *How many of your friends or people in the social, school, or work groups you belong to are also the same religion as you?* (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

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Socialization in American Schools

Schools have played a tremendous role in the lives of immigrant youth throughout AmericaвЂ™s history for a host of reasons, one of which is their role in absorbing and integrating newcomers. Particularly since the mid-19th century, U.S. public schools have been seen as places where young people can be woven into the fabric of society (or a segment of it) and as a key mechanism by which common values are shared and a sense of national identity is generated and maintained (Ciment and Radzilowski 2015).

Based on several indicators, the large majority of Muslim American studentsвЂ”an estimated 90 to 95 percentвЂ”attend mainstream, non-Islamic educational institutions rather than Islamic schools. Karen Keyworth, one of the founders of the Islamic School League of America (ISLA), cites that only an estimated 4 percent of Muslim youth attend private Islamic school (Keyworth 2009). This compares to 23 percent of Jewish Americans who said they attended yeshiva or Jewish day school (Pew 2013a).

According to my conversations with Muslim parents around the country, while the majority are not economically or ideologically inclined to send their children to schools outside the public system, the issue is debated within some segments of the community. Some Muslim parents decide not to put their children in Islamic schools because they do not believe the schools are educationally on a par with other schools. Karen Keyworth reflected this sentiment in an interview: вЂњIf youвЂ™re dealing with immigrants, youвЂ™re dealing with post-colonial attitudes.B .B .B . The way to move upward was through Western schoolsB .B .B . they saw Islamic schools as not where they should put their students if they want their kids to end up in HarvardвЂќ (Huus 2011). Other Muslim American parents speak out against sending children to Islamic schools out of fear that it will create a sense of separatism or вЂњghettoizationвЂќ of the community.

Other Muslim parents, however, see Islamic schools as a good option for their children. Parents in favor of Islamic schools said they prefer an institution where their children would be safe from discrimination and discomfort and would be able to practice their religion openly. Many parents also expressed interest in their childrenвЂ™s learning Arabic and the QurвЂ™an. These ideas are supported by Grewal and Coolidge (2013), who note that the Muslim-majority school environment creates an Islamic ethos that normalizes Islamic practices and Page 71

→attempts to cultivate pride and a Muslim identity for students. Several interviewees also mentioned that some Muslims see Islamic schools as a way to guard their children from harmful influences they associated with public schools, such as sexual activity, drug and alcohol use, and gang involvement.

Islamic schooling has been heavily stigmatized since 9/11 due to public fears that such schools produce radical youth.[12] These fears remain unsubstantiated, and they ignore the rich history and important role of Islamic schooling for the Muslim community in the United States. The Nation of Islam established the first formal U.S. Islamic pedagogical institutions in the 1930s, called вЂњUniversities of Islam.вЂќ The schools offered K-12 education and were seen as alternatives to the poor conditions and structural racism that confronted black students in the public schools in urban America (McCloud 1995). The large majority of full-time Islamic schools operating in the United States today, however, were established in the 1990s by more recent immigrants, primarily from the Middle East and South Asia. Their methods and curriculum largely mirror those of American public schools, often differing only by offering Islamic studies and Arabic.

Supplemental Islamic Schooling

Some American Muslims participate in supplemental, part-time religious programming such as Islamic Sunday schools at local mosques, summer camps led by national organizations, and tutors who teach children how to read the QurвЂ™an at home. While the MANOS sample did not reveal whether respondents had full or supplemental Islamic schooling, it indicated that foreign-born Muslims were more likely to have had some Islamic teaching than those born in the United States. Thirty-eight percent of U.S.-born Muslims said they had at least a year of Islamic schooling, compared with 52 percent of foreign-born Muslims. Among U.S.-born Muslims, those who identified as Asian were most likely to have received some Islamic schooling, with 60 percent reporting at least one year of instruction. This compares to 24 percent of U.S.-born Arab Muslims, 37 percent of U.S.-born white Muslims and 35 percent of U.S.-born black Muslims.

For comparison with another religious group, 59 percent of Jewish Americans in a national study by the Pew Research Center reported that they participated in some form of formal Jewish education and 38 percent said they had attended overnight Jewish summer camps (Pew 2013a).

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Civic Integration

The ability of migrants and their descendants to understand and participate in the political process is another important measure of membership in a society. This goes hand-in-hand with a belief in the legitimacy of a countryвЂ™s governmental, legal system, and political system. This section considers the naturalization and voting rates among Muslim Americans, the data for which indicate that their levels of civic engagement are comparable to other Americans.

Citizenship

The long process of citizenship through naturalization can be arduous for some immigrants. While one may easily meet some of the technical requirementsвЂ”be at least 18 years old and have lived in the United States for at least five years (or three if married to an American citizen)вЂ”for many immigrants to the United States, there are several additional steps to earn citizenship, not to mention the hundreds, sometimes thousands, of dollars spent on application fees. For example, those who have not arrived speaking English may spend years preparing to demonstrate the requisite knowledge of American history and government (вЂњcivicsвЂќ) and the ability to read, write, and speak basic English. Furthermore, U.S. law requires immigrants to vouch for their own вЂњgood moral character,вЂќ typically demonstrated by a clean criminal record and letters from people like neighbors, religious leaders, or employers to affirm their character and detail how they contribute to U.S. society.

On top of this, several Muslims I spoke with discussed additional barriers to citizenship for Muslims, pointing to a once-secret United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) program, the Controlled Application

Review and Resolution Program (CARRP). The ACLUвЂ”which helped win approval to pursue a class-action lawsuit against the U.S. government for the program in 2017вЂ”explains that USCIS created CARRP in 2008 as a way to determine when an applicant should be labeled a вЂњnational security concern.вЂќ They argued that it relies on вЂњoverly-broad and discriminatory criteriaвЂќ that disproportionally affects applicants who are Muslim or from Muslim-majority countries. The program reportedly directs USCIS officers to delay and ultimately deny these applications without informing applicants they are subject to the policy. Page 73 →вЂњIronically, while CARRP treats applicants as supposedly too dangerous to naturalize, they are simultaneously treated as too harmless to expeditiously investigate, arrest or deport, undermining any argument that applicants subject to CARRP are true вЂnational security concernsвЂ™вЂќ (Pasquarella 2013, 2).

Despite these types of policies and barriers to naturalization, Muslim immigrants in the United States have high naturalization rates, even when compared with other immigrant groups. Sixty-one percent of the foreign-born Muslims in the MANOS dataset were naturalized U.S. citizens, compared to 45 percent of all foreign-born individuals in the U.S. Census. According to the Pew Research Center, MuslimsвЂ™ naturalization rates are highly correlated with their immigration year. Among Muslims who arrived in the United States before 1980, virtually all (more than 99 percent) had become U.S. citizens. Of those who arrived in the 1980s, 95 percent had become citizens, and 80 percent of those who arrived in the 1990s were citizens. Among those who arrived after 2000, a much lower proportionвЂ”42 percentвЂ”had already become citizens (Pew 2011).

Voting

A simple measure of an immigrantвЂ™s ability to navigate and participate in the political process of her new country is the act of voting. Voting requires citizenship, registration within a neighborhood, and some level of motivation and political awareness to go out to the polls. MANOS foreign-born Muslim respondents reported voting at the same rate as U.S.-born Muslims in the 2012 presidential election: 61 percent of U.S.-born *and* naturalized Muslims reported that they voted. This falls within the range of the 2014 census numbers for the general American population: 64 percent of whites, 66 percent of African Americans, 48 percent of Hispanics, and 47 percent of Asians voted in the 2012 presidential election (File 2013). Relatively high levels of education and income may account in part for such high levels of voting among Muslim Americans, but some studies have also found that mosque attendance, similar to church attendance, enhances political and civic participation for Muslim Americans (Jamal 2005; Dana, Barreto, and Oskooii 2011; Senzai and Bazian 2013). Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009) have found that with mosques and Islamic centers playing a more active political role after 9/11, the Muslim community has in fact continued to increase its participation in electoral politics in every election since 2001. Page 74 →Several national Muslim advocacy groups, such as the Council for American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), are also known to carry out voter registration drives and to encourage mosque members to vote.

Though Muslim AmericansвЂ™ political behavior was scantly researched prior to 2001, some scholars report that Muslims in the past were split evenly between Democrats and Republicans (Findley 2001) and between liberals and conservatives (Duran 1997). As Barreto and Bozonelos (2009) report, however, the 2000 presidential election saw significant political organization within the community. For the first time, Muslim American organizations came together to create the American-Muslim Political Coordination Committee (AMPCC), holding talks with all three major candidates and pressing each on Muslim American issues, with the AMPCC ultimately endorsing George W. Bush (72 percent) (Findley 2001). African American Muslims even voted for Mr. Bush at double the rate of Christian African Americans, at 15 percent. In the post-9/11 era, however, support for President Bush and the Republican Party dropped dramatically due to the Bush administrationвЂ™s response to the September 11 terrorist attacks (Barreto and Bozonelos 2009).

By 2011, Pew found that 70 percent of Muslims leaned toward the Democratic Party, compared with just 11 percent of Muslims leaning Republican. Party affiliation appears to be related to greater feelings of hostility coming from the Republican party toward Muslims: 48 percent of Muslims felt the Republican Party was unfriendly toward their community and only 15 percent saw it as friendly. By contrast, 46 percent of Muslims said the Democratic Party was friendly toward them and only 7 percent said they were unfriendly. A survey by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) similarly found that only 15 percent of Muslim Americans

wanted Trump to win over Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election (Mogahed and Chouhoud 2017).

Many foreign-born respondents in this study, in addition to engaging politically on domestic issues, were also active in political organizations that focused on U.S. foreign policy in their home countries; individuals were identifying and mobilizing as Egyptian Americans, Libyan Americans, Syrian Americans, and so on.

Though Muslims demonstrate a high level of political engagement as measured by voting, there is a small minority of American Muslims who regard democratic political engagement to be un-Islamic and choose not to participate. While elections are not explicitly forbidden in Islamic holy texts, the logic behind this position is based in part on the belief that MuslimsPage 75 → should follow GodвЂ™s laws (*Shariah*). Allowing men and women (elected politicians and legislators) to create their own laws, which may contradict GodвЂ™s instructions, would in effect elevate humans to the level of God. For example, some segments of the conservative Salafi community believe that democratic rule is illegitimate (Ramadan 2005). However, work by Dana, Wilcox-Archuelta, and Barreto (2017) suggests that this is a minority view, as they demonstrate an association between American MuslimsвЂ™ religiosity and belief that political participation in the West is legitimate.

Cultural Practices and Beliefs

Popular and scholarly discussions about MuslimsвЂ™ integration in Western societies regularly highlight cultural practices and beliefs as the key differences between Muslims and the larger society. There are studies supporting the intuitive assumption that Muslims will adopt American customs increasingly over the time they spend in the United States (Hasan 2000; Goldwasser 2000; Haddad and Esposito 2000; Abdo 2006). From another perspective, some studies (mostly in the European context) have suggested that Muslims adjust their cultural practices more slowly than other immigrant groups (Bisin et al. 2008; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Specifically, there is anxiety among Westerners, for example, that Islamic ways of life are in conflict with Western values (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2008) and that their views toward women are inconsistent with those of the larger society (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016). This section examines these perceptions by looking at levels of religiosity among Muslims compared with other religious groups in American society, as well as attitudes about the role of women in the workplace and at home.

The vast diversity in ethnic and national backgrounds among immigrant Muslims lends a similarly broad heterogeneity to their religious practices and beliefs in the United States. The governments and societies in their countries of origin vary from explicitly Islamic regimes (e.g., Iran) to avowedly secular ones (e.g., Kemalist Turkey). Immigrants were thus socialized under a range of laws and norms regulating religious behavior, practices that may or may not be passed down to later generations.

The data here show that Muslims on average appear to fall somewhere in the middle (between religiously conservative and liberal) in terms of their religious beliefs compared to other American religious groups and that the Page 76 →rigor of their religious practice appears to decline across generations. On attitudes toward women, respondents in this study considered beliefs about women in the mosque and society to be one of the foremost issues dividing the Muslim community, particularly across generations. While Muslims on average appear to hold egalitarian views toward women in the workplace and politics, they hold more traditional views of womenвЂ™s roles in the home.

Secular and Nonreligious Muslims

Some Muslim Americans regard religion as a private matter that does not belong in the public square, and many of these individuals do not attend a mosque or get involved in Islamic organizations. There is also a sizable segment of Muslim Americans who have rejected the faith or at least have chosen not to act on it in any obvious way.

Measuring the degree of secularism within the Muslim community is difficult because some secular Muslims, even if born and raised in Muslim families, would be unlikely to identify themselves on a survey as вЂњMuslim.вЂќ Such individuals would be more likely to place themselves in the вЂњatheist,вЂќ вЂњagnostic, вЂќ or вЂњnothing in particularвЂќ category. Indeed, the Pew Research Center finds the number of individuals

who do not affiliate with any religion to be growing rapidly in the United States, a trend that appears to include Muslim Americans (Pew 2012b). An estimated one in four people who were raised Muslim in the United States no longer identify with the faith (Pew 2015a). An independent 2014 documentary film titled *Unmosqued*, directed by Atif Mahmud, was created to highlight the need for reform in American mosques to re-engage and retain the young and second-generation Muslims who are perceived to have distanced themselves from the mosque community relative to immigrant Muslims.

Among those Americans who *do* identify themselves as Muslim, however, their levels of religious practicesвЂ”frequency of prayer and attendance at religious servicesвЂ”are on a par with many other American religious groups.

Prayer

One of the five pillars of Islam is *salat*, or the performance of the ritual prayer five times a day. Like other religious Americans, however, not all Muslims in the United States pray at the same rate. As presented in figure 2.4, on average, 66 percent of Muslim Americans said they вЂњpray every Page 77 → day,вЂќ compared to 83 percent of Mormons, 82 percent of white Evangelicals, 80 percent of black Protestants, 58 percent of Catholics, and 48 percent of white mainline Protestants (Pew 2012a).

Fig. 2.4. Percentage of Americans Who Pray Every Day

Note: Figure 2.4 presents the percentage of Muslims, by generation and race, and other Americans, by religion, who report that they pray every day. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013 and Pew Research Center 2012)

There are significant differences in levels of prayer among Muslims along racial and ethnic lines and across generation and age. U.S.-born blacks reported some of the highest levels of daily prayer among Muslims, with 76 percent saying they prayed every day. Generally speaking, the percentage of those saying they pray every day declines across generations. The largest decline appears among Muslims who identify as white (20 percentage point decline) and Asian (18 percentage point decline), followed by a 10-percentage point decline among Arabs between the first and second generations.

Religious Services and Events

As for attending religious services, Muslim Americans appear to fall in the lower to middle range of the spectrum when compared to other religious Americans. Twenty-six percent of foreign-born Muslims and 31 percent of U.S.-born Muslims said they attend a religious service every week, comparedPage 78 → to 77 percent of Mormons, 64 percent of white Evangelicals, 60 percent of black Protestants, and 27 percent of mainline Protestants (Pew 2012a). In some Muslim communities abroad, women do not attend religious services as frequently as men. If this practice carries over to the United States, it could lower the average level of weekly mosque attendance in the community. Among MANOS respondents, however, women were just as likely as men to attend religious services.

Nineteen percent of foreign-born Muslims and 13 percent of U.S.-born Muslims reported that they never attend religious services. These figures also seem to fall in the middle range when compared to other religious groups. In 2012 a study by the Pew Research Center, 8 percent of Mormons, 10 percent of white Evangelicals, 11 percent of black Protestants, 19 percent of Catholics, and 26 percent of mainline Protestants said they never attend religious services (Pew 2012a). In all, it appears that the frequency of Muslim AmericansвЂ™ attendance at religious services is similar to that of other American religious groups, if not less frequent.

When comparing mosque attendance across Arab American generations, the data show a decline with each generation. Among foreign-born Arabs, 24 percent said they attend mosque every week, compared with only 8 percent of Arabs born in the United States. Among those who identified as white, however, there appears to be an increase in mosque attendance across generations. Seventeen percent of foreign-born whites (coming primarily

from Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Arab countries) said they attend mosque each week compared to 33 percent of white (nonconvert) Muslims born in the United States. Attendance appears to be lower among U.S.-born white converts to Islam (20 percent go each week) than among those who say they have always been Muslim (47 percent go each week).[13] While the explanation for these differentiations is unclear, they highlight important religious, cultural, and social differences across segments of the Muslim American community.

Interpretations of Religious Texts

One measure of religious conservatism is the degree to which adherents of a religion believe the word of God should be interpreted literally. Are Muslims different from other Americans in this regard? In order to compare levels of conservatism among Muslims to that of other American religious groups, the MANOS survey asked respondents directly whether they believed the word of God (such as it appears in the QuвЂ™ran, for example)Page 79 → should be taken word for word. Foreign-born Muslims and African American Muslims were significantly more likely to show conservatism, with 68 percent agreeing that the word of God should be taken literally. U.S.-born Muslims (nonblack) are significantly less likely to adhere to literal interpretations of religious texts, with 50 percent agreeing that the word of God should be taken literally.

Christians also vary in the degree to which they believe the word of God should be taken literally. In the Pew study, 62 percent of Americans attending historically black churches believed the word of God should be taken literally, word for word, as did 59 percent of Evangelicals, 35 percent of Mormons, 23 percent of Catholics, and 22 percent of mainline Protestants (Pew 2012a).

The figures above suggest that a higher percentage of Muslims take a more literal interpretation of religious texts as compared to their non-Muslim counterparts in the United States, but that the propensity to embrace literal interpretations appears to decline across generations.

One interviewee, a U.S.-born woman of Palestinian descent, explained that Muslims in the United States are divided by their degree of religiosity. вЂњSome of us are more progressive, open-minded, and liberal. We interpret religion more openly, as opposed to those who are stricter and stick to more traditional ways. Sometimes these groups do not get alongвЂќ (AI 9). A third-generation Muslim, echoing the survey results, said she noticed that first-generation Americans are far more traditional. вЂњAs generations go on, people become more open-minded, and sometimes even start to lose their religion and culture as they try to assimilateвЂќ (AI 11).

Religion and the Law

This study also assessed Muslim conservatism by another yardstick: views on whether religion should have a larger role in determining U.S. law. The MANOS survey asked respondents whether they believed that вЂњright and wrong in U.S. law should be based on GodвЂ™s lawsвЂќ and, separately, whether вЂњright and wrong in U.S. law should be decided by society.вЂќ[14] Just over 49 and 45 percent of U.S.-born and foreign-born Muslims, respectively, agreed that U.S. law should be based on GodвЂ™s law. Thirty-two and 35 percent of U.S.-born and foreign-born, respectively, agreed that right and wrong should *not* be determined by society. When asked which should have more influence over the laws of the countryвЂ”the Bible or the will of the peopleвЂ”among those with religious affiliations, 60 percent of white Page 80 →Evangelicals agreed that the Bible should have more influence over U.S. laws than the will of the American people, compared to 53 percent of black protestants, 16 percent of mainline whites and 23 percent of Catholics (Pew 2006).

Views toward Women

Scholars have cited egalitarian views toward women as a critical cultural difference between Islamic practices and Western culture. Compared with Western nations, Islamic societies tend to be more conservative on issues of sexuality and gender equality, particularly on the question of egalitarian roles for women in the home, workforce, and public sphere (Fish 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003). When speaking with Muslim interviewees across the country about issues dividing their community, the most frequently mentioned was the role of women in the mosque and society; they not only saw this as divisive across various sects of Islam, but also particularly across

generations. Later-generation Muslims appear more likely to advocate for allowing Muslim women to serve in leadership roles in the mosque and to remove the physical barriers between men and women in places of worship. While such issues involve ongoing negotiations and considerations within individual mosques and communities, they remain an area of discussion in national Islamic fora as well.

As a young U.S.-born Arab woman explained, вЂњIn many different mosques, like the MCA [Muslim Community Association], it is written in the bylaws that women cannot be on the board of directors. This makes many women and some men angry because there is no religious law against women gaining power. The fact that so many people allow these rules to exist in mosques angers many people, but because some agree with it, it continues to divide the Muslim communityвЂќ (AI 35). Another young U.S.-born woman feels that while Muslim women are treated differently than Muslim men, the MCA was doing a good job of trying to treat young boys and girls equally, especially compared with other communities that try more strictly to control how women interact with men. She expressed hope that more Muslim women would take up leadership roles, not only in the mosque but in the greater American community, saying that вЂњotherwise the American community will judge us for having negative gender rolesвЂќ (AI 27). A 24-year-old U.S.-born woman of Indian descent lamented that the вЂњcommunity is not doing enough to encourage women to participate in politics and education.вЂќ Page 81 → She hopes to start an organization that will create resources for Muslim girls to help them with career development. вЂњThere are not enough Muslim institutions that are doing this.B .B . Leaders need to start stepping up and peopleвЂ™s thoughts about women need to change. The situation could be much betterвЂќ (AI 34).

Even foreign-born Muslims acknowledged the generational and cultural distinctions. A Jordanian-born woman said that sometimes Muslim women are treated more negatively than men, a sentiment she saw as coming from вЂњolder men who have discriminatory habits toward womenB .B . those men have not adjusted to American society, nor have they gotten rid of their sexist views. Their behavior makes the Muslim community look bad. The sad thing is that the younger generation is afraid to stand up to itвЂќ (AI 29). One Egyptian-born man confessed that he didnвЂ™t realize that women were treated differently, or even worse than men in the community, until his wife pointed it out. He says he now believes that women should be more involved in the mosque and the community and in politics as well. He doubts, however, that immigrant Muslims are ready for women to take more of a leadership role but is hopeful that the second and third generations will be more progressive and prepared to have women as leaders (AI 33). Another Egyptian-born man agreed that вЂњgender valuesвЂќ differ significantly across generations, as younger Muslims are more comfortable than older Muslims with the idea of open relationships of the opposite gender (AI 1).

On the other hand, several interviewees explained that the status of women in the Muslim community is not inferior, but that non-Muslim observers often misread the meaning of headscarves and sexual segregation in the mosque. Some clarified further that while Islamic texts state that men and women are equal, they are naturally different physically and mentally and thus have different but complementary strengths, roles, and responsibilities in the family. As one woman described it, вЂњIn Islam, men and women are treated differently because men and women are differentвЂ”that difference can be positive or negative depending on the angle from which you look at it. Our religion encourages equal righteousness in men and women, and women play an important role in guiding the community. But compared to non-Muslims, I think Muslim women are treated better, especially in terms of respectвЂќ (AI 25). Several men with whom I spoke similarly saw gender segregation in the mosque and modest dress as a sign of respect toward women. Other young women also explained that they felt more comfortable in the workplace when dressing modestly, becausePage 82 → they felt that men would be more inclined to treat them equally and to view them less sexually.

Racial Differences in Views on Women

Several scholars and interviewees for this study noted differences in womenвЂ™s status in African American mosques and communities when compared with other Muslim groups, suggesting that they do not as strictly limit womenвЂ™s involvement or leadership in the mosque. In their book *Muslim Women in America* (2006), Haddad, Smith, and Moore observed that many immigrant Muslims come from cultures in which women seldom, if ever,

attend the mosque, whereas African American Muslim women in the United States for generations have been able to attend the mosque if they so choose (64).

Karen Leonard (2003) cites that вЂњin 81 percent of immigrant mosques, women pray behind a curtain or in another room, but in only 30 percent of African American mosques do women do thisвЂќ (63). As for taking on prominent leadership roles, вЂњAfrican American mosques today have the highest number of women leadersвЂ”over 80 percent allow women on their boards and profess themselves to be quite open to female participation. South Asians have the fewest female board participants, and Arab mosques are somewhere in the middleвЂќ (Haddad, Smith, and Moore 2006, 66).

The presence and active participation of African American women in mosques, however, can sometimes create uncomfortable situations and limit cross-cultural mosque membership. As interactions between immigrant communities and African American Muslim communities increase, tensions arise about womenвЂ™s roles, especially in mosques (Leonard 2003, 78).

Women in Politics

In addition to the views culled from interviews for this study, the MANOS survey asked a series of questions about the roles of women at home and in society in an attempt to get a more representative understanding of whether Muslims systematically differ in their view toward womenвЂ™s roles. The data is inconclusive, however, on whether Muslims hold less egalitarian views toward women than the broader American society. On multiple items, Muslim respondents show equality in how they treat men and women; other responses, however, suggest more conservative views toward womenвЂ™s roles compared with non-Muslims, especially in the home.

Page 83 →To assess beliefs about women in the professional realm, MANOS included a series of questions and randomized experiments that compare how respondents view men and women differently in the workplace. One question asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement, *Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women*. Forty-four percent of foreign-born Muslims agreed with this statement, whereas only 27 percent of U.S.-born Muslims agreed. When this question was last asked in the General Social Survey in 2006, 24 percent of the general American population agreed with this statement. Consistent with the interviews, these data indicate that while foreign-born Muslims hold less egalitarian views toward women than other Americans, Muslims appear to become more egalitarian across generations, a signal of cultural integration. Indeed, U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ views toward women in politics do not significantly differ from the larger American population.

Female Career Advancement

In another item, respondents read a prompt discussing an employee up for promotion. For half of the respondents the employee in the prompt was a man, and for the other half the employee was a woman. The goal of this question was to determine whether respondents were significantly more likely to promote a man over a woman in similar circumstances. The prompt read as follows:

> *Employers in major companies have many considerations when selecting qualified workers to promote into leadership roles. Suppose you are considering promoting a* [man/woman] *who is an expert in* [his/her] *field.* [He/She] *is known to be extremely confident, knowledgeable, firm on issues, and is an aggressive debater. However,* [he/she] *is rumored to be going through marriage problems because* [his/her] *spouse complains that* [he/she] *works such long hours. Some are concerned that this could distract* [him/her] *from work related tasks. Based on this information, would you still be willing to promote this person?*

The findings reveal that Muslim respondents were just as likely to promote the woman as they were the man. This provides some evidence that Muslims may not treat women significantly differently than men in the workplace.

Page 84 →Respondents were later asked whether they agreed with the statement, *It is important that young* [men /women] *get married early in life before pursuing advanced education or a career*. The data reveal again that Muslims were no more likely to agree with the statement if the subject was a man or a woman.

WomenвЂ™s Role in the Home

The MANOS survey also asked about the role of women in the household, questions on which Muslims and non-Muslims did seem to differ. When asked if they agreed with the statement, вЂњ*A manвЂ™s job is to earn money; a womanвЂ™s job is to look after the home and family*,вЂќ 40 percent of Muslim Americans agreed with the statement. There was no difference in opinion by generation or gender. That same statement drew agreement from 22 percent of the general American population when it was last posed in the 2002 General Social Survey.

Fifty-five percent of Muslim respondents agreed with the statement, *If the husband in a family wants children, but the wife decides that she does not want any children, it is all right for the wife to refuse to have children.* Once again, there was no significant difference in opinion by generation or gender among Muslim respondents. This statement elicited agreement from 82 percent of the general American population when asked in the 1996 General Social Survey.

Mixed Findings on the Views toward Women

While this section by no means fully addresses the nuances of Muslim AmericansвЂ™ views toward women and their role in society, it allows us preliminarily to compare the baseline attitudes of Muslims to the broader American population. The data provide mixed results as to where American Muslims stand compared to non-Muslims on their views toward women. Muslims on average appear to hold less egalitarian views toward women than non-Muslims on issues that pertain to the home; on issues pertaining to women in the workplace, however, by the second generation Muslim opinions reflect that of the broader American population and support equality in the treatment of men and women. As the interviews reflect, there continues to be much debate regarding the role and status of women within and across segments of the Muslim American community. Just as with Christianity, Judaism, and other religions, religious and cultural beliefs regarding women vary among Muslims from community to community.

Fig. 2.5. Percentage of Muslims Who Say Being American Is Important to Their Lives

Note: Figure 2.5 presents the percentage of Muslims, by generation and race, who believe that being American is important to their lives. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

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Psychological Integration

The analysis up until this point has assessed the degree to which Muslims are integrated into societyвЂ”or have converged with other American groupsвЂ”by comparing Muslims to non-Muslims on a series of economic, social, civic, and cultural indicators. A different, but important, aspect of integration is the psychological component, the degree to which Muslims express that they *feel* part of or *identify* with American society, and whether Muslims feel respected (without prejudice) and accepted by members of the host society (Padilla 1980; Padilla and Perez 2003). The data suggest that while Muslim Americans across generations strongly identify with the country, they also increasingly feel discriminated against in America.

On the Importance of Being American

Data from the MANOS study indicate that a large majority of Muslim Americans feel that being American is very important to their lives. This sense of American identity becomes stronger among later generations, making U.S.-born Muslims indistinguishable from the broader American Page 86 →population. Sixty-four percent of foreign-born respondents agreed that вЂњbeing American is important to [their] lives,вЂќ as did 80 percent of U.S.-born Muslims. Seventeen percent and 12 percent of foreign-born and U.S.-born Muslims, respectively, said

that being American is not important to their lives. These figures compare with 75 percent of the general American population surveyed for this study who reported that being American is important to their lives, 16 percent who said it is somewhat important, and 10 percent who said it is not important to their lives. Among Muslims who were born abroad, more time in the U.S. significantly increases feelings of вЂњAmerican-ness.вЂќ Among Muslim immigrants who had lived in the United States for five years or less, 55 percent said that being American is important to their lives. This number jumped to 75 percent among those who had lived in the United States for more than five years.

These findings go against assertions that Muslim Americans are, as a group, actively rejecting an American identity or are largely anti-American, as the majority of Americans believe (Pew 2016c). These findings similarly challenge suggestions that there is a fundamental conflict between being Muslim and being American. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, many Muslims born in the United States feel that they have more in common with other U.S.-born Americans than with Muslims from overseas.

Feelings of Acceptance

While strength of identity with America is a helpful benchmark for understanding MuslimsвЂ™ integration in the United States, it is also telling to examine whether and how much Muslims feel *accepted* as Americans by the government and by other American citizens. While the data suggest that Muslims feel being American is important to their identity, this does not preclude Muslims from feeling excluded in the United States as religious (and largely ethnic) minorities. Experiences of discrimination or rejection are known to be closely related to group identity and can have a powerful effect on shaping oneвЂ™s orientation toward government and society. The differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in society are made more salient by the prospect of unfair treatment based on religion; the shared perception of and experience of discrimination create a heightened sense of identity and feelings of closeness with other Muslims (Peek 2011; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981).

To capture the degree to which Muslims in America feel strongly attached to the Muslim American community and view their group as being Page 87 →disadvantaged in the United States, three measures were used here to create an index, hereafter referred to as Muslim American вЂњCollective Threat.вЂќ

Fig. 2.6. Muslim AmericansвЂ™ Perception of вЂњCollective Threat,вЂќ by Generation

Note: Figure 2.6 presents predicted values of Muslim AmericansвЂ™ perception of a вЂњCollective ThreatвЂќ against their religious group. The measure вЂњCollective ThreatвЂќ is an index composed of three items, rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Respondents are asked to agree or disagree with the following statements: *Being a member of my religious community is important to my life; I am treated with less respect than other people because of my religion; Americans are hostile towards my religious group.* Values account for differences in age, gender, income, educational level, and personal religious identity. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

The items here similarly aim to measure the degree that each respondent:

> Holds a salient religious identity, measured by the question, *How important is being a member of your religious community to your life?*;
> Perceives a collective group threat against Muslim Americans, *Americans are hostile toward my religious group*; and
> Page 88 →Has been personally affected by religious discrimination, *I am treated with less respect than other people because of my religion.*

Respondents answered each of these three items on a 7-point scale, with 4 as a neutral category. The items were each coded to equal 1 if the respondent agreed with the statement, and zero if not. The Collective Threat scale equals 1 if all three items are answered affirmatively, and zero otherwise.[15]

Figure 2.6 displays predicted values of Collective Threat across three generations of Muslims living in the United

States, controlling for age, income, education, gender, and personal religiosity.[16] The findings from the index show that the sense of Collective Threat is greater among U.S.-born Muslims than among foreign-born Muslims. That is, U.S.-born Muslims are more likely to perceive and experience group-based discrimination and feel attached to fellow Muslim Americans. Twenty-four percent of foreign-born Muslims living in the United States say that they feel close to the Muslim American community and are discriminated against because of their religious affiliation. This number compared to 39 percent of second-generation Muslims and 42 percent of third-generation Muslims who hold these views. The difference between foreign and U.S.-born Muslims is statistically significant. These numbers compare to only about 20 percent of other Americans surveyed for this study who report similar feelings toward their religious or ethnic group.

Discussion: An Integration-Identification Paradox

Taken together, the data from this chapter demonstrate that the Muslim American community is well-integrated on a variety of measures. Muslim Americans look similar to other Americans in terms of their economic success and educational attainment, their involvement in key American institutions such as public schools, their interactions with other Americans, their adoption of many similar cultural beliefs, and their belief that being American is important to their lives. In most cases, later-generation Muslims are more integrated according to these measures than their immigrant parents. This is consistent with much academic work contending that integration into the American cultural, social, and economic mainstream across successive generations remains the dominant empirical patternPage 89 → among immigrants in the United States (see Alba and Nee 1997; Alba and Nee 2003).

Nevertheless, a paradox arises. Later-generation MuslimsвЂ”those born and raised in American schools and under American institutions, who arguably are the most integrated and familiar with American society, norms, and beliefsвЂ”express the highest levels of Collective Threat. In other words, increased integration among Muslim Americans coincides with a stronger Muslim American identity and greater perceptions of Muslims as a lower-status group in American society. Why?

The following chapters explore the reasons for this integration-identification paradox in the Muslim American community and its implications for attitudes toward the government and cooperation with law enforcement. Chapter 3 relies on qualitative interviews to flesh out the experience of Muslims in the United States and explains why different segments of the community feel more targeted as Muslim Americans than do others. Such perceptions of mistreatment further heighten the importance of embracing a Muslim American identity among those who might otherwise find more in common with fellow non-Muslim Americans.

3. Identity and Discrimination

The Muslim American Experience

Why do U.S.-born Muslims, who are more integrated as Americans than foreign-born Muslims, also perceive discrimination against Muslim Americans to a greater degree than do immigrant Muslims? This paradox, presented in chapter 2, is perplexing for several reasons. First, it appears to contradict expectations that greater levels of integration across generations would lead to a weakening of the perceived lines between immigrants, their children, and the wider American community (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964). The second puzzling issue is that post-9/11 policies reacting to the threat of violent extremism focused primarily on immigrant Muslims rather than on those born in the United States, as discussed in the introduction. We might thus expect *foreign-born* Muslims to perceive greater amounts of discrimination by the government than U.S.-born Muslims would.

This chapter delves deeper into this integration-identity paradox. While several factors appear to contribute to the variance in perceptions among Muslim Americans, the interviews in this study suggest that U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ greater sensitivity to discrimination and sense of attachment to other Muslim Americans exists *because of* their greater integration into American society. Muslims with more experience and knowledge of the American system, similar to other Americans, hold higher expectations of the government and embrace the American values of fairness and equality in practice and under the law. Second-generation Muslims are more likely to make comparisons as to how they are treated by the government on these measures relative to their non-Muslim U.S.-born counterparts and thus are better able to recognize when the government is treating Muslim citizens worse than other Americans. These features magnify Page 92 →U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ sensitivity toward any differential treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims, further heightening the salience of a Muslim American identity and the degree to which they view their personal experiences within the broader context of the treatment of Muslims across the United States.

Views of the U.S. Government across Muslim American Generations

A number of scholars have documented the increased scrutiny placed on immigrant Muslims in the post-9/11 period (Abdo 2006; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009; Peek 2011; Brooks and Manza 2013; Cainkar 2009; Jamal 2008; Apuzzo and Goldman 2013). Civil rights and civil liberties activists condemned the security policies that unfairly targeted and profiled law-abiding citizens in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Though the participants in this study frequently raised concerns about some of these security policies (some of which were outlined in the previous chapters), it should be noted that not all Muslim Americans perceive the governmentвЂ™s actions in the same way. Several respondents said they did not believe the government had ill intent as it sought to secure the country, and many suggested that the extra security measures were justifiable given the concerns and confusion during that time.

These differing interpretations of the post-9/11 environment should not be surprising, as beliefs about вЂњdiscriminationвЂќ are defined in part by differing beliefs about the potential discriminatorвЂ™s intentions. Because the intent behind a governmentвЂ™s actions can be ambiguous, discrimination can occur without the targetвЂ™s perception of it; conversely it can be perceived in cases where it did not occur (Mena, Padilla, and Maldonado 1987). Even when two people can agree that misconduct has occurred, one may view it as a reflection of a systemic problem affecting Americans, while the other may believe that they are being targeted as a member of a stigmatized group in society (more egregious behavior). The same effectively discriminatory actions that some perceive to be routine may be perceived by others as exceptional and disreputable. This is the case among many communities in the United States, and the Muslim American community appears to be no exception.

The clearest and strongest dividing line with regard to perceptions of Page 93 →the U.S. government and to Muslim identity was between generations, those who had been born and raised in the United States and those who had been born abroad. This showed up strikingly when the Collective Threat scale (introduced in the previous

chapter) was used to assess the relationship between perceived group discrimination of Muslims and identity with the Muslim American community. Table 3.1 reports mean levels of perceived Collective Threat among Muslim Americans by generation. For comparison, it also reports the average level of Collective Threat for non-Muslim respondents.

On average, MuslimsвЂ”both U.S.-born and foreign-bornвЂ”reported feeling significantly more discriminated against because of their religious identities compared with non-Muslim Americans. This is perhaps unsurprising, given the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment and hate crimes against Muslims since 2001 (Pew 2016b). What is curious is why there is such a significant difference in the way U.S.-born and foreign-born Muslims perceive the post-9/11 environment. This generational difference applies both to second-generation Muslims (whose parents were born abroad) and to third-generation Muslims (whose parents were born in the United States). Although a large percentage of third-generation Muslims are African AmericanвЂ”who typically report higher levels of perceived discrimination than other groups in the United States (Carter and Murphy 2015)вЂ”even after accounting for this group, third-generation respondents were still significantly more likely to perceive Collective Threat compared to foreign-born Muslims.

Table 3.1. Mean Levels of Perceived вЂњCollective ThreatвЂќ

	вЂњCollective ThreatвЂќ M (S.E.)	**Obs. (*N*)**
First-Generation Muslims	.63 (.03)	217
Second-Generation Muslims	.64 (.05)	109
Foreign-Born Muslims	.48 (.03)	165
Non-Muslims	.26 (.01)	988

Note: Table 3.1 reports mean levels of perceived вЂњCollective ThreatвЂќ based on religion. The measure вЂњCollective ThreatвЂќ is an index composed of three items, rescaled to range from 0вЂ“1. Respondents are asked to agree or disagree with the following statements: *Being a member of my religious community is important to my life; I am treated with less respect than other people because of my religion; Americans are hostile towards my religious group.* (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

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Explaining the Generational Gap

What are the possible causes of this apparent generational gap? In short, the interviews suggest that higher expectations for nondiscrimination and a stronger sense of identification with the broader Muslim American community contribute to this gap.

As the interviews will highlight, the environment in which one is socialized appears to significantly frame how he or she views the government and the larger American society. U.S.-born Muslims, as a feature of being born, raised, and socialized in the United States, seemed much more familiar with American values, norms, and laws than were foreign-born individuals. As discussed above, this means that like other Americans they expect the government to abide by concepts of due process, fairness, and equality. U.S.-born Muslims thus expect to be treated identically to their non-Muslim U.S. counterparts. When discrepancies are detected, U.S.-born Muslims perceive discrimination. The majority of Muslim immigrants, however, were socialized abroad. Many come from less liberal regimes and do not necessarily expect governments to behave with equality and fairness. Immigrants, therefore, may not be able as readily to identify differential treatment when it occurs and may also not hold the U.S. government to the same high standards. Given their lower standards, foreign-born Muslims appear less outwardly critical of the U.S. government. Among the interviewees, illiberal policies toward Muslims in America were viewed as more egregious by U.S.-born Muslims than by foreign-born Muslims, even if these policies did not target them directly.

The interviews also highlight that U.S.-born Muslims perceive the discrimination they see against Muslim Americans as something that they have in common with and that brings them closer to other Muslim Americans. An offense against a fellow Muslim is an offense to all because it is based on a shared identity as an American Muslim. As this collective struggle affects lives of all Muslims across racial and ethnic boundaries, these boundaries become less relevant for individuals who view Muslims as being the targets of discriminatory treatment. U.S.-born Muslims are therefore more likely to identify with the broader Muslim American community rather than to primarily focus on their ethnic community or their familyвЂ™s country of origin, as immigrants are more likely to do. U.S.-born Muslims are thus nearly as concerned when a Muslim of a different ethnic group is affected by post-9/11 policies as Page 95 →they would be when a Muslim within their own ethnic group is affected. This effectively multiplies the number of incidents U.S.-born Muslims are watching carefully, which further enhances their sense of mistreatment of Muslims as a group.

The remainder of this chapter walks through the prominent themes that emerged from interviews, with interview excerpts that illustrate these themes.

Socialization and Perceptions of Discrimination

U.S.-born Muslims Emphasize Their American Identity

The U.S.-born participants in this study, many of whom were young when the 9/11 attacks occurred, shared that the aftermath had a significant effect on how they saw themselves, their community, and their country. They experienced the post-9/11 environment as вЂњborn-and-bredвЂќ Americans, in the same way as their non-Muslim peers: with shock, sadness, and fear. The difference for Muslim Americans, they said, was that in a single day they went from being and feeling like just every other American citizen to suspects whose patriotism, faith, and even place of birth were thrown into question.

One young, U.S.-born woman of Pakistani descent recalled that she became confused when students jokingly called her a terrorist or asked why her religion supported violence. She admitted that at the time she knew little about Islam, apart from what she had learned during holidays growing up, which, she stressed, by no means promoted any type of violence. Like many other young Americans at that time, she had never heard of Al-Qaeda and was horrified by the attacks. What frustrated her most over the years was the seemingly broad public perception that Muslims in the United States were somehow un-American and even anti-American. She was irritated by the question of whether she felt more Muslim or American, as if the two were mutually exclusive categories. She herself felt no conflict between her American and Muslim identities, she reflected (AI 101).

Similarly, one young U.S.-born interviewee of Bengali descent emphasized in a conversation around balancing his Muslim and American identities that вЂњbeing American is very important to my identityвЂ”itвЂ™s what I am. *Of course* I feel close to other Americans because I live here and grew up with all American friends!вЂќ (AI 26).

Over the months and years following 9/11, U.S.-born Muslims watched Page 96 →carefully as various government policies and ad hoc security measures placed Muslim Americans under more intense scrutiny, to the point of stereotyping and discriminating against many innocent people (as discussed in the introduction). U.S.-born respondents explained that when assessing these policies, they viewed the government through the same lens as other students they had sat next to in their classes at school. That is, they were sensitive to the infringement of rights and freedoms of any citizens, particularly infringements based on race, creed, or gender. In this context, Muslims were upset by what they saw.

> *The way Muslim Americans are being treated does not match up with the ideals of this democracy.* (AI 9)

> *We, the American people, elect our government and the government is supposed to serve the people. When our rights are being violated, we are not being served appropriately.* (AI 104)

> *Could you imagine the uproar if other Americans were treated this way? If white* [non-Muslim] *mothers knew their children were being monitored by government agents? Infiltrating their religious*

gatherings? They would be outraged! (AI 107)

U.S.-Born Muslims Higher Expectations of Government

These shared expectations for the government to be fair and transparent, and the desire to uphold American ideals, appear to explain why U.S.-born Muslims are particularly aware of the differential treatment faced by Muslims in the post-9/11 environment. U.S.-born Muslim Americans received the same history lessons and internalized the same norms and values as their non-Muslim counterparts. The interviews conveyed that they value checks and balances on abuses of rights and can quickly recognize when government institutions are not operating at their ideal standards. Concepts of equality, freedom of speech, and the protection of minority rights were common knowledge among U.S.-born Muslim Americans. In fact, U.S.-born Muslims in the MANOS survey were significantly more likely to defend freedom of speech than their foreign-born counterparts, even when the speech was hate speech against Islam.[1] Many could articulate the parts of U.S. constitutional law they believed were being violated by post-9/11 policies, often citing violations of habeas corpus and the Page 97 → Fourth Amendment (which protects citizens from unwarranted search and seizures).

Several U.S.-born interviewees linked Muslim AmericansвЂ™ experiences of discrimination to those of other groups, such as the civil rights history of African Americans or the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Indeed, in 2016, Mogahed and Chouhoud (2017) found that 66 percent of all Muslim Americans expressed support for the Black Lives Matter movement, with 72 percent or more of black, Asian, female, and young (18вЂ“29) Muslims supporting.[2] Interviewees said they saw African Americans as examples for Muslim Americans in their fight against вЂњIslamophobia,вЂќ or prejudice against Islam or Muslims. They repeatedly expressed an expectation that Muslims would be treated equally under the law and that their civil liberties as Americans would be protected. In true American form, those who felt frustration also felt it their duty as citizens to give feedback through voting, reaching out to elected officials, and participating in political organizations to make their views heard when the government was not living up to its standards. Most critiques of the government were couched in hopeful language, suggesting the potential for a correction to the unfair treatment, as with other minority groups that had experienced government-sanctioned discrimination (intended or not). Overall, they were supportive, though not uncritical, of the government.

Several U.S.-born respondents noted that their inherent familiarity with the U.S. government and American political system distinguished them from their immigrant parents or grandparents, who were described as вЂњmuch more isolated from the rest of American societyвЂќ (AI 105). One woman explained that U.S.-born Muslims are not intimidated by Americans who talk badly about Muslims, and they are less fearful than their foreign-born counterparts of criticizing the government. вЂњWe are equipped to interact with the government and mainstream America and are more politically active. The first generation just sticks to their own friends of the same culture to mind their own business. They want to avoid stirring up troublevвЂќ (AI 3). вЂњWe know how to deal with these things the American way, while our parents deal with these issues in their own cultural wayвЂќ (AI 26). Overall, U.S.-born participants in this study were not hesitant to critique the government where they believed it was falling short. They held high expectations for the government and most seemed hopeful that collective action could result in better outcomes for the community.

These findings about Muslim Americans reflect and support studies of other immigrant populations and their expectations of government elsewhere.Page 98 → Ethnic competition theory argues that greater familiarity with the dominant culture and greater socioeconomic success allow immigrants to gain a realistic understanding of inequality and the practice of discrimination in U.S. society as they compete with members of the dominant group (Portes 1984, 1995; Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Indeed, U.S.-born Muslims in the present study appear more familiar with American history as it relates to the various social cleavages in society, making them more sensitive to possible discrimination. Furthermore, Garcia-Bedolla (2005) and Michelson (2001, 2003b) suggest that as members of the Latino community become part of American culturevвЂ”particularly later generationsвЂ”they learn to be critical of the government because they become aware of their unequal position in society and of the realities of discrimination. As Michelson states, вЂњTheir identity is transformed from that of

an immigrant looking forward to membership in the dominant society into that of a member of a minority group that is denied the full benefits of such membershipвЂќ (Michelson 2001). Maxwell similarly finds that second-generation individuals in Europe are more likely to share nativesвЂ™ educational and cultural experiences and therefore to have higher expectations of the government, making them more sensitive to discrimination (Maxwell 2010, 2008).

These works also dovetail with the relative deprivation framework, which suggests that more advantaged members of disadvantaged groups are most likely to engage in intergroup comparisons (Taylor and Moghaddam 1994). In the case of this study, U.S.-born Muslims can be seen as more вЂњadvantagedвЂќ in terms of their status as American-born citizens. They compare their treatment by the government to other U.S.-born Americans with whom they share rights and privileges. When U.S.-born Muslims then face more scrutiny than their non-Muslim peers, despite having no involvement with criminal activity, they view this as discriminatory treatment.

Foreign-Born Muslims and the Impact of Being Socialized Abroad

Muslim Immigrants Less Openly Critical of Post-9/11 Policies

Prior to the election of Donald Trump, many Muslim immigrants in this study were familiar with the various national security programs implementedPage 99 → in the United States following 9/11; compared to their U.S.-born counterparts, however, relatively few expressed resentment or personal offense toward the government because of those policies. When discussing the concept of systematic mistreatment, many immigrants conveyed an underlying level of trust in the U.S. legal system, expressing the belief that people who were not involved in terrorism or other illegal activities would not face any problems from U.S. law enforcement. In other words, many suspected that those who had been arrested in the aftermath of 9/11 were likely involved in some kind of bad activities.

Unlike many of their U.S.-born counterparts, few immigrants claimed that entire security institutions were corrupt. Indeed, only 52 percent of foreign-born respondents in the MANOS dataset agreed that the American government is corrupt, compared to 81 percent of U.S.-born Muslims. This compares to 75 percent of all Americans who perceived widespread government corruption in 2014 (Gallup 2015).[3]

Similarly, prior to the election of Donald Trump, when asked about high-profile cases potentially involving the illegal targeting of Muslims, many foreign-born Muslims described these as aberrations and the result of a few вЂњbad applesвЂќ within federal law enforcement agencies. Whereas 73 percent of U.S.-born respondents from the MANOS survey agreed that the FBI regularly unfairly targets individuals from certain backgrounds on issues of terrorism, a significantly lower percentage (62 percent) of foreign-born individuals agreed. One Indian man even described the harassment he receives in airports in the current era as вЂњjustifiable,вЂќ given the security threat facing the country (AI 102). In fact, many foreign-born Muslims were apologetic about terrorist attacks, saying they understood why Americans were scared.

Common was the view that Muslims should not complain about their treatment in the United States. A Palestinian-born man said that regardless of whatвЂ™s going on with some Muslims in the country, being in America is a blessing and the rights and privileges should be appreciated by all Muslims (AI 74). Similarly, Maxwell (2010), in his study of migrants across 24 European countries, found that first-generation immigrants who had gone through the disruptive process of changing countries had lower expectations of the government and were more likely to have positive evaluations of the host society. Other scholars have similarly argued that because many immigrants are prompted to leave their home countries due to dissatisfaction with their governments and have undergone conscious Page 100 →sacrifices to migrate, they are more prepared to accept difficult circumstances as the price of moving to their chosen country (DeSipio 1996; de la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia 1996).

This optimism appears to have dimmed following the election of Donald Trump in 2016. Shortly after his inauguration, executive orders that indefinitely suspended the resettlement of Syrian refugees and temporarily

prevented people from seven predominantly Muslim nations from entering the United States sent a deep chill through the Muslim immigrant population. Even those not directly affected by the ban believed there was a greater chance that their status in the United States, too, could be subject to change under the new president. While immigrantsвЂ™ sense of discrimination certainly increased, a profound sense of fear seemed to prevent them from speaking out against the government (unlike U.S.-born Muslims, who felt less vulnerable).

Even prior to President Trump, foreign-born participants in this study were still awareвЂ”even if subconsciouslyвЂ”of the stigma associated with being Muslim in the United States. One Egyptian businessman said he was careful not to вЂњmix his religion with his business, or mention Islam or wear religious clothing while doing businessвЂќ because he otherwise would вЂњnot be as successfulвЂќ here in the United States (AI 108). Similar sentiments were often stated as known facts of getting along in the United States. Another woman, while reporting that she normally did not experience discrimination, admitted that people would treat her differently and generalize her behavior to that of other Muslims were she to wear a headscarf. She found such stereotyping вЂњludicrousвЂќ (AI 27). Another Egyptian-born man shared that since 9/11, Americans seemed more apprehensive about getting to know Muslims, which made assimilation more challenging (AI 17).

Of course, there were cases where foreign-born Muslims did feel strongly about the treatment of Muslims, though this concern was often directed at security institutions as a whole rather than at individuals. One interviewee said he had a negative view of the FBI, believing it unfairly treated Muslims (AI 2). He cited a case involving an FBI informant at the Islamic Center of Irvine: Beginning in 2006, Craig Monteilh, a felon who was working undercover for the FBI infiltrating mosques, was reportedly asked by the FBI to pose as a radical to lure out Islamist sympathizers at mosques in Orange County. When he started discussing jihad with other mosque-goers at the Islamic Center of Irvine, however, they obtained a restraining order against him and reported him to the FBI and the Irvine Page 101 →police as a possible terror suspect. The community would not find out until two years later, from the proceedings of another case in Orange County, that the radical they had reported to the FBI had in fact been an undercover FBI operative (Harris 2012). (In the other case, which the FBI brought against an Afghan immigrant named Ahmad Niazi, Monteilh outed himself to the press, saying he set Niazi up and the FBI was trying to blackmail the Afghani into becoming an informant. The charges were subsequently dropped.) Our interviewee noted that the event not only severely damaged the relationship between the Islamic Center and the FBI, but also damaged the reputation of the Muslim community in the eyes of those who had simply read about the case in the news.

Bringing Home-Country Values and Norms to America

Foreign-born individuals in this study often explained their own or other immigrantsвЂ™ lack of political participation and interaction with government as stemming from experiences with government in their home country. A Pakistani man explained that вЂњmost Muslims feel like their participation will not make a differenceB .B .B . this is something that was true of the countries that they came from.вЂќ A Palestinian man from Libya agreed: вЂњWe have a leftover lack of political participation from our culture. Immigrants tend to believe that politics will not directly impact our lives in a good wayвЂ”many countries Muslims come from discourage people from getting involvedвЂќ (AI 5). An Iranian female graduate student who had recently arrived in the United States insisted that involvement in politics only leads to bad things. вЂњIn my country, we donвЂ™t study politics. We study engineering, math, and medicine. People who talk politics get into troublevЂќ (AI 85). A Syrian-born respondent agreed, saying that вЂњthe first generation brings a lot of baggage from their native countries. WevЂ™re not used to the freedoms that are guaranteed here in the United States and we donвЂ™t usually take advantage of the freedom to speak out or demonstratevЂќ (AI 19).

Indeed, scholarly evidence suggests that immigrantsвЂ™ experiences and beliefs about government that are formed in their home countries are sticky and can influence how they interpret their new host societies (Waldinger and Lichter 2003; De Vos and Suarez-Orozco 1990; Correia 2010; Wortley and Owusu-Bempah 2009). Migrants who were socialized under conditions of severe political repression may be less familiar with democratic norms and may be uncomfortable participating in the host society civic sphere. In addition, these migrants may be predisposed to Page 102 →distrust politicians and thus hold low expectations for how government entities behave

(Ramakrishnan 2005; Bueker 2005). But even those who are hopeful that the United States government will be better than that of their home country risk being disillusioned over time, as has been observed among other immigrants to the United States (Correia 2010; Chun, Organista, and Marin 2003; Chow 2002; Michelson 2001, 2003a, 2003b).

Immigrant interviewees in this study coming from countries under authoritarian rule tended to be less surprised by U.S. security measures such as monitoring and surveillance; many assumed this was going on anyway. One foreign-born interviewee shrugged and said, вЂњIвЂ™m not surprised [that the government is monitoring its citizens]вЂ”thatвЂ™s just what governments do. You shouldnвЂ™t say anything on the phone or elsewhere that you donвЂ™t want the government to hearвЂќ (AI 93).

Foreign-Born MuslimsвЂ™ Lower Investment in U.S. Politics

Even with widely covered cases of apparent discrimination against Muslims in the media, foreign-born interviewees appeared to be less concerned with the condition of the Muslim American community than with competing issues faced by immigrants in general. Rather than focusing on shared injustices, as did many U.S.-born Muslims, foreign-born participants in this study were more focused on вЂњputting food on the table, вЂќ on the well-being of their families, jobs, and blending in. One Indian-born man explained that many first-generation Muslims believe they will someday return to their home countries, do not fully consider themselves as American, and thus are not as invested in American politics. вЂњThe second generation, on the other hand, feels truly American, and AmericaвЂ™s problems are its problemsвЂќ (AI 7).

With regard to politics, foreign-born respondents seemed far more focused on political developments in their countries of origin. Two issues that interviewees brought up frequently were the contentious Israel-Palestine relationship and U.S. engagement in conflicts overseas. Some perceived the war in Iraq as an American occupation in the Middle East, an issue that appeared to upset many more immigrants than U.S.-born Muslims. Foreign-born Muslims were particularly skeptical of U.S. involvement with governments in the Middle East and generally disapproved of the U.S. military presence in the region. U.S. military support for Israel was a particularly sensitive topic.

Several African American Muslims expressed the feeling that some Page 103 → immigrant Muslim communities are too focused on issues abroad, вЂњsending their donations and prayers to Palestine and Kashmir when there are plenty of problems among city dwellersвЂќ in the United States (AI 116). They believed Muslims living in the United States should be more focused on the Muslim American community at home.

Even among those immigrants who were concerned about the profiling and harassment of Muslims, many felt that it was more appropriate for U.S.-born Muslims to be involved politically to come up with a solution, since they knew more about the issues and the American political landscape. In fact, a significantly higher number of U.S.-born Muslims (67 percent), compared with foreign-born Muslims (51 percent), said they could understand those who join, belong to, or donate to political organizations that fight for his or her groupвЂ™s rights in the United States.

> *The second and third generations have an opportunity to worry about more than just putting food on the tableB .B .B . they get an education and get involved in issues beyond their ethnic group and beyond their parentsвЂ™ country of originB .B .B . they are more concerned with things like civil rights and abuseB .B .B . they grew up with other American kids and they are involved with their peers on issues that concern them.* (AI 6)

> *The first generation keeps its head down and is most focused on its career. The second generation tries to build a lasting Muslim American community by investing in mosques and community centers. The third generation sees itself as not just Muslims who happen to be living in America, but instead as Muslim Americans. They want to invest in non-Muslim institutions and take part in non-Muslim activities so that they can establish a strong Muslim American identity.* (AI 32)

> *The second and third generations donвЂ™t know any other countryвЂ”they identify strongly with America so thatвЂ™s where their focus is. Culturally they see the world in different ways [from us immigrants] because their primary culture is American. They donвЂ™t speak with an accent and they donвЂ™t think with an accent!* (AI 17)

Expressions such as these highlight the immigrantsвЂ™ acknowledgment that second- and third-generation Muslims have significantly different socialization experiences that shape their connection to the United States. Foreign-born MuslimsвЂ™ experiences in their home countries seemed to Page 104 → play a central role in framing their relationship with the U.S. government, much more than did their beliefs about the status of American ethnic minority groups. These findings are consistent with studies of Muslims in Europe, where similar gaps of personal investment in the home country exist between first- and second-generation Muslims (Gest 2010).

Muslim American Identity and the Common Threat of Discrimination

Experiences of Discrimination

Participants shared their personal experiences of discrimination, some of which occurred shortly after the 9/11 attacks, others following the election of Donald Trump, or the years in between. A middle-aged Arab woman living in Seattle explained that for the most part, her day-to-day life had not changed much since 9/11 and that overall she experienced positive treatment in the United States. She acknowledged, however, that MuslimsвЂ™ experiences can differ from place to place within the United States. The most egregious discrimination she experienced, she recalled, took place at a gas station in San Jose, where she and her entire family were subjected to name calling and other verbal abuse and told to leave the country. She had been pulled aside at least 14 times in airports, where she was held and questioned about her life, her work, and her family. She told of having to hire lawyers and spend thousands of dollars to help family friends navigate unprecedented delays in the immigration process. A self-described Democrat, she noted that this all happened under the Obama administration and pointed out that Muslim Americans were continuing to have such experiences more than a decade after 9/11 (AI 13). Complaints about being stopped in the airport were perhaps the most common reference to government mistreatment. One respondent said he paid for TSA pre-check to avoid the consistent вЂњrandomвЂќ screening checks in the security line. He said it was a waste of his money because he still was regularly pulled aside for additional questioning (AI 175). Another said her boarding pass always has the mysterious вЂњSSSSSвЂќ printed on it, causing her to receive additional screening at the boarding gate (AI 174).

The majority of respondents in this study had not personally experienced discrimination. Typically, a respondent would explain that while people in his or her local community generally were kind and tolerant, Page 105 → Muslims in other parts of the country had it much worse. Discussions about poor treatment of Muslims tended to focus on the government and larger organizations rather than on individuals.

Most participants in this study said they were awakened to the experiences of other Muslims in America through stories passed on in their personal networks and through media consumption. Moreover, e-mail lists of major Islamic organizations in the United States regularly send out reports on events and policies affecting the Muslim community. For example, when the NYPD spying case (discussed briefly in the introduction) was revealed, many Muslim communities across the country were immediately informed. Similarly, during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan in June 2017, the assault and killing of a 17-year-old Muslim girl in Virginia, Nabra Hussein, sent shockwaves throughout Muslim communities across the country. While law enforcement cited the attack as a вЂњroad rage incident,вЂќ the event was widely viewed as a hate crime, and community members urged caution in a time of increased scrutiny. вЂњWhen Muslims in the United States hear about this, itвЂ™s not just about the ADAMS community (the mosque the victim attended) or the family members who just lost their daughter or their niece or their sister this weekend. The entire Muslim American community hears about it and experiences this kind of vicarious traumaвЂќ (Green 2017b).

Following the election of Donald Trump, Muslim Americans experienced heightened anxiety about safety, as hate crimes against Muslims reached the highest reported levels since 2001 (Southern Poverty Law Center 2016).

Mogahed and Chouhoud (2017) suggest that Muslim political identity is increasingly being formed in the context of fear. They find that since the 2016 election, roughly one-fifth of Muslims under age 30 have made plans to leave the country, if necessary. Nearly half of young Muslims say they fear for their personal safety because of groups like neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and the Ku Klux Klan. Many respondents in this study internalized attacks against other Muslims in a personal way, which demonstrates the ripple effect of the damage of even indirect discrimination.

Perceptions of a Group Threat

U.S.-born Muslims reported that what connected them most strongly with other Muslim Americans around the countryвЂ”even those of different ethnic backgrounds and from different sects of IslamвЂ”was the commonPage 106 → threat of discrimination. They were deeply concerned, they explained, about how Muslims in America were being treated because they saw discrimination against other Muslims as directly related to their own prospects; this is in keeping with the concept of вЂњlinked fateвЂќ introduced by Dawson (1994). According to Dawson, those who hold strong perceptions of linked fate believe that their individual fates are connected with those of their racial or ethnic group, which helps to explain why a member of a minority group may choose to consider the needs of his or her racial/ethnic group, rather than just his or her own self-interest, when making political choices.

These respondents realized that if one Muslim was being singled out based on religious affiliation, they themselves were just as vulnerable to such scrutiny, no matter how upstanding a citizen they were. U.S.-born interviewees believed that Muslim Americans should be invested in improving the overall treatment and status of Muslims living in the United States, many saying it was important for the community to collectively address these grievances. This connection between perceived discrimination and Muslim group identity is supported by several studies. Barreto, Masuoka, and Sanchez (2008) found that perceived discrimination increases views of commonality among American Muslims as well as their perceptions of linked fate. Other scholars similarly have found that, post-9/11, religious identity became an important base of collective association with other Muslim Americans (Peek 2005; Barrett 2008; Abdo 2006; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009).

A female student of Egyptian descent described this connection with other Muslims this way: вЂњThe Muslims I know unite based on the pressure that they feel from the negative labeling from non-Muslims in society. This common problem brings us together, giving us a common basic identityвЂќ (AI 114). Others used similar wording, defining their identification with other Muslim Americans as based on вЂњbeing a targeted group,вЂќ вЂњbeing looked at less favorably than other cultures in America,вЂќ being a вЂњminority,вЂќ or having вЂњrights violatedвЂќ (AI 26, 31). One Pakistani-American from Los Angeles said she вЂњstill feels America can be a hostile environment [for Muslims].B .B .B . [Muslims] are so different and donвЂ™t all think the same, but I do identify with those experiencing discriminationвЂќ (AI 180).

A Strengthened Muslim American Identity

The sense of unity, based on a shared experience of religious discrimination, pushed many Muslim American participants in this study to understandPage 107 → their religion better. A young U.S.-born Pakistani American man from Los Angeles added that, unlike his parents, he and his college peers have studied Islam carefully, especially since 9/11, in order to distinguish true tenets of the faith from cultural traditions that are closely tied with other national backgrounds (AI 52). Similarly, a young Afghani man from New York, who grew up in a religious family, said вЂњ[discrimination] has definitely made me closer [to Islam]. It has caused me to seek more knowledge about my religion beyond the traditions we practiced in my familyвЂќ (AI 141). As a U.S.-born Sudanese American Muslim from California explained, вЂњdiscrimination toward Muslims has caused me to become closer to my religion because it makes me feel somewhat excluded from American society, so I look to other Muslims to form a sort of support group against injustices I face as a Muslim AmericanвЂќ (AI 142).

Abdo (2006) similarly argues that one result of the 9/11 aftermath is that the younger generation of Muslims in the United States is forming a вЂњnew Islamic identityвЂќ (5). As evidenced by the growth of Muslim Student

Associations, the push by young parents to build new Islamic schools, and the trend among younger women to wear Islamic headscarves, she and others (Haddad 2007; Peek 2005) suggest that 9/11 created a surge of Islamic pride among American Muslims, forcing them to defend the faith and turn inward to some extent to form a more cohesive community. This might appear to contradict findings from chapter 2 that report declining frequency of prayer and more liberal interpretation of religious texts among later-generation Muslim Americans, but the MANOS data do not find significant differences across generations in terms of attendance at religious services. The interviews suggest that while some American-born Muslims are less вЂњtraditionalвЂќ than their immigrant counterpartsвЂ”and in some cases less religiousвЂ”they still value being in the physical presence of their Muslim community, especially in times of scrutiny toward Muslims.

Muslims AmericansвЂ™ Diverse Responses to Discrimination

While many participants in this study were optimistic about American Muslims coming together to address the discrimination against their community, a few others were more demoralized and did not believe it was worthwhile to be politically active on behalf of the community.

A few respondents noted that the negative attention directed toward Muslims made them want to disassociate themselves from the Muslim American communityвЂ”in some instances to вЂњpassвЂќ as non-Muslims or to adopt a non-Islamic nameвЂ”to avoid the scrutiny. While still identifying Page 108 → as Muslim, they felt the need to actively minimize the difference between themselves and their non-Muslim counterparts in social or work spaces. One young woman noted that she stopped wearing her hijab at her university because she was afraid of harassment. When she was unable to attend social events due to religious conflicts, she would just explain that she had a вЂњmeeting at churchвЂќ she had to attend.

On the contrary, several participants felt a responsibility to contribute a positive representation of Islam to other Americans by actively reaching out and sharing about who Muslims are and about their faith. One college student of Palestinian descent, who was very well known and liked for her activism on behalf of disadvantaged groups on campus, decided to start wearing a hijab for the first time so people would know she was Muslim. She explained that most of her friends didnвЂ™t know her religious identity, and she wanted to offer a contrasting view to counteract negative images of Muslims portrayed in the media (AI 181). Another woman in this study explained that she felt pressure to be extremely careful about how she conducted herself in society so as not to be judged or to portray a negative image of Muslims. вЂњI must always try to project a positive, good-citizen image of myself so that people have no reason to attack my religionвЂќ (AI 3). Calfano (2018) similarly finds that Muslims in the United States have clear concerns about how they and other Muslim Americans are perceived by the broader American society.

Other respondents did not feel particularly close to other Muslim Americans who experienced discrimination because they believed there was too much of a вЂњvictimвЂќ narrative within the Muslim American community, which they did not identify with or like. Some respondents blamed particular national Muslim organizations for perpetuating a narrative of victimization and for promoting conspiracies that served to isolate the community from the government and broader society. While acknowledging the need to defend Muslim rights, many believed that this sort of discourse, without proposed action to address problems politically, was not helpful.

Others simply believed that broad-based perceptions of discrimination against Muslims in the United States were overblown. One U.S.-born Arab living in New York explained that he never faced discrimination and suggested that those who felt isolated were likely segregating themselves by choosing not to assimilate: вЂњI donвЂ™t understand why some Muslims come to this country and choose to look visibly differentвЂ”growing a beard, for exampleвЂ”and then complain about being discriminated Page 109 → against. They should expect to be viewed differently. While there is not justification for discrimination, if people come to the United States, they need to assimilate and leave those cultural, not-religiously-required customs behindвЂќ (AI 30). He also didnвЂ™t think that he should hold any particular identity or affinity with others simply because he shares a single characteristic [religion] with them.

Race, Ethnicity, and the Prospects for Muslim American Unity in an Age of Discrimination

Ethnic Divides and Prejudice in the Muslim American Community

Participants noted that one barrier to true identification to the broader Muslim American community was that some Muslim immigrants held strong attachments to their particular ethnic communities and sometimes brought with them prejudices from their country of origin. Unless they came to the United States at a very young age, foreign-born participants in this study generally, as one might expect, expressed a stronger attachment to their national or ethnic community (e.g. Pakistani, Egyptian, Iranian, etc.) than to the broader Muslim American community. As one foreign-born Pakistani respondent explained, вЂњthe Muslim American community is divided into different ethnic groups. Even if itвЂ™s unintentional, different Muslim organizations tend to be dominated by different cultures, like Arab, Asian, Bosnian, and so on. Not everyone is separated, but it just naturally happens that people stick with their own ethnicityвЂќ (AI 123). A man who came to the United States as an infant said that many вЂњimmigrant Muslims cling to the culture they come from, dividing Muslim AmericansB .B .B . additionally, some Muslims are stricter or more closed-minded than other mainstream, liberal Muslim Americans. That makes it hard for them to be able to mixвЂќ (AI 144).

American mosques, as discussed earlier, are often divided based on ethnic and national lines, with services and cultural traditions conducted in the native language. Many congregations also sponsor classes that teach homeland cultural traditions and language skills. For immigrants, this important, community-building elementвЂ”connecting friends and colleagues who share a language and cultureвЂ”was seen as a way to help them get along in the United States. Studies have shown, in fact, that immigrantsPage 110 → accrue a variety of social and economic benefits from involvement in religious communities (Hirschman 2004), and religion is seen as an important channel through which immigrants are eased into the mainstream in the United States (Foner and Alba 2008). Less racial diversity in mosques, however, is associated with lesser feelings of commonality with other Muslim Americans (Barreto, Masuoka, and Sanchez 2008).

Several participants went further in describing the ethnic divides in the Muslim American community resulting from racial and ethnic discrimination, which are often a remnant of historical conflicts abroad. The topic of racism is particularly sensitive in the Muslim American community, as Islam itself advocates a вЂњunified tribe,вЂќ meaning that ethnicity and nationalism should be replaced by one Islamic identity (Khan 2000). When asked about ethnic divides, most foreign-born respondents adamantly repeated IslamвЂ™s teachings about the equality of all people, regardless of race, ethnicity, or language. Some, however, admitted that вЂњracial groups divide the community, like Pakistani versus Egyptian versus ArabвЂќ (AI 38). A recent female immigrant from Iran expressed hesitation toward interacting with Afghans, even in America, because in her country Afghans are known to be вЂњpoor thieves who steal and rape womenвЂќ (AI 115). A first-generation Somali man in Minnesota explained that most Somalis do not like вЂњforeignersвЂќ (non-Somalis). He noted that historically Arabs had never respected Somalis and that even in the United States, вЂњArabs donвЂ™t care about our community. These big Muslim organizations only serve Arabs and Pakistanis. We are left behindвЂќ (AI 116).

U.S.-born individuals were relatively open about the fact that long-held cultural beliefs in immigrant communities created tensions across ethnic lines. A U.S.-born female of Afghani descent in California said that while she has no personal animus toward Arabs, beliefs of her immigrant parentsвЂ™ generation have led to tensions between her ethnic community and other Muslim groups: вЂњBeing Afghan, in general, conflicts with other Muslims because Afghans are known to hate Arabs. ItвЂ™s because Arabs came to Afghanistan and forced strict religious schooling on its people, there is a cultural conflictвЂќ (AI 32).

Interviewees said that most U.S.-born Muslims did not carry the same cultural вЂњbaggageвЂќ as their parents or grandparents. This would suggest that ethnic and racial divides are less relevant in later generations, which would allow for a more cohesive Muslim American identity among U.S.-born Muslims. Barreto, Masuoka, and Sanchez (2008) similarly found that U.S.-born Muslims are more likely to perceive commonality with other Muslim Americans than with foreign-born Muslims. This shift to a Page 111 →more вЂњcultureless IslamвЂќ among later generations has also been found in other ethnographic studies of Muslim youth who attempt to appropriate

Islam separate from the ethnic culture of the parental generation and reject some traditions as non-Islamic and as obstacles to community building (Cesari 2002; Yang and Ebaugh 2001).

Exclusion of African American Muslims

Several participants in this study said that antiblack sentiments in the immigrant community were rarely openly acknowledged but had resulted in the passive exclusion of African American Muslims from some immigrant-dominated Muslim organizations. Many of this studyвЂ™s Arab American Muslim participants in the Detroit areaвЂ”where there is also a sizable black Muslim communityвЂ”did not view the Nation of Islam (NOI) as true Islam, but instead saw it as a distinctive and separate religious identity for African Americans, while the immigrant community was practicing the вЂњtrueвЂќ and вЂњlegitimateвЂќ Islam. Many immigrant Muslims in this study did not make any distinctions between various African American Muslims, associating all black Muslims with nonmainstream theological practices. One interviewee suggested that Arab businesses in the Detroit areaвЂ”especially liquor stores and gas stationsвЂ”were disproportionately the victims of crime and speculated that racial resentment toward Arabs by blacks was part of the reason.

Leaders in the Muslim American community have expressed concern over discrimination within the community and have sought to address it head-on. Imam Dawud Walid, the executive director of the Michigan chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), spoke out against using Arabic slurs such as *abed* (slave or servant) or its plural form *abeed*, when referring to African Americans:

> Intra-Muslim racism is an issue often swept under the rug in the American Muslim community. Some of its manifestations are overt while its varying expressions tend to be more subtle. In order for us to be a communityB .B .B . we must put forth the same, if not more, intellectual and social energy, in confronting intra-Muslim racism as we do when confronting Islamophobia. (Walid 2014)

Exclusion from immigrant Muslim communities was not lost on African American Muslim interviewees, some of whom believed that immigrant Muslims were вЂњracistвЂќ against them and did вЂњnot respect [them] as Page 112 → authentic Muslims.вЂќ Some African American respondents said they were often discredited by the immigrant Muslim community because of their general lack of knowledge or experience with Arabic and foreign Islamic cultures (AI 58, AI 72). In her research on women in the Muslim American community, Karim (2008) observes that вЂњthe pursuit for acceptance causes immigrants to differentiate themselves from blacks and also drives them to perceive and treat blacks with a scorn taught by the dominant racial discourseвЂќ (28). вЂњOther African American Muslims,вЂќ she continued, вЂњwho watched immigrants strive at all costs to be accepted by whites, questioned why immigrants had not made as much effort to build alliances with African Americans, with whom they shared an *ummah* (Muslim community)вЂќ (128).

Some characterized the relationship between Arab and African American communities in the greater Detroit area as one of mutual suspicion, if not open hostility. Many African American Muslims specifically expressed resentment that the American publicвЂ™s perception of Islam had become shaped by the image of Muslims as either Arab or Pakistani, but not as African American. Others complained that immigrant Muslims tended to be more enthusiastic about new Anglo members of the community than they were about blacks. (Another respondent, a Latino convert to Islam, offered a different perspective, noting that while there was sometimes suspicion of converts, they were overall very welcomed in the community [AI 147].)

Despite high levels of expressed support for the Black Lives Matter movement mentioned earlier, Green (2017a) reports that black Muslims do not see much support from Middle Eastern or South Asian Muslims on issues related to the black community or concern for black lives. She notes that when protesters swarmed airports in large American cities following President TrumpвЂ™s executive order temporarily limiting immigration from several Muslim-majority countries, some black Muslims stayed home.

U.S.-Born Muslims Identifying across Races

Many children of immigrants believed they did not share many of the biases of their parents and, in fact, had little

in common with those born in their parentsвЂ™ ancestral homeland (AI 9). One young woman from New Jersey, whose parents were both born in Pakistan, said she felt she had more in common with her non-Muslim friends because she came from a liberal sect of Islam. She felt relatively little attachment to being Pakistani Page 113 →or to issues related to Pakistan because her everyday life was so far removed from Pakistanis living outside of the United States. U.S.-born Muslims overall were more likely to express an identification with the Muslims who were also born and raised in America or at least who shared a focus and investment in the Muslim community in America. This attachment seemed to supersede ethnic affiliations to a greater degree than in the immigrant community.

Representatives from several national Islamic organizations spoke about differences in identification among U.S.-born and foreign-born Muslims. A representative from the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) office in Washington, DC, described U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ greater attachment across ethnic groups in the Muslim American community as the result of being raised in diverse communities while growing up in a society that is suspicious of Islam.

> *As Americans, [U.S.-born] Muslims do not have ethnic ties as strong as those of their parents. TheyвЂ™ve done much more to reach out to other Muslim groups to build community, including African Americans. Secondly, negative public discourse about Islam, and to a lesser extent discrimination, has been imposed on U.S.-born Muslims by the public. The public is talking about Islam in a way that has led many to read more into their faith, study to learn more about Islam, and come closer to others.*

The socialization experience of American-born Muslims allowed for a sense of commonality with Americans across a range of ethnic backgrounds. Because U.S.-born Muslims were much more likely to be aware of the mistreatment of Muslims based on their religious affiliation, they were more likely to see themselves as part of a community with other Muslim Americans, even across ethnic lines.

Some respondents suggested that the suspicion and targeting of Muslims in the post-911 era has brought some immigrant Muslims together with other segments of the Muslim community and helped them better understand the struggles that the African American community has been dealing with for hundreds of years in America. Smith (2009) argues that their joint discrimination is helping to create a new, uniquely American Islam, in which all American Muslims, no matter which race or ethnicity, must routinely defend their faith and their right to live in America. Chande (2008) adds that immigrant Muslims are now more willing to consult AfricanPage 114 → Americans on civil rights issues, with which African Americans are well-experienced. Abraham, Howell, and Shryock (2011) note that for the first time since 9/11, the Detroit NAACP and CAIR have found they have much in common.

While interviewees in this study noted that progress has been made toward uniting segments of the Muslim American community, many expressed that there was much more work to be done. Addressing the problem of discrimination coming from outside the community, they stressed, requires first solving MuslimsвЂ™ intercommunity conflicts.

Experiencing Discrimination in Post-9/11 America: Differences by Race

Beyond causing divisions within the Muslim American community, race appears to have shaped respondentsвЂ™ experiences in the United States as well. American-born interviewees in this study discussed the significance of phenotype (their observable physical characteristics) in shaping their experience as a Muslim in America. A respondent who identified as white acknowledged that he was вЂњlucky and privileged enough to escape discriminationвЂќ (AI 20). One self-described light-skinned interviewee felt he had not personally been discriminated against because of his complexion (AI 5). Others lamented that lighter-skinned Muslims could pass for white and did not understand the negative associations and assumptions about being foreign that came with dark complexion, because they had not experienced it for themselves. The inescapability of being a minority among those with darker complexions seemed to bring them closer with the Muslim American community for

support and sympathy.

In her interviews of Muslim Americans, Selod (2015) similarly observed that Muslims with darker complexions, or those who belonged to an ethnic group that had already been racialized, experienced far more scrutiny from American society and the government. Individuals with lighter skin could pass for white and could avoid the вЂњstares, questions, and constant condemnation many Muslim Americans face because of their religious identityB .B .B . lighter skin tone and the removal of religious signifiers resulted in the ability to claim social membership [in America].B .B .B . South Asian and Arab women who have darker skin complexion are not able to pass for white even without the hijabвЂќ (Selod 2015, 8). Muslims born abroad, however, were much less likely to discuss openly the significance of American racial categories. If anything, immigrant interviewеesPage 115 → preferred to be associated with the perceived upward mobility of white Americans. This greater association with American whites has been observed among other American immigrant groups as well (McClain et al. 2006; Loewen 1971).

Fig. 3.1. Perceived вЂњCollective Threat,вЂќ by Race and Generation

Note: Figure 3.1 presents predicted values of вЂњCollective Threat.вЂќ The measure вЂњCollective ThreatвЂќ is an index composed of three agree/disagree items, rescaled to range from 0 to 1: *Being a member of my religious community is important to my life; I am treated with less respect than other people because of my religion; Americans are hostile towards my religious group.* Higher values indicate agreement with the statements. Values account for differences in age, gender, income, and educational level. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

Data from MANOS indicate that the racial identification of Muslim respondents also systematically affected both their perceptions of discrimination and their identification with the American Muslim community.[4] Figure 3.1 presents predicted values from an OLS regression estimating Collective Threat by racial identification among U.S.-born respondents and foreign-born respondents. The data show that among U.S.-born Muslims, there are significant differences along the lines of racial identification; race does not appear to play a significant role, however, in shaping Collective Threat levels for foreign-born Muslims. American-born Arabs and blacks held significantly higher levels of Collective Threat than other groups, at 56 percent and 45 percent, respectively. Asians are significantly Page 116 →less likely (with Collective Threat levels at just 13 percent) than all other U.S.-born Muslims to perceive discrimination and to identify closely with the American Muslim community.

Why might U.S.-born Arabs and blacks hold the highest levels of perceived Collective Threat? This observation offers some confirmation that those who are more phenotypically distinct from mainstream Americans may have more discriminatory experiences and develop a stronger group identity. Arabs and individuals who appear to be of Middle Eastern descent have indeed been the target of hate crimes, negative public opinion, and counterterrorism policies since 9/11 (Brooks and Manza 2013; Love 2017). Even prior to 9/11, Arab American organizations were concerned about issues of profiling and discrimination. In this they share common ground with African Americans, who have an extensive history of actively fighting for equality in the United States. Both the Arab and black Muslim communities are extremely well-institutionalized in the United States and are active politically. Such organization may enhance community membersвЂ™ ability to stay abreast of issues such as discrimination that affect Muslim Americans, even those members who have not experienced discrimination directly.

The reason behind the low levels of perceived discrimination and group closeness among Asian respondentsвЂ”most of which are of Southeast Asian descentвЂ”is not immediately clear. Asian American Muslims are also involved in many prominent Muslim American organizations in the United States and have similarly been the targets of profiling and counterterrorism policies. At the same time, as noted earlier, Asian Americans may benefit from other AmericansвЂ™ less fearful assumptions of them (Wong et al. 1998), which might result in better treatment than their black and Arab counterparts receive. Moreover, the majority of Asian Muslims did not come to the United States until after the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, and, as a result, a much smaller portion of the community was born in the United States. Less than 6 percent of Asians reported being third generation or later, compared with 14 percent of Arabs and 37 percent of nonconvert

whites. Although it is not clear whether Asian MuslimsвЂ™ relative lack of a historical memory in the United States and high proportion of foreign-born members affect group cohesion, their low levels of perceived discrimination reflect trends among Asians of other ethnic backgrounds in the United States, who are significantly less likely than other ethnic groups to report discrimination (Pew 2013d).

The observation that Muslims who are ethnic minorities tend to perceive greater amounts of discrimination against Muslims is supported by Page 117 →research by Waters (1994) on first- and second-generation West Indian and Haitian immigrants. She found that the key factor for identification among second-generation immigrants was how they experienced and reacted to racial discrimination. Those in her study who identified as black American tended to see more discrimination in the United States, whereas those who identified as ethnic West Indian tended to see more opportunities and rewards for individual effort and initiative. Similarly, Portes and Zhou (1993) argued that being nonwhite and living among other native racial minorities can lead to identification with a lower status group, despite economic well-being.

Discussion: How Socialization, Discrimination, Race, and Identity Are Linked

This chapter set out to explore why later-generation Muslims perceive higher levels of discrimination against Muslims in the United States and hold a stronger Muslim American identity than their foreign-born counterparts. The interviews presented in this chapter highlight the importance of respondentsвЂ™ individual socialization experiences in shaping their expectations for how the government should treat them and in framing their perception of their groupвЂ™s standing in society. The wide diversity of the Muslim American community means that not all Muslims have the same experiences in the United States or have identical views toward the government.

The evidence from interviews presented in this chapter largely supports the patterns found in the MANOS data on вЂњCollective Threat.вЂќ Muslim Americans with greater familiarity with the American system, specifically those who were born and raised in the United States, expressed higher levels of group-based discrimination and group-based identity compared to individuals who were born abroad and whose ethnic affiliations may limit their full embrace of the entire Muslim American community. Overall, immigrants did not criticize the U.S. government for failing to live up to its stated values to the degree that U.S.-born Muslims did. While immigrants were less personally invested in addressing post-9/11 policies targeting Muslim Americans (believing that was the job of later-generation Muslims), they also held lower expectations for how governments tend to behave toward citizens and thus seemed less outraged by these policies. Foreign-born interviewees were focused on acclimating Page 118 →and on issues affecting their national or ethnic communities, whereas U.S.-born Muslims had developed a sense of commonality with other Muslims in America over their shared experience as a scrutinized American minority, despite ethnic and racial divides in the community.

There also appears to be a relationship between the racial background of U.S.-born Muslims and their connection with the broader Muslim American community. Racial divides within the community itself are salient, particularly for African American Muslims. The evidence suggests that U.S.-born Muslims with darker complexions also perceive more scrutiny from American society and the government. The inescapability of being a minority among those with darker complexions seems to bring them closer to their Muslim American community for support and sympathy. In particular, American-born Arabs and blacks express the highest levels of Collective Threat compared to all other groups. This suggests that phenotypic or ethnic differences can shape how individuals are socialized and thus how they identify themselves within American society.

While this chapter offers interesting insight into the mechanism driving the вЂњidentification-integration paradox,вЂќ the next chapter assesses how this paradox manifests itself in MuslimsвЂ™ attitudes toward a particular government institution that was regularly brought up in conversations with interviewees: U.S. law enforcement. At the heart of many intervieweesвЂ™ concerns regarding government policies that aim to address violent extremism and terrorism was whether the police, in their effort to secure the country, will treat Muslims as well as they would treat non-Muslims in identical circumstances. While Muslims want as much as other Americans for terrorist attacks to be thwarted, as was discussed in chapter 1, many worry over wrongful

associations between religious practice and identity and criminal activity. How do U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ experiences and sense of attachment with other Muslim Americans prime their relationship with American law enforcement? How do immigrant MuslimsвЂ™ past experiences in their home countries frame how they expect to be treated by police officers? Chapter 4 offers a more precise look at how the socialization of different segments of the Muslim American community frames their expectations of the police.

4. Expectations of U.S. Law Enforcement Behavior

The preceding chapters have established several important points regarding the Muslim American community. Available data reveal that Muslim Americans are well-integrated into American society and that the average Muslim American shares the disdain of the broader American public toward political violence. In fact, Muslim American community members make up the single largest known source of information that has helped to disrupt terrorism plots (New America 2017; Bergen et al. 2014), which demonstrates their willingness to proactively combat terror.

At the same time, the data reveal a growing perception among Muslim Americans that Muslims are being unfairly targeted by the U.S. government and many of its Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and counterterrorism (CT) policies. This was particularly true among U.S.-born Muslims, who were more likely than foreign-born Muslims to perceive differential treatment by the government because of their greater familiarity with American government, politics, and values. As discussed in the previous chapter, this appears to be linked with a heightened sense of identification with the Muslim American community across ethnic, racial, and cultural boundaries. Foreign-born individuals, who, based on the governance they experienced in their countries of origin, held lower expectations of the U.S. government, were less shocked by apparent mistreatment and did not feel there was much upside to speaking up against the government.

What are the practical implications for U.S. security policy, and society at large, of this integration-identification paradox (more-integrated Muslims more readily perceiving discrimination by their government)? Considering the central role of U.S. law enforcement in Muslim AmericansвЂ™ post-9/11 experience, do these patterns of perceived discrimination systematicallyPage 120 → map onto MuslimsвЂ™ attitudes about how law enforcement will treat their community? In particular, do individual Muslims believe that their religious identity will result in differential treatment by authorities, or do they trust that they will be treated indiscriminately?

This chapter serves as an additional assessment of the qualitative findings discussed in chapters 2 and 3, supporting and affirming the previous patterns of perceived discrimination among different generations of Muslim Americans. Using a randomized survey experiment, the analysis compares MuslimsвЂ™ attitudes toward police behavior when the suspect is Muslim American versus some other background. The findings demonstrate that, indeed, U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ expectations of police behavior differ depending upon on the religious identity of the suspect. Foreign-born Muslims do not make this same distinction, but instead base their judgments of the police on experiences in their home countries.

Perceiving Unfair Policing

We have discussed how Muslim AmericansвЂ™ perceptions of discrimination and fairness in government are shaped by their socialization experiences and expectations (higher perceptions of discrimination for U.S.-born Muslims, lower for foreign-born Muslims). Are MuslimsвЂ™ perceptions of police behavior formed in the same way? CitizensвЂ™ perceptions of police fairness are key to understanding overall judgments of law enforcement and have implications for community-assisted policing. The perceptions and stories of Muslim Americans, in particular, highlight the importance of creating an environment in which citizens feel safe going to law enforcement with information or when they are in need.

On what bases do citizens overall tend to judge police? Empirical research has consistently demonstrated that satisfaction with the police and legal systems are shaped as much by beliefs about whether one is being governed with fairness and objectivity as by the actual outcome one receives (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler and Fagan 2008). For example, Tyler and Folger (1980) found that when citizens are stopped for traffic violations, their evaluations of the interaction with the officer is influenced more by the perceived fairness with which they are treated than by the result itself (e.g., whether they were issued a traffic citation).

Beyond direct personal interactions with law enforcement, research Page 121 →suggests that peopleвЂ™s

perceptions of how their in-group members are treated also affect their judgments about the legitimacy of specific law enforcement behavior. People tend to sympathize more with individuals who share similar traits and backgrounds. For instance, whitesвЂ™ support for punitive policies such as the death penalty decrease significantly when they learn that the criminal perpetrator is white rather than nonwhite (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Eberhardt et al. 2004). Hurwitz and Peffley (2005) found that blacks tend to sympathize and be more sensitive toward the treatment of black suspects because they anticipate mistreatment toward black suspects relative to white suspects, whereas white respondents expect police to treat whites and blacks in an identical fashion.

As discussed in chapter 3, since 2001 Muslim Americans have become less trusting of law enforcement agencies and police. They believe that many innocent people are regularly subjected to unwarranted surveillance, and they observe that Muslims are frequently harassed by airport security and immigration officials. Moreover, pervasive societal discrimination has undermined some MuslimsвЂ™ confidence they will be treated fairly by law enforcement in an investigation. According to a 2011 poll by the Pew Research Center, more than half of Muslim Americans believe that the governmentвЂ™s antiterrorism policies single out Muslims for increased surveillance and monitoring. In PewвЂ™s 2017 poll, nearly half of Muslims surveyed reported being called offensive names, singled out by airport security or law enforcement, or physically threatened for being Muslim.

One U.S.-born Arab interviewee from Seattle noted that her son was continually harassed by the FBI for two years and faced charges that were later dropped. During that time, she explained, he could not pass a background check for work and was lucky to be able to attend his university. She sawвЂ”through his experience with government efforts to pre-empt terrorism, including unfair policing and harassmentвЂ”how suspects, not to mention their families, can become frustrated and deeply resentful and distrustful of authorities (AI 13).

Even without personal experiences of ill treatment, the more familiar U.S.-born participants were with high-profile cases of discriminationвЂ”such as the NYPD spying case mentioned in the introductionвЂ”the more they seemed to adopt cynical views and negative expectations of U.S. law enforcement. A white, U.S.-born, female convert said that although she had never interacted with the FBI, she believed the organization is вЂњcorruptB .B .B . they are unfair by labeling and stereotyping Muslims as terrorists. Page 122 →They do too much fake stuff to stop extremismB .B .B . like tracking and spying and buggingB .B .B . and itвЂ™s all done under the excuse of protecting America from extremistsB .B .B . itвЂ™s so excessive and itвЂ™s ineffectiveвЂќ (AI 143).

While interviews are critical to understanding the Muslim American perspective, statistical trends and patterns can also help us to see how the broader Muslim American community interprets law enforcement intentions and behaviors in various circumstances.

Survey Experiment: Attitudes toward Police

To systematically assess American MuslimsвЂ™ perceptions of fairness by U.S. law enforcement, the MANOS dataset included a survey experiment focused on police. Respondents were asked about how fairly they believed the police would behave in a theoretical criminal investigation.

To evaluate whether peopleвЂ™s beliefs about police behavior would change depending on the suspects involved in the investigation, an experimental survey design manipulated the identity of the suspect in question. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In one condition, the suspect is a presumably a non-Muslim American named вЂњJake Lewis.вЂќ In the other condition, the suspect is presumably a Muslim American named вЂњUmar Sayyid.вЂќ For each respondent, the response when the suspect is a non-Muslim or a Muslim is observed, but not both.

Subjects were told that вЂњ*the police have received an anonymous tip that a 23-year-old American citizen, [Jake Lewis/Umar Sayyid], a man without a criminal record, is planning to commit a major crime*.вЂќ Following the prompt, respondents were asked about their expectations of police fairness: вЂњ*Generally speaking, do you think*

*U.S. law enforcement will treat a person like this fairly?*вЂќ Answers were ranked on a 7-point scale from completely agree (7) to completely disagree (1), and were rescaled to range from 1 to 0 in the following analysis.

Differential Perceptions of Fairness

To estimate the effect of the suspectвЂ™s identity on expectations of law enforcement fairness, table 4.1 presents a series of predicted probabilities that are derived from two OLS regressions. The first column of the table lists the MANOS subgroups under consideration. For each subgroup listed, the second column displays predicted levels of expected fairness Page 123 →when the suspect is identified a non-Muslim, along with corresponding confidence intervals. The third column displays predicted levels of expected fairness when the suspect is identified as a Muslim, along with corresponding confidence intervals. The final column visually displays the difference between the two conditions for each subgroup of interest. The results are robust to the inclusion of basic demographic controls: age, income, education, and gender.[1]

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Generational Differences

Looking at the entire sample of Muslim Americans, priming respondents to consider the treatment of Muslims under police scrutiny reduces perceptions of fairness by 13 percentage points, a statistically significant difference. This indicates that on average, Muslim Americans expect U.S. law enforcement to treat Muslim suspects less well than non-Muslim suspects in identical situations.

The next row in table 4.1 assesses the difference by generation in respondentsвЂ™ expectations of how the police will treat Jake and Umar. Looking at the вЂњJakeвЂќ column, foreign-born and U.S.-born Muslims have nearly identical prior expectations about the conduct that non-Muslims suspects are likely to see from police. There is a striking difference, however, between how foreign-born and U.S.-born Muslims respond to police interacting with a Muslim suspect. While foreign-born Muslims expect equal treatment under the law regardless of the identity of the suspect, Muslims born in the United States are 20 percentage points (a statistically significant difference) less likely to expect the police to treat Muslim suspects fairly.

This offers additional confirmation that U.S.-born Muslims are significantly more likely to have an internalized expectation about the mistreatment of Muslims by the government. This is consistent with the evidence put forth in chapter 3 showing that U.S.-born Muslims perceive greater discrimination by the government and are more sensitive to the mistreatment of fellow Muslim Americans. U.S.-born participants in this study noted that negative stories about othersвЂ™ encounters with law enforcement have led them to have a more pessimistic view of American society and government, a pattern that appears to be reflected here.

How do the results of this experiment line up with the other interesting finding, presented in chapter 3, of a strong association between U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ perceptions of discrimination and strong identification with the Muslim American community? As shown in appendix 3, indeed, those with the stronger Muslim identity anticipated at a higher rate unfair treatment for the hypothetical Muslim suspect. This supports the idea that it is the greater sense of identification with the Muslim American community that is heightening U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ concern for fellow Muslims, and it explains, in part, the lack of a similar pattern among foreign-born Muslims who do not identify as strongly with the Muslim American community broadly.

This finding is also consistent with studies that have found that immigrants,Page 125 → particularly those who have not fully assimilated, have more positive attitudes toward the government relative to those who were born in the country (Maxwell 2010; Maxwell 2008a; Garcia-Bedolla 2005; Michelson 2001; Michelson 2003a, 2003b; Correia 2010). Even though immigrantsвЂ™ experiences under illiberal, corrupt regimes can result in low expectations of the government (as presented in chapter 3 and confirmed below), they still on average have more positive views of American law enforcement than do U.S.-born Muslims when considering how police will behave toward a Muslim.

Generational Differences across Races

Muslims who are phenotypically distinct (nonwhite), as mentioned in chapter 3, report higher levels of discrimination and of identity with the Muslim American community. Indeed, a long line of empirical evidence demonstrates that racial minorities in the United States are more likely to be the victims of police violence and racial profiling (Tyler and Huo 2002; Weitzer 2002; Tyler and Wakslak 2004). Consequently, minority residents tend to perceive that they and other racial group members are unfairly targeted for aggressive and discourteous treatment by the police because of their race (Brunson 2007; Sharp and Atherton 2007; Garcia and Cao 2005; Cao, Frank, and Cullen 1996; Hurst, Frank, and Browning 2000). It follows, then, that Muslims who are racial minorities would be more likely to have hostile or negative interactions with the government due to profiling or being associated by virtue of their race with criminal activity. They may thus be more familiar with instances of police misconduct toward Muslims (or at very least open to the idea that police can behave badly) and as a result more likely to expect the mistreatment of Muslims by law enforcement in ambiguous situations.

Moving down table 4.1, it becomes clear that the effect of generation on perceived fairness discussed above is generally consistent across racial groups. That is, U.S.-born and foreign-born Muslims alike, of all races, anticipated similar levels of police fairness for a non-Muslim suspect, but U.S.-born Muslims expected worse treatment for a Muslim suspect. The largest decrease in expectations of fairness for a Muslim suspect can be seen among U.S.-born Arab Muslims and black Muslims: 25- and 27-point drops, respectively. This difference is statistically significant and suggests that the experiences of Arab and black Muslims may make them particularly sensitive to scenarios that involve Muslim suspects and law enforcement.

Page 126 →The exception to this pattern is Asian respondents. Foreign-born *and* U.S.-born AsiansвЂ™ expectations of fairness also drop, by 12 percentage points and 11 percentage points respectively, when considering the treatment of a Muslim suspect compared to a non-Muslim suspect, but these effects do not quite reach statistical significance (the confidence intervals for the Jake and Umar condition overlap). These patterns are consistent, however, with the observation in chapter 3 that Asian Muslims tend to perceive significantly less discrimination against their community than Arab or black Muslims, and it is also consistent with the observation that Asian Americans generally tend to perceive less discrimination than other U.S. minority groups (Pew 2013d).

The data presented in this section point to the importance of generational differences and experiences in explaining perceptions of AmericaвЂ™s security apparatus. The findings provide additional support for the argument that Muslim immigrants come to the United States with less negative expectation toward the treatment of Muslim suspects, but that U.S.-born Muslims who have been socialized within the United States, and are thus more familiar with AmericaвЂ™s security apparatus and its history, hold greater cynicism toward the government when it deals with a Muslim suspect.

Foreign-Born Influences of American Muslim Immigrants

The data thus far confirm that U.S.-born Muslims hold more pessimistic views toward law enforcement than do their foreign-born counterparts and that this generational difference is based on an increased awareness of *group-based* injustices. That is, U.S.-born Muslims do not hold more negative views of the police overall, but their perceptions of unfairness are directed at the treatment of Muslim Americans specifically.

Given that foreign-born Muslims do not seem to perceive group-based mistreatment against Muslims to this same degree, what can be learned about how the views of foreign-born Muslims develop? As discussed in chapter 3, several foreign-born respondents said that they carried over attitudes and beliefs about governments and security from their countries of origin. An Arab man from the San Francisco area suggested that Muslim immigrants вЂњcome from countries where there is distrust in government because the government is not democraticвЂќ and have a hard time fully accepting that governments can be any different. When asked about his views toward national security agencies in the United States such as the Page 127 →FBI, an Egyptian-born man insisted that based on what he has been exposed to back home, he вЂњ[does] not trust the security agencies of *any* country, not exclusively the American security agenciesB .B .B . worldwide, security agencies protect the government, not the peopleвЂќ (AI 33).

Several studies have noted that foreign-born individuals tend to use their experience with social institutions in their home countries as a reference to interpret their experiences and evaluate the institutions in a new country (Wals 2011; Waldinger and Lichter 2003; De Vos and Suarez-Orozco 1990; Correia 2010; Wortley and Owusu-Bempah 2009). Specifically, negative evaluations of police in oneвЂ™s home country can carry over to result in more negative perceptions of law enforcement in the new destination country, as has been found with Chinese and Korean immigrants to America and Canada (Wu, Sun, and Smith 2010; Pogrebin and Poole 1990). The feature of institutions that has been shown to be most consistently associated with citizensвЂ™ trust in government is corruption (Delhey and Newton 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Compared to fair and impartial institutions, corrupt institutions are more likely to give way to negative experiences of discrimination and unfair treatment.

When making judgments about the legitimacy and fairness of police in the United States, based on interviews from this study as well as past research, immigrant Muslims are likely to reference the government institutions in their countries of origin. Specifically, Muslims who come from countries that are corrupt, with unfair administration of the law, may not hold the U.S. government to standards as high as those held by U.S.-born Muslims. Immigrants from highly corrupt countries may have less trust that governments live up to their ideals compared to immigrants who come from less corrupt societies with strong institutions and rule of law. So while on average we observe that U.S.-born Muslims have more negative views toward police than immigrants overall, when comparing foreign-born individuals to each other, we expect to see variation in attitudes toward police, based on the quality of government institutions in the countries from which they came.

The Moderating Effect of New Experiences

Regardless of whether an immigrantвЂ™s prior socialization experience with her home countryвЂ™s institutions was positive or negative, her home frame of reference may fade as she spends more time in the United States, acquires new information and experiences, and becomes more integrated in Page 128 → society. Immigrants in this study who were more familiar with recent controversies surrounding counterterrorism policing and Muslims were more cynical toward AmericaвЂ™s security apparatus and sounded more like native-born Muslim Americans when discussing these issues. Though most expressed genuine support for and optimism about the FBIвЂ™s goal and responsibility of protecting the United States from terrorism, frustration was expressed toward what interviewees described as the FBIвЂ™s вЂњblackmailing Muslims into spying on other MuslimsвЂќ by threatening things like deportation due to immigration violations. This sentiment was captured by the remarks of one Pakistan-born man, who said, вЂњWhen Muslims are given money to place bombs by the FBI and then later arrested to make it look like they planned it themselves, this is not helping bring safety to AmericansB .B . the FBI pretends to befriend Muslims when its goal is actually to spy on mosques, even if it has no real suspicions. That makes the FBI inherently discriminatory, which is unfairвЂќ (AI 167).

Political science and sociology literature finds, in fact, that as immigrants have more contact with government authorities, they become less trusting of the government (Michelson 2001, 2003a, 2003b). Chun, Organista, and Marin (2003) and Chow (2002) find that immigrants who had more previous contact with the police have less respect for law enforcement. Studies have shown that immigrantsвЂ™ experience with immigration officials also directly affects perceptions of other U.S. legal authorities. This is because some immigrants, particularly those from countries with centralized civil service systems, may not distinguish U.S. police officers from immigration officers (Wu, Sun, and Smith 2010; Chaundry et al. 2010).[2]

Based on this line of thinking, the blurring of roles between immigration officials and local police means that immigrants who have gone through the naturalization processвЂ”and who have thus had direct experience with U.S. authorities and more socialization as an AmericanвЂ”are more likely to make judgments of American legal institutions based on their personal interactions in the United States and less likely to be influenced by previous experiences under institutional corruption. Indeed, the naturalization process itself has been shown to increase integration and knowledge of national laws among immigrants (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2015; Just and Anderson 2012). Moreover, greater knowledge of society and the government is associated with higher reported rates of discrimination compared to less acculturated immigrants (Finch, Kolody, and Vega 2000).

So while Muslim immigrantsвЂ™ expectations of American law enforcementPage 129 → are likely shaped by

the quality of institutions in their home countries, those preconceived expectations will be updated as immigrants become exposed to the American system, whether through socialization, police contact, or more general contact with government institutions frequented by immigrants.

Measuring Country-of-Origin Corruption

In order to assess for this study whether the quality of institutions under which foreign-born respondents were socialized in their home countries would affect their perceptions of American law enforcement, a measure of the corruption levels in respondentsвЂ™ countries of origin was constructed using data from the World BankвЂ™s Political Indicators Index: the вЂњCorruption ControlвЂќ measure (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). The levels of Corruption Control for respondentsвЂ™ respective home countries are presented in figure 4.1. вЂњCorruption,вЂќ for the purposes of analysis, is the inverse of the Corruption Control Index. Higher values of вЂњCorruptionвЂќ represent poor control of corruption, or higher levels of corruption.

In the MANOS sample, 17 percent of respondents came from countries with a Corruption Control index score greater than 1, meaning that these countries had relatively low levels of corruption. Those countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., and Qatar. The bulk of the foreign-born sample (56 percent) was born in countries with corruption control scores between 1 and 0, with moderate levels of corruption, including countries like Turkey, Jordan, and Israel. Seventeen percent came from countries with scores between 0 and вЂ“1, higher levels of corruption, the majority of which are from Pakistan and India. Just 10 percent of foreign-born respondents in this sample came from countries with corruption control index score less than в€ ’1, countries with rampant corruption, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.

Foreign-Born Muslims and Sending-Country Effects

Returning to the MANOS data, table 4.2 presents the results from an OLS regression that estimates the degree to which foreign-born respondentsвЂ™ beliefs about police fairness are related to the levels of corruption in their countries of origin. The potential effect of having gone through the naturalization process is also considered. The second model includes an interactionPage 131 → between вЂњCorruptionвЂќ and вЂњNaturalization,вЂќ in order to determine whether the effects of home-country corruption depend on whether the respondent is a naturalized citizen or not. Finally, the third model was developed to assess whether an immigrantвЂ™s background differentially affects her or his perceptions of fairness depending on the identity of the suspect. To do this, interactions between the identity of the suspect (Umar or Jake) and home-level вЂњCorruptionвЂќ; the identity of the suspect and вЂњNaturalizationвЂќ; and a triple interaction between вЂњCorruption,вЂќ вЂњNaturalization,вЂќ and the identity of the suspect are included. All models control for age, income, education, and gender. The results of these three estimates are reported as models 1 to 3 in table 4.2.

