Civilizations and World Order

Geopolitics and Cultural Difference

Fred Dallmayr, M. Akif Kayapınar, and İsmail Yaylacı
Foreword by Ahmet Davutoğlu

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Foreword

Civilizational Revival in the Global Age

Ahmet Davutoğlu

Using the terms "civilization" and "globalization" in singular or in plural reveals not only a linguistic preference but also a position in understanding "order"—both conceptually and historically. When the plural form of the concept of "civilization" is reserved for historical reference while its singular version is employed in reference to present and future, this preference rests on certain basic presuppositions: (i) throughout history different civilizations emerged and survived with their own geographical and historical differences; (ii) the radical changes of the modern era accelerated by scientific and technological instruments created a new historical flow directed towards the formation of a monolithic global culture; (iii) this historical flow will is led by an "active/subject/dominating civilization" that is able to control and re-create these instruments; (iv) the "passive/object/dominated civilizations" are disappearihng in the course of this process; (v) and there will effectively be only one "civilization" in future which will mark the end of history.

On the other hand, using the concept of civilization in the plural ("civilizations") to refer not only to historical phenomena but also to present and future existence also relies on a set of certain assumptions: (i) the historical existence of different civilizations is not only a result of external factors but also a reflection of human nature and will; (ii) therefore the existence of different civilizations has been and will continue to be a richness of human culture; (iii) the relationship among civilizations has been characterized by interaction rather than absolute hierarchy and annihilation; (iv) human nature cannot be limited, monopolized, dominated, or controlled by a monolithic structure regardless of its instrumental supremacy; (v) the categories of "active/subject" civilization and "passive/object" civilizations reflect a presentism of conjectural phenomena rather than a substantive and pervasive historical process; (vi) and there might be fluctuations and transformations in inter-civilizational relations, but there are and will always be different civilizations.

These differing perspectives can be noticed both in the writings of classical historians of civilizations and in the recently developing litera-

ture on civilizations as new actors of international relations. Arnold Toynbee's analysis of civilizations, for instance, provides us with different—sometimes even conflicting—examples of these two alternative approaches. The most striking example for the first approach regarding the existence of a singular civilization in the future is Toynbee's prediction back in the 1930s that "out of twenty six civilizations no less than sixteen are by now dead and buried"[1] and "that the remaining ten surviving civilizations are in their last agonies being under the threat of either annihilation or assimilation by western civilization."[2]

Yet, in his historical analysis, Toynbee clearly uses the plural form of the concept of civilization. He argues that the idea of *the unity of civilization* is "a misconception into which modern Western historians have been led by the influence of their social environment" because of the misleading contention that "in modern times, our own Western civilization has cast the net of its economic system all round the world, and this economic unification on a western basis has been followed by a political unification on the same basis which has gone almost as far."[3] Here Toynbee criticizes presentism by suggesting that reading the economic and political hegemony of Western Civilization "as [the] evidence of the unity of civilization is a superficial view."[4]

Oswald Spengler, a supporter of the idea of the plurality of civilizations, suggests that history is nothing but recording the birth, maturity, and decline of civilizations, all of which have different spirits. Fernand Braudel calls for exercising caution in using the concept of civilization in the singular: "if we were asked, now, to define civilization in the singular, we should certainly be more hesitant."[5] Analyzing the transformation of the meaning of "civilization" from Victor Riqueti's *A Treatise on Population* (1756)—which uses the concept in singular form—to its first usage in plural in 1819 to refer to "the characteristics common to the collective life of a period or a group," Braudel suggests that this is not merely a linguistic transformation, but rather it reflects a substantive and methodological change in approaching historical phenomena: "The use of plural signifies, in fact, the gradual decline of a concept—the typical eighteenth century notion that there was such a thing as civilization, coupled with faith in progress and confined to a few privileged peoples or groups, humanity's elite. The twentieth century, happily, has abandoned a certain number of such value-judgments, and would be hard put to it to decide—and on what criteria—which civilization was the best."[6]

This theoretical discussion has been even more complicated with the rise of "modernization" and later on "globalization." The singular conception of "civilization" that denotes a unidirectional process was imbricated in the colonial administrative and intellectual structures, and continued to enjoy a substantial impact on the modernization theories of the post-World War II period and also on the postcolonial revolutions. Many thinkers and politicians thought that the political, economic, and social

institutions, conceptual structures, and lifestyle of Western civilization would penetrate into local cultures and that these environments would lose their reproductive power over time as a result of the linear historical progress. Modernization, understood as a process of adaptation to a "higher" civilization, was construed as an indispensable civilizational import. In that respect, it is not surprising to see a figure such as Samuel Huntington, who considers all non-Western civilizations in a single category ("the rest"), to be among the leading theorists of modernization in 1960s.[7]

This approach exerted influence even on the most prominent experts of non-Western civilizations and cultures. John Alden Williams and Guy S. Alitto's work provide two very impressive analyses of the psychology governing that period. J. A. Williams, a great contributor to the field of the classics of Islamic civilization, felt the need to explain his position in the introductory chapter of his masterpiece, *Themes of Islamic Civilization*, in order not to be out of the general intellectual trend:

> I should explain that when using the term 'Islamic civilization' I do not mean a civilization which exists today. . . . Yet, despite its brilliance, its success, its riches, Islamic civilization appears to have been the first of the three to lose its vital force; to 'die'. . . . Today there is only one civilization—Modern Technological, as at home in Japan or China as in England or Brazil—in which men can respond creatively to change, or hope to meet the future.[8]

Guy S. Alitto's inspiring biographical study of Chinese traditionalist Liang Shu-ming has become a classic to understand the Chinese dilemma of modernity and carries a title that reflects the same psychology: *The Last Confucian*. Although he points out that "the book shows the areas in which Chinese communism and Confucian conservatism overlap," Alitto considers this overlap as a byproduct of reactions against modernization rather than a common civilizational conception, and this is far from seeing the Confucian tradition as a living civilization. The very title of his book implies that Confucianism and the Chinese civilization are no longer living entities that have a future, but a tradition whose last representative is striving to survive against the modernist challenges.[9]

The significant roles and even the existence of different civilizations have been ignored within these modernization theoretical frameworks. Francis Fukuyama's claim about *the end of history* is a typical formulation of this vision which connects the processes of modernization and globalization to the unidirectional flow of *the* civilization. He declared the ultimate victory of Western liberal democracy and argued that it "may constitute the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the final form of human government and as such constituted the end of history."[10] Hence, the ultimate fossilization of other cultures and civilizations was inevitable since the political and economic mechanisms developed by the

Western civilization enabled human beings to reach perfection, and therefore brought an end to humanity's political and philosophical search. In other words, the course of history ended in a way that rendered the existence and the roles of other civilizations meaningless since humanity would no longer be in search of a better alternative.

We can call this approach the "illusion of the hegemons"—a mistake also made by the elites of other dominant civilizations in history. For instance, Roman philosophers underestimated the dynamism of Germanic tribes whom they regarded as primitive and barbