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SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2020

The World Trump Made



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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Volume 99, Number 5

THE WORLD TRUMP MADE

COVER: DAVID PLUNKERT

September/October 2020

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THE GLOBAL RECKONING WITH RACE

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Archibald Cary Coolidge, Founding Editor
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CONTRIBUTORS

MARGARET MacMILLAN has spent her career grappling with the lessons of history. Canadian by birth, she trained at Oxford, where she later served as the warden of St. Antony's College. She has written several award-winning books, including *Paris 1919*, a seminal reassessment of the Paris Peace Conference. In "Which Past Is Prologue?" (page 12), MacMillan, now a professor of history at the University of Toronto and the visiting distinguished historian at the Council on Foreign Relations, asks what guidance the past can offer those envisioning a post-Trump global order.

Armed with an M.F.A. in creative writing from New York University, **BEN RHODES** initially aspired to be a novelist. After the September 11 attacks, however, he changed career paths and eventually helped draft the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the report of the Iraq Study Group. As a deputy national security adviser to U.S. President Barack Obama, Rhodes was instrumental in shaping and articulating the administration's foreign policy. In "The Democratic Renewal" (page 46), Rhodes maps out how a Democratic president might find fresh purpose for the United States in the world.

SHIVSHANKAR MENON is one of South Asia's most accomplished diplomats. His 42-year career in India's foreign service included stints as ambassador to China, foreign secretary, and national security adviser. In "League of Nationalists" (page 132), Menon, now a distinguished fellow at Brookings India, argues that under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Donald Trump, India and the United States have grown closer but their relationship has become narrower.

An associate professor of history at the University of Pittsburgh, **KEISHA BLAIN** has produced pioneering scholarship on African American history, the modern African diaspora, and women's and gender studies. She won numerous awards for her 2018 book, *Set the World on Fire*, and has shaped public discussion through her crowdsourced syllabi on race and politics. In "Civil Rights International" (page 176), Blain argues that the American civil rights and Black Power movements of earlier eras were fundamentally global—and so is Black Lives Matter.

THE WORLD TRUMP MADE

How will historians judge President Donald Trump's handling of American foreign policy? Not kindly, writes Margaret MacMillan in this issue's lead package. After nearly four years of turbulence, the country's enemies are stronger, its friends are weaker, and the United States itself is increasingly isolated and prostrate.

Richard Haass notes that "Trump inherited an imperfect but valuable system and tried to repeal it without offering a substitute." The result, he claims, "is a United States and a world that are considerably worse off." Dragging his party and the executive branch along, the president has reshaped national policy in his own image: focused on short-term advantage, obsessed with money, and uninterested in everything else.

His opponent has pledged to repudiate Trump's approach if elected, embracing international cooperation and restoring American global leadership. But is that even possible now? Most of the world looks at Washington with horror and pity rather than admiration or respect, and the one thing many of Trump's domestic supporters and critics agree on is there's no going back.

"Washington cannot simply return to the comfortable assumptions of the past," argues Nadia Schadlow, a former deputy national security adviser in the Trump administration. Great-power competition is inevitable, and multilateral cooperation is for suckers. Ben Rhodes, who also served as a deputy national security adviser, but in the Obama administration, agrees that the liberal international order is defunct. Rather than try to revive it, he wants Washington to shape a new and better one by checking its privilege, avoiding hypocrisy, and attacking global inequality.

From that perspective, the mass protests against racism that erupted this past spring after the police killings of George Floyd and other Black Americans represent not just a national reckoning but also a call to arms, as the issue's second package explains. Keisha Blain shows that the struggle for civil rights in the United States has always been part of a global struggle for human dignity. Suzanne Mettler and Robert Lieberman observe that tense debates over national identity grow even more dangerous when played out against a backdrop of political polarization, economic inequality, and concentrated executive power. Fortunately, Laurence Ralph points out, at least in the case of police reform, there are good international models to follow—although little evidence yet that Americans are prepared to adopt them.

"America is not a lie; it is a disappointment," the political scientist Samuel Huntington once wrote. "But it can be a disappointment only because it is also a hope." The challenge now is to keep that hope alive.

—Gideon Rose, Editor

Although the damage is difficult to measure, under Trump, the United States has lost much of its moral authority.

– Margaret MacMillan

Which Past Is Prologue?

Heeding the Right Warnings From History

Margaret MacMillan

U.S. President Donald Trump largely ignores the past or tends to get it wrong. "What's this all about?" he is reported to have asked on a visit to the Pearl Harbor National Memorial, in Hawaii, in 2017. When he has paid attention to history, it has been to call on it as a friendly judge, ready to give him top marks and vindicate him: his administration, he has claimed repeatedly, has been the best in U.S. history. The evidence—something that historians, at least, take seriously—suggests a different picture.

Whenever he leaves office, in early 2021, 2025, or sometime in between, the world will be in a worse state than it was in 2016. China has become more assertive and even aggressive. Russia, under its president for life, Vladimir Putin, carries on brazenly as a rogue state, destabilizing its neighbors and waging a covert war against democracies through cyberattacks and assassinations. In Brazil, Hungary, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia, a new crop of strongman rulers has emerged. The world is struggling to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic and is just coming to appreciate the magnitude of its economic and social fallout. Looming over everything is climate change.

These troubled times are not all Trump's fault, but he has made things worse. Flattery for dictators, especially coming from the leader of the most powerful state in the world, does not make them reasonable; it feeds their egos and appetites. Washington's fitful and chaotic response to the pandemic has made the population of the United States and those of its neighbors more vulnerable to the virus, and by pulling the United States out of the World Health Organization, Trump is undermining its ability to deal with the current pandemic and the ones bound to come. Renouncing arms control agreements has made the world a more dangerous place. Trump's bullying of U.S. allies and his attacks on NATO and the EU have weakened ties that have served the United States and its partners well for decades. And although the damage is difficult to measure, the United States has lost much of its moral authority.

Will the coming decades bring a new Cold War, with China cast as the Soviet Union and the rest of the world picking sides or trying to find a middle ground? Humanity survived the original Cold War in part because each side's massive nuclear arsenal deterred the other from starting a hot war and in part because the West and the Soviet bloc got used to dealing with each other over time, like partners in a long and unhappy relationship, and created a legal framework with frequent consultation and confidence-building measures. In the decades ahead, perhaps China and the United States

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can likewise work out their own tense but lasting peace. Today's unstable world, however, looks more like that of the 1910s or the 1930s, when social and economic unrest were widespread and multiple powerful players crowded the international scene, some bent on upending the existing order. Just as China is challenging the United States today, the rising powers of Germany, Japan, and the United States threatened the hegemonic power of the British Empire in the 1910s. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to an economic downturn reminiscent of the Great Depression of the 1930s.

The history of the first half of the twentieth century demonstrates all too vividly that unchecked or unmoderated tensions can lead to extremism at home and conflict abroad. It also shows that at times of heightened tension, accidents can set off explosions like a spark in a powder keg, especially if countries in those moments of crisis lack wise and capable leadership. Had Archduke Franz Ferdinand not been assassinated in Sarajevo in June 1914, World War I might not have erupted. One can only imagine the chain of potentially catastrophic events that could be set in motion if Chinese and American naval ships or airplanes collided in the South China Sea today.

"History doesn't repeat itself, but it often rhymes," as Mark Twain is reputed to have said, and it rhymes enough to make one uneasy. If the administration that succeeds Trump's wants to repair the damaged world and rebuild a stable international order, it ought to use history—not as a judge but as a wise adviser. The past offers warnings but also encouragement. Moments of crisis are sometimes moments of opportunity. The end of the Thirty Years' War brought the Peace of Westphalia and with it the principle of respect for national sovereignty. The Congress of Vienna, on the heels of the Napoleonic Wars, created a settlement that provided Europe with an unprecedented several decades of peace. The world wars of the twentieth century gave rise to new ideas and institutions for a stable and just international order based on cooperation and not confrontation. Once the Trump administration itself becomes history, world leaders can allow the existing fault lines to deepen—or they can work toward international peace and stability.

WARNING SIGNS

A knowledge of history offers insurance against sudden shocks. World wars and great depressions do not come out of the clear blue sky; they happen because previous restraints on bad behavior have weakened. In the nineteenth century, enough European powers—in particular the five great ones, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom—came to believe that unprovoked aggression should not be tolerated, and Europe enjoyed more peace than at any other time in its troubled history until after 1945. Today, when states such as Russia or Turkey act in defiance of such restraints and face little in the way of sanctions, they come away emboldened, and others are tempted to follow their example.

Further hastening the breakdown of the international order is how states are increasingly resorting to confrontational politics, in substance as well as in style. Their motives are as old as states themselves: ambition and greed, ideologies

and emotions, or just fear of what the other side might be intending. Preparing for conflict—or even appearing to do so—pushes the other side toward a confrontational stance of its own. Scenarios sketched out as possibilities in more peaceful times become probabilities, and leaders find that their freedom to maneuver is shrinking. In World War I, both the American and the Japanese navies started to contemplate the day when they would vie for control of the Pacific. In the 1920s and 1930s, each built bases, procured equipment, strategized, and trained with the expectation that it might one day have to fight the other. That did not make war between them inevitable, just more likely, since each side interpreted the words and actions of the other as evidence of hostile intent. After the Soviet Union shot down a South Korean airliner in 1983, its leaders persuaded themselves that the United States was planning to use the incident as pretext to gin up a war and launch a sneak nuclear attack. Suddenly, even U.S. President Ronald Reagan's more frequent phone calls with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher seemed to be evidence of preparation.

Public rhetoric matters, too, because it can create the anticipation of, even a longing for, confrontation and can stir up forces that leaders cannot control. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt probably did not want war with Israel in 1967, but his eloquence and nods to Arab nationalism (such as his decision to close the Strait of Hormuz) inflamed an already tense situation. Today, decades of "patriotic education" in China's schools have fostered a highly nationalist younger generation that expects its government to assert itself in the world.

Defusing tensions is possible, but it requires leadership aided by patient diplomacy, confidence building, and compromise. During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962—probably the most dangerous moment of the Cold War—U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev found channels through which they could broker a face-saving deal. Unfortunately, compromise does not always play well to domestic audiences or elites who see their honor and status tied up with that of their country. But capable leaders can overcome those obstacles. Kennedy and Khrushchev overruled their militaries, which were urging war on them; they chose, at considerable risk, to work with each other, thus sparing the world a nuclear war.

Trump, too, has left a highly personal mark on global politics. In the long debate among historians and international relations experts over which matters most—great impersonal forces or specific leaders—his presidency surely adds weight to the latter. He has used the bully pulpit as a megaphone. His character traits, life experiences, and ambitions, combined with the considerable power the president can exert over foreign policy, have shaped much of U.S. foreign policy over the last nearly four years, just as Putin's memories of the humiliation and disappearance of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War have fed his determination to make Russia count again on the world stage. It still matters that both men happen to lead large and powerful countries. Enver Hoxha, who ruled Albania for over 40 years following World War II, was a tyrant to Albanians and a menace to his neigh-

bors in the Balkans, but not a threat to the peace of Europe or the world. When Germany fell into the clutches of Adolf Hitler, in contrast, he was able to start a world war.

THE NOT-SO-GOLDEN AGE

In relatively stable times, the world can endure problematic leaders without lasting damage. It is when a number of disruptive factors come together that those wielding power can bring on the perfect storm. One need go back no further than to the international relations of the first half of the twentieth century to see this.

In the decade before the outbreak of World War I, many Europeans—perhaps a majority—looked back on the previous century with satisfaction, even smugness. The continent had come such a long way: it dominated much of the world and was enjoying ever-increasing prosperity and, it was hoped, lasting peace. The Austrian writer Stefan Zweig called it "the Golden Age of Security." Europe and the world were increasingly integrated through trade, investment, and communications. International law and multilateral agreements on such issues as arms control and the rules of war and a large and enthusiastic peace movement seemed firm impediments to war. Yet Europe had a darker side, and its troubles were piling up both in domestic politics and internationally. Within countries, acute political and class divisions, growing labor unrest, often violent revolutionary movements, and panicking upper classes strained even robust political systems. Rising ethnic nationalism shook multinational states such as Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Imperial appetites had not yet been sated by the carving up of Africa and much of Asia, and great powers now looked greedily at China and the Ottoman Empire.

Norms and practices that had restrained European powers began to weaken. The Concert of Europe was a shadow of its former self, and the great powers found it more and more difficult to act together. In 1911, when Italy invaded what is today Libya, it breached an unwritten understanding that no power would risk setting off a dangerous competition for the declining Ottoman Empire. The other great powers expressed regret but did little, and their inaction did not go unnoticed. In 1912, the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia joined forces to take what was left of Ottoman territory in Europe and soon fell out over the spoils. The Balkan wars that followed threatened more than the region. Austria-Hungary saw a Greater Serbia as a threat, whereas Russia saw it as a small Orthodox brother. The two powers came close to war. Had that happened, France might have felt obliged to support its ally Russia, and Germany might have come to Austria-Hungary's aid. After a certain amount of belligerent talk and threatening moves, a peace of sorts was cobbled together, thanks mainly to Germany and the United Kingdom, which, for separate reasons, did not want a general war. Nevertheless, the war scare left behind a poisonous residue of mutual suspicion and resentment. Russia resolved to back Serbia in the future, and Austria-Hungary was as determined to destroy what it saw as a deadly enemy.

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This series of crises showed that war was still a distinct possibility in European politics. Moreover, the division of the continent into two alliance systems, which some statesmen had assumed would create restraint, turned out to do the opposite. Considerations of prestige and the need to keep alliance partners happy meant that Russia found it difficult not to come to Serbia's aid, no matter how recklessly that small country behaved. Germany's leaders, for their part, feared that if they failed to back Austria-Hungary, they risked losing their only dependable ally. France was anxious to maintain its alliance with Russia, which it saw as a counterbalance to Germany, even if that meant supporting Russia in a quarrel with Austria-Hungary.

By 1914, confrontation had become the preferred option for all the players, with the exception of the United Kingdom, which still hoped to prevent or at least stay out of a general European war. Governments had grown accustomed to taking threatening actions, whether with troop movements or by ordering their diplomats home. Feeding the tensions further, Europe's armies and navies were growing at an accelerating rate. The rhetoric, both public and private, became harsher. At a family wedding in 1913, the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, chastised his British cousin King George V for siding with a decadent nation such as France and a semi-barbarous one like Russia. Across Europe, the press whipped up hatreds and ran scare stories about enemy plots. Although they might not have realized it, many Europeans were psychologically prepared for war. An exaggerated respect for their own militaries and the widespread influence of social Darwinism encouraged a belief that war was a noble and necessary part of a nation's struggle for survival.

Political and military leaders convinced themselves that potential enemies were on the verge of becoming real ones. The German high command feared that Russia's modernization was proceeding so quickly that by 1917, Germany would stand no chance against its eastern neighbor. German leaders also assumed that the French were bound to come to Russia's aid in a conflict, so that Germany would have no choice but to fight a war on two fronts. The Russian military similarly felt it might have no option but to fight a two-front war against both Austria-Hungary and Germany.

The only chance of preventing a local conflict from becoming a continent-wide conflagration lay with the civilian leaders who would ultimately decide whether or not to sign the mobilization orders. But those nominally in charge were unfit to bear that responsibility. The governments of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia had all failed to inform themselves of what their militaries were planning. Even British and French military leaders, whose countries had strong traditions of civilian control over the military, had made plans for joint military and naval preparations for war, going further than their governments had perhaps intended.

In the last days of peace, in July and early August 1914, the task of keeping Europe out of conflict weighed increasingly on a few men, above all Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, and Emperor Franz Josef of Austria-Hungary. Each proved unable to withstand the pressure from those

who urged war. Each was weak in his own way. The Kaiser, who had backed down in previous confrontations, was afraid of being called a coward; the tsar feared for his throne and the honor of Russia; and the emperor—old, ill, and alone—could not stand up to his generals. All signed the mobilization orders put before them. The last two were dead by the time the war ended in 1918; Wilhelm had lost his throne and was in exile in the Netherlands. Europe was changed forever: Austria-Hungary had vanished, Russia was in the throes of a civil war, and the British and French victors were considerably weaker than they had been in 1914. The global balance of power had shifted, with a major new international player across the Atlantic and a stronger and more assertive Japan to the east.

THE MISUNDERSTOOD DECADE

With the benefit of hindsight, historians have often considered the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 to be a failure and the 1920s a mere prelude to the inevitable rise of the dictators and the descent into World War II. It is true that Europe and the world faced many problems in 1919. As often happens at the end of wars, allies were drifting apart, and the winners and losers alike felt they had not come out of the peace settlements with their just spoils. Germans, particularly those on the right, loathed the Treaty of Versailles, whereas many French felt that it was too lenient. Italy and Japan argued that they had not been treated fairly despite having been on the winning side. The successor states to Austria-Hungary and the ones that had emerged out of the Russian empire were weak, economically fragile, internally divided by class and ethnicity, and prone to quarreling with one another. Founded on the basis of ethnic nationalism, all had substantial and often unhappy minorities. Added to this combustible mix was international communism. The victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia encouraged a wave of revolutionary activity around the world. Increasingly obedient to Moscow, substantial communist parties in France, Germany, and Italy threw themselves into undermining the existing democratic structures in their countries.

Lately, however, some historians have begun to see that interwar decade in a different light—as a time of real progress toward a strong international order. World War I had forced an appraisal of what had gone wrong and what might be done to prevent another such catastrophe. The value of international cooperation had been a regular subject of debate since the previous century, and states had already taken some concrete steps toward it, with multilateral agreements, international courts, and even international conferences to deal with pandemics. So when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson laid out his vision for a new world order in his famous Fourteen Points speech of 1918 and in subsequent speeches, he found a receptive and enthusiastic audience around the world.

The establishment in 1920 of his brainchild, the League of Nations, was a significant step, even without U.S. membership: it created an international body to provide collective security for its members and with the power to use sanctions, even including war, against aggressors. Its first years were promising. It settled a 1923 dispute between Greece

and Italy that had threatened to escalate into all-out war, monitored plebiscites in disputed territories in Europe, and coordinated a host of international agencies, from the forerunner of the World Health Organization to the International Labor Organization. The United States supported much of the league's work from the outside and continued to assist in building peace in Europe. With the backing of their government, American negotiators helped broker two agreements on German reparations, the Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Young Plan of 1929, which facilitated German payments through foreign loans, among other things, and reduced the total amount owed.

Overall, the 1920s were a time of cooperation, not confrontation, in international relations. For the most part, the leaders of the major powers, the Soviet Union excepted, supported a peaceful international order. In 1921 and 1922, the United States held major naval disarmament conferences in Washington that helped freeze naval competition in the Pacific for the following ten years. At the same conference, nine powers with interests in the Pacific signed a treaty to respect the territorial integrity of China. The government of Japan, although still angry over the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference, saw itself as part of the international order and cooperated in sustaining it. Under the enlightened leadership of Gustav Stresemann, who was foreign minister from 1923 to 1929, Germany joined the League of Nations and once again became a respectable member of the international community. Alongside the French politician Aristide Briand, Stresemann worked to lay the basis for greater Franco-German understanding. In 1926, the two men won the Nobel Peace Prize.

In Italy, Benito Mussolini played the part of a statesman, working with France and the United Kingdom to defuse some of the tensions resulting from the peace settlements. At the Locarno conference of 1925, when Germany accepted its new western borders and agreed to a nonaggression pact with Belgium and France, Italy acted as a guarantor alongside the United Kingdom. And under the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, eventually more than 50 signatories, among them France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, renounced war as an instrument with which to settle disputes.

The promise of the 1920s was cut short by the Great Depression. Bank failures, sharp reductions in domestic production, and a precipitous decline in world trade led to mass unemployment and deepening poverty even in prosperous countries. Citizens lost faith in the ability of their leaders to cope with the crisis. What was more ominous, they often lost faith in capitalism and democracy. The result was the growth of extremist parties on both the right and the left. Although some democracies were able to adjust and survive, others were not. In Germany, the Weimar Republic came to an ignominious end in 1933, when antidemocratic conservatives invited the leader of the Nazi Party to become chancellor, foolishly thinking they could exploit him for their own ends. Instead, Hitler used and discarded them. In Japan, ultranationalist militarists seized power. Mussolini saw which way the wind was blowing and eventually threw his lot in with the Axis.

The catastrophe that followed showed yet again how important the individual can be in the wielding of power. Hitler had clear goals—to break what he called "the chains" of the Treaty of Versailles and make Germany and "the Aryan race" dominant in Europe, if not the world—and he was determined to achieve them at whatever cost. Once in power, he banned all political parties except his own, outlawed labor unions, and reorganized the institutions of civil society. He welcomed the prospect of confrontation and war, which he saw as a means to bring the German nation together and imbue it with the proper military virtues. The military, delighted by the increases in defense spending and beguiled by Hitler's promises of glory and territorial expansion, tamely went along. In Italy, Mussolini, who had long dreamed of a second Roman Empire, abandoned his earlier caution. On the other side of the world, Japan's new rulers were also thinking in terms of national glory and building a Greater Japan through conquest.

Preoccupied with their own problems, the leaders of the remaining democracies were slow to realize the developing threat to world order and slow to take action. The French, facing deepening political divisions at home, looked to the British to react, but they had their own domestic challenges and were seriously overstretched abroad, with growing problems in their empire. Both hoped for support from the United States, but in his first term, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt was focused on solving the problems at home.

The League of Nations, only ever as strong as its members allowed it to be, was powerless in the face of open acts of aggression. In 1931, Japan seized the Chinese region of Manchuria, in breach of the league's covenant and Tokyo's own treaty obligations, and suffered few, if any, real penalties. Four years later, Mussolini attacked Ethiopia in a brutal campaign of conquest; again, democratic states did little by way of sanctions. As early as 1933, Hitler had pulled Germany out of the league, and, step by step over the next several years, he violated the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, moving troops into the Rhineland in 1936 and annexing Austria in 1938. That year, France and the United Kingdom handed over a large part of democratic Czechoslovakia to Germany in a doomed attempt to appease Hitler. In 1939, Hitler showed that he could not be appeased and seized what was left of Czechoslovakia. France and the United Kingdom, faced with a choice between continued capitulation and resistance, finally chose the latter, and war broke out that fall. This time, war was the result not of reckless brinkmanship or weak governments but of powerful leaders deliberately seeking confrontation. Those who might have opposed them, such as the British prime minister Neville Chamberlain, chose instead to appease them in the hope that war could be avoided. By failing to act in the face of repeated violations of treaties and international law, the leaders of the democracies allowed the international order to break.

OMINOUS ECHOES

Led by Roosevelt, statesmen in the Allied countries were determined to learn from this mistake. Even as the war raged, they enunciated the principles and planned the institutions for a new and

better world order. Three-quarters of a century later, however, that order is looking dangerously creaky. The COVID-19 pandemic has damaged the world's economy and set back international cooperation. Tensions are building up as they did before the two world wars, with intensifying great-power rivalries and with regional conflicts, such as the recent skirmishes between China and India, that threaten to draw in other players. Meanwhile, the pandemic will shake publics' faith in their countries' institutions, just as the Great Depression did. Norms that once seemed inviolable, including those against aggression and conquest, have been breached. Russia seized Crimea by force in 2014, and the Trump administration last year gave the United States' blessing to Israel's de facto annexation of the Golan Heights and may well recognize the threatened annexation of large parts of the West Bank that Israel conquered in 1967. Will others follow the example set by Russia and Israel, as happened in the 1910s and the 1930s?

As the current world order weakens, the confrontations have grown more pronounced. Russia continues to meddle wherever it can, and Putin dreams of destroying the EU. U.S.-Chinese relations are increasingly adversarial, with continued spats over trade, advanced technology, and strategic influence, and both sides are developing scenarios for a possible war. The two countries' rhetoric has grown more bellicose, too. China's "Wolf Warrior" diplomats, so named by Chinese officials after a popular movie series, excoriate those who dare to criticize or oppose Beijing, and American officials respond in kind. Zhao Lijian, the spokesperson for China's Foreign Ministry, has tweeted that COVID-19 may have been brought to Wuhan by the U.S. military, and Trump speaks of the "kung flu." U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo calls the Chinese Communist Party a "rogue actor"; according to China's state-controlled press, Pompeo is "deranged" and "the public enemy of mankind."

It is easy to downplay this posturing as merely for show and complacently assume that the world will get through the crises to come. One can guess what those might be, but it is impossible to foresee how different factors will intersect, or in what order. How the world copes will depend on the strength of its institutions and, at crucial moments, on leadership. Weak and indecisive leaders may allow bad situations to get worse, as they did in 1914. Determined and ruthless ones can create wars, as they did in 1939. Wise and brave ones may guide the world through the storms. Let us hope the last group has read some history.

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Present at the Disruption

How Trump Unmade U.S. Foreign Policy

Richard Haass

Present at the Creation is an 800-page memoir written by Dean Acheson, U.S. President Harry Truman's secretary of state. The title, with its biblical echo, was immodest, but in Acheson's defense, it was deserved.

Working from planning begun under President Franklin Roosevelt, Truman and his senior advisers built nothing less than a new international order in the wake of World War II. The United States adopted the doctrine of containment, which would guide U.S. foreign policy for four decades in its Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. It transformed Germany and Japan into democracies and built a network of alliances in Asia and Europe. It provided the aid Europe needed to get back on its feet under the Marshall Plan and channeled economic and military assistance to countries vulnerable to communism under the Truman Doctrine. It established a host of international organizations, including the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the forerunner to the World Trade Organization). And it constructed a modern foreign and defense policy apparatus, including the National Security Council, the CIA, and the Department of Defense.

It is impossible to imagine one of the national security principals of the Trump administration writing a memoir that includes the word "creation" in its title. The problem is not just that little has been built over the past three and a half years. Building has simply not been a central aim of this administration's foreign policy. To the contrary, the president and the frequently changing cast of officials around him have been much more interested in tearing things apart. A more fitting title for an administration memoir would be *Present at the Disruption*.

The term "disruption" is in and of itself neither a compliment nor a criticism. Disruption can be desirable and even necessary if the status quo is incompatible with one's interests and there is an alternative that is both advantageous and achievable. But disruption is anything but desirable if the status quo serves one's interests (or would with only minor adjustments) or the available alternatives are likely to be worse. By this standard, the disruption set in motion by the Trump administration was neither warranted nor wise.

As with health care and the Affordable Care Act, when it came to foreign policy, Trump inherited an imperfect but valuable system and tried to repeal it without offering a substitute. The result is a United States and a world that are considerably worse off. This disruption will leave an enduring mark. And if such disruption continues or accelerates, which there is every reason to believe it will if Donald Trump is

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elected to a second term, then "destruction" might well become a more apt term to describe this period of U.S. foreign policy.

A DISTORTED LENS

Trump entered the Oval Office in January 2017 convinced that U.S. foreign policy needed to be disrupted. In his inaugural address, speaking from the steps of the Capitol, the new president offered a grim account of the United States' record:

> For many decades, we've enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry, subsidized the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military. We've defended other nation's borders while refusing to defend our own. And spent trillions and trillions of dollars overseas while America's infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay. We've made other countries rich while the wealth, strength, and confidence of our country has dissipated over the horizon. . . . From this day forward, it's going to be only America first.

After three and a half years at the helm of U.S. foreign policy, Trump had apparently seen nothing to change his mind. Addressing graduating cadets at West Point earlier this year, he applied a similar logic to the use of military force:

> We are restoring the fundamental principles that the job of the American soldier is not to rebuild foreign nations, but defend—and defend strongly—our nation from foreign enemies. We are ending the era of endless wars. In its place is a renewed, clear-eyed focus on defending America's vital interests. It is not the duty of U.S. troops to solve ancient conflicts in faraway lands that many people have never even heard of. We are not the policemen of the world.

Many of the foundational elements of Trump's approach to the world can be gleaned from these two speeches. As he sees it, foreign policy is mostly an expensive distraction. The United States was doing too much abroad and was worse off at home because of it. Trade and immigration were destroying jobs and communities. Other countries—above all U.S. allies—were taking advantage of the United States, which had nothing to show for its exertion even as others profited. The costs of American leadership substantially outweighed the benefits.

Missing from this worldview is any appreciation of what, from a U.S. perspective, was remarkable about the previous three quarters of a century: the absence of great-power war, the extension of democracy around much of the world, a 90-fold growth in the size of the U.S. economy, a ten-year increase in the lifespan of the average American. Also missing is a recognition that the Cold War, the defining struggle of that era, ended peacefully, on terms that could hardly have been more favorable to the United States; that none of this would have been possible without U.S. leadership and U.S. allies; and that despite this victory, the United States still faces challenges in the world (beyond "radical Islamic terrorism," the one threat Trump singled out in his inaugural address) that affect the country and its citizens, and that partners, diplomacy, and global institutions would be valuable assets in meeting them.

Numerous other dubious assumptions run through Trump's worldview. Trade is portrayed as an unmitigated negative that has helped China take advantage of the United States, rather than as a source of many good export-oriented jobs, more choices along with lower costs for the American consumer, and lower rates of inflation at home. The United States' domestic ills are attributed in large part to the costs of foreign policy, even though—while the costs, in lives and dollars, have been high—the share of economic output spent on national security has fallen in recent decades and is far below what it was during the Cold War, which happened to be a time when Americans were able to enjoy security and prosperity simultaneously. There is ample reason to find fault with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq without blaming them for the condition of American airports and bridges. And although Americans spend far more on health care and education than their counterparts in many other developed countries do, the average American is worse off. All of which is to say, doing less abroad would not necessarily lead to doing more of the right things at home.

It is possible to understand this distorted framing of U.S. national security only by considering the context that gave rise to "Trumpism." The United States emerged from the Cold War with no rivals, but also with no consensus as to what it should do with its unrivaled power. Containment, the compass that had guided U.S. foreign policy for four decades, was useless in the new circumstances. And policymakers and analysts struggled to settle on a new framework.

As a result, the most powerful country on earth adopted a piecemeal approach to the world—one that, over time, led to overextension and exhaustion. In the 1990s, the United States fought a successful limited war to reverse Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf and carried out humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and elsewhere (some relatively successful, others not). After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush sent large numbers of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq—both ill-advised wars of choice (Iraq from the outset, Afghanistan over time), in which the human and economic costs dwarfed any benefits. In the Obama years, the United States initiated or continued several costly interventions and at the same time signaled uncertainty as to its intentions.

Frustration over perceived overextension abroad was reinforced by trends at home, especially after the 2008 financial crisis. Middle-class wages stagnated, and widespread job losses and factory closings created a narrow but intense hostility to trade (despite the fact that productivity increases tied to technological innovation were the primary culprit). Altogether, there was a widespread sense of the establishment having failed, both by neglecting to protect American workers at home and by undertaking an overly ambitious foreign policy abroad, one detached from the country's vital interests and the welfare of its citizens.

DEPARTING FROM WHAT MOSTLY WORKED

The foreign policies of the first four post–Cold War presidents—George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama—blended the

principal schools of thought that had guided the United States' approach to the world since World War II. These included realism (emphasizing global stability, largely by maintaining a balance of power and attempting to shape other countries' foreign, rather than domestic, policies); idealism (putting greater weight on promoting human rights and shaping the domestic political trajectory of other countries); and humanitarianism (focusing on relieving poverty, alleviating disease, and caring for refugees and the displaced). The four presidents differed in their emphasis but also had a good deal in common. Trump broke with all of them.

In some ways, Trump's approach does incorporate elements of long-standing currents in U.S., and especially Republican, foreign policy—particularly the nineteenth-century nationalist unilateralism of President Andrew Jackson, the pre– and post–World War II isolationism of figures such as Republican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, and the more recent protectionism of the presidential candidates Pat Buchanan and Ross Perot. But what distinguishes Trump more than anything else is his emphasis on economic interests and his narrow understanding of what they are and how they should be pursued. His predecessors believed that if the United States helped shape the global economy, using its power and leadership to promote stability and set rules for trade and investment, American companies, workers, and investors would flourish. The Gulf War, for example, was fought not for oil, in the sense of creating opportunities for U.S. companies to gain control of supplies, but to ensure that oil would be available to fuel the U.S. and global economies. Both grew markedly as a result.

Trump, by contrast, routinely complains that the United States erred by not seizing Iraqi oil. More fundamentally, he obsesses over bilateral trade balances, on increasing American exports and decreasing imports, even though deficits matter little as long as other countries are playing by the rules and the United States can borrow to cover the shortfall. (All countries have comparative advantages, and different rates of saving and spending, that lead to deficits with some and surpluses with others.) He berates allies for not spending more on their militaries, incorrectly telling fellow members of NATO that their failure to spend two percent of their GDPs on defense means that they owe the United States money. He was quick to cancel large military exercises central to the U.S.–South Korean alliance, in part because he thought they were too expensive. In trade negotiations with China, he cared more about getting Beijing to commit to specific purchases of American agricultural products than tackling larger structural issues, even though addressing the latter would be much more beneficial for American companies and for the U.S. economy as a whole.

The corollary to this focus on narrowly defined economic interests has been an almost total neglect of other aims of U.S. foreign policy. Trump has shown little interest in advocating human rights, advancing democracy, alleviating humanitarian hardship, or addressing global challenges such as migration, climate change, or infectious diseases (the toll of such disinterest in

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the last has become especially, and tragically, clear in recent months). When it came to Saudi Arabia, he did not allow blatant human rights violations to get in the way of arms sales. And he has been reluctant to respond at all to Russia's military intervention in Syria, its interference in U.S. politics, or recent evidence that Russian agents paid bounties to the Taliban to kill American soldiers.

The contrast between Trump and previous presidents is no less pronounced when it comes to the means of foreign policy. The two Republican and two Democratic presidents just before him all broadly believed in multilateralism, whether through alliances or treaties or institutions. That did not mean they eschewed unilateral action altogether, but all understood that, in most cases, multilateral arrangements magnify U.S. influence and treaties bring a degree of predictability to international relations. Multilateralism also pools resources to address common challenges in a way that no amount of individual national effort can match.

Trump, by contrast, has made a habit of withdrawing or threatening to withdraw from multilateral commitments. Even a partial list would include the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris climate accord, the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Open Skies Treaty. Trump's United States also refused to join a global migration pact or European-led efforts to develop a vaccine for COVID-19.

APPETITE FOR DISRUPTION

Trump's narrow and inadequate understanding of U.S. interests and the best means of pursuing them has also shaped—and in most cases hindered—the administration's approach to other issues. When it comes to the military, Trump's appetite for disruption has been most evident in the actual or threatened withdrawal of forces, often with little thought to why they were there in the first place or what the consequences of withdrawal might be. All presidents make decisions about the use of military force on a case-by-case basis. Trump, like Obama in this one area, has been largely wary of new military entanglements; his uses of force against Syria and Iran were brief and limited in scope, and his threats to unleash "fire and fury" on North Korea quickly gave way to summitry, despite North Korea's continued work on its nuclear and missile arsenals.

His calls for withdrawal, meanwhile, have applied to areas of conflict as well as places where U.S. troops have been stationed for decades in order to deter war. In Syria, the United States' Kurdish partners were left in the lurch when Trump abruptly announced U.S. troop withdrawals in late 2018; in Afghanistan, little thought seems to have been given to what might happen to the government in Kabul once U.S. troops depart. But it's one thing to conclude that the United States erred in Afghanistan and Iraq and should avoid such wars in the future, quite another to equate those interventions with the stationing of U.S. forces in Germany, Japan, or South Korea, which have helped maintain stability for decades. The administration's announcement in June that it

would withdraw 9,500 troops from Germany, seemingly triggered by German Chancellor Angela Merkel's refusal to travel to Washington for a G-7 meeting amid a global pandemic and not by national security considerations, was entirely consistent with Trump's coolness toward overseas military commitments. That this decision was taken without prior consultation with Berlin, just as the decision to cancel major military exercises with South Korea was taken without consulting Seoul, only made a bad situation worse.

These moves reflect Trump's broader indifference to allies. Alliances depend on treating the security of others as seriously as one's own; "America first" makes clear that U.S. allies come second. Trump's relentless focus on offsetting the costs of the United States' overseas military presence has reinforced the corrosive message that U.S. support for allies has become transactional and conditional. His warm treatment of foes and competitors—he has consistently been friendlier toward Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un than toward their democratic counterparts—has exacerbated the problem, especially given Trump's reluctance to reaffirm U.S. fidelity to NATO's Article 5, the treaty's collective-defense provision. Even Russian interference in American democracy hasn't stopped Trump from being less confrontational with Putin than with European leaders. In the one notable case in which the administration acted against Putin, in providing arms to Ukraine, any reassurance was undercut by the fact that subsequent aid was conditioned on a commitment by Ukraine's new president to investigate Trump's likely Democratic opponent in the 2020 election.

On trade, the administration has mostly rejected multilateral pacts, including the TPP, which would have brought together countries representing 40 percent of the world's GDP and pressured China to meet higher economic standards. It has regularly resorted to unilateral tariffs, even imposing them on allies and using dubious legal justifications. And although the United States has not withdrawn from the World Trade Organization, the administration has tied it in knots by refusing to approve judges for the panel that adjudicates trade disputes. The one exception is the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement. The USMCA is a curious exception, however, in that it departs only modestly from the harshly criticized NAFTA and borrows heavily from the text of the rejected TPP.

With China, Trump's welcome willingness to challenge Beijing on trade has been undermined by what can only be described as an incoherent policy. The administration has used confrontational language but has diluted any real leverage it might have had by bowing out of the TPP, incessantly criticizing (rather than enlisting) allies in Asia and Europe, and blatantly showing its hunger for a narrow trade deal that commits China to accepting greater American exports ahead of Trump's reelection campaign. The administration has been tardy or inconsistent in its criticism of China for its crackdown in Hong Kong and its treatment of the Uighurs in Xinjiang,

and it has been mostly passive as China has solidified its control of the South China Sea. Meanwhile, reduced spending on basic research at home, the placement of new limits on the number of skilled immigrants allowed into the United States, and the inept handling of the COVID-19 pandemic have made the country less competitive vis-à-vis China.

In the Middle East, Trump's disruption has similarly undermined U.S. objectives and increased the likelihood of instability. For five decades, the United States had positioned itself as an honest broker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; everyone understood that the United States stood closer to Israel, but not so close that it would not push Israel when necessary. Convinced that a new approach had to be taken, the Trump administration abandoned any pretense of such a role, forgoing any real peace process for a series of faits accomplis premised on the mistaken belief that the Palestinians were too weak to resist and Sunni Arab governments would look the other way given their desire to work with Israel against Iran. The administration sanctioned the Palestinians even as it moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, recognized Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights, and put forward a "peace plan" that set the stage for Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank. The policy risks sowing instability in the region, foreclosing future opportunities for peacemaking, and jeopardizing Israel's future as both a democratic and a Jewish state.

With Iran, the administration has managed to isolate itself more than Tehran. In 2018, Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, introducing a new round of sanctions as he did so. The sanctions hurt Iran's economy, just as the killing of Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was a setback for its regional ambitions. But neither was enough to force fundamental changes in Tehran's behavior, at home or abroad, or bring down the regime (which appears to have been the real goal of the administration's policy). Iran has now started flouting the limits on its nuclear programs established by the JCPOA and, through its meddling in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, continues to try to reshape much of the Middle East.

THE NEW NORMAL

Trump encountered a difficult inbox at the start of his presidency: growing great-power rivalry, an increasingly assertive China, a turbulent Middle East, a nuclear-armed North Korea, numerous conflicts within countries, a largely unregulated cyberspace, the lingering threat of terrorism, accelerating climate change, and plenty more. On the eve of his inauguration, my book *A World in Disarray* was published, which I mention only to underscore that many difficult challenges greeted the 45th president. Today, the disarray is considerably greater. Most of the problems that Trump inherited have gotten worse; to the extent that he has simply ignored many of them, neglect has not been benign. And the standing of the United States in the world has fallen, thanks to its inept handling of COVID-19, its denial of climate change and rejection of refugees and immigrants, and the continued scourges of mass shootings and endemic racism. The country is seen not

just as less attractive and capable but also as less reliable, as it withdraws from multilateral agreements and distances itself from allies.

American allies, for their part, have come to view the United States differently. Alliances are predicated on reliability and predictability, and no ally is likely to view the United States as it did before. Seeds of doubt have been sown: if it could happen once, it could happen again. It is difficult to reclaim a throne after abdicating it. What's more, a new president would be constrained by the ongoing pandemic, large-scale unemployment, and deep political divisions, all at a time when the country is struggling to address racial injustice and growing inequality. There would be considerable pressure to focus on righting the home front and limiting ambition abroad.

A partial restoration of U.S. foreign policy is still possible, however. The United States could commit to rebuilding its relationships with its NATO allies, as well as its allies in Asia. It could reenter many of the agreements it exited, negotiate a follow-on pact to the TPP, and spearhead a reform of the World Trade Organization. It could adjust its immigration policy.

But there is no going back to the way things were. Four years may not be a long time in the sweep of history, but it is plenty long enough for things to change irreversibly. China is wealthier and stronger, North Korea has more nuclear weapons and better missiles, climate change is more advanced, the U.S. embassy has been relocated to Jerusalem, and Nicolás Maduro is more entrenched in Venezuela, as is Bashar al-Assad in Syria. This is the new reality.

Moreover, restoration on any scale will be inadequate given the extent to which disarray has spread under Trump. The United States will need a new framework for contending with a more assertive and repressive China, as well as initiatives that narrow the gap between the scale of global challenges—climate change and infectious diseases, terrorism and nuclear proliferation, cyberwar and trade—and the arrangements meant to address them. Rejoining an inadequate Paris agreement, a soon-to-begin-expiring JCPOA, or a flawed WHO would not be nearly enough. Instead, a new administration will need to negotiate follow-on agreements on both climate change and Iran and partner with others to reform the WHO or bring about a new body to assume some of the global health burden.

And if Trump is reelected? Buoyed by an electoral victory that he would interpret as a mandate, he would likely double down on the central elements of the foreign policy that has defined his first term. At some point, disruption becomes so far-reaching that there is no turning back. *Present at the Disruption* could become *Present at the Destruction*.

Countless norms, alliances, treaties, and institutions would weaken or wither. The world would become more Hobbesian, a struggle of all against all. (This was actually previewed in May 2017 in a *Wall Street Journal* op-ed written by two senior Trump administration officials: "The world is not a 'global community' but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage.") Conflict would become more common, and democracy less so. Proliferation would accelerate as alliances lost their ability to reassure friends and deter foes. Spheres of influence could arise. Trade would become more managed, at best growing more slowly, but possibly even shrinking. The U.S. dollar would begin to lose its unique place in the global economy, with alternatives such as the euro, and possibly the renminbi and various cryptocurrencies, growing in importance. U.S. indebtedness could become a major liability. The global order that existed for 75 years would surely end; the only question is what, if anything, would take its place.

A great deal hinges on which course the United States follows. Even a partial restoration would make Trump's foreign policy something of an aberration, in which case its impact would prove limited. But if his brand of foreign policy persists for another four years, Trump will be seen as a truly consequential president. In this scenario, the model embraced by the United States from World War II until 2016 will prove to be the aberration—a relatively brief exception in a longer tradition of isolationism, protectionism, and nationalist unilateralism. History makes it impossible to view this latter prospect with anything but alarm.

The End of American Illusion

Trump and the World as It Is

Nadia Schadlow

Since the end of the Cold War, most U.S. policymakers have been beguiled by a set of illusions about the world order. On critical issues, they have seen the world as they wish it were and not how it really is. President Donald Trump, who is not a product of the American foreign policy community, does not labor under these illusions. Trump has been a disrupter, and his policies, informed by his heterodox perspective, have set in motion a series of long-overdue corrections. Many of these necessary adjustments have been misrepresented or misunderstood in today's vitriolic, partisan debates. But the changes Trump has initiated will help ensure that the international order remains favorable to U.S. interests and values and to those of other free and open societies.

As the administration's first term draws to a close, Washington should take stock of the crumbling post–Cold War order and chart a path toward a more equitable and secure future. No matter who is U.S. president come January, American policymakers will need to adopt new ideas about the country's role in the world and new thinking about rivals such as China and Russia—states that have long manipulated the rules of the liberal international order to their own benefit.

A new set of assumptions should underpin U.S. foreign policy. Contrary to the optimistic predictions made in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, widespread political liberalization and the growth of transnational organizations have not tempered rivalries among countries. Likewise, globalization and economic interdependence have not been unalloyed goods; often, they have generated unanticipated inequalities and vulnerabilities. And although the proliferation of digital technologies has increased productivity and brought other benefits, it has also eroded the U.S. military's advantages and posed challenges to democratic societies.

Given these new realities, Washington cannot simply return to the comfortable assumptions of the past. The world has moved beyond the "unipolar moment" of the post–Cold War period and into an age of interdependence and competition that calls for different policies and tools. To properly navigate this new era, Washington must let go of old illusions, move past the myths of liberal internationalism, and reconsider its views about the nature of the world order.

ALL TOGETHER NOW?

As the twentieth century drew to a close, the increasing number of countries that were embracing democratic ideals inspired pride in the West and high hopes for the future. A consensus formed that a convergence on liberal democracy would lead to a stable international political order. As the Soviet Union withered and the Cold War ended, U.S. President George H. W. Bush called

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for a "new world order," a "Pax Universalis" founded on liberal values, democratic governance, and free markets. Several years later, President Bill Clinton's 1996 National Security Strategy articulated a policy of engagement and democratic enlargement that would improve "the prospects for political stability, peaceful conflict resolution, and greater dignity and hope for the people of the world."

This presumption of liberal convergence motivated the decision to allow China to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. As Clinton said at the time, such an opening would have "a profound impact on human rights and political liberty." The rest of the world would get access to Chinese markets and cheap imports, and China would get the chance to bring prosperity to hundreds of millions—which, many in Washington believed, would improve the prospects for democratization. It was a win-win.

But China had no intention of converging with the West. The Chinese Communist Party never intended to play by the West's rules; it was determined to control markets rather than open them, and it did so by keeping its exchange rate artificially low, providing unfair advantages to state-owned enterprises, and erecting regulatory barriers against non-Chinese companies. Officials in both the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations worried about China's intentions. But fundamentally, they remained convinced that the United States needed to engage with China to strengthen the rules-based international system and that China's economic liberalization would ultimately lead to political liberalization. Instead, China has continued to take advantage of economic interdependence to grow its economy and enhance its military, thereby ensuring the long-term strength of the CCP.

While China and other actors subverted the liberal convergence overseas, economic globalization was failing to meet expectations at home. Proponents of globalization claimed that in an economy lubricated by free trade, consumers would benefit from access to cheaper goods, lost manufacturing jobs would be replaced by better jobs in the growing service industry, foreign direct investment would flow to every sector, and companies everywhere would become more efficient and innovative. Organizations such as the WTO, meanwhile, would help manage this freer and more integrated world (never mind its 22,000 pages of regulations).

But the promise that globalization's rising tide would lift all boats went unfulfilled: some rose to extreme heights, some stagnated, and others simply sank. It turned out that liberal convergence was not a win-win: there were, in fact, winners and losers.

A populist backlash against this reality caught elites off-guard. This reaction intensified as malfeasance on Wall Street and the U.S. Federal Reserve's misguided monetary policies helped bring about the 2008 global financial crisis. The generous bailouts that banks and financial firms received in its wake convinced many Americans that corporate and political elites were gaming the system—a theme that Trump seized on in his 2016 campaign. Years before Trump's victory, however, many ordinary Americans had already come to see that globalization was hurting them. Working people directly experienced how free trade could hollow out

America first: Trump in Wisconsin, June 2020

TIA DUFOUR / WHITE HOUSE PRESS OFFICE

communities as jobs and capital investments fled overseas. Even the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, Gita Gopinath, acknowledged in 2019 that international trade had been very costly for manufacturing workers in the United States. Between 2000 and 2016, the country lost some five million manufacturing jobs.

SLOUCHING TOWARDS TURTLE BAY

A second illusion that has entranced U.S. policymakers is the idea that Washington could depend on international organizations to help it confront major challenges and that "global governance" would emerge with the help of American leadership. Since countries were supposedly converging on political and economic liberalization, it was natural to think that transnational challenges such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and climate change would replace interstate competition as the principal focal point for U.S. leaders. The conventional wisdom held that such threats could best be managed by international institutions.

That view presumed that since other countries were progressing inexorably toward liberal democracy, they would share many of Washington's goals and would play by Washington's rules. That belief tended to minimize the importance of national sovereignty and the fact that countries differ in how they organize their own communities. Even among democracies, there exists a high degree of variation when it comes to cultural, institutional, and political values.

Nevertheless, international institutions grew more expansive and ambitious. In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for*

Peace envisioned a world in which the UN would maintain world peace, protect human rights, and promote social progress through expanding peacekeeping missions. Between 1989 and 1994, the organization authorized 20 peacekeeping missions—more than the total number of missions it had carried out during the previous four decades.

Mission creep extended to individual UN agencies, as well. The World Health Organization—created in 1948 to prevent the spread of infectious diseases—pioneered a number of the UN's greatest accomplishments, including the eradication of smallpox and the near eradication of polio. But over the years, its scope grew dramatically. By 2000, it had begun to issue warnings on everything from food safety to cellular phone usage to air quality. This spread staff and resources too thin, crippling the organization's ability to respond to genuine crises, such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. During the initial outbreak, the WHO was relegated to the sidelines as national governments raced to secure medical equipment. The institution's robust defense of China's response to the pandemic demonstrated that the CCP had used its clout to co-opt the WHO rather than support its missions.

The trouble at the UN went far beyond the WHO, however. In 2016, Anthony Banbury, a career UN official who had recently served as assistant secretary-general for field support, wrote that the organization's bureaucracy had become so complex that it was incapable of delivering results, creating a black hole into which disappeared "countless tax dollars," as well as a long list of "human aspirations, never to be seen again." Such lost opportunities have led to cynicism and have weakened the liberal international order from within.

INVINCIBLE NO MORE

Although liberal internationalism encouraged interdependence and multilateralism, it also rested on a faith in Washington's ability to indefinitely maintain the uncontested military superiority it enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. In reality, U.S. military dominance is now challenged in virtually every domain. The United States is no longer able to operate freely in the traditional spheres of land, sea, and air, nor in newer ones such as outer space and cyberspace. The spread of new technologies and weapon systems and the pursuit of asymmetric strategies by adversaries have limited the U.S. military's ability to find and strike targets, supply and safeguard its forces abroad, freely navigate the seas, control sea lines of communication, and protect the homeland. Nothing is likely to reverse these trends.

Since the 1990s, the United States has become more dependent on space for its national security, because so many military and intelligence functions depend on assets, such as satellites, that are based there. But China, Russia, and other states now have the ability to field antisatellite weapons systems. Meanwhile, private commercial activities in space have increased exponentially, as well. Since 2014, a majority of satellite launches have been conducted by countries other than the United States—primarily China, India, Japan, and members of the EU, further eroding the United States' ability to maneuver freely in

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space and increasing the amount of debris orbiting the earth, which threatens all space assets.

In cyberspace, hardware and software vulnerabilities have emerged across military supply chains, potentially reducing the effectiveness of important platforms. In 2018, David Goldfein, the U.S. Air Force's chief of staff, described the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as "a computer that happens to fly"—and thus, like all computers, it is vulnerable to cyberattacks. That same year, the Defense Science Board warned that since so many weapons systems were connected, a vulnerability in one could affect others, too.

At the same time, bureaucratic requirements have made it harder for the military to innovate. More than 20 years passed from when the Joint Strike Fighter program was envisioned to when the first combat squadron of F-35s was declared operational. The military demands unrealistically high levels of performance, which companies, hungry for contracts, promise to deliver. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has bemoaned the armed forces' unwillingness to settle for an "80 percent" solution that could actually be built and fielded in a reasonable time frame. Given how quickly countervailing technologies develop, these frictions in the U.S. defense industry pose serious questions about the country's ability to fight and win wars, especially against near-peer competitors.

Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow have developed so-called anti-access/area-denial weapons systems, which reduce Washington's ability to project power in East Asia and Europe. China has developed and modernized its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and has invested heavily in technologies to improve its conventional forces. Russia has built an array of exotic "doomsday weapons" and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, despite arms control agreements with the United States. And both countries are also pouring resources into hypersonic weapons whose speed and maneuverability render conventional missile defense systems ineffective.

In addition, smaller rivals such as Iran and North Korea have continued to develop and refine their nuclear programs. Despite visions of a world in which no one could challenge American force, the era of U.S. military dominance proved to be relatively short.

UNFRIENDING TECH

Misplaced faith in the advantages of new technologies has not been confined to military affairs. As the digital revolution began, policymakers and business leaders were optimistic that these technologies would accelerate the spread of liberal democratic values—that "the age of information can become the age of liberation," as President George H. W. Bush put it in 1991. A few years later, Clinton predicted that "liberty [would] spread by cell phone and cable modem."

Over time, however, it has become clear that the same technologies that connect and empower people can also imperil freedom and openness and limit the right to be left alone—all elements of a flourishing democracy. Authoritarian countries have deployed digital technologies to control their citizens, with the (sometimes unwitting) assistance of Western companies. The CCP has developed the most sophisticated

surveillance system in the world, for example, using facial and voice recognition technologies and DNA sequencing to create a "social credit" system that monitors China's 1.4 billion people and rewards or punishes them based on their perceived loyalty to the party-state.

These practices are not limited to authoritarian governments—partly because Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, has exported surveillance tools to 49 countries, including tools that employ artificial intelligence (AI). According to the Carnegie Endowment's AI Global Surveillance Index, virtually all the countries in the G-20 have deployed AI-enabled surveillance technology, including facial recognition programs. Meanwhile, even as the CCP banned Twitter in its own country, Beijing and other governments have used it and other platforms to carry out disinformation campaigns abroad aimed at weakening democracies from within.

MYTHBUSTERS

Trump, in his campaign and presidency, has offered some correctives to the illusions of the past—often bluntly and sometimes inconsistently. His departures from traditional ways of talking about and conducting foreign policy stem from an embrace of the uncomfortable truth that visions of benevolent globalization and peace-building liberal internationalism have failed to materialize, leaving in their place a world that is increasingly hostile to American values and interests.

Trump emphasizes the role of states in the international order, challenging an American tendency since the end of the Cold War to transfer power to international organizations. This has not meant unilaterally reducing the U.S. role in the world; rather, it has meant signaling respect for the sovereignty of others. Consider, for example, the administration's strategy for a free and open Indo-Pacific region, which involves countering China's excessive and illegal territorial claims in the South China Sea and bolstering the maritime security of other countries in the region, such as Vietnam, by providing them with equipment. Such measures draw a contrast with Beijing's efforts to create subservient relationships in the region and establish spheres of influence.

More broadly, the Trump administration has applied the principle of reciprocity to various international institutions and norms. This has meant urging other powers to take more responsibility for their own security and contribute more to the strength of the Western-led order. Trump's attention to burden sharing has "made NATO stronger," according to NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. Between 2016 and 2018, defense spending by NATO members other than the United States increased by $43 billion, and Stoltenberg has predicted that by 2024, such spending will increase by another $400 billion.

In trade and commerce, reciprocity has meant raising the alarm, louder than in the past, about China's unwillingness to open its market to U.S. products and services and Beijing's unfair practices, such as forced technology transfers and intellectual property theft. Experts estimate that since 2013, the United States has suffered over $1.2 trillion in economic damage as a result of China's egregious abuses.

Trump's use of tariffs as a trade tactic has underscored his willingness to take risks. Critics have decried the tariffs as

radical departures from orthodoxy. In reality, the use of retaliatory tariffs to demand reciprocity is an American tradition that dates back to the presidency of George Washington. They are also used by countries around the world to enforce WTO decisions or counteract unfair subsidies provided by other states. Trump's tariffs helped yield an initial agreement with China that, unlike any previous bilateral U.S.-Chinese agreement, includes meaningful commitments from Beijing to limit the theft of trade secrets, reduce forced technology transfers, and open Chinese markets to U.S. financial services and agricultural goods.

The ongoing negotiations with China are part of the Trump administration's broader effort to mitigate the downsides of globalization, such as the vulnerabilities created by "just in time" supply chains and the deindustrialization of the U.S. heartland. In the words of Robert Lighthizer, the U.S. trade representative, in these pages, the goal is to support "the kind of society [Americans] want to live in" by acknowledging the dignity of work and always keeping American workers and U.S. national security in mind when crafting economic policy. Along those lines, one important measure was the administration's strengthening of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which reviews major investments in U.S. companies by foreign entities and has helped to block Chinese companies from using investments to access key technologies developed by U.S. firms.

In accordance with the goal of enhancing American power, Trump has fulfilled his campaign promise to reverse the decline of the U.S. military—and has increased defense spending by almost 20 percent since 2017. Funding for nuclear modernization and missile defense has returned after years of neglect, and the Trump administration has established the Space Force. The Department of Defense has prioritized the pursuit of advanced technologies, such as hypersonic missiles and AI, as part of an overall focus on competing with other great powers. The Pentagon and U.S. intelligence organizations have also advanced the important operational concept of "defend forward" in cyberspace, which guides the United States to more proactively identify threats, preempt attacks, and impose costs in order to deter and defeat malicious cyber-campaigns.

No administration's policies are without flaws or inconsistencies. The Trump administration has exhibited a tendency, shared by many of its predecessors, to rely too heavily on regional partners that are not always up to the job. One example is the confusion about the extent to which Washington could withdraw its forces from Iraq and Syria following the U.S.-led victory over the Islamic State (also known as ISIS). Consolidating U.S. gains there required understanding the limited capabilities of Washington's partners in Syria, the mixed motivations of leaders in Iraq and Turkey, and the danger of leaving the field open to the Assad regime, Iran, and Russia. Ultimately, protecting U.S. interests has required a direct if modest American role.

The president and members of his administration have also been brash to the point of counterproductively alienating allies, especially in Europe. And tariffs have not always been applied in a strategic manner. It would have been better to seek unity in the contest against

China rather than pick fights with allies and partners by imposing steel and aluminum tariffs on them in 2018.

GET OVER IT

No matter who is elected president in November, returning to a set of strategic assumptions designed for the unipolar moment would harm U.S. interests. Competition is and will remain a core feature of the international environment, and interdependence does not obviate that. If a Democrat wins the White House, he will likely require convincing that rivalry is an unalterable feature of the international system and that it would be a grave mistake to return to the premises of a bygone era.

If Trump wins a second term, his administration must focus on better implementing the policy shifts it has initiated, sending more consistent messages, and building stronger coalitions both at home and abroad. Whoever occupies the White House in January will need to understand that today's multidimensional rivalries will not end in conventional victories. More broadly, policymakers and strategists need to move past their emphasis on achieving particular end states, since that springs from a mechanistic and ahistorical view of how politics works. In reality, as the historian Michael Howard argued, human acts create new sets of circumstances that, in turn, require new judgments and decisions.

Geopolitics is eternal. That is why competition persists no matter how much idealists might wish otherwise. A main objective of U.S. strategy, therefore, should be to prevent the accumulation of activities and trends that harm U.S. interests and values, rather

than to pursue grand projects such as trying to determine how China or other countries should govern themselves. To do this, the United States must craft policies that aim to maintain regional balances of power and deter aggression by revisionist powers.

Many on the right who favor restraint or retrenchment will be reluctant to embrace the idea of constant competition because they tend to discount the aspirations of other powers. If the United States is restrained, their argument goes, others will follow suit. History suggests otherwise. Many on the left will be reluctant to accept the idea of a rolling end state because they tend to believe that the arc of history is progressing toward a liberal convergence and view the push and pull of a competitive world as overly aggressive and likely to lead to war.

But recognizing the centrality of competition does not mean favoring the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, nor does it mean a drive to war. A wider acceptance of the competitive nature of geopolitics does indeed require a foundation of military power, but it also accentuates the need for diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft. Precisely because so much of today's international competition happens below the threshold of military conflict, civilian agencies need to take the lead in maintaining order and shaping a landscape favorable to U.S. interests and values. But that will occur only once the mindset and culture of U.S. government agencies change to allow for a broader recognition of the competition now underway.

Going forward, U.S. foreign policy success will hinge on a clear-eyed approach to cooperation. Rather than seeing cooperation with other countries as an end in itself, policymakers should recognize it as a means to crafting a stronger competitive strategy. They must also grasp that genuine cooperation requires reciprocity. Margrethe Vestager, the EU's competition commissioner, perhaps put it best when she expressed the essence of this policy: "Where I come from—I grew up in the western part of Denmark—if you keep inviting people and they don't invite you back, you stop inviting them."

In addition, Washington needs to accept that global problems are not necessarily best solved by global institutions, which are accountable primarily to internal bureaucracies rather than to external constituencies. Such institutions can play useful roles as conveners and centers for information sharing, but they lack the operational capacity to act at scale; bureaucratic complexity prevents them from accomplishing broader missions.

Reconsidering global governance does not require rejecting liberal principles or abandoning an order based on them. But because only a handful of countries are committed to those principles, the goal should be to foster what the scholar Paul Miller has described as a "smaller, deeper liberal order" of industrialized democracies that would defend liberal values and serve strategic and economic purposes. The focus might be on creating mission-driven coalitions that could construct redundant supply chains, fund research in emerging technologies, promote fair and reciprocal trade, and cooperate on security issues. Such coalitions would be open to new members provided they shared U.S. interests and values and

could bring capabilities to bear on key problems. The Cold War–era rules-based order began much the same way: as a U.S.-led group of like-minded states seeking to win a strategic and ideological competition against a common adversary.

Washington also needs to refresh its thinking about political economy and improve the capacity of U.S. government agencies to address the interplay of politics and economics. The United States will never be able to integrate its economic policies and political strategies as China does by putting its command economy directly in the service of the CCP's goals. But Washington should invest more in economic intelligence and make it easier to share such information across departments and agencies by establishing a national center for economic intelligence, perhaps modeled on the National Counterterrorism Center, as the scholar Anthony Vinci has advocated.

Moreover, the U.S. government must counter China's massive investments in research and development in emerging technologies. Congress must fund public- and private-sector research in AI, high-performance computing, synthetic biology, and other strategically important technology sectors. And the State Department should also put economics front and center by giving economic officers more responsibility at embassies and by opening more consulates around the world, to better foster business and commercial relationships.

Finally, U.S. policymakers must accept that in the contemporary world, speed is a vital component of power. The ability to respond quickly to threats and seize opportunities enhances a country's influence. Slow responses undermine democratic governance, since they reduce citizens' confidence that their government can meet needs within a reasonable amount of time. This truth has been underscored by the current pandemic, at the beginning of which, owing in large part to China's initial cover-up, governments around the world acted too slowly. U.S. government agencies need to introduce a new calculation: time to outcome. Armed with this measure, a policymaker might have a hope of identifying obstacles that need to be removed to get things done.

WHAT TRUMP SAW

The goals of the liberal international order were laudable—and, in many cases, they were achieved against daunting odds. The world is safer, more prosperous, and more just than it once was. But the unexpected consequences of globalization and the unfulfilled promises of global governance cannot be overlooked.

In a world of great-power competition, economic inequality, and dazzling technological capabilities, where ideologies as well as pathogens spread with viral ferocity, the stakes are too high and the consequences too dire to simply stick with what worked in the past and hope for the best. Trump recognized this reality earlier than many in the U.S. foreign policy community. Whoever follows him—be it in 2021 or 2025—will need to recognize it, as well.

The Democratic Renewal

What It Will Take to Fix U.S. Foreign Policy

Ben Rhodes

If elected president, Joe Biden will inherit a United States that has abdicated its leadership role in the world and lost its claim to moral authority. He will also take the reins of a country still in the throes of a pandemic, still reeling from the economic fallout of the novel coronavirus, and still deeply polarized. This wreckage will exceed even President Barack Obama's inheritance of a financial crisis and two foundering wars. Biden and his team will have to find some way to reshape U.S. foreign policy and revive the United States' sense of its purpose in the world.

It won't be easy. A Biden victory in November would offer the temptation of seeking to restore the United States' post–Cold War image of itself as a virtuous hegemon. But that would badly underestimate the country's current predicament. The United States hasn't just lost ground; the ship of state is pointed in the wrong direction, and the rest of the world has moved on. Global concerns about U.S. credibility aren't simply tied to the calamitous presidency of Donald Trump—they're rooted in the fact that the American people elected someone like Trump in the first place. Having seen Americans do that once, foreign leaders and publics will wonder whether the United States might do it again, particularly given the fealty of the Republican Party to Trump's nationalist, authoritarian brand of politics. In this environment, it is essential for a President Biden to find opportunity not in the past but in the present—in the wake of the recent crises that have upended American life and in the green shoots of the remarkable popular uprising that followed the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis in May.

The extraordinary mobilization against structural racism and injustice offers an opportunity to renew the United States' sense of purpose. A large part of the country's claim to global leadership has been the evolutionary and redemptive elements of its story—the fact that the United States is a multiethnic, multicultural society that has, through constitutional democracy, chipped away at institutional racism and the lingering power of white supremacy. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson understood this when, in 1952, he filed a letter to the Supreme Court as it considered *Brown v. Board of Education*: "The continuance of racial discrimination in the United States," he wrote, "remains a source of constant embarrassment to this Government in the day-to-day conduct of its foreign relations; and it jeopardizes the effective maintenance of our moral leadership of the free and democratic nations of the world."

At a time when the world has lost confidence in the U.S. government, the global demonstrations in support of the

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Black Lives Matter movement have shown that there is still a United States that the rest of the world wants to identify with. American protests are of a piece with other mass mobilizations in recent years: climate strikes, demonstrations against economic inequality, and the protests in defense of Hong Kong's autonomy and civil liberties. Despite its flaws, democracy is the only form of government that can take the necessary corrective action to address such challenges on behalf of citizens. If Biden wins and his incoming administration can harness that energy and reflect it in policies, then the defeat of Trump could offer a pivotal opportunity to renew American democracy at home. Beyond that, it could also provide momentum for a democratic renewal around the world, taking on structural inequality and crafting a global order that better responds to the aspirations of everyday citizens.

AVOIDING BLOB RULE

If elected, how should Biden seize this opportunity? To begin with, it is important to have a clear sense of what a new Democratic administration should not do. It would be wrong to return to the failures of post-9/11 U.S. policy in response to the harsh reality of Trump's own colossal errors. Yes, Trump's approach to the world has been an unmitigated disaster. His signature initiatives have resulted in the opposite of their objectives: North Korea is enlarging its nuclear arsenal, Iran has resumed its nuclear program, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has tightened his grip on power, and China has not altered any of the institutional practices that Trump's trade war was meant to stop. Trump's slogan "America first" has only turbocharged American decline: global confidence in the United States has collapsed, U.S. alliances have eroded, the liberal international order is unraveling, and China is expanding its influence and selling its techno-totalitarian model of government as an alternative to liberal democracy. The absence of any U.S. leadership in response to the COVID-19 pandemic has opened a window onto a new world disorder, one in which crude nationalism makes effective collective action impossible and conflict almost inevitable.

But fixating on Trump's missteps obscures the fundamental reassessment necessary for U.S. foreign policy. Some members of the foreign policy establishment (I've labeled them "the Blob") who were unhappy with the direction of policy during the Obama years argue that Trump's bungling is additional proof of the need to revive a more muscular brand of U.S. exceptionalism. They argue, time and again, that Trump has continued a course that Obama set: disentangling the United States from foreign wars, promoting greater burden sharing with other countries, and accommodating the emergence of alternative political models and rising powers such as China.

This revisionism is comically absurd. One of the organizing principles of Trump's foreign policy is to dismantle Obama's principal achievements: the Paris climate accord, the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the thawing of relations with Cuba, and perhaps even the New START treaty. That's hardly continuity. What is more fundamental, this line of thinking muddles an essential distinc-

tion. Obama was deeply critical of the George W. Bush administration's decision to go to war in Iraq, the single most catastrophic foreign policy decision of my lifetime, and one that enjoyed broad support from the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Trump has made some rhetorical feints toward Obama's worldview, echoing his critiques of U.S. interventionism. But Obama and Trump proposed opposite treatments for this disease. During his presidency, Obama tried to redirect U.S. foreign policy toward a new set of multilateral arrangements, strategically important yet overlooked regions such as the Asia-Pacific, and neglected issues such as climate change and pandemic preparedness. Trump, on the other had, has simply blended isolationism with occasional spasms of belligerence and a steady stream of rhetoric straight out of Fox News.

The decisions of the Obama era that have aged the worst are those that were most in line with the predilections of the Blob: the surge in Afghanistan, a massively overfunded plan to modernize the United States' nuclear weapons infrastructure, and support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. By contrast, some of the most contentious decisions of the Obama era are the ones that have aged the best: most notably, the Iran nuclear deal, which has been sadly vindicated by the fact that the dire scenarios the deal's opponents conjured up have all materialized since Trump's withdrawal of the United States from it.

Trump may have turned his back on the liberal international order, but he has also followed core tenets of the post-9/11 playbook of the Blob. The United States has never been more tightly aligned with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In 2017, U.S. planes bombed a Syrian airfield in response to a chemical weapons attack. The United States has never been more hostile toward Iran. The United States has sent nearly 20,000 additional troops to the Middle East since Trump took office, hardly a withdrawal from the region. The defense budget has ballooned to over $700 billion. The United States effectively has a policy of regime change for Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela. The Trump administration regularly engages in the kind of performative bluster that was demanded by many who felt that Obama was insufficiently strident in his assertion of American exceptionalism.

An incoming Biden administration cannot afford to reprise a failed set of ideas and policies that are out of step with the moment. For instance, Washington doesn't have the time or the political capital abroad to waste the first year of a new administration designing an approach to Iran that indulges the agenda of Gulf Arab states that relentlessly undermined the last Democratic president. The fact that the United States was on the verge of a war with Iran while COVID-19 was beginning to spread from China to the rest of the world demonstrates the fallacy of Washington's perpetual obsession with the Islamic Republic. Given the fact that the United States went back on its word, it would be a huge accomplishment just to return to the baseline of the JCPOA, which serves the core U.S. national security interests in Iran and could provide a foundation for future diplomatic initiatives.

There is a dangerous chasm between the expectations of those voters who might elect Biden and the instincts of

Back to normal: Biden with supporters in South Carolina, February 2020

TRAVIS DOVE / THE NEW YORK TIMES / REDUX

those in the foreign policy establishment who will clamor for a return to a United States that acts like a hegemon. If he listens to his voters and not hawkish denizens of the Beltway, Biden would be wise to signal an end to the United States' permanent war by repealing the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, terminating the United States' support for the ongoing moral and strategic catastrophe in Yemen, and unwinding a corrosive relationship with Saudi Arabia. Instead of lending the veneer of a peace process to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's annexation of Palestinian land, the United States should publicly lay out its positions on final-status issues for two states and stand behind them internationally and in any future effort for peace. Instead of repeating the same debates and mistakes of the last two decades, it's time to move on.

REBUILDING THE CITY ON A HILL

What should be the animating priorities for a new administration? First and foremost will be the response to COVID-19. Immediate steps have to be taken to bring domestic public health measures in line with the latest scientific recommendations. Globally, the United States can earn back goodwill by working to ensure that the dissemination of any potential vaccine proceeds as swiftly and equitably as possible and that the profit concerns of pharmaceutical companies don't cause needless delays. That project will have many associated challenges, including the resumption of global travel and supply chains. A Biden administration should recruit new talent into the government to stamp out COVID-19, even if only on a temporary basis. And as Washington repairs its ties with international institutions such as the World Health Organization, U.S.

policymakers should establish a more robust health security infrastructure—with increased funding for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health, collaborative offices abroad to monitor and respond to outbreaks, and multilateral scenario planning to apply the lessons of COVID-19 to future epidemics.

The action needed to address the current pandemic should be part of a broader reappraisal of American priorities and global leadership. Americans must understand that there can no longer be any contradiction between what the country does at home and what the country does abroad. Perhaps nothing demonstrates this necessity more clearly than the fact that some of the same Americans calling for sanctions on China for suppressing peaceful protests in Hong Kong also called for the military to suppress peaceful protests in Washington. A Biden administration cannot indulge this form of hypocrisy. In refashioning U.S. global leadership, a President Biden must make domestic action the starting point of his foreign policy.

This effort must necessarily begin with American democracy itself, which is no longer the exemplar it once was. A Biden administration must move immediately to accomplish badly needed democratic reforms in the United States, including extending and protecting voting rights, working to end gerrymandering, and promoting transparency about and limiting the role of money in U.S. politics. The Black Lives Matter protests have highlighted the racial disparities and the abiding force of white supremacy in the United States, but they have also shown how much a broad majority of Americans want to reckon with injustices in their country. A Biden administration must reform a law enforcement and criminal justice apparatus that reflects the legacy of white supremacy, as well as rewrite a tax code that rewards wealth at the expense of people who do the essential work. Biden should frame such measures as part of an international effort to revitalize democracy around the world—from Hong Kong to Hungary to the American heartland.

A Biden administration would also have to rebuild ties with democratic allies on a foundation of shared values. Should he win, Biden should make good on a promise to convene a summit of the world's democracies in the first year of his presidency. The meeting should identify national commitments to reinvigorate established democracies, while taking steps to support democratic institutions and human rights in fledgling democracies and autocracies. The participants should devise coordinated measures to promote transparent governance, crack down on tax avoidance, and help those states transitioning to more democratic systems. This should include efforts to root out corruption. Over $1 trillion in dark money moves across borders every year, fueling everything from Russian influence operations to rampant graft. The beneficial-ownership loophole should be closed in the United States, so that bad actors can't park their money in the country without disclosing whose money it is. Multilateral efforts to track illicit money flows should be strengthened, and the United States and its allies should not be shy about disclosing the illicit wealth and corruption networks of illiberal leaders.

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This effort to reconsolidate the free world is inseparable from U.S. security concerns about Russia. What the United States and Europe need, more than any individual policy, is a systematic effort to create antibodies against authoritarian attempts to interfere in democracies. Working in step with other democracies around the world, they need to strengthen the West's own institutions to provide a more resilient democratic example and unabashedly advocate democratic values. This push should extend to institutions such as NATO and the European Union, which should be recast as alliances of democracies. If countries such as Hungary and Turkey keep sliding toward illiberalism, they should be threatened with sanction or expulsion.

The United States should drop any reluctance to speak out against human rights abuses—whether they take place within the borders of U.S. partners, such as Saudi Arabia, or in major powers such as China and Russia (whose propaganda machines are not shy about commenting on internal U.S. matters). Washington should move away from counterproductive embargoes against Cuba and Venezuela and employ more targeted tools, such as sanctions that punish culpable individuals, not whole nations. In all that it does, the United States should aim to speak and act in coordination with the greatest number of countries possible, to counteract any fears they may have in standing up to flagrant human rights violations in Xinjiang or the swallowing up of Hong Kong's democratic autonomy.

That necessary spirit of solidarity should extend to the realm of technology. U.S. social media companies, such as Facebook, have helped spread disinformation that has ravaged the world's democracies. The United States should start regulating such companies. This is not, as some technology companies argue, a matter of limiting free speech; it's a matter of regulating algorithms that promulgate the kind of hate and disinformation that can fuel everything from a breakdown of social cohesion in the United States to ethnic cleansing in Myanmar. The United States should also catch up to the European Union in establishing stricter privacy protections.

A similar mindset of democratic resilience should accelerate U.S. commitments to innovation. The United States badly needs to invest in its own research and development, particularly as the world adopts more uses for artificial intelligence and the so-called Internet of Things. Globally, instead of scolding countries that feel that they have no alternative to Chinese technology, the United States should deepen its collaboration with like-minded countries in the development of 5G networks and the protection of intellectual property and critical cyber-infrastructure. Similarly, the United States and other democracies should work together to develop rules governing the use of these technologies, which could then pave the way to a fresh set of multilateral negotiations with China rather than an endless and escalating bilateral confrontation.

Each of these priorities is connected to the United States' fundamental identity as a nation that welcomes immigrants; the country's democratic example is inseparable from its sense of itself as a striving nation of outsiders, and its capacity to innovate has depended on welcoming the best and brightest from around the world. Immi-

gration replenishes the U.S. workforce, enriches American society, spurs entrepreneurship, establishes global connections, and imbues the United States with perspectives that reflect the world's diversity. Yet the Trump administration has weaponized immigration as part of a culture war rooted in white nationalism—surrendering moral authority, sacrificing the benefits of immigration, and driving anti-refugee and anti-immigrant policies that target people all over the world.

A Biden administration should move in the opposite direction. It should rescind the Islamophobic travel restrictions, discard inhumane border and deportation policies, and resume a working asylum process with additional resources to process claims. Immigrants who lack authorization to work or live in the United States but have been in the country for a long time should be offered a path to legal status, preferably through legislation rather than an executive order. Efficient, legal immigration and the education of foreign students at U.S. colleges and universities are national assets—and they should be treated that way. The resettlement of refugees in the United States should return to the level approached at the end of the Obama administration—a minimum of 120,000 people per year.

Finally, the leading threat to U.S. national security is climate change, and Americans can no longer afford to indulge voices that deny its existence, nor can they treat it as merely an environmental concern. The world is hurtling toward an apocalyptic future of rising temperatures and sea levels, population displacement, and extreme weather events that will make the disruptions of COVID-19 look quaint by comparison. Nearly every other major national security challenge that Americans already face—terrorism, failing states, great-power conflict, pandemics, and mass migration—will be exacerbated.

And yet the United States is nowhere near taking or leading the necessary action to limit global warming to roughly 1.5 degrees Celsius by the end of the century, the level scientists say is necessary. Instead, the Trump administration has moved in the opposite direction—pulling out of the Paris agreement and unraveling Obama-era regulations of greenhouse gas emissions. Leadership at the state and local level and in the private sector has mitigated some of the damage, but only the federal government can mobilize the action needed at home, and only the United States can galvanize the required collective action abroad.

On day one of a Biden administration, the United States should rejoin the Paris agreement and set to work developing the most ambitious contribution to emission reductions possible. The country's credibility and ambition abroad will be tied entirely to its actions at home. In addition to returning to—and building on—the environmental regulatory framework of the Obama years, a Biden administration should seek to pass climate and energy legislation in its first year. Consistent with proposals for a Green New Deal, this package should invest heavily in energy efficiency, renewables, and international climate mitigation and adaptation, and it should do so with an eye toward job creation and infrastructure development in marginalized communities.

Combating climate change must also become a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy for the world to have a chance at

decarbonizing the global economy. In Obama's second term, the Paris agreement was achieved not simply through negotiations; climate change became a priority for the United States in nearly every bilateral and multilateral relationship. That emphasis must be fully integrated into the way the State Department and other agencies are organized and staffed around the world and into the way Washington approaches other governments at every diplomatic level, from that of the president to that of embassies. For example, Washington should try to compel Beijing to bring the Belt and Road Initiative, its vast infrastructure project, in line with the strictures of the Paris agreement, and it should encourage New Delhi to meet its international commitments and Brasília to protect the Amazon rainforest. Climate change should become a sustained, top priority in the G-7, the G-20, and the World Trade Organization.

Progress on all these fronts—democracy, technology, immigration, and the climate—is fundamentally interconnected. If Washington doesn't fortify democracy and push back against authoritarian nationalism, then the collective action needed to address mass migration, climate change, and pandemics will prove impossible. It is no coincidence that the countries that have handled COVID-19 the worst—Brazil, Russia, and the United States—are led by far-right nationalists who use technology as a tool of disinformation, demonize minorities, and ignore climate change. Nor is it a coincidence that the collapse of American democracy has propelled the rise of an alternative model from China. The answer to that challenge is not to embrace some new Cold War with the Chinese Communist Party; it is to pursue a broader national project that can reenergize the United States and promote collective action abroad.

TOWARD A NEW EXCEPTIONALISM

Just as the divide between foreign and domestic policies must be eliminated, so, too, must the artificial separation between foreign policy and domestic politics be removed. In the United States and around the world, forces on the right have recognized that foreign policy is an extension of their domestic political projects. The left, on the other hand, has been reflexively reluctant to blend the two.

In the United States, this hesitation has allowed all foreign and national security policies to be viewed through a right-wing prism. This tendency has deep roots, from the collapse of the liberal national security establishment after the Vietnam War, through the Republican Party's mythologizing of its role in the victory of the Cold War, and, most acutely, in the post-9/11 era, when U.S. leaders sought to project toughness as a form of legitimacy. The catastrophic outcomes of the George W. Bush administration's state-sponsored torture, militarization of foreign policy, and invasion of Iraq seem only to have fomented a more belligerent and even bigoted creed of American exceptionalism. Instead of reckoning with foreign policy failures, the current iteration of the Republican Party has sought to blame others, with Trump constantly searching for villains and scapegoats, from Obama to immigrants to the antifascist movement known as "antifa."

The Democratic Party, in turn, has been needlessly defensive. In the Obama era, its timidity led to a reluctance to stand behind the party's principles, even when the Democrats were on the right side of issues. The prison at Guantánamo Bay is bizarrely still open almost 20 years after 9/11, at a cost of millions of dollars per prisoner, because too many Democrats have feared being called weak. In the ferocious debates over the JCPOA, too many Democrats felt the need to qualify their support, issuing hawkish caveats about the inadequacies of the deal and repeating the myriad ways in which Iran was a bad actor. Why would voters opt for less belligerent candidates in elections up and down the ballot if they've been led to believe that U.S. policy toward Iran requires a belligerent stance? On various issues, including immigration and climate change, too many Democrats are unwilling or unable to make the sustained arguments necessary to reshape public opinion.

The calamitous failures of the Trump administration offer an opportunity to discard this defensiveness. There is no need for Democrats to feel reluctant to challenge the misguided priorities of a country preparing, for instance, to tear up arms control agreements and spend nearly $1 trillion modernizing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. Why not make the case to the American people that this money would be better spent elsewhere and that a new nuclear arms race is tantamount to insanity? Even when it comes to issues on which national opinion is largely on the side of Democratic policies—for instance, ending a misguided and inhumane embargo on Cuba—fear of provoking a single conservative slice of the electorate in a few neighborhoods in Miami regularly ties the party in knots, perpetuating idiosyncratic and failed policies toward both Cuba and Venezuela.

What Republicans have consistently understood is that the appearance of firm convictions and a willingness to fight for them has more popular appeal than an apolitical and defensive approach. But now in 2020, Republicans have followed their own logic into a rabbit hole. In rhetoric and deed, Republicans have betrayed the United States' values, coddled its adversaries, and subjugated its interests to the political whims of an incompetent authoritarian. There is a lot of room for the Democratic Party to establish itself as the defender of democratic values, strong alliances, and U.S. leadership—but only if it takes that project seriously.

The Democrats need to have broader horizons. For the last decade, the political project of an increasingly far-right Republican Party has become enmeshed with other right-wing movements in Brazil, Hungary, Poland, Russia, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Across the West, in particular, right-wing parties share sources of financing, media and disinformation platforms, political strategies, and consultants. As president, Trump has been brazen in trying to boost the political fortunes of like-minded autocrats.

Progressives must not shy away from the international dimensions of this fight. A Biden administration should unabashedly oppose right-wing campaigns to transform politics in the United States and other democracies. And just as right-wing populists directed the backlash to the 2008 financial crisis against liberalism itself, a Biden

administration should do whatever it can to ensure that the backlash to the current economic crisis hits the correct target: the collection of right-wing nationalists around the globe who couldn't solve the structural inequality, corruption, and failures of governance that triggered the rise of populism in the first place. Although there are necessary limits on what a U.S. administration can do, the Democratic Party and American progressives should seek more systematic cooperation with like-minded parties around the world. Progressives working in the United States on issues such as voting rights, democratic reform, and racial justice should deepen their coordination with progressives elsewhere, learning from and supporting one another.

To succeed, the Democrats must make the case for a distinct form of American exceptionalism. Here, there is a profound difference between the two parties. For the Republican Party that chose Trump as its standard-bearer, there seems to be a belief that might makes right—that the size of the country's defense budget, its willingness to pursue regime change, its muscular assertion of American economic and military power, and its very identity as the vanguard of a predominantly white, Christian civilization imbue the United States with an inherent exceptionalism. For Democrats, particularly progressives, there is a belief that right makes might—that the United States' capacity to correct its imperfections at home, its identity as a multicultural democracy that welcomes immigrants, its adherence to the rule of law, and its concern for the inherent dignity of people everywhere are what give the country a moral claim to leadership.

The U.S.-led liberal international order was an enormous achievement that blended elements of both of these worldviews. But Washington has passed through the dusk of that era. In the awakening that Americans have seen this summer in their own streets, the country now has an opportunity to shape what emerges from the collapse of the American superpower during the COVID-19 crisis. Biden has described the prospect of his presidency as a bridge to the future, a chance to restore a sense of normalcy at home and abroad, while advancing toward a different kind of United States. That effort should include a different kind of world order, one in which the United States leads without dictating the terms, lives by the standards it seeks for others, and combats global inequality instead of fueling it.

Martin Luther King, Jr., in speaking out against the Vietnam War and against poverty, once cautioned: "The problem of racism, the problem of economic exploitation, and the problem of war are all tied together." So they are today. A movement that insists on that truth, and a presidency that reflects it, could meet the perilous moment and build a bridge to a nation and a world more equipped to pursue justice, equality, and peace.

Graduate School Forum Showcase:

International Affairs in an Age of Global Crises

From the pandemic to the protests to the presidential election, recent events demonstrate that leaders need to be ready for anything. The policy choices they make matter.

While no one can account for every possibility, mastering the elements of international affairs and policy prepares future leaders for such crucial moments.

Training in international affairs and policy develops the ability to recognize the cultural, economic, social, and political forces at work in the world. It challenges students to build communication, leadership, and teamwork skills. An interdisciplinary curriculum and a diverse community of people integrate differing ideas. Graduates distinguish themselves by their flexibility and adaptability. They can separate facts from opinions.

As you begin your search for a master's program, consider how schools look at the future of international cooperation and emerging mechanisms of policymaking. Ask how the program tries to anticipate changes in the way people will work and live in the future. Look at how they bring emerging voices into the conversation. Discover in what ways students challenge traditional ideas and formulate new ones. Examine how the school works to cultivate leadership qualities in students, as well as skills.

Adaptability and contingency planning are vital to a global career. International affairs graduates master underlying principles of an ever-changing world to prepare for the future—whatever it holds.

By **Carmen Iezzi Mezzera**
Executive Director
Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (@apsiainfo)

Contents

Tamar Gutner

SIS Professor
Director, Online Master of Arts in International Relations
School of International Service
American University

Cooperation in Crisis

How does American University's School of International Service (SIS) view international cooperation?

In 1944, at the end of the Bretton Woods Conference establishing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr, gave a closing address that resonates today. "There is a curious notion" that people from different countries cannot work together without sacrificing their national interests, Morgenthau said. He argued that the negotiators recognized the opposite: "… the wisest and most effective way to protect our national interests is through international cooperation."

Schools such as SIS were created to prepare students to become leaders in an uncertain world, where complex problems do not respect national boundaries. Our mission is no less important today than it was decades ago.

What skills are needed to help students prepare to manage global crises in uncertain times? How does SIS instill these qualities in students?

Students at SIS learn how to think, analyze, question, understand, and act. They learn ethical perspectives that will guide them as they become citizens—and leaders—of the world. These fundamental skills are as essential today as they ever were. Leaders must be nimble, be capable of responding to the unexpected, and hold a vision of what the future might look like and ideas on how to get there. The issues may change over time, and some are more complex than others, but fundamental skills are always applicable. Our students also learn many other types of skills from their courses and skills institutes. These can include data visualization techniques, strategic planning, grant writing, and research methods.

The School of International Service is constantly adapting. Our students benefit from an interdisciplinary faculty of over 120 professors, ranging from theorists who help us to understand broad patterns and larger perspectives to practitioner-scholars who have advised, devised, and implemented policy. All work to keep an environment of inclusivity foremost in the curriculum and in the classroom teaching and learning experience. Students can learn leadership skills from a history class or a class that examines institutions of foreign policy-making. They can take a class that teaches negotiation techniques, monitoring and evaluation strategies, and intercultural communication skills. They can take part in a practicum where student teams partner with outside organizations. They can even take advantage of all of these options through an online degree program.

As policy-making adapts to a post-pandemic world, and we all struggle to discern the evolving roles of institutions, what can we not afford to forget?

The role of international cooperation has never been more vital. The pandemic has produced sealed borders, set back globalization, and increased instability worldwide. We cannot even be sure about all the ripple effects it will trigger. We can be sure that global leaders are essential. Morgenthau's advice should not be forgotten: "To seek the achievement of our aims separately through the planless, senseless rivalry that divided us in the past, or through the outright economic aggression which turned neighbors into enemies, would be to invite ruin again upon us all."

SCHOOL *of* INTERNATIONAL SERVICE
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY • WASHINGTON, DC

Carolyn Kissane
Academic Director and Clinical Professor
NYU School of Professional Studies
Center for Global Affairs

Preparing Global Affairs Leaders to Address an Uncertain Future

The NYU School of Professional Studies Center for Global Affairs (CGA), was launched 15 years ago to address new and emerging global challenges. CGA offers dynamic and innovative curricula that provides students with the knowledge, skills, and network to thrive in an uncertain world. Its flagship, **MS in Global Affairs,** was among the first programs of its kind to address global challenges through multiple perspectives and disciplines. That approach is illustrated through the degree's eight concentrations and three specializations, which prepare students to embrace change and to be solution-oriented by considering what challenges lie on the horizon.

How has the CGA responded to COVID and thinking about a post-pandemic world?

This past year has amplified the urgency to develop the mindset of adaptive thinking and the ability to pivot quickly and effectively. The COVID-19 pandemic is creating unique pressures on all aspects of the global system, and we are responding accordingly. This fall, CGA is offering "A World Remade," a new course designed to provide a deep understanding of policy options and action during COVID-19 and beyond. It will use our concentrations as the lens by which students examine a changing world.

What are the leadership traits needed to navigate in uncertain times?

In these uncertain times, navigating the linkages between global environmental and social challenges, and potentially viable solutions, has never been more complex. The CGA, home to world-renowned experts in the most relevant areas related to global challenges—is uniquely positioned to connect the dots between business, human rights, transnational security, sustainable development, and innovation. Through courses, public events, and initiatives, we bring together some of the top authorities to tackle pressing global issues, risks, and uncertainties. This fall, we will be building our energy, climate security, and sustainability offerings in response to the climate emergency and the need for a cleaner and more decarbonized energy transition.

At the CGA, we work together as a faculty and as a team to address racism and the ways in which we can work towards social justice. The Black Lives Matter movement highlights our responsibility as educators to take the lead—through our teaching, course offerings, and public events—to set an example for our students, alumni, and the broader community.

What is the CGA doing to help students prepare to manage crises and global risk?

In our courses, we examine how the global landscape is changing and how disruptions—both good and bad—can be managed and understood. In "Responding to Emergencies," a course taught by Professor Christopher Ankersen, students are guided through multiple case studies and participate in a crisis simulation. Under Professor Ankeren's leadership, we also are launching a new specialization in global risk, which will afford students the opportunity to learn about different types of risk and how to manage uncertainties successfully.

There is no better testimonial of our success than our 1,400 alumni who work around the globe, in the private sector, NGOs, governments, multilateral institutions, and think tanks, implementing what they have learned at the CGA. Our graduates are resilient and able to anticipate risk and uncertainty in a world that constantly changes. Visit **sps.nyu.edu/cga**.

NYU | SCHOOL OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES
CENTER FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Yanzhong Huang, PhD

Professor
Director, Center for Global Health Studies
School of Diplomacy and International Relations
Seton Hall University

Navigating the New World Order Requires Expertise in Global Health and Security

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to surge throughout the world, Professor Yanzhong Huang, Director of the School of Diplomacy and International Relations' Center for Global Health Studies and a Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations, remains a sought-out global health expert on the impact of its continuing spread. Huang, who specializes in the security and foreign policy aspects of health issues, has authored the books *Governing Health in Contemporary China* and *Toxic Politics* and is the founding editor of *Global Health Governance: The Scholarly Journal for the New Health Security Paradigm*. The response to the pandemic, he says, demonstrates the value of open-mindedness and an interdisciplinary perspective.

How are global health and security connected to the pandemic and climate change?

Both infectious disease outbreaks and climate change are human security concerns due to their impact on global public health. They are also increasingly becoming "high politics" issues because of their profound implications on governance and national security. Students who have gained expertise in global health security will be well equipped to address the dual challenges of infectious diseases and climate change.

You have written about the lack of international cooperation during the pandemic, particularly between the United States and China. What motivates leaders to work together to do the right thing?

Typically, a global public health emergency is sufficient to motivate collective action and catalyze international cooperation given its ability to wreak havoc on a global community in a short period of time. The lack of international cooperation during this pandemic highlights the importance of sound political leadership that values people's health and well-being over domestic politics or geopolitical considerations.

Why is global health security an important field to study and build a career in right now?

The ongoing pandemic is a global crisis requiring a global solution. The pandemic reveals the lack of resources, capabilities, and cooperation in addressing a global challenge. But fundamentally, it points to the failure to correctly define the challenges we face, design effective policy solutions, and pursue their implementation in a timely and coherent manner. Students of global health security at Seton Hall develop the knowledge and skills to analyze complex situations, synthesize information, and design interventions for improved global health governance.

What might the field look in the future?

In five years, global health programs will be mushrooming in the United States and worldwide. I expect all schools of international affairs to have a program that addresses the complex dynamics among health, development, and security. The program here at the School of Diplomacy is well established. We've been around since 2003.

How can students prepare for careers that affect positive change?

They should be ready to update their toolbox and prove that their knowledge and skills are relevant in a complex and capricious world.

What traits do you believe students need to succeed professionally in the field?

Be open-minded and flexible, with a global and interdisciplinary perspective.

SCHOOL OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SETON HALL UNIVERSITY

Jeremy Carrette
Dean for Europe
Brussels School of International Studies
University of Kent

Advanced International Studies in the Capital of Europe with Leading Academics and Experienced Practitioners

What makes the Brussels School of International Studies (BSIS) special?

Our school is right at the heart of Europe and sits close to the institutions making decisions influencing all of us, wherever we are in the world. Our students are part of this, combining a world-class master's level education while being immersed in conferences, internships, seminars, and lectures across the city. It's a truly unique experience that will prepare students for an exciting range of careers in the international sector. We have met the challenge of delivering high-quality education during the pandemic by committing to face-to-face teaching in a responsible way, while continuing to offer guest lectures and conferences online during the immediate future. This hybrid model ensures we are prepared, should a second wave force us to move teaching back online.

What international cooperation does BSIS participate in?

We have a long history of collaborations and partnerships, whether it's local via our link to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Commission or farther afield via our Two Capitals exchange program with the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing and Virginia Tech in the United States. The pandemic has shown that the globalized world is more connected than ever. Through our programs and research links, we aim to bring the world to the classroom.

Brussels is known as the "capital of Europe." In this, Brussels is an international city like no other, home to international institutions, headquarters, charities and CCC. This allows us to offer students unparalleled access to organizations through internships, conferences, seminars, and university partnerships. We believe that international cooperation benefits students and research beyond anything else and enables excellent prospects during and after studies, in terms of job prospects in an ever increasingly global world.

And how does this cooperation work on a day-to-day basis at BSIS?

Our students choose us for many different reasons, but the ability to combine a world-class education with outstanding networking opportunities in Brussels among the international community is the reason we hear most. In a post-pandemic world, the job market will have greater competition. To help our students, we aim to bring in expertise from the international community to enhance our in-class teaching. We find that a blend of theoretical teaching and analysis fits well with the more case-study, practical orientation that our practitioners bring to the classroom. Besides teaching and internships, our location in Brussels allows interaction with organizations in terms of visit days, research links, and collaboration on seminars and workshops.

What developments are taking place at BSIS?

We are launching a new master's degree in global health policy. This new master's degree will draw on our strengths by looking at the issue of global health in relation to conflict zones, development and aid, and human migration. Brussels is a natural home for global health studies. Many organizations are increasingly focusing on issues related to health, and policy is changing rapidly to reflect this. Given the pandemic, this is likely to accelerate.

University of Kent | Brussels School of International Studies

Jessica Gottlieb
Associate Professor
The Bush School of Government and Public Service
Texas A&M University

Training in Comparative and Rigorous Analysis for an Interconnected, Changing World

The Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University offers students rigorous training and opportunities to interface with policymakers preparing them to meet the challenges of careers in public service and international affairs today.

How is the Bush School preparing students to manage crises and global risk?

In addition to faculty who specialize in international institutions, the Bush School prepares students to engage in comparative analysis of countries and issues with faculty who specialize in almost every region from China to the Middle East, from Africa to Latin America. In this increasingly globalized world, most economic, social, and political phenomena do not stop at country borders. Understanding how issues arise and play out in one region can be instructive to understanding that in another region. In one example, my capstone classes have been collecting recent event data from across the globe on how leaders erode democratic institutions. Working closely with capstone clients in USAID, the State Department, and nongovernmental organizations, our analyses help us understand similar trends emerging across the globe and help inform U.S. investment in supporting civic space in closing contexts.

The capstone program is one of the highlights of the Bush School experience—giving students an opportunity to work closely with a policy organization to understand the types of questions they ask and to practice applying the research skills they've gained in class to thoroughly answer these questions. These experiences, along with the internships students complete between their first and second year, are instrumental in solidifying networks between the Bush School and the policy community with positive results: Bush School students find careers that matter to them, with between 81 and 95 percent employed within six months of graduation.

How does the Bush School prepare students to adapt to a rapidly changing policy context?

In these uncertain times, one of the best skills we can offer future public servants is adaptability. As policies constantly need to be reevaluated to match the changing context, our students will need the tools to assess where we are and how to change course. The Bush School offers a rigorous core curriculum on data collection and analysis as well as a menu of options for students seeking to deepen their methods skills. In addition, the Bush School is part of a large research university of over sixty thousand students that features world-class departments and institutes in a variety of fields, which offer further instruction in methods, like GIS or statistics, and in substantive areas that include public health, engineering, or agriculture.

Training we offer in the social science methods is key to informing broad, interdisciplinary policy issues, such as access and inequality. For instance, in the wake of COVID-19, the policy community, in addition to seeking advice from health experts, has also turned to colleagues in the social sciences to answer questions about the political and economic effects of the coronavirus pandemic and how existing inequalities can exacerbate its impact among some groups. With rapid-response surveys informed by theory, we can generate evidence to inform quick policy decisions—skills we are teaching Bush School students in our Methods sequence.

TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
The Bush School
of Government & Public Service

Zoltan L. Hajnal
Associate Dean and Professor
School of Global Policy and Strategy
UC San Diego

Dangerously Divided: A Look at Racial Disparity in the United States

In your new book *Dangerously Divided*, you show that racial minorities disproportionately lose in American democracy. What steps can we take on a policy level to help reduce inequality?

The data clearly shows that who is in power matters. American democracy is tilted in favor of whites but much less so when Democrats are in charge. Under Democrats, the policy views of minorities are translated into policy as much as the policy views of whites, which ultimately leads to greater gains in economic well-being for minorities under Democrats. Thus, if the goal is to balance American democracy and improve minority well-being, one solution is work to elect more Democrats.

How has COVID-19 impacted U.S. race relations?

The pandemic has reinforced just how much race and policy are intertwined. A virus that originally had no connection to race has, nevertheless, had wide-ranging implications for the well-being of racial minorities. On the political side, simply because the virus originated in China, politicians have tried to use the virus to stoke racial tension. On the health side, existing racial inequalities—less health care in poorer neighborhoods, poorer health outcomes for minorities, and the need to continue to work to survive—have interacted with the virus to disproportionately impact the minority population. Any new problem is likely to affect different racial groups differently, and that has to be taken into account when we consider policy actions.

We often hear in the news about how voter ID laws negatively impact people of color. Can you share how your research explores the topic?

In my research, I look to see how the relative turnout of different racial groups changes after states pass new strict voter ID laws and compare that to changes in turnout in similar states that didn't pass a new law. The data show that the implementation of new strict ID laws in four states across the country had a disproportionately negative impact on turnout in 2016 in racially diverse counties. In other words, where strict ID laws are enacted, the voices of Latinos, Black people, and Asian Americans all become more muted, and the relative influence of white America grows. If the 2020 election is tight, racial and ethnic minorities being disproportionately deterred from voting could alter the outcome, especially since more states have enacted strict ID laws in the interim.

How will the 2020 election influence your teaching during the fall term?

The election will have a huge impact on my teaching. Clearly, this is something that interests the students, and it is also an important election with wide-ranging implications for race and well-being. The idea will be to use current events such as the election to explain deeper issues about our democracy.

How have students been involved in the work and research you're doing?

I always have a number of graduate students working with me on my research. They do everything from data collection to data analysis to coming up with the original ideas for projects. Much of my work has been co-authored with my graduate students. They are critical.

UC San Diego
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL POLICY AND STRATEGY

Dr. Joel S. Hellman
Dean
Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

The Walsh School of Foreign Service: Leading at a Moment of Global Challenge

In this challenging moment, how is the Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) preparing students to serve in a rapidly changing international landscape?

At SFS, we recognize that, to develop feasible solutions to global problems, we must rethink our approach to international service. Our graduate programs are designed to be multidisciplinary and to build upon the best of theory and practice.

Our new Center for Security and Emerging Technology launched with a $55 million grant from the Open Philanthropy Project. The center is dedicated to understanding how emerging technologies are remaking the global security landscape. We are also integrating a deeper training in science and technology across all graduate programs.

In the master of arts program in international business and policy, our top-ranked faculty work with those from the McDonough School of Business to study global problems that require a truly integrated training in both business and international politics.

This year, SFS launched two new graduate certificates. The social innovation and global development certificate connects the public and private sectors within market-oriented systems to solve major poverty reduction challenges, and our certificate in gender, peace, and security explores the important intersectional role of women and gender dynamics in defense, development, and diplomacy.

At this important global moment, we are focused on recruiting exceptionally qualified graduate students from diverse backgrounds around the world to commit to public service careers through our new full-tuition Donald F. McHenry Global Public Service Fellowship.

The COVID-19 pandemic is an example of the unpredictability of global issues. What expertise on this topic is reflected in the SFS faculty?

The faculty at SFS have always engaged with issues beyond the traditional scope of international affairs. Our faculty includes global health experts, such as Dr. Rebecca Katz, director of the Center for Global Health Science and Security and a leading voice on the current pandemic. Alumnus and adjunct faculty member Jeremy Konyndyk led the Obama administration's response to the Ebola crisis and was among the first to warn that COVID-19 would become a pandemic.

2019–2020 marked the centennial of SFS. How did that anniversary position the school for the next century?

The centennial celebrated our legacy as the first U.S. school dedicated to preparing our nation to engage on the world stage after World War I. Many of the values that inspired our founders are now being questioned, and it is critically important that we recommit to our founding principles.

Inscribed in our academic building is a quote from priest and scholar Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J., "The Age of Nations is past. It remains for us now, if we do not wish to perish, to set aside the ancient prejudices and build the earth." Increasing trends toward nationalism and isolationism undermine efforts to solve global problems. If the pandemic has taught us anything, it is that multilateralism and cooperation are increasingly important. At SFS, we prepare our students to be values-led global leaders, equipped to tackle some of the world's most pressing challenges.

SFS | GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Walsh School of Foreign Service

David Leheny
Professor
Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies
Waseda University

The Asia-Pacific and Leadership in a Post-Pandemic World

The COVID-19 pandemic has reshaped international interactions, government strategies, and personal decisions: a multilayered crisis highlighting the complex challenges of an interdependent world. While no country is unaffected by the pandemic, its political ramifications are especially pronounced in Tokyo, which made the difficult decision to postpone scheduled Olympic Games meant to represent global friendship and peaceful engagement.

Indeed, the symbolism of the Games is matched by that of Tokyo itself: a major metropolis that is a global and regional financial center, an increasingly diverse city with vibrant populations of residents from around the world, and the heart of some of the most important political decisions being made anywhere. The COVID-19 crisis reminds us of the need and opportunity to learn from diverse experiences and to think critically about solutions to emerging social, political, security, and economic problems. The Asia-Pacific region encapsulates these issues and opportunities in ways that will have disproportionate consequences for the world over the next century. No expertise or practical skillset in global challenges will be complete without close engagement with the region.

Waseda University's Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS) offers a superb environment in which to develop this expertise and these practical skills. With roughly four hundred students from over fifty countries and a teaching faculty of distinguished scholars with practical experience, GSAPS offers all of its courses in both English and Japanese, taught by bilingual professors of economics, political science, international development, sociology, anthropology, and international relations. These classes aim to foster critical analytical skills, with an eye toward shaping the next generation's global leaders: people able to think broadly and conceptually while engaging the pressing concerns and challenges of the region.

GSAPS students also participate in faculty-led research seminars that prioritize dialogue and constructive feedback about their chosen thesis projects, each semester covering a dizzying array of important topics, from security relations between Japan and Russia, LGBT rights in Japanese cities, poverty reduction programs in Cambodia, agricultural trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific, and educational challenges for children of economic migrants across the region. Each GSAPS student can expect the focused attention of not only their faculty advisor but also their diverse, talented classmates in crafting top-notch research contributions.

While much of the curriculum addresses the Asia-Pacific, students are encouraged to think globally and to develop research themes that engage these problems around the world. To that end, we also encourage student to study abroad for a semester at one of our many partner institutions in Asia, Europe, North America, Australia, and elsewhere, to promote truly global engagement.

This unsurpassed commitment to global education, as well as to disciplinary training and interdisciplinary problem-solving, means the creation of professionals uniquely suited to lead the international response to crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. For the past several months, governments have competed, sometimes unproductively, over leadership at this critical moment. GSAPS's uniquely transnational research environment has, for more than twenty years, worked to build a global network of professionals with the critical skills and rigorous training necessary to foster the kind of transnational cooperation and fearless curiosity that crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic demand.

Waseda University
Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies
早稲田大学 大学院アジア太平洋研究科

SPONSORED SECTION

Tracy Kijewski-Correa and Steve Reifenberg

Co-Directors of the Integration Lab (i-Lab)
Keough School of Global Affairs
University of Notre Dame

Creative Global Education and Engagement

How have you adapted the i-Lab to enable student learning amid a pandemic?

We had to conceive a new plan for field research this year—research that masters students would have otherwise conducted over the summer in India, South Africa, Myanmar, Uganda, the Philippines, Chile, and the Pacific Islands. As our partner organizations and their field offices experienced the shock waves of stay-at-home orders worldwide, often without the infrastructure to undertake virtual modes of work, the second half of the semester was a time of considerable uncertainty for all of us.

We were impressed by the creativity that our partners and students brought to their relationships, accompanying one another and co-creating new ways to pivot their projects to a virtual mode.

How have students adapted their research methods?

For some, this meant collecting data in new ways through representatives on the ground, such as capturing photos that convey the concept of home in refugee settlements in Uganda. Other students facilitated virtual engagements with key informants around the globe, conducting WhatsApp interviews on sustainable natural resource management with communities in South Africa and convening virtual focus groups of educational leaders in rural Chile.

Learning to navigate this uncertainty and developing skills to do so meant that our students had to exercise new muscles, which will be increasingly important in their professional and personal lives.

What skills are needed to help students prepare to manage crises and global risk?

Undoubtedly, crises and global risks tend to trigger our survival instincts, which narrow our vision in decision-making, limit our ability to collaborate with others, and stifle creativity necessary to find optimal solutions and new opportunities. Yet, our students have found ways to be creative, effective, and mindful practitioners, engaging a systems thinking mindset and operating with empathy for themselves and others. That empathy ensures they can remain human-centered, flexible, and adaptive—traits that are essential in today's reality.

How does the Keough School's i-Lab help students develop these skills during the two-year Master of Global Affairs program?

The i-Lab focuses on learning by doing. We cultivate practice-relevant skills that our student teams will need to be effective with their partner organizations: managing projects with agility, working ethically across cultures, communicating strategically, and solving problems collaboratively. Students engage with partner organizations over several semesters to translate theory into practice, integrating knowledge gained in coursework and the i-Lab to have a meaningful impact on their partners and the communities where they engage.

As we learned this year, this skill building actually intensifies when crises require unexpected virtualization and rapid adaptation. With the resilience and creativity our students have shown, we know they are equipped to not just survive but flourish.

KEOUGH SCHOOL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

Michael J. Williams
Director
Master of Arts in International Relations
Executive Master of International Relations
Associate Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University

Principled Leadership in Uncertain Times

Adaptability. A strong internal compass. Practiced knowledge and skills to act decisively and cooperatively. These are the traits of great leaders during uncertain times.

That is according to Michael John Williams, the new director of the Master of Arts in International Relations (MAIR) program of Syracuse University's #1-ranked Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. An accomplished international relations scholar with a focus on international security issues, Williams assumes leadership of a program that will prepare graduates to lead in the wake of COVID-19.

As we write this, leaders at all levels of government and across the private sector share a common goal—stopping the pandemic and mitigating its impacts. What does this moment show us about leadership?

To be an effective leader, you need to have sound principles. Who are you? What do you stand for? What do you believe? When a crisis comes, you will act first and foremost on those principles. The rapid, global spread of the coronavirus has pitted personal freedoms against the collective good, created tensions around the distribution of vital resources, and raised questions about the role of social safety nets in market economies. Effective leaders help us quickly make sense of these trade-offs, so that societies can respond collectively.

Students come to Maxwell committed to living the Athenian Oath inscribed on its walls—to leave the world better than they found it. They leave Maxwell with an internal sense of self and principles—tested against competing ideas and viewpoints—so that when crises emerge, they're able to respond adeptly.

How does Maxwell apply this to international contexts?

We challenge our students to view the world from multiple angles. As a school of social science and public policy, we look at issues through different disciplines to develop a holistic understanding. Maxwell students learn the history of a region, the sociology of a society, and the economic drivers of a market and can bring all of these viewpoints together in powerful and informative ways to make sense of a challenge and take appropriate actions.

We provide a rich environment for students to test their ideas. Students in our interdisciplinary MAIR study alongside students from our midcareer, executive and social science masters, and international fellows, who inform discussions with real world experiences and a variety of perspectives. They research pressing global issues from aging to public health, to environmental challenges, to autonomous systems policy, in one of ten interdisciplinary research centers.

Our curriculum emphasizes skills needed to quickly frame and present a challenge in a way that's understandable to policymakers: writing policy briefs and decision memos, developing executive plans, and participating in the Capstone Crisis Simulation.

Internships at locations around the world—including our Washington, DC, headquarters at the #1-ranked Center for Strategic and International Studies—are required for the MAIR, optional for the Master of Public Administration, and help students hone their skills and build bridges to a meaningful career. When Maxwell graduates finish their degree, they hit the ground running in the global job market.

Syracuse University
Maxwell School of
Citizenship & Public Affairs

Narges Bajoghli
Assistant Professor
School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University

The Changing World of International Affairs

Why is it important to study international affairs?

At no other time in our living memory have so many factors been in such flux both within societies and on a global scale. The world is changing before our eyes in real time; COVID-19 has rendered bare many fault lines across the world, and we should expect to see many changes in the years to come. How fundamental the changes will be in this new, post-pandemic world remain to be seen, but it is not a stretch of the imagination to say some of the key international institutions, norms, and players of the past century will face deep challenges. How do we think about these changes? What trends will we see, and what can they point to? What will new configurations of polities, societies, and powers look like, and how can we best study them? How do we think about policymaking in the midst of these shifts? These questions will not be mere intellectual exercises anymore. Our classrooms will take on a new urgency as we learn about these shifts together. If there was any time to study international affairs, this is it.

How do current events underscore the need for practitioners of international affairs?

In the past two years, we have witnessed young generations rising up, taking to the streets and clamoring for change in the United States, Chile, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria, and Hong Kong, among others. These protest movements are concerned with local issues as much as they are with broader trends of global economic systems and regional and international politics. On these streets, across social media, and at universities, we see lively debates erupt over some of the fundamental political, economic, social, and cultural norms and policies that have undergirded our international political and economic system for decades. Regardless of where one's political allegiances may be, these global uprisings point to massive discontent over existing logics that have resulted in extreme global inequalities. We need new generations of practitioners of international affairs to learn, understand, and offer new ideas. The world is changing in drastic ways, and the need for new ideas and leadership at all levels is acutely obvious.

How does the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) stand out from other schools?

As an anthropologist and documentary filmmaker, you might be surprised to see me at SAIS, but I cannot imagine a more exciting place to explore today's complex global issues. From organizing sold-out art exhibitions and film premieres of Oscar-winning filmmakers to developing an ethnography lab, I've learned that the school takes interdisciplinary work seriously. At a time when big data looms large yet comes short in capturing the minute ways that COVID-19 alters daily life, the ethnography lab will help inject different ways of thinking about the pandemic. Students learn to use integrated, multimedia storytelling to disseminate their original research and to connect with a larger audience. To me, this is what the school is about: thinking in different ways and questioning conventional knowledge.

SAIS
JOHNS HOPKINS
SCHOOL *of* ADVANCED
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Susana Malcorra
Dean
IE School of Global and Public Affairs

Training the World's Future Leaders Alongside Prestigious Global Partners

IE School of Global and Public Affairs includes prestigious institutions, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations System Staff College, the OAS, and the ICC, as its partners. What do these partnerships mean for the school's programs, and what opportunities do they offer students?

At IE, we believe that shaping the world's future leaders requires a holistic understanding of tomorrow. The erosion of trust in institutions, the proliferation of fake news, and the fast pace of technological disruption have created uncertainty exacerbated by global challenges, which include inequality, climate change, and the urgent need to find inclusive and sustainable solutions.

That's why it is vital we infuse our learning journey with different perspectives that enrich the depth and breadth of our programs. One way to achieve this is by bringing students into contact with partners that offer real-life experience and diverse viewpoints.

We are also strong believers in the need for public and private sectors to work together to solve the world's biggest problems. By uniting different players from technology, public policy, business, and global affairs, we seek to educate individuals capable of succeeding in a fast-changing and interconnected world.

How do the school's programs prepare students to be flexible and adapt to an ever-changing world?

Our academic programs combine an interdisciplinary curriculum with hands-on learning and an entrepreneurial mindset. Our students graduate with the knowledge and experience needed to launch or transform their career.

Our programs are designed to prepare global leaders who will confidently stand at the intersection of international relations, economics, development, technology, public policy, and business. The ability to transition between these different spheres of influence and work is central to the design and delivery of all our programs.

What will the next generation of students need to succeed in the field of international development and trade?

We understand that today's deeply integrated and interconnected world is a complex system that moves at unprecedented speed. In order to fully grasp that complexity, our students must enhance their hard and soft skills while obtaining the necessary flexibility to bring about change. They must develop a critical mindset that questions the status quo, the capacity to adapt and adjust to an ever-changing reality, the ability to seamlessly transition between real and virtual worlds, and the desire to take the necessary risks to achieve sustainable solutions.

What do students gain from their experiences beyond the classroom?

At IE, we are committed to innovation. This is reflected not only by the use of technology in the classroom and beyond but also by our curricula—which are always focused on the latest global developments.

Our new concept, "liquid learning," combines face-to-face individual and group work, in both real and digital environments, with field exposure, trips, and fellowship opportunities.

All of this is nurtured by the school's network of partners, enabling us to instill our programs with the best ways to translate theory into practice and policy into delivery. As well, internships and fellowships offer students invaluable exposure to leading institutions, preparing them for their future careers.

ie
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Professor Henry Schwalbenberg
Director
Graduate Program in International Political Economy and Development
Fordham University

Understanding Global Economic Issues Through an Interdisciplinary Lens

What sets Fordham University's Graduate Program in International Political Economy and Development (Fordham IPED) apart from other international affairs programs?

The Fordham IPED Program offers a unique, rigorous, and innovative approach to analyzing contemporary global economic relations. Issues in international economic relations and in international development are understood from both a political and an economic perspective. Furthermore, we provide a strong quantitative methods foundation that allows our students to develop robust analytical skills in data analysis, project assessment, and computer programming. We also stress professional experience outside of the classroom. Additionally, we only admit a small select group of about twenty students each year.

How does Fordham IPED prepare its students for challenges posed by global crises and a changing international affairs landscape?

Our core curriculum, consisting of economic, political, and quantitative courses, provides our students with an advanced interdisciplinary knowledge of global economic relations. Our electives allow students to specialize in the fields of international banking and finance, international development studies, international and development economics, or in global environmental and resource economics—giving our students expertise critically needed in a world threatened by rising nationalism and desperate for global cooperation.

Through our Summer Intern Fellowship Program, we fund a number of field placements for our students to gain practical experience with international businesses, government agencies, and nonprofit organizations, not only here in New York but also in Washington, DC, as well as in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.

What unique advantages are available for students in the Fordham IPED Program?

Our curriculum and our location in New York City are ideal for anyone who wishes to be at the center of the world economy. Our location affords our students a wealth of internship opportunities, ranging from the United Nations and international nonprofit organizations to international think tanks and Wall Street.

We also complement our classes with a weekly lecture series and various career trips in New York and Washington, DC, that feature a broad range of professionals highlighting the practitioner perspective on contemporary issues in international affairs.

We have a small class size of roughly twenty students, providing the opportunity for close interactions with our supportive and distinguished faculty of experts. Our students, drawn from around the world, come from diverse cultural and professional backgrounds. We admit our students from among the top 40 percent of all applicants to U.S. graduate programs. We offer generous scholarships to exceptional students and provide funding for students' participation in internship placements, language immersion programs, and international fieldwork overseas.

Lastly, we have a strong alumni network and close association with various international organizations. Our placement record is strong, with about 40 percent of alumni in the private sector, 25 percent in the nonprofit sector, 22 percent in government, and the remaining 13 percent in academia. Our graduates also have a strong record of winning various prestigious awards, such as Fulbrights and U.S. Presidential Management Fellowships.

FORDHAM | IPED
THE GRADUATE PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT
FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

Eric Johnson
Mayor of the City of Dallas, Texas
Master in Public Affairs, 2003

Ken Sofer
Advisor for Policy and Planning
Office of the President, International Rescue Committee
Master in Public Affairs, 2017

Princeton in Service to the Nation and Humanity

What leadership traits are crucial to addressing the current global challenges and risks of COVID-19?

Eric: Leaders should be honest, analytical, resilient, and effective communicators. We began responding to COVID-19 without knowing when it would end. The pandemic upended everything, so we had to adapt quickly to the new reality.

In times like these, there are no easy choices. You have to use every tool at your disposal, analyze available data, make decisions, and then do it all again the next day. You have to communicate transparently with the public—through an increasingly fractured media landscape—while showing both strength and empathy.

Ken: The unprecedented nature of COVID-19 and its reflection of economic inequality and racial injustice make imagination and the ability to process uncertainty more important than ever. Things that seemed unthinkable six months ago are now taken for granted. Leaders who fail to think beyond today's political and policy reality are going to get left behind by a rapidly changing world.

How did Princeton prepare you to lead, and how do you facilitate conversation in a tensely politicized time?

Eric: The Master in Public Affairs program helped me to learn different ways of looking at the world's complex challenges. This is critical to leadership because facilitating conversations in a tensely politicized time requires a willingness to listen and understand the perspectives of others who are not like you.

Dallas is an incredibly diverse city, not defined by one specific issue or economic sector. We must bring different people together and find common ground to make progress on the issues that face our residents.

Ken: I find myself drawing on the interdisciplinary nature of my education at Princeton to look at this crisis from various angles. In particular, the quantitative analysis and behavioral psychology training is proving critical to understanding the science behind COVID-19 and how communities react to constantly evolving information about the virus.

Marginalized communities are often the most impacted when crises come. In what ways did Princeton prepare you to advocate for marginalized voices?

Eric: I grew up in underserved communities in Dallas. As a professional, I knew I wanted to help those neighborhoods. My time at Princeton helped me to think beyond talking points and slogans. I was able to have robust discussions about the kinds of policies that would have real impact for those communities who need it most.

Ken: My classmates at Princeton—through their words and actions—educated me on the unique vulnerabilities of marginalized communities, particularly people of color and immigrant communities, and how seemingly benign technocratic policy choices could compound those vulnerabilities. My classmates challenged me to go further than just thinking about the macro-level impact of a particular policy choice and to think more about how those policies affect individuals in unintended and often harmful ways. I also find myself thinking to the example my classmates showed me about how to marry activism and policy work—the outside and the inside game of politics—as a way to shift the Overton window and secure lasting, meaningful change.

Princeton School of Public and International Affairs

Sanjeev Khagram, PhD
Director General and Dean
Thunderbird School of Global Management

Global Leadership for the Fourth Industrial Revolution

How did Thunderbird and ASU become among the best prepared academic institutions in a COVID-19 world?

A bold reimagining of how we can empower our students in today's environment of constant innovation positioned Thunderbird and ASU to adapt with agility as societies worldwide sustain successive shocks to systems and institutions. In recent years, we have doubled and tripled down on enhancing our digital capabilities and offerings, we've revamped our curriculum to span disciplines and sectors, and we've expanded our world-class faculty with eminent practitioners and scholars. At Thunderbird, we took these steps to develop principled leaders and managers who transform organizations and improve the world with 21st-century mastery in creating immense opportunities and navigating the risks arising from change, whether it comes in the form of a public health emergency, shifting geopolitics, rapid technological advancement, or any other complex forces that affect global enterprises.

How has Thunderbird innovated through adversity to offer world-class digital and blended education?

We have invested heavily in advanced digital learning, and the pandemic has accelerated our investments in new modalities. We've built on our technical capacities to expand and project multiple blended environments of learning, teaching, innovating, and discovering in new ways. For example, we're making our fully online master's program available in Mandarin. We also recently harnessed the power of remotely controlled telepresence robots in a virtual commencement ceremony, innovating to provide our graduates with an avatar experience of "walking the stage" and receiving their degree as a robot. We can now use the same mobile, live audiovisual interfaces to provide expanded telepresence options to students, one of several new ways to engage remotely.

Employing HD video along with the latest telepresence hardware and software allows Thunderbird to extend our intimate learning environments and world-class faculty around the globe, to make our transformational learning experiences more available and accessible than ever. And as emerging technologies like mixed reality and AI advance, Thunderbird will pioneer them inclusively and sustainably.

What makes Thunderbird's programs unique and transformative in 2020?

Thunderbird specializes in preparing global leaders to guide diverse teams through disruptions and uncertainty by creating solutions that transform complexity from a liability into an asset, transcending boundaries. Roughly half of our students come from outside the US and our cohorts deliver value that parallels the rigorous curriculum, which includes a second language fluency requirement in the case of our Master of Global Management.

The cross-sectoral, transdisciplinary approach to global leadership and management education at the core of Thunderbird's DNA has increased the value of a T-bird in this turbulent new decade, especially for organizations operating across borders and language barriers. For example, our new Executive Master of Global Affairs and Management is delivered at ASU's Barrett & O'Connor Center in Washington, DC where mid-career professionals in business, government, and civil society can master leadership for an interconnected world while tapping into all the US capital has to offer.

All T-birds acquire cutting-edge skills for shaping futures by transforming the practices of organizations that span geographies and industries.

THUNDERBIRD
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL MANAGEMENT

A unit of the Arizona State University Enterprise

Patrick Müller, PhD
Chair of European Studies
Diplomatische Akademie Wien
Vienna School of International Studies
University of Vienna

Fostering International Cooperation in Times of Multiple Crises

Graduate programs at the Diplomatische Akademie Wien—Vienna School of International Studies (DA) prepare students to excel in a range of international careers. Located in the heart of Vienna, the DA is near international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, diplomatic missions, and cultural institutions. With alumni from over 120 countries, the DA has a vast alumni network.

How does your program look at international cooperation?

International cooperation, through a system of common rules and multilateral institutions, remains central for realizing shared interests and for managing challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, in a highly interdependent world. Teaching at the DA follows an interdisciplinary approach that captures the multifaceted nature of international cooperation. Its pillars are international relations, international economics, international and European law, and history. Besides equipping students with a high-quality education in the social sciences, the DA's programs reflect important developments in technology and innovation. Our three graduate programs—the Master of Advanced International Studies, the Diploma Program, and the Master of Science in Environmental Technology and International Affairs (ETIA)—pay attention to the intersection between technology, innovation, and international cooperation. Reflecting this commitment, we organize our two-year ETIA program in cooperation with the Vienna University of Technology.

What skills are needed to prepare students to manage crises and global risks?

Managing crises and global risks requires substantive knowledge about the evolution, institutional design, and workings of international cooperation, specific diplomatic knowledge and skills, and staying on top of fast-moving developments. Students need to navigate a complex, multilayered global system that involves multiple actors, the blurring of the border between the domestic and international spheres, and new technologies and innovations. The DA's curriculum addresses these requirements through a three-fold strategy. First, it aims at interdisciplinary breadth—combining the study of history, law, economics, and political science. Hence, students learn to approach international issues from multiple perspectives in a scientifically rigorous fashion. Second, it allows students to pursue areas of major interests through specializations. This includes advanced courses on theories of conflict resolution; the role of international actors, such as the European Union or the United Nations, in crisis management; geographical areas, such as the Middle East, Africa, or Asia; or thematic issues, such as cybersecurity or sustainable development. Third, there is a focus on practical skills—including language training and negotiation and communication exercises. Our students benefit from close relations with the vibrant diplomatic community in Vienna and vast diplomatic contacts and networks.

How has the pandemic impacted global cooperation?

The pandemic has had a substantive impact on people and economies around the world. Governments responded with lockdowns, border closures, and travel bans to contain the spread of the virus. Many of these actions were taken nationally or locally, whilst necessary global action has been in short supply. Yet, a recent survey by the United Nations suggests that the pandemic has fuelled public demands for more international cooperation. Building cooperation on this public support is pivotal in times of rising domestic challenges to international cooperation, including the recent wave of populist movements and nationalist sentiments in Western democracies.

diplomatische akademie wien
Vienna School of International Studies
École des Hautes Études Internationales de Vienne

Rachel Kyte
Dean
The Fletcher School
Tufts University

Interdisciplinarity and Crisis Management

How does The Fletcher School empower students to approach international cooperation?

In 1933, Fletcher was founded as the first graduate school of international affairs in the United States, when the country struggled to emerge from the Great Depression and when nationalism, fascism, and xenophobia were on the rise. Our founders were committed to the pursuit of peace and justice and determined that international cooperation should be deepened to address common challenges around the world. We are globalist in our stance and Interdisciplinary in our analysis of challenges.

COVID-19 and the economic crisis it provokes brings into stark relief the scale and kinds of crises that this generation of Fletcher students will face, whatever career paths they pursue. Inequality and global health are compounded by crises still to come—climate change, nuclear proliferation, and cyber threats. Resilience, flexibility, analytical capability, and a strong network are attributes traditionally associated with Fletcher graduates. Strengthening teaching about these crises across all our fields of study and bolstering hard skills will prepare students further.

The beginning of this decade focused on global inequality, rising conflict, the end of an era of globalization, and the need to decarbonize. Now, the recovery from the pandemic will push the world onto a trajectory that helps us to thrive through this decade and beyond—or not. Our students, who will go into global business and finance, into international organizations and civil society, or into government as diplomats across departments, are at the front line of society's success.

How does Fletcher prepare students to become leaders equipped to manage crises and global risk?

Solutions to today's crises all require international cooperation; however, the current mechanisms for that are under extraordinary stress. Fletcher prepares students for international careers in all sectors while working to design and build the new mechanisms for international cooperation—on peace and security, health and well-being, and economic prosperity.

We have added new courses, and provide access to a global faculty remotely as well as in-person, and we will be bringing the outside world into our curriculum, non and extra curricula activities. We are propelling the conversation on decolonizing international relations with a third conference in a series this fall. We have worked on simulations as a critical part of strategic skill development, and we'll expand and develop that through remote instruction.

How are policy-making mechanisms changing to adapt to a post-pandemic world?

The pandemic has shown how brittle some global systems are. Policy-making starts with asking the right questions, and that requires Interdisciplinary approaches and a global perspective.

At Fletcher, we believe we need scaffolding and scholarship. Scaffolding should be erected around the current mechanisms of international coordination and policy-making. How do we continue to support the global health regulations needed to allow countries to cooperate in managing a pandemic? How do we work together in responding to the highly synchronized, global economic downturn we experience as a result of the pandemic?

Beyond the scaffolding, what international economic or financial cooperation do we need for an era of global crises? Is it time for a new Bretton Woods moment? How do we manage and govern one-health policy globally? At Fletcher, we are asking and working on these questions.

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL
TUFTS UNIVERSITY

Francis Fukuyama
Director
Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy
Stanford University

Preparing Leaders to Be Effective in Changing and Uncertain Times

How does your program look at international cooperation?

The parent institute from which our program draws its faculty looks at international affairs and international cooperation through an interdisciplinary lens. It encompasses the Center on Food Security and the Environment, Stanford Health Policy, and a new Cyber Policy Center, in addition to ones dealing with more traditional issues, such as international security, regional politics, and governance. Many of these faculty have had experience working on issues outside of the usual ones involving security or international economics; for example, on issues such as abating lead poisoning in Bangladesh or dealing with Russian election interference from inside one of the Silicon Valley platforms. We also need to understand the obstacles to international cooperation, which is why we have had a program over the past three years on global populism and have been teaching students about the politics of backlash against globalization.

How are the mechanisms of policy-making changing to adapt to a post-pandemic world?

Policy-making mechanisms have not been adapting particularly well to the conditions we can expect post-pandemic. There has been less international cooperation than in the 2008 financial crisis, with the United States checking out of most international institutions. The speed of decision-making has not kept up with the speed of change, and it has not remotely taken advantage of the kinds of technological tools that are now available to analyze problems and implement responses. Populist movements and leaders have challenged the very legitimacy of elite decision-making and regular process. Nonetheless, the forced adaptation of people around the world to quarantine conditions may show the way toward uses of technology to communicate and coordinate in unanticipated ways.

What skills are needed to help students prepare to manage crises and global risk?

In revamping our program last year, we have implemented a completely new sequence, including a leadership course introducing students to our Policy Problem-Solving Framework, in which they are put in the position of leaders facing difficult real-world problems through case-based teaching. We want them to go beyond analyzing problems and manipulating data to being able to formulate and implement solutions under real-world conditions. Unless students understand the importance of context, history, and culture, they will not be able to deal with the crises they will face later in their careers.

What leadership traits are needed to navigate in uncertain times? How does your school look to instill these qualities in your students?

Our leadership course is part of a sequence leading to a two-quarter capstone, in which teams of students are paired with international partners and given the opportunity to apply the Policy Problem-Solving Framework to an actual problem. The problem is not necessarily the one initially laid out by the partner but is negotiated with the student teams. One of the required leadership qualities is being able to manage an often complex relationship with the partner.

Stanford | Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy
Freeman Spogli Institute

Nobuko Maybin

Class of 2017
Master of Arts in International Development Studies

The Elliott School Welcomed Me

Why did you choose the Elliott School?

I chose the Elliott School because of the school's location in Washington, DC, the flexibility of the International Development Studies (IDS) program, and its emphasis on putting theory to practice. I researched many international development and international education programs and found that they were too narrowly focused, so that studying one field would mean forfeiting focus on the other. The IDS program allowed me to actually be balanced in my studies of both. I was able to have a substantial amount of courses in international education while also maintaining the core knowledge and background needed in the international development field. Under the umbrella of the George Washington University (GW), I was also eligible to apply for the GW UNESCO Fellows Program in International Education for Development, the GW UNESCO Chair is one of only three designated chairs in a U.S. school.

The Elliott School is also walking distance to many international and development organizations, such as the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the Asian Development Bank, the Organization of American States, and the U.S. Department of State. This meant I engaged with these institutions' networks because they regularly visited the school or were guest faculty for my classes. I also volunteered and attended many development summits and conferences hosted throughout the year by these organizations.

Were there elements of the IDS program that were attractive to a student seeking flexibility, like yourself?

Above all, I was interested in the IDS program's emphasis on putting theory to practice, which was largely conveyed in its final capstone project. Coming straight into a graduate program from undergraduate studies, I didn't have a lot of work experience in the international development field. So I was interested in getting as much hands-on experience as possible to bolster both my confidence and knowledge in the field. The capstone project gave students funding to partner with an international development organization to conduct research on a particular area of development work in the respective country of implementation. No other program I researched provided this level of insight, experience, and networking opportunities in the field of international development. The Elliott School was an easy decision to make after I realized this.

As a mixed African-American woman coming from a historically Black college and university—or HBCU—it was not only important that the coursework bring value to my professional career but that the institution also recognizes and celebrates the added value that I bring to it. I attended during a tumultuous time, especially following the 2016 presidential election in the United States, where incidents of hate crimes were popping up everywhere around the city. I remember feeling anxious but reassured after the school administration quickly spoke out and underscored its appreciation of the student body's diversity. I also remember classmates and professors initiating tough discussions on discrimination, racism, and neocolonialism and its effect on development projects.

Against the backdrop of the Washington Monument, I sat at graduation, feeling I didn't just purchase the name of the university on my degree but also an experience that amplified my voice and merit alongside my classmates and professors.

Elliott School of International Affairs

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Leela Fernandes
Director
Stanley D. Golub Chair of International Studies
The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington

Making a World of Difference in Uncertain Times

Why is a multidisciplinary approach important in addressing today's global challenges?

The world is currently facing critical challenges. The effects of climate change and the current global pandemic highlight our interconnectedness across borders. These challenges intersect with the social tensions arising from inequality and movements for democratic and human rights. Such complexities demand innovative solutions that cut across traditional disciplinary boundaries. The Jackson School provides a unique interdisciplinary academic environment that sparks new ways of thinking about such pressing problems. Our expertise crosses the social sciences, humanities and professional schools. This allows us to develop complex understandings of the current challenges that we face.

What competencies does your program build inside and outside the classroom?

The Jackson School's commitment to public engagement is a critical source of global leadership. Connections to local and global communities through its 21 outreach centers and programs allow students and the public to immerse themselves in firsthand global experience. Our School engages with broad cross-national issues and illuminates the ways in which such issues require deep understandings of particular places, historical contexts, cultural meanings and regional dynamics. We combine this with practical training that trains students to develop concrete solutions to pressing global problems.

We have a deep commitment to inviting practitioners from nonacademic fields to speak to students and teach special courses. In addition, the Jackson School houses six different federally funded centers and programs under the prestigious Title VI federal program, to support and provide funding for the teaching and study of world regions and foreign languages and generate public engagement in international affairs.

Our alumni are leaders in academia, industry, NGOs, tech, government and think tanks. Companies our alumni work in include Starbucks, Amazon, Boeing, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, UNICEF, PATH, U.S. State Department, NATO, Cornell University, University of Auckland in New Zealand, China Daily, Accenture, the Defense Intelligence Agency and McKinsey & Company.

What are advantages in studying in the Pacific Northwest region?

Our location in Seattle and the Pacific Northwest region places our scholarship in the center of global public and private innovation. We offer access to research, engagement and networking connections with global decision-makers in trade, technology, military, philanthropy, business and the public sector. Located on the Pacific Rim, with deep historical ties to Asia, we are distinctively poised to address changes in the global political economy sparked by the growing significance of the Asia-Pacific region.

HENRY M. JACKSON SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
UNIVERSITY of WASHINGTON

Gilbert Collins
Director of Global Health Programs
Princeton University
Public Policy and International Affairs Program (PPIA)

Training the Next Generation of Policy Leaders: A Discussion about PPIA

Gilbert Collins is the Director of Global Health Programs at Princeton University, and sits on the board of directors of the nonprofit organization PPIA. In this interview, he offers perspectives on PPIA's impact in equipping students to pursue careers in public policy and international affairs.

First of all, what is PPIA?

The Public Policy and International Affairs Program (PPIA) has been supporting efforts to increase diversity in public service for 40 years. PPIA believes that society is best served by public managers, policy makers, and community leaders who represent diverse backgrounds and perspectives.

PPIA offers several programs for undergraduate students from groups who are underrepresented in government, nonprofits, international organizations and other institutional settings. PPIA's flagship programs are its Junior Summer Institutes (JSIs), which are intensive seven-week educational programs hosted by five universities that prepare students for graduate study and policy-focused careers.

As an African-American growing up in Milwaukee, how did you first become involved in international affairs?

Well, I've always loved foreign languages and cultures. I dreamed of serving in an international context, so I majored in Government in college. As I started considering options after college, I learned about PPIA from the career services office. I applied to the JSI program, was accepted, and spent the summer before my senior year studying policy analysis, international diplomacy, microeconomics, and statistics at Princeton University as a JSI student.

How did that experience influence your next steps after college?

JSI taught me analytical skills needed for success in international affairs, and exposed me to the wide range of policy-focused graduate programs available at various universities. I also became part of a supportive community of JSI alumni throughout the public, private and nonprofit sectors who have offered me support and encouragement along with valuable professional networking opportunities.

I went on to fifteen years of federal service, first in humanitarian relief with the U.S. Agency for International Development and then in development work as a Peace Corps Country Director in southern Africa. In 2014, I returned to Princeton University and have served in several positions since, including as Princeton's JSI Director.

How are the mechanisms of policymaking changing to adapt to a post-pandemic world?

This pandemic highlights many often-ignored truths in policy circles. Policymakers must consider the interconnectedness of global society. Isolation is elusive; physical, social, economic, or technological events in one area can have profound impacts elsewhere. Relatedly, the disparate toll the pandemic has taken on various socioeconomic and demographic groups underlines the fact that policy responses must meet the needs of often dissimilar beneficiaries. Further, policymakers must not be prisoners of the moment. While working to address today's challenges, they must also look to invest in solutions to other issues lurking just over the horizon. Preparation and strategic investments today can greatly decrease the costs that will be borne by future generations.

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The Pandemic Depression

The Global Economy Will Never Be the Same

Carmen Reinhart and Vincent Reinhart

The COVID-19 pandemic poses a once-in-a-generation threat to the world's population. Although this is not the first disease outbreak to spread around the globe, it is the first one that governments have so fiercely combated. Mitigation efforts—including lockdowns and travel bans—have attempted to slow the rate of infections to conserve available medical resources. To fund these and other public health measures, governments around the world have deployed economic firepower on a scale rarely seen before.

Although dubbed a "global financial crisis," the downturn that began in 2008 was largely a banking crisis in 11 advanced economies. Supported by double-digit growth in China, high commodity prices, and lean balance sheets, emerging markets proved quite resilient to the turmoil of the last global crisis. The current economic slowdown is different. The shared nature of this shock—the novel coronavirus does not respect national borders—has put a larger proportion of the global community in recession than at any other time since the Great Depression. As a result, the recovery will not be as robust or rapid as the downturn. And ultimately, the fiscal and monetary policies used to combat the contraction will mitigate, rather than eliminate, the economic losses, leaving an extended stretch of time before the global economy claws back to where it was at the start of 2020.

The pandemic has created a massive economic contraction that will be followed by a financial crisis in many parts of the globe, as nonperforming corporate loans accumulate alongside bankruptcies. Sover-

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eign defaults in the developing world are also poised to spike. This crisis will follow a path similar to the one the last crisis took, except worse, commensurate with the scale and scope of the collapse in global economic activity. And the crisis will hit lower-income households and countries harder than their wealthier counterparts. Indeed, the World Bank estimates that as many as 60 million people globally will be pushed into extreme poverty as a result of the pandemic. The global economy can be expected to run differently as a result, as balance sheets in many countries slip deeper into the red and the once inexorable march of globalization grinds to a halt.

ALL ENGINES DOWN

In its most recent analysis, the World Bank predicted that the global economy will shrink by 5.2 percent in 2020. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recently posted the worst monthly unemployment figures in the 72 years for which the agency has data on record. Most analyses project that the U.S. unemployment rate will remain near the double-digit mark through the middle of next year. And the Bank of England has warned that this year the United Kingdom will face its steepest decline in output since 1706. This situation is so dire that it deserves to be called a "depression"—a pandemic depression. Unfortunately, the memory of the Great Depression has prevented economists and others from using that word, as the downturn of the 1930s was wrenching in both its depth and its length in a manner not likely to be repeated. But the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were filled with depressions. It seems disrespectful to the many losing their jobs and shutting their businesses to use a lesser term to describe this affliction.

Epidemiologists consider the coronavirus that causes COVID-19 to be novel; it follows, then, that its spread has elicited new reactions from public and private actors alike. The consensus approach to slowing its spread involves keeping workers away from their livelihoods and shoppers away from marketplaces. Assuming that there are no second or third waves of the kind that characterized the Spanish influenza pandemic of 1918–19, this pandemic will follow an inverted V-shaped curve of rising and then falling infections and deaths. But even if this scenario comes to pass, COVID-19 will likely linger in some places around the world.

So far, the incidence of the disease has not been synchronous. The number of new cases decreased first in China and other parts of Asia, then in Europe, and then much more gradually in parts of the United

States (before beginning to rise again in others). At the same time, COVID-19 hot spots have cropped up in places as distinct as Brazil, India, and Russia. In this crisis, economic turmoil follows closely on the disease. This two-pronged assault has left a deep scar on global economic activity.

Some important economies are now reopening, a fact reflected in the improving business conditions across Asia and Europe and in a turnaround in the U.S. labor market. That said, this rebound should not be confused with a recovery. In all of the worst financial crises since the mid-nineteenth century, it took an average of eight years for per capita GDP to return to the pre-crisis level. (The median was seven years.) With historic levels of fiscal and monetary stimulus, one might expect that the United States will fare better. But most countries do not have the capacity to offset the economic damage of COVID-19. The ongoing rebound is the beginning of a long journey out of a deep hole.

Although any kind of prediction in this environment will be shot through with uncertainty, there are three indicators that together suggest that the road to recovery will be a long one. The first is exports. Because of border closures and lockdowns, global demand for goods has contracted, hitting export-dependent economies hard. Even before the pandemic, many exporters were facing pressures. Between 2008 and 2018, global trade growth had decreased by half, compared with the previous decade. More recently, exports were harmed by the U.S.-Chinese trade war that U.S. President Donald Trump launched in the middle of 2018. For economies where tourism is an important source of growth, the collapse in international travel has been catastrophic. The International Monetary Fund has predicted that in the Caribbean, where tourism accounts for between 50 and 90 percent of income and employment in some countries, tourism revenues will "return to pre-crisis levels only gradually over the next three years."

Not only is the volume of trade down; the prices of many exports have also fallen. Nowhere has the drama of falling commodity prices been more visible than in the oil market. The slowdown has caused a huge drop in the demand for energy and splintered the fragile coalition known as OPEC+, made up of the members of OPEC, Russia, and other allied producers, which had been steering oil prices into the $45 to $70 per barrel range for much of the past three years. OPEC+ had been able to cooperate when demand was strong and only token supply cuts were necessary. But the sort of supply cuts that this pandemic required would have caused the cartel's two major players, Russia and

Saudi Arabia, to withstand real pain, which they were unwilling to bear. The resulting overproduction and free fall in oil prices is testing the business models of all producers, particularly those in emerging markets, including the one that exists in the United States—the shale oil and gas sector. The attendant financial strains have piled grief on already weak entities in the United States and elsewhere. Oil-dependent Ecuador, for example, went into default status in April 2020, and other developing oil producers are at high risk of following suit.

This depression arrived at a time when the economic fundamentals in many countries were already weakening.

In other prominent episodes of distress, the blows to the global economy were only partial. During the decadelong Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s and the 1997 Asian financial crisis, most advanced economies continued to grow. Emerging markets, notably China, were a key source of growth during the 2008 global financial crisis. Not this time. The last time all engines failed was in the Great Depression; the collapse this time will be similarly abrupt and steep. The World Trade Organization estimates that global trade is poised to fall by between 13 and 32 percent in 2020. If the outcome is somewhere in the midpoint of that wide range, it will be the worst year for globalization since the early 1930s.

The second indicator pointing to a long and slow recovery is unemployment. Pandemic mitigation efforts are dismantling the most complicated piece of machinery in history, the modern market economy, and the parts will not be put back together either quickly or seamlessly. Some shuttered businesses will not reopen. Their owners will have depleted their savings and may opt for a more cautious stance regarding future business ventures. Winnowing the entrepreneurial class will not benefit innovation.

What is more, some furloughed or fired workers will exit the labor force permanently. Others will lose skills and miss out on professional development opportunities during the long spell of unemployment, making them less attractive to potential employers. The most vulnerable are those who may never get a job in the first place—graduates entering an impaired economy. After all, the relative wage performance of those in their 40s and 50s can be explained by their job status during their teens and 20s. Those who stumble at the starting

gate of the employment race trail permanently. Meanwhile, those still in school are receiving a substandard education in their socially distanced, online classrooms; in countries where Internet connectivity is lacking or slow, poorer students are leaving the educational system in droves. This will be another cohort left behind.

National policies matter, of course. European economies by and large subsidize the salaries of employees who are unable to work or who are working reduced hours, thus preventing unemployment, whereas the United States does not. In emerging economies, people mostly operate without much of a safety net. But regardless of their relative wealth, governments are spending more and taking in less. Many local and provincial governments are obliged by law to keep a balanced budget, meaning that the debt they build up now will lead to austerity later. Meanwhile, central governments are incurring losses even as their tax bases shrink. Those countries that rely on commodity exports, tourism, and remittances from citizens working abroad face the strongest economic headwinds.

What is perhaps more troubling, this depression arrived at a time when the economic fundamentals in many countries—including many of the world's poorest—were already weakening. In part as a result of this prior instability, more sovereign borrowers have been downgraded by rating agencies this year than in any year since 1980. Corporate downgrades are on a similar trajectory, which bodes ill for governments, since private-sector mistakes often become public-sector obligations. As a result, even those states that prudently manage their resources might find themselves underwater.

The third salient feature of this crisis is that it is highly regressive within countries and across countries. The ongoing economic dislocations are falling far more heavily on those with lower incomes. Such people generally do not have the ability to work remotely or the resources to tide themselves over when not working. In the United States, for instance, almost half of all workers are employed by small businesses, largely in the service industry, where wages are low. These small enterprises may be the most vulnerable to bankruptcy, especially as the pandemic's effects on consumer behavior may last much longer than the mandatory lockdowns.

In developing countries, where safety nets are underdeveloped or nonexistent, the decline in living standards will take place mostly in the poorest segments of society. The regressive nature of the pandemic may

also be amplified by a worldwide spike in the price of food, as disease and lockdowns disrupt supply chains and agricultural labor migration patterns. The United Nations has recently warned that the world is facing the worst food crisis in 50 years. In the poorest countries, food accounts for anywhere from 40 to 60 percent of consumption-related expenditures; as a share of their incomes, people in low-income countries spend five to six times as much on food as their counterparts in advanced economies do.

THE ROAD TO RECOVERY

In the second half of 2020, as the public health crisis slowly comes under control, there will likely be impressive-looking gains in economic activity and employment, fueling financial-market optimism. However, this rebound effect is unlikely to deliver a full recovery. Even an enlightened and coordinated macroeconomic policy response cannot sell products that haven't been made or services that were never offered.

Thus far, the fiscal response around the world has been relatively narrowly targeted and planned as temporary. A normally sclerotic U.S. Congress passed four rounds of stimulus legislation in about as many weeks. But many of these measures either are one-offs or have predetermined expiration dates. The speed of the response no doubt was driven by the magnitude and suddenness of the problem, which also did not provide politicians with an opportunity to add pork to the legislation. The United States' actions represent a relatively large share of the estimated $11 trillion in fiscal support that the countries of the G-20 have injected into their economies. Once again, greater size offers greater room to maneuver. Countries with larger economies have developed more ambitious stimulus plans. By contrast, the aggregate stimulus of the ten emerging markets in the G-20 is five percentage points below that of their advanced-economy counterparts. Unfortunately, this means that the countercyclical response is going to be smaller in those places hit harder by the shock. Even so, the fiscal stimulus in the advanced economies is less impressive than the large numbers seem to indicate. In the G-20, only Australia and the United States have spent more money than they have provided to companies and individuals in the form of loans, equity, and guarantees. The stimulus in the European economies, in particular, is more about the balance sheets of large businesses than about spending, raising questions about its efficacy in offsetting a demand shock.

Hit hardest: at a soup kitchen in Cape Town, South Africa, June 2020

Central banks have also attempted to stimulate the failing global economy. Those banks that did not already have their hands tied by prior decisions to keep interest rates pinned at historic lows—as the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank did—relaxed their grip on the flow of money. Among that group were central banks in emerging economies, including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, South Africa, and Turkey. At prior times of stress, officials in such places often went in the other direction, raising policy rates to prevent exchange-rate depreciation and to contain inflation and, by extension, capital flight. Presumably, the shared shock leveled the playing field, lessening concerns about the capital flight that usually accompanies currency depreciation and falling interest rates.

Just as important, central banks have fought desperately to keep the financial plumbing flowing by pumping currency reserves into the banking system and lowering private banks' reserve requirements so that debtors could make payments more easily. The U.S. Federal Re-

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serve, for instance, did both, doubling the amount it injected into the economy in under two months and putting the required reserve ratio at zero. The United States' status as the issuer of the global reserve currency gave the Federal Reserve a unique responsibility to provide dollar liquidity globally. It did so by arranging currency swap agreements with nine other central banks. Within a few weeks of this decision, those official institutions borrowed almost half a trillion dollars to lend to their domestic banks.

The fiscal stimulus in the advanced economies is less impressive than the large numbers seem to indicate.

What is perhaps most consequential, central banks have been able to prevent temporarily illiquid firms from falling into insolvency. A central bank can look past market volatility and purchase assets that are currently illiquid but appear to be solvent. Central bankers have used virtually all the pages from this part of the playbook, taking on a broad range of collateral, including private and municipal debt. The long list of banks that have enacted such measures includes the usual suspects in the developed world—such as the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, and the Federal Reserve—as well as central banks in such emerging economies as Colombia, Chile, Hungary, India, Laos, Mexico, Poland, and Thailand. Essentially, these countries are attempting to build a bridge over the current illiquidity to the recovered economy of the future.

Central banks acted forcefully and in a hurry. But why did they have to? Weren't the legislative and regulatory efforts that followed the last financial crisis about tempering the crisis next time? Central banks' foray into territory far outside the norm is a direct result of design flaws in earlier attempts at remediation. After the crisis in 2008, governments did nothing to change the risk and return preferences of investors. Instead, they made it more expensive for the regulated community—that is, commercial banks, especially big ones—to accommodate the demand for lower-quality loans by introducing leverage and quality-of-asset restrictions, stress tests, and so-called living wills. The result of this trend was the rise of shadow banks, a cohort of largely unregulated financial institutions. Central banks are now dealing with new assets and new counterparties because public policy intentionally pushed out the commercial banks that had previously supported illiquid firms and governments.

To be sure, central bank action has apparently stopped a cumulating deterioration in market functioning with rate cuts, massive injections of liquidity, and asset purchases. Acting that way has been woven into central banks' DNA since the Fed failed to do so in the 1930s, to tragic effect. However, the net result of these policies is probably far from sufficient to offset a shock as large as the one the world is living through right now. Long-term interest rates were already quite low before the pandemic took hold. And in spite of all the U.S. dollars that the Federal Reserve channeled abroad, the exchange value of the dollar rose rather than fell. By themselves, these monetary stimulus measures are not sufficient to lead households and firms to spend more, given the current economic distress and uncertainty. As a result, the world's most important central bankers—Haruhiko Kuroda, governor of the Bank of Japan; Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central Bank; and Jerome Powell, chair of the Federal Reserve—have been urging governments to implement additional fiscal stimulus measures. Their pleas have been met, but incompletely, so there has been a massive decline in global economic activity.

THE ECONOMY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

The shadow of this crisis will be long and dark—more so than those of many of the prior ones. The International Monetary Fund predicts that the deficit-to-GDP ratio in advanced economies will swell from 3.3 percent in 2019 to 16.6 percent this year, and in emerging markets, it will go from 4.9 percent to 10.6 percent over the same period. Many developing countries are following the lead of their developed counterparts in opening up the fiscal tap. But among both advanced and developing economies, many governments lack the fiscal space to do so. The result is multiple overextended government balance sheets.

Dealing with this debt will hinder rebuilding. The G-20 has already postponed debt-service payments for 76 of the poorest countries. Wealthier governments and lending institutions will have to do more in the coming months, incorporating other economies into their debt-relief schemes and involving the private sector. But the political will to undertake these measures may well be lacking if countries decide to turn inward rather than prop up the global economy.

Globalization was first thrown into reverse with the arrival of the Trump administration in 2016. The speed of the unwinding will only pick up as blame is assigned for the current mess. Open borders seem

to facilitate the spread of infection. A reliance on export markets appears to drag a domestic economy down when the volume of global trade dwindles. Many emerging markets have seen the prices of their major commodities collapse and remittances from their citizens abroad plummet. Public sentiment matters to the economy, and it is hard to imagine that attitudes toward foreign travel or education abroad will rally quickly. More generally, trust—a key lubricant for market transactions—is in short supply internationally. Many borders will be difficult to cross, and doubts about the reliability of some foreign partners will fester.

Yet another reason why global cooperation may falter is that policymakers may confuse the short-term rebound with a lasting recovery. Stopping the slide in incomes and output is a critical accomplishment, but so, too, will be hastening the recovery. The longer it takes to climb out of the hole this pandemic punched in the global economy, the longer some people will be unnecessarily out of work and the more likely medium- and longer-term growth prospects will be permanently impaired.

The economic consequences are straightforward. As future income decreases, debt burdens become more onerous. The social consequences are harder to predict. A market economy involves a bargain among its citizens: resources will be put to their most efficient use to make the economic pie as large as possible and to increase the chance that it grows over time. When circumstances change as a result of technological advances or the opening of international trade routes, resources shift, creating winners and losers. As long as the pie is expanding rapidly, the losers can take comfort in the fact that the absolute size of their slice is still growing. For example, real GDP growth of four percent per year, the norm among advanced economies late last century, implies a doubling of output in 18 years. If growth is one percent, the level that prevailed in the shadow of the 2008–9 recession, the time it takes to double output stretches to 72 years. With the current costs evident and the benefits receding into a more distant horizon, people may begin to rethink the market bargain.

The historian Henry Adams once noted that politics is about the systematic organization of hatreds. Voters who have lost their jobs, have seen their businesses close, and have depleted their savings are angry. There is no guarantee that this anger will be channeled in a productive direction by the current political class—or by the ones to

follow if the politicians in power are voted out. A tide of populist nationalism often rises when the economy ebbs, so mistrust among the global community is almost sure to increase. This will speed the decline of multilateralism and may create a vicious cycle by further lowering future economic prospects. That is precisely what happened in between the two world wars, when nationalism and beggar-thy-neighbor policies flourished.

There is no one-size-fits-all solution to these political and social problems. But one prudent course of action is to prevent the economic conditions that produced these pressures from worsening. Officials need to press on with fiscal and monetary stimulus. And above all, they must refrain from confusing a rebound for a recovery.

The Tragedy of Vaccine Nationalism

Only Cooperation Can End the Pandemic

Thomas J. Bollyky and Chad P. Bown

Trump administration officials have compared the global allocation of vaccines against the coronavirus that causes COVID-19 to oxygen masks dropping inside a depressurizing airplane. "You put on your own first, and then we want to help others as quickly as possible," Peter Marks, a senior official at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration who oversaw the initial phases of vaccine development for the U.S. government, said during a panel discussion in June. The major difference, of course, is that airplane oxygen masks do not drop only in first class—which is the equivalent of what will happen when vaccines eventually become available if governments delay providing access to them to people in other countries.

By early July, there were 160 candidate vaccines against the new coronavirus in development, with 21 in clinical trials. Although it will be months, at least, before one or more of those candidates has been proved to be safe and effective and is ready to be delivered, countries that manufacture vaccines (and wealthy ones that do not) are already competing to lock in early access. And to judge from the way governments have acted during the current pandemic and past outbreaks, it seems highly likely that such behavior will persist. Absent an international, enforceable commitment to distribute vaccines globally in an equitable and rational way, leaders will instead prioritize taking care of their own populations over slowing the

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spread of COVID-19 elsewhere or helping protect essential health-care workers and highly vulnerable populations in other countries.

That sort of "vaccine nationalism," or a "my country first" approach to allocation, will have profound and far-reaching consequences. Without global coordination, countries may bid against one another, driving up the price of vaccines and related materials. Supplies of proven vaccines will be limited initially even in some rich countries, but the greatest suffering will be in low- and middle-income countries. Such places will be forced to watch as their wealthier counterparts deplete supplies and will have to wait months (or longer) for their replenishment. In the interim, health-care workers and billions of elderly and other high-risk inhabitants in poorer countries will go unprotected, which will extend the pandemic, increase its death toll, and imperil already fragile health-care systems and economies. In their quest to obtain vaccines, countries without access to the initial stock will search for any form of leverage they can find, including blocking exports of critical vaccine components, which will lead to the breakdown of supply chains for raw ingredients, syringes, and vials. Desperate governments may also strike short-term deals for vaccines with adverse consequences for their long-term economic, diplomatic, and strategic interests. The result will be not only needless economic and humanitarian hardship but also intense resentment against vaccine-hoarding countries, which will imperil the kind of international cooperation that will be necessary to tackle future outbreaks—not to mention other pressing challenges, such as climate change and nuclear proliferation.

It is not too late for global cooperation to prevail over global dysfunction, but it will require states and their political leaders to change course. What the world needs is an enforceable COVID-19 vaccine trade and investment agreement that would alleviate the fears of leaders in vaccine-producing countries, who worry that sharing their output would make it harder to look after their own populations. Such an agreement could be forged and fostered by existing institutions and systems. And it would not require any novel enforcement mechanisms: the dynamics of vaccine manufacturing and global trade generally create layers of interdependence, which would encourage participants to live up to their commitments. What it would require, however, is leadership on the part of a majority of vaccine-manufacturing countries—including, ideally, the United States.

WINNERS AND LOSERS

The goal of a vaccine is to raise an immune response so that when a vaccinated person is exposed to the virus, the immune system takes control of the pathogen and the person does not get infected or sick. The vaccine candidates against COVID-19 must be proved to be safe and effective first in animal studies, then in small trials in healthy volunteers, and finally in large trials in representative groups of people, including the elderly, the sick, and the young.

Most of the candidates currently in the pipeline will fail. If one or more vaccines are proved to be safe and effective at preventing infection and a large enough share of a population gets vaccinated, the number of susceptible individuals will fall to the point where the coronavirus will not be able to spread. That population-wide protection, or "herd immunity," would benefit everyone, whether vaccinated or not.

It is not clear yet whether achieving herd immunity will be possible with this coronavirus. A COVID-19 vaccine may prove to be more like the vaccines that protect against influenza: a critical public health tool that reduces the risk of contracting the disease, experiencing its most severe symptoms, and dying from it, but that does not completely prevent the spread of the virus. Nevertheless, given the potential of vaccines to end or contain the most deadly pandemic in a century, world leaders as varied as French President Emmanuel Macron, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres have referred to them as global public goods—a resource to be made available to all, with the use of a vaccine in one country not interfering with its use in another.

At least initially, however, that will not be the reality. During the period when global supplies of COVID-19 vaccines remain limited, providing them to some people will necessarily delay access for others. That bottleneck will prevent any vaccine from becoming a truly global public good.

Vaccine manufacturing is an expensive, complex process, in which even subtle changes may alter the purity, safety, or efficacy of the final product. That is why regulators license not just the finished vaccine but each stage of production and each facility where it occurs. Making a vaccine involves purifying raw ingredients; formulating and adding stabilizers, preservatives, and adjuvants (substances that increase the immune response); and packaging doses into vials or syringes. A few dozen companies all over the world can carry out that last step, known as "fill and finish." And far fewer can handle the quality-controlled

JOSEPH CAMPBELL / REUTERS

Going viral: a coronavirus researcher in Singapore, March 2020

manufacture of active ingredients—especially for more novel, sophisticated vaccines, whose production has been dominated historically by just four large multinational firms based in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Roughly a dozen other companies now have some ability to manufacture such vaccines at scale, including a few large outfits, such as the Serum Institute of India, the world's largest producer of vaccines. But most are small manufacturers that would be unable to produce billions of doses.

Further complicating the picture is that some of today's leading COVID-19 vaccine candidates are based on emerging technologies that have never before been licensed. Scaling up production and ensuring timely approvals for these novel vaccines will be challenging, even for rich countries with experienced regulators. All of this suggests that the manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines will be limited to a handful of countries.

And even after vaccines are ready, a number of factors might delay their availability to nonmanufacturing states. Authorities in producing countries might insist on vaccinating large numbers of people in their own populations before sharing a vaccine with other countries.

There might also turn out to be technical limits on the volume of doses and related vaccine materials that companies can produce each day. And poor countries might not have adequate systems to deliver and administer whatever vaccines they do manage to get.

During that inevitable period of delay, there will be many losers, especially poorer countries. But some rich countries will suffer, too, including those that sought to develop and manufacture their own vaccines but bet exclusively on the wrong candidates. By rejecting cooperation with others, those countries will have gambled their national health on hyped views of their own exceptionalism.

And even "winning" countries will needlessly suffer in the absence of an enforceable scheme to share proven vaccines. If health systems collapse under the strain of the pandemic and foreign consumers are ill or dying, there will be less global demand for export-dependent industries in rich countries, such as aircraft or automobiles. If foreign workers are under lockdown and cannot do their jobs, cross-border supply chains will be disrupted, and even countries with vaccine supplies will be deprived of the imported parts and services they need to keep their economies moving.

PAGING DR. HOBBES

Forecasts project that the coronavirus pandemic could kill 40 million people and reduce global economic output by $12.5 trillion by the end of 2021. Ending this pandemic as soon as possible is in everyone's interest. Yet in most capitals, appeals for a global approach have gone unheeded.

In fact, the early months of the pandemic involved a decided shift in the wrong direction. In the face of global shortages, first China; then France, Germany, and the European Union; and finally the United States hoarded supplies of respirators, surgical masks, and gloves for their own hospital workers' use. Overall, more than 70 countries plus the European Union imposed export controls on local supplies of personal protective equipment, ventilators, or medicines during the first four months of the pandemic. That group includes most of the countries where potential COVID-19 vaccines are being manufactured.

Such hoarding is not new. A vaccine was developed in just seven months for the 2009 pandemic of the influenza A virus H1N1, also known as swine flu, which killed as many as 284,000 people globally. But wealthy countries bought up virtually all the supplies of the vaccine. After the World Health Organization appealed for do-


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nations, Australia, Canada, the United States, and six other countries agreed to share ten percent of their vaccines with poorer countries, but only after determining that their remaining supplies would be sufficient to meet domestic needs.

Nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations have adopted two limited strategies to reduce the risk of such vaccine nationalism in the case of COVID-19. First, CEPI (the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations) the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the nongovernmental vaccine partnership known as Gavi, and other donors have developed plans to shorten the queue for vaccines by investing early in the manufacturing and distribution capacity for promising candidates, even before their safety and efficacy have been established. The hope is that doing so will reduce delays in ramping up supplies in poor countries. This approach is sensible but competes with better-resourced national initiatives to pool scientific expertise and augment manufacturing capacity. What is more, shortening the queue in this manner may exclude middle-income countries such as Pakistan, South Africa, and most Latin American states, which do not meet the criteria for receiving donor assistance. It would also fail to address the fact that the governments of manufacturing countries might seize more vaccine stocks than they need, regardless of the suffering elsewhere.

Vaccine allocation resembles the classic game theory problem known as "the prisoner's dilemma."

An alternative approach is to try to eliminate the queue altogether. More than a dozen countries and philanthropies made initial pledges of $8 billion to the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, an initiative dedicated to the rapid development and equitable deployment of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics for COVID-19. The ACT Accelerator, however, has so far failed to attract major vaccine-manufacturing states, including the United States and India. In the United States, the Trump administration has instead devoted nearly $10 billion to Operation Warp Speed, a program designed to deliver hundreds of millions of COVID-19 vaccines by January 2021—but only to Americans. Meanwhile, Adar Poonawalla, the chief executive of the Serum Institute of India, has stated that "at least initially," any vaccine the company produces will go to India's 1.3 billion people. Other vaccine developers have made similar statements, pledging that host governments or advanced purchasers will get the early doses if supplies are limited.

Given the lack of confidence that any cooperative effort would be able to overcome such obstacles, more and more countries have tried to secure their own supplies. France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands formed the Inclusive Vaccine Alliance to jointly negotiate with vaccine developers and producers. That alliance is now part of a larger European Commission effort to negotiate with manufacturers on behalf of EU member states to arrange for advance contracts and to reserve doses of promising candidates. In May, Xi told attendees at the World Health Assembly, the decision-making body of the World Health Organization, that if Beijing succeeds in developing a vaccine, it will share the results with the world, but he did not say when. In June, Anthony Fauci, the director of the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, expressed skepticism about that claim and told *The Wall Street Journal* that he expects that the Chinese government will use its vaccines "predominantly for the very large populace of China." This summer, the United States bought up virtually all the supplies of remdesivir, one of the first drugs proven to work against COVID-19, leaving none for the United Kingdom, the EU, or most of the rest of the world for three months.

LEARNING THE HARD WAY

Global cooperation on vaccine allocation would be the most efficient way to disrupt the spread of the virus. It would also spur economies, avoid supply chain disruptions, and prevent unnecessary geopolitical conflict. Yet if all other vaccine-manufacturing countries are being nationalists, no one will have an incentive to buck the trend. In this respect, vaccine allocation resembles the classic game theory problem known as "the prisoner's dilemma"—and countries are very much acting like the proverbial prisoner.

"If we have learned anything from the coronavirus and swine flu H1N1 epidemic of 2009," said Peter Navarro, the globalization skeptic whom President Donald Trump appointed in March to lead the U.S. supply chain response to COVID-19, "it is that we cannot necessarily depend on other countries, even close allies, to supply us with needed items, from face masks to vaccines." Navarro has done his best to make sure everyone else learns this lesson, as well: shortly after he made that statement, the White House slapped export restrictions on U.S.-manufactured surgical masks, respirators, and gloves, including to many poor countries.

By failing to develop a plan to coordinate the mass manufacture and distribution of vaccines, many governments—including the U.S. government—are writing off the potential for global cooperation. Such cooperation remains possible, but it would require a large number of countries to make an enforceable commitment to sharing in order to overcome leaders' fears of domestic opposition.

The time horizon for most political leaders is short, especially for those facing an imminent election. Many remain unconvinced that voters would understand that the long-term health and economic consequences of the coronavirus spreading unabated abroad are greater than the immediate threat posed by their or their loved ones' having to wait to be vaccinated at home. And to politicians, the potential for opposition at home may seem like a bigger risk than outrage abroad over their hoarding supplies, especially if it is for a limited time and other countries are seen as likely to do the same.

Fortunately, there are ways to weaken this disincentive to cooperate. First, politicians might be more willing to forgo immunizing their entire populations in order to share vaccines with other countries if there were reliable research indicating the number and allocation of doses needed to achieve critical public health objectives at home—such as protecting health-care workers, military personnel, and nursing home staffs; reducing the spread to the elderly and other vulnerable populations; and breaking transmission chains. Having that information would allow elected leaders to pledge to share vaccine supplies with other countries only if they have enough at home to reach those goals. This type of research has long been part of national planning for immunization campaigns. It has revealed, for example, that because influenza vaccines induce a relatively weak immune response in the elderly, older people are much better protected if the vaccination of children, who are the chief spreaders, is prioritized. Such research does not yet exist for COVID-19 but should be part of the expedited clinical trials that companies are currently conducting for vaccine candidates.

A framework agreement on vaccine sharing would also be more likely to succeed if it were undertaken through an established international forum and linked to preventing the export bans and seizures that have disrupted COVID-19-related medical supply chains. Baby steps toward such an agreement have already been taken by a working group of G-20 trade ministers, but that effort needs to be expanded to include public health officials. The result should be a COVID-19 vaccine trade and in-

vestment agreement, which should include an investment fund to purchase vaccines in advance and allocate them, once they have been proved to be safe and effective, on the basis of public health need rather than the size of any individual country's purse. Governments would pay into the investment fund on a subscription basis, with escalating, nonrefundable payments tied to the number of vaccine doses they secured and other milestones of progress. Participation of the poorest countries should be heavily subsidized or free. Such an agreement could leverage the international organizations that already exist for the purchase and distribution of vaccines and medications for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. The agreement should include an enforceable commitment on the part of participating countries to not place export restrictions on supplies of vaccines and related materials destined for other participating countries.

The agreement could stipulate that if a minimum number of vaccine-producing countries did not participate, it would not enter into force, reducing the risk to early signatories. Some manufacturers would be hesitant to submit to a global allocation plan unless the participating governments committed to indemnification, allowed the use of product liability insurance, or agreed to a capped injury-compensation program to mitigate the manufacturers' risk. Linking the agreement to existing networks of regulators, such as the International Coalition of Medicines Regulatory Authorities, might help ease such concerns and would also help create a more transparent pathway to the licensing of vaccines, instill global confidence, reduce development costs, and expedite access in less remunerative markets.

WHAT YOU DON'T KNOW CAN HURT (AND HELP) YOU

Even if policymakers can be convinced about the benefits of sharing, cooperation will remain a nonstarter if there is nothing to prevent countries from reneging on an agreement and seizing local supplies of a vaccine once it has been proved to be safe and effective. Cooperation will ensue only when countries are convinced that it can be enforced.

The key thing to understand is that allocating COVID-19 vaccines will not be a one-off experience: multiple safe and effective vaccines may eventually emerge, each with different strengths and benefits. If one country were to deny others access to an early vaccine, those other countries could be expected to reciprocate by withholding potentially more effective vaccines they might develop later. And game theory makes clear that, even for the most selfish players, incentives for co-

operation improve when the game is repeated and players can credibly threaten quick and effective punishment for cheating.

Which vaccine turns out to be most effective may vary by the target patient population and setting. Some may be more suitable for children or for places with limited refrigeration. Yet because the various vaccine candidates still in development require different ingredients and different types of manufacturing facilities, no one country, not even the United States, will be able to build all the facilities that may later prove useful.

Today's vaccine supply chains are also unavoidably global. The country lucky enough to manufacture the first proven vaccine is unlikely to have all the inputs necessary to scale up and sustain production. For example, a number of vaccine candidates use the same adjuvant, a substance produced from a natural compound extracted from the Chilean soapbark tree. This compound comes mostly from Chile and is processed in Sweden. Although Chile and Sweden do not manufacture vaccines, they would be able to rely on their control of the limited supply of this input to ensure access to the eventual output. Vaccine supply chains abound with such situations. Because the science has not settled on which vaccine will work best, it is impossible to fully anticipate and thus prepare for all the needed inputs.

Today's vaccine supply chains are unavoidably global.

The Trump administration, as well as some in Congress, has blamed the United States' failure to produce vast supplies of everything it needs to respond to COVID-19 on "dependency." But when it comes to creating an enforceable international vaccine agreement, complex cross-border supply chains are a feature, not a bug. Even countries without vaccine-manufacturing capacity can credibly threaten to hold up input supplies to the United States or other vaccine-manufacturing countries if they engage in vaccine nationalism.

The Trump administration was reminded of this dynamic in April, when the president invoked the Defense Production Act and threatened to ban exports to Canada and Mexico of respirators made by 3M. Had Trump followed through, Canada could have retaliated by halting exports of hospital-grade pulp that U.S. companies needed to produce surgical masks and gowns. Or Canada could have stopped Canadian nurses and hospital workers from crossing the border into

Michigan, where they were desperately needed to treat American patients. Mexico, for its part, could have cut off the supply of motors and other components that U.S. companies needed to make ventilators. The White House seemed unaware of these potential vulnerabilities. Once it got up to speed, the administration backed off.

Of course, the Trump administration should have already learned that trading partners—even historical allies—are willing and able to swiftly and effectively retaliate against one another if someone breaks an agreement. In early 2018, this was apparently an unknown—at least to Navarro. Explaining why Trump was planning to put tariffs on steel and aluminum, Navarro reassured Americans: "I don't believe there is any country in the world that is going to retaliate," he declared. After Trump imposed the duties, Canada, Mexico, and the European Union, along with China, Russia, and Turkey, all immediately retaliated. The EU went through a similar learning experience in March. The European Commission originally imposed a broad set of export restrictions on personal protective equipment. It was forced to quickly scale them back after realizing that cutting off non-EU members, such as Norway and Switzerland, could imperil the flow of parts that companies based in the EU needed to supply the EU's own member states with medical supplies.

American and European policymakers now understand—or at least should understand—that what they don't know about cross-border flows can hurt them. Paradoxically, this lack of information may help convince skeptical policymakers to maintain the interdependence needed to fight the pandemic. Not knowing what they don't know reduces the risk that governments will renege on a deal tomorrow that is in their own best interest to sign on to today.

THE POWER OF FOMO

When the oxygen masks drop in a depressurizing plane, they drop at the same time in every part of the plane because time is of the essence and because that is the best way to ensure the safety of all onboard. The same is true of the global, equitable allocation of safe and effective vaccines against COVID-19.

Vaccine nationalism is not just morally and ethically reprehensible: it is contrary to every country's economic, strategic, and health interests. If rich, powerful countries choose that path, there will be no winners—ultimately, every country will be a loser. The world is not

doomed to learn this the hard way, however. All the necessary tools exist to forge an agreement that would encourage cooperation and limit the appeal of shortsighted "my country first" approaches.

But time is running out: the closer the world gets to the day when the first proven vaccines emerge, the less time there is to set up an equitable, enforceable system for allocating them. As a first step, a coalition of political leaders from countries representing at least 50 percent of global vaccine-manufacturing capacity must get together and instruct their public health officials and trade ministers to get out of their silos and work together. Combining forces, they should hammer out a short-term agreement that articulates the conditions for sharing, including with the legions of poorer, nonmanufacturing countries, and makes clear what would happen to participants who subsequently reneged and undertook vaccine nationalism. Such a step would get the ball rolling and convince even more of the manufacturing countries to sign on. The fear of missing out on vaccine access, in the event their countries' own vaccine candidates fail, may be what it takes to pressure even today's most reluctant leaders to cooperate.

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Giving Up on God

The Global Decline of Religion

Ronald F. Inglehart

In the early years of the twenty-first century, religion seemed to be on the rise. The collapse of both communism and the Soviet Union had left an ideological vacuum that was being filled by Orthodox Christianity in Russia and other post-Soviet states. The election in the United States of President George W. Bush, an evangelical Christian who made no secret of his piety, suggested that evangelical Christianity was rising as a political force in the country. And the 9/11 attacks directed international attention to the power of political Islam in the Muslim world.

A dozen years ago, my colleague Pippa Norris and I analyzed data on religious trends in 49 countries, including a few subnational territories such as Northern Ireland, from which survey evidence was available from 1981 to 2007 (these countries contained 60 percent of the world's population). We did not find a universal resurgence of religion, despite claims to that effect—most high-income countries became less religious—but we did find that in 33 of the 49 countries we studied, people became more religious during those years. This was true in most former communist countries, in most developing countries, and even in a number of high-income countries. Our findings made it clear that industrialization and the spread of scientific knowledge were not causing religion to disappear, as some scholars had once assumed.

But since 2007, things have changed with surprising speed. From about 2007 to 2019, the overwhelming majority of the countries we studied—43 out of 49—became less religious. The decline in belief was not confined to high-income countries and appeared across most of the world.

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Growing numbers of people no longer find religion a necessary source of support and meaning in their lives. Even the United States—long cited as proof that an economically advanced society can be strongly religious—has now joined other wealthy countries in moving away from religion. Several forces are driving this trend, but the most powerful one is the waning hold of a set of beliefs closely linked to the imperative of maintaining high birthrates. Modern societies have become less religious in part because they no longer need to uphold the kinds of gender and sexual norms that the major world religions have instilled for centuries.

Although some religious conservatives warn that the retreat from faith will lead to a collapse of social cohesion and public morality, the evidence doesn't support this claim. As unexpected as it may seem, countries that are less religious actually tend to be less corrupt and have lower murder rates than more religious ones. Needless to say, religion itself doesn't encourage corruption and crime. This phenomenon reflects the fact that as societies develop, survival becomes more secure: starvation, once pervasive, becomes uncommon; life expectancy increases; murder and other forms of violence diminish. And as this level of security rises, people tend to become less religious.

THE RISE AND FALL OF FAITH

Our earlier study, published in 2011, compared levels of religious belief measured as early as 1981 with findings from the latest surveys then available, from around 2007, bridging a period of roughly a quarter century. In each survey, respondents were asked to indicate how important God was in their lives by choosing a value on a scale ranging from one—"Not at all important"—to ten—"Very important."

Examining how a country's level of religiosity changed over time led to some striking findings. A majority of the countries surveyed showed upticks in a belief in the importance of God. The largest increases were in former communist countries. For example, from 1981 to 2007, the mean score of the Bulgarian public rose from 3.6 to 5.7. In Russia, it rose from 4.0 to 6.0. In part, this growth in religiosity was a response to the severe decline of economic, physical, and psychological security experienced after the Soviet Union disintegrated; religion was filling the ideological vacuum left by the collapse of communism. Religious beliefs also increased in many developing countries outside the former Soviet Union, including Brazil, China, Mexico, and South Africa. On the other hand, religion declined in most high-income countries.

Since 2007, there has been a remarkably sharp trend away from religion. In virtually every high-income country, religion has continued to decline. At the same time, many poor countries, together with most of the former communist states, have also become less religious. From 2007 to 2019, only five countries became more religious, whereas the vast majority of the countries studied moved in the opposite direction.

India is the most important exception to the general pattern of declining religiosity. The period of the study coincides roughly with the return to power of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, whose brand of politics seeks to conflate national identity with religious identity. The BJP government has advocated policies that discriminate against the followers of other religions, particularly India's large Muslim minority, polarizing communities and whipping up religious sentiments.

The most dramatic shift away from religion has taken place among the American public.

The most dramatic shift away from religion has taken place among the American public. From 1981 to 2007, the United States ranked as one of the world's more religious countries, with religiosity levels changing very little. Since then, the United States has shown the largest move away from religion of any country for which we have data. Near the end of the initial period studied, Americans' mean rating of the importance of God in their lives was 8.2 on a ten-point scale. In the most recent U.S. survey, from 2017, the figure had dropped to 4.6, an astonishingly sharp decline. For years, the United States had been the key case demonstrating that economic modernization need not produce secularization. By this measure, the United States now ranks as the 11th least religious country for which we have data.

Influential thinkers from Karl Marx to Max Weber to Émile Durkheim predicted that the spread of scientific knowledge would dispel religion throughout the world, but that did not happen. For most people, religious faith was more emotional than cognitive. And for most of human history, sheer survival was uncertain. Religion provided assurance that the world was in the hands of an infallible higher power (or powers) who promised that, if one followed the rules, things would ultimately work out for the best. In a world where people often lived near starvation, religion helped them cope with severe uncertainty and stress. But as economic and technologi-

The Decline of Religion, 2007–2019



cal development took place, people became increasingly able to escape starvation, cope with disease, and suppress violence. They become less dependent on religion—and less willing to accept its constraints, including keeping women in the kitchen and gay people in the closet—as existential insecurity diminished and life expectancy rose.

Secularization doesn't happen everywhere at once; it occurs when countries have attained high levels of existential security, and even then it usually moves at a glacial pace, as one generation replaces another. It can even reverse itself, with societies becoming more religious if they experience prolonged periods of diminished security. Secularization has been gradually taking place since the nineteenth century, starting with the societies of western Europe and North America that were most secure economically and physically and then spreading to more and more parts of the world.

Although secularization normally occurs at the pace of intergenerational population replacement, it can reach a tipping point when the dominant opinion shifts and, swayed by the forces of conformism and social desirability, people start to favor the outlook they once opposed—producing exceptionally rapid cultural change. Younger and better-educated groups in high-income countries have recently reached this threshold.

LOSING THEIR RELIGION

Several other factors beyond rising levels of economic and technological development help explain the waning of religion. In the United States, politics accounts for some of the decline. Since the 1990s, the Republican Party has sought to win support by adopting conservative Christian positions on same-sex marriage, abortion, and other cultural issues. But this political appeal to religious voters has had the corollary effect of pushing other voters, especially those who are young and culturally liberal, away from religion. It once was generally assumed that religious beliefs shaped political views, not the other way around. But recent evidence indicates that the causality can run the other way: panel studies have found that many people change their political views first and then become less religious.

The uncritical embrace of President Donald Trump—a leader who cannot be described as a paragon of Christian virtue—by many prominent evangelicals has led other evangelicals to fear that young people will desert their churches in droves, accelerating an ongoing trend.

Plenty of seats: at a Catholic church in New York City, June 2014

The Roman Catholic Church, for its part, has lost adherents because of its own crises. Earlier this year, the Pew Research Center found that fully 92 percent of U.S. adults were aware of recent reports of sexual abuse by Catholic priests, and about 80 percent of those surveyed said they believed that the abuses were "ongoing problems that are still happening." Accordingly, 27 percent of U.S. Catholics polled said that they had scaled back their attendance at Mass in response to these reports.

But perhaps the most important force behind secularization is a transformation concerning the norms governing human fertility. For many centuries, most societies assigned to women the role of producing as many children as possible and discouraged divorce, abortion, homosexuality, contraception, and any sexual behavior not linked to reproduction. The sacred writings of the world's major religions vary greatly, but as Norris and I have demonstrated, virtually all world religions instilled these pro-fertility norms in their adherents. Religions emphasized the importance of fertility because it was necessary. In the world of high infant mortality and low life expectancy that prevailed until recently, the average woman had to produce five to eight children in order to simply replace the population.

During the twentieth century, a growing number of countries attained drastically reduced infant mortality rates and higher life expectancies, making these traditional cultural norms no longer necessary. This process didn't happen overnight. The major world

CHRISTOPHER GREGORY / THE NEW YORK TIMES

religions had presented pro-fertility norms as absolute moral rules and stoutly resisted change. People only slowly gave up the familiar beliefs and societal roles they had known since childhood concerning gender and sexual behavior. But when a society reached a sufficiently high level of economic and physical security, younger generations grew up taking that security for granted, and the norms around fertility receded. Ideas, practices, and laws concerning gender equality, divorce, abortion, and homosexuality are now changing rapidly.

This shift is quantifiable. Data collected in the World Values Survey over the years offer a glimpse of a deep transformation. The survey uses a ten-point scale based on each country's acceptance of divorce, abortion, and homosexuality. The tipping point is around the middle of the scale, at 5.50: lower scores indicate that a majority of the country's people harbor more conservative views, and higher scores indicate that a majority have more liberal views centered on individual choice. Around 1981, majorities in every country for which we have data supported pro-fertility norms. Even in high-income countries, the mean scores ranged from as low as 3.44 (Spain), 3.49 (the United States), 3.50 (Japan), 4.14 (the United Kingdom), and 4.63 (Finland) to as high as 5.35 for Sweden—then the most liberal country but with a score still slightly below the scale's tipping point. But a profound change was underway. By 2019, Spain's mean score had risen to 6.74, the United States' to 5.86, Japan's to 6.17, the United Kingdom's to 6.90, Finland's to 7.35, and Sweden's to 8.49. All these countries were below the 5.50 tipping point when first surveyed, and all of them were above it by 2019. These numbers offer a simplified picture of a complex reality, but they convey the scale of the recent acceleration of secularization.

This trend has been spreading to the rest of the world, with one major exception. The populations of the 18 Muslim-majority countries for which data are available in the World Values Survey have stayed far below the tipping point, remaining strongly religious and committed to preserving traditional norms concerning gender and fertility. Even controlling for economic development, Muslim-majority countries tend to be somewhat more religious and culturally conservative than average.

THINGS WON'T FALL APART

For centuries, religion has served as a force for social cohesion, reducing crime and encouraging compliance with the law. Every major religion inculcates some version of the biblical commandments "Thou shalt

not steal" and "Thou shalt not kill." So it is understandable that religious conservatives fear that the retreat of religion will lead to social disarray, with rising corruption and crime. But to a surprising extent, that concern is not supported by the evidence.

Since 1993, Transparency International has monitored the relative corruption and honesty of government officials and business people around the world. Each year, this watchdog group publishes the Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories. These data make it possible to test the actual relationship between religiosity and corruption: Is corruption less widespread in religious countries than in less religious ones? The answer is an unequivocal no—in fact, religious countries actually tend to be more corrupt than secular ones. The highly secular Nordic states have some of the world's lowest levels of corruption, and highly religious countries, such as Bangladesh, Guatemala, Iraq, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, have some of the highest.

Religious countries tend to be more corrupt than secular ones.

Clearly, religiosity does not cause corruption. Countries with low levels of economic and physical security tend to have high levels of religiosity and also high levels of corruption. Although religion may once have played a crucial role in supporting public morality, that role shrinks as societies develop economically. The people of religious countries are slightly more likely to condemn corruption than the people of less religious countries, but the impact of religion on behavior ends there. Religion may make people more punitive, but it does not make them less corrupt.

This pattern also applies to other crimes, such as murder. As surprising as it may seem, the murder rate is more than ten times as high in the most religious countries as it is in the least religious countries. Some relatively poor countries have low murder rates, but overall, prosperous countries that provide their residents with material and legal security are much safer than poor countries. It is not that religiosity causes murders, of course, but that both crime and religiosity tend to be high in societies with low levels of existential security.

The evidence suggests that modern societies will not descend into nihilistic chaos without religious faith to bind them, but that may not always have been the case. In early agrarian societies, when most

people lived just above the survival level, religion may have been the most effective way to maintain order and cohesion. But modernization has changed the equation. As traditional religiosity declines, an equally strong set of moral norms seems to be emerging to fill the void. Evidence from the World Values Survey indicates that in highly secure and secular countries, people are giving increasingly high priority to self-expression and free choice, with a growing emphasis on human rights, tolerance of outsiders, environmental protection, gender equality, and freedom of speech.

Traditional religions can be dangerously divisive in contemporary global society. Religions inherently tend to present their norms as absolute values, despite the fact that they actually reflect their societies' histories and socioeconomic characteristics. The rigidity of any absolute belief system can give rise to fanatical intolerance, as the historical conflicts between Catholics and Protestants and Christians and Muslims have demonstrated.

As societies develop from agrarian to industrial to knowledge-based, growing existential security tends to reduce the importance of religion in people's lives, and people become less obedient to traditional religious leaders and institutions. That trend seems likely to continue, but the future is always uncertain. Pandemics such as the COVID-19 one reduce people's sense of existential security. If the pandemic lasts for many years or leads to a new Great Depression, the cultural changes of recent decades might begin to reverse.

But that shift remains unlikely, because it would run counter to the powerful, long-term, technology-driven trend of growing prosperity and increased life expectancy that is helping push people away from religion. If that trend continues, the influence that traditional religious authorities wield over public morality will keep shrinking as a culture of growing tolerance becomes ever stronger.

Messiah Complex

How Brazil Made Bolsonaro

Brian Winter

Brazil has a face that it tends to present to the world: a country of glittering beaches and hillside favelas, of Oscar Niemeyer's delightful churches and museums, of João Gilberto crooning "The Girl From Ipanema." This is the Brazil of Rio de Janeiro, which is also, not coincidentally, the city that hosts global events, such as the Olympics, and that serves as a base for most foreign correspondents. This Brazil is troubled but romantic, a racial mosaic, violent but impossible to resist. It is a postcard, a nightmare, a dream.

Inevitably, a country of 210 million people has many other faces, from the riverside villages of the Amazon to the *Blade Runner*–style skyscapes of São Paulo and the old gaucho country of the far south. But the Brazil perhaps least known to outsiders is what some Brazilians call—sometimes fondly, sometimes with an eye roll—the *interiorzão*, which translates literally as "the big interior."

The *interiorzão* is not defined on any map, but it generally refers to a belt of land sagging around the country's geographic midsection, from the state of Mato Grosso do Sul in the west through Goiás, Minas Gerais, and parts of Bahia in the east. This is a Brazil of soy farms and cattle ranches, oversize Ford pickup trucks, air-conditioned shopping malls, and all-you-can-eat steakhouses. Some of it is old, but much of it was erected only in the last 30 years or so. Instead of Afro-Catholic syncretism and bossa nova, it boasts evangelical megachurches and *sertanejo*, a kind of tropicalized country music sung by barrel-chested men in cowboy hats and Wrangler jeans.

The *interiorzão*, more than any other region, is also the Brazil of President Jair Bolsonaro. It is where polls show his support is strongest

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and most intense. And it is critical to understanding why a president who is often regarded with a mix of incomprehension and horror by the rest of the world has maintained a steady domestic approval rating of about 40 percent. Bolsonaro's tenure in office has been marked by one of the world's deadliest outbreaks of COVID-19, a disappointing economic record, a global uproar over deforestation in the Amazon, and a growing array of scandals involving his allies and family members. Yet his followers have continued to stand by their man.

Since taking office in January 2019, the 65-year-old former army paratrooper has fed his supporters a steady diet of confrontation and outrage under the slogan "Brazil Above Everything, God Above Everyone." The story of his presidency so far illustrates how a generation of twenty-first-century populists, which arguably includes such disparate figures as U.S. President Donald Trump, Hungary's Viktor Orban, and the Philippines' Rodrigo Duterte, has had far more staying power than many observers expected. The global factors that drove the rise of these leaders—including resurgent nationalism and anger over increasing economic inequality—have been exhaustively documented. But local factors have played as large a role: in Brazil's case, the growth of evangelical Christianity and a legacy of military rule that has never been fully overcome. Much of the media coverage of Bolsonaro, at home and abroad, portrays his government as perpetually on the brink of collapse, as if a great national epiphany were just around the corner. But a deeper look suggests that support for Bolsonaro—and, perhaps, for some of his peers—remains surprisingly resilient, even if he is in many ways utterly failing to deliver positive results for either his base or the country as a whole.

A NATION IN CRISIS

Bolsonaro spends much of his energy denouncing the various evils that he says plunged Brazil into economic and political crisis starting around 2013—a chasm from which it has still not fully emerged. He rages against "gender ideology" and moral decay and attacks everyone from the supposed "communists" who led Brazil for the past 25 years (in reality, a range of leaders from the moderate left to the center-right) to the climate activist Greta Thunberg ("a little brat"). These tirades are amplified online by a so-called digital militia made up largely of 20-something acolytes who talk of a conservative revolution that will last for 100 years.

Jair Bolsonaro

Bolsonaro's championing of increased gun ownership as a cure-all for Brazil's ills, including the COVID-19 pandemic, and his incessant clashes with the Congress and the judiciary have alienated or simply exhausted many in the country's cosmopolitan locales, such as Rio. In national polls, his negative ratings have steadily crept up. But in interior cities, such as Cuiabá and Goiânia, and in smaller towns, such as Barretos, where the president rode a horse in the rodeo last year, the fervor for the man they call "the Messiah" (*Messias*, which is Bolsonaro's real middle name, believe it or not) continues to grow.

Maintaining an energized, loyal base even at the cost of intense polarization is regarded by politicians the world over as a necessary evil in this age of social media. But it has always been a matter of do or die in Brazilian politics, sometimes in the most literal sense. Two of the last four presidents who won election in Brazil prior to Bolsonaro

NATALYA BALNOVA

were impeached, in 1992 and 2016, after seeing their popular support melt away. Over the past 70 years, one Brazilian president resigned after less than a year, another committed suicide in office, another was ousted by a military coup, another may have been murdered after leaving office, and yet another passed away—of natural causes—just before his inauguration. Bolsonaro's immediate predecessor, Michel Temer, saw his approval rating sink as low as three percent and staved off impeachment in 2017 only by funneling billions in patronage to allies in Congress. Brazil is not a good country for presidents without friends.

Despite comparisons to Trump, Bolsonaro is a Brazilian invention.

Today, there are at least 40 separate motions before Congress seeking Bolsonaro's impeachment for various causes, including his disastrous handling of the pandemic and his alleged interference in the investigations of his allies by the Federal Police. The conventional wisdom in Brasília is that congressional leaders will wait to push these cases forward at least until late this year, after the worst of the pandemic has presumably passed, for fear of plunging Brazil into an even deeper crisis. But the real deterrent is the support Bolsonaro enjoys from both his resilient base and the military; it is a combination that makes impeachment impractical, if not physically dangerous, for its proponents. If the president can maintain both pillars of support, even leaders of the opposition concede—in private, between clenched teeth—that Bolsonaro seems likely to at least serve the entirety of his four-year term, until the end of 2022. In Brazil, that would be an achievement in itself.

Of course, surviving isn't everything. Brazil has seen some progress under Bolsonaro: violent crime is down (although the causes are disputed), and the government has passed some pro-market reforms and cut red tape for small-business owners. But overall, the country seems terribly stuck. It is confronting the real possibility of a second consecutive "lost decade" of economic stagnation, political dysfunction, and diminished ambition. Even before the pandemic began, Brazil's moribund economy was, astonishingly, smaller than it had been in 2010 when measured on a per capita basis, and it had failed to grow any faster under Bolsonaro than it did under his predecessors.

A country that a decade ago was clamoring for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and preparing to host the World Cup and the Olympics now seems content to pursue a foreign policy of near-

automatic alignment with the United States, with little tangible benefit so far in return. Hunger is rising, the middle class is shrinking, and some fear democracy itself is in danger. And yet this man, who is best known abroad for telling a female legislator that she "didn't deserve to be raped" and for making such statements as "a policeman who doesn't kill isn't a policeman," has not seen his popularity budge by even one percentage point in some polls. Fully explaining why requires a deeper dive into Brazil's past and present.

A TRUMP OF THE TROPICS?

International media coverage tends to portray Bolsonaro as "the Trump of the Tropics," a "far-right" nationalist who is even more unrefined, more vulgar, and more of a threat to the established world order than the man in the White House. Such renderings are incomplete, although they are not always unfair.

Indeed, Bolsonaro himself has done much to encourage the comparisons, including once streaming a Facebook video in which he simply sat in front of a television for more than an hour watching Trump give a speech. Bolsonaro's national political profile first began to take off in early 2017, just as Trump took office, and it is obvious that he was taking notes. Prominent U.S. conservatives, including Steve Bannon, have direct ties to the government in Brasília; in 2019, the Conservative Political Action Conference, a right-wing U.S. organization, held a meeting in Brazil for the first time. In November 2018, Bolsonaro's son Eduardo, a member of Brazil's Congress, walked out of the Trump hotel in Washington, D.C., wearing a "Make America Great Again" hat. Bolsonaro himself regularly complains about "fake news," fantasizes aloud about locking up his political rivals, and wages a constant crusade against independent institutions, most notably the Supreme Court. Like Trump, Bolsonaro is on his third marriage, to a telegenic, much younger woman. At times, the similarities are almost eerie.

But make no mistake: Bolsonaro is a Brazilian invention. He is a product of the singularly awful economic and political crisis the country has endured over the last decade and, just as important, of Brazil's long tradition of being ruled by conservative white men of military background. Throughout most of Brazil's existence, going back to the nineteenth-century monarchy of Emperor Dom Pedro II and beyond, members of the armed forces have held critical positions in politics and business, forming the very backbone of the country's elite. One

can see the legacy clearly in Rio, Brazil's capital from its independence until 1960, where a disproportionately large number of thoroughfares bear names such as Admiral Barroso Avenue, Major Vaz Tunnel, and Captain César de Andrade Street.

A century ago, an editorial in the military journal *A Defesa Nacional* (National Defense) spelled out the need for Brazil's armed forces to exercise a "conservative and stabilizing role" in politics to correct what officers saw as the inevitable excesses of self-interested and corrupt civilian leaders. In the ensuing decades, the armed forces frequently acted on this sense of noblesse oblige, although usually with a modicum of restraint. That changed in 1964, when the military toppled President João Goulart, who had flirted with China and Cuba. The ensuing dictatorship held on to power until 1985 and oversaw a spurt of extraordinary economic growth, the so-called Brazilian miracle, when GDP briefly grew faster than ten percent a year, until it fizzled out amid high inflation and unsustainable debt. The regime also tortured and murdered suspected dissidents, censored the media, and tolerated little opposition in Congress.

The military emerged from that era chastened and unpopular, but not quite disgraced. Brazil's generals, unlike their contemporaries in neighboring Argentina, were largely able to dictate the terms of the transition to democracy and never faced justice for their crimes. Civilian leaders initially did little better at managing the economy, and street crime began a terrifying surge. Still, the end of the Cold War seemed to signal that the days of coups and military leaders were over, not just in Brazil but throughout Latin America. A duo of transformational two-term presidents, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2003) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–11), ushered in a period of solid economic growth and democratic stability, and Cardoso carefully installed a civilian-run defense ministry for the first time in Brazil's history. Under President Dilma Rousseff (2011–16), a former left-wing guerrilla who had been tortured by the dictatorship, a truth commission was established to investigate past crimes, although it had no power to arrest or punish anyone. It seemed that the soldiers had retreated to the barracks for good.

That Jair Bolsonaro would be the one to bring the military back to power, or close to it, is profoundly ironic. Bolsonaro served in the army from 1977 to 1988, but he ran afoul of senior officers on several occasions and never rose beyond the rank of captain. In one instance,

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he spent 15 days in a penitentiary for insubordination; in another, he was court-martialed for an alleged plot to blow up Rio's water supply, ostensibly to protest low wages for the military rank and file. (Bolsonaro denied wrongdoing and was acquitted for lack of evidence.) One of his commanding officers described him as "lacking logic, rationality, and balance." Ernesto Geisel, a general and former president under the military dictatorship, singled out Bolsonaro in a 1993 interview as "a bad soldier" and "an abnormal case."

In the sweep of Brazilian history, Bolsonaro is not an aberration but a return to normalcy.

Bolsonaro's subversive style always played better among the military's rank and file than with its commanders; in 1991, after leaving active duty, Bolsonaro was elected to Congress, representing Rio de Janeiro, home to a large contingent of retired military veterans. He soon emerged as a lonely voice of nostalgia for the dictatorship, at a time when such sentiments were not uncommon in private but definitely taboo in public. He also drew attention for his invectives against women, LGBTQ people, leftists, and establishment figures such as Cardoso, who he said "should have been shot" during the dictatorship, "along with 30,000 other corrupt people." During his 27 years as a legislator, such statements often made headlines, but Bolsonaro was mostly treated as a sideshow—more embarrassment than menace, too marginal to be taken seriously.

Then came the collapse. Not long after the commodities boom of the first decade of this century ended, Brazil descended into a morass of street protests, the worst recession in the country's history, and a series of unprecedented corruption scandals. Crime also continued its post-dictatorship rise; in 2017, Brazil recorded 63,000 homicides, more than any other country. In a tale that has been repeated in other, comparatively less troubled countries in recent years, Bolsonaro's outsider status suddenly became his greatest asset.

But that was only part of the story. By 2018, the year of the election, polls showed that the military had once again become Brazil's most popular institution. This was precisely because soldiers had been absent from politics for several years and therefore could not be blamed for the meltdown. Nostalgia surged for a safer, more stable, supposedly less corrupt past. Bolsonaro wisely emphasized his military background during the campaign (leaving out the rougher parts, of course)

and chose a retired general as his running mate. For some voters, Bolsonaro represented less a revolution than a restoration—even if many of them, in a country where half the population was under 35, were too young to know exactly what that meant.

Since becoming president, Bolsonaro has indeed brought soldiers back to the table—to the degree that many Brazilians think of his administration as a military government in all but name. By July of this year, retired or active-duty soldiers were leading ten of 23 ministries and occupied hundreds of key positions throughout the federal bureaucracy. Along with social conservatives, they form the two main pillars of Bolsonaro's support.

In private, members of the military tend to say that their experience has been mixed. They are delighted that one of their own now runs the Defense Ministry, instead of the civilian leaders of previous years. Not coincidentally, the government largely exempted the armed forces from recent budget cuts and reductions to pensions. Government officials have vowed to rewrite school textbooks to de-emphasize the military dictatorship's atrocities, and the National Truth Commission's work has mostly been forgotten. Yet even though the generals should have known Bolsonaro better than anyone, many have expressed shock at his government's perpetual disorganization, penchant for constant conflict, and narrow emphasis on topics they view as secondary—or completely irrelevant—to Brazil's well-being. Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, a retired four-star general whom Bolsonaro fired from a senior position in early 2019, summed it up for many when he called the government "*um show de besteira*"—freely translated, "a shitshow."

CULTURE WARRIOR UNTAMED

There is a particular type of Bolsonaro voter who has repented in the past year: relatively wealthy and well educated, often an executive at a bank or a large company. Among this tiny but disproportionately influential demographic, many cite one particular moment when they realized the president was never going to "pivot"—that he would always be the same volatile provocateur he has been since the 1980s.

That moment came just two months into his presidency, on March 5, 2019, when Bolsonaro tweeted a video of a man urinating on another man's head during a Carnival celebration in São Paulo. The post was meant to expose the supposed decadence of the left in general and the LGBTQ community in particular. "I do not feel comfortable showing

this . . . but this is what Brazil's Carnival has turned into," the president wrote. The next day, in an apparent effort to either feign ignorance or stir controversy even further—it is not clear which—the president tweeted: "What is a golden shower?"

This made headlines around the world, and late-night TV comedians from Argentina to the United States had a field day. But in Brazil, especially within business circles, the episode was treated as something utterly serious: a confirmation that Bolsonaro's presidency would always be more about the culture wars—about the need for "boys to wear blue and girls to wear pink," in the words of his women's affairs minister, Damares Alves—than about pro-market reforms or even the fight against corruption. The Brazilian media have reported extensively on "the cabinet of hate," a group of mostly young aides that allegedly includes the president's three politically active sons and dedicates itself to attacks against—and spreading fake news about—the government's opponents. (Bolsonaro and his sons deny the group exists.) The administration's chief ideologue is Olavo de Carvalho, a septuagenarian and former astrologer who lives in the woods of rural Virginia, dresses like a modern-day Marlboro Man, and, via YouTube videos often recorded in the predawn hours, excoriates anyone—including generals and other military figures within the government—who deviates from his version of conservative dogma.

Time and again, the president has opted to please the *olavista* portion of his base, as it is known, even when doing so sabotages other parts of his agenda. Throughout much of 2019, Carvalho and other online warriors turned their wrath on Rodrigo Maia, the president of Brazil's Chamber of Deputies. Maia was the key to passing a pension reform bill that would help close a gaping budget deficit—a bill that had been the holy grail of pro-market types in Brazil for years. Maia, a centrist, was supportive of the reform from day one, but he still came under relentless, frequently vulgar attacks on Twitter from Carvalho and Bolsonaro's sons for supposedly being part of Brasília's corrupt old guard. Maia reacted with exasperation, calling the government "a desert of ideas," urging Bolsonaro to stay off social media, and lamenting "this radical environment where they have to feed meat to the lions every single day." After months of delays, and a few strained gestures of reconciliation from the president, the pension reform finally passed in October 2019. But by that point, many investors had lost interest and moved on.

Indeed, the economy has suffered extensive damage from the president's combative approach. Wall Street was at first euphoric following Bolsonaro's election, believing that the finance minister, the University of Chicago–trained Paulo Guedes, would have free rein to cut entitlements, privatize state-run companies, and simplify what the World Bank has characterized as the world's most complex tax system. ("I truly don't understand economics," Bolsonaro frequently insists, in an effort to underline Guedes's autonomy.) Guedes has made some changes, including privatizations, but almost all the truly transformational reforms require legislative approval. Bolsonaro's relationship with Congress has been so dysfunctional that in November 2019, he dropped out of his own party, which he had essentially created himself a year earlier. With the reform agenda mostly stalled, Brazil's economy ended up growing just 1.1 percent in Bolsonaro's first year, its worst performance in three years and less than half what economists expected when he took office.

For many, the final straw came in mid-2019, when massive fires set by illegal land speculators broke out in the Amazon and international commentators began using the word "pariah" to describe Brazil. Activists called for boycotts of the country's soy and beef, and some investment funds, especially those in Europe, dropped Brazilian assets from their portfolios. After initially lashing out at "globalists," the government eventually took some steps to suppress the fires, including deploying the military. But concern flared again earlier this year when a video surfaced of a cabinet meeting in which the environment minister urged Bolsonaro to remove as many environmental regulations as possible while the world was distracted by COVID-19. This prompted another wave of political instability, pressure for divestments, and exasperation with the president. One Brazilian CEO privately lamented, "It's like Trump, but without the good economy."

STANDING BY THEIR MAN

In Brazil, as elsewhere in the world, the pandemic has exposed the shortcomings of this generation of populist leaders on both the ideological left and the ideological right. As of late June, Bolsonaro's Brazil, Trump's United States, Boris Johnson's United Kingdom, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador's Mexico were among the countries with the highest number of deaths and confirmed cases. Brazil has a history of bold, creative public health responses to diseases such as AIDS and Zika.

But Bolsonaro, again taking cues from Washington, dismissed COVID-19 as "a little flu," frequently refused to wear a mask in public, and championed chloroquine as a miracle cure. He also fired or forced out two health ministers in the span of a month and actively undermined governors and mayors who espoused social-distancing policies—to an extent that surpassed even Trump's actions. When journalists asked Bolsonaro about the rising death toll in April, he replied, "What do you want me to do? My name is Messiah, but I can't make miracles." Even when he tested positive for the virus himself in July, his initial reaction amounted to a shrug.

Through it all, Bolsonaro's base has barely wavered. Nor has it lost its remarkable ability to explain away obvious setbacks. When Sérgio Moro, a former judge and an iconic figure in Brazil's fight against corruption, resigned as Bolsonaro's justice minister in May, alleging that the president had tried to interfere in police investigations, the online brigade quickly labeled him an "opportunist" who had never been a true conservative believer. Investigations of two of Bolsonaro's sons for their alleged roles in a kickback scheme among public servants in Rio and in spreading libelous statements against their rivals have been dismissed as sour grapes on the part of a corrupt elite still angry over the 2018 election result. The loss of support Bolsonaro has experienced amid the pandemic among wealthy, well-educated voters has been offset by an increase of support among poor Brazilians, who are grateful to be receiving a new emergency government stipend of about $125 a month.

Indeed, even as deaths from COVID-19 mounted and the economy slid deeper into recession, many of Bolsonaro's supporters were urging him to make a play for even greater power. This time, the Supreme Court was the main target; signs appeared at pro-Bolsonaro rallies urging the president to arrest some members of the court or even to close it entirely. Following several adverse rulings, Bolsonaro declared that neither he nor the armed forces would accept further "absurd orders" from Congress or the judiciary. This fed widespread rumors that the military could intervene on Bolsonaro's behalf in the power struggle and even stage a coup. Most observers doubt that is likely, in part because of many army commanders' misgivings about Bolsonaro. Regardless, the parlor game of trying to decipher the military's true motivations and the power dynamics among individual generals has once again become a national pastime in Brazil—as it was throughout most of its history until the 1990s.

The opposition, meanwhile, has remained divided and in search of a new message, still focused on its losing argument of 2018: that Bolsonaro poses a threat to democracy. By the middle of this year, efforts were gathering momentum to launch a broad, pro-democratic front with promising young leaders such as Flávio Dino, the leftist governor of the state of Maranhão, and Luciano Huck, a television host and entrepreneur popular with both the business community and Brazil's working class. But much of the left has refused to participate. Early polls suggest that the 2022 election is shaping up as another battle between Bolsonaro and Lula da Silva's leftist Workers' Party—which is still widely reviled for its role in Brazil's collapse during the last decade—and that in such a matchup, Bolsonaro would win handily.

Doomsday predictions for Bolsonaro, frequent in both the Brazilian and the international press, have failed to hold up. Some political analysts believed that the scandals involving his sons would damage his approval ratings. Others have predicted that if Trump loses his reelection bid in November, it could spell doom for Bolsonaro, depriving him of his greatest ally and hastening the impeachment process in Congress. Anything is possible; Trump's recent struggles suggest that today's populists are not invincible. But these forecasts have probably been shaped by the same fallacy that has plagued Bolsonaro's opponents since his unexpected rise to power began: they ignore not only the strong loyalty Bolsonaro inspires but also the profoundly Brazilian nature of his appeal. In the broad sweep of history, Bolsonaro is arguably not an aberration but a return to normalcy. The exceptional period may prove to have been the past 30 years, when civilian authority, a degree of tolerance, and an emphasis on reducing inequality were the rule.

Today, Brazil is a country where, according to a Veja/FSB poll taken in February, 61 percent of people support Bolsonaro's idea to open new military schools, 60 percent favor mandatory religious instruction in schools, and majorities oppose gay marriage and abortion. The progressive Brazil the world was accustomed to seeing, the Brazil of samba and Carnival, still exists; it hasn't disappeared. But the Brazil of 2020 is more like its president than many would care to admit.

League of Nationalists

How Trump and Modi Refashioned the U.S.-Indian Relationship

Shivshankar Menon

Under President Donald Trump, the United States' relations with many of its closest friends have deteriorated drastically. Longtime allies and partners in Asia, Europe, and North America have been reeling from the president's trade disputes, decisions to withdraw the United States from international treaties, allegations of free-riding, and "America first" approach to the world. German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke for many spurned allies when she said in 2017, "We Europeans must really take our fate into our own hands."

Yet some countries have had a very different experience. Governed by leaders who share Trump's worldview and politics, they have accepted the Trumpian terms of engagement and strengthened their ties with the United States as a result. Like Trump, these leaders see diplomacy as more about giving and getting favors than finding a common purpose. Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro, Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu, and Saudi Arabia's Mohammed bin Salman—all fit this mold. Yet the best example of the phenomenon may be Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, another leader who has resorted to ultranationalism to compensate for his divisive domestic agenda. Like the others, Modi has sought a closer relationship with Trump, and in this, he has succeeded.

Since Trump took office, Washington's relations with New Delhi have gone from strength to strength. U.S.-Indian defense and intelligence cooperation has reached new heights, and the two countries have anchored their work on maritime security in new agreements. Bilateral trade has grown steadily. At a personal level, the relationship between Modi and Trump is, in the words of India's foreign

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ministry, one of "friendship," "mutual esteem," and "exceptional warmth." In September 2019, the two leaders appeared together in Houston, Texas, at "Howdy, Modi!"—a mega-rally attended by some 50,000 Indian Americans. Months later, when Trump visited Ahmedabad, India, he was greeted by a crowd of more than 100,000. That so many would turn out was hardly a surprise in a country where, according to a 2020 Pew Research Center survey, 56 percent of the population has confidence in Trump to "do the right thing regarding world affairs"—compared with the global median of 29 percent.

This may seem like a rosy picture. But the relationship between the world's two largest democracies is now also much narrower. Where India and the United States once collaborated on a wide range of issues in pursuit of common goals, they now cooperate on security to the exclusion of much else. For India, as well as the countries making a similar bet, this is a risky gamble: the very policies that create comity in the short run are eroding the foundations that will stabilize it over the long run.

INTO EACH OTHER'S ARMS

Looming above everything, of course, is China. Whether because of a belief that its time has come or a result of internal stress, China has grown markedly more assertive over the past decade, and even in the past year. Chinese state media have called the new no-holds-barred approach of 2020 "Wolf Warrior diplomacy," after a pair of popular action movies. India is one of its targets. New Delhi has bristled at Beijing's expanding military presence in the Indian Ocean and stepped-up commitment to India's antagonistic sibling, Pakistan. India has also been frustrated by China's political meddling in Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka and its opposition to Indian interests in the UN and other international institutions.

Then there is the simmering border dispute. Beginning in April 2020, China escalated its efforts to redefine the Line of Actual Control, the boundary between the Ladakh region of India and Tibet, an autonomous region of China, a line that the two countries formally agreed to respect in 1993. On June 15, a skirmish broke out, killing 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese ones—the first deadly clash on the Chinese-Indian border in 45 years.

This is not the first time that Chinese assertiveness has given India and the United States a newfound incentive to cooperate. In the

late 1950s and early 1960s, during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, China and India butted heads over Tibet, which the Dalai Lama had fled for asylum in India. They even fought a one-month war over their Himalayan border in 1962. The United States, for its part, came to see democratic India as a regional counterweight to communist China. But that wore off under the Johnson administration, as the United States sought parity between India and Pakistan. Once U.S. President Richard Nixon began the process of normalizing relations with China—an outreach brokered by Pakistan—the nascent partnership with India petered out. Washington feared that nonaligned India was drifting too close to the Soviet Union. "By 1971," Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, later wrote, "our relations with India had achieved a state of exasperatedly strained cordiality, like a couple that can neither separate nor get along."

Today, India and the United States share a broad view of the challenge that China poses. They also agree on the specifics of what to do about it in the vast expanse of ocean stretching from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of the United States, a region that both now call "the Indo-Pacific." In 2017, India and the United States, along with Australia and Japan, revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad—a dormant forum focused on keeping the Indo-Pacific safe, free, and open. U.S.-Indian relations have also been aided by the removal of the Pakistan factor: the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is limiting the American impulse to court India's foe.

The result has been vastly improved bilateral defense cooperation—more equipment sales, more joint exercises, and more technological collaboration. Since 2008, U.S. defense exports to India have gone from zero to a cumulative $20 billion, and the United States now accounts for 15 percent of India's military equipment purchases. During the Trump administration, India has signed the type of defense agreements with the United States that eluded previous Indian governments, arrangements promoting the interoperability of the two countries' forces and covering everything from logistics to communications. Since 2005, the Indian armed forces have conducted more exercises with the U.S. military than with all other countries' militaries combined. The annual Malabar naval exercise, which began with India and the United States, now includes Japan and is expected to include Australia after a 13-year hiatus.

New Delhi and Washington are now linked by tighter economic bonds, too. In 2019, the United States overtook China as India's larg-

Can you feel the love tonight? Modi and Trump in Houston, Texas, September 2019

2020 IMAGES / ALAMY STOCK PHOTO

est trading partner. While India's two-way trade with China declined for the second successive year in 2019, to $84 billion, with the United States, the figure grew to $143 billion. India is the United States' ninth-largest goods trading partner, and U.S. exports to India in goods and services support some 200,000 U.S. jobs.

THE GREAT NARROWING

In many ways, then, U.S.-Indian relations are in better shape than ever. But they are also different from what previous U.S. and Indian governments had envisaged. Above all, they are now much narrower, encompassing a smaller set of issues. Once vibrant exchanges in education, agriculture, and science and technology have atrophied. Indian immigration to the United States has declined, and in June, citing the pandemic, the White House suspended H1-B visas, which allowed Indian technology professionals and their families to come to the United States. Thanks in part to Trump's more restrictive immigration policies, the number of Indians studying computer science and engineering at U.S. graduate programs fell by 25 percent between 2016 and 2018. Cumulatively, these trends will slow the growth

of one of the biggest sources of comity between the two countries: the nearly four million Indian Americans.

The real narrowing has been in the mind, with both sides now conceiving of the relationship in transactional, rather than principled, terms. Trump's disdain for world order, international institutions, and multilateral cooperation has been met with a shrug by Modi's government. Neither side seems to have a long-term strategic vision for the relationship. Unlike the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, the Trump administration has never displayed the conviction that India's rise is in the United States' interest. Modi's government, for its part, prioritizes domestic politics in its handling of foreign policy issues, and its international engagement focuses more on events and symbols than processes and outcomes.

This is not the first time that Chinese assertiveness has given India and the United States a newfound incentive to cooperate.

Under Modi, India has excluded Muslim immigrants from the path to citizenship and limited the autonomy of the Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir region. Uninterested in human rights and democracy, Trump has given the Modi government a free pass on its controversial domestic agenda. It has largely been Democrats, including Indian American members of Congress, such as Pramila Jayapal of Washington State and Ro Khanna of California, who have expressed public disquiet about some of Modi's domestic policies. The bipartisan consensus in the United States on strengthening ties with India is in danger.

A growing source of friction in the U.S.-Indian relationship concerns trade. Like Trump, Modi has turned toward protectionism. India has raised tariffs on imports for four years running, and in 2019, it opted out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—a proposed free-trade agreement among Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—just as eight years of negotiations were coming to a close. Already, the United States has pushed back against India's approach to intellectual property rights, its restrictions on dairy and agricultural imports, its requirement that manufacturers source components locally, and its rules regarding data privacy. Nor is it happy about India's commercial links with Iran and defense imports from Russia.

All in all, U.S.-Indian relations have benefited from the Trump effect, building on a 20-year effort to improve relations that has survived many changes of government in both countries. That should give one confidence for the future of the relationship. But it's also imaginable that things could get worse. If global economic growth slows, protectionism rises, and China's economy remains strong, there is a real possibility that the current Indian government could turn even further inward. Modi's calls for self-reliance could extend to import substitution, the strategy of discouraging foreign imports and encouraging domestic production, which India tried unsuccessfully beginning in the late 1950s. That strategy is unlikely to work any better this time around. And it could spell difficulty for the U.S.-Indian partnership in the long run, as two inward-looking countries will need each other less.

ROUGH NEIGHBORHOOD

Even on the central issue that has brought India and the United States closer together—China—there may be less overlap than meets the eye. Modi has walked a fine line on Beijing. Even as his government has moved closer to Washington, it has tried not to offend Beijing. Since 2017, India has toned down its criticism of the Belt and Road Initiative, China's massive global infrastructure project, which Indian officials privately resent as entrapping many regional neighbors. It has refrained from commenting on China's treatment of the Uighurs, its crackdown on Hong Kong, or its militarization of the South China Sea. Nor has India spoken up about China's mishandling of the COVID-19 outbreak. Modi's hope for a "free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific," which he outlined in 2018, differs from the American vision: it includes a place for China and concentrates on uncontroversial, win-win issues.

The recent border clash with China has persuaded even fence sitters in India of the value of closer ties with the United States, but the risk is that India may come to expect too much. In the years after the 1962 border war between China and India, U.S.-Indian cooperation foundered. The United States decided it needed to bring Pakistan into its fold, and it considered a nonaligned India an unreliable partner in the fight against communism. India, meanwhile, saw its politics turn leftist and populist. Today, the United States is unlikely to offer complete solutions to India's two main security problems, China

and Pakistan. New Delhi and Washington see eye to eye on maritime strategy, but not on what to do on the Asian mainland.

More broadly, partnership will be harder in an increasingly tense Asia. The list of hot spots now includes China's Xinjiang Province, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the South China Sea, the Chinese-Indian border, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, and Ukraine. To make matters worse, in the past decade, China, India, and the Philippines have seen the rise to power of authoritarian leaders who have been unable to deliver the rapid growth and prosperity that their predecessors did. Deriving their authority from ultranationalist politics and personality cults, these leaders are less interested in the give-and-take that is so essential for diplomacy.

Once vibrant exchanges in education, agriculture, and science and technology have atrophied.

At its root, however, Asia's volatility is a result of the shifting balance of power in the region. The Trump administration's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a broad free-trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific, left the field open to China to organize the regional economy. Not only is China doing that through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership; it is now also willing to join the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And Trump's direct negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear weapons and the lack of any meaningful outcome have weakened U.S. extended deterrence and raised the odds that first South Korea and then Japan could go nuclear.

China has worked diligently to change the military balance of power off its shores, attempting to convert the South China Sea into a Chinese lake. It has sought to demonstrate that the U.S. alliance system does not provide an answer to Chinese behavior, thus inducing countries in the region to enter into bilateral arrangements with China. The doubts that China is raising about the United States' willingness to exercise power are falling on receptive ears, particularly in Southeast Asia. At the same time, China has not been shy about using all forms of power itself—imposing a new national security law on Hong Kong, increasing its military presence around Taiwan, and waging a tariff war with Australia.

Chinese assertiveness on the Indian border has hardened opinions in India, and it will drive the country closer to the United States. China's "Wolf Warrior diplomacy" is unlikely to spark the creation of a NATO-like group of allies in Asia, for all the countries active in the region, in-

cluding India and the United States, have too much at stake to truly cut ties with China. But it would be reasonable to expect that the Quad will expand its activities and attempt to involve other Asian powers in them and that states in the region will broker stronger security arrangements.

THE COVID EFFECT

Some in China have suggested that as the world settles into the COVID-19 pandemic, it will divide in two: a group of East Asian countries led by China that are relatively successful in suppressing the pandemic and staging an economic recovery and a West mired in repeated waves of disease that has trouble regaining its economic momentum. This prediction seems self-serving and unlikely to come true. What has in fact happened is that the pandemic has diminished every major power's economy, reputation, and influence. Not one has been unscathed. The more likely future is thus one of greater protectionism on the part of all the major powers and a fragmented, slowly growing global economy. Asia, in particular, is in for considerable turbulence.

India and the United States need to adjust to this poorer, smaller world. If the two turn inward and prove unable to act together and with other partners, both will suffer. But because the two countries' domestic politics have become so polarized, no matter who wins the U.S. presidential election in November, it is hard to imagine U.S.-Indian relations returning to the glory days of the early years of this century. Moreover, as U.S.-Chinese tensions grow, as they almost inevitably will, both China and the United States may ask Asian countries to choose between them. That would be an awkward choice for India. Its logical posture has always been to seek better relations with China and the United States than each has with the other. But if push comes to shove, self-interest will likely compel India to choose the United States.

For the present, then, India will continue to seek security in a strengthened military partnership with the United States. Yet it would be a shame if that continued to be the extent of the relationship. Ideally, their cooperation would go far beyond military questions. On so many transnational issues—cybersecurity, freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, counterterrorism, and climate change, to name a few—New Delhi and Washington are natural partners linked by common interests and values. With imagination and vision on both sides, one hopes, India and the United States will someday attain the relationship they deserve.

The Kremlin's Plot Against Democracy

How Russia Updated Its 2016 Playbook for 2020

Alina Polyakova

As the United States gets ready for the 2020 presidential election, there is reason to think that this time, the country might be spared the massive interference campaign that Russia carried out in 2016. Back then, Moscow had a clear opportunity. The cost of running the Internet Research Agency (IRA), the St. Petersburg–based troll farm set up by the Kremlin to spread disinformation during the U.S. election, was about $1.25 million a month. That was a small price to pay for a remarkable foreign policy coup: a seemingly pro-Russian U.S. president in Donald Trump, a humiliating defeat for Hillary Clinton (whom Russian President Vladimir Putin had long disliked), and, above all, a chance to expose U.S. democracy as dysfunctional. Unprepared and seemingly unaware of the planned Russian operation, the United States was low-hanging fruit.

Four years on, Moscow's calculus is less straightforward. The pandemic and the ensuing crash in oil prices hit the country hard, and Putin's approval ratings have taken a nosedive. In the past, the Russian president has used foreign policy wins, such as the 2014 invasion of Crimea and Russia's years-long intervention in Syria, to maintain his support at home. The unspoken contract behind this strategy—that making Russia great again on the world stage was worth some economic sacrifices by its citizens—had grown fragile even before the pandemic. Now, with the Russian economy on a

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path to long-term stagnation, the majority of Russians want their government to focus on the problems at home. Selling them another foreign policy adventure will be a tall order.

On top of these domestic concerns, the Kremlin would need to work harder in order to manipulate U.S. voters and cover its tracks this time around. A growing cottage industry of analysts now monitors Russia's disinformation operations across the world. Social media companies have become more aggressive in taking down networks of inauthentic accounts and bots, and they are more willing to point the finger at Moscow and other governments. And the investigation by the U.S. special counsel Robert Mueller revealed the Kremlin's operational tactics in impressive detail, naming both IRA employees and operatives of the GRU, Russia's military intelligence unit, which carried out cyberattacks against the Democratic National Committee and the Clinton campaign.

Yet it's equally plausible that Russia might try again. As Putin positions himself to be Russia's leader for life, undermining faith in democracy writ large is still very much in the Kremlin's interest. Most of Russia's interference in 2016 aimed to amplify divisions around hot-button social issues such as race, immigration, and religion. These divisions have only deepened in the coronavirus era, providing even more ample opportunities to incite chaos. A more divided United States means a more inward-looking White House that will be less concerned with pushing back against Russia's activities in Syria, Ukraine, and elsewhere. And if the Kremlin once feared the potential consequences of exposure, the United States' mild response after 2016 put those fears to rest. Although it laid bare the extent of Russia's meddling, the special counsel's investigation resulted in only 13 indictments of Russian nationals, mostly low-level IRA and GRU operatives. The U.S. Congress imposed additional targeted sanctions on individual Russian officials and entities but shied away from more aggressive measures, such as instituting broad sanctions on Russian business sectors or restricting Russian financial institutions' access to the SWIFT international banking payment system. All the while, Trump, who considers any mention of Russian meddling an attack on his own legitimacy, repeatedly went against his country's intelligence community by believing Putin's denials.

The Russian government came away emboldened, judging from its daring covert actions in the years since. In 2018, the GRU poisoned and

nearly killed the former double agent Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom, and earlier this year, it was reported that Russia had orchestrated a scheme in 2019 to pay Taliban fighters bounties for attacks on U.S. troops in Afghanistan. At the same time, Russia's disinformation peddlers have refined their tactics, with social media accounts linked to Russia spreading falsehoods on a number of topics, from the Skripal attack to the Catalan independence movement to the pandemic.

The U.S. government, meanwhile, has responded tepidly to Russian meddling and is now consumed by the pandemic. Russia and others know they are pushing on an open door. With new players in the disinformation game, in all likelihood, 2020 will not be a replay of 2016. It will be far worse.

A TSUNAMI OF FALSEHOODS

A big part of the risk is that Russia is no longer the sole danger. The lack of serious retaliation or long-lasting consequences for its behavior has effectively left the door open for others to follow Russia's lead. To these newcomers, the Kremlin's 2016 operation against the United States offers a handy step-by-step guide.

Step one is to build an audience. As early as 2014, the IRA had set up fake social media accounts purportedly belonging to ordinary Americans. Using those accounts, it created online content that was not necessarily divisive or even political but simply designed to attract attention. One IRA Instagram account, @army_of_jesus, initially posted image stills from *The Muppet Show* and *The Simpsons*. Between 2015 and 2017, the IRA also purchased a total of over 3,500 online ads for approximately $100,000 to promote its pages.

Step two is to flip the switch. Once an IRA-run account gained some following, it suddenly began publishing increasingly divisive content on race, immigration, and religion. One prominent account was the anti-immigrant Facebook group Secured Borders; another was a pro–Black Lives Matter pair of Facebook and Twitter accounts called "Blacktivist." The most popular IRA-controlled group, United Muslims of America, had over 300,000 followers on Facebook by mid-2017, when Facebook deactivated the account. Many of the accounts began publishing anti-Clinton content in 2015, adding pro-Trump messaging to the mix the following year.

Step three is to make it real. In time, the IRA's fake accounts sent private messages to their real-life followers, urging Americans to or-

ganize rallies that would sometimes pit opposing groups against each other. According to the special counsel's investigation, the IRA Instagram account Stand for Freedom tried to organize a pro-Confederate rally in Houston as early as 2015. The next year, another IRA-organized rally in Houston, against the "Islamization" of Texas, pitted protesters and counterprotesters against each other outside the Islamic Dawah Center. In all, the special counsel's investigation identified dozens of IRA-organized rallies in the United States.

When it comes to disinformation, 2020 will not be a replay of 2016. It will be far worse.

The IRA was able to reach millions and millions of people—126 million through Facebook alone, according to the company, and 1.4 million through Twitter. The GRU's publication of thousands of stolen Clinton campaign emails dominated news headlines for months, tarnishing the image of the Democratic Party and the Clinton campaign. Such success in reaching large numbers of Americans at a relatively low cost did not go unnoticed, especially by authoritarian regimes. The Iranian government, for example, has stepped up its disinformation operations over the last two years, using methods that are often reminiscent of the IRA's. In 2018, Facebook removed accounts, pages, and groups associated with two disinformation campaigns (or "inauthentic coordinated behavior," in the company's language) originating in Iran. One of the campaigns targeted users in the United Kingdom, the United States, Latin America, and the Middle East. It copied the IRA's focus on divisive social issues, especially race, promoting memes in support of the former NFL player and social justice activist Colin Kaepernick and cartoons criticizing the future U.S. Supreme Court justice Brett Kavanaugh. Another Iranian campaign, in January 2019, focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the wars in Syria and Yemen and targeted Facebook and Twitter users in dozens of countries, including France, Germany, India, and the United States. At least one of the Iranian-controlled Facebook pages involved had amassed some two million followers. Earlier this year, Facebook removed another set of accounts linked to Iran that it suspected of targeting the United States ahead of the presidential election.

A host of other countries, including Bangladesh, Egypt, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, and Venezuela, have also fallen afoul of Facebook's and Twitter's rules against disin-

formation campaigns. But perhaps the most important new player is China. Until recently, Beijing mostly limited its propaganda efforts to its own neighborhood: at the height of the Hong Kong protests in the summer of 2019, Facebook and Twitter for the first time removed accounts and pages linked to the Chinese government; these had been spreading false information about the protests and questioning their legitimacy. In its attempts to change the narrative on how it handled its COVID-19 outbreak, however, Beijing has grown more ambitious: at the peak of the pandemic in Europe this past spring, China unleashed a series of disinformation attacks on several European states, spreading false information about the origins of the virus and the effectiveness of democracies' responses to the crisis. This prompted the EU to take the unprecedented step of directly and publicly rebuking Beijing in June of this year.

Future elections in the United States and other democracies will face an onslaught of disinformation and conspiracy theories emanating not just from Russia but also from China, Iran, Venezuela, and beyond. The attacks will come through a number of channels: traditional state-sponsored media, fly-by-night digital outlets, and fake social media accounts and pages. They will deploy artificial intelligence technologies to produce realistic deepfakes—audio and video material generated by artificial intelligence that cannot be easily discerned as such. They will be coordinated across major social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube, but also across smaller platforms, such as Medium, Pinterest, and Reddit, which are less equipped to defend themselves. New Chinese social media platforms, such as the fast-growing video-sharing app TikTok, will be unlikely to bow to U.S. political pressure to expose disinformation campaigns, especially those carried out by Beijing. Russia's "firehose of falsehood," as researchers at the RAND Corporation have called it, will turn into a worldwide tsunami.

The Russian playbook has been copied by others, but it has also evolved, in large part thanks to Moscow's own innovations. After social media companies got better at verifying accounts, for instance, Russia began looking for ways to roll out its campaigns without relying on fake online profiles. In the run-up to the 2019 presidential election in Ukraine—long a testing ground for Moscow's new forms of political warfare—Russian agents tried their hand at account "rentals." At least one apprehended agent confessed to trying to pay

unsuspecting Ukrainians to temporarily hand over some control of their Facebook accounts. The agent planned to use these authentic accounts to promote misleading content and buy political ads.

Moscow has tested similar methods elsewhere. In the lead-up to the 2018 presidential election in Madagascar, Russian agents established a print newspaper and hired students to write positive articles about the incumbent president. The agents also bought billboards and television ads, paid protesters to attend rallies, and then paid journalists to write about them. In the fall of 2019, a massive disinformation campaign linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Russian businessman and Putin confidant who allegedly set up the IRA, brought the new rental strategy to several other African countries, including Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Mozambique, and Sudan. In each case, Russian operatives worked with locals in order to hide the true origins of the campaign, disguising a foreign influence operation as the voices of domestic actors.

A barrage of attacks could leave governments and social media companies scrambling to catch up.

Setting up shell media and social media entities, as Russia did in Africa, is more scalable than the co-optation of individual social media accounts, allowing Russia to reach a larger audience. Most important, however, it lets Russia eradicate that telltale of foreign interference: foreign-based accounts whose location gives away their true identity. In just four years, the once clear line between domestic and foreign disinformation has basically disappeared.

Americans could also be induced to rent out their social media accounts—or, in a twisted version of the gig economy, convinced to run disinformation campaigns themselves. U.S. citizens could even become unwitting pawns in such an effort, since Russian agents could easily set up seemingly legitimate shell companies and pay in U.S. dollars. They could also reach out to their targets through encrypted messaging platforms such as WhatsApp (as they did in Africa), adding another layer of secrecy. And because false content that is in fact pushed by foreigners could look like genuine domestic conversations protected by the First Amendment, it would be trickier to crack down on it. A barrage of attacks, combined with the increasingly sophisticated methods used to avoid detection, could leave governments, social media companies, and researchers scrambling to catch up.

BRACE FOR IMPACT

The United States is woefully underprepared for such a scenario, having done little to deter new attacks. Since 2016, the U.S. Congress has not passed any major legislation targeting disinformation peddlers other than the limited sanctions against individual Russian officials and entities, nor has it mandated that social media companies take action. In fact, it is unclear who in the U.S. government even owns the problem. The Global Engagement Center is tasked with countering state-sponsored disinformation, but as part of the State Department, it has no mandate to act inside the United States. A group of government agencies has published guidance on how the federal government should alert the American public of foreign interference, but it is weak on specifics. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency produced an entertaining leaflet showing how easy it is to polarize an online community on seemingly benign issues, such as putting pineapple on a pizza. That agency's parent organization, the Department of Homeland Security, has worked to secure the physical machinery of elections, updating and replacing electronic voting machines and strengthening security around the storage of voter data. And it has tried to improve information sharing among federal, state, and local election authorities. Those are important measures for defending against an election hack, but they are useless against foreign disinformation operations. And Trump's tendency to blur the facts and undermine U.S. intelligence agencies has only worsened Americans' confusion about the nature of the 2016 Russian attack, which in turn leaves them vulnerable to future operations aimed at undermining trust in the democratic process.

Social media companies, for their part, have their own patchwork of responses and policies. Whereas Twitter has banned all political advertising (and even restricted the visibility of some of Trump's tweets for violating its policy against abusive behavior), Facebook has said it will allow political ads regardless of their veracity. Concerned with user privacy, social media companies have also been reluctant to share data with outsiders, which makes it difficult for governments and independent groups to inform the public about the scope of the threat. In the United States, the First Amendment's far-reaching protections for free speech add another layer of complexity as companies attempt to navigate the gray areas of content moderation.

A bevy of research groups, consultancies, and nonprofits have emerged to expose disinformation campaigns, advise political cam-

ITAR-TASS / ALAMY STOCK PHOTO

Don't feed the trolls: Prigozhin in Moscow, March 2017

paigns about them, and develop potential tools for responding to future threats such as deepfakes. But exposure in itself is not enough to deter adversaries or even to keep up with the rapid evolution of their tactics. Sometimes, detailing the methods of a disinformation campaign merely provides others a blueprint to follow. The same can happen when Russia watchers explain their methods for detecting disinformation operations: once those methods are out in the open, Russia and others will seek to circumvent them. And so companies, researchers, and governments are stuck playing a game of whack-a-mole, shutting down disinformation campaigns as they arise without any proactive strategy to prevent them in the first place.

It is late, but not too late, to shore up U.S. defenses in time for the November election. The focus should be Russia, given its status as the main originator and innovator of disinformation operations. Fortunately for Washington, the Kremlin tends to make carefully calculated decisions. Putin has shown himself willing to take risks in his foreign policy, but there is a limit to the costs he will incur. Washington's task is therefore to increase the pain Moscow will feel if it engages in further disinformation campaigns. Doing so would in turn send a clear message to other states looking to mimic Russia.

As a first step, the U.S. government should add individuals and state-linked entities that engage in disinformation campaigns to its sanctions list. Existing executive orders and the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, passed by Congress in 2017, give the government the authority to be far more aggressive on this front. Changing states' behavior through sanctions, as the United States aimed to do with the now defunct Iran nuclear deal, requires an expansive sanctions regime that ties good behavior to sanctions relief. That effort has been lacking in the case of Russia. A more assertive sanctions policy, which would likely require new legislation, could sanction the entire Russian cyberwarfare apparatus—government agencies, specific technology companies, and cybercriminals.

It is late, but not too late, to shore up U.S. defenses in time for the November election.

Second, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development should expand funding for independent research groups and investigative journalists working on exposing Russian-linked corruption across the world. The 2017 Panama Papers investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists revealed rampant corruption in Putin's inner circle. Little is known about how such corruption helps finance state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, but the funds devoted to setting up the IRA most certainly came from illicit sources. Identifying Russia's complex web of illicit finance is critical in order to cut the lifeline to such operations. Once companies, individuals, and other entities are identified as being involved in illicit financing schemes in support of disinformation campaigns and cyber-operations, they should be sanctioned. But such investigative work is expensive and sometimes dangerous. In 2018, for example, three Russian journalists were killed in the Central African Republic while investigating the activities of the Wagner Group, a Prigozhin-controlled private military organization linked to Russia's 2019 disinformation campaigns in Africa.

Perhaps most important, the U.S. government must do much more to explain to its citizens what state-sponsored disinformation is and why they should care. Ahead of national elections in 2018, the Swedish government went as far as mailing every household in the country an explanatory leaflet detailing what disinformation is, how to identify it, and what to do about it. Other European governments, such as the United Kingdom during the Skripal scandal, have

developed strategic communications campaigns to counter false narratives. The European Union, through its foreign affairs arm, has set up a rapid-response mechanism for member states to share information about foreign disinformation campaigns. Washington could learn from the experiences of its partners. With a president who still questions the overwhelming evidence of Russian interference four years ago, this will be a hard task for the U.S. government to take on, if it is possible at all. Unless Washington acts now, however, Americans may soon look back at the 2020 election with the same shock and incredulity that they felt in 2016. This time, they will have only themselves to blame.

An Answer to Aggression

How to Push Back Against Beijing

Aaron L. Friedberg

The Chinese Communist Party's initial mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic and its subsequent attempts to exploit the crisis have produced enduring problems for the rest of the world. But the CCP's behavior has also helped clarify the threat that China poses to the security, prosperity, and well-being of other countries. Public opinion polls show that over 60 percent of Americans of both political parties now hold a negative view of Beijing's leadership and intentions, and similar attitudes can be found across the democratic world. This heightened awareness of a shared danger creates an opportunity for the United States and its allies to formulate a new and more effective strategy for dealing with China.

For the past four decades, Western democracies have hoped that engagement with China would cause its leaders to abandon any revisionist ambitions they might harbor and accept their country's place as a "responsible stakeholder" in the U.S.-led international order. Expanding flows of trade and investment would, it was thought, also encourage Beijing to proceed down the path toward greater economic and political openness. The policy of engagement was not absurd on its face; it was a gamble rather than an outright blunder. But as has become increasingly obvious, the West's wager has failed to pay off.

Instead of opening up and mellowing out, with Xi Jinping at the helm, China is pursuing unusually brutal and oppressive policies at home and acting more aggressively abroad. China is trying to replace the United States as the world's leading economic and technological nation and to displace it as the preponderant power in East Asia. Beijing has ratcheted up its efforts to exploit the openness of democratic societies in order to shape the perceptions and policies of their govern-

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ments. It is working hard to establish itself as the leader of the developing nations and, with their support, to rewrite rules and reshape international norms, standards, and institutions in line with its own illiberal, authoritarian preferences. In the long run, China's rulers evidently hope that they can divide, discredit, and weaken the democracies, lessening the appeal of their system, co-opting some, isolating others, and leaving the United States at the head of what will be, at best, a diminished and enfeebled coalition.

It is one thing to have such dreams, another to actually fulfill them. In addition to its impressive strengths, China has large and mounting liabilities, including a slowing economy, a rapidly aging population, and a system of governance that relies on costly coercion rather than the freely given consent of its people. These liabilities will complicate the regime's plans and could eventually derail them. But it would be imprudent to assume that this will happen soon or of its own accord.

Deflecting Beijing from its present, revisionist path will naturally require defensive measures. In the face of China's growing strength, the United States and its allies need to bolster their defenses against overt acts of military aggression or coercion. They must also do more to protect their economies from exploitation and their societies and political systems from penetration and subversion.

But better defenses alone will not suffice. An effective strategy must also have a strong offensive component; it must be designed to identify and exploit the CCP regime's vulnerabilities instead of simply responding to its actions or trying to match its strengths. A purely reactive posture might have been adequate for dealing with a far weaker, nascent rival, but it cannot succeed against an opponent as powerful and aggressive as China has become. Even as they block Beijing's attempts to advance toward its goals, the United States and its allies must therefore find ways to regain the initiative.

The aims of this approach should be twofold: first, to deny Beijing its immediate objectives, imposing costs, slowing the growth of China's power and influence, and reducing the threat it can pose to democracies and to an open international system; and second, by demonstrating the futility of China's current strategy, to change the calculations of its ruling elite, forcing them to eventually rethink both their foreign and their domestic policies. This will take time, and given Xi's obvious predispositions and commitments, success may well depend on changes in the top leadership of the CCP.

As a National Security Council white paper that the White House released in May notes, it would be foolish to premise U.S. strategy on "determining a particular end state for China." But Washington need not be fatalistic. Even as they acknowledge that China's future is not theirs to decide, the United States and its allies should articulate a hope for deeper reforms that will someday change the fundamental character of the regime. The democracies should not waver in their insistence that universal values do in fact exist and that all people, including China's citizens, are entitled to the rights and freedoms that flow from those values. Anything less would be a betrayal of principle, and of those in China who hold fast to this belief.

A LENINIST STATE IN A LIBERAL ORDER

Ever since the founding of the People's Republic of China, in 1949, the nation's leaders have felt threatened from within and without. The principal danger has always been the United States, which Chinese leaders have seen as working tirelessly to constrain their country, even as it has spoken earnestly of engagement. In Beijing's view, the United States has sought to encircle China with a ring of alliances. It has also challenged the legitimacy and endangered the survival of the CCP's one-party Leninist system by proclaiming the existence of a liberal international order based on principles at odds with authoritarian rule.

Faced with these threats, the party has pursued three essential goals: to preserve its monopoly on political power, to restore China to its rightful place as the dominant power in Asia, and to demonstrate the superiority of its socialist system by transforming the country into a truly global player whose wealth, power, and influence will eventually exceed those of the United States. Although these goals have not changed over time, Beijing's confidence in its ability to achieve them has. After a period of relative quiescence, the regime now feels strong enough to push back, not only against the material strength and physical presence of the United States and its democratic allies but also against the insidious threat of their liberal democratic ideals.

A turning point in this process came shortly after the 2008 financial crisis. The near collapse of the global economy aroused a mix of anxiety and optimism among the CCP elite, deepening fears about their own ability to sustain growth and stay in power, while persuading them that the United States and other liberal democracies had entered a period of decline. Beijing responded with repression and



Leading man: Xi in Beijing, March 2018

nationalism at home, mercantilism and assertiveness abroad. These tendencies became much more pronounced after Xi came to power in 2012. Under Xi, the CCP has finally abandoned Deng Xiaoping's advice to "hide its capabilities and bide its time."

Despite his swagger, Xi is driven by a sense of urgency. He is keenly aware of his country's many problems. CCP strategists have also anticipated for some time that China's growing power would eventually provoke counterbalancing from others. If such a response comes too soon, they recognize, it could choke off China's access to Western markets and technology, halting its rise before it can achieve a sufficient degree of self-reliance.

Unlike other, earlier rising powers, such as the United States, which established regional dominance before pursuing their global ambitions, China is trying to do both at once. The mix of instruments used varies with distance. Close to home, Beijing is expanding its conventional anti-access/area-denial capabilities and modernizing its nuclear arsenal in an effort to weaken the credibility of U.S. security guarantees and undermine the network of democratic alliances that rests on them. But because China's capacity to project military power over long distances is limited, the further

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from its own borders China goes, the more it must rely on other tools—namely, economic statecraft and political influence operations.

With the advanced industrial democracies, Beijing wants to preserve the status quo, which it considers favorable, for as long as possible. The regime seeks to discourage these countries from implementing tougher policies by highlighting the benefits of continued cooperation and the costs of potential conflict. It wants them to believe that they face a choice between, on the one hand, continued profits and collaboration on issues such as climate change and communicable diseases and, on the other, the terrifying specter of protectionism, deglobalization, and a new Cold War. The regime hopes that the democracies will choose the promise of cooperation, thus safeguarding Chinese access to Western markets and technology, which are still essential to the country's quest to become a high-tech superpower.

Beijing will beat the nationalist drum no matter how Washington and its allies behave.

With its massive Belt and Road Initiative, a network of infrastructure projects that stretches across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, China seeks to secure resources, tap new markets, and expand its military reach. But Beijing also aims to cement its self-proclaimed position as leader of the global South. Abandoning its past reluctance to be seen as posing an ideological challenge to the West, it now openly offers its mix of authoritarian politics and quasi-market economics as a model for nations that want to, in Xi's words, "speed up their development while preserving their independence."

The CCP is also leveraging its relationships with elites in the developing world to gain influence in international institutions (such as the World Health Organization) and encouraging developing countries to enter new groupings that it can more easily dominate. Rejecting what he calls the "so-called universal values" of liberal democracy and human rights, Xi has declared his desire to build a nonjudgmental "community of common destiny" in which China would naturally take the lead.

To an underappreciated degree, the global South appears to be central to the CCP's strategy. China's rulers may not want to rule the world, but as the analyst Nadège Rolland has argued, they do aspire to a "partial, loose, and malleable hegemony" over much of it. Taking a page from Mao Zedong's peasant-centric playbook, today's leaders

may also believe that they can "encircle the cities from the countryside," rallying poorer nations to roll back the influence of a divided, demoralized, and declining West.

THE COOPERATION TRAP

A more competitive stance toward China does not preclude working with it when interests converge. But Washington shouldn't get its hopes up. Seemingly sensible proposals that the United States engage in "responsible competition" or "cooperate while competing" overlook the zero-sum mentality of China's current rulers and understate their ambitions. As the CCP's mishandling of the COVID-19 outbreak made plain, just because transnational policy coordination is desirable does not mean it will be forthcoming. Democratic governments must avoid the familiar trap of allowing the alluring prospect of cooperation to take precedence over the urgent necessity of competition.

Nor should the democracies worry that tougher polices will empower hawks in the CCP. At this point, there is no evidence that doves are nesting quietly in its upper ranks. Persistent opposition to Xi's current course is more likely to force change than further attempts at accommodation. The dominant hawks must be discredited before any doves can be expected to emerge.

Faced with greater resistance to its actions, Beijing will inevitably blame "hostile foreign forces" and amp up its patriotic rhetoric. But these are well-worn tactics that have been deployed even when the United States was bending over backward to get along. Beijing will beat the nationalist drum no matter how Washington and its allies behave. All that the democracies can do is convey as clearly as possible that their stiffer stance comes in response to the CCP leadership's misguided policies.

Beyond heightening its rhetoric, the regime may manufacture crises, both to play to a domestic audience and to discourage foreign powers from challenging it. This is a real danger, as the June skirmish on the Chinese-Indian border suggested, but it should not be exaggerated. Despite being strategically forward-leaning, the CCP has generally been cautious in its tactics. It has shown no inclination to lash out blindly or enter into confrontations that it has reason to fear it may lose or that could spin out of control. Nevertheless, a strategy that applies greater pressure to Beijing must be accompanied by enhanced defenses and a stronger deterrent.

BATTLEGROUND ASIA

The starting point for a successful U.S. strategy lies in preserving a favorable balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific. If China can control the waters off its coasts and sow enough doubt about U.S. security guarantees, it will be able to reshape relations with its maritime neighbors in ways that enhance its power while freeing up resources to pursue aims in other regions. Absorbing Taiwan, for example, could give China control of some of the high-tech manufacturing capabilities that it needs to strengthen its military and economy.

It will be especially difficult for Washington to right the military balance in a time of tighter defense budgets, but it can be done. Pentagon planners will have to shift scarce resources away from the Middle East and Europe and toward the Indo-Pacific, while deepening cooperation with regional allies (particularly Australia and Japan) and democratic partners (including India and Taiwan). They also need to prioritize the development and large-scale acquisition of relatively inexpensive weapons, such as long-range conventional missiles and unmanned air and undersea vehicles, that can offset China's sizable investments in its anti-access/area-denial capabilities and its growing surface fleet.

A successful strategy for long-term military competition with China must also have an offensive component. Greater investment in undersea warfare is an area of particular promise in this regard. By upgrading their already substantial capabilities in this domain, the United States and its allies would highlight the possibility of a maritime blockade of China. That, in turn, could reinforce Beijing's inclination to build uneconomical overland pipelines and transportation infrastructure. It would also force China to invest more in antisubmarine warfare—a costly and difficult business in which its navy has little experience. For similar reasons, the United States and its allies should refine their capabilities to deliver precision strikes with stealthy cruise missiles, conventional ballistic missiles, and hypersonic delivery vehicles. This could induce Chinese planners to throw money at underground bunkers and air and missile defenses, including for its newly built and potentially vulnerable island bases in the South China Sea, rather than spending still more on their own offensive forces. Such U.S. and allied investments should be designed to redirect a greater portion of China's military budget toward capabilities that are less threatening to the United States and its allies and away from those that are more so.



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THE GROWTH GAME

The world's democracies opened the doors to their economies and societies on the assumption that doing so would cause China's system to converge with their own. Instead, they now find themselves vulnerable to a massive and powerful state that rejects their values and threatens their prosperity and security.

In the economic realm, what is required is not total decoupling but partial disengagement, a substantial realignment of trade and investment policies that takes account of three facts. First, for the foreseeable future, Beijing is not going to abandon its problematic policies of stealing technology, subsidizing industry, and restricting access to its market. Despite their win-win rhetoric, Chinese leaders are mercantilists; they see economic relations as yet another zero-sum struggle in which the goal is not primarily to improve their citizens' welfare but to enhance the power of the party and the nation. Second, because of the nature of the Chinese system and Beijing's doctrine of "civil-military fusion," even nominally private companies must be regarded as likely tools of the state. And finally, a China ruled by the CCP is not merely an economic competitor but also a geopolitical and ideological rival.

In light of these facts, the United States and other advanced industrial countries can no longer afford to treat China as just another trading partner. Doing so only accelerates the growth of China's power while weakening the foundations of their own. The democracies should do nothing to make it easier for Beijing to sustain its growth without far-reaching reforms of the sort that engagement was intended to encourage.

To defend themselves against surveillance or sabotage, Washington and its partners must restrict the role of Chinese companies in building information technology networks and other sensitive infrastructure and prevent them from acquiring more of their citizens' personal data. The democracies also need to limit their reliance on China for some critical materials and manufactured goods, using tax incentives to encourage the diversification of supply chains. If the CCP continues to wield trade as a weapon, the democracies will have no choice but to limit their overall dependence on the Chinese market.

For military and commercial reasons, the United States needs to preserve and extend its advantages in high technology. This will require a mix of defense and offense, running faster to stay ahead and doing more to slow China down. To foster innovation, the U.S.

government needs to invest more in education and basic research, encourage greater cooperation with the private sector, and adopt immigration policies that attract talented people from around the world. At the same time, Washington must work with like-minded countries to reduce the rate at which ideas and technologies first developed in their university, corporate, and government laboratories diffuse to China. These efforts will not prevent China from advancing, but they will slow its progress and force it to bear more of the costs of innovation.

Some of the ways in which China obtains technology are clearly illegal. The United States must toughen its enforcement of existing laws against intellectual property theft and cyber-espionage, but it should also go further and punish violators with tariffs on their products and restrictions on their ability to raise capital in U.S. financial markets. Given Beijing's mercantilist practices and hostile intent, even Chinese companies that are not violating the law must be subject to greater scrutiny and special restrictions. Proposed investments from China should be tightly screened, and stricter limits should be imposed on the export of critical technologies, such as the machinery and software required for manufacturing high-end semiconductors. Washington has made strides in these areas, but it has tended to do so unilaterally. Undertaking these measures on a multilateral basis would give them teeth.

More generally, the United States must abandon for the moment the dream of building a fully integrated global economy. Instead, it should work with like-minded countries to rebuild and strengthen a partial liberal trading system, one in which all the participants genuinely adhere to the same principles of openness and defend their interests against those that do not. This is the best way to promote trade among the democracies and reduce Beijing's economic leverage—forcing it to pay a price for its predatory behavior and perhaps, with enough time and pressure, convincing it to change.

PROTECTING OPEN SOCIETIES

The CCP exploits the openness of liberal societies and, in particular, their commitment to freedom of speech. Its use of social media platforms banned in China to spread disinformation about COVID-19 in the West is just the most recent illustration of this phenomenon. Many of Beijing's influence operations are more subtle. In an effort to shape the percep-

tions of foreign elites, it engages them in profitable business ventures, hires local lawyers and lobbyists to sway them, and donates generously to the influential think tanks and universities they frequent.

Most of these activities are legal in the United States, and many are the hallmarks of a free society. Nevertheless, tighter rules are clearly required in certain areas. Former members of Congress, military officers, and executive-branch officials should be barred from lobbying for companies from countries (such as China) that the U.S. government has identified as posing a security threat. And private institutions such as think tanks and universities should have to disclose the gifts they receive from foreign entities.

The United States can no longer afford to treat China as just another trading partner.

In addition to passing stronger laws, the democracies should focus on increasing public awareness of what the CCP calls "United Front" tactics. These typically involve employing seemingly unofficial Chinese organizations or private individuals to gain access to influential institutions and people in target countries. More readily available information about the links between these intermediaries and the organs of the party-state would help reduce the risks of manipulation. Their counterparts in democracies must also be made to understand that in today's China, there is no such thing as a truly independent think tank, foundation, university, or company.

The American higher education system is an extraordinarily valuable asset that attracts people from the world over. Although the vast majority of students and researchers from China pose no threat, prudence demands restrictions on those who are affiliated with the People's Liberation Army or other elements of China's security apparatus. Scientists and engineers who choose to accept funding from and share their expertise through Beijing's talent-recruitment programs, whether Chinese nationals or American citizens, should be barred from taking part in projects funded by the U.S. government. And to directly impose costs on the CCP elite, Washington should restrict educational and other visas for party officials involved in human rights abuses or other noxious and threatening activities, along with members of their families.

The challenge for the United States and other free societies is to do all of this while remaining as open as possible to individual Chinese citizens who have legitimate reasons to study, work, and live in

their countries. Continued openness helps undercut the CCP's claims that Western democracies have a problem with the Chinese people, rather than with their government.

WINNING OVER THE DEVELOPING WORLD

As the pandemic spreads across the developing world, it will create opportunities for China to deepen its influence there. If countries that have received loans through the Belt and Road Initiative are unable to repay their debts to Chinese lenders because they have been stricken by the virus, Beijing may seize the valuable assets or natural resources they put up as collateral. Or it may seek to accrue political capital, and gain future diplomatic leverage, by renegotiating the loans on more favorable terms.

Beijing is in a tight spot. If it insists on the prompt repayment of outstanding loans despite the current crisis, it should be held accountable for the additional hardship that results. On the other hand, if some of their debtors default, Chinese banks will suffer losses, and Xi may face renewed criticism at home for his costly overseas adventures. In any event, the United States and the other advanced democracies should ensure that the support that international institutions offer distressed countries is not funneled directly to Beijing, bailing it out of a problem of its own creation.

China must be made to bear the reputational costs of its exploitative practices. Beijing is allergic to accusations that it engages in "debt-trap diplomacy," an aversion that can be reinforced with continued scrutiny, especially from independent journalists and local nongovernmental organizations. Governments and nongovernmental organizations in the advanced democracies can make developing countries more resistant to Chinese influence by helping strengthen these institutions of civil society.

Washington cannot oppose every one of China's expanding activities in the developing world, nor should it try to. Some of China's investments will prove wasteful, others may provoke a local backlash, and some could even draw Beijing into counterinsurgencies or other costly armed conflicts. When its gambits in the developing world saddle Beijing with new burdens and generate new vulnerabilities, Washington and its allies should not stand in the way. At the same time, to prevent developing countries from being drawn still further into China's orbit, the democracies must have something positive to

offer. That may include aid, medical assistance, more educational visas, and improved access to their own markets. Western governments should also work with established international institutions and private investors to fund infrastructure projects that are built to high standards, using local labor, and on reasonable financial terms. Here, as in other areas, the objective should be to regain the initiative rather than merely respond to China's actions.

WAGING POLITICAL WARFARE

For all its investment in information control, in the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, China was unable to prevent critical commentary and damaging images from circulating domestically. The authorities soon regained their grip, silencing critics and unleashing a torrent of self-praise, detailed accounts of disorder in other countries, and disinformation about the source of the virus. Yet the episode highlighted both the importance that the CCP attaches to shaping how others speak and think about its actions and the difficulty of actually doing so.

The democracies should not abandon their efforts to penetrate China's tightly controlled information sphere. They should continue to invest in methods of circumventing the "Great Firewall." But finger-wagging and public diplomacy campaigns are not the right approach. Instead, the goal should be to amplify critical Chinese voices and to enable accurate information about what is happening inside China's borders to flow back into the country. Before the pandemic began, the Chinese public was already concerned about the CCP's corruption, unfair treatment of ordinary citizens, and wasteful overseas investments. Especially if the coming economic recovery is slow, dissatisfaction on all these issues is certain to grow. If the regime feels compelled to spend more money to deal with rising discontent—either by addressing the genuine needs of the Chinese people or by spending still more on internal security—it will have to divert scarce resources from the pursuit of its external objectives.

There is a growing recognition that China's problematic behavior stems from the character of its regime; it is, as a European Union communiqué put it in 2019, "a systemic rival" of the liberal democratic West. In addition to highlighting the differences that separate them from an authoritarian China, the United States and like-minded countries need to reassert their commitment to their shared ideals. Unless their leaders can forcefully and credibly articulate

those principles and act on them, the democracies will continue to drift apart, just as Beijing hopes they will.

The United States and its allies must be prepared to take the offensive in what CCP theorists describe as the struggle for "discursive power"—the battle of dueling narratives. The democracies should not only push back harder against Beijing's false claims about the West; they must also directly attack its distorted narrative about itself. China's material achievements of the last several decades are undeniably impressive. But they were accomplished on the backs of poorly paid and politically powerless workers and peasants, at enormous cost to the natural environment, and with invaluable help from the advanced industrial countries. The CCP's attempts to substitute the "right to development" for widely shared conceptions of human rights provides thin cover for its brutal repression. China's rulers live in fear of their own people; they go to extraordinary lengths to enforce what they label "social stability," spending billions on internal security forces and high-tech surveillance programs. Claims that their system is superior, that its rise is unstoppable, or that it provides a desirable model for others deserve to be debunked.

By contrast, for all their shortcomings, the democracies have a track record of flexibility, innovation, adaptation, and self-renewal that extends over two centuries. They have achieved sustained material progress while granting their citizens the freedom to express their opinions and choose their leaders. Needless to say, the case for liberal democracy will be all the more compelling if its exemplars are themselves seen to be reaping the benefits of the freedom, prosperity, and security that they promise, practicing the virtues that they preach, and extending an open hand to those who wish to follow a similar path.

THE LONG GAME

At present, the United States is not well situated to capitalize on Beijing's belligerence. The Trump administration deserves credit for turning U.S. China policy in a more realistic direction. But for nearly four years, the president has picked fights with the United States' friends and allies, proved incapable of speaking persuasively about democratic values, and refused to criticize Beijing for its egregious violations of human rights. All of this has left the United States poorly positioned to lead a coalition in pushing back against China. Meanwhile, the president's decision to make China a centerpiece in

his reelection campaign, blaming Beijing for all the hardships unleashed by the pandemic, has short-circuited some early efforts at bipartisan cooperation in Congress. Still, the fact that the Democratic and Republican Parties are now accusing each other of being soft on China and competing to stake out the tougher position suggests that a consensus has begun to take shape.

If the United States and its allies are able to engage in sustained resistance, China's leaders may eventually be forced to reconsider their present path. For the moment, however, Xi and his colleagues appear to believe that they have the wind at their backs and that, in any event, they have no choice but to press ahead. It will take time and effort to convince them, or their successors, that their goals are unattainable and that they should adopt a more accommodating stance.

A change in the upper ranks of the CCP, the emergence of a new leading group persuaded of the need to take a new approach, could bring a change in tactics and perhaps an easing of tensions. But the problem likely lies deeper than the current composition of the party's Central Committee. In light of the CCP's implacable insecurities, overweening ambition, and obsessive desire for control, it is difficult to see how a China in which the party continues to wield absolute authority can coexist comfortably in a world where liberal democracies remain strong and united. Assuming the democracies hang together, until China changes, a prolonged period of rivalry is therefore all but inevitable.

A Grand Strategy of Resilience

American Power in the Age of Fragility

Ganesh Sitaraman

Every so often in the history of the United States, there are moments of political realignment—times when the consensus that defined an era collapses and a new paradigm emerges. The liberal era ushered in by President Franklin Roosevelt defined U.S. politics for a generation. So did the neoliberal wave that followed in the 1980s. Today, that era, too, is coming to a close, its demise hastened by the election of President Donald Trump and the chaos of the coronavirus pandemic.

The coming era will be one of health crises, climate shocks, cyberattacks, and geoeconomic competition among great powers. What unites those seemingly disparate threats is that each is not so much a battle to be won as a challenge to be weathered. This year, a pandemic is forcing hundreds of millions of Americans to stay at home. Next year, it might be a 1,000-year drought that devastates agriculture and food production. The year after that, a cyberattack could take out the power grid or cut off critical supply chains. If the current pandemic is any indication, the United States is woefully underprepared for handling such disruptions. What it needs is an economy, a society, and a democracy that can prevent these challenges when possible and endure, bounce back, and adapt when necessary—and do so without suffering thousands of deaths and seeing millions unemployed. What the United States needs is a grand strategy of resilience.

For psychologists who research child development, resilience is what enables some children to endure traumatic events and emerge stronger and better able to navigate future stresses. For ecologists,

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resilience is an ecosystem's ability to resist, recover, and adapt to fires, floods, or invasive species. For emergency, disaster relief, and homeland security experts, a resilient system is flexible, adaptable, and can withstand an impact. The writer Maria Konnikova has summed up the concept with a single question: "Do you succumb or do you surmount?"

The highest goal for American policymakers should be to preserve and defend the country's constitutional democracy while enabling Americans to thrive regardless of their race, gender, location, or origin. A society that achieves that goal will be better prepared to face the next crisis. A more equal and more just nation is a more resilient one.

Although Americans tend to think of grand strategy as an overarching foreign policy vision, any true grand strategy requires a solid domestic foundation. The United States' Cold War policy of containment, for instance, had a domestic analog, although it is less emphasized in the foreign policy community. For a generation after World War II, Democrats and Republicans alike embraced a model of regulated capitalism, with high taxes, financial regulations, strong unions, and social safety net programs, and thus charted a path between the totalitarian control of the Soviet Union and the laissez-faire approach that had plunged the United States into the Great Depression. Regulated capitalism and containment together were the grand strategy that defined the post–World War II era. A grand strategy of resilience, likewise, will not meet with success unless the United States addresses the many forms of inequality, fragility, and weakness that undermine the country's preparedness from within.

AGE OF CRISES

"Grand strategy" is a slippery term, with perhaps as many definitions as authors who invoke it. It can describe a framework that guides and focuses leaders and societies on their aims and priorities. Critics of the notion believe this is impossible: no paradigm, they say, can help navigate a chaotic, uncertain future, and in any case, U.S. society is too polarized to identify a consensus paradigm today. But the skeptics have it backward. Grand strategy is won, not found. It emerges from argument and debate. And it is useful precisely because it offers guidance in a complex world.

Start with pandemics. For hundreds of years, quarantines have been essential to preventing the spread of infectious diseases. But today's stay-at-home orders have exacted a devastating social, eco-

When the going gets tough: at a mobile food bank in Indianapolis, Indiana, May 2020

MICHAEL CONROY / AP PHOTO

nomic, and psychological toll on individuals and communities. Small businesses that are closed may never reopen. Tens of millions of people are out of work. Families are struggling to juggle childcare, homeschooling, and working from home. The government's goal should be to minimize those disruptions—to build a system that can prevent economic disaster, secure supply chains for essential materials, and massively scale up production and testing when needed.

Climate change could pose an even bigger threat. A sustained drought, akin to the one that created the Dust Bowl during the Great Depression, could threaten the global food supply. Rising sea levels, especially when coupled with storms, could flood low-lying cities. Fires already disrupt life in California every year. Climate-induced crises will also lead to population migrations globally and, with them, social unrest and violence. Part of the answer is aggressive action to limit increases in temperature. But in addition, the United States must be able to endure climate shocks when they arise.

Consider also the country's dependence on technology and the vulnerabilities it entails. Cyberattacks have already targeted U.S. election systems, banks, the Pentagon, and even local governments. The city of Riviera Beach, Florida, was forced to pay a ransom to

cybercriminals who had taken over its computer systems; big cities, such as Atlanta and Baltimore, have faced similar attacks. Cyberattacks on the U.S. power grid, akin to the one that led to blackouts in Ukraine in December 2015, could "deny large regions of the country access to bulk system power for weeks or even months," according to the National Academy of Sciences.

All these challenges will play out at a time of growing rivalry—and especially geoeconomic competition—among great powers. Over the last half century, the United States has been the world's most powerful economy and has thus been relatively safe from outside economic pressures. But as China's economic strength grows, that is likely to change. The United States and other democracies have become dependent on China for essential and nonessential goods. China's ability to exploit that dependence in a future crisis or conflict should be extremely worrisome. A strategy based on resilience would help deter such coercion and minimize the disruption if it does occur.

THE HOME FRONT

One foundational weakness is that American democracy is beset by broken processes and vulnerable to outside meddling. Four years after Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election, the United States has yet to take serious steps to protect is voting systems from hostile foreign governments and cybercriminals. Comprehensive reforms would include voter-verified paper ballots and the auditing of voting results. A new agency charged with election security could develop standards and conduct mandatory training for election officials, as Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, has proposed. And as the pandemic has made clear, voting should not require a trip to the ballot box on Election Day. Nationwide vote-by-mail and early voting policies would provide resilience during a crisis—and make voting easier and safer in ordinary times, too.

Democracy is not resilient if people do not believe in it. Yet Americans' trust in the government has been stuck near historic lows for years, and surveys show that startling numbers of citizens do not think democracy is important. It is no accident that this loss of faith has coincided with decades of widening economic inequality and a rising consensus that the government is corrupt. Study after study has shown that the U.S. government is far more responsive to the wealthy and big corporations than to ordinary citizens. Only sweeping changes to

the rules regulating lobbying, government ethics, corruption, and revolving-door hiring from the private sector can restore public trust.

Generations of racist policies—redlining, militant policing, and the failure to regulate predatory lending, to name just three examples—have done much to undermine U.S. resilience, too. A country will have trouble bouncing back when entire communities are disproportionately vulnerable in a crisis and when leaders use divide-and-conquer ideas to stir division and prevent solidarity across races. Fighting for justice is the morally right thing to do—and it makes American society stronger.

The United States needs a democracy, an economy, and a society that can endure, bounce back, and adapt.

When it comes to economic policy, an entire generation of American leaders embraced deregulation, privatization, liberalization, and austerity. The result has been staggering inequality, stagnant wages, rising debt loads, an intolerable racial wealth gap, shrinking opportunity, and rising anxiety. Low wages, limited social benefits, and an unaffordable and inefficient health insurance system have weakened the country's resilience by turning any economic shock into a potentially existential threat for many citizens. "Deaths of despair," such as suicides and overdoses, plague rural areas. Meanwhile, the wealthy and powerful continue to push for and win lower tax rates, which increase their wealth and power and create artificial political pressure to oppose social infrastructure spending. The damage to American resilience, in ordinary times and especially in a crisis such as the current one, has been considerable, as has the resulting loss of economic opportunity and innovation that could boost the United States' power.

Resilience demands reversing these trends: expanding health care and childcare to all Americans, restructuring the economy so that people gain higher wages, restoring the power of unions, making early education universal, and ensuring that students can graduate from college debt free. All these goals are eminently achievable.

Officials must also provide the basic infrastructure necessary to operate in the modern world. The United States has a long tradition of public investment in infrastructure—from the post office to rural electrification to the national highway system. In recent decades, however, that legacy has been abandoned. The pandemic has revealed that, whether for telemedicine, remote work, or education, high-speed

Internet is an essential utility, just like water and electricity. But nearly a quarter of rural Americans do not have adequate access to it, in part because Internet provision has been left to the marketplace. The country's financial infrastructure also needs to be updated. Millions of unbanked Americans are dependent on check cashers to access their hard-earned dollars, which eats into their wages and their time. Both in normal times and during a crisis, the Federal Reserve's policies are less effective than they could be and favor financial institutions because the Fed uses banks as intermediaries rather than interfacing directly with consumers. If every person or business instead had access to a no-fee, no-frills account at the Federal Reserve, it could reduce the unbanked population and ensure that everyone could get stimulus payments instantaneously in a crisis.

MARKET FAILURES

Decades of neoliberal capitalism have not made markets more resilient, either. Competition is suffering, and fewer companies are being founded, as monopolists and megacorporations come to dominate one sector after another. The "shareholder primacy" philosophy and growing pressure from financialization have turned some corporate leaders into short-term tacticians who use buybacks, leverage, tax strategies, and lobbying to increase their stock prices, even if doing so means greater fragility, volatility, and boom-and-bust economic cycles that lead to big taxpayer bailouts. As some sectors come to depend on just a few firms, prices rise, innovation suffers, and supply chains become fragile. Meanwhile, some companies amass so much power that they distort the democratic process by throwing their weight around in Washington.

Combating these trends will require reforms designed to deconcentrate wealth and power: robust financial regulations (including a new Glass-Steagall Act, to separate investment banking from retail banking), a more progressive tax structure, stronger unions, and aggressive antitrust enforcement to prevent anticompetitive mergers and to divorce platforms from the commercial activity that traffics across them. Such reforms, especially when applied to the financial, telecommunications, and technology sectors, would discourage business models that increase systemic risk and make individual companies "too big to fail." These reforms would also make it harder for wealthy individuals and well-funded special interest groups to capture the government.

For decades, economic-policy makers also failed to think seriously about a deliberate, national-level industrial policy, deeming it impermissible even as they allowed it in the form of a host of sector-specific tax benefits and regulatory policies. A coherent industrial strategy would enable leadership and innovation in areas critical to the challenges of the future, including clean energy and technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics. It would also decrease the risk of supply chain disruptions, which can lead to public health and economic disasters, as the shortages of ventilators and personal protective equipment during the pandemic have shown.

Decades of neoliberal capitalism have not made markets more resilient.

The failure to pursue sound industrial policy points to a broader oversight. Whether the next crisis is another pandemic, a cyberattack, a climate shock, or a geoeconomic conflict, the United States lacks a comprehensive strategy to ensure its economic resilience. The government does not even have an office equipped to develop such a plan. Yet there is so much planning and coordinating to do: research and development keeps the country on the cutting edge of the technology needed to prevent and respond to threats. Supply chain analysis and planning ensures that critical materials can be produced even after a systemic shock. Production and mobilization planning ensures that supplies can be delivered quickly and exported to help countries in need. This is difficult, detailed, and technical work, and it must be ongoing because markets are constantly evolving. A new U.S. Department of Economic Resilience, consolidating resources currently spread across many agencies, could lead the charge and draw up a comprehensive road map, akin to the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. In it, the government could set goals for R & D, identify supply chain threats, coordinate its response to trade-induced inequality, develop a plan for competitiveness in artificial intelligence and other frontier sectors, and lay out a range of industrial policy programs, from small-business lending to export incentives.

The full array of ills that beset U.S. economic resilience is on display in the defense sector. Debates over U.S. military spending attract considerable attention but often overlook how concentrated the country's defense industrial base has become. A 2019 government report found that of 183 major weapons systems contracts, two-thirds

had been awarded with no competition and half had gone to just five firms. In such a top-heavy sector, small businesses and entrepreneurs have a hard time breaking in—many, according to news reports, have simply given up. The Pentagon is left to partner with the same companies over and over, even those that charge excessive prices or, worse still, have previously been accused of fraud. All of this adds up to lower quality, higher costs, and less innovation. The United States' ability to endure and bounce back is strengthened when it has innovative, competitive markets that can anticipate a crisis or adapt when one takes place—and weakened when it does not.

Offshoring, too, has made the U.S. military less resilient. A recent report from the Department of Defense revealed that the United States no longer has the capacity to produce many of the essential materials used for military hardware or the technical know-how to scale up domestic production in the event of a major crisis. "China is the single or sole supplier for a number of specialty chemicals used in munitions and missiles," the report notes. When it comes to one critical material, carbon fibers, "a sudden and catastrophic loss of supply would disrupt [Department of Defense] missile, satellite, space launch, and other defense manufacturing programs. In many cases, there are no substitutes readily available."

A COLLECTIVE PROJECT

To build a foundation of domestic strength is not to withdraw from the world—far from it. Most countries, including the United States, cannot be completely resilient on their own. Not all critical supplies and manufacturing capacities will be available domestically, and not all countries will have enough economic power to withstand political and economic pressure from great-power competitors. The solution is to deepen the ties and alliances that bind the like-minded liberal democracies of North America, western Europe, and Northeast Asia. A single country might not control the entire supply chains needed to respond to a public health emergency, for instance, but an alliance likely could. An alliance composed of resilient liberal democracies would also have the collective countervailing power to deter geoeconomic threats or cyberattacks from great-power competitors such as China and Russia. Critically, the purpose of such collective resilience is not to expand and engulf the world; it is to preserve the states within the alliance.

When it comes to economic issues, collective resilience will require a major change in outlook. The recent history of international economic policy is one of trade liberalization, often in ways that have benefited capital and with little regard for the regime types of the countries involved or the potential ramifications for domestic resilience. To continue down this path is risky. International trade policies that increase inequality and weaken domestic production capacity make the United States less resilient and more susceptible to geoeconomic threats and leverage. Liberal democracies' agenda for international cooperation should focus on strengthening their own social infrastructure and making markets resilient, not on marginal gains in efficiency that come at the expense of domestic resilience.

Even as the United States deepens its relationships with close allies, resilience will require attending to the rest of the world, as well. Diseases travel with ease, so any country far or near that cannot get a handle on an epidemic poses a danger to the United States and the world. Famines and other climate shocks might lead to massive refugee flows or set off violence that spills over into peaceful areas. Another critical part of U.S. foreign policy should therefore be to advocate, and assist with, a development agenda based on resilience. That means, for example, helping foreign countries build up their public health capacities and foster sturdy and diversified economies. Most developing countries must currently choose between a neoliberal approach that benefits global capital and a Chinese-led path that brings with it a risk of dependence and debt traps. The United States and international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should aim to provide a new path focused on domestic flexibility and capacity.

More broadly, an international system that depends on a single country to accomplish collective goals is not a resilient one. For decades, some foreign policy experts have celebrated the United States' role as "the indispensable nation." Today, Washington should instead use its influence to ensure that its allies and partners can accomplish shared goals even when the United States is not involved—call it "resilient multilateralism." The African Union's creation, in 2016, of the Africa Centers for Disease Control is a good example of what such institution building can look like.

When it comes to great-power rivals, a U.S. grand strategy of resilience will require healthy working relationships and frequent cooperation. Working together is necessary for managing climate

change and pandemics. Economic ties are inevitable and desirable, and the vast majority of goods and services do not require fully independent supply chains. Functional relationships with China and Russia will make open conflict less likely by reducing the risk of misperceptions and misunderstandings. Ultimately, cooperation and communication do not require affection or a shared ideology, nor do they prevent countries from acknowledging their differences or seeking greater economic independence from one another.

A resilient United States needs to retain a powerful, cutting-edge military to deter and defend against threats from abroad. But it would not—and should not—go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. As the last two decades have shown, wars of choice designed to transform foreign societies make the United States less resilient, not more. They cost an enormous amount of money, diverting dollars that could have been spent at home. They redirect the attention of policymakers, who then cannot focus on challenges that arrive without warning, such as pandemics, or arrive gradually, such as climate change. And the dream of turning war-torn countries into Denmark is just that: a dream. Its failure contributes to the loss of faith in U.S. leaders and institutions, in the United States and elsewhere.

Any grand strategy has tradeoffs, and a resilience-based approach is no exception. It would require the United States to abandon democracy promotion by force and deprioritize policies that focus on economic efficiency and benefit global capital. But these are tradeoffs worth making. Even well-intentioned wars can weaken the country and destabilize entire regions, and the era of go-go trade liberalization has contributed to extreme economic inequality.

Washington is at a pivotal moment. Ideas that dominated for decades have been exhausted, and the need for a new approach coincides today with a crisis of massive proportions. The precise challenges ahead are not yet known, but they are coming, and they are certain to require planning, adaptation, and durability. In this new era, a grand strategy of resilience can act as a North Star for policymakers. It will make the United States stronger, freer, and more equal, and it will preserve, protect, and strengthen democracy for the next generation.

THE GLOBAL RECKONING WITH RACE

Anti-Black racism and white supremacy are global scourges. – Keisha Blain

SIPA USA / AP

Civil Rights International

The Fight Against Racism Has Always Been Global

Keisha N. Blain

On June 13, 2020, Black Lives Matter (BLM) activists gathered in London's Trafalgar Square to call for the eradication of racism and white supremacy. With their fists raised high, the activists, mostly dressed in black, chanted, "Black power!" Were it not for the face masks, which they wore to help stop the spread of COVID-19, the scene could have been taken straight from the 1960s. In that earlier era, activists around the world connected their own struggles to those of African Americans who challenged segregation, disenfranchisement, poverty, and police brutality—just as their successors do today. Meanwhile, Black American activists agitated for human rights and called attention to the devaluation of Black lives not only in the United States but all over the world, including in places under colonial rule.

Many tend to think of that era's push for civil rights and Black power as a distinctly American phenomenon. It was, in fact, a global movement—and so is BLM today. By linking national concerns to global ones, BLM activists are building on a long history of Black internationalism. Indeed, Black Americans have always connected their struggle for rights to fights for freedom in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and elsewhere.

Although surges of Black internationalism have often been led from the top—through the efforts of politicians and diplomats—some of the most dynamic and enduring movements have developed at the grassroots, often led by Black women and involving working-class and impoverished Black people. During the twentieth century, Black internationalists organized on the local level, frequently in urban centers, to give voice to the concerns of ordinary people. Utilizing diverse strategies and tactics, they articulated global visions of freedom by working collaboratively and in solidarity with Black people and other people of color across the world. BLM activists have carried on this tradition, often using social media as a vehicle to forge transnational alliances.

Although much has changed since the 1960s, racism continues to shape every aspect of Black life in the United States. The troubling pattern of police killings of unarmed Black Americans sparked the current uprisings, but it represents only part of the problem; such killings, horrific though they may be, are merely symptoms of the deeper diseases of anti-Black racism and white supremacy. As BLM activists have emphasized, these problems are not contained within the borders of the United States: they are global scourges, and addressing them requires a global effort.

FOOTSTEPS TO FOLLOW

BLM was launched in 2013 by the activists Patrisse Cullors, Alicia Garza, and Opal Tometi after the acquittal on

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murder charges of the man who killed Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old African American boy, in Florida the previous year. Following the 2014 police shooting of another Black teenager, Michael Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri, BLM evolved into a nationwide and global protest movement. In a matter of months, activists had established BLM chapters in several major cities outside the United States. In Toronto, for example, Janaya Khan and Yusra Ali co-founded a chapter in October 2014 following the police killing of Jermaine Carby, a 33-year-old Black man, in nearby Brampton, Ontario. A few months later, a diverse group of activists in Japan launched an Afro-Asian solidarity march called "Tokyo for Ferguson" in the wake of a grand jury's acquittal of the police officer who gunned down Brown. Displaying signs in both English and Japanese, hundreds of protesters marched through the streets of Tokyo. In the months that followed, BLM demonstrations swept cities across Europe, including Amsterdam, Berlin, London, and Paris.

In 2016, Tometi delivered a speech before the UN General Assembly and issued a statement emphasizing an "urgent need to engage the international community about the most pressing human rights crises of our day" and pointing out that by internationalizing the movement, BLM was following "in the footsteps of many courageous civil and human rights defenders that came before." Over the past several years, BLM activists in the United States have indeed forged meaningful alliances with activists and human rights campaigners elsewhere. The movement's internationalization was made visible with the massive demonstrations that erupted in the wake of the police killings of Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, Tony McDade, and other Black Americans earlier this year.

In establishing such links, BLM is very much following in the footsteps of previous movements against racism. In the early twentieth century, civil rights activists often called on African Americans to see their interests as tied to those of people of color elsewhere. In January 1919, for example, the Black journalist John Quincy Adams published an open letter to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in *The Appeal*, an influential Black-owned newspaper, demanding that the United States seek to protect the rights and recognition of people of color everywhere. "Through the centuries," Adams noted, "the colored races of the globe have been subjected to the most unjust and inhuman treatment by the so-called white peoples."

At around the same time, Madam C. J. Walker, a business pioneer who rose to fame after making a fortune marketing beauty and hair products for Black people, established the International League of Darker Peoples with several other well-known Black activists, including the Jamaican Black nationalist Marcus Garvey, the labor organizer A. Philip Randolph, and the Harlem clergyman Adam Clayton Powell, Sr. During World War I, the ILDP provided a platform for Walker and her associates to advocate for the rights and dignity of marginalized groups across the world and to tap into surging anti-imperialist and anticolonial fervor. In January 1919, Walker coordinated a historic meeting in New York City between a delegation from the ILDP and S. Kuriowa, the

publisher of the Tokyo newspaper *Yorudo Choho*. At the meeting, members of the ILDP asked Kuriowa to encourage Japanese officials to advocate racial equality at the Paris Peace Conference, which was scheduled to take place several days later. They received a favorable response from Kuriowa, who assured them: "The race question will be raised at the peace table." Western officials ultimately sidelined the issue of racial prejudice at the conference. But Walker's actions laid the groundwork for a new generation of Black activists and intellectuals who sought international support in the decades that followed.

The 1930s saw the rise of a number of grassroots political organizations through which African Americans built alliances with activists of color from other countries in the global struggle against white supremacy. During the early 1930s, Pearl Sherrod, a leader of an organization called the Development of Our Own, became an early proponent of solidarity among poor nations, identifying the common interests between Black Americans and nonwhites in colonies across Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. In a 1934 editorial in the *Detroit Tribune Independent*, she reminded readers that "the greater part of the colored world is today under white political control," even though the majority of the world's inhabitants were nonwhite. Echoing Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, and others, Sherrod called on people of African descent in the United States to forge transracial political alliances. "Then, and only then will we get power," she wrote.

Sherrod's internationalist vision mirrored those of other Black intellectuals and activists, including members of the Peace Movement of Ethiopia, the largest Black nationalist organization established by a woman in the United States. Founded by Mittie Maude Lena Gordon in Chicago in December 1932, the PME advocated universal Black liberation, economic self-sufficiency, racial pride, and Black unity and attracted around 300,000 supporters during the 1930s and 1940s. Deeply attuned to developments elsewhere, Gordon sought out alliances with activists from abroad. In December 1940, for example, after reading in the *Richmond Times* about Akweke Abyssinia Nwafor Orizu, a Black nationalist from eastern Nigeria, she invited him to speak before an audience of PME supporters in Chicago. For ten days in March 1941, Orizu held a series of public meetings with Gordon and her supporters, addressing African nationalism and the emigration of Black Americans to Africa.

Like Sherrod, Gordon saw a direct link between manifestations of white supremacy in the United States and those in Asia, arguing in 1942 that the "destruction of the white man in Asia is the destruction of the white man in the United States." In particular, she emphasized the connection between the challenges facing Black Americans and the plight of Indians under British colonial rule. "The complete freedom of India will bring complete freedom to the American black people," she wrote, "because the same men are holding them in slavery."

FREEDOM IN THE MOTHERLAND

The Black internationalist movements and organizations that formed in the first half of the twentieth century laid the intellectual groundwork for the civil

rights and Black Power movements of the second half. Many of the African American leaders who emerged during the 1950s and 1960s adopted an internationalist vision. For some of them, Ghana—one of the first African countries to gain independence from European colonial rule—held particular significance. Martin Luther King, Jr., and his wife, Coretta Scott King, worked across national borders and forged solidarity with people of color across the globe. The Kings joined a cadre of Black activists and artists—including Randolph, the actress and vocalist Etta Moten Barnett, and the political scientist and diplomat Ralph Bunche—on a trip to Ghana in 1957, just after the country won its independence from the United Kingdom. At the invitation of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's new prime minister, these African American activists participated in several events in the capital, Accra. During an interview he gave while in Ghana, King credited the visit with renewing his conviction in "the ultimate triumph of justice." Ghana's liberation, he said, had given him "new hope in the struggle for freedom."

The following year, the anticolonial activist Eslanda Goode Robeson, the wife of the singer and civil rights activist Paul Robeson, joined Nkrumah, the Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba, the U.S. labor organizer Maida Springer, and many other notable figures at the All African People's Conference in Accra. At the conference, attendees advocated the immediate end of colonialism in Africa and emphasized the significance of pan-African unity. In subsequent years, several well-known Black American activists and intellectuals, including Du Bois, Maya Angelou, and Julian Mayfield,

relocated to Ghana, drawn to the country by Nkrumah's pan-Africanist vision and excited by the challenge of nation building in a postcolonial state. "I never dreamed to see this miracle," Du Bois later explained. "I am startled before it."

During this period, activists skillfully leveraged their transnational alliances and global audience to bring international pressure on the United States to confront racism and discrimination. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, U.S. leaders wanted their country to be seen as a champion of equal rights and democracy and as a beacon of freedom. But efforts to draw a stark contrast between U.S. democracy and Soviet communism were undermined by the mistreatment of Black Americans. Black leaders took advantage of this tension to advance the struggle for civil and human rights.

Less well-known and more radical African American activists also drew inspiration from overseas and built international networks. From 1957 to 1963, the Universal Association of Ethiopian Women, a grassroots organization led by the radical Black activist Audley "Queen Mother" Moore, brought together Black women in Louisiana to seek reparations, welfare rights, and legal aid for Black men in the United States who had been wrongly accused of rape. Moore emphasized the need to secure rights and freedom for "Africans everywhere at home and abroad," and the UAEW actively forged transnational relationships, including with the Kenyan labor leader and pan-Africanist Tom Mboya.

Moore mentored a number of Black Power activists, including Malcolm X. Her dreams of global Black liberation influenced the internationalist ideas that defined his later years. In 1964, Malcolm X toured West Africa for six months, during which time he made a pilgrimage to Mecca. When he returned to the United States, he established the Organization of Afro-American Unity, which became a significant vehicle for Black internationalist organizing in the 1960s. During his first public address on behalf of the new organization, Malcolm X—who had adopted the name el-Hajj Malik el-Shabazz following his trip to Mecca—explained that the new group would seek to organize "everyone in the Western Hemisphere of African descent into one united force" and, eventually, to "unite with our brothers on the motherland, on the continent of Africa."

Malcolm's work inspired the activists in the Black Panther Party, originally established in Los Angeles in 1966 by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale to challenge police brutality against African Americans—much like today's BLM movement. And, like BLM, the BPP's work in the United States sparked a global movement to confront anti-Black racism. By the late 1960s, BPP chapters could be found in several cities across the globe, including Algiers and London. BPP leaders also maintained strong transnational alliances with activists in diverse places, such as Cuba, India, Israel, and New Zealand.

From the late 1960s to the early 1990s, African Americans were actively engaged in the struggle to end apartheid in South Africa. Several organizations, including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Council of Negro Women, supported the antiapartheid movement through picketing, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities. Prominent African American celebrities, such as Harry

Belafonte, Arthur Ashe, and Stevie Wonder, also lent their support, using their platforms to bring international attention to the issue.

The collaboration between African American and South African activists highlighted the power and significance of Black internationalism as a political strategy. Activists in both countries endured some of the same challenges, including anticommunist smear campaigns waged by officials intent on suppressing Black resistance. Yet these transnational exchanges played a vital role in shaping the foreign policies of both nations. The political gains and successes, no matter how small, helped invigorate organizers, who drew inspiration from one another as they worked to dismantle racism and white supremacy. By linking local and national concerns with global ones, activists during this period set a precedent for future generations of Black internationalists, including members of BLM.

BLACK LIVES MATTER—EVERYWHERE

In a recent interview, Cullors, one of the co-founders of BLM, described the current uprisings as "a watershed moment" in U.S. and global history. "The entire world is saying, 'Black lives matter,'" she added. "The world is watching us," remarked her fellow co-founder Tometi. "We see these rallies in solidarity emerging all across the globe, and I have friends texting me with their images in France and the Netherlands and Costa Rica, and people are showing me that they are showing up in solidarity."

BLM has become a vital force in the long history of Black internationalism. The movement now offers a significant platform for Black activists in the United States to forge and deepen transnational links with activists across the globe. Today, BLM has a global network of dozens of chapters. This number will likely grow exponentially in the coming years.

The protests in the United States, in their strength, reach, and sheer magnitude, are unlike any the country has ever witnessed before. The COVID-19 pandemic—which has exacerbated already difficult conditions for Black people in the United States and abroad—has provoked a sense of urgency among protesters. As recent data have revealed, COVID-19 infection rates in Black communities are significantly higher than in predominately white communities. Owing to disparities in income, wealth, and access to health care, among other factors, Black people in the United States are dying from COVID-19 at a rate that far exceeds those for other racial groups, laying bare how racism shapes every aspect of Black life.

As the 2020 U.S. presidential election looms, the uprising that began this past spring in the United States is likely to fuel new rallies and protests, which will probably expand across the globe, extending to new places and inspiring activists of all races and social backgrounds. Efforts to quell these movements will also intensify—including efforts that involve surveillance by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. However, the urgency of the moment and the demands to dismantle anti-Black racism and white supremacy and the violence they yield will keep activists in the streets. Those in the United States can take heart knowing that people all over the world see their own struggles for rights and dignity reflected in the BLM movement.

The Fragile Republic

American Democracy Has Never Faced So Many Threats All at Once

Suzanne Mettler and Robert C. Lieberman

When the U.S. president used his power to target immigrants, the press, and his political opponents, the sheer overreach of his actions shocked many citizens. Tensions among the country's political leaders had been escalating for years. Embroiled in one intense conflict after another, both sides had grown increasingly distrustful of each other. Every action by one camp provoked a greater counterreaction from the other, sometimes straining the limits of the Constitution. Fights and mob violence often followed.

Leaders of the dominant party grew convinced that their only hope for fixing the government was to do everything possible to weaken their opponents and silence dissent. The president signed into law provisions that made it more difficult for immigrants (who tended to support the opposition) to attain citizenship and that mandated the deportation of those who were deemed dangerous or who came from "hostile" states. Another law allowed for the prosecution of those who openly criticized his administration, such as newspaper publishers.

Much of this may sound familiar to anyone living through the present moment in the United States. But the year was 1798. The president was John Adams, and the legislation was known as the Alien and Sedition Acts. Adams's allies in Congress, the Federalists, argued that in anticipation of a possible war with France, these measures were necessary to protect the country from internal spies, subversive elements, and dissent. The Federalists disapproved of immigrants, viewing them as a threat to the purity of the national character. They particularly disliked the Irish, the largest immigrant group, who sympathized with the French and tended to favor the opposition party, the Republicans. As one Federalist member of Congress put it, there was no need to "invite hordes of Wild Irishmen, nor the turbulent and disorderly of all the world, to come here with a basic view to distract our tranquility."

Critics of the new laws raised their voices in protest. The Republicans charged that they amounted to barefaced efforts to weaken their faction, which happened to include most Americans not of English heritage. Two leading Republicans, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, went so far as to advise state governments to refuse to abide by the Sedition Act, resolving that it was unconstitutional.

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Political conflicts boiled over into everyday life. Federalists and Republicans often resided in different neighborhoods and attended different churches. The Federalists, centered particularly in New England, prized their Anglo-American identity, and even after the American Revolution, they retained their affinity with the mother country. Republicans saw themselves as cosmopolitan, cherishing the Enlightenment ideals of liberty and equality, and they championed the French Revolution and disdained Great Britain. As early as 1794, partisans in urban communities were holding separate Fourth of July ceremonies. Republicans read aloud the Declaration of Independence—penned by Jefferson, the founder of their party—as evidence that independence had been their own achievement, whereas Federalists offered toasts to their leader, President George Washington. The Republicans viewed themselves as the party of the people; one prominent politician among them chided the Federalists for celebrating not "we the people" but "we the noble, chosen, privileged few."

On the streets, mock violence—the burning of effigies—was swiftly devolving into the real thing, as politically motivated beatings and open brawls proliferated. In one case, on July 27, 1798, Federalists in New York marched up Broadway singing "God Save the King" just to antagonize the Republicans; the latter responded by singing French revolutionary songs. Soon, the singing contest became a street fight.

Watching the growing chaos and division, Americans of all stripes worried that their experiment in self-government might not survive the decade. They feared that monarchy would reassert itself, aristocracy would replace representative government, or some states might secede from the union, causing its demise. The beginnings of American democracy were fragile—even at a time when some of the U.S. Constitution's framers themselves, along with other luminaries of the era, held public office.

Of course, the early republic was by no means a fully realized democracy. The bold democratic ideals of equality and government by consent, which were enshrined in the nation's founding documents, were paired with governing practices that repudiated them, most blatantly by sanctioning slavery. The U.S. Constitution established representative government, with public officials chosen directly or indirectly by a quickly expanded electorate of white men of all classes, who gained suffrage rights well before their peers in Europe. Yet nearly one in five Americans, all of them of African descent, were enslaved, lacking all civil and political rights. The Constitution not only implicitly condoned this practice but even granted extra political power to slaveholders and the states in which they resided.

After two centuries of struggle, the United States democratized. Not until the 1970s could the United States be called a truly robust and inclusive democracy. That long path included numerous periods when the country lurched toward greater authoritarianism rather than progressing toward a stronger democracy. Time and again, democratic reforms and the project of popular government were put at risk of reversal, and in some instances, real backsliding occurred. In the 1850s, divisions over slavery literally tore the

country apart, leading to a destructive civil war in the next decade. In the 1890s, amid the convulsive changes of the industrial era and an upsurge in labor conflict and farmers' political organizing, nearly four million African Americans were stripped of their voting rights. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, many Americans welcomed the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, who was willing to use greater executive power than his predecessors—but others worried that Roosevelt was paving the way for the type of strongman rule on the rise in several European countries. During the Watergate scandal of the 1970s, in the wake of unrest over racism and the Vietnam War, President Richard Nixon tried to use the tools of executive power that were developed in the 1930s as political weapons to punish his enemies, creating a constitutional crisis and sapping citizens' confidence in institutions of all kinds.

These crises of democracy did not occur randomly. Rather, they developed in the presence of one or more of four specific threats: political polarization, conflict over who belongs in the political community, high and growing economic inequality, and excessive executive power. When those conditions are absent, democracy tends to flourish. When one or more of them are present, democracy is prone to decay.

Today, for the first time in its history, the United States faces all four threats at the same time. It is this unprecedented confluence—more than the rise to power of any particular leader—that lies behind the contemporary crisis of American democracy. The threats have grown deeply entrenched, and they will likely persist and wreak havoc for some time to come.

Although the threats have been gathering steam for decades, they burst ever more vividly and dangerously into the open this year. The COVID-19 pandemic and the economic crisis it precipitated have dramatically exposed the United States' partisan, economic, and racial fault lines. Americans of color have disproportionately been victims of the novel coronavirus. African Americans, for example, have been five times as likely as whites to be hospitalized for COVID-19 and have accounted for nearly one in four deaths related to the coronavirus that causes the disease—twice their proportion of the population. The pandemic-induced recession has exacerbated economic inequality, exposing the most economically vulnerable to job losses, food and housing insecurity, and the loss of health insurance. And partisan differences have shaped Americans' responses to the pandemic: Democrats have been much more likely to alter their health behavior, and even the simple act of wearing a mask in public has become a partisan symbol. The Black Lives Matter protests that erupted after the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis in May have further highlighted the deep hold that systemic racism has long had on American politics and society.

President Donald Trump has ruthlessly exploited these widening divisions to deflect attention from his administration's poor response to the pandemic and to attack those he perceives as his personal or political enemies. Chaotic elections that have occurred during the pandemic, in Wisconsin and Georgia,

The good old days: a drawing depicting a brawl in the U.S. Congress in 1798

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

for example, have underscored the heightened risk to U.S. democracy that the threats pose today.

The situation is dire. To protect the republic, Americans must make strengthening democracy their top political priority, using it to guide the leaders they select, the agendas they support, and the activities they pursue.

THE SLUGFEST

Not long ago, lawmakers in Washington frequently cooperated across party lines, forging both policy alliances and personal friendships. Now, hostility more often prevails, and it has been accompanied by brinkmanship and dysfunction that imperil lawmaking on major issues. The public is no different. In the 1950s, when pollsters asked Americans whether they would prefer that their child "marry a Democrat or a Republican, all other things being equal," the vast majority—72 percent—either didn't answer or said they didn't care. By contrast, in 2016, a majority of respondents—55 percent—expressed a partisan preference for their future son-in-law or daughter-in-law. For many Americans, partisanship has become a central part of their identity.

Vibrant political parties are essential to the functioning of democracy. Yet when parties divide lawmakers and society into two unalterably opposed camps that view each other as enemies, they can undermine social cohesion and political stability. The framers of the U.S. Constitution, attuned to such threats because of Great Britain's previous century of experience with violent parties and factions, hoped their new country could avoid parties altogether. Yet no sooner was the new

government up and running than political leaders—including some of the founders themselves—began to choose sides on the critical issues of the day, leading to the formation of the sharply antagonistic Federalist and Republican factions. That bout of polarization subsided only after the deadlocked presidential election of 1800, during which both sides prepared for violence and many feared civil war. The outcome was ultimately decided peacefully in the House of Representatives when, after multiple inconclusive votes, one member of Congress shifted his support from Aaron Burr to Jefferson.

Polarization grows when citizens sort themselves so that, instead of having multiple, crosscutting ties to others, their social and political memberships and identities increasingly overlap, reinforcing their affinity for some groups and setting them apart from others. In the mid-twentieth century, this process commenced once again as white southerners, beginning as early as the 1930s and accelerating by the 1960s, distanced themselves from the Democratic Party and its uneven but growing embrace of the cause of racial equality, shifting gradually toward the Republicans.

Polarization intensifies as ambitious political entrepreneurs take advantage of emerging divisions to expand their power. They may do this by adopting opposing positions on issues, highlighting and promoting underlying social differences, and using inflammatory rhetoric in order to consolidate their supporters and weaken their opponents. Contemporary polarization in Congress advanced in this way starting in 1978. A young Republican congressman named Newt Gingrich, lamenting his party's decades of minority status, launched a long-term attack on the institution of Congress itself in order to undermine public trust in the institution and convince voters that it was time for a change. He told Republicans, "Raise hell all the time. . . . This party does not need another generation of cautious, prudent, careful, bland, irrelevant, quasi-leaders. . . . What we really need are people who are willing to stand up in a slugfest and match it out with their opponent." He rallied the base, found ways to embarrass the Democratic majority, and proved to be a master of attracting media attention.

As a political strategy, polarization delivered: congressional elections became more competitive than they had been for the previous half century. Every election from 1980 to the present has presented an opportunity for either party to take control of each chamber of Congress. In 1994, Republicans finally won a majority in the House of Representatives after being in the minority for 58 of the preceding 62 years, and they elected Gingrich as Speaker. Partisan control of Congress has seesawed ever since.

Party leaders from Gingrich onward encouraged their fellow partisans to act as loyal members of a team, prioritizing party unity. They shifted staff and resources away from policy committees and toward public relations, allowing them to communicate constantly to voters about the differences between their party and the opposition. Such messaging to the base helps parties be competitive in elections. But this approach hinders democratic governance by making it more difficult for Congress to work across party lines and

address major issues. This occurs in part because polarization makes many of the attributes of a well-functioning polity—such as cooperation, negotiation, and compromise—more costly for public officials, who fear being punished at the polls if they engage in these ways with opponents. As division escalates, the normal functioning of democracy can break down if partisans cease to be able or willing to resolve political differences by finding a middle ground. Politics becomes a game in which winning is the singular imperative, and opponents transform into enemies to be vanquished.

Polarization is not a static state but a process that feeds on itself and creates a cascade of worsening outcomes. Over time, those who exploit it may find it difficult to control, as members of the party base become less and less trustful of elites and believe that none is sufficiently devoted to their core values. These dynamics give rise to even less principled actors, as epitomized by Trump's rise. During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, numerous established Republican politicians, such as Senators Lindsey Graham of South Carolina and Marco Rubio of Florida, expressed their disdain for Trump, only to eat their words once he was nominated and to support him faithfully once he was in the White House.

The culmination of polarization can endanger democracy itself. If members of one political group come to view their opponents as an existential threat to their core values, they may seek to defeat them at all costs, even if it undermines normal democratic procedures. They may cease to view the opposition as legitimate and seek permanent ways to prevent it from gaining power, such as by stacking the deck in their own favor. They may become convinced that it is justifiable to circumvent the rule of law and defy checks and balances or to scale back voting rights, civil liberties, or civil rights for the sake of preserving or protecting the country as they see fit.

SELF-EVIDENT?

Democracy has been most successful in places where citizens share broad agreement about the boundaries of the national community: who should be included as a member and on what terms, meaning whether all should have equal status or if rights should be parceled out in different ways to different groups. Conversely, when a country features deep social divisions along lines of race, gender, religion, or ethnicity, some citizens may favor excluding certain groups or granting them subordinate status. When these divisions emanate from rifts that either predated the country's founding or emerged from it, they can prove particularly pernicious and persist as formidable forces in politics.

Such formative rifts may come to a head as the result of some political change that prompts opposing political parties to take divergent stands on the status of certain groups. Politicians may deliberately seek to inflame divisions as a political strategy, to unite and mobilize groups that would not otherwise share a common goal. Or social movements might mobilize people on one side of a rift, leading to a countermobilization by those on the other side. In either case, when such divisions are triggered, those who favor a return to earlier boundaries

of civic membership and status may be convinced that they must pursue their goals even if democracy is curtailed in the process.

The United States at its inception divided the political community by race, creating a formative rift that has organized the country's politics ever since. A commitment to white supremacy has often prevailed, impelling many Americans to build coalitions around appeals to racism and segregation in order to further their political interests. The quest to preserve slavery drove U.S. politics for decades. Even after slavery ended, white supremacy often reigned through decades of voting restrictions, the denial of rights, discrimination, and segregation. Yet a countervailing commitment to equality and inclusion also emerged in American politics, fueled by the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and sustained by the persistent efforts of enslaved and oppressed Americans themselves. This tradition repeatedly and powerfully challenged slavery and white supremacy and brought about critical reforms that expanded rights and advanced American democracy.

The American gender divide, also codified in law, made men's dominance in politics and society appear to be natural and rendered the gender hierarchy resistant to change. A countervailing commitment to equality emerged, however, in the nineteenth-century women's movement, articulated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments at the Seneca Falls Convention: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal." Yet not until 1916 would the two major political parties embrace the cause of women's suffrage at the national level, ushering in the 19th Amendment's ratification in 1920.

Certainly, some tendencies of human nature can help explain why formative rifts can prove so potent. Many people trust communities that seem familiar to them and that they associate with virtue and safety, and they feel distrustful of other groups, whose customs strike them as strange and even dangerous. When political figures or events ignite voters' anger, especially around matters pertaining to race or gender, political participation is often elevated, particularly among those who favor traditional hierarchies and are willing to put democracy itself at risk in order to restore them.

Yet views about who belongs in the political community do not always foster political conflict; it all depends on how they map onto the political party system. In some periods, for example, neither party strongly challenged white supremacy, in which case the status quo prevailed, its restrictions on democracy persisting unchallenged. In other periods, the conflict between racially inclusive and white supremacist visions of American society and democracy has overlapped with partisan divisions and fueled intense political conflict. At such moments, democracy stood on the brink—with the promise of its expansion existing alongside the threat of its demise.

The first half of the nineteenth century featured white man's democracy on southern terms, as neither party challenged the South's devotion to slavery. In the 1850s, however, the region's dominance of national politics began to decline. As that happened, its ability to use the political system to protect slavery eroded, and subse-

quently southerners abandoned democratic means for resolving the conflict. The party system reorganized itself around the slavery question, and ruinous polarization ensued. In response to the election of President Abraham Lincoln, the South seceded, and the country plunged into a violent civil war, the ultimate democratic breakdown.

In the decades after the Civil War, the country made strides at building a multiracial democracy, as newly enfranchised African American men voted at high rates and over 2,000 of them won election to public office, serving as local officials, in state legislatures, and in the U.S. Congress. But in the 1890s, the forces of white supremacy rebounded, resulting in violent repression and the removal of voting rights from millions of African Americans. Sixty years of American apartheid followed, not only in the authoritarian enclaves of the South but in northern states as well and in national institutions such as the federal bureaucracy and the U.S. military.

In the contemporary period, the conflict between egalitarian and white supremacist visions of American society once again overlaps with the party system and coincides with intense polarization. Over the past several decades, as the U.S. population has become more racially and ethnically diverse, the composition of the Republican Party has grown to be far whiter than the population at large, and the Democratic Party has forged a more diverse coalition. Attitudes among party members have diverged, as well: since the 1980s, Republicans have become far more likely to express racist views, and Democrats, far less so, as revealed by the American Na-

tional Election Studies. This political chasm has been further exacerbated by rising hostility to immigration and simmering disagreement about the status of immigrants in American society. The resulting divergence makes for extremely volatile politics.

THE NEW GILDED AGE

Democratic fragility can also result from high rates of economic inequality, which can undermine the institutions and practices of existing democracies. Countries in which inequality is on the rise are more likely to see democracy distorted, limited, and potentially destabilized. By contrast, countries in which inequality is low or declining are less likely to suffer democratic deterioration.

People typically assume that inequality makes democracy vulnerable by increasing the chances that the less well-off will rise up against the wealthy, but that is rarely the case. Rather, as inequality grows, it is the affluent themselves who are more likely to mobilize effectively. They realize that working- and middle-class people, who greatly outnumber them, tend to favor redistributive policies—and the higher taxes necessary to fund them, which would fall disproportionately on the rich. Fearful of such policy changes, the rich take action to protect their interests and preserve their wealth and advantages. For a time, this may skew the democratic process by giving the rich an outsize voice, but it can eventually cause more fundamental problems, endangering democratic stability itself. This can occur when the wealthiest citizens seek to solidify their power even if it entails harm to democracy. They may be willing to abide a polarizing politics of "us versus them" and the adoption of repressive measures if that is what it takes for leaders to protect their interests.

Among wealthy democracies in the world today, the United States is the most economically unequal. After a period during the mid-twentieth century when low- and middle-income Americans experienced quickly rising incomes, since the late 1970s, they have seen slow or stagnant wage growth and shrinking opportunities. The affluent, meanwhile, have continued to experience soaring incomes and wealth, particularly among the richest one percent of the population. The compensation of chief executives skyrocketed from 30 times the annual pay of the average worker in 1978 to 312 times as much by 2017.

In the late eighteenth century and the nineteenth century up through the Civil War, the widespread existence of slavery made for extreme inequality in the American South. Other regions of the country during that same period, however, featured greater equality than did the countries of Europe, being unencumbered by feudalism and the inherited structure of rigid social classes. But as the nineteenth century proceeded, economic inequality grew throughout the country, and by the late nineteenth century—"the Gilded Age," as Mark Twain called it—the United States had nearly caught up with the intensely class-stratified United Kingdom. These disparities would endure until the U.S. stock market crashed in 1929. The wealthy lost much during the Great Depression, and then, after World War II, a strong economy and government policies fostered upward mobility and the growth of a large

middle class. By later in the twentieth century, however, economic inequality was growing once again, owing not only to deindustrialization and globalization but also to policy changes that favored the wealthy.

Greater political inequality generally accompanies rising economic inequality, and the United States has been no exception in this regard. In the age of the robber barons, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Industrial Revolution generated vastly unequal wealth paired with unequal political power. Decades of bloody repression of workers ensued as an ascendant class of capitalists enjoyed protection from the courts.

Many Americans had already been living on the edge of destitution when the Great Depression plunged the country into soaring rates of joblessness and poverty. Under Roosevelt's leadership, the United States responded with the New Deal, a collection of policies to provide social protection, restructure the economy, and ensure labor rights. Along with World War II, the New Deal helped revive the American economy and reduce economic inequality, while largely preserving existing racial and gender hierarchies and inequalities. These changes helped sustain three decades of shared prosperity and relatively low polarization in American politics.

But beginning in the 1970s, economic inequality began to grow, and the affluent and big business in the United States became more politically organized than ever, in ways that presented major obstacles to democracy. Since the 1990s, the amount of money spent on politics—on both campaign contributions and lobbying—has escalated sharply, owing to the deep pockets and strong motivations of wealthy Americans and corporations. Even more striking is the degree to which the rich have organized themselves politically to pursue their policy agenda at the state and national levels. When government responds primarily to the rich, it transforms itself into an oligarchy, which better protects the interests of the wealthy few. Keeping watch over democracy is not their concern.

THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY

A final factor in democratic backsliding is the demise of checks on executive power, which typically results when powerful leaders take steps to expand their power and autonomy relative to more broadly representative legislatures and courts that are expected to protect rights. These executive actions might be perfectly legal, such as filling the courts and government agencies with political allies. But executives might also be tempted to stack the deck against their political opponents, making it hard to challenge their dominance; circumvent the rule of law; or roll back civil liberties and civil rights.

The American founders sought to thwart executive tyranny and to prevent a single group of leaders from seizing control of all the levers of government power at once. But separation-of-powers systems, such as that of the United States, are notoriously prone to intractable political conflicts between the executive and the legislative branches, each of which can claim democratic legitimacy because it is independently elected. Moreover, a president engaged in such a conflict might be tempted to

assume a populist mantle—to equate his supporters with "the people" as a whole and present his preferred policies as reflective of a single popular will, as opposed to the multiplicity of voices and interests represented in the legislature.

Across most of the first 125 years of the country's history, the very idea of a president achieving autocratic powers would have seemed inconceivable because the office was limited and Congress prevailed as the dominant branch. In the early twentieth century, however, presidential power began to grow, with the presidency eventually becoming a much more dominant office than the framers ever envisioned. Certainly, the president cannot single-handedly create or repeal laws, as those powers are vested in Congress. But in other respects, an aspiring autocrat who occupied the White House would find considerable authority awaiting him.

Presidents throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first have expanded the powers of the office through the use of executive orders and proclamations, the administrative state, an enlarged White House staff and the creation of the Executive Office of the President, and the president's control over foreign policy and national security. Meanwhile, Congress has ceded considerable authority to the executive branch, often in moments of crisis, and has enabled presidents to act unilaterally and often without oversight. As a result, the ordinary checks an d balances that the framers intended to ensure democratic accountability have grown weaker.

This "imperial presidency," as some have dubbed it, has afforded presidents near-complete autonomy in foreign policy decisions and allowed them to commit the country to expensive and risky interventions abroad, with the executive seeking congressional approval only later. A vast national security apparatus has grown in tandem. It has secretly conducted domestic surveillance and engaged in political repression, often targeted at immigrants, minorities, and the politically vulnerable. In the hands of a leader who sees himself as above the law, these tools provide ample means to further the leader's own agenda, at great cost to accountable democratic government.