Page 130 → Fig. 4.1. Corruption Control Index by Sending Country

Note: Figure 4.1 presents index scores drawn from the World Bank Governance Indicators project (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). Scores range from 2 to в€ ’2; higher values represent better control of corruption (lower levels of corruption). Figures are averaged from 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 for more reliable estimates. Variable вЂњCorruptionвЂќ used in the analysis is the inverse of the Corruption Control Index.

Fig. 4.2. Country of Origin Corruption Density

Note: Figure 4.2 displays the density of respondents by sending-country corruption levels. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013 and World Bank Governance Indicators Project 2009)

Sending-Country Corruption

Model 1 in table 4.2 confirms that whether the suspect is a Muslim or not has no direct effect on expectations of police fairness for foreign-born Page 132 →Muslims. The coefficient in model 1 for the level of corruption of

oneвЂ™s sending country is negative, as is the coefficient for naturalized citizens; neither, however, is statistically distinguishable from zero. This means that we cannot be sure that changes in the level of home-country corruption or naturalization status are necessarily linked to attitudes toward police. Whether law enforcement is engaging with a suspect identified as a Muslim or non-Muslim, foreign-born respondents are no more likely to think law enforcement will behave unfairly.

When the interaction of вЂњCorruptionвЂќ and вЂњNaturalizationвЂќ is included in model 2, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. This can be interpreted to mean that the effect of the level of corruption of oneвЂ™s sending country depends on whether the respondent is a naturalized citizen or not. Specifically, home-country corruption only has an effect on perceptions of police fairness if one has not yet become a naturalized citizen.

The effect of the interaction in model 2 is visualized in figure 4.3. LookingPage 133 → first at non-citizen immigrants (solid line), on the left side of the graph, individuals who emigrated from countries with low levels of corruption come to the United States with relatively sanguine prior expectations regarding fair treatment by law enforcement. In other words, the individuals in the survey who were most optimistic about how fairly police would treat both suspects were foreign-born noncitizens largely from Western democracies with relatively low levels of corruption, such as the Netherlands and Canada.

Table 4.2. Determinants of Expected Fairness among Foreign-Born Muslims

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Corruption (sending-country)	в€ ’0.04	в€ ’0.09*	в€ ’0.11*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Naturalized	в€ ’0.05	в€ ’0.07	в€ ’0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Γ— Corrupt		0.09*	0.14*
		(0.05)	(0.06)
Umar (Treatment)	0.06	0.07	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Γ— Naturalized			0.05
			(0.10)
Γ— Corrupt			0.11
			(0.11)
Γ— Corrupt Γ— Naturalized			в€ ’0.18
			(0.12)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y
R^2	0.17	0.19	0.21
N	168	168	168

Note: Table 4.2 presents determinants of perceived fairness of law enforcement using a standard OLS regression with robust standard errors. The dependent variable, perceived fairness, is measured by the item: *Generally speaking, do you think U.S. law enforcement will treat a person like this fairly?* Higher values indicate agreement with the statement. Models include foreign-born respondents only and control for age, income, education, and gender. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Fig. 4.3. Expected Fairness of Foreign-Born Naturalized Citizens and Noncitizens, by Corruption Level

Note: Figure 4.3 presents expected values of perceived fairness among foreign-born Muslims by level of corruption in the respondentвЂ™s home country and by naturalization status. This figure is based on results from an OLS regression controlling for age, income, gender, and education. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

Moving to the right across the graph, as levels of country corruption increase, perceptions of fairness decrease for non-naturalized immigrants. Among Muslim immigrants overall, non-naturalized immigrants coming from countries with the highest levels of corruption, such as Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, have the most pessimistic views of U.S. law enforcement (and about the same level of pessimism as expressed by U.S.-born Muslims,[3] denoted by the dotted line in figure 4.3). The observation that Page 134 →among immigrants, noncitizens coming from noncorrupt countries expect the most fairness, and those coming from highly corrupt countries expect the least fairness, is robust to the inclusion of standard demographics controls, as well as controls for racial identification.[4]

The Naturalization Process

As discussed in chapter 3, immigrants coming to the United States tend to be most optimistic toward the government before they have had a chance to interact with officials, to learn more about the society, or to have unpleasant experiences. But over time, disillusionment can set in (Correia 2010; Chun, Organista, and Marin 2003; Chow 2002; Michelson 2003a, 2003b, 2001). We also see this trend in the MANOS data. The positive expectations of those coming from noncorrupt societies appear to be wiped away by the time Muslims have gone through the naturalization process. As displayed in figure 4.3, foreign-born naturalized citizensвЂ™ (dashed line) expectations of fairness do not vary by the corruption level of their countries of origin. This offers some evidence that with more time and experiences in the United States, influences from an immigrantвЂ™s country of origin may fade.

To judge the importance of the naturalization process, the impact of naturalization on perceptions of fairness was simulated while other variables were held at their means. Among those who emigrated from a country with low corruption (corruption-control score higher than 1), as they move from noncitizen to citizen the probability of expecting fair treatment decreases from .80 to .52, a 28-point difference. The difference between noncitizens and citizens becomes smaller as levels of corruption increase. Among those coming from countries with moderate levels of corruption, citizensвЂ™ probability of expecting fairness is about 10 points less than that of noncitizens. Among those from the most corrupt countries (corruption-control score less than в€ ’1), the probability of expecting fair treatment is actually lower among noncitizens (.37) than citizens (.47).

Many of those coming from the most corrupt countries are likely to be refugees; Iraqi, Afghani, and Somali nationals have made up some of the largest percentages of refugees to the United States between 2009 and 2011 (Department of Homeland Security 2011). This suggests that refugeesвЂ™ expectations for governance may actually improve somewhat after becoming citizens.

In order to assess whether an immigrantвЂ™s background differentially affects her perceptions of fairness depending on the identity of the suspect,Page 135 → model 3 in table 4.2 presents interactions between the identity of the suspect, citizenship status, and level of sending-country corruption. The lack of significance indicates that while previous experiences of corruption and familiarity with the U.S. system reduce *overall* expectations of fairness, the expectation is not reduced at a greater rate when it is a Muslim suspect versus a non-Muslim suspect. This is in keeping with earlier findings that foreign-born MuslimsвЂ”regardless of their naturalization status or country-of-origin level of corruptionвЂ”are not expecting the police to treat the Muslim and non-Muslim suspects differently.

Fig. 4.4. Expected Fairness, by Time Lived in the United States

Note: Figure 4.4 presents expected values of perceived fairness among foreign-born Muslims by the time the respondent has spent in the United States and by age. Figure 4.4 is based on results from an OLS regression controlling for age, income, gender, and education. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

The Effects of Time in the United States on Perceptions of Fairness

How does time in the United States, versus the naturalization process, affect expectations of fairness toward law enforcement? The effect of time is Page 136 → a difficult thing to measure, namely because it is likely to depend on the age during which one migrated to the United States. For example, the effect of living in America for 20 years is likely to mean something different for those who came to America as infants than for those who came as adults.

Fig. 4.5. Marginal Effect of Home-Country Corruption on Perceived Fairness, by Time Lived in the United States

Note: Figure 4.5 presents the marginal effect of home-country corruption on perceived fairness among foreign-born Muslims by proportion of life lived in the United States. Proportion of life lived in the United States is measured by dividing years of residency by the respondentвЂ™s age. Figure 4.5 is based on results from an OLS regression controlling for age, income, gender, and education. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

To assess the effect of time as a function of age, figure 4.4 presents the effect of time spent in the United States on predicted values of expected fairness, by age of the respondent. Specifically, the figure shows how this relationship differs based on whether the respondent is under 30 years of age.

Looking first to immigrants who are over 30 years of age (solid line), on average, time in the United States does not significantly change an individualвЂ™s attitude toward U.S. law enforcement. Looking then to individualsPage 137 → who are under the age of 30, attitudes appear to be more malleable with time. Specifically, for individuals who came to the United States at a young age, expectations of fairness drop significantly over time.

Among those who have lived almost their entire lives in America, not surprisingly, their expectations of U.S. law enforcement are identical to those of native-born Muslims.

Just as those who came to the United States as children and adolescents are more likely to hold attitudes about law enforcement that are similar to U.S.-born Muslims, it follows that country-of-origin effects should be weak among those who have spent very few years living in the countries where were born. Figure 4.5 presents the marginal effect of home-country corruption on predicted values of expected fairness by the proportion of oneвЂ™s life spent abroad (years lived in the U.S./age).

We see from the figure that home-country corruption does not affect the expectations of those who have lived the majority of their lives in the United States (right side of graph). For those who have spent most their lives in their country of origin (left side of graph), home-country corruption significantly reduces expectations of fairness.

Robustness Checks and Limitations

The finding that home-country effects carry over into the United States and then fade as individuals become more familiar with the American institutions is consistent with interviews with immigrant respondents and with the related literature. Nonetheless, potential alternative explanations to the theory are assessed below.

U.S. War Zone Migrants

Could the findings about the impact of home-country corruption on perceptions be veiled by another effect: an immigrantвЂ™s negative experience with U.S. foreign policy in his or her country of origin?

Among the most corrupt countries include Iraq and Afghanistan, countries where in 2013 (the year the MANOS

survey was administered) the United States had stationed troops within each country for at least ten years. In this sample, 8 percent of respondents reported being born in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and about half of them immigrated to the United States after 9/11. All those who came before 9/11 have become naturalized citizens, and about half who arrived after 9/11 are citizens. Individuals who were born in Iraq or Afghanistan are 28 percentage points less likely to Page 138 →expect fair treatment by law enforcement than other foreign-born respondents. This difference is substantively large and statistically significant, even after controlling for sending-country corruption and citizenship status. This suggests that U.S. foreign policy in immigrantsвЂ™ country of origin may also shape attitudes toward the broader American government, including local police. Removing individuals from Iraq or Afghanistan from the full models in table 4.2 does not change the substantive results, but the interaction between citizenship status and corruption now just barely misses statistical significance (perhaps due to a reduced sample size). Naturalization is still significantly related to lower levels of expected fairness.

Economic Development and Anti-American Sentiment

While the quality of government institutions is known to shape levels of trust in government (Uslaner 2008), a countryвЂ™s corruption levels are also correlated with its levels of economic development, as well as levels of anti-American sentiment within the country (Gillum 2009). Could corruption also be serving as a veil for either of these effects?

Anti-American sentiment is particularly high in the Muslim world and is a popular topic of discussion for political elites in the region (Blaydes and Linzer 2012). It could be that newcomers from corrupt, war-ridden countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, bring negative conceptions of the U.S. security apparatus, due not only to poor experiences with their countryвЂ™s institutions, but also to negative interactions with U.S. military personnel or extensive exposure to anti-American rhetoric.

First, we examine the potential role of economic development in an immigrantвЂ™s country of origin on perceptions of fairness. As a robustness check, the models from table 4.2 were rerun using the International Monetary FundвЂ™s 2012 per capita GDP estimates instead of the Corruption measure (regression results are presented in appendix 3). While GDP has a positive effect on expectations of fairness, the effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Similarly, the effects of GDP are larger for noncitizens, but this effect is not statistically significant. This means that home-country GDP has no notable impact on perceptions of police fairness for MANOS respondents.

The models were also rerun using the average levels of anti-American sentiment (based on the Pew Research CenterвЂ™s 2007 estimates) in oneвЂ™s sending country in place of the Corruption measure. Similar to GDP, Page 139 →while anti-American sentiment has a negative effect on expectations of fairness, the effect is not statistically distinguishable from zero. The effects of anti-American sentiment are larger for noncitizens, but this effect is not statistically significant. This means that the level of anti-American sentiment in oneвЂ™s home country is not related to his or her perceptions of police fairness in the United States.

Self-Selection among Naturalized Citizens?

Because naturalization requires action on the part of the respondent, there could be a self-selection effect. In other words, those who choose to naturalize could be primed to hold more positive views; those with more negative perceptions of the United States would choose *not* to naturalize. While the results show precisely the opposite (naturalized citizens were more likely to hold negative views), it is worth noting whether any other factors that could potentially affect perceptions of fairness are more commonly associated with those who choose to become citizens.

Sixty-one percent of the foreign-born sampled respondents report being naturalized U.S. citizens. Muslims have a very high naturalization rate that is significantly correlated with immigration year. As discussed in chapter 3, since it technically takes at least three to five years to become Page 140 →eligible for citizenship, many of the more recent arrivals have not been in the country long enough to apply. Moreover, having gone through the process of

naturalization suggests extensive contact with U.S. immigration officials and American legal institutions, which is shown to directly affect perceptions of other U.S. legal authorities, specifically the police (Wu, Sun, and Smith 2010; Chaundry et al. 2010).

Table 4.3. Demographic Comparisons of Noncitizens, Naturalized Citizens, and U.S.-Born Muslims

	Foreign-born (Non-citizen)\	Foreign-born (Citizen)	U.S.-born
N	69	103	331
Age	38.2 (33.3вЂ“43.1)	42.5 (37.9вЂ“47.1)	44.1 (40.7вЂ“47.5)
Female	.49 (.34вЂ“.65)	.35 (.21вЂ“.49)	.53 (.44вЂ“.62)
Education	4.0 (3.5вЂ“4.5)	3.7 (3.4вЂ“4.0)	3.5 (3.3вЂ“3.7)
Income	5.1 (4.1вЂ“6.2)	6.1 (4.6вЂ“7.5)	5.7 (5.1вЂ“6.2)
Convert	.10 (.02вЂ“.18)	.15 (.01вЂ“.28)	.42 (.32вЂ“.50)
Republican	.11 (.04вЂ“.18)	.15 (.05вЂ“.26)	.14 (.09вЂ“.19)
Perceived Religious Disc.	.54 (.44вЂ“.64)	.52 (.43вЂ“.61)	.61 (.56вЂ“.66)
Perceived Ethnic Disc.	.47 (.38вЂ“.57)	.43 (.34вЂ“.52)	.52 (.47вЂ“.57)
Religiosity (Pray)	.78 (.70вЂ“.87)	.75 (.66вЂ“.83)	.76 (.70вЂ“.82)
Anti-U.S. Sentiment (Home country value)	59.4 (51.6вЂ“67.2)	48.6 (39.0вЂ“58.2)	

Note: Table 4.3 presents the demographic features of MANOS respondents by generation and naturalization status. Means are presented with 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses, *N* = 501. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

To assess whether individuals who choose to naturalize are significantly different from those who do not, table 4.3 presents mean levels of a variety of socioeconomic and behavioral indicators.

The table reveals that naturalized citizens and noncitizens do not significantly differ on these indicators, including age, socioeconomic status, race, political preference, or religiosity.

Discussion: American Muslim Integration, Foreign-Born Influences, and Trust in Police across Generations

This chapter set out to understand whether observed patterns of perceived discrimination among American Muslims, presented in chapters 2 and 3, mapped onto perceptions of U.S. law enforcement. The experimental design allowed for a more precise measure of the degree to which Muslims have (or have not) internalized beliefs about the differential treatment of Muslims in the United States by law enforcement agencies. Consistent with patterns in chapters 2 and 3, Muslims who are more familiar with American norms and the governmentвЂ”measured here by generation, naturalization, and time in the United StatesвЂ”generally expect U.S. law enforcement to behave less fairly when conducting criminal investigations. Respondents who are less familiar with the American system, foreign-born Muslims and noncitizens, tend to be more trusting of the police overall.

The findings of this chapter confirm empirically two significant explanations for differential patterns of trust in police across generations. First, what appears to change across generations is an increased awareness of *group-based* injustices. The data, echoing the findings in chapter 3, demonstrate that U.S.-born Muslims have a greater sensitivity to the differential treatment of *Muslim Americans* as a group. Muslims born outside of the United States tend to expect equal treatment of Muslim and non-Muslim suspects by police, while U.S.-born respondents expect Muslims Page 141 →to be treated significantly worse than non-Muslims. As demonstrated in chapter 3, U.S.-born Muslims express stronger levels of attachment to the broader Muslim American community. A more salient

Muslim American identity appears to make U.S.-born Muslims more sensitive to the treatment of fellow group members. These findings also further support the observation in chapter 3 that U.S.-born Muslims are more likely to make direct comparisons between themselves and their non-Muslim, U.S.-born counterparts in the country. It is the discrepancies that they perceive that drive their perceptions of the police and perhaps of the government.

The data also indicate that U.S.-born Muslims do not necessarily have an *overall* negative view of U.S. law enforcement. On average, U.S.-born and foreign-born Muslims hold similar levels of trust in AmericaвЂ™s security institutions when discussing the treatment of non-Muslims. The groups differ in their beliefs about the police only when considering the treatment of Muslims in the United States. This potentially offers more nuance to studies that have similarly found reduced trust among second-generation immigrants toward the government (Michelson 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Garcia-Bedolla 2005). It may be that the decrease in trust on the part of immigrants and their children over time does not represent their belief that entire institutions are inevitably untrustworthy, but are more of an indication that they have internalized their status in the society.

Second, the analysis suggests that foreign-born MuslimsвЂ™ attitudes toward U.S. law enforcement are shaped, in part, by their experiences with governments in their countries of origin. Muslims coming from countries with low levels of institutional corruption arrive in the United States with more optimistic beliefs about the fairness of law enforcement than those who come from corruption-ridden countries. Home-country effects, however, fade as Muslims become more familiar with the U.S. system and update their beliefs about U.S. law enforcement. Citizens who have gone through the naturalization process have much more pessimistic views toward law enforcement overall, regardless of their country of origin. This suggests that through time and the process of naturalization, foreign-born Muslims increasingly reflect the more cynical attitudes of U.S.-born Muslims toward government institutions such as the police.

While understanding attitudes of legitimacy and fairness among citizenry is important normatively, an extensive literature suggests that beliefs about government fairness and legitimacy also have important policy implications for governments and law enforcement agencies. According Page 142 →to Tyler (2009), procedural justice predicts cooperation with law enforcement, with legitimacy as the mediator. If individuals believe they are being treated unfairly, perceptions of legitimacy, and therefore cooperation, will decline (Levi 1997). The following chapter builds upon the findings here and assesses whether expectations of police fairness among Muslims affect their willingness to assist law enforcement in a criminal investigation.

5. Assisting Law Enforcement

Given the evidence from chapter 1, that Muslim Americans largely reject violent extremism and have played a significant role in helping disrupt plots, what are the consequences of their perceptions of unfair policing, as analyzed in chapter 4? To what extent do fears of unfair treatment on the part of Muslims reduce the ability of U.S. law enforcement to solicit assistance from the Muslim American community? Under what circumstances are Muslims willing to assist law enforcement on a CVE case when the suspect is Muslim?

Building on the findings from previous chapters, this chapter first explores the complicated concerns that arise when Muslim Americans consider whether to approach law enforcement. Second, the chapter empirically examines the relationship between Muslim AmericansвЂ™ willingness to assist the police and perceptions of police fairness. Fairness is considered alongside several other known factors that affect oneвЂ™s willingness to approach law enforcement.

Considerations in Approaching Law Enforcement

Muslim American participants in this study expressed little doubt of the important work of law enforcement in keeping the United States safe. One Egyptian-born man in his mid-thirties noted that there is great fear of terrorist attacks among all Americans and that the FBI has a responsibility as a law enforcement agency to stop attacks before they occur (AI 22). An African American female interviewee in her forties similarly emphasized that it is the governmentвЂ™s duty to protect its citizens (AI 25), and a Pakistani man living in Seattle stressed that anyone hurting others, regardless of faith, is wrong and should be punished (AI 18). A U.S.-born respondent Page 144 →of Afghani descent expressed appreciation that the government is doing all it can to prevent attacks, evidenced by the relatively few the country has seen since 9/11 (AI 32).

Indeed, nearly half of all MANOS respondents (48 percent) said that the FBI should be given more freedoms in order to better protect the American public from terrorist attacks, even if it reduces the suspectsвЂ™ privacy.[1] The American Muslim Taskforce on Civil Rights and Elections (AMT), a national coalition of major Islamic organizations, has issued statements reaffirming their вЂњcommitment to being full partners in the defense, development and prosperity of our homeland, the United StatesвЂќ (CAIR 2009), and several other Islamic organizations actively work with law enforcement agencies around the country to help counter terrorist activities. Other research has found that Muslim communities are motivated and effective in preventing radicalization leading to violence among youth, and that many leaders of these communities are eager to partner with police (Henderson et al. 2006; Schanzer, Kurzman, and Moosa 2010).

Nevertheless, several participants in this study expressed the difficulty of balancing the reality of the need for law enforcement and Muslim American cooperation with the related reality that nonviolent, noncriminal Muslim Americans have faced unfair scrutiny by law enforcement in the process of trying to secure the country from a future attack.

While the Obama administrationвЂ™s CVE policy aimed to use more holistic methods to help build community resilience against radicalization, many argue that in practice the operational policy was more punitive and broadened the set of behaviors that are considered criminal. Its stated aim was to persuade susceptible individuals to resist the temptation of ideological radicalization; to counter the jihadist narrative; to engage local communities in prevention and resilience; and to build awareness of indicators of radicalization and recruitment. Crenshaw and LaFree (2017), however, note that this kind of preventive counterterrorism policy has been characterized by large numbers of arrests for many different criminal offenses, most based on some form of вЂњmaterial supportвЂќ for terrorism, a broadly defined charge that brings severe sentencing. Some critics are concerned that individuals who are not actually radicalized or do not have violent capabilities or intent can be swept up in such preventive policies.

While they supported the governmentвЂ™s mission, most interviewees expressed that they would like to see

internal policy changes in how the government pursues its mission.

> Page 145 → *The FBI has a responsibility as a law enforcement agency, and fears of terrorist attacks are real and should be taken seriously. However, [the FBIвЂ™s] current policies are misguided. Although its employees are normal, good people, what the FBI is doing is dangerous. More Muslims and Arabs should join the FBI, then more Muslims would be cooperative and not afraid to turn in other Muslims who are actually a threat to Americans, because that is the right thing to do.* (AI 22)
>
> *I actually always wanted to join the FBI since I was a kidвЂ”I used to really respect it. Now, IвЂ™m more disappointed with it and not so enthusiastic. Although the FBIвЂ™s intentions are good, the way they go about their operations is questionable. There are better ways they could prevent terrorism.* (AI 26)
>
> *I think the FBI needs an overhaul. In terms of the issues concerning Islam, the FBI is out of touch with the threat of terrorism and it needs to create a new approach to eradicating it. The entire culture needs to be re-thought because it causes more harm than good. It sometimes radicalizes people who would actually make good allies otherwise. But having said that, I would always cooperate with the FBI in a situation where the law was being broken.* (AI 13)

Concerns Over Fair Treatment of the Suspect

As was revealed in chapter 4, many American Muslims do not expect that U.S. law enforcement will treat Muslim criminal suspects as fairly as non-Muslim suspects. Existing research suggests that perceptions of mistreatment matters for citizen cooperation with law enforcement, not just for Muslims, but for all Americans. When governmental institutions are perceived as fair and legitimate, individuals are more likely to cooperate with state authorities, in part because they feel it is right to do so (Weber 1968; Levi 1997). Indeed, in an interview-based study of Muslim Americans in New York City in 2009, Tyler, Schulhofer, and Huq (2010) argue that the primary factors shaping cooperation by Muslims with the police relate to concerns about procedural justice. If one does not anticipate a fair legal process, one will be less likely to view the criminal justice system as legitimate and will be thus less motivated to cooperate.

Page 146 → Muslim Americans have expressed concern that their community members are being incriminated for their religious beliefs rather than for breaking the law. As Patel (2011) explains:

> The putative markers of radicalization about which law enforcement agencies seek information are frequently tied to religious beliefs and behavior. Asking American Muslims to report on these beliefs and behaviors as signs of potential terrorism not only places them in an awkward position vis-Г -vis their fellow believers, but it also reinforces the view that their faith and their communities are under siege. Some American Muslim organizations have specifically rejected engagement with law enforcement representatives on precisely these grounds, contending that as long as American Muslim communities are indiscriminately targeted in counterterrorism investigations and considered to be suspicious, they cannot legitimately partner with law enforcement. (203вЂ“4)

A U.S.-born participant in this study noted that while she sees the FBI as necessary, she also views it as вЂњscaryвЂќ when it can вЂњimprison people who have not committed a crime and do not get a trial, but imprison based simply on loose suspicionsвЂќ (AI 11). Another interviewee similarly said the FBIвЂ™s job is needed and fine, вЂњhowever, the rules that single out certain groups and rules that allow people to be detained without evidence are unfairB .B .B . it seems scary that things like that can happen just because the FBI has powerвЂќ (AI 10). One Muslim interviewee, a professor of law, described this as a challenge for parents who worry their children could be exploring radical ideas online. She explained that while вЂњof course mothers do not want their children to do harm to themselves or others, if mothers do not think the police will do a fair investigation, the possibility of incriminating their child on what could be baseless grounds will cause them to be more hesitant to preemptively go to the policeвЂќ (AI 182).

Another participant, an investigator from a Muslim legal-advocacy group, explained that many in the Muslim American community feel honored when law enforcement wants to engage cooperatively with the community. вЂњMost say, law enforcement is good and we have nothing to hidevЂ”this is a good thing and we are honored to help.вЂќ At the same time, he expressed concern over federal agents who in the past have tried to extract information and conduct investigations under the guise of community outreach. He feels that local law enforcement has done a better job than Page 147 →national agencies at building sincere relationships with Muslim Americans, which enhances community policing. He believes community policing can help current relations. Officers who are living among Muslim American communities and see Muslims on a daily basis get to know the individuals in their neighborhoods, regularly attend local *iftars*, and invite youth to play against the police basketball league. Their understanding of the community makes them less likely to invoke national security in nonthreatening situations (AI 43).

Others participants in this study, however, argued that local community police should not be involved at all in terrorism investigations. They expressed worry that MuslimsвЂ”immigrants in particularвЂ”will be afraid to go to the local police when they need protection or would otherwise report non-terror-related crimes, such as sexual assaults or domestic violence, in their local communities. They emphasized that in order to keep communication with law enforcement open, all individuals should feel secure that contacting or being addressed by members of law enforcement will not automatically lead to a violent extremism or immigration inquiry. Others worry that recent CVE pilot programs in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis, launched in 2015, which focus solely on Muslim communities, are simply covers to spy on Muslim youth rather than genuine outreach. Such concerns are based on previous cases in which law enforcement outreach efforts were, unbeknownst to participants, used to gather intelligence (Hirsi 2015).