Although presidential power had grown over the first third of the twentieth century, it was Roosevelt who truly launched the process of executive aggrandizement. He took office at a moment of deep crisis, and many Americans expected him to assume dictatorial powers like those on display in Europe—some even urged him to do so. Roosevelt managed to steer the country through the crisis in a manner that preserved democracy, but he did so through an unprecedented expansion of presidential power. As the fascist threat grew in the 1930s, Roosevelt secretly authorized extensive domestic wiretapping, ostensibly to counter the danger of Nazi subversion. And during World War II, he ordered the mass incarceration of more than 100,000 people of Japanese descent, some 70,000 of whom were U.S. citizens.

In the 1970s, Nixon built on those precedents in order to weaponize the presidency, turning the national security apparatus against his personal and political enemies. Nixon's White House and campaign operatives engaged in a wide array of skullduggery and law breaking to harass, surveil, and discredit

his antagonists, including, most famously, the botched Watergate burglary in 1972 that ultimately brought Nixon down.

TRUMP AND THE FOUR THREATS

The four threats to democracy have waxed and waned over the course of U.S. history, each according to its own pattern. When even one threat existed, the course of democracy was put at risk, as occurred with the escalation of polarization in the 1790s and executive aggrandizement in the 1930s and 1970s. In the absence of the other threats, however, little backsliding occurred during those periods. When several threats coalesced, however, democratic progress was endangered. In both the 1850s and the 1890s, the combination of polarization, economic inequality, and racial conflict produced calamities.

Today, for the first time ever, the country is facing all four threats at once. Polarization has become extreme, prompting members of Congress to act more like members of a team than as representatives or policymakers. Among ordinary citizens, polarization is prompting a sense of politics as "us versus them," in which people's political choices are driven by their hostility toward the opposition. Economic inequality has skyrocketed, and wealthy individuals and business leaders are highly motivated and organized to protect their interests and expand their riches, even if they must tolerate or embrace racist, nativistic politics to achieve their goals. And in the face of political dysfunction and stalemate, the power of the executive branch has grown exponentially.

Trump's nomination and election were one result of these trends; his presidency has become a driving force behind them. He is polarization personified, utterly dismissive of and vicious toward all opponents. He has repeatedly stoked racial antagonism and nativism. Despite the populist atmospherics of his rallies and rhetoric, his approach to governing has been plutocratic, not redistributive, delivering robust benefits to the wealthy and business interests and relatively little to everyone else. And more than any president since Nixon, Trump views the presidency as his personal domain and has wielded its power to promote his personal interests—political and financial—at the expense of democratic accountability.

Throughout his time in the White House, Trump has launched a frontal attack on elections and the public's confidence in them. This began with his unsubstantiated 2016 claims that the electoral system was "rigged" and his warnings that he would not accept the results if they went against him; even after he won, he made spurious allegations of voter fraud in order to wave away the fact that he had lost the popular vote. He has also tolerated and even encouraged foreign interference in U.S. elections, failing to condemn Russian meddling in 2016 and later making a bald-faced effort to coerce Ukraine into launching a baseless investigation into former Vice President Joe Biden, Trump's likely opponent in the 2020 election, in order to provide him with dirt to use against Biden.

Even more dangerous is Trump's assault on the rule of law. Previous presidents have stretched the law and even violated it in pursuit of policy goals and political advantage. But few have so resolutely flouted the line between presidential power and personal gain.

Trump has made no secret of his belief that the FBI and the Justice Department are not public entities responsible for carrying out the rule of law; rather, he regards them as a private investigative force and a law firm that can protect him and his allies and harass and prosecute his enemies. In William Barr, he has found an attorney general who is willing to provide this personal protection.

Trump has also chipped away at bedrock values of American democracy, such as the idea of a free press, going so far as to threaten to revoke the licenses of news outlets that have published critical reporting on him and his administration; luckily, he has not followed through. Yet his frequent attacks on the mainstream media as "fake news" and "enemies of the people" have further undermined confidence in the press, with invidious effects. And when it comes to civil rights, Trump's frequent verbal assaults on immigrants and members of other minority groups have been accompanied by several policy and administrative changes that have scaled back the rights of vulnerable communities.

Americans may wish to assume that their democracy will survive this onslaught. After all, the country has weathered severe threats before. But history reveals that American democracy has always been vulnerable—and that the country has never faced a test quite like this.

A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT

Democratic decay is not inevitable, however. Politics does not adhere to mechanical principles, in which given circumstances foreordain a particular outcome. Rather, politics is driven by human beings who exercise agency and choice and who can set their sights on preserving and restoring democracy. Political leaders and citizens can rescue American democracy, but they must act before it is too late.

Some will say that focusing on the risk of backsliding misses the bigger point that American democracy has been far from perfect even in the past half century, never mind prior to the 1960s. And yet in recent decades, American democracy—despite its limitations—has nonetheless continued some of the best-established traditions of the United States and has allowed for a vast improvement over earlier periods with respect to free and fair elections and the integrity of rights.

Some political scientists and commentators believe that the only way to improve democracy in the United States would be through deep structural reforms. The equal representation of states in the Senate, for example, gives extra representation to residents of sparsely populated states and diminishes the power of people who live in more densely populated places. The Electoral College makes possible a perverse and undemocratic result in which the candidate for president who receives the most votes does not win—the result in two of the last five presidential elections.

But changes to such long-standing features of the U.S. political system seem unlikely. Amending the Constitution is difficult under the best of circumstances, and probably next to impossible in today's polarized climate. Moreover, those in power are the beneficiaries of the current arrangements and have little incentive to change them.

Absent such changes, one key to protecting democracy is surprisingly simple: to allow that goal to explicitly

guide political choices. In evaluating a policy or a proposal, Americans should lean away from their ideological tendencies, material interests, and partisan preferences and instead focus on whether the measure at hand will reinforce democracy or weaken it. The most important thing Americans can do is to insist on the rule of law, the legitimacy of competition, the integrity of rights, and strong protection for free and fair elections. These pillars are the rules of the game that permit all Americans to participate in politics, regardless of which party wins office.

Today's Republican Party has abandoned its willingness to protect those pillars of democracy, despite its legacy of having done so in earlier periods. The party has tolerated increasingly repressive and antidemocratic behavior as it has sought to maintain and expand its power. Republican officials and leaders now sanction the unjust punishment of their political enemies, efforts to limit voting by those who favor Democrats, and even the dismissal of election results that do not favor their party. In other countries where support for illiberal or authoritarian rule has emerged, opposition parties have embraced the role of champion of democracy. In the United States, that obligation now falls to the Democratic Party.

But ordinary citizens must become engaged, as well. Early generations of Americans made immense personal sacrifices for the sake of democracy. During World War II, Americans defeated Nazism and fascism through military service overseas and substantial efforts on the home front. During the 1950s and 1960s, Americans marched for civil rights, took part in lunch counter sits-ins, and volunteered for Freedom Summer. The time has come once again for Americans to defend democracy, joining in a long legacy.

The first half of 2020 deepened the crisis of democracy in the United States. A global pandemic, a deep recession, and feckless leadership have exposed and further exacerbated all four threats to democracy. At the same time, the broad and widespread Black Lives Matter protests that have filled streets and public squares in cities and towns across the country since the spring are forcing unprecedented numbers of Americans to confront their country's shameful history of racial inequality. If this reckoning bears electoral fruit in November and beyond, the United States might once again pull itself back from the brink. Crisis might lead to renewal.

To Protect and to Serve

Global Lessons in Police Reform

Laurence Ralph

Public outcry over the murders of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd earlier this year has ignited mass demonstrations against structural racism and police violence in the United States. The protests have reached every American state and spread to countries around the world; they arguably constitute the most broad-based civil rights movement in American history. Protests against the brutalization of communities of color by the U.S. criminal justice system have been growing for years, but the explosive scale of the uprising this spring and summer makes it clear that the United States has reached a national reckoning.

Most Americans now understand that their country needs a radical transformation: polls conducted in early June found that a majority of U.S. citizens support sweeping national law enforcement reforms. But as Americans embark on an urgent public conversation about policing, bias, and the use of force, they should remember that theirs is not the first or the only country to grapple with these policy questions. Many reform advocates and researchers have already begun to look overseas, pointing to countries where police training looks vastly different than it does in the United States: countries where police departments take far different approaches to the use of force or have even disarmed entirely, where criminal justice systems have adopted alternative sentencing programs, and where authorities have experimented with innovative approaches to de-escalation.

Some of these ideas could be adapted for use in the United States. For too long, a culture of American exceptionalism has been a barrier to the implementation of policies that have improved public safety around the globe. Now, the United States' capacity to heal as a nation could very well depend on its willingness to listen and learn from the rest of the world.

BRUTALITY AND BIAS

If Americans and their political leaders are to glean useful lessons from the experiences of other countries, they must first examine the practice of policing in the United States and try to define—as precisely as possible—the nature and scope of the problem. The aggressive tactics that U.S. police departments employ today were shaped by the legacies of slavery and Jim Crow. During the late nineteenth century, the slave patrols and militias that had regulated the movement of enslaved people before emancipation coalesced into more formalized police forces, and they continued to enforce the racial hierarchy in a segregated nation. In the second half of the twentieth century, as the country slowly and often grudgingly integrated, police

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departments honed the tactics of those earlier eras as a new means of controlling and repressing Black Americans. In response to the protests and unrest of the 1960s, police forces developed the kinds of quasi-military techniques that Americans today have seen applied to a new generation of protesters. In recent decades, police departments have systematically harassed Black communities with stop-and-frisk methods and aggressive fines, which municipalities craved to supplement their shrinking budgets in an age of tax cuts and austerity.

This kind of policing does not simply threaten the quality of life in Black communities; it is a matter of life and death. In 2014, ProPublica published one of the most comprehensive analyses to date of racial disparities in deadly police encounters. Its examination included detailed accounts of more than 12,000 police homicides between 1980 and 2012, drawn from the FBI's Supplementary Homicide Reports. During this three-decade period, ProPublica found that young Black men were 21 times as likely to be fatally shot by law enforcement as were their white peers.

The ProPublica investigation went on to describe how white officers, who were responsible for 68 percent of the police killings of people of color, typically reported that they had used deadly force out of fear for their physical safety. Reliance on this rationale increased substantially after the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in *Tennessee v. Garner*, which held that the police could use deadly force if a suspect posed a threat to a police officer or to others. In the four years preceding *Tennessee v. Garner*, "officer under attack" was cited in just 33 percent of police killings; 20 years later, over another four-year period, it was cited 62 percent of the time, eventually becoming an almost infallible legal defense for police officers who kill.

The U.S. government has not made data on police shootings available to the public since 2013, despite a number of high-profile fatal police shootings that would have made these records a matter of keen public interest. Although the Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013 requires U.S. law enforcement agencies to provide basic information about the people killed while in custody, the extent to which individual police departments have complied with this mandate is unclear.

Citizen-led organizations have tried to fill the void. A group called Mapping Police Violence maintains a comprehensive, crowdsourced database on police killings in the United States, scouring social media, obituaries, and criminal records in an effort to account for every lost life. In an analysis of the more than 8,200 police killings that have taken place in the United States since January 2013, Mapping Police Violence found that African Americans were three times as likely to be killed by law enforcement as were their white counterparts. Crucially, the group's findings contradict the common assumption that police officers kill African Americans at higher rates because they pose a greater threat: police departments of the 100 largest American cities killed unarmed Black people at a rate four times as high as the rate for unarmed white suspects. Still, in a shocking 99 percent of the cases the group analyzed, no officers were convicted of a crime.

GLOBAL POLICING NORMS

The analysis by Mapping Police Violence also contained another revealing finding: the group compared the victim data it had compiled against published crime rates and found no correlation between levels of violent crime in American cities and the likelihood of police killings. This presents a stark contrast with the rest of the world, where correlations generally exist between crime, social instability, and police killings. The United States is a wealthy, stable outlier in the list of countries with the highest rates of police killings. In 2019, the rate at which people were killed by the police in the United States (46.6 such killings per ten million residents) put it right between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (47.8 per ten million) and Iraq (45.1 per ten million), both of which are just emerging from years of conflict. Countries with levels of police brutality comparable to that in the United States are generally far more violent places to live and include ones, such as Egypt and Iran, that are often described by human rights campaigners as "police states."

Other factors also differentiate the United States from wealthy, stable countries with low rates of police killings. For one thing, the countries with the lowest rates, such as Denmark, Iceland, Switzerland, and Japan, have instituted mechanisms for police oversight at the national level. Although police unions exist in countries with low levels of police violence, these unions are generally affiliated with larger organizational bodies, such as Sweden's Confederation of Professional Employees and the German Confederation of Trade Unions, and do not have as much power to insulate officers from punishment as police unions in the United States do. Many professional groups in the United States have experienced sharp declines in union membership since the 1970s, yet American police unions remain strong, and union protection frequently makes it difficult to hold police officers accountable for misconduct.

Compared with the law enforcement infrastructures in countries that have lower levels of police violence, the U.S. law enforcement infrastructure is extremely decentralized. There are nearly 18,000 police agencies in the United States. Most states have hundreds of municipal police departments and county sheriff's offices, as well as state police forces and highway patrols. Additionally, the United States has a large number of autonomous federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and Customs and Border Protection. As a result, the standards around the use of force vary widely. On rare occasions, typically after a city has been embroiled in years of scandal, the federal government and a municipality might enter into a consent decree, which allows the Department of Justice to monitor the activities of a particular agency and shepherd any necessary reforms. Such oversight is considered an exceptional step in the United States; in the safest countries in the world, it is the norm.

In Japan, where just 0.2 people per ten million were killed by the police in 2019, police departments are coordinated and trained by the National Police Agency. In Luxembourg (16.9 per ten million) and Iceland (no police killings), that role is filled by the Ministry of Internal Security and the Ministry of Justice, respectively. In the Netherlands (2.3 per ten

Brute force: at a Black Lives Matter protest in New York City, May 2020

MARK PETERSON / REDUX

million), the National Police Corps coordinates policing efforts in different regions of the country.

Other countries have also established firm rules about police conduct, which make deadly violence far less likely. The Netherlands, for example, employs more than 23,500 "peace officers," known as BOAs, in addition to its regular police force of 55,000. Although a June 2020 decision by the Dutch Justice Ministry now permits BOAs to carry batons under certain circumstances, most are unarmed. BOAs receive training to help resolve noncriminal issues and to de-escalate conflict by remaining calm, inquiring about a person's well-being, and trying to reduce a person's anxiety—even while asking for identification, issuing fines, and making arrests. Such techniques also inform policing in the United Kingdom (0.5 per ten million killed by the police in 2019) and Norway (1.9 per ten million). In both places, police officers face far more restrictions than their American counterparts when it comes to the use of deadly weapons and combat techniques that can injure and kill, such as chokeholds.

Another commonality among countries with low rates of police violence is the rigor of their training programs. In 2016, Colin Kaepernick, the American quarterback who is widely believed to have been blackballed by the National Football League for kneeling during the national anthem to protest police violence, observed that in the United States, "you can become a cop in six months and don't have to have the same amount of training as a cosmetologist." In fact, Kaepernick's estimate was too generous: basic training can take as little as 21 weeks. By contrast, the requirements to

be a police officer in Germany (1.3 per ten million killed by the police in 2019) include at least two and a half years of basic training, and in some circumstances, it takes up to four years to become an officer. Iceland, which has had only one fatal police shooting in its history, requires two years of training.

CONFOUNDING FACTORS

When analyzing police training programs internationally, it is important to note that many practices that have contributed to lower rates of police violence elsewhere—changing the rules governing deadly force, training about implicit bias, and emphasizing officers' connections with the community—have also been tried in the United States. And although such approaches might have led to some forms of progress, they have not made a dent in the country's shocking rate of police killings.

One reason for this that is frequently given is the prevalence of guns in the United States, which is comparable in this regard to no other country on earth. Faced with a heavily armed populace, U.S. law enforcement agencies often argue that they must have military-grade weapons and the right to use deadly force. Citing the correlation—widely accepted in public health scholarship—between the availability of firearms and homicide, Derek Thompson of *The Atlantic* recently described a vicious cycle: "Where guns are abundant, civilians are more likely to kill civilians and cops, and cops are, in turn, more likely to kill civilians." In Thompson's view, "the morbid exceptionalism" of police violence in the United States can be sufficiently addressed only through legislation that reduces the availability of firearms. But when it comes to weapons and law enforcement, the central question, How much is enough? has never been answered sufficiently. In 2014, the Los Angeles School Police Department announced that although it had decided to return the grenade launchers it had stockpiled, it would be keeping its armored tank.

Yet the prevalence of guns is surely not the only reason that reform efforts have failed to address the worst forms of police abuse in the United States. Nor is the localized nature of policing or the lack of federal oversight. Part of the problem, it seems, is that police departments in the United States appear to be immune to reform. Much has been made of the fact, for example, that the Atlanta police officer who was charged with murder after the killing in June of Rayshard Brooks outside a Wendy's restaurant had recently been trained in de-escalation techniques. The same could be said of hundreds of other officers in the United States whose reform-based training should have led to different outcomes in situations that ended in police killings. That is one reason why many within the U.S.-based Black Lives Matter movement have shifted from calling for police departments to be reformed to demanding that they be defunded or abolished altogether.

From a global perspective, it is not unprecedented for calls for police abolition to follow protracted political unrest due to a lack of trust in the government and questions about its legitimacy. In 1990, Estonia, a country that today has extremely low levels of crime, abolished the *militsiya*, its Soviet-era police force, and established a more peaceful security force, not unlike the unarmed peace

officers in the Netherlands. The Estonian police underwent another significant transformation in 2004, as part of the country's process of integration into the European Union—a process that reduced the number of police officers in Estonia by 75 percent.

Likewise, Georgia abolished its police force following its 2004 revolution. Georgia's newly elected president, Mikheil Saakashvili, created a dramatically smaller force, with support from the U.S. embassy, the European Union, and the British Council—a move that has helped reestablish the legitimacy of the government and quell corruption in the country. In total, the government fired some 16,000 police officers because of enduring problems with corruption. After significant resistance from the police unions, Saakashvili's new government abolished them, along with the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the traffic police, all of which had become infamous for extorting the public.

The recent decision by the Minneapolis City Council to take steps toward dismantling the city's police force may seem extraordinary to many Americans, but defunding the police as the first step toward an abolition program has been the goal of grassroots activism for nearly a decade. Activist groups in Chicago, for example, have long discussed scaling back the city's police department and redirecting its funds to social programs. In March 2018, young people of color in Chicago staged a "die-in" at City Hall to protest then Mayor Rahm Emanuel's plan to spend $95 million to build a police academy. The young protesters set up cardboard tombstones featuring the names of people who had been killed by the Chicago police, along with the names of schools and facilities in Chicago that had been shuttered because of a lack of funding.

Speaking about her reasons for helping organize the event, 20-year-old Nita Tennyson explained: "In my neighborhood, there are no grocery stores. We live in a food desert. There are a bunch of schools getting shut down. The mental health facilities are shut down, too. And that just leaves people with nothing to do. They become a danger to themselves and their community. But if we had those resources," she continued, referring to the funding earmarked for the police academy, "we wouldn't even need the police to try to stop those people, because resources would already be in place to help them." Tennyson's description of how the lack of resources in her community contributes to violence seemed laced with resentment because, as she saw it, a vast expenditure of time and resources was being spent to clean up a problem that should not have existed in the first place.

In activist circles, the concept of defunding the police has long stood in for a call to reprioritize the spending of taxpayer money. The argument is that the government should redirect the billions that now go to police departments toward providing health care, housing, education, and employment.

Activist groups that seek to abolish or dramatically cut funding for police forces often hark back to large-scale social programs such as those developed under Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, noting that such programs did in fact work to create social mobility for many Americans and helped keep them safe. The problem

was that the programs were not extended to all citizens equally, particularly Black Americans. In this regard, it is important to note that the Scandinavian countries with the lowest levels of crime and police violence also provide comprehensive social programs that have been remarkably successful at reducing poverty. Also, whereas in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, a high percentage of the workforce is unionized, instilling job security, in the United States, unions have largely eroded since the 1980s—except for police unions, whose profound influence has made it all the more difficult to hold accountable officers who break the law.

For more than a century, cities across the United States have periodically responded to anger over police violence with a combination of organizational reforms, training programs, ethics codes, and civilian-oversight bodies, along with efforts to ramp up recruitment and increase pay. But a coherent model of noncoercive policing has yet to emerge in American cities. The federal government has stepped in occasionally. Over the decades, large-scale, government-commissioned studies, despite differing in their specific recommendations, have almost always suggested funneling more economic resources into police departments, even though more spending has not led to meaningful reductions in police violence. That fact has fueled the movement for defunding—and it also explains the dissatisfaction many activists felt when, in the wake of Floyd's death and the explosion of Black Lives Matter protests this past spring, the Democratic presidential hopeful Joe Biden suggested spending $300 million in federal funds to strengthen community policing programs.

Political scientists and social psychologists have long been able to demonstrate that even the mere perception of racial bias within a police force erodes public trust in law enforcement and can compromise its legitimacy. If police forces in the United States are to regain the public's trust, any serious discussion of policing practices—including police rules, training standards, reform efforts, and legal frameworks—must be part of a new consensus committed to uniting the American public around human dignity.

REVIEWS & RESPONSES

LAM YIK FEI / THE NEW YORK TIMES / REDUX

One Country, Two Systems, No Future

The End of Hong Kong as We Know It

Jane Perlez

City on Fire: The Fight for Hong Kong BY ANTONY DAPIRAN. Scribe, 2020, 336 pp.

Unfree Speech: The Threat to Global Democracy and Why We Must Act, Now BY JOSHUA WONG WITH JASON Y. NG. Penguin Books, 2020, 288 pp.

Last summer, hundreds of thousands of protesters had been pouring onto the streets of Hong Kong for about a month when I got a call from a senior official in Beijing inviting me to lunch. We were quite friendly. We had shared stories about our work experiences and had politely sparred over the deepening chasm between the United States and China. I was about to leave China after seven years, and I was looking forward to a warm goodbye.

Thanks to Beijing's scrupulous censorship, the crowds of angry Hong Kongers had barely registered on the mainland. Even as Hong Kong was becoming important on the world stage, the open defiance toward Beijing—two back-to-back marches had drawn more than a million people each—had yet to be revealed by China's state-run media. Chinese leaders were afraid of contagion: if images of the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong were seen on the mainland, they might inspire errant thoughts and actions.

So as I headed to lunch, ordinary Chinese people were only vaguely aware of the tumult. Many of them consider Hong Kong to be a place that is rightfully part of the mainland and dismiss its residents as spoiled ingrates who do not understand the wisdom of hard work. When the protests later turned violent, China's media presented the tear gas, Molotov cocktails, ramming rods, and injured people as dark examples of what was wrong with the disobedient territory.

My host quickly dispensed with pleasantries. Hong Kong was the designated subject of our discourse, and the tone was more insistent than usual. As my host described the protesters as traitors, the United States became central to the argument: Washington was acting as the Black Hand. More specifically: "Allen Weinstein is responsible." I knew about Weinstein from a book he wrote in 1978 that set out to prove with newly disclosed documents that Alger Hiss was a Soviet spy. "But Weinstein is dead," I replied. The official retorted that Weinstein had founded the National Endowment for Democracy in 1983 and insisted that the NED was behind the protests.

The idea that Washington was provoking the eruption in Hong Kong through a thinly funded nonprofit seemed far-fetched—something out of

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a 1950s playbook. But it also sounded like the kind of theory that would be attractive to Chinese Communist Party loyalists. In fact, my lunch partner had just emerged from a long refresher course at the Central Party School, the main ideological training ground for China's elite, and the subject of how to deal with Hong Kong had been on the curriculum. Some weeks later, another Chinese official offered the same NED conspiracy theory to a friend of mine, a prominent civil servant in the government of one of the United States' Asian allies. My friend had more fortitude than me and gave the rational response: if Washington had tried to organize the Hong Kong protests, only a handful of people would have shown up.

By blaming Washington, Beijing was eliding its own responsibility for the political unrest, which was provoked by the creeping chokehold that China's leader, Xi Jinping, had imposed on Hong Kong in the previous five years. Decades ago, China and the United Kingdom agreed that when British rule of Hong Kong ended, in 1997, the territory would be entitled to its own governance. Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong's chief executive would be appointed by Beijing but the territory would maintain its own legislature and an independent judiciary, with the right to freedom of expression as the underlying glue. The arrangement was designed to last until 2047, when Hong Kong would pass into the hands of China. Although it was not specified in writing, it was generally assumed that the agreement would grant Hong Kong breathing room until then.

Before Xi came to power, in 2012, Beijing had mostly treated Hong Kong as a backwater. China's officials dealt with it through their appointees in the territory, who publicly supported the status quo. Xi had other ideas, however, and soon began chipping away at the territory's autonomy. At first, his Hong Kong handlers meddled by dictating a new school curriculum, designed to inculcate loyalty to Beijing. A strong backlash from Hong Kongers forced the withdrawal of the plan; the leaders of the anti-curriculum effort also mobilized 79 days of protests in 2014, known as the Umbrella Movement. In 2015, five Hong Kong booksellers vanished; all had been known to offer material critical of the mainland. Some of them, after reappearing, later revealed that they had been abducted by Chinese law enforcement. As a result, written criticism of China, once an attraction in Hong Kong for even the curious party faithful visiting from the mainland, disappeared.

In 2019, when Beijing proposed an extradition law that would allow criminal suspects in Hong Kong to be tried on the mainland, China's overbearing approach finally proved more than Hong Kongers could bear. Naturally, many of them feared that the extradition law would cast a wide net and capture more than just those in legal trouble. Protests over the move have roiled Hong Kong for the past year, and the tensions finally came to a head when, on June 30, China imposed a harsh new national security law on the territory—a move that eschews any pretense of democratic rule, strips Hong Kong of much of its autonomy, and arguably signals its absorption by the mainland, decades ahead of schedule.

As two recent books make clear, what has happened in Hong Kong will affect not only its 7.5 million residents

but also the entire region—and the rest of the world. China's crackdown has revealed that Xi is determined to impose authoritarian rule on the troublesome territory. Washington, meanwhile, has shown little appetite for confronting China over Hong Kong. And yet there is little doubt that the drama there will have an impact on the already tense U.S.-Chinese relationship.

A TEAR GAS BUFFET

In *City on Fire*, Antony Dapiran gives a rousing account of the protest movement from its beginnings in 2014 to the long showdowns in 2019. Australian by nationality, Dapiran has lived in Hong Kong for 20 years. As a blogger and a lawyer who has advised many Hong Kong firms, Dapiran is convincing in his analysis that the protests were homegrown, largely born of Beijing's heavy-handed determination to stage a takeover of the former British colony decades before it had any legal right to do so.

Dapiran takes readers through the streets, alleyways, and subways of the city alongside the black-clad, yellow-hardhat-wearing, gas-masked protesters. He gets inside their skin, signing in to Telegram, an online social network used by the protesters to organize. Because Dapiran is with the crowds, he describes with great verve how the protesters operate without leaders, instead moving "like water" to pop up and then evade the police.

It is appropriate that Dapiran begins his discussion of the 2019 protests with the Hong Kong police resorting to tear gas, a vestige of the British colonial era. (He also points out that tear gas is not in fact a gas but rather a powder delivered by the smoke of a burning shell.) During the seven months of protests that began in June 2019, the police fired 16,000 rounds of tear gas, lobbing it inside subway stations, onto crowded walkways, and onto apartment balconies. Hong Kongers sardonically called the tactics an "all-you-can-eat tear gas buffet." Hong Kong nurses, who treated wave after wave of victims, rallied against its use.

The tear gas had a dual role. "As well as having a psychological effect on those being gassed, tear gas also has a psychological effect on those deploying it," Dapiran writes. "By creating a scene of violence and chaos, tear gas works to objectify the crowd, turning it from a group of human beings into a seething, writhing mass."

Soon, the Hong Kong police pulled out another weapon. Outside the government headquarters at the end of August, the police unleashed water cannons onto thousands of protesters. The jets of water contained a form of pepper spray and an indelible bright blue dye. Protesters were left dripping, smarting in pain, and now easily identifiable for arrest.

As the protests unfolded, Beijing bullied or co-opted Hong Kong's commanding heights, sending a clear message about who was now in charge. Rupert Hogg, the chief executive of Cathay Pacific Airways, a potent symbol of Hong Kong as Asia's financial hub, was forced to resign when staffers showed sympathy with the protesters. By contrast, Beijing treated the Hong Kong police sergeant Lau Chak-kei as a hero. He had pointed his shotgun—his finger on the trigger—at an unarmed crowd outside a police station. (The police later said that the gun was loaded

with beanbags.) The Chinese government hailed Lau for standing up to what it characterized as violent rioters and invited him to Beijing for the National Day celebrations.

Last November, Dapiran watched as young middle-class professionals passed chunks of bricks from hand to hand to be thrown at the police during their two-week siege of a university campus. "It was clear to me that something in Hong Kong society had broken," he writes.

LETTER FROM A HONG KONG JAIL

The 2019 protesters could easily have used Joshua Wong as their mascot. Wong had been a 17-year-old charismatic leader of the 2014 Umbrella Movement—the vibrant precursor of the 2019 protests—and subsequently served several prison sentences for his activism. But instead of seeking to spearhead the more recent opposition to Beijing, Wong endorsed the idea that the 2019 protests should try a different strategy and be leaderless. None of the 2019 demonstrators put his or her head above the parapet by making speeches. Wong wandered the streets at the peak of the 2019 protests as one of the pack, almost unrecognizable except for when he turned up for interviews with the Western press. *Unfree Speech,* his portrait of his generation of Hong Kongers, provides a basic understanding of why so many ordinary people, most of whom had never been near a demonstration before, took to the streets. They were loyal, he explains, to Hong Kong—and not to the United Kingdom, like their parents, or to China, from where many of their ancestors had fled.

Wong writes that he learned about Hong Kong's extraordinarily high rates of economic inequality as a student at United Christian College, a private secondary school in Hong Kong. Old people pick through trash cans and push heavy carts of recycled paper to make a borderline living. Salaried workers live in tiny cramped apartments. Yet the city's monied class, with ties to Beijing, owns some of the most expensive real estate in the world. Although many members of his age cohort stayed on the sidelines during the 2014 protests, Wong was driven, he explains, by what he calls an "incompetent" Hong Kong government and the economic and social effects of the SARS epidemic, which hit Hong Kong especially hard. Most important, he found he had a gift for speaking in a way that could mobilize his peers.

Due to his organizing skills and his clarity as an anti-China campaigner, Wong served 69 days in Hong Kong jails, where he turned 21. While there, he kept a diary, which he reprints as a part of his book. What is most notable, Wong led a jailhouse protest against the compulsory biweekly head shaving of the juvenile inmates. He was allowed to receive mail, play Ping-Pong, and keep current with his computer skills. His jottings fall short of ranking among the classics of prison literature, but they are appealing as an entrée into the mind of a brave young protest leader.

Wong is not so foolhardy as to call for independence for Hong Kong; he knows that is not a winning idea. But he has been unrelenting in his advocacy for freedom of expression and a fair electoral process, both of which Beijing has feared could become attractive at some point on the mainland.

YOU COULD BE NEXT

Even as the protests heated up during 2014, Hong Kong stayed low on the agenda at the White House and on the periphery in the inner sanctum of Zhongnanhai, the formal seat of Xi's power in Beijing. But the turmoil of 2019 pulled Hong Kong right to the center of Xi's concerns. Xi essentially defined Hong Kong as a sovereignty issue, raising the price that the United States and its allies would have to pay if they tried to oppose him. Xi acted quickly to contain the protests. The coronavirus pandemic delayed his imposition of a new draconian national security law, but only by a few months.

The new law, put into effect on June 30, brings Hong Kong directly under China's thumb. It has effectively flattened the already reeling protest movement. Beijing's long-dreaded security forces are now authorized to set up operations in the territory. Beijing will be able to override local laws. Separatism, terrorism, subversion, and "colluding with foreign powers" are all defined as crimes. In short, the law makes it almost impossible for protest leaders, such as Wong and older prominent figures of the movement, to oppose the diktats of the Communist Party without risking extradition to the mainland. Hours after the new law came into effect, Wong and his co-founders resigned as the leaders of Demosisto, the political party they had formed in 2016 as the face of the protest movement.

For the small clutch of Washington lawmakers who care about Beijing's suppression of human rights, Hong Kong's travails have intensified their hard line against China. But for many Americans, including many policymakers and officeholders, the territory is little more than an exotic destination, an entrepot that mixes Asia and the West, and a now faded stopover for shopping. The lack of appetite in Washington to take a stand on Hong Kong almost certainly means that the territory will be steadily subsumed into China's grand design for the Greater Bay Area, a planned megapolis of roughly 70 million people and 11 cities, including booming Guangzhou and Shenzhen. What has been Asia's financial hub may find itself reduced to a twenty-first-century version of the fishing village that Queen Victoria's subjects found when they sailed into the harbor in 1841.

The takeover of Hong Kong has also sent shudders through Taiwan, intensifying opposition there to the mainland. Chinese fighter jets buzzed Taiwan's airspace on a daily basis in the period leading up to Beijing's imposition of the new national security law in Hong Kong. That sent an unmistakable message to the island's 23 million inhabitants: "You could be next."

The day after the new national security law went into effect, the U.S. Congress unanimously passed a bill imposing sanctions on the Chinese officials and companies that will help implement the law. There is talk of revoking Hong Kong's special status under American trade law, a step that would have little impact on Hong Kong's economy. These measures are unlikely to deter Beijing's resolve to keep Hong Kong on a very short leash or impress Hong Kong's business community, now dominated by big Chinese investors. Whoever occupies the White House come January will have a hard time reversing the mugging of a world-renowned vibrant society at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party.

Citizens of the World

How Cosmopolitanism Made Europe Modern

Jerrold Seigel

The Europeans: Three Lives and the Making of a Cosmopolitan Culture
BY ORLANDO FIGES. Metropolitan Books, 2019, 592 pp.

One thing that has long made Europe what it is, distinct from any other part of the world, is a peculiar mix of division and integration. Since the fall of Rome, Europe has never been unified by an overarching imperial power. Instead, the continent evolved from feudal fragmentation into a system of independent, competing nation-states, restrained from devouring one another—at least before the twentieth century—by a system of balance-of-power politics. Competition goaded each state to develop its political and economic capabilities, so that by the mid-1700s, the continent as a whole was well on the way to realizing its potential to dominate other regions—a power that would alter the world in the age of imperialism.

This mix of separateness and coordination preserved the distinct identities of Europe's parts but created a frame in which trade, competition, and a semblance of religious unity drew them all together. It was also a chief factor in cultural development and social change. Take, for example, the Enlightenment. In France, the movement was largely devoted to a critique of the ancien régime's political and religious oppression. It morphed into a celebration of native civility and constitutional liberty in Great Britain and shifted its focus in Germany from the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau's emphasis on the politics of domination to the conditions of inner moral freedom.

It was against this background that the notion of cosmopolitanism began to spread in Europe. Cosmopolitanism was primarily a political ideal, associated with the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who in a 1795 essay entitled *Perpetual Peace* posited a "cosmopolitan law" that would give individuals rights as "citizens of the earth" rather than as citizens of particular countries. But cosmopolitanism also had a strong literary dimension. Travel writing—such as Captain James Cook's diaries of his travels to Oceania and the Pacific and Montesquieu's fictitious *Persian Letters*—encouraged people to imagine themselves in foreign environments. One French writer of the period thus referred to himself as a *cosmopolite*, declaring that "all countries are the same to me."

Other people drawn to a cosmopolitan perspective approached it by way of the special mix of internal division and integration that made Europe a favorable site for cosmopolitanism in the first place. They posited a kind of dialectical relationship that made more restricted ties a starting point for developing broader ones. This dialectic

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was also at the heart of the celebrated Republic of Letters, which attracted many partisans of the Enlightenment. The republic was made up of writers, thinkers, and other truth seekers linked together by networks of correspondence, publication, patronage, and friendship. It was dedicated to liberating its members from the prejudices and attachments that their local, national, or denominational ties produced. But this goal could only be pursued as long as it was never fully realized, because if it were, then all otherness would be eradicated, depriving successive participants in the republic's activities of the exposure to the alternative perspectives that could help them become more enlightened, more rational, and more cosmopolitan citizens.

Had this interplay between the local and the universal fully informed the story of cosmopolitanism that Orlando Figes puts at the center of his cultural history, *The Europeans*, his good book could have been much better. Figes provides a vast store of information on European cultural institutions—theaters, opera houses, museums, and international exhibitions—as well as their social and economic underpinnings. He seeks to integrate all this material in two ways. First, he shows how Europe's cosmopolitan culture was formed by the international links that were either created or strengthened over the nineteenth century, so that by the end of the period, not only was "all of Europe reading the same books"—a fact that the literary historian Franco Moretti established with statistics in his *Atlas of the European Novel*—but people everywhere were also hearing the same music and looking at the same pictures. This development owed much to an expansion of publishing and, in particular, of translations. It also stemmed from a variety of new photographic techniques that publishers combined with lithography and engraving in order to tap a growing market of consumers. But the most powerful engine of cultural integration in the nineteenth century was the railroad.

Trains crisscrossed the continent with great rapidity starting in the 1850s, bringing together people and objects that were once weeks or months of travel apart. Figes begins his book with a colorful account of the opening of the first short-range international lines in 1843 and 1846. This appealing curtain raiser already announces the book's one-sidedness, however, because such an emphasis on the railroad as an engine of internationalism obscures the degree to which it served as a vehicle for national integration, providing such countries as France and Germany with the market unity that was crucial to the establishment of modern industry. In addition, it underestimates the role railroads played in forging cultural unity. Continental Europe entered the nineteenth century as a linguistically splintered congeries of local cultures. Railways helped merge many of these cultures and turn them into national characteristics by making travel easier and faster than ever before.

The Europeans' second unifying thread is human rather than technological: throughout his volume, Figes traces the lives of three exceptionally cosmopolitan Europeans. One of the protagonists of Figes's narrative is a Spanish soprano, Pauline Viardot. Although best known as an opera singer, Viardot was also a

Modern love: portraits of Ivan Turgenev, Pauline Viardot, and Louis Viardot

LEFT TO RIGHT: CHRONICLE / ALAMY STOCK PHOTO; GL ARCHIVE / ALAMY STOCK PHOTO; HERITAGE IMAGE / ALAMY STOCK PHOTO

first-rate pianist and a talented composer, whose charm and intelligence made her the center of cultural life wherever she set up her household. *The Europeans* also follows her French husband, Louis Viardot, who was a writer, art critic, impresario, and radical political activist. The last of the three lives in the book's subtitle belongs to the Russian novelist Ivan Turgenev, best known for his remarkable story of radicalism and generational conflict, *Fathers and Sons*.

What bound Turgenev to the Viardots was his emotional attachment to Pauline, with whom he fell in love in 1843. Turgenev would spend the rest of his life either in close proximity to Pauline or wishing for it, following her and Louis to Paris and London, often living near them and spending long, languorous days in their company. Turgenev was also Pauline's lover and very likely the father of one of her children. Louis accepted his wife's liaison with Turgenev and maintained friendly relations with the Russian writer throughout his lifetime.

UNITY IN DIVERSITY

The richness of both the personalities and the story seeds Figes's book with memorable moments. Pauline, in particular, stands out. A figure less remembered than her achievements merit—in large part because her singing and her ability to foster far-reaching networks of friends and acquaintances left little material trace—Pauline captured the cosmopolitanism of the period. Descriptions of her deep yet flexible soprano and the dramatic quality of her performances leave one yearning for some way to hear them; alas, her work as a composer, which competent judges admired, was impeded by the common assumption that women were not up to writing music. Pauline was also connected to dozens of famous composers and musicians, from Frédéric Chopin and Richard Wagner to Johannes Brahms, Giacomo Meyerbeer, Camille Saint-Saëns, Clara Schumann, and Johann Strauss II. One memorable example of Figes's talent for uncovering fascinating vignettes is his account of a soiree at the Viardots' house in 1860, where Pauline and

Wagner gave the first performance of the famous love duet from the second act of *Tristan und Isolde*, Wagner's great epic of love and death.

Turgenev's career also serves as a lens through which to view European cultural history. His literary realism provides an entry into the development of the novel, and his radicalism, into the continent's politics. One of his early books helped turn Russian opinion against serfdom. Turgenev was a determined westernizer who was nevertheless close to such deeply Russian figures as Leo Tolstoy and Fyodor Dostoyevsky. Among his contributions to cosmopolitanism was his sponsorship of French and German writers in Russia—he was especially close to Gustave Flaubert and Émile Zola—and of Russian ones in the West. Turgenev was also an active participant in the movement to establish an international system of copyright. Louis Viardot receives the least attention of the three, but he, too, has a place in the weaving of international connections; his writings on Spanish art and his guides for visitors to museums were highly popular.

But there are two reasons why, despite these virtues, *The Europeans* falls short of fulfilling its promise. The first is that Figes's attempt to make a general cultural history of the period cohere around the lives of Turgenev and the Viardots forces him to alternate biographical sections with ones that take up various bigger topics. This may seem like a promising way to integrate individual lives with larger historical currents, but as a result of this organization, the reader is obliged to engage in a kind of literary multitasking, made even more difficult by the many complex details and the multitude of minor figures who enter into the story along the way.

The greater problem, however, is not organizational but conceptual. There can be no doubt that Europe became more closely integrated as railroad construction proceeded; there was also something new about the fact that people across the continent were reading the same books, listening to the same music, and gazing at the same works of art. But Figes is also perfectly aware that opposition to cosmopolitanism developed alongside its progress, notably in the rise of nationalist currents in every cultural domain. Because he generally regards these currents as mere episodes of resistance to cosmopolitanism, he never succeeds in establishing a meaningful relationship between them and the growth of a cosmopolitan outlook. At the start of the book, he quotes the British art historian Kenneth Clark's claim that "nearly all the great advances in civilization" have come at times of "utmost internationalism." And he calls on the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche at the end to say that "the process of *becoming European*" involves "a growing detachment" from local conditions, "an increasing independence of any definite *milieu*." He extends this point even further in his discussion of the opera *Carmen*. Figes writes that "it was no longer possible, or even meaningful, to distinguish between what was nationally 'authentic' and what foreign or international—so much cultural exchange was there across national borders in the modern world."

And yet people still found it necessary to make such distinctions, as Figes himself tells us a few pages later. Western audiences still "wanted Russian

music to sound 'Russian,' Spanish music 'Spanish,' Hungarian 'Hungarian.'" When the Belgian journal *L'Art moderne* proposed to serve as a space where Latin and Germanic sensibilities could interact and stimulate each other, the premise was not that becoming fully European required dissolving such differences but that something positive would come of the encounter between them. Moreover, sometimes *The Europeans* seems to question its own premise that the overall trajectory of nineteenth-century European cultural history was toward the triumph of cosmopolitanism. For instance, Figes observes that Meyerbeer's death in 1864 marked "the passing of the cosmopolitan idea of European culture which his life and work had embodied." Elsewhere, he quotes Henry James's accusation that the writers in Flaubert's circle were dogmatic to the point of being "ignorant of anything that was not French."

A NARROW PATH

The point is not that Figes would have done well to pay more attention to the kind of nationalism that would become so destructive in the twentieth century, and remains so today. In order to understand the manner in which Europe could and could not be cosmopolitan, historians must remain attentive to the long-standing pattern wherein the continued separateness of Europe's parts functions as the underlying condition of the continent's special mode of unity. Cosmopolitanism is not a state into which people can enter once and for all by reading the same books or listening to the same music. Human beings can never wholly detach themselves from the definite milieus of which Nietzsche saw only the dark side; they can only aspire to be citizens of the world by acknowledging their rootedness in some smaller part of it. The British poet T. S. Eliot affirmed this when he defined a "good European" not as one who seeks to diminish "local and national" differences but as one who becomes more critical of his or her own culture by recognizing that other ways of life have something to teach. Treating cosmopolitanism as an aspiration to dissolve all differences in favor of some universal way of being is misguided, as it would lead to a condition "in which we should have nothing to gain from each other," Eliot notes. Since the same differences that make those gains possible are the ones that also lead to conflict and hostility, the path Europeans must walk is a narrow one.

This lesson is especially important after the success of Brexiteers in convincing a large proportion of the British electorate that the United Kingdom's national interests could be served only by renouncing international ties. To save liberal cosmopolitanism at a time when populist sentiment in Europe and the United States promotes the revival of a divisive and narrow nationalism, it is important to recognize that cosmopolitanism need not set itself against local loyalties and attachments and that, properly understood, the two can nurture each other. The best way to become cosmopolitans is by aspiring to the broad perspectives that coming to know a range of diverse cultures and viewpoints opens up. One belongs best to the wider world when one perceives it as the sum of all the particular ways of being and seeing of which it is composed.

Recent Books

Political and Legal

G. John Ikenberry

The Ages of Globalization: Geography, Technology, and Institutions
BY JEFFREY D. SACHS. Columbia University Press, 2020, 280 pp.

This masterful history of the human experience of global interconnectedness begins in the Paleolithic Age and ends in today's COVID-19 pandemic. Sachs makes a powerful case that the globalizing forces creating our increasingly interdependent world are deeply rooted in the human condition and that they are forces—for better and worse—that are here to stay. The book identifies seven ages of globalization, from the classical age to the digital age. In each, technology, geography, and social institutions have shaped the frontiers of economic advancement and human interaction. Sachs shows that in each successive period, the scale of organization, exchange, and cooperation has dramatically increased. The book acknowledges both the upside and the downside of globalization: it has created opportunities for learning, economic growth, and new forms of political community, even as it has brought great suffering to the world through disease, conquest, war, and financial crises. On balance, Sachs seems to think that the gains from globalization are indisputable, and in each historical age, it has fostered social advancement. But Sachs's history also shows that the revolutions in technology that propel globalization tend to outpace the ability of governments to manage their consequences.

The World: A Brief Introduction
BY RICHARD HAASS. Penguin Press, 2020, 400 pp.

Writing for a popular audience, Haass provides a clear and concise account of the history, diplomacy, economics, and societal forces that have molded the modern global system. The book begins by telling the story of the rise of the Western state system, the subsequent centuries of war and peacemaking, and the Cold War and its aftermath. In other chapters, Haass examines the political, economic, and demographic forces that have shaped Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas, and he explains globalization through sections on trade, finance, migration, climate

JOHN WATERBURY has retired as the reviewer of the section on the Middle East, and we thank him for his outstanding contributions. We are fortunate to have as his successor LISA ANDERSON, the James T. Shotwell professor emerita of international relations at Columbia University. Anderson served as president of the American University of Cairo from 2011 to 2015. From 1996 to 2008, she was dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Earlier, she served as chair of the Political Science Department at Columbia and as director of the university's Middle East Institute.

change, terrorism, and cyberspace. The book avoids theoretical debates, focusing instead on the interplay between broad world-historical forces—science and technology, capitalism, nationalism, power politics—and diplomacy and leadership. The rise of liberal democracy and economic interdependence has encouraged rules-based relations and global governance, but anarchy and the threat of war always loom in the background. Haass gives credit to the United States for underwriting the postwar liberal order, but he also sees American leadership on the wane, nationalism reasserting itself, and an increasingly ambitious China seeking to tilt the world away from liberal democracy. If the liberal order cannot be rebuilt, Haass expects a more fragmented world order to emerge, one organized around spheres of influence.

Disunited Nations: The Scramble for Power in an Ungoverned World
BY PETER ZEIHAN. Harper Business, 2020, 480 pp.

This quick-paced tour of today's fragmenting global order ominously warns that more chaos and conflict is on the way. According to Zeihan, the post-1945 era of peace and prosperity was a historical aberration, made possible by a U.S.-led system of trade and alliances. This hegemonic system—what he calls "the Order"—provided the foundation for decades of progress in education, health, prosperity, security, democracy, and human connectivity. The bad news, according to Zeihan, is that the Order was a historically unique, never-to-be-repeated anomaly, and its demise will spark chaos and disorder on an epic scale. The Trump administration is speeding up the process, but the Order has been weakening for decades. Zeihan offers a gloomy picture of collapsing markets, deteriorating global norms, escalating conflicts over energy and food, and the return of great-power struggles over maritime supremacy and territorial borders. Scholars who debate the consequences of hegemonic decline will find this tale familiar.

Orders of Exclusion: Great Powers and the Strategic Sources of Foundational Rules in International Relations
BY KYLE M. LASCURETTES. Oxford University Press, 2020, 352 pp.

In this impressive study of order building in the modern era, Lascurettes argues that powerful states have long shaped the rules of the international order to undermine rival states. The book offers detailed historical accounts of great ordering moments from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. In each instance, Lascurettes sees the dominant state proposing principles and institutions that would weaken or exclude states that threatened its security and primacy. The victors of the Thirty Years' War devised rules of sovereign statehood to undercut the universalist authority of the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire. The post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe was organized to protect conservative monarchical regimes from emerging liberal and revolutionary states. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's emphasis on national self-determination after World War I was at least partly aimed at countering the revolutionary ideals of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the post-1945 U.S.-led order was defined in opposition to fascist and communist rivals. Lascurettes

contrasts his theory with the work of other scholars who see the modern international order as built through consensus and infused with universalist aspirations. The book's contribution is less in its interpretations of history than in its illumination of the ways in which international rules and institutions empower some states and undercut others.

The Challenges of Multilateralism
BY KATHRYN C. LAVELLE. Yale University Press, 2020, 352 pp.

The post-1815 Concert of Europe was a watershed in diplomatic history, fostering a tradition of multilateral diplomacy. By the end of the nineteenth century, traders, jurists, professional groups, and social activists were working across borders to establish multilateral institutions to coordinate their activities. Lavelle argues that the interwar period was also a surprisingly important era in the evolution of multilateral cooperation. The United States failed to join the League of Nations, but private networks of cooperation flourished. Bankers negotiated deals to stabilize financial flows, and the Rockefeller Foundation was the driving force in fostering international cooperation on public health. Lavelle shows that the post-1945 explosion of multilateralism was possible precisely because of trial and error in earlier decades. Chapters explore the founding and evolution of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system, the decolonization movement, alliances, and public health and environmental cooperation. Lavelle's most important contention is that multilateralism is less an idealistic aspiration than a pragmatic tool for managing economic and security interdependence. Multilateralism may be in retreat today, but it remains the best solution for the world's increasingly complex problems.

Economic, Social, and Environmental

Richard N. Cooper

Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World
BY BRANKO MILANOVIC. Harvard University Press, 2019, 304 pp.

This fascinating book offers a big-picture view of economic and social history over the past two centuries. As a system for organizing economies and societies, capitalism has won and has no rival. It provides more prosperity with a modicum of freedom than any other system. But the author distinguishes several competing kinds of capitalism. He focuses on two variants: liberal meritocratic capitalism, embodied by the United States, and political (authoritarian) capitalism, embodied by China. The latter, which boasts good bureaucrats but lacks the rule of law, carries the possibly fatal flaw of inherent corruption. Milanovic makes the compelling argument that communism brought much of the developing world out of feudalism and into the modern world without developing an industrial middle class, as capitalism did in Europe and North America. But the factors that helped produce higher standards of living for industrial workers in the West—trade unions, mass education, and progressive

taxation and transfers—have receded in recent decades. The author hopes for a future defined by what he calls "people's capitalism," in which the economy isn't so skewed to the advantage of those who own capital at the expense of those who make a living through their labor. But Milanovic is not confident that a more equal capitalism will emerge.

Measuring What Counts: The Global Movement for Well-Being
BY JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, AND MARTINE DURAND. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2019, 256 pp.