Concerns Over Involving Oneself in an Investigation

Interviewees noted that immigrants were especially concerned about the possibility that going to law enforcement would bring unwanted scrutiny on themselves and on immediate family. According to Rita Zawaideh of the Arab American Community Coalition, immigrant Muslims may be wary of approaching law enforcement in part due to the experiences in their countries of origin: вЂњIn countries where many Arab immigrants are from [*sic*], the government and the police are repressive, they are not your friendвЂќ (Zawaideh 2002).

According to Wessler (2002), this general fear of government has been aggravated by the detention and deportation of Muslims and Arabs by the federal government after September 11th. A 2002 Human Rights Watch report found incidents of Muslim immigrants who had volunteered to help federal authorities and ended up in indefinite detention without the Page 148 →ability to contact a lawyer. Others faced unrelated immigration charges (HRW 2002). Similarly, several immigrants who participated in the FBIвЂ™s voluntary interview program in the aftermath of 9/11 were also detained on unrelated immigration charges (Chishti and Bergeron 2011; Anderson 2003; Sheridan 2004). A later Human Rights Watch Report concluded that needless incarcerations вЂњaggravated distrust toward the government in Muslim communities in the United States that have been repeatedly targeted by sweeping, ill-advised and at times illegal post-September 11 investigation, arrest and detention policiesвЂќ (HRW 2005, 6).

Such fears appeared to make some Muslim Americans fearful of interacting with law enforcement in any capacity. Kripa Ubadhyay of the South Asian Network in Los Angeles discussed her experience in trying to organize a Muslim American community forum on September-11-related civil liberties issues: вЂњWe invited the FBI and INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service). One hundred fifty people attended a similar past forum, however, only 60 attended this one. We later found out from many [who didnвЂ™t attend] that they were afraid of being detained by the INSвЂќ (Ubadhay 2002).

In many cases, individuals have even been afraid to go to law enforcement to report hate crimes out of concern that it would draw attention to noncitizens who had violated the terms of their visas. Stephen Wessler (2002) of the Center on the Prevention of Hate Violence in Portland, Maine, stated, вЂњWhat struck me most was not a fear of hate crimes [in the Muslim community], it was a fear of the federal government. The fear of detention or deportation continued even when the fear of hate crimes ended.вЂќ The Vera Institute similarly reported that in

the years following September 11, some Muslim American communities were more afraid of law enforcement agenciesвЂ”especially federal law enforcement agenciesвЂ”than they were of acts of hate or violence, despite an increase in hate crimes (Henderson et al. 2006, 7). Such concerns appear only to have increased under the Trump administration.

Controversial Law Enforcement Methods

Several participants in this study discussed the conflict they felt when assessing the FBI. While they appreciate what the agency is doing, they still worry about the unfair treatment of Muslims, especially in relation to police tactics such as the so-called вЂњAl CaponeвЂќ approach[2] and the use of вЂњagents provocateurвЂќ and informants. The вЂњCaponeвЂќ approach involves Page 149 →apprehending individuals potentially linked to terrorism on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur casesвЂ”often called sting operationsвЂ”undercover government operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. Similarly, law enforcement frequently targets members of the community who will report to the government in exchange for more lenient treatment for their own criminal behavior or in exchange for pay.

These techniques, which U.S. law enforcement has used on a variety of groups and in different permutations for almost a century, have generated controversy and concern among community members and civil libertarians. They are often tantamount to entrapment, opponents contend, because law enforcement can encourage individuals to agree to actions they would not have considered or would not have been able to carry out on their own.

Muslim community activists have particularly expressed fear that law enforcement coerces immigrants into becoming informants, especially those with legal problems or those applying for green cards. One respondent in this study suggested that law enforcement used petty crime or unrelated immigration violations as a means to blackmail a man into becoming an informant in his local mosque (AI 136). There have even been reports of law enforcement retaliating against people who have refused to be recruited as an informant (CAIR 2009).

In a case reported by the *Wall Street Journal*, a 24-year-old Moroccan man, Yassine Ouassif, was stopped by immigration officials in November 2005 as he crossed into Canada. His legal permanent resident card was taken from him and he was instructed to contact a specific FBI agent when he returned home to San Francisco. Ouassif complied with immigration officials, and the agent offered him the opportunity to become an informant and regularly report to the FBI on what his Muslim friends in San Francisco were saying and doing. In exchange, his legal permanent resident card would be returned and he could resume his education and bring his Moroccan wife to America. If he refused, according to an account written by Ouassif, the FBI agent told him, вЂњI will work hard to deport you to Morocco as soon as possibleвЂќ (Waldman 2006).

Several participants in this study expressed particular concern over the use of paid informants and agents provocateur, rather than undercover law enforcement agents, who might potentially entice impressionable youth into fictitious terrorist plots. They suggest that once recruited, some of these individuals are incentivized to feed as much as possible to law Page 150 →enforcement for their own benefit. Indeed, Crenshaw and LaFree (2017) point out that while no entrapment defense has succeeded in a terrorism case in U.S. courts to date, it is often difficult to know whether the defendant would have been willing or able to carry out the plot without the assistance of the informant.

The story of the вЂњNewburgh FourвЂќвЂ”now an HBO documentary[3]вЂ”is often cited as an egregious example of entrapment. In that case, a paid FBI informant (himself a former convict) allegedly made an offer to impoverished converts to Islam with former drug offenses. He offered $250,000, a luxury car, and a trip to Puerto Rico, among other inducements, to trigger explosives near a synagogue and shoot down military aircraft. The plot was apparently completely conjured by the informant, and the Newburgh Four formerly had no known terrorist ambitions. Though the group was sent to prison, even their judge, Colleen McMahon, told the FBI, вЂњI believe beyond a shadow of a doubt that there would have been no crime here except the government instigated it, planned it and brought it to fruitionвЂќ (Harris 2011). Cases such as these have generated suspicion of law enforcement and caused many in the community to question the efficacy of these policing practices. In fact, 30

percent of Muslims interviewed by Pew in 2017 said law enforcement officers have arrested mostly people who were tricked and did not pose a real threat.

A participant in this study, a U.S.-born 24-year-old female of Indian descent, shared her experience with FBI informants:

> *The FBIвЂ™s work is needed. Their domestic actions are good, but sometimes things like sending informants into mosques are bad. These actions are a waste of money and they create their own problems.B .B .B . IвЂ™ve never actually interacted with the FBI, but at my university, it trailed some students, and it was scary that the FBI was wasting its time following people just because they were politically active, especially when the normal thing for college students to do is to get involved politicallyB .B .B . they sent informants to approach young guys and talk to them about getting extreme. The situation turned into a huge problem and the FBIвЂ™s work in that instance undermined the work that mosques and organizations like CAIR do to work with the FBI. If the FBI wants to work with the Muslim community, it needs to stop sending informants. By sending informants, it is not reciprocating MuslimsвЂ™ desire to collaborate*. (AI 34)

Page 151 → Another respondent said he also was concerned about the cases of informants encouraging religious extremism, and he worried that the informants themselves could be responsible for some of the incidents that occur. вЂњSome arrests have been controversial, and IвЂ™ve heard of cases where the individuals appeared to have mental disorders and may have been coaxed into criminal activity through the use of paid informants in sting operationsвЂќ (AI 33). Other research supports this sentiment, finding that the belief that informants have been sent to infiltrate mosques generates deep suspicion of law enforcement among Muslim Americans (Schanzer et al. 2016). Other interviewees further expressed this resentment and suspicion.

> *The individual employees of the FBI are genuinely and rightfully concerned with national security. They have good intentions. However, the FBI is run by some people who vilify Muslims and portray all Muslims as a threat. The FBI should invite Muslims and Muslim leaders to talk and find more effective ways to protect the nation. Current methods, like sending informants into mosques, are not effective. With these strategies, the FBI pretends to befriend Muslims when its goal is actually to spy on mosques, even if it has no real suspicions*. (AI 17)

> *I generally have a positive view of the FBI, as long as they do not discriminate. But the FBI is pushing Muslims, like what they did in the mosque in Southern California,*[4] *and that is wrong. Instead of using unfair enforcement, they should just maintain positive relationships with Muslim leaders and openly tell them not to allow extremists to come and voice their opinions in Muslim mosques*. (AI 39)

The Muslim Public Affairs Council, a national group that has cooperated extensively with the government, is particularly concerned with how the underregulation of the use of informants can have negative policy effects on terrorism prevention. вЂњWe do not argue that the use of informants should be discontinued altogether; they can serve as an effective and legitimate law enforcement tool to bring criminals to justice. Nevertheless, it also has its tactical limitations, and if used improperly, can be strategically counterproductiveвЂќ (Beutel 2010).

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Community Warnings against Freely Cooperating

National and local Muslim American organizations have become more aware and wary of detentions by the government. While promoting cooperation with law enforcement to protect the nation, legal groups such as Muslim Advocates have put out community alerts that notify community members when the FBI is contacting Muslim Americans to solicit information about addressing violent extremism. These groups have strongly urged individuals not to speak with law enforcement officials without the presence or advice of an attorney (Patel 2011). Similarly, on several occasions, the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), in response to reports of increasing numbers of FBI agents and other law enforcement officers visiting and interviewing American

Muslims, has embarked on campaigns to remind its constituents of their rights when interacting with law enforcement officials (e.g., CAIR 2010a, CAIR 2010b, CAIR 2015).

After the NYPDвЂ™s secret demographics unitвЂ”discussed in the introductionвЂ”was uncovered in 2011, several Muslim community leaders openly taught other Muslims how to identify police informants, encouraged them always to talk to a lawyer before speaking with the authorities, and reminded those already working with law enforcement that they have the right to change their minds. A brochure from the City University of New York Law School warned people to вЂњbe very careful about involving the police [after encountering someone who advocates violence against the United States].B .B .B . If the individual is an informant, the police may not do anything.B .B .B . If the individual is not an informant and you report them, the unintended consequences could be devastatingвЂќ (Hawley and Sullivan 2011). Ramzi Kassem, a law professor at the City University of New York, explained that вЂњMost of the time [police interviews are] fishing expeditions.B .B .B . So the safest thing you can do for yourself, your family and for your community, is not to answerвЂќ (Hawley and Sullivan 2011).

While it is unclear how influential such campaigns have been in various communities, 36 percent of respondents in the MANOS study agreed that вЂњpeople like me are better off avoiding the U.S. government.вЂќ

Continued Cooperation by the Muslim American Community

Despite fears of unfair policing tactics, several Muslim American leaders and organizations have continued to cooperate actively with law enforcementPage 153 → and to encourage their membership to do so as well. While many Muslim elites think current CVE tactics are problematic, they realize that the stakes are too high for them merely to criticize and that it is in their core interest to be able to help shape the governmentвЂ™s strategy against violent extremism. Several leaders who actively cooperate with law enforcement say they hope that by working with the government, they will be able to empower communities both to protect their youth from recruitment by foreign terrorist organizations and to protect Muslims from government overreach. While leaders know they have no control over the actions of groups such as ISIS, they do not want to be absent from the conversations where their religion is under the microscope, and they certainly do not want the countryвЂ™s domestic terrorism threat to get worse.

Among Muslim communities actively cooperating with law enforcement, the All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS) Center is exemplary; it was recognized by the FBI with the 2015 DirectorвЂ™s Community Leadership Award for its role in building partnerships between law enforcement and the Muslim community (FBI 2016b). Mohamed Magid, chief imam at ADAMS, says that вЂњIf a young man walks into my mosque and has an ideology about Islam that is distorted, in my responsibility as an imam, I try to correct his ideaB .B .B . if I find him to be a person who might pose a danger to my community by trying to recruit others, then I have to exclude him from the community. And we have to report himвЂ”if you have an idea to commit harm to America, we will report you to the authoritiesвЂќ (Gjelten 2015). (Incidentally, the ADAMS Center is the same community that in 2017 experienced the loss of its young member, Nabra Hussein, discussed in chapter 3).

The president of the Muslims Public Affairs Council (MPAC), Salam Al-Marayati, maintains an unofficial partnership with LAPDвЂ™s commanding officer of the counterterrorism and special operations bureau, Deputy Chief Michael Downing (Freedman 2015). MPAC has highlighted its work with the Los Angeles Police Department in reforming its Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) program, which determines how officers should identify and report suspicious behaviors that indicate potential terrorist activity (MPAC 2012). MPAC also heads and promotes the nationwide Safe Spaces initiative as an alternative to CVE programs that use widespread surveillance and informants. Save Spaces promotes community-driven programs and encourages citizens to go to law enforcement over concerns of possible radicalization after community or family intervention efforts have failed.

Dearborn, Michigan, home to the countryвЂ™s largest Arab American Page 154 →community, is said to have particularly healthy and longstanding relationships with local law enforcement. The open channels of communication and high level of interaction between Dearborn officials and members of the Dearborn Arab and

Muslim communities enabled community leaders to promptly mobilize city officials to address a potential backlash against Muslims after the September 11 attacks (Patel 2011).

Concerns over Cooperating with the Trump Administration

Because some segments of the Muslim American community view the Trump administration as more openly hostile toward Muslims than was the Obama administration, willingness to cooperate with the government on CVE efforts began to decline shortly after President Trump took office. After reports that the Trump administration was considering reconfiguring current CVE programs to focus exclusively on radical Islam (Ainsley, Volz, and Cooke 2017), several Muslim American organizations that had been awarded federal grants under the Obama administration for their local CVE work decided to reject the government funds. Leaders of these organizations said they not only disagreed with the ideology of the administration, they believed associating with the administration would hurt their relationship with the communities with which they worked.

A California Islamic graduate school decided to turn down an $800,000 grant shortly after President Trump took office. The organizationвЂ™s leadership already had reservations about President ObamaвЂ™s CVE policies due to concerns of surveillance and because they felt there was no clear or proven pathway to violence for someone with a particular extreme ideology. They cooperated nonetheless because they believed the Obama administration was not hostile to their faith. While the founding president of the school said he wanted to keep an open mind about Donald Trump before he took office, вЂњIt was becoming more and more apparent that heвЂ™s actually looking to carry out all the scary stuff he said [on the campaign trail].B .B .B . Our mission and our vision is to serve the community and to bring our community to a position of excellence. And if weвЂ™re compromised, even if only by perception in terms of our standing in the community, we ultimately canвЂ™t achieve our goalвЂќ (Abdollah 2017).

A Minneapolis organization that works with Somali youth also turned down a $500,000 CVE grant they had been working toward for years. Minneapolis city councilman Abdi Warsame, himself Somali American, said he was inundated with e-mails and calls from worried Somalis regardingPage 155 → President TrumpвЂ™s policy plans. He supported the organizationвЂ™s rejection of the grant, stating that the Trump administration вЂњhas in a way declared war on the Muslim American community with the ban and the restrictions [on refugees and immigrants from several Muslim countries, including Somalia]вЂќ (Murphy 2017).

Other Muslim community leaders viewed the alleged CVE policy changes to be less fundamental, suggesting that President ObamaвЂ™s CVE programs already focused on Islam almost exclusively, despite rhetoric to the contrary. Faiza Patel, a codirector of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law, said President TrumpвЂ™s proposed change to the CVE program вЂњmakes explicit what was already implied.B .B .B . Now all of that window dressing goes out the doorвЂќ (Nixon, Goldman, and Apuzzo 2017).

One Minneapolis Muslim activist argued that community organizations should still consider working with the administration: вЂњThe community desperately needs the money.B .B .B . That is the only administration we have in place. That is the government of the land nowвЂќ (Murphy 2017).

Measuring Willingness to Assist Police

To assess American MuslimsвЂ™ willingness to assist U.S. law enforcement, the same experimental design from chapter 4 was applied. Respondents answered questions in response to a theoretical criminal investigation. The survey included an experiment with a between-subjects design that manipulates the identity of the suspect in question. In one condition, the suspect is a presumably non-Muslim American named вЂњJake Lewis.вЂќ In the second condition, the suspect is presumably a Muslim American named вЂњUmar Sayyid.вЂќ For each respondent, the response when the suspect is a non-Muslim or a Muslim is observed, but not both.

Subjects were told that the police have received an anonymous tip that a 23-year-old American citizen, [Jake Lewis/Umar Sayyid], a man without a criminal record, was planning to commit a major crime. Respondents were

asked whether they would be willing to assist police in investigating a crime like this. This item, вЂњAssist,вЂќ serves as the main outcome variable of interest. Respondents answered on a 7-point scale from completely agree (7) to completely disagree (1) and were rescaled to range from 1 to 0 in the following analyses. The item Assist is collapsed into a binary variable where affirmative answers equal 1 and neutral and negative answers equal 0.

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Assistance by Foreign-Born Muslims

Findings from chapter 4 highlight a distinct difference in attitudes toward the police between U.S.-born and foreign-born Muslims. Specifically, on average, foreign-born Muslims expect U.S. law enforcement to behave more fairly toward Muslim criminal suspects than do U.S.-born Muslims. Table 5.1 offers a closer look (by means of a standard OLS regression) at what factors may affect foreign-born MuslimsвЂ™ willingness to proactively assist the police, controlling for age, income, education, and gender.

Model 1 of table 5.1 shows that foreign-born respondentsвЂ™ willingness to assist the police is not dependent on the identity of the suspect. In other words, foreign-born Muslims are just as likely to assist the police when the suspect is a Muslim as they are when the suspect is a non-Muslim. Model 1 also confirms that foreign-born citizens and noncitizens are equally likely to assist the police.

As model 2 indicates, however, when the interaction between the identity of the suspect and the respondentsвЂ™ naturalization status is included, the interaction coefficient becomes statistically significant. This can be interpreted to mean that the respondentвЂ™s citizenship (whether one is a naturalized U.S. citizen or not) may shape her or his willingness to assist the Page 157 →police, whether the suspect is a Muslim or not. Figure 5.1 helps illustrate the interpretation of the finding.

Table 5.1. Determinants of Police Assistance among Foreign-Born Muslims

	Foreign-born Muslims			
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Expected Fairness			0.35***	0.35***
			(0.10)	(0.10)
Naturalized	0.09	0.20**	0.10*	0.21**
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Treatment (Umar)	0.04	0.15*	0.03	0.13*
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Γ— Naturalized		в€ ’0.26**		в€ ’0.26**
		(0.09)		(0.08)
R^2	0.10	0.15	0.21	0.26
N	170	170	170	170

Note: Table 5.1 presents the determinants of assisting police among foreign-born Muslims using a standard OLS regression with robust standard errors. Models control for age, income, education, and gender. The dependent variable, вЂњAssist police,вЂќ an ordinal variable rescaled to range from 0вЂ“1, where higher values indicate greater willingness to assist U.S. law enforcement. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Fig. 5.1. Predicted Values of Assisting Police among Foreign-Born Muslims

Note: Figure 5.1 presents the predicted values of willingness to assist police among foreign-born Muslims, by suspect identity. The dependent variable, вЂњAssist police,вЂќ is an ordinal variable rescaled to range from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate greater willingness to assist U.S. law enforcement. Data is based on the results of model 4 in table 5.1. Models control for expected fairness, age, income, education, and gender. 95 percent CIвЂ™s shown. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

Looking first to naturalized citizens in figure 5.1, we see that when considering a suspect named Jake, naturalized citizens are significantly more likely than noncitizens to assist the police. Naturalized citizensвЂ™ willingness to assist when the suspect is Umar, however, is significantly lower. Looking then to noncitizens, while on average these individuals are just as likely to assist the police when the suspect is a Muslim versus a non-Muslim, noncitizens are significantly less willing to engage with police overall, regardless of the identity of the suspect. So while naturalized citizens respond differently to the identity of the suspect, noncitizens seem to have an overall aversion to police engagement.

Previous scholarly work suggests that perceptions of fair treatment by Page 158 → government authorities enhances government compliance through increasing cooperation with law enforcement (Levi 1997; Tyler 2009; Weber 1968). The literature is not as clear, however, on whether the relationship between perceptions of fairness and government compliance persists across different cultural groups or among minority or immigrant subgroups (Brockner et al. 2001).

IndividualsвЂ™ levels of expected fairness of police are included in model 3. The literature suggests that willingness to assist the police should be largely driven by expectations of fairness. That is, the effect of the suspectвЂ™s identity should operate based on expectations of how fairly that type of individual would be treated by police. Model 3 on table 5.1 shows that fairness does significantly predict respondentsвЂ™ willingness to assist the police. By shifting fairness from its minimum to its maximum, while holding other variables at their means, the probability that a respondent will assist the police in a counterterrorism investigation increases by 35 percentage points, a statistically significant increase. This offers initial support to the extant literature on the relationship between fair treatment by government authorities and citizen compliance and suggests that this relationship does indeed hold in Muslim immigrant communities.

After controlling for expected fairness in model 4, however, the identity of the suspect and the respondentsвЂ™ naturalization status are still significantly related to oneвЂ™s willingness to assist the police. This means that while expectations of fairness are important in determining willingness to cooperate with the police, the identity of the suspect has differential effects on citizens and noncitizens. Citizens are significantly more likely to assist the police when the suspect is a non-Muslim. Noncitizens are relatively less likely to engage with police, regardless of how they expect the police to treat the suspect. This suggests that other concerns may be overriding nonnaturalized immigrantsвЂ™ considerations for engaging with law enforcement.

Other studies on U.S. immigrants similarly find that while immigrants consistently rate the government and law enforcement institutions higher than do native-born Americans (Correia 2010; Davis and Henderson 2007; Garcia-Bedolla 2005), they are far less likely than native-born Americans to contact the police (Davis and Henderson 2007). This includes issues like reporting crimes, reporting suspicious persons or noises, or participating in anticrime programs. Studies have also found that residents of predominantly immigrant communities are less likely to participate in policing efforts than are residents of longer-establishedPage 159 → ethnic communities (Davis and Henderson 2003; Davis and Miller 2002). Even under conditions in which immigrants were experiencing abuse, Wachholz and Miedema (2000) found that immigrant women would not seek police assistance if it meant interacting with law enforcement. Other studies suggest that some Muslim American communities believe that their public safety concerns are not being fully addressed by the police and therefore are not interested in engaging on other issues (Schanzer et al. 2016).

This suggests that while considerations of fairness are likely to explain some behavior toward the government among Americans generally, assessing the behavior of immigrant minority groups toward the government may be more complex. Muslim immigrants, who potentially view themselves as more vulnerable to possible negative

consequences that come with interacting with law enforcement, may be also considering their personal and family well-being when deciding whether to approach the police. This may especially be true post-9/11, after revelations of immigrants being indefinitely detained, and even deported, after assisting the police in terrorism investigations (Chishti and Bergeron 2011; Anderson 2003; Sheridan 2004; HRW 2002, 2005).

Assistance from U.S.-Born Muslims

The next part of the analysis assesses whether perceptions of fairness determine U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ willingness to proactively assist the police in criminal investigations. The previous chapter found that U.S.-born Muslims were significantly more outwardly cynical than were their foreign-born counterparts about the treatment of Muslim suspects. Specifically, black and Arab Muslims had the strongest and most negative expectations of the police. In addition to assessing the effect of perceived fairness on willingness to assist police, the following analysis considers the effects of race as well as the identity of the suspect. The results are presented in table 5.2.

Model 5 on table 5.2 shows that on average, U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ race is not related to their willingness to assist law enforcement in an investigation. Moreover, the analysis indicates that U.S.-born Muslims on average are just as likely to assist the police when the suspect is a Muslim as when the suspect is a non-Muslim.

The picture changes in model 6, however, when the interaction between the identity of the suspect and the race of the respondent is included; the coefficient on the interaction between the suspectвЂ™s identity and the respondentsPage 160 → who identify as black is statistically significant. This suggests that for blacks, willingness to assist police depends on the identity of the suspect. The direction of the result, however, diverges from what the chapter 4 findings might suggest. Black Muslims are significantly *more* likely to assist the police when the suspect is a Muslim compared to a non-Muslim.

Model 7 explores the impact of expectations of fairness by the police by controlling for that factor. Expectations of fairness are positively and significantly related to U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ willingness to assist the police. By shifting fairness from its minimum to its maximum while holding other variables at their means, the probability that a respondent will assist the police in an investigation increases by 37 percentage points, a statistically significant increase. The effect of fairness for U.S.-born Muslims is nearly identical to the effect size of fairness for foreign-born Muslims.

Table 5.2. Determinants of Police Assistance among U.S.-Born Muslims

	U.S.-born Muslims			
	Model 5	**Model 6**	**Model 7**	**Model 8**
Expected Fairness			0.37***	0.39***
			(0.08)	
Black	0.01	в€ ’0.08	0.03	в€ ’0.08
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Arab	в€ ’0.13	в€ ’0.13	в€ ’0.13	в€ ’0.18
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Asian	в€ ’0.09	0.00	в€ ’0.11	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Treatment (Umar)	в€ ’0.03	в€ ’0.08	0.04	в€ ’0.04
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)

Γ— Black		0.23*		0.27*
		(0.11)		(0.11)
Γ— Arab		в€ ’0.07		0.08
		(0.16)		(0.16)
Γ— Asian		в€ ’0.15		в€ ’0.18
		(0.13)		(0.13)
R^2	0.08	0.12	0.21	0.25
N	330	330	327	327

Note: Table 5.2 presents the determinants of willingness to assist police among U.S.-born Muslims using a standard OLS regression with robust standard errors. The dependent variable, вЂњAssist police,вЂќ is an ordinal variable rescaled to range from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate greater willingness to assist U.S. law enforcement. Models control for age, income, education, and gender. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Fig. 5.2. Willingness to Assist Police among U.S.-Born Muslims, by Race and Suspect Identity

Note: Figure 5.2 presents the predicted values of willingness to assist police among U.S.-born Muslims, by suspect identity. The dependent variable, вЂњAssist police,вЂќ is an ordinal variable rescaled to range from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate greater willingness to assist U.S. law enforcement. Data is based on the results of model 8 in table 5.2. Models control for age, income, education, and gender. 95 percent CIвЂ™s shown. (*Source:* Muslim American National Opinion Survey 2013)

Page 161 → Including the interaction between the suspectвЂ™s identity and the race of the respondent in model 8 reveals that even with controlling for expectations of fairness, the suspectвЂ™s identity significantly shapes black MuslimsвЂ™ willingness to assist the police. Figure 5.2 illustrates the size of the effect.

Even after controlling for expectations of fairness, when the suspect is a non-Muslim, blacks are reluctant to assist the police. In fact, they are the least willing to engage with police compared to all other Muslims under the same conditions. But in comparing the control condition to the treatment condition, blacks are significantly *more* likely to cooperate with police in an investigation when the suspect is a Muslim compared to when the suspect is a non-Muslim. This is surprising given blacksвЂ™ extremely low levels of trust in the police and their expectations of unfair treatment of Muslim suspects.