Gross domestic product, a concept initially developed by economists in the 1930s, has now entered the everyday lexicon of journalists, businessmen, officials, and politicians. GDP is a measure of how a national economy uses its resources—labor, land, and capital—to produce goods and services during a particular period of time, usually a year. But GDP has come to be used much more widely as a measure of economic growth and as a proxy for economic well-being, often without important qualifications and caveats. The misuse of GDP has troubled an increasing number of economists and noneconomists. This volume successfully explains what GDP does not and cannot measure well and suggests that countries should publish a dashboard that measures what is really important. The authors propose 67 indicators that would present a more complete picture of the health of a national economy. Although these are useful measures, many countries would find it a challenge to collect and maintain such thorough statistics.

In China's Wake: How the Commodity Boom Transformed Development Strategies in the Global South
BY NICHOLAS JEPSON. Columbia University Press, 2020, 376 pp.

Jepson shares case studies of 15 developing countries, most of which have benefited from the twenty-first-century boom in commodities such as fossil fuels, minerals, and soybeans, which has been driven by rising demand in China. This export boom permitted a change in development strategies from those that prevailed in the late twentieth century with the backing of international financial institutions, especially the World Bank. The author traces patterns across countries and explores domestic political dynamics that led to shifts in economic policy.

The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the People's Economy
BY STEPHANIE KELTON. PublicAffairs, 2020, 336 pp.

Kelton, an economist, is a prominent proponent of modern monetary theory, the idea that many rich countries need not worry about expanding their deficits. In this clear and vigorously written book, she argues that any country that borrows in its own currency in a floating exchange-rate system has no effective limit on its central-government debt. A country reaches the limits of its ability to spend when the rate of inflation rises; the size of its budget deficits and public debt is irrelevant. Kelton sets these compelling arguments in a broader left-wing agenda for the United States that includes greater environmental

protections and government-guaranteed work, with minimum pay fixed at $15 per hour, for any U.S. resident who desires it. Recent U.S. congressional fiscal action in response to the pandemic, as well as new programs launched by the Federal Reserve, suggests that the author is at least partly right in her assessment of the spending power of governments.

Sovereign Debt: A Guide for Economists and Practitioners
EDITED BY S. ALI ABBAS, ALEX PIENKOWSKI, AND KENNETH ROGOFF. International Monetary Fund, 2019, 464 pp.

The International Monetary Fund has a lot of experience in dealing with sovereign debt in its nearly 200 member countries. Its officers try to both persuade governments to adopt policies to reduce their overall debts and help those governments restructure their debts to reduce the burden on future budgets. The IMF held a conference in 2018 to collect this accumulated knowledge, and the result is this volume, with contributions from over 30 authors. The explosion of budget deficits as a result of the coronavirus pandemic suggests that this collected wisdom will be especially useful in future years, providing guidance on both what to do and what not to do.

Military, Scientific, and Technological

Lawrence D. Freedman

Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy
BY FRANCIS J. GAVIN. Brookings Institution Press, 2020, 320 pp.

The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War
BY FRED KAPLAN. Simon & Schuster, 2020, 384 pp.

Super Bomb: Organizational Conflict and the Development of the Hydrogen Bomb
BY KEN YOUNG AND WARNER R. SCHILLING. Cornell University Press, 2020, 240 pp.

These three books trace the political history of nuclear weapons in the United States. In a thoughtful and probing series of essays, Gavin explores the dissonance between how theorists plotted the nuclear age and how events actually unfurled. He explores, for instance, how leaders fretted about "quantitative superiority"—boasting bigger nuclear arsenals than their rivals—when it provided no route to victory. He also tries to understand why the United States put so much effort into preventing other states from getting their own nuclear weapons when doing so meant that Washington had to take more responsibility for the security of others.

In 1983, Kaplan made a splash with *The Wizards of Armageddon,* which recounted in intriguing detail the actions

and rivalries of the civilian strategists who built the framework for U.S. nuclear strategy. His new book focuses on the presidents and generals who were responsible for making and executing U.S. nuclear policy. Kaplan writes well, engaging the reader even when describing arcane bureaucratic battles. Although the early chapters cover familiar ground, the post–Cold War ones provide fascinating insights into why there has been so much continuity in U.S. nuclear policy, including maintaining the "nuclear triad," which allows weapons to be launched from land, sea, and air.

In the 1950s, Schilling interviewed 66 of the key players involved in the decision to develop the hydrogen bomb, including U.S. President Harry Truman. He wrote an article with his findings but never completed a planned book on the subject. Young, a British academic, took Schilling's material, carried out some additional research, and crafted a compelling book that was published posthumously. Young used the interviews to present a fresh look at the defeat of the scientists, led by Robert Oppenheimer, who opposed the hydrogen bomb. He shows how the scientists were tactically inept, relying too much on the moral case against a city-destroying weapon. Truman was never likely to share their optimism on the possibility of mutual restraint with the Soviets. Proponents of the bomb turned on Oppenheimer and treated him as if he were undermining U.S. security. Schilling marveled at how the pleasant people he interviewed were entangled in so much rancor.

The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics
BY BEN BUCHANAN. Harvard University Press, 2020, 432 pp.

Buchanan's handy book offers a substantial and measured history of cyberattacks in recent decades. Buchanan traces the progression of hacking operations beginning with the early efforts of the U.S. National Security Agency and the United Kingdom's Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ, agencies that intercept all sorts of communications—including those of supposedly friendly governments. Many countries now engage in hacking in the pursuit of their national interests. The joint U.S.-Israeli operation that transmitted the Stuxnet virus that sabotaged centrifuges in Iran was discovered in 2010. Russia easily shut down Ukraine's energy supplies through hacking in 2016 and famously meddled in the U.S. presidential election that same year by hacking the email accounts of Democratic Party officials and the chair of Hillary Clinton's campaign. China has used hacking for the purposes of industrial sabotage. The 2013 revelations of the former NSA contractor Edward Snowden showed how Western governments did their spying. Despite the growing ubiquity of cyberattacks, Buchanan also highlights their limits as a means of coercion or as a way of sending a message.

Burn-In: A Novel of the Real Robotic Revolution
BY P. W. SINGER AND AUGUST COLE. Houghton Mifflin, 2020, 432 pp.

Singer and Cole write what they like to call "useful fiction." *Burn-In* highlights both the logistical and the moral issues

raised by new technologies. As did its predecessor, *Ghost Fleet*, which concerned a future war with China, this novel comes with a full set of endnotes to show that it is not purely a work of the imagination. The plot takes place in a dystopian United States in which unconstrained automation has led to mass unemployment and a restive public. As a conspiracy of neo-Luddite villains, each with his or her own agenda, tries to inflame and exploit the unrest, the FBI agent Lara Keegan seeks to limit the damage and find the culprits. She enjoys the assistance of a robot, whose effectiveness and value she must assess. It learns on the job, constantly accessing and interpreting vast amounts of information. The novel is fast moving and readable, and it explores important questions about whether and how humanity can benefit from intelligent machines without being overwhelmed by them.

The United States

Jessica T. Mathews

One Mighty and Irresistible Tide
BY JIA LYNN YANG. Norton, 2020, 336 pp.

The passage in the United States of the restrictive 1924 Immigration Act seemed to settle the question of who should be admitted to the country. The United States, said one of the bill's sponsors, "will cease to be the 'melting pot.'" Under the new law's strict ethnic quotas—including its total exclusion of Asians—fewer immigrants entered the country in the subsequent four decades than had arrived in the first decade of the twentieth century. But the law set up another decades-long fight, which culminated in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which abolished the restrictive quotas. President Lyndon Johnson welcomed its passage with a paean to the "nation of strangers" who had built the United States by "joining and blending in one mighty and irresistible tide." But that law too proved contentious. With quotas for Mexicans set far below the demand for their labor and visas based on family reunification rather than skills, it sparked new tensions. Immigration remains a deeply contested issue that Americans continue to struggle with today. Yang, a senior editor at *The New York Times* and the daughter of immigrants, tells the story of the important fight for the 1965 law with an immediacy that comes from being one of its direct beneficiaries.

Trump and Us: What He Says and Why People Listen
BY RODERICK P. HART. Cambridge University Press, 2020, 280 pp.

This unusual study, by a scholar of political rhetoric, focuses on how U.S. President Donald Trump uses language to tap into public emotions. Hart mines a massive database of political speech that reaches back to 1948, running various computer programs to assess word choice, rhetorical patterns, and the contexts in which politicians use certain language. The data are interesting: for instance, Trump used terms related to anger and hurt in 2016 nearly five times as often as the political norm. Hart's own percep-

tions are striking. He sees Trump less as a baby or a toddler, as he is often portrayed by critics, than as an adolescent: moody, impulsive, terribly needy for love, resentful of authority, full of fears he cannot admit, and emotionally raw. In Hart's analysis, Trump has tapped into four primary public emotions: feelings of being ignored, of being trapped, of being besieged (by elites and outsiders), and of weariness (with the political establishment). Switching between Trump's words and their reception by his supporters yields insights that other observers of the president haven't discerned.

The Rule of Five: Making Climate History at the Supreme Court
BY RICHARD J. LAZARUS. Belknap Press, 2020, 368 pp.

In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, by a vote of five to four, that the Environmental Protection Agency could regulate carbon dioxide as an air pollutant. The decision was immensely important not only because of the existential threat of climate change but also because no one in the Supreme Court's two-century history had ever before won a case against the federal government after losing in the lower courts. In vivid detail, with every sentence clear to a nonlawyer, Lazarus traces the story of the case through eight years of ups and downs. He brings to life the strategy of brief writing, how petitioners try to beat the slim odds of the high court hearing their case, an attorney's 200 hours of agonizing preparation for a 30-minute oral argument, and the culture and operations of the Supreme Court. This case highlighted the work of the late, brilliant justice John Paul Stevens, who, at 86, was determined to write a momentous decision while holding together a fragile majority. This is a riveting story, beautifully told.

Lie Machines
BY PHILIP N. HOWARD. Yale University Press, 2020, 240 pp.

The universe of social media is almost incomprehensibly massive: people write 500 million tweets, send 65 billion WhatsApp messages, and post four petabytes of material on Facebook every day. Lurking within this churn of content is what Howard dubs a "lie machine": a global enterprise of bots, conspiracy theorists, politicians, scammers, authoritarian governments, and more that is devoted to spreading disinformation in the service of ideology, profit, and power. Automated, scalable, anonymous, and capable of microtargeting to the level of the individual, the machine shapes today's politics. Its operations undermine democracies by stoking skepticism, polarizing societies, and destroying trust in all the once authoritative sources of information (including journalists, scientists, experts, and political leaders). Howard traces the evolution the lie machine from Russia's deployment of armies of online trolls to the use of advanced chatbots, which mimic human interaction. As dangerous as things are now, they will only get worse; the enormous flood of data coming from the so-called Internet of Things, along with the growing sophistication of artificial intelligence, will make disinformation easier to generate and disseminate and much harder to spot and remove. Howard tackles the tough task of suggesting the changes that are

needed to create a radically redesigned social media ecosystem that would reinforce, rather than erode, democracy.

The Age of Hiroshima
EDITED BY MICHAEL D. GORDIN AND G. JOHN IKENBERRY. Princeton University Press, 2020, 448 pp.

The essays chosen for this rich volume are an attempt by its editors to "unsettle" the legacy and understanding of the bombing of Hiroshima, an act that triggered the nuclear age 75 years ago. This collection explores the age's unanswered questions from a global perspective, rather than through the prism of the Cold War. It is not only geographically broad; it is also enriched by the diverse perspectives of historians, political scientists, and other theorists of international relations. One set of chapters reveals, for example, that the familiar binary categories of nuclear state and nonnuclear state hide a fluid spectrum of conditions of which these are merely the endpoints. Other chapters explore the ways political and cultural contexts constrain the choices leaders can make about nuclear weapons and programs. And some contributors wrestle with the surprising fact that many pivotal questions about the nuclear age—for instance, does deterrence work?—remain unanswerable.

Western Europe

Andrew Moravcsik

Stars With Stripes: The Essential Partnership Between the European Union and the United States
BY ANTHONY LUZZATTO GARDNER. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, 468 pp.

This memoir relates the impressions of the Obama administration's final U.S. ambassador to the European Union. Gardner's term began with the 2014 Ukraine crisis, which ironically helped deflect attention from transatlantic differences over a litany of other issues, including digital surveillance, the euro crisis, and a proposed transatlantic trade agreement. Gardner spent much of his time trying to pry decisions from the bureaucratic and procedure-bound EU system. But he insists nonetheless that the interests of the EU and the United States are more closely aligned than those of any other two parts of the world. They can and should cooperate closely not just on economic issues but also on law enforcement, counterterrorism, sanctions, energy, the environment, foreign aid, and military security. This compelling book also makes a strong case for the EU as a preferred U.S. partner and dismisses Brexit as absurd. Gardner's term ended in 2017. Just three years later, after his successor admitted pursuing U.S. President Donald Trump's domestic political objectives in Ukraine, the former ambassador's cultural sensitivity,

deep experience, and genuine belief in transatlantic cooperation seem like relics of a forgotten era.

The Tipping Point: Britain, Brexit, and Security in the 2020s
BY MICHAEL CLARKE AND HELEN RAMSCAR. I.B. Tauris, 2019, 328 pp.

Two London-based policy analysts study the challenges and opportunities facing British foreign policy. On challenges, they recycle clichés: the world is materially better but people remain dissatisfied, inequality and xenophobia threaten liberal democracy, globalization creates turmoil, and smaller countries such as the United Kingdom are being cut out of the emerging twenty-first-century great-power competition among China, India, Russia, and the United States. Skip to the second half, however, and their analysis of how the United Kingdom, a middle power, should adapt to decline and to the consequences of Brexit proves more engaging and original. They tally national assets and capabilities and conclude that the United Kingdom can and will ally with the Europeans on most military and diplomatic initiatives, but that the British can still play an outsize role by exploiting their robust nonmilitary instruments of power: global networks of foreign aid, strong intelligence capacities, diplomatic expertise, world-class financial and educational sectors—and the soft power created by the British monarchy, the BBC, and soccer's Premier League. To bolster the country's status, they recommend a "strategic surge" of spending, focused primarily on these nonmilitary policy instruments.

War for Eternity: Inside Bannon's Far-Right Circle of Global Power Brokers
BY BENJAMIN R. TEITELBAUM. HarperCollins, 2020, 336 pp.

This book has the makings of a fine Hollywood script. Start with Steve Bannon, the Harvard-educated former U.S. Navy officer, investment banker, and Breitbart News executive who became U.S. President Donald Trump's alt-right political strategist. Fired within a year of the 2016 election, Bannon now promotes nationalist, far-right populists in Europe. Seeking to understand the roots of Bannon's eccentric post-fascist beliefs, Teitelbaum (a music professor who also studies radical populists) convinced him to sit for 20 hours of interviews. Teitelbaum sets out to find the leaders of Bannon's underground "spiritual school" committed to "Traditionalism," a secretive ideology that rejects modernity, the Enlightenment, materialism, and globalization. They include a bearded supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin who promotes "Eurasianism" as an alternative to the rotten West, the former leader of a Hungarian nationalist and anti-Roma party, an Iranian American author peddling plans for a eugenic purification of Persians, a Brazilian philosopher active on social media and close to Brazil's current populist government, and a Briton with obscure corporate and political connections and the code name "Jellyfish." Fun stuff—but in the end, the Traditionalists seem like cranks with obscure, inconsistent beliefs and only a small following.

Theodor Herzl: The Charismatic Leader
BY DEREK PENSLAR. Yale University Press, 2020, 256 pp.

This pocket biography demystifies—then re-mystifies—Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement. At 35, despite possessing neither deep knowledge of Jewish culture nor any known religious beliefs, he penned a classic pamphlet, *The Jewish State*, asserting a demand on behalf of European Jews for their own nation-state—on the model of the demands of Czechs, Serbs, and other groups within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For the next nine years, before dying quite young, he organized continent-wide conferences, harangued national leaders, visited Palestine, and churned out speeches and articles. Although historians dismiss Herzl's intellectual achievements, this book seeks to reinterpret him as a brilliant organizer and activist. Yet it is hard to see why. At the time, most people viewed him as a crackpot. Upper-class Jews (including his wife) disparaged Zionism as an unsavory mass ideology. Orthodox groups criticized it as unholy. Herzl's own vague and inconsistent plans for governing a Jewish state were fashioned with remarkable ignorance of Palestine—when he wasn't weighing Argentina or Mozambique as an alternative. This book reminds readers that intellectuals are sometimes remembered simply for stating an ideal goal that, much later and for reasons unforeseeable by them, becomes reality.

The Life and Death of Ancient Cities: A Natural History
BY GREG WOOLF. Oxford University Press, 2020, 528 pp.

Today, for the first time in human history, more than half of humanity lives in cities. Yet until about 500 years ago, cities were few and fragile. This book focuses on history's major exception: the Mediterranean in classical antiquity. Overall urbanization rates there reached around 20 percent, higher than Europe would see again until the nineteenth century. The force behind ancient Mediterranean urbanization was economic: control over the surplus from surrounding agricultural land and, for the largest cities, privileged access to long-distance trade. Yet ancient cities were not self-sufficient: the more they grew, the more taxes they had to levy; the more food, water, stone, metals, and luxury goods they had to import; and the more slave labor they needed to offset high urban mortality from famine, disease, fire, and natural disasters. Ancient cities became the hubs of hegemonies and empires—a highly leveraged arrangement that made them vulnerable to sudden shocks and military decline. They collapsed much faster than they had been built: in three centuries, Rome's population declined from over a million to just about 10,000. Today's global cities face similar vulnerabilities, and one wonders whether future historians will write about them in the same way.

Soviet Judgment at Nuremberg: A New History of the International Military Tribunal After World War II
BY FRANCINE HIRSCH. Oxford University Press, 2020, 560 pp.

Histories of the Nuremberg trials, held mostly from 1945 to 1946 to punish Nazi leaders for their crimes, have traditionally taken a Western perspective. The Soviet view, examined in this pathbreaking book, rarely receives mention. Yet the Soviets were the first to suggest trials for Nazi leaders, perhaps in order to strengthen reparation claims for the Soviet Union for its unmatched sacrifice during the war. Western countries had initially preferred the summary execution of Nazi officials. Moreover, Soviet lawyers played a key role in developing Nuremberg's legal innovations, such as the notion that those complicit in a conspiracy were guilty for actions committed by any of its members. Yet once the trials started, the roles reversed, with Western lawyers seeking to stage a high-minded fair trial and the Soviets, under tight leadership from Moscow, looking to stage a didactic show trial. Relations between the Western powers and Moscow grew tenser as Winston Churchill began calling for Western cooperation against the Soviet Union. The propaganda war over the trial offers a glimpse of the beginning of the Cold War.

The Bridge: Natural Gas in a Redivided Europe
BY THANE GUSTAFSON. Harvard University Press, 2020, 520 pp.

Few energy issues provoke as much transatlantic angst as Europe's reliance on Russian natural gas. Critics fret that trusting Russian President Vladimir Putin to keep the heat on invites blackmail. In a useful exploration of Europe's energy future, Gustafson offers a corrective to this view. Factors beyond geopolitics have shaped and will continue to drive the Russian-European energy relationship. Russia has suddenly stopped exports to Europe on a few occasions, but the business logic of Russian supply and European demand has generally held firm and will likely continue to do so despite U.S. pressure. Gustafson shows how the European Union has used its legal powers—enforcing regulations on competition and requirements to diversify gas transportation links—to limit the ability of the Russian energy giant Gazprom to monopolize supply for the continent. He also outlines how the changing nature of the gas industry itself has shifted the balance of power: Gazprom faces competition from U.S. and Russian liquefied natural gas producers. Indeed, the most ominous development for the natural gas sector may come not from geopolitical tensions with Russia but from growing calls in Europe to keep fossil fuels in the ground.

NEIL BHATIYA

Western Hemisphere

Richard Feinberg

The Cubans: Ordinary Lives in Extraordinary Times
BY ANTHONY DEPALMA. Viking, 2020, 368 pp.

In this beautifully crafted work of reportage, the veteran journalist DePalma dives into Guanabacoa, a historic, decaying neighborhood of Havana, and into the lives of its inhabitants. Among the lead characters is Caridad Limonta, a brilliant executive who abandons state-owned enterprises to apply her management skills in the emerging private sector. Arturo Montoto, an established conceptual artist, constructs ironic monumental sculptures, including a huge black baseball that evokes the decline of professional sports in Cuba. DePalma also meets Jorge García, an émigré living in Miami, who remains deeply embittered by the deaths in 1994 of family members who drowned trying to flee Cuba in a tugboat. Through such stories, DePalma takes the reader on a tour of the glorious triumphs and ardent idealism of the early days of the Cuban Revolution, the dark years of the post-Soviet economic collapse, the revived hopes occasioned by the thaw of U.S.-Cuban relations under U.S. President Barack Obama, and now the seemingly endless days of deprivation. As daily life becomes increasingly difficult in Cuba, the distance grows between the privileged elites in their white Ladas and the impoverished masses on their bicycles. But as Limonta explains, *cubanidad*, or "Cubanness," retains its richness: that blend of outsize exceptionalism, intense passions, and inextinguishable love.

The Gathering Storm: Eduardo Frei's Revolution in Liberty and Chile's Cold War
BY SEBASTIÁN HURTADO-TORRES. Cornell University Press, 2020, 270 pp.

Drawing on newly released diplomatic correspondence between the U.S. embassy in Santiago, the U.S. State Department, and the White House, the Chilean historian Hurtado-Torres offers a sophisticated reinterpretation of U.S.-Chilean relations in the 1960s prior to the 1970 election of the leftist Salvador Allende. Hurtado-Torres is impressed by the astuteness of well-networked U.S. diplomats, their distaste for corrupt local hacks, and their preference for effective progressive (but not too progressive) leaders. U.S. diplomacy succeeded, Hurtado-Torres convincingly shows, when it was most closely aligned with the interests of local partners (notably President Eduardo Frei Montalva and his centrist Christian Democrats) and when respectful of local institutions. Not surprisingly, disentangling U.S. influence from local politics proves a difficult methodological task for the historian; the anticommunist bent of U.S. policy during the Cold War may have contributed to severe political polarization in Chile, but the deepening left-right ideological divide among Chileans was the primary driver of political strife and led, inexorably, to the tragedy of the violent 1973 military coup that extinguished Chilean democracy for nearly a generation.

A Long Petal of the Sea
BY ISABEL ALLENDE. TRANSLATED BY NICK CAISTOR AND AMANDA HOPKINSON. Ballantine Books, 2020, 336 pp.

A Long Petal of the Sea (a reference to the geography of Chile) weaves a love story spanning the Spanish Civil War and the coup that toppled the leftist Chilean president Salvador Allende in 1973. The prolific and celebrated author also happens to be related to the deposed president. In the novel, she reimagines the real voyage of a cargo ship, the SS *Winnipeg*, that in 1939 ferried desperate refugees from the Spanish Civil War to Chile. When many countries were closing their doors to European immigrants, the progressive Chilean government tasked the diplomat and poet Pablo Neruda with selecting the *Winnipeg*'s lucky 2,200 passengers. Allende deplores the reactionary vengeance of General Francisco Franco in Spain, mocks the Chilean aristocracy for its provincial arrogance, and decries the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet for its unspeakable atrocities. Her strong-willed protagonists endure historical tragedies, eventually setting aside their youthful utopian idealism for professional accomplishments and enduring love.

Brazil Apart, 1964–2019
BY PERRY ANDERSON. Verso, 2019, 240 pp.

In this collection of essays—mostly published first in the *London Review of Books*—Anderson deploys mordant Marxist critiques, provocative class analysis, and perceptive political narrative to analyze the shifting landscape of Brazilian politics. In the earlier essays, he begrudgingly places some hope in the newly elected Fernando Henrique Cardoso, an intellectual "cosmopolitan prince" and president of Brazil from 1995 to 2002, only to dismiss his opportunism in later essays. Similarly, Anderson held high hopes for the Workers' Party and for its authentic working-class leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who was president of Brazil from 2003 to 2010. Anderson struggles to explain the profound moral and political deterioration of the Workers' Party and the recent rise of the evangelical culture warrior Jair Bolsonaro, the current president. Shocking corruption scandals and prolonged austerity feature significantly in Anderson's admonitions. He also faults the Workers' Party for not better mobilizing and educating its members, for its "myopic philistinism" in ignoring the advice of intellectuals, and for its weak reformism and recourse to stale campaign slogans. In the epilogue, Anderson expresses fear that Brazil may be moving backward, to the type of military dictatorship that ruled the country from 1964 to 1985, slipping into another authoritarian nightmare.

The Collector of Leftover Souls: Field Notes on Brazil's Everyday Insurrections
BY ELIANE BRUM. TRANSLATED BY DIANE GROSKLAUS WHITTY. Graywolf Press, 2019, 232 pp.

Brum, an investigative journalist, explores the lives of Brazilians surviving on the margins of society in this collection of vignettes. Society may be rigged against them, but Brum's subjects draw on deep wells of strength and perseverance; many

find joy in the struggle itself, in their "everyday insurrections." The more moving stories include a factory worker ailing from asbestos poisoning who stubbornly refuses to die until the offending corporation offers his family acceptable monetary compensation for his death, a woman with serious disabilities who heroically overcomes a series of social barriers, and an elderly man who collects garbage ("leftover souls") with the artistic sensibility of a Marcel Duchamp. By calling attention to deep social injustices in Brazil, Brum may be seeking to mobilize public opinion behind corrective policies. But readers will be forgiven for concluding that the immense human suffering that Brum sketches so powerfully will persist from generation to generation, with no relief in sight.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

Maria Lipman

How Russia Learned to Talk: A History of Public Speaking in the Stenographic Age, 1860–1930
BY STEPHEN LOVELL. Oxford University Press, 2020, 352 pp.

Lovell delves into the history of public speaking in Russia, where governments have been inherently hostile to free speech and deliberative democracy. His concise and lively narrative begins in the early 1860s, when Tsar Alexander II launched liberal reforms, and ends in the early 1930s, when Stalin established systems for the total censoring of the oral word. The intervening period was "the stenographic age": the skills of shorthand (which evolved in Russia primarily as a woman's job) played a major role in allowing Russian society to hear itself. The introduction of jury trials in the second half of the nineteenth century spurred the rise of courtroom eloquence; Russian Orthodox priests abandoned the traditional, scholastic language incomprehensible to uneducated worshipers and spoke to parishioners about pressing social issues in a direct manner. The longest chapter focuses on the proceedings of Russia's short-lived parliament, from 1905 to 1917, including fascinating portraits of Duma deputies such as Vladimir Nabokov (the famous writer's father), "who combined Russian aristocratic poise with the robustness of an English parliamentarian." The victory of the Bolsheviks in the subsequent revolutionary upheaval owed much to their unparalleled ability to whip up agitated crowds with passionate speeches.

Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe
BY LARRY WOLFF. Stanford University Press, 2020, 304 pp.

After World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson embarked on a major campaign, inspired by the ideals of the Progressive era, to bring national self-determination to eastern Europe. Wolff's enthralling account traces the way the president's principles clashed with the messy reality of historical frontiers and political rivalries in the region. Wilson's belief in the right of all peoples to decide their own futures

collided with his involvement in what he described as "carving a piece of Poland out of Germany's side" and "rearranging the territorial divisions of the Balkan states." He belatedly grew aware of the problem of "national minorities," seeing that their aspirations were impossible to reconcile with those of majority communities. The system of nation-states in eastern Europe, which emerged thanks in large part to Wilson's efforts, persisted through most of the twentieth century. But in the process, as Wolff describes, Wilson discovered that his dream of justice and self-determination was a barely sustainable fantasy.

It Will Be Fun and Terrifying: Nationalism and Protest in Post-Soviet Russia
BY FABRIZIO FENGHI. University of Wisconsin Press, 2020, 312 pp.

Fenghi parses both the left- and the right-wing fringes of post-Soviet Russian culture. He focuses on two scandalous and charismatic figures: Eduard Limonov and Aleksandr Dugin. In the early 1990s, they launched the National Bolshevik Party, which merged anti-mainstream artistic expression and radical nationalist ideas with political action. The NBP categorically rejected Western capitalism and encouraged personal, cultural, and sexual freedom and transgressive behavior. Its followers included those as diverse as radical artists and disgruntled provincial youth. Dugin, an eccentric and prolific philosopher and writer, later gravitated toward the Kremlin establishment, but Limonov remained forever a rebel and a contrarian—whether as an anti-Western immigrant in the United States; as the author of the 1979 novel *It's Me, Eddie,* which included intense violence and graphic descriptions of gay sex; or as an avid traveler to war zones in Abkhazia, Transnistria, and the former Yugoslavia. Fenghi posits that Limonov saw his own life as an artistic project, making his real-life persona inseparable from his writing and his politics. A month after the publication of Fenghi's book, Limonov died in Moscow. In addition to offering a profound and probing understanding of the post-Soviet political and cultural fringe, the book serves as an homage to its controversial protagonists.

Sketches of the Criminal World: Further Kolyma Stories
BY VARLAM SHALAMOV. TRANSLATED BY DONALD RAYFIELD. New York Review Books, 2020, 576 pp.

During the Stalin era, Shalamov spent over 15 years in prison camps in Kolyma, in the Russian Far East. He documented his experience in short stories, written in a manner that he himself described as "laconic and simple," with "everything redundant discarded even before . . . picking up my pen." This book is the second of the two volumes of a complete English translation. In precise and ruthless detail, Shalamov depicts the ordeal of the camp, with its nine months of wintry weather that wore down the prisoners near to death. Survival depended on fortune or cunning. An additional sentence of ten more years didn't bother an inmate, Shalamov writes, since "there was no sense in planning your life more than one day ahead." This volume of Shalamov's stories focuses on the *blatari*—professional criminals or gangsters. Shalamov condemns the Rus-

sian literary tradition (that includes Fyodor Dostoyevsky, as well as Maxim Gorky and Isaac Babel) of romanticizing the criminal world. By contrast, he sees *blatari* as "beyond human morality." A story called "The Glove" describes an old man whose hands are blown off for speaking disrespectfully to a young gangster: the man is forced to hold in his bound hands a percussion cap with a fuse. non-Russian republics. In today's Russia, the sacrifices of Soviet dissidents remain unappreciated and largely forgotten.

Middle East

Lisa Anderson

The Dissidents: A Memoir of Working With the Resistance in Russia, 1960–1990
BY PETER REDDAWAY. Brookings Institution Press, 2020, 320 pp.

In 1964, as a British graduate student in Moscow, Reddaway was expelled from the Soviet Union for meeting with the wife of a Soviet defector to the United Kingdom. For over three decades thereafter, he remained at the center of Western attempts to help Soviet dissidents. In his memoir, Reddaway shares his recollections of how dissidents struggled for freedom in the face of prison terms and internment in psychiatric hospitals. He describes the Westerners who amplified the dissidents' cause—politicians, academics, journalists, writers, and publishers. He pays special tribute to the translators whose quiet efforts enabled Soviet dissidents to get their messages to the world. Reddaway identifies "the rise, despite official persecution, of independent thinking and action" as one of the major causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In retrospect, however, the contributions of the book's main protagonists—proponents of civil liberties and democratic freedoms—appear to have been much smaller than those of the nationalist movements in the

Missions Impossible: Higher Education and Policymaking in the Arab World
BY JOHN WATERBURY. American University in Cairo Press, 2020, 409 pp.

For those who think the Arab world is stagnating, here's some news: according to Waterbury—a distinguished political scientist, former president of the American University of Beirut, and my predecessor as this magazine's regular reviewer for books about the Middle East—the number of universities in the region has quadrupled in the last decade. In a region where employment is highest among young university graduates, this may seem like a ray of hope. Most of these new universities are private institutions, many of them for-profit, and they raise the tantalizing prospect that antiquated educational curricula and pedagogy will evolve to meet the needs of a labor market glutted with unfilled jobs because current graduates don't have the appropriate skills. Perhaps, too, that market could enlarge the space for institutional autonomy, as such universities might put profits ahead of political agendas in determining their performance metrics. Waterbury is not sanguine; universities everywhere face manifold challenges, and given the Arab

world's history of suffocating political interference and a long-standing brain drain, he thinks the region is unlikely to be the source of dramatic institutional innovation. But the higher education sector is a fascinating prism through which to observe both stagnation and change in the region, and there is no better guide than this book, which is vintage Waterbury: comprehensive, thought provoking, and often droll.

Egypt's Diplomacy in War, Peace, and Transition
BY NABIL FAHMY. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, 377 pp.

Fahmy, who has served as the Egyptian ambassador to the United States, Egypt's foreign minister, and dean of the public policy school at the American University in Cairo, has furnished readers with an excellent mixture of memoir and analysis. Fahmy, whose father resigned his post as Egypt's foreign minister to protest Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem, adds valuable perspective to the sometimes cacophonous debates about Israel's relations with its neighbors, the American role in the Middle East, and the vicissitudes of inter-Arab politics. A deeply proud Egyptian, Fahmy is nonetheless candid and self-critical—unusually so for a career diplomat. Although he may not convince his readers at every turn, his book is filled with revealing and thought-provoking insights into people and events as disparate as the "catastrophic" U.S. policy in post-invasion Iraq and the "overwhelmed" military brass who ruled Egypt after the uprising of 2011. And most readers will also come away wishing there were more imaginative and independent minds like Fahmy's in diplomatic service everywhere today.

The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917–2017
BY RASHID KHALIDI. Henry Holt, 2020, 336 pp.

Khalidi, a colleague of mine at Columbia University, is one of today's most influential historians of the Middle East, a participant in diplomatic efforts on behalf of the Palestinian cause, and a scion of a prominent Palestinian family. In this book, he combines these roles to remarkably good effect. Drawing on family archives and stories passed down through the generations, his own experience in negotiations among Palestinian factions and with the Israelis, and the more conventional tools of the professional historian, Khalidi constructs a powerful argument about the nature of the Zionist claim to Palestine, framing it as a late instance of the settler colonialism that characterized much of British and, later, American imperialism. Not every reader will be comfortable with all of Khalidi's arguments: few of the protagonists, on any side, come off well, and many Americans would cringe at the idea that they were complicit in imperialist expropriation and domination. But no one who cares about the Middle East's central conflict can afford to ignore this perspective, and all policymakers need to grapple with its implications. This book presents the most cogent, comprehensive, and compelling account yet of this struggle from the Palestinian vantage point, and it deserves a wide audience.

MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed bin Salman
BY BEN HUBBARD. Tim Duggan Books, 2020, 384 pp.

This is a fascinating, well-reported, and compellingly recounted story of the rise of Saudi Arabia's impatient young crown prince and his increasingly brazen concentration of power. Hubbard wears his familiarity with the Middle East lightly and shares it generously, conveying how Mohammed bin Salman (known universally as MBS) has efficiently sidelined his rivals, weakened his opponents, and destroyed his detractors, all while styling himself as the reforming savior of a sclerotic regime. The book is a revealing look at the drawbacks of unaccountable government in an oil kingdom—vast corruption, widespread incompetence, and almost infinite entitlement—as well as a chilling account of how those limitations can nurture ambition unconstrained by honesty, expertise, or loyalty. Hubbard adds disturbing detail to the well-known story of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, a regime critic, at the hands of regime enforcers close to MBS. The portrait of MBS that emerges from the book resembles no one so much as the brash young man who took power in Libya in 1969: Muammar al-Qaddafi, who initially presented himself as an ambitious modernizer but who went on to spend the next 40 years destroying his own country and spreading mayhem throughout the world.

The State in North Africa: After the Arab Uprisings
BY LUIS MARTINEZ. TRANSLATED BY CYNTHIA SCHOCH. Oxford University Press, 2020, 221 pp.

Martinez, one of France's most reliable analysts of North Africa, has crafted a succinct overview of politics on the Mediterranean's southern shore since the uprisings that rattled the Arab world in 2010–11. He argues that many of the problems that afflict the region were already present when countries there gained independence. He also suggests that all of the region's governments confront societies that are far more diverse economically, regionally, and ethnically than the official rhetoric would suggest. Deprived of the unity forged by anticolonial struggles elsewhere, North African regimes have had a hard time fashioning national identities that would sustain social cohesion, political legitimacy, and secure borders. In their own ways, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia have all fallen victim to a toxic mix of rapid population growth and high unemployment and have seen many of their citizens swayed by the Islamist promise that "Islam is the solution." Martinez does not highlight the responsibility that the governments themselves bear in creating this poisonous atmosphere as much as he might; after all, elite corruption, incompetence, and delusions of grandeur play an important role in explaining popular discontent. Nonetheless, this is a good survey of the challenges confronting each of these countries today.

Cairo's Ultras: Resistance and Revolution in Egypt's Football Culture
BY RONNIE CLOSE. American University in Cairo Press, 2019, 256 pp.

If anyone needs a reminder that policy is made not only by princes, presidents, and politicians but also by the many people who don't care much about politics but just don't like to be pushed around, the story of Egypt's fanatical football fans should do the trick. Close's book provides an instructive, if imperfect, introduction to the so-called Ultras, who came to widespread attention during and after the 2011 uprising that ousted President Hosni Mubarak from power. They proved to be able foot soldiers during many of the protests, owing less to their political convictions—most had no ideological allegiance—than to their long-standing resentment of the police. Readers unaccustomed to prose describing "a different type of spectacle, freed from the controlled commodity vision, and repurposed as a spectacle of community" may find the language trying. But Close paints an evocative portrait of the varied and ambiguous roles sports can play in an autocracy, where a regime's reliance on bread and circuses may eventually wear thin in the absence of genuine progress.

Asia and Pacific

Andrew J. Nathan

Political Development in Hong Kong
BY JOSEPH YU-SHEK CHENG. World Scientific, 2020, 712 pp.

Take Back Our Future: An Eventful Sociology of the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement
EDITED BY CHING KWAN LEE AND MING SING. ILR Press, 2019, 270 pp.

Denise Ho: Becoming the Song
DIRECTED BY SUE WILLIAMS. Ambrica Productions, 2020, 83 mins.

We Have Boots
DIRECTED BY EVANS CHAN. NYHK Productions, 2020, 129 mins.

Two books and two documentary films explore the massive anti-China demonstrations that shook Hong Kong in 2014 and over the past year. Cheng is a Hong Kong–based scholar who has been writing on local affairs for four decades. The two dozen articles and book chapters reprinted here trace residents' transition from political apathy under British colonial rule to resistance to what many view as an even more colonialist Chinese rule. The Basic Law, or "mini-constitution," that Beijing wrote to define how the territory would be governed after its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 created an all-powerful chief executive and a weak legislative council, both beholden to Beijing. China anticipated that Hong

Kong residents would learn to accept their status as Chinese citizens as the territory prospered from economic integration with the mainland. Instead, income stagnation, rising housing costs, and growing inequality created pessimism about the future. Beijing's handpicked chief executives turned out to be politically tone-deaf, and China increasingly interfered in the territory's politics, judicial autonomy, and media.

With public sentiment trending the wrong way, Beijing delayed the promised introduction of direct elections for Hong Kong's chief executive. Frustration over that delay sparked the massive, 79-day Umbrella Movement in 2014, which is analyzed in Lee and Sing's edited volume. The contributors' deep reporting reveals the debates among the demonstrators over how to preserve the territory's autonomy. Moderates advocated accommodating to the reality of Chinese sovereignty in exchange for more freedom to elect local leaders. Hong Kong nationalists wanted to resist infrastructure projects that would speed integration with the mainland. Self-proclaimed "localists" ranged from those who sought merely to limit the right of mainlanders to buy Hong Kong property to those who advocated full independence and statehood. As students took the lead from established pro-democracy figures, the movement grew more radical. In the end, Hong Kong police violently suppressed the protests, and there were no concessions made by either Beijing or the Hong Kong government.

These events set the stage for even bigger demonstrations beginning in 2019 against a proposed extradition agreement. Two documentary films convey the intensity of feeling that drove millions into the streets to brave tear gas and police batons. *Denise Ho* is the inspiring story of a Cantonese-language pop star who found herself locked out of the mainland Chinese market and her endorsements from international luxury brands dropped because she stood with the protesters. *We Have Boots* presents extraordinary footage and interviews that reveal how the vicious cycle of protest, government rigidity, and police violence pushed demonstrators toward an ever-deeper commitment to Hong Kong's separate identity. In 2020, however, Beijing imposed a national security law on the territory, with the apparent purpose of using the threat of punishment to force Hong Kongers to "love the motherland."

The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and the World Order
EDITED BY YOICHI FUNABASHI AND G. JOHN IKENBERRY.
Brookings Institution Press, 2020, 340 pp.

Can a traditionally restrained Japan play a more active role in defending the liberal international order, now that the United States is retreating from its role as the order's guarantor? The expert contributors to this volume give the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe high marks for adopting a more proactive foreign policy than its predecessors. Japan rescued the trade agreement formerly known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership after the United States withdrew from it; sought security cooperation with the European Union, Australia, India, and other regional powers; toughened its military posture around the contested Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China);

and directed development assistance to strengthen governing institutions in democratic countries. The writers recommend further measures in the same direction, including enhancing security cooperation with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, backing reform at the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, and increasing support for multilateral and civil society organizations that promote the rule of law and environmental rights. The book is a richly informative primer on Japanese politics and foreign policy. But the modesty of its proposals underscores the reality that there is no good solution for Japanese security if the country cannot rely on the alliance with the United States.

Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea
BY ANKIT PANDA. Oxford University Press, 2020, 416 pp.

It has always seemed incredible that a poor country like North Korea could develop not just one but three kinds of nuclear weapons—those fueled by plutonium, those fueled by uranium, and (according to North Korean claims) those fueled by hydrogen—plus the missiles to deliver them. Such disbelief may be the reason why, as Panda points out, the West did little to stop the process until it was too late. His deeply informed book explains as much as is publicly known about how Pyongyang developed nuclear weapons. The government reverse engineered missiles from China and the Soviet Union, got uranium-enrichment centrifuges from the Pakistani official A. Q. Khan in exchange for missile technology, and hired Russian engineers after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But most of the work was done by the country's own scientists, about whom little is known. Today, North Korean bombs threaten not only U.S. bases in Guam, Japan, and South Korea but the whole American mainland. If there is any good news, it is that Panda believes Pyongyang does not intend to use these weapons for aggression—at least not yet—only to disrupt a planned U.S. invasion before it can happen. The bad news is that Pyongyang might interpret almost any action taken by U.S. forces as just such preparation for an invasion.

In the Name of the Nation: India and Its Northeast
BY SANJIB BARUAH. Stanford University Press, 2020, 296 pp.

The part of India known as "the Northeast"—a raised fist of land connected to the state of West Bengal through a corridor that runs between Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh—is separate from the rest of the country in ways that are more than geographic. Some six dozen different ethnic groups and tribes populate its eight states, and many are predominantly Christian. Arunachal Pradesh is partly populated by ethnic Tibetans and is claimed by China. About one-third of the people living in Assam are Muslim, most of them viewed as "illegal" immigrants from Bangladesh. There are at least half a dozen armed insurgencies in the region that New Delhi has been battling for close to six decades under a harsh security regime authorized by the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. A program of targeted assassinations eliminated one Assamese

rebel group, but the government continues to coexist uneasily with long-running rebellions in Nagaland and Mizoram, among others. Baruah's intimate history and ethnography shows how neglect, corruption, uneven development, and repression—and recently the rise of Hindu nationalism at the federal level—have intensified the Northeast's alienation from the rest of the country.

Fighting for Virtue: Justice and Politics in Thailand
BY DUNCAN MCCARGO. Cornell University Press, 2020, 282 pp.

McCargo explores the complicated role of the judiciary in Thailand, where the military, often in league with the monarchy, overthrows elected officials and enforces laws that limit freedom of speech. His new book challenges simplistic interpretations of Thailand's judges and courts as mere rubber stamps. Instead, he explains with empathy the career path of judges, their perceived special relationship with the crown, their passive collusion with military coups, and their draconian decisions in some of Thailand's most spectacularly unjust cases of lese majesty and treason, which arose between 2006 and 2016. Rather than dismissing the judiciary as a tool of the military and the monarchy, McCargo uncovers a more ambivalent, messy, and ultimately ineffective organization. He argues convincingly that Thailand's judges have sought to take up the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej's charge to resolve Thailand's intractable political crisis—a conflict that pits the established royal and military authorities against the political opposition elected by the majority of the population. However, McCargo dances around the inconvenient fact that whatever their complexities, the judges tend to adjudicate cases in favor of the status quo.

TAMARA LOOS

Africa

Nicolas van de Walle

Regime Threats and State Solutions: Bureaucratic Loyalty and Embeddedness in Kenya
BY MAI HASSAN. Cambridge University Press, 2020, 284 pp.

This remarkable study of the bureaucracy in Kenya since its independence is all the more impressive because it is one of very few recent academic studies of the internal dynamics of an authoritarian state. It can be difficult for scholars to speak meaningfully about the internal political logic of such opaque systems. But Hassan is able to show how successive regimes in Kenya have managed the administration of the state and appointed top bureaucrats to regulate the country's ethnic elites and maintain political stability. She employs a novel data set that tracks the career trajectories of over 2,000 Kenyan bureaucrats, and she layers in fascinating qualitative data from her interviews with dozens of the officials. Her analysis questions simplistic understandings of the role that ethnicity plays in governing Kenya: many bureaucrats have not come from the president's ethnic group, even as the president has been far more likely to

place administrators from his own ethnic group in key positions. Hassan's book should be required reading for students of contemporary authoritarian rule.

When There Was No Aid: War and Peace in Somaliland
BY SARAH G. PHILLIPS. Cornell University Press, 2020, 256 pp.

The territory of Somaliland unilaterally broke away from Somalia to become an independent state at the beginning of the civil war in 1991. But the international community never formally recognized the legality of this secession. As a result, Somaliland has not received as much international economic or state-building support as Somalia. Nevertheless, it has managed to be more peaceful and democratic than the country it broke away from. Phillips's nuanced and provocative study is the most compelling account yet of Somaliland's recent history. Her explanation for the country's success weaves together domestic and international dynamics. At the domestic level, she shows that a fear of violence and instability encouraged cohesion and a sense of shared civic purpose among social elites. Phillips also argues that the lack of international attention provided space for elites to work out their differences without the often disastrous distraction of courting donors.

Democratic Struggle, Institutional Reform, and State Resilience in the African Sahel
EDITED BY LEONARDO A. VILLALÓN AND RAHMANE IDRISSA. Lexington Books, 2020, 230 pp.

This excellent collection of studies of six Francophone countries in the Sahel region of West Africa (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal) examines the impact of democratization on state building since the early 1990s. The supporters of democratization assumed that it would produce more legitimate and effective central states. The process has proved partial and uneven, but all six countries did allow political oppositions to form and began to convene regular multiparty elections. The valuable case studies of Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger suggest that the turn to electoral politics strengthened institutions, whereas the chapter on Mali shows how democratization led to the government's collapse in 2011. The collection offers no easy generalizations to explain this variation but draws out the social, political, and economic histories of each country, the choices made by individual politicians, and the key political groups that shaped institutional outcomes.

U.S. Policy Toward Africa: Eight Decades of Realpolitik
BY HERMAN J. COHEN. Lynne Rienner, 2020, 280 pp.

Cohen is a retired U.S. diplomat who devoted most of his career in the State Department and the White House to Africa. His comprehensive political history of U.S.-African relations carefully chronicles American policy on the continent across successive presidencies, from the administration of Franklin Roosevelt to that of Donald Trump. Cohen emphasizes the continuities across both Democratic and Republican governments and defends most policy actions in terms of the U.S. national interest. The book does a commendable

job of explaining a complicated succession of diplomatic initiatives in reaction to events on the continent. Readers will be struck by how the single-minded attention to the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union shaped U.S. policy, to the exclusion of salient domestic and regional politics. That emphasis helps explain the sense of policy drift in the second half of the book, when the post–Cold War era leaves U.S. decision-makers without an overarching framework for policy toward African countries.

Islamist Foreign Policy in Sudan: Between Radicalism and the Search for Survival
BY MOHAMMED H. SHARFI.
Routledge, 2020, 144 pp.

Sharfi's noteworthy study of Sudanese foreign policy during the past 30 years devotes particular attention to the first decade of the Islamist regime that came to power in 1989. Sudan stands at the crossroads of Africa and the Arab world. It maintains close relations with the Gulf states across the Red Sea but is also Ethiopia's main rival for hegemony in the region. The Islamist coalition government that formed under the aegis of the National Islamic Front in 1989 had wanted to advance through its foreign policy the cause of radical Islam and, initially at least, anti-Western ideals. As Sharfi astutely argues, the regime had to abandon some of this more ideologically driven policy in favor of pragmatism, an evolution that led to the downfall of Hassan al-Turabi, one of the founders of the NIF, and the consolidation of power under President Omar al-Bashir. The book contains case studies, including a particularly interesting chapter devoted to the fallout from Sudan's role in the botched assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995 and an analysis of the internal organization of the foreign service, whose technocrats often battled for influence with the ideologues of the NIF.

FOR THE RECORD

A July/August 2020 article ("The Retrenchment Syndrome") stated that in his March/April 2020 article ("The Price of Primacy"), Stephen Wertheim argued that U.S. retrenchment could bring about "the cessation of Iran's proxy wars." Wertheim's article suggested that "the United States should end its grudge match" with Iran but did not claim that doing so would have that particular effect.

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

Advancing the Frontiers of Monetary Policy

EDITED BY TOBIAS ADRIAN, DOUGLAS LAXTON, AND MAURICE OBSTFELD

Inflation-forecast targeting is state of the art for monetary policy. This book explores first principles, including managing short-term policy trade-offs. Outlining efficient operational procedures and reviewing the experiences of Canada, the Czech Republic, and India.

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

Fiscal Policies and Gender Equality

EDITED BY LISA KOLOVICH

Gender budgeting goals include increasing access to education, childcare, and health services; raising female labor force participation; and eradicating violence against women. Gender budgeting allows fiscal authorities to ensure that tax spending and policies address inequality and the advancement of women.

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

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Why did so many Germans embrace the Nazi regime? Moritz Föllmer relates the everyday experience of people living under Nazism to give us a privileged insight into the question.

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Oxford University Press



Autocracy and Resistance in the Internet Age

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"Very interesting, well conceptualized, and well researched... Vanderhill systematically explores the political effects of social media on authoritarian regimes in Central Asia and the Middle East."
—Marc Lynch, The George Washington University

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Lynne Rienner Publishers



Russian Cyber Operations

Coding the Boundaries of Conflict

SCOTT JASPER; FOREWORD BY GEN. KEITH ALEXANDER

Russia has deployed cyber operations while maintaining a thin veneer of deniability and avoiding direct acts of war. In this volume, Scott Jasper dives into the legal and technical maneuvers of Russian cyber strategies, proposing nations develop resilience to withstand attacks.

fam.ag/russiancyber
Georgetown University Press

Is the Worst of COVID-19 Yet to Come?

Foreign Affairs Brain Trust

We asked dozens of experts whether they agreed or disagreed that daily totals of new COVID-19 cases would be higher at the start of 2021 than they were in mid-2020. The results are below.



DISAGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 8

Michelle Williams

Dean of the Faculty and Angelopoulos Professor in Public Health and International Development, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health

"My response is informed by the observation that countries such as France, Germany, and Italy can crush the curve. Countries currently lacking the necessary political will and an organized public health response can and will slow the spread."

AGREE, CONFIDENCE LEVEL 5

Rebecca Katz

Professor and Director of the Center for Global Health Science and Security, Georgetown University Medical Center

"I certainly hope this is not the case but fear that in the absence of major actions or a medical countermeasure, we will continue to see new cases. We will also continue to see better testing and will thus be able to actually identify new cases."

→ **See the full responses at ForeignAffairs.com/Pandemic2021**


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

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HPC5 is now installed at Eni's Green Data Center: as one of the most powerful supercomputers in the world, it plays a crucial role in digitalizing our business. It's a tool that, together with the expertise of Eni's people, will help shape the energy of tomorrow.

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