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Understanding Black MuslimsвЂ™ Willingness to Assist

The literature suggests that expectations of police fairness should determine individualsвЂ™ willingness to cooperate with police. Why then are black MuslimsвЂ”who express the highest levels of cynicism toward the police, particularly when police are dealing with a Muslim suspectвЂ”also the least likely to assist the police when the suspect is a non-Muslim? Even more curious, why are blacks significantly *more likely* to assist the police in an investigation when the suspect is a Muslim, more so than any other U.S.-born Muslim subgroup? Why might black Muslims be breaking from the expected pattern where fairness predicts cooperation?

To better understand the perspective of black Muslims in the United States, several interviews were conducted between June 2011 and July 2015 with black Muslims from around the country, including Chicago; Newark, NJ; New York; and Washington, DC. Through these conversations, it became clear that the experience of black Muslims is drastically different from that of immigrant Muslims and that ideological distinctions between black

Muslim groups must be explored further in order to understand their perceptions of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the post-9/11 environment. Specifically, the ideological orientation toward the U.S. government among adherents of the Nation of Islam (NOI) appears more adversarial compared to black Muslims who affiliate with mainstream Islamic movements (hereafter referred to as вЂњmainstreamвЂќ black Muslims).

The Nation of Islam and Relations with the State

Understanding the perspective of black MuslimsвЂ™ relationship to law enforcement requires some acknowledgment of the context in which prominent black Muslim organizations were formed, during a time of hostility between many police departments and local black communities. When the Nation of Islam was founded in 1930, it was against the historical backdrop of public violence against blacks by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), dating from just after the Civil War to its peak in the 1920s and well into the 1960s. Around this time, police brutality against blacks came onto the national forefront in response to black protests for equal voter rights and against segregation. Such violence put into question the effectiveness of civil rights leadersвЂ™ passive resistance strategy for achieving equality (Allen 1996).

In addition to their promotion of black self-reliance, the NOI favored Page 163 →self-defense measures over tactics of passive resistance. Malcolm X, who helped raise the NOI to prominence during the civil rights era, often mentioned the movementвЂ™s assertion of blacksвЂ™ right to defend themselves against police brutality, reflecting the tense relations between African Americans and police at the time.

> Black people in this country have been the victims of violence at the hands of the white man for 400 years.B .B .B . Today, the Honorable Elijah Muhammad is showing black people in this country that just as the white man and every other person on this earth has God-given rights, natural rights, civil rights, any kind of rights that you can think of, when it comes to defending himself, black people should have the right to defend ourselves also.B .B .B . A hundred years ago [the white man] used to put on a white sheet and use a bloodhound against Negroes. Today theyвЂ™ve taken off the white sheet and put on police uniforms, theyвЂ™ve traded in the bloodhounds for police dogs, and theyвЂ™re still doing the same thing.
>
> вЂ”Malcolm X, 1963[5]

Malcolm XвЂ™s growing popularity and the growth of the civil rights movement brought increasing government attention. From 1956 to 1971, the FBI ran a counterintelligence program, вЂњCOINTELPRO,вЂќ that sought to вЂњdisruptвЂќ and вЂњneutralizeвЂќ groups and individuals that J. Edgar Hoover, the first FBI director, perceived as a threat. Later deemed illegal by Congress for violating First Amendment rights of American citizens, the program specifically targeted the Nation of Islam among several black organizations and other вЂњsubversiveвЂќ groups (though files on civil rights groups significantly outnumbered those of other organizations). The FBI used informants, agents provocateur, infiltrators, legal and illegal wiretaps, break-ins, and false correspondence, among other tactics. Across the country the FBI collaborated with local police to repress targeted groups (Senate Report 1976).

Government reports from the 1960s indeed suggest that the Nation of Islam was concerned about FBI informants within the organization. Ministers advised members more broadly to avoid interaction with federal law enforcement officials: вЂњSome of you may think that it is wise to engage them in conversation when [FBI agents] come to your house, but this is wrong. They will trick you.B .B .B . When they come to see you, do not talk to them. You do not have to let them into your house. If they have a warrant Page 164 →for you, then go peacefully with them. If they do not have a warrant then close your door and walk away because they cannot force you to talk to themвЂќ (FBI 1960, 30). Members were asked to report immediately to the NOI if interviewed by FBI agents (FBI 1960, 94).

Years later, under the leadership of Louis Farrakhan, the organization continues to speak out against police abuse and brutality and to urge members to know their rights.

Ideological Distinctions among Black Muslims

The black Muslim community has changed drastically since the height of the NOI in the 1960s. Today the majority of black Muslims are believed to adhere to some form of mainstream Sunni Islam, a legacy of Warith Deen MohammadвЂ™s reformation of the organization beginning in 1976.[6]

In the MANOS sample, 30 percent of black Muslims associate with the Nation of Islam. While interviews with NOI members were not necessarily anti-American, official beliefs and statements by the NOI distinguished the group from mainstream black Muslims in terms of its more adversarial view of U.S. law enforcement. Among the NOIвЂ™s core beliefs are the need for separation from mainstream American society and the contention that Muslims should not assist America in fighting its wars.[7] This is because the police and military are seen a tools of oppression.

On the contrary, several black mainstream Sunni participants in this study living in the District of Columbia, New York, and New Jersey were actively involved with federal officials to improve relations between the Muslim community and U.S. law enforcement. These community leaders were outspoken about their patriotism, had American flags posted within their Islamic centers, and celebrated civil service workers and veterans within their communities. For example, the president and imam of Masjid Muhammad in Washington, DC, Talib Shareef, served as a retired chief master sergeant of the United States Air Force for 30 years. Imam Shareef was proud of the MasjidвЂ™s significant veteran membership and its initiation of the nationвЂ™s first Muslim American Veterans Association (MAVA), which now has several chapters and is growing around the country. This orientation is a far cry from its roots as Temple No. 4, the first NOI temple built from the ground up with funds from Malcolm X and dedicated by founder Elijah Muhammad himself in 1960. While still acknowledging its roots in the Nation of Islam, the temple emphasizes that its membership has вЂњproudly taken serious the responsibility of citizenship, and is comprised of and associated with millionsPage 165 → of hardworking loyal Muslims who are in every field of public service and the private sector, and are making significant contributions to support, defend, protect, and invest in the betterment of our society, our nation, the United States of America.вЂќ[8] Masjid Muhammad was in fact the only Islamic organization to receive federal funding from DHS for CVE efforts in 2017 after the Trump administration reoriented the focus on the program.[9]

The attitudes of Nation of Islam followers were tested against the premise that ideological distinctions are likely to influence respondentsвЂ™ willingness to engage with U.S. law enforcement. NOI followers in the MANOS dataset maintained the lowest levels of willingness to assist the police compared to all other Muslim Americans, regardless of the identity of the suspect. The spike in police assistance observed among black Muslims under the Umar (Muslim) condition comes from mainstream black Muslims. Mainstream black Muslims are the most likely to assist in an investigation involving a Muslim, compared to all Muslim Americans.

Given that both NOI and mainstream blacks maintain the lowest levels of expected fairness by police, why might mainstream blacks be significantly more eager to assist police in such investigations? Although more systematic research is required to answer such a question, interviews with mainstream black Muslims suggest that it could be that mainstream black Muslims feel they can be effective liaisons between police and the Muslim American community and may want to help to ensure that Muslim suspects are indeed treated fairly. Participants from an African American mosque in Washington, DC, expressed concern that as the U.S. government has sought to engage the Muslim community, black Muslims have been largely excluded. вЂњMany of us served our country proudly in the armed forces.B .B .B . We donвЂ™t have the same separatist attitudes as the Nation [Nation of Islam]. But so many people hear вЂњblack MuslimвЂ™ and think of the Nation and donвЂ™t realize the diversity of the African American Muslim community and the positive things happening in this communityвЂќ (AI 103). Many mainstream black Muslims believed their long history in the United States and familiarity with American institutions makes them a natural link between the government and the broader Muslim American community.

Alternatively, some mainstream black participants also revealed in interviews that they do not identify as strongly with immigrant Muslims as they do with other Americans. Through several conversations and roundtables, it became clear that the relationship between black Muslims and Page 166 →immigrant Muslims, most of whom arrived in the United States after the civil rights era, has been tense because of cultural, educational, and class

differences (Moore 1995), as discussed in chapter 3. Several even said that they felt disrespected or discriminated against by Muslims from immigrant communities that failed to acknowledge them as legitimate Muslims. вЂњIslam is not foreign to the United States. WevЂ™ve been here for centuriesвЂ”we are American and are a part of American historyвЂќ (AI 64).

Some mainstream blacks expressed the feeling that life has become even harder for them in the post-9/11 era. They highlighted that they are being profiled not only for being black in America, but also for being potential terrorists. Such circumstances have created incentives for black Muslims to help the police not only understand Islam better, but to actively prevent future attacks on the homeland.

The MANOS dataset provided additional questions about attitudes toward the U.S. government among black Muslims. The data suggest that mainstream black Muslims are the least likely to believe that the use of violence to oppose U.S. influence can be legitimized, compared to adherents to the Nation of Islam. Mainstream black Muslims are also significantly less likely to say that they вЂњare better off avoiding the government.вЂќ These two items, which both significantly predict whether individuals are willing to assist the government in police investigations, provide some insight into the different perspectives of mainstream blacks compared with other Muslims. The NOIвЂ™s history of promoting self-defense and deep distrust of the government may, in part, explain the unwillingness of NOI Muslims to assist the police with criminal investigations involving Muslims.

Discussion: Fairness, Suspect Identity, and Willingness to Assist Police

This chapter set out to better understand the conditions under which Muslim Americans are willing to assist U.S. law enforcement in counterterrorism investigations. Going beyond the current literature, the chapter also assesses whether willingness to assist police varies depending on the identity of the suspect. The data show that beliefs about police legitimacy and fairness among Muslim Americans have a direct and significant effect on willingness to cooperate with the police. The majority of Muslim Americans are less willing to voluntarily assist police when the suspect is Page 167 →a Muslim compared to a non-Muslim. This hesitancy to engage with police when the suspect is a Muslim is rooted in part in differential beliefs in how fairly U.S. law enforcement will deal with the suspect. These findings suggest that the large majority of the Muslim American community is no different than other segments of the American population, eager to assist the government when they believe that government representatives will uphold the rights and will not discriminate against its citizens.

While these findings highlight the importance of community relations and perceptions of government legitimacy in the effectiveness of CVE policies, individuals balance a complicated set of loyalties and concerns when deciding whether to engage with police. The data reveal that the positive relationship between expectations of fairness and willingness to voluntarily assist law enforcement in an investigation holds for most American Muslims, with two key exceptions: immigrants and black Muslims.

Immigrant Muslims

Muslims who have recently arrived in the United States and have not yet naturalized are significantly less likely to engage with U.S. law enforcement, regardless of the identity of the suspect. This is despite noncitizensвЂ™ relatively high expectations of fairness by law enforcement. This avoidance of police by new Muslim immigrants is consistent with the behavior of other U.S. immigrant communities. Several studies have found that although immigrants rate the police more positively than do native-born Americans, they are far less likely to initiate contact with the police (Davis and Miller 2002; Davis and Henderson 2003, 2007). Immigrants who have naturalized are significantly more likely voluntarily to assist police on average, but naturalized citizens are similarly reluctant to approach law enforcement when the suspect is a Muslim, even after accounting for expectations of fairness.

The finding that new immigrants are reluctant to engage with police, despite their high levels of trust, highlights the complicated factors that individuals must consider before approaching law enforcement. It may be the case that in addition to shaping conceptions of police fairness from past experience with government institutions,

oneвЂ™s experience in a sending country may have led to an understanding that it is better to avoid law enforcement. In the case of Muslims living in the United States, fears of implicating oneself or oneвЂ™s family in a terrorism investigationPage 168 → may be further incentive to avoid law enforcement investigations involving Muslims, since others in the past have faced unrelated charges when assisting the police.

Black Muslims

Black Muslims are significantly less trusting of the police than any other segment of the Muslim American community. This comes as no surprise, considering their tumultuous history with U.S. law enforcement. Reflecting this distrust, black Muslims who identify with the Nation of Islam are the least likely of any group to engage with police, regardless of whether the suspect is a Muslim or a non-Muslim. This is consistent with the NOIвЂ™s more skeptical views of the U.S. government. Mainstream black Muslims are similarly reluctant to engage with police when the suspect is a non-Muslim. When asked to assist police when the suspect of interest is a Muslim, however, mainstream black Muslims are significantly *more* willing than any other segment of the Muslim American population to assist the police in an investigation, despite their deep cynicism toward law enforcement. Qualitative evidence suggests that this pattern may be a result of a distinct ideological orientation toward American institutions and a desire to help mediate relations between law enforcement and Muslims in the United States.

After considering some of the drivers of Muslim AmericansвЂ™ perceptions and relationship with U.S. law enforcement, it is important to assess the wider significance of these findings for the future of Muslim AmericansвЂ™ relationship with their government. The following chapter concludes this book with a discussion of the implications of the findings of this study, taken together, for the questions and concerns raised in the introduction. Particularly, what do the results of this study tell us about the efficacy of current U.S. counterterrorism measures and tactics and the prospects for bridging the gap between some of the flawed policy premises and the reality? What can future U.S. administrations learn from the findings? Additionally, chapter 6 points to the limitations of this study, as well as gaps in the existing research on counterterrorism policy, on Muslim American communities and immigration studies, and suggests topics for further research.

6. Implications for U.S. Government and Security

The Muslim American experience since 2001 has been significantly influenced by the shift toward pre-emptive domestic security policies focusing on Muslims and public sentiment that is highly suspicious of Islam. The situation intensified during the 2016 presidential campaign, a time that witnessed the highest levels of hate crimes against Muslims since 2001 (FBI 2016). The election of Donald Trump not only coincided with a spike of anti-Muslim incidents (SPLC 2016), but early policy proposals to curb migration from several Muslim-majority countries following campaign promises of a вЂњMuslim banвЂќ appeared further to stigmatize the community. As the Muslim American population is expected to grow rapidly over the next few decades, such public sentiment toward Muslims is unlikely to disappear quickly. As discussed in this bookвЂ™s opening, at the time of President TrumpвЂ™s election, half of all Americans believed that Muslim Americans were anti-American and more prone to violence, and a third believed that Muslims should be subject to greater scrutiny than other groups in America (Pew 2016b; Pew 2015b). Yet, as mentioned at the start of the book, there has been very little data to address these common presumptions about Muslim Americans, and data on this population overall is relatively difficult to come by.

This study sheds light on how the fears of the American public about Muslims in the United States relate to the reality of Muslim American lives and attitudes; it provides original insights into how the Muslim American community has responded to the post-9/11 security environment. The findings here paint a different and more nuanced picture that challenges perceptions of Muslims as an isolated, un-American, and potentially violent segment of the U.S. population, conceptions on which many of the counterterrorism and CVE policies that implicate Muslim communities Page 170 →are based. The data demonstrate that Muslim Americans not only reject supporters of political violence at the same rate as Christian Americans, but that Muslim Americans have actively helped defend the United States by serving as one of the largest known sources of information toward disrupting terrorism plots since 9/11. As we have seen, the data suggest that, far from being an isolated community in the United States, Muslims Americans have had economic and social experiences in the United States similar to those of other American communities, with later generations becoming more integrated and identifying as American at rates identical to other U.S.-born Americans.

Despite these realities, negative political rhetoric around Muslim Americans persists, and past and ongoing policies that unfairly target Muslims have damaged the relationship between segments of the Muslim American community and U.S. law enforcement and other government entities. Specifically, the findings presented in this book suggest that U.S.-born Muslims, who are most familiar with American laws, citizen rights, and the political landscape in the United States, have internalized the scrutiny directed at the Muslim American community and compare their treatment to that received by fellow native-born Americans. U.S.-born Muslims have come to expect that law enforcement will treat Muslim American criminal suspects less fairly, and in certain conditions these expectations are associated with a hesitancy to approach law enforcement with concerns about criminal activity. Similarly, learning of the negative consequences some immigrants have faced after engaging with law enforcement has had a chilling effect on some Muslims, who are similarly cautious about engaging with law enforcement. In short, the very policies designed to keep America safe from terrorist attacks may have, in some ways, eroded one of law enforcementвЂ™s greatest assets in the fight against domestic violent extremism.

This final chapter elaborates on the implications of these findings for the future of the U.S. governmentвЂ™s relations with the Muslim American community and points to several areas of future research.

The Toll of Counterterror and Countering Violent Extremism Measures

Evaluating the effectiveness of specific counterterrorism measures and Countering Violent Extremism programs has remained a challenge for Page 171 →both academic researchers and policymakers for decades (Crenshaw and LaFree 2017). While the high monetary costs alone justify careful examination of such measures, so do the less tangible but serious consequences on American civil liberties, trust in government and, of course, ability to thwart

attacks.

Interviewees in this study expressed concern over several post-9/11 counterterror policies that they believe violated Muslim AmericansвЂ™ constitutionally protected rights. While several of the policies that were put in place in the chaotic aftermath of 9/11 have since been terminated, a number of controversial laws remain in place. For example, several Muslim interviewees brought up the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA), which among its many provisions allows for the indefinite detention without trial of American citizens suspected of supporting terrorism. This includes Americans on U.S. soil. Critics of the law point out that, in effect, the government has made an exception to key constitutional protections in the face of the вЂњWar on Terror,вЂќ changes that are difficult to roll back. Civil liberty advocates point out that the broad language of the law allows for a wide group of Americans[1] to be indefinitely detained without a trial, which weakens protections from arbitrary and unreasonable arrest and detention. Whether and how U.S. lawmakers address this and similar policies has important implications for the perceived legitimacy of U.S. law enforcement and the criminal justice system among all Americans, not just Muslims. Failure to confront such vague laws risksвЂ”under the wrong leadershipвЂ”harking back to some of the worst civil rights violations in U.S. history.

Respondents in this study also expressed concern over CVE *tactics* that have eroded trust between segments of the Muslim community and law enforcement officers. For example, participants suggested in chapter 5 that immigrant Muslims are increasingly fearful of approaching law enforcementвЂ”to provide assistance in violent extremism investigations or otherwiseвЂ”out of fear that they or their family members will be profiled and potentially face detention or deportation, even if they are in the country legally. Such fears are fueled in part by reports of Muslim immigrants having volunteered to help or cooperate with federal authorities and ending up in indefinite detention (HRW 2002) or, as cited in chapter 5, being arrested and held on unrelated charges until proven innocent of terrorism. Others expressed fears over being blackmailed into becoming an informant, another strategy allegedly used by law enforcement toward Muslims after 2001 (Pasquarella 2013). Such fears of law enforcement are problematic;Page 172 → as noted above, immigrant Muslims may be less likely to go to police when they personally need help or protection, not to mention when they are in a position to provide a tip on a suspected criminal plot.

The Trump administrationвЂ™s early executive order on immigrationвЂ”which indefinitely suspended the resettlement of Syrian refugees and temporarily prevented individuals from seven predominantly Muslim nations from entering the United StatesвЂ”alarmed Muslims living in the United States. Though the executive order did not have the term вЂњMuslimвЂќ in its text, many interpreted it as directly targeting the community and a sign of things to come, which heightened MuslimsвЂ™ anxiety about their status and treatment by the government. Given the significant role of Muslim communities in disrupting homegrown violent extremist threats, measures that unnecessarily alienate Muslim communities from law enforcement and other government agencies are particularly concerning. In fact, reported discussions within the Trump administration of reorienting government CVE programs to exclusively target Muslims had a near-immediate effect on collaboration between the government and the Muslim American community over CVE efforts. As discussed in chapter 5, in February 2017, just weeks after President Trump came into office, several nonprofit Muslim organizations working actively on CVE within their local communities chose to turn away hundreds of thousands of dollars of federal grants out of concern that the administrationвЂ™s policies and stance toward the Muslim community would be counterproductive to national security (Abdollah 2017; Murphy 2017). Of the few Muslim organizations that still hoped to cooperate with the government, the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) was stripped of its CVE funding in June 2017 for their Safe Spaces program (the stated aim of which was to improve relations between Muslims institutions and law enforcement) as DHS tilted more toward law-enforcement-based CVE tactics and away from community-based interventions (Hansler 2017; C-SPAN 2017).

The Trump administration has been criticized by politicians and the public alike for signaling to the wider American public that Muslims are worthy of suspicion and scrutiny. The administrationвЂ™s rhetoric toward Muslims is said to be a departure from that of presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, who took great care to avoid stigmatizing all Muslims while they pursued campaigns against extremists. Mischaracterizing the threat of the Muslim community only serves to exacerbate a climate of unwarranted fear and scrutiny toward the large

majority of nonviolent Muslim Americans, and as a result can contribute to the public pressure to Page 173 →adopt further counterproductive CVE measures. Moreover, an increase in the publicвЂ™s discriminatory behavior toward Muslims risks pushing some communities to become more insular in order to withstand such aggression (Abdo 2006; Barrett 2008; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009; Haddad 2007). While data from chapter 2 show that Muslims are relatively well-integrated in the United States, alienating political rhetoric toward the Muslim community is counterproductive as it can measurably hamper integration (Gould and Klor 2016; Kaushal, Kaestner, and Reimers 2007; Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2015).

Systematic policy assessments are needed to help law enforcement and lawmakers eliminate policies that do not effectively distinguish between the mass majority of nonviolent, nonradical individuals and those who are prone to engage in violence. While there is much debate within the Muslim American community itself as to what reforms are needed to improve CVE policies, several participants highlighted the need to truly separate вЂњsoftвЂќ community-building programs that genuinely seek to develop collaboration with Muslim American communities from вЂњhardвЂќ security programs that target actual plots and violent individuals. Without that division, government community partners can end up being no more than law enforcement proxies surveilling the Muslim communities they work with, potentially fostering a sense of paranoia and distrust. Participants in this study pointed to several instances of where this has happened as evidence against government-led programs for Muslim youth. Particularly damaging were cases where Muslim community leaders were actively cooperating with the government, only to learn later that, unbeknownst to them, informants had been sent into their community centers or mosques. Such instances not only eliminated any trust that had been built between the community members and law enforcement, but reduced the willingness of the leaders to go above and beyond to give the government more access to their communities out of concern for the safety of their congregants.

Conversations with Muslim interviewees point to the importance of fostering mutual trust between Muslim communities and law enforcement. Many suggest that this will require transparency and open communication to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel unfairly targeted. Muslim community leaders say that, ideally, there would be a dialogue in which on the one hand American Muslims are able to present their concerns about government policies to a receptive audience, and on the other hand FBI agents and other law enforcement officers are allowed the opportunity to learn about persons who are behaving suspiciously. Without Page 174 →reform toward this end, CVE efforts will continue to appear to Muslims to be insincere and merely a one-way means for the government to surveil their community members. Such a state of affairs holds little promise for combating terrorism. As highlighted throughout this study, broad-stroke policies that implicate innocent Americans are likely to only deteriorate relationships between government authorities and local communities.

Distrust in Law Enforcement and Political Mobilization

What do these findings suggest about how the Muslim American community will engage with the government politically moving forward? Two issues to consider are the effect of discrimination on group identity and political mobilization, and perceptions of government legitimacy.

Chapter 3 demonstrated that U.S.-born MuslimsвЂ™ higher expectations of the government and greater knowledge of the American system appear to have contributed to their heightened perceptions of discrimination against Muslims in America. Native-born Muslims see how their community has been affected by the post-9/11 security policies compared to other native-born segments of American society, noting violations of civil liberties and unfair targeting of innocent Muslims. U.S.-born respondents in this study expressed that they see the discrimination against Muslims as a shared experience that brings them closer to other Muslim Americans across various ethnic and racial backgrounds. This sense of commonality makes their Muslim American identity all the more important to how they interpret the world around them.

This heightened sense of group identity and common group threat is likely to serve as a resource and potential catalyst for political mobilization for Muslim Americans, particularly among U.S.-born Muslims, as it has for other racial and ethnic minorities in the United States (Wong, Lien, and Conway 2005; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Dawson 1994; Barreto 2007; Chong and Rogers 2005). Participants in this study suggested that Muslims who

have a greater sense of Muslim American collective identity are also more willing to mobilize politically on behalf of the group. Several U.S.-born interviewees compared Muslim AmericansвЂ™ situation in the United States to other American groups that have collectively mobilized for social inclusion and full rights, such as African Americans. A number explicitly said it was their responsibility as citizens to engage politically to help their government abide by its highest values and ideals. MANOS surveyPage 175 → respondents born in the United States were also significantly more likely than their foreign-born counterparts to say that they would donate or volunteer for an organization that fought for their groupвЂ™s rights, a feeling significantly related to levels of group identity and perceptions of group discrimination.

These findings are supported by other academic studies that suggest that the Muslim community has in fact continued to increase its participation in electoral politics in every election since 2001 (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009). Cainkar (2009) also found, in her study of Arab Muslims living in Chicago, that Muslim communities experiencing institutional discrimination and government targeting have also experienced enhanced civic inclusion. Islamic organizations have become more visible players in the American political and public space than they were previously (with the notable exception of African American Muslims, who have a long history of political engagement in American society). Such trends could accelerate under the Trump administration, as diverse Muslim American organizations coordinate to challenge policies they believe are heavily affecting their communities in negative ways. While many MuslimsвЂ™ experiences of discrimination in the post-9/11 environment have been negative, one might view the resulting heightened levels of civic integration in American society among later-generation Muslims as a positive outcome. Nevertheless, some immigrant Muslims, less sure of their status in the United States and of their ability to challenge the government, may feel even more vulnerable and thus withdraw from political engagement. While data in chapter 2 suggest that immigrant Muslims are politically engaged relative to other groups, fear of increased government scrutiny could supress this.

Alternatively, although Oskooii (2016) finds that the perception of political disenfranchisement among Muslims in the United States is linked to greater participation in various political activities, a belief that one has been *rejected* by society is associated with political acquiescence and behavioral alienation. Gest (2010), focusing on later-generation immigrant-origin Muslims in Britain and Spain, similarly finds that experiences of discrimination can lead to disaffection and even antisystem behavior when individuals feel there is no legitimate way to challenge their mistreatment. Much work in American politics points to this dynamic as well. In proposing the вЂњmistrust-efficaciousвЂќ hypothesis, Gamson (1968) posited that radical political mobilization could be explained by low levels of trust and high levels of cynicism in the political system, coupled with high Page 176 →motivation to influence the government. CitizensвЂ™ faith in government diminishes when democratic principles of nondiscrimination and equal treatment are undermined (Iyengar 1980). Without a general belief in the governmentвЂ™s responsiveness, individuals may withdraw from the political process altogether, and some studies suggest that citizens may instead pursue other avenues to meet their needs and demands (Citrin 1977), including unconventional, system-challenging behaviors such as protests, riots, and even acts of violence (Wright 1976; Schwartz 1973).

Even so, the findings of chapter 1 suggest that the majority of Muslims living in the United States are no more likely than Christian Americans to tolerate those who might resort to violence for a political cause, which implies that Muslims similarly perceive U.S. political systems to be legitimate. Nonetheless, policymakers and law enforcement officers should continue to encourage open dialogue and to protect free speech on issues of concern for all Americans, including those of the Islamic faith. Several have expressed concern that Muslim AmericansвЂ™ rights to free and open speech have been violated by a number of practices that associate political activism and routine religious practices with criminal activity. For example, the 2007 NYPD Intelligence Division report titled вЂњRadicalization in the West: The Homegrown ThreatвЂќ (as discussed in note 6 of the introduction) claimed to identify a вЂњradicalization processвЂќ by which individuals turn into terrorists. Some of its purported radicalization indicators included First AmendmentвЂ“protected activities, including вЂњwearing traditional Islamic clothing,вЂќ and вЂњbecoming involved in social activismвЂќ (Silber and Bhatt 2007). While the report has officially been removed from the NYPD website, it is still regularly cited by security professionals and commentators,[2] and it reportedly continues to influence the FBI and other law enforcement

agencies (Patel 2011).

Some comments by participants in this study suggest that some Muslims are afraid to become politically active out of concern for drawing unwanted scrutiny on themselves or their families. Moreover, supporting open speech is important to avoid driving dissent underground or outside the current political system. Birmingham City Council member Salma Yaqoob, expressing concern over the suppression of speech by the United KingdomвЂ™s Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) policies, noted:

> By denying the legitimacy of democratic opposition to the government from Muslims, and by promoting and recognizing only those Muslims who toe the line, government policy is serving to Page 177 →strengthen the hands of the genuine extremists; those who say that our engagement in the democratic process is pointless or wrong. (Yaqoob 2008)

Discriminating between criminal and constitutionally protected religious behavior is crucial on several fronts: (1) it allows the government to safeguard the nation efficiently by focusing only on true threats, and (2) it allows the protection of Muslim American citizensвЂ™ right to free speech, which in turn helps to ensure their full political inclusion in the American system.

Avenues for Future Research

Beyond the direct political and security implications of this study, the findings also point to several other promising areas for fruitful research and exploration.

More academic research is needed on Muslim American attitudes and political behavior, not only to develop a base of knowledge on this rapidly growing American subpopulation but to better understand perspectives and experiences across its host of racial, ethnic, and immigrant groups. Outside academia, such research may help balance discussions and calm misperceptions about Muslims that are pervasive in American society. Law enforcement training should also balance out current curricula on radical ideologies with study of the views of the vast majority of nonviolent Muslims living in the United States. Officers otherwise run the risk of developing biases from the belief that most Muslims they encounter are sympathetic to radical causes. Provided that Islam is on track to become the United StatesвЂ™ second-largest religious group by 2050 (Mohamed 2016), the need to develop a broader understanding of the Muslim American community will only continue to increase.

Scholars studying immigrant or minority groups in the United States and Europe may be interested in other findings of this study, which place the Muslim American community in the context of the broader picture of immigrant populations. Chapter 2 highlights that Muslim Americans overall are well-integrated in American society. Muslims look increasingly similar to their non-Muslim counterparts on a variety of socioeconomic, social, civic, and psychological dimensions across generations. While this study provides a broad-based look at Muslim American integration Page 178 →through a patchwork of available data, there is a need for a more systematic definition and measurement of integration that is meaningful to both policymakers and scholars alike. Due to the difficulty of defining the concept of вЂњsuccessful integration,вЂќ current studies of integration each rely on their own specification definition of the concept. This substantially reduces the possibility of comparison across countries and groups over time. Consequently, there is a lack of cumulative knowledge about rates of integration success among Muslims and other immigrant groups in the United States and Europe. Such a measure would not only allow for the accumulation of academic knowledge, but would allow scholars to understand better what policy regimes best support integration.

Findings throughout this book point to the significance of race in the Muslim American experience. U.S.-born black and Arab Muslims, for example, appear to have particularly low levels of confidence in how fairly Muslims are treated in the United States. The intersection of being both a racial and religious minority in the United States should be further explored. Future studies of discrimination against Muslims in the United States should find ways to isolate the effects of religious discrimination from racial discrimination, to see if these individuals indeed have a more negative experience in the United States due to their race. Finally, ethnic and cultural divides challenge the

formation and existence of a unified identity among Muslim immigrants. The circumstances under which such differences may be overcomeвЂ”by MuslimsвЂ™ common concerns and other factorsвЂ”generally deserve further exploration.

The research design used in chapter 4 to assess MuslimsвЂ™ attitudes toward police reveals an important caveat to a major finding in the literature on race and ethnic politics. The extant literature observes that trust in government declines over successive generations of immigrants in the United States. The findings in this study are able to identify more clearly that what changes across generations is an increased awareness of *group-based* injustices among later-generation immigrants, rather than a general distaste for the government. This is important, as it suggests that later-generation Muslims are not disillusioned with AmericaвЂ™s criminal justice system overall, but express concerns that standards of treatment are not being equally applied to all Americans. Future studies assessing generational differences in government trust among minority populations should continue to specify the identity of the subject of government treatment; it could be that residents are confident of an institutionвЂ™s overall Page 179 → functionality but distrust government when it is dealing with particular subgroups of the population.

As with immigrants of other religious backgrounds in the United States, scholars studying the Muslim American community should continue to consider the role of sending-country features on various attitudes and behaviors of Muslim Americans. This study provides, to my knowledge, the first empirical test of sending-country effects on MuslimsвЂ™ perceptions of the U.S. government. Muslims coming from countries with low levels of institutional corruption arrive in the United States with more optimistic prior beliefs about the fairness of law enforcement than those who come from corruption-ridden countries. The task of considering sending-country effects is made more difficult by the fact that Muslim American immigrants originate from such a wide number of countriesвЂ”upwards of 70 (Cesari 2007)вЂ”each varying in the quality of their government institutions, among other features. Sending-country effects are likely to be particularly important when assessing issues of interest to policy makers, such as religious belief and practice, integration, and attitudes toward the government.

Taken together, the findings of this study offer important insights into an understudied American community, but they also point to several important areas for future research and exploration. The data reveal a wide range of experiences by different segments of the Muslim community in the United States, resulting in diverse views of the U.S. government. Nevertheless, emerging patterns suggest that Muslims, contrary to many public assumptions, are not systematically different from their non-Muslim American counterparts in terms of attitude formation and other behavioral features.

Moving forward, what will be important to watch are the external factorsвЂ”government policy and public scrutinyвЂ”that continue to shape MuslimsвЂ™ relationship with the government. As of this writing, whether the actions of the Trump administration will have had the effect of increasingly alienating the community or propelling it further onto the American political scene remains fully to be seen. The nationвЂ™s security is not the only factor at stake; the treatment of Muslim Americans is also a bellwether of the American promise to safeguard the democratic rights and privileges of all Americans.

Appendixes

Notes

Introduction

1. In this study, the term вЂњfirst generationвЂќ refers to foreign-born individuals. вЂњSecond generationвЂќ refers to U.S.-born individuals with at least one foreign-born parent. вЂњThird-generationвЂќ refers to U.S.-born individuals with at least one foreign-born grandparent. The term вЂњgenerationвЂќ is not meant to represent age or the time period in which the respondent was born (e.g., вЂњMillennialвЂќ).
2. See Smith (2009) and Naber (2008) for a review of the pre- and post-9/11 experiences of Muslim and Arab Americans.
3. In describing the 9/11 aftermath and the policy changes that ensued, I am mindful of the circumstances confronting security officials and the country at the time. Many government employees worked tirelessly and with enormous dedication over an extended period to meet these challenges with the best intentions. Without diminishing their contribution in any way, I seek to highlight the Muslim American experience during this time.
4. For example, Section 215 of the Patriot Act allows the government to obtain any вЂњtangible thingsвЂќ in connection with an international terrorism or foreign intelligence investigation and does not require reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the person being investigated or the thing being seized is related to suspected criminal activity. Compliance with the law only requires that the government claim the items or documents are connected to terrorism or a foreign intelligence investigation, and nothing more. The broadly written provision gives the FBI power to access a slew of data detailing the private lives of law-abiding Americans, including telephone records, e-mails, bank statements, credit card transactions, medical records, and educational records (Zaman, Maznavi, and Sabur 2011).
5. Section 805 of the Patriot Act expanded the definition of вЂњmaterial support and resourcesвЂќ to include вЂњexpert advice or assistance,вЂќ and section 810 increased penalties for violations of the statute. Congress narrowed these provisions in 2004 to require that a person have knowledge that the organization is a designated foreign terrorist organization or has engaged in or engages in terrorism. The statute still, however, does not require the government to prove that the person specifically *intended* for his or her support to advance the terrorist activities of the designated organization. In a 2009 report, the American Civil Liberties Union argued that the vague definition threatens First Page 198 →AmendmentвЂ“protected speech, providing the example case of University of Idaho PhD candidate Sami Omar Al-Hussayen. Al-HussayenвЂ™s volunteer work, managing websites for a Muslim charity, led to a six-week criminal trial for materially supporting terrorism. The prosecution argued that by running a website that had links to other websites that carried speeches advocating violence, Al-Hussayen provided вЂњexpert assistanceвЂќ to terrorists. A jury ultimately acquitted Al-Hussayen of all terrorism-related charges (German and Richardson 2009).
6. For an example, Silber and Bhatt (2007) produced a widely read NYPD report titled вЂњRadicalization in the West: The Homegrown ThreatвЂќ (also discussed in chapter 6), that was highly influential in law enforcement circles but has been heavily criticized for equating religious behavior with radicalization. For example, the theories underlying the report have been criticized by Patel (2011) as вЂњthinly sourcedвЂќ and вЂњreductionist,вЂќ premised roughly on the notion that the path to terrorism has a fixed trajectory and that each step of the process has specific, identifiable markers. Patel argues that no empirical social scientific research supports the notion of a вЂњreligious conveyer beltвЂќ that leads to and can predict terrorism. In fact, research suggests that there is no such process that can be identified with any confidence. Moreover, Patel notes that the so-called markers of radicalization are over-determinate. For example, the NYPD report notes at the same time that вЂњA range of socioeconomic and psychological factors have been associated with those who have chosen to radicalize include the bored and/or frustrated, successful college students, the unemployed, the second and third generation, new immigrants, petty criminals, and prison paroleesвЂќ (22) *and* that markers of the вЂњpre-radicalization phaseвЂќ include вЂњmiddle-class

backgrounds; not economically destitute,вЂќ вЂњhaving вЂordinaryвЂ™ lives and jobsвЂќ and вЂњlittle, if any, criminal historyвЂќ (23). Markers of radicalization also focused on Muslim religious practice, identifying вЂњwearing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beardвЂќ as signs of the вЂњself-identificationвЂќ phase of radicalization (31). The report has since been removed from the NYPDвЂ™s website.

7. For a review of the debate over the link between integration and terrorism, see Rahimi and Graumans (2015).

8. Respondents may have been previously surveyed for a range of different purposes, including but not limited to marketing research, product reviews, academic research, and political opinion polling.

9. A full discussion of YouGovвЂ™s sampling methods, including weighting, can be found in appendix 1.

10. The author designed questions in the non-Muslim American survey specifically for this study in collaboration with Stanford UniversityвЂ™s Laboratory for the Study of American Values.

11. While there are no official statistics on Muslim American language acquisition, the Pew Research CenterвЂ™s 2007 national survey of Muslim Americans allowed interviewees to choose whether to have their interview conducted in English, Arabic, Farsi, or Urdu. Overall, 17 percent of those interviewed chose to be questioned in a language other than English (Pew 2009). Moreover, 80 percent of Arabs in the 2003 Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS) say they speak English вЂњwell or very wellвЂќ (Baker et al. 2003). For comparison, U.S. Census data reports that 72 percent of all foreign-born individuals living in the United States have strong English-speaking abilities.

Page 199 → 12. Some individuals who identified themselves as white were Caucasian, while others were of Arab, Afghani, and Turkish descent. Eleven percent of respondents identified as some other race.

13. However, several scholars point out that there is evidence that the first Muslim arrivals to North America came during the 16th century, when European explorers and colonists arrived in search of new trading routes (GhaneaBassiri 2010).

14. Elijah Muhammad took leadership of the NOI after FardвЂ™s disappearance in 1934. He led the NOI until his death in 1975.

15. For a more detailed discussion of the origins and transformations of the Nation of Islam and related organizations over time, see Allen (1996).

16. The Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924, which established general immigration quotas and restricted all immigration from Asia, effectively ended this wave.

17. One of the first missionaries sent by the Ahmadiyya movement to the United States was Mufti Muhammad Sadiq in 1920. Muhammad Sadiq attracted a substantial number of converts in his short stay in America, most notably in Detroit and Chicago between 1922 and 1923.

18. In the modern era, the schools of thought that are most prevalent among Sunnis include Shafi, Hanafi, Hanbali, and Maliki. The most prevalent among Shias is the Jafari school of thought.

19. Another sizable portion of the sampleвЂ”39 percentвЂ”noted that they refer to the QurвЂ™an and Sunnah as their authority, as opposed to following traditional schools of thought. They generally believe the QurвЂ™an and Sunnah are open to interpretations that consider the underlying purposes of the texts and modern circumstances, versus the literal meaning. This is typically a more flexible approach to Islam when compared with traditional schools of thought.

20. For a review on Salafism, see Stemmann (2006) and Kepel (2002).

Chapter 1

1. The Gun Violence Archive defines a mass shooting as a single shooting incident that kills or injures four or more people, not including the assailant.

2. PerligerвЂ™s (2013) dataset documents all violent attacks that (1) were perpetrated by groups or individuals affiliated with far-right associations, or (2) were intended to promote ideas compatible with far-right ideology. This definition makes his study a more generalized designation of political violence, broader than some agreed-upon definitions of terrorism.

3. These 41 individuals represent about 23 percent of the 176 Muslim Americans who have been associated (through various means of support) with a violent plot or attempted plot against targets in the United States

since 9/11.
4. The motivation of the duo is debated, but many point to MuhammadвЂ™s attempt to regain custody of his children and to kill his wife (Horwitz and Ruane 2003; Cannon 2010).
5. When including the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the April 19, 1995, Oklahoma City bombing, these figures change dramatically: 39 homicide events motivatedPage 200 → by Islamist extremism killed 3,058, and 178 homicide events motivated by far-right extremism killed 413.
6. During the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Al-Qaeda members killed 72 law enforcement officers and 55 military personnel. The Oklahoma City bombing killed 13 law enforcement officers and 4 military personnel. From 1990 to 2015, 18 military personnel have be killed in 3 incidents by Islamist extremists compared to zero by far right extremists (Parkin et al. 2017).
7. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) estimates that there were 476 terror attacks within the United States in 1970 (although most of these attacks were nonlethal).
8. For example, see Pew (2011) and Carroll and Jacobson (2015).
9. Many analysts are cautious about claiming that radicalization inevitably leads to terrorism because only a tiny minority of radicalized individuals actually cross over to become terrorists, and many violent individuals do not necessarily have radical opinions (See Sageman 2008; Gartenstein and Grossman 2009; McCauley and Moskalenko 2014).
10. Muslim respondents from the MANOS survey are compared to the general American population using an identical survey administered by YouGov to 1,000 American respondents in February 2013, the same year as the MANOS survey. Details on this survey can be found in appendix 1.
11. In an attempt to create a standard to measure individualsвЂ™ readiness to participate in political and social action, Corning and Myers (2002) developed what they call the Activism Orientation Scale. Based on Corning and MyersвЂ™ 2002 study, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) developed a new scale, the Activism and Radicalization Intention Scale (ARIS), which is designed to examine the readiness to engage in legal and nonviolent political action (activism) as well as readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action (radicalism) among a sample of undergraduate students in the United States and Ukraine.
12. Together the items achieve a CronbachвЂ™s alpha of .92 for Muslims and .86 for non-Muslims.
13. As noted in note 19 of the introduction, another sizable portion of the samplevвЂ”39 percentвЂ”noted that they refer to the QurвЂ™an and Sunnah as their authority as opposed to following traditional schools of thought. About 29 percent of individuals who selected this category expressed any levels of tolerance for individuals who support violent groups.
14. About 16 percent indicated that they look to all the *madhhДЇhib* instead of just one, a slightly more flexible but still conservative interpretation. These individuals expressed similar levels of tolerance toward those who might support groups who use political violence as those who follow just one *madhhab*.
15. As an additional robustness check, all models are rerun using a logistic regression on the single item that assesses tolerance toward those who support groups that sometimes resort to violence. The results are identical to the models using the full index.
16. This finding holds even when controlling for *madhhab* and Salafi individually, without controlling for the Nation of Islam (models not shown).
17. There have been several similar cases of community members reaching out to law Page 201 →enforcement when they learn about a potential threat. Nevertheless, it should be noted that some participants in this study expressed concern that informants can inadvertently push perpetrators toward taking action they otherwise would not have taken. Some also question whether in some cases the informants performed their role voluntarily, given reports of informants acting under the pressure of blackmail or to avoid punishment for other criminal charges. Chapter 5 discusses in more depth these dynamics and the Muslim American communityвЂ™s relationship with U.S. law enforcement.
18. Sean Hannity has claimed that Muslims do not speak up enough against terrorism, and 2016 Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump went as far to accuse Muslim Americans of вЂњnot reporting trouble when they see itвЂќ (Grierson 2016).
19. A *fatwa* is an Islamic legal pronouncement, issued by an expert in religious law (*mufti*), pertaining to a specific issue, usually at the request of an individual or judge to resolve an issue where Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) is unclear. Typically, such uncertainty arises as Muslim society works to address new issues that develop as technology and society advance.

20. Imam Omar Ahmad Suleiman, New Orleans, LA, Member of ICNAвЂ™s Shariah Council http://www.icna.org/icnas-shariah-council-responds-to-anwar-al-awlaki/

Chapter 2

1. Quote from interview on Fox News with Sean Hannity on June 15, 2016. Also see DelReal 2016.
2. For examples, see Castles, Haas, and Miller (2009), Alba and Nee (2003), and Ager and Strang (2008).
3. This study assumes both a role by the immigrant as well as the host society in determining successful integration. While acknowledging that achieving parity and equality with the dominant society is an important component of integration, this study does not assume that there is just one way to fit in to American society. Nor does this study argue that integration is a one-way process. The present chapter, however, mainly focuses on the behaviors and features of Muslim immigrants, while later chapters put more focus on the policies and features of American society that might affect the integration of Muslims, particularly in the post-9/11 environment.
4. According to the 2013 U.S. Census, the year the MANOS survey was administered, the median income for full-time male workers was $50,033 and for full-time female workers was $39,157. The median household income in 2013 was $51,939.
5. The U.S. Federal Reserve reported in 2014 that 28.1 percent of Americans reported earning more than $49,999 in 2013.
6. For households with three persons, the national poverty level is $20,090 (U.S. Department of Human Health and Services 2015).
7. Data from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement obtained through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Data analyzed by Brookings Institution (Ruiz 2014).
8. Such engagement implies some degree of shared experiences and mutual understanding,Page 202 → and for immigrants it reflects a weakening reliance on networks of home society (Persons 1987). But the degree of social contact of course also reflects a desire by the native population who may not accept individuals of other backgrounds as colleagues, or some structural or institutional factors that prevent the physical mixing of social networks, such as segregated neighborhoods, jobs, or social classes.
9. Note, however, that only about a third of Arabs in the United States are Muslim.
10. If Protestantism is treated as a single religious group, then 28 percent of American adults who are married or living with a partner have a spouse or partner with a religion different than their own. When the three major Protestant traditions (evangelical Protestantism, mainline Protestantism, and historically black Protestantism) are analyzed as separate categories, the number rises to 33 percent.
11. While 10 percent of all married people in 2015 were in interracial marriages, one in six newlyweds (17 percent) were married to a person of a different race or ethnicity in 2015 (Bialik 2017).
12. Examples of news articles linking Islamic schools with Islamist extremism include, Daniel Pipes, вЂњWhat Are Islamic Schools Teaching?вЂќ *New York Sun*, March 29, 2005; Kenneth Adelman, вЂњU.S. Islamic Schools Teaching Homegrown Hate,вЂќ *Fox News*, March 15, 2007.
13. Although these individuals identify as white only, among whites whose parents were born abroad, upwards of 90 percent report that their parents were born in the Middle East, Turkey, or Eastern Europe.
14. These exact questions were last asked of the general American population in the 1991 General Social Survey. Just over 57 percent of the general American population agreed with the statement, вЂњRight and wrong in U.S. law should be based on GodвЂ™s laws.вЂќ Thirty one percent of the general American population believed that right and wrong should not be determined by society.
15. Together these items achieve an alpha score of .66.
16. The predicted values presented are estimated based on an OLS regression where the outcome variable is Collective Threat, controlling for age, income, gender, education, and religiosity.

Chapter 3

1. In a randomized survey experiment, respondents saw the following prompt: *There has been a lot of talk these days about the dangers of hate speech, but also respecting freedom of speech. In your opinion, if*

somebody who opposes [Christianity/Islam] *wanted to make a speech in your community against all* [churches/mosques] *and* [Christians/Muslims], *do you agree or disagree the he should be allowed to speak? (Completely Agree (7)- Completely Disagree (1)).* The item was recoded to equal 1 if respondents agreed at all with this statement and 0 if the respondents disagreed or were neutral. Sixty-one percent of U.S.-born Muslims agreed that such an individual should be allowed to speak against Islam, and an equal percentage agreed that such an individual should be allowed to speak against Christianity. This compares to foreign-born individuals, among whom Page 203 →only 42 percent agreed that such an individual should be allowed to speak against Islam and 46 percent who agreed that such an individual should be allowed to speak against Christianity.

2. This figure compares to 38 percent of white Americans who support the Black Lives Matter movement, and 77 percent of black Americans. Fifty-six percent of Muslims over the age of 50 report supporting the movement (Mogahed and Chouhoud 2017).

3. The Gallup poll asked one thousand U.S. adults, вЂњIs corruption widespread throughout the government in this country or not?вЂќ

4. MANOS respondents were able to self-identify into multiple ethnic and racial categories, although most chose just one. Less than 6 percent of respondents reported being more than one major racial category. Half of those reported being Arab and white. Among U.S.-born respondents, about 40 percent of respondents identified as вЂњwhiteвЂќ only. Fifty percent of white-only U.S.-born respondents reported being at least third-generation and converts to Islam. Seventy-three percent of these individuals were women. Among nonconverts, individuals reported having parents from a variety of Arab countries, including Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria. Individuals also represented non-Arab countries such as Turkey and Afghanistan, as well as several African and European countries. Twelve percent of U.S.-born Muslims identified as Arab, 10 percent as Asian (with parents mostly from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh) and 34 percent as black. Only 13 percent of U.S.-born blacks were second generation and reported being primarily of Caribbean or (sub-Saharan) African descent. Just over half (53 percent) of U.S.-born blacks reported being converts to Islam.

Chapter 4

1. Details of the full models are presented in appendix 3.

2. In addition to this confusion, in the post-9/11 era local police departments have become increasingly involved in the enforcement of federal immigration laws, an issue about which Muslim Americans have faced particular scrutiny (Skogan 2009).

3. The average score for вЂњExpected FairnessвЂќ for U.S.-born Muslims is 0.44 (0.39вЂ“0.50) as seen in the dotted line in figure 4.3. The average for immigrant Muslims is 0.53 (0.46вЂ“0.58). This means that U.S.-born Muslims hold overall lower levels of expected fairness than do foreign-born Muslims. Among immigrant Muslims from countries with a Corruption Index score greater than 1 (highest levels of corruption: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Somalia), the average level of expected fairness is 0.32 (0.11вЂ“0.53). While this score is lower than the average score for U.S.-born Muslims, the difference is not statistically significant, as the confidence intervals overlap. So statistically speaking, U.S.-born Muslims and Muslims coming from the most corrupt countries hold equal levels of expected fairness.

4. The models in table 4.2 do not include controls for race, but race is not significantly related to expectations of fairness for foreign-born Muslims, and including race does not change the findings of the model.

Page 204 →Chapter 5

1. Respondents were asked: *Current laws sometimes make it difficult for the FBI to collect enough evidence to prosecute criminals. Do you think the FBI should be given more freedom to pursue criminals like this, even if it may reduce the suspectвЂ™s privacy?* Respondents were able to answer on a scale from 1 to 7, from вЂњDefinitely NoвЂќ to вЂњDefinitely Yes.вЂќ

2. As the term suggests, the Al Capone approach is a reference to the policing tactic used against the

infamous Chicago gangster, convicting and jailing him on a lesser crime (tax evasion) rather than one of his more serious offenses that may have been more difficult to prove in court. The Al Capone approach has been employed against many types of targets in the United States such as Mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants.

3. *Newburgh Sting*, documentary. Directed by Kate Davis and David Heilbroner, 2014, New York: HBO Documentary Films.

4. The respondent is referring to the use of a paid FBI informant, Craig Monteilh, himself a convicted criminal, who infiltrated the Islamic Center of Irvine. He espoused radical ideology in hopes of finding sympathizers, but mosque leaders reported him to the FBI. See short description of the case in chapter 3.

5. Malcolm X, вЂњMalcolm X on вЂThe Negro and the American Promise.вЂ™вЂќ Interview by Boston public television producer Henry Morgenthau III alongside Martin Luther King and James Baldwin, 1963. http://www.pbs.org/video/american-experience-malcolm-x-on-the-negro-and-the-american-promise/ (accessed August 11, 2017).

6. For a more detailed discussion of the origins and transformations of the Nation of Islam and related organizations over time, see Allen 1996.

7. вЂњThe Muslim Program,вЂќ NOI.org. https://www.noi.org/muslim-program/ (accessed August 3, 2017).

8. вЂњHistory,вЂќ Masjid Muhammad: The NationвЂ™s Mosque. http://thenationsmosque.org/about/ (accessed August 3, 2017).

9. See вЂњDHS Countering Violent Extremism Grants,вЂќ Department of Homeland Security website, June 23, 2017. https://www.dhs.gov/cvegrants (accessed August 4, 2017).

Chapter 6

1. Under Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), anyone who has committed a вЂњbelligerent actвЂќ can be detained indefinitely without charges or trial. Civil Liberty advocates argue that this is a direct violation of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. вЂњA person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.вЂќ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 112-81, December 31, 2011, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/1540/text

2. For example see Ernst 2017; Sperry 2017; Grove 2017.

Page 205 → Appendix 1

1. Some individuals who identified themselves as white were Caucasian, while others were of Arab, Afghani, and Turkish descent. Eleven percent of respondents identified as some other race.

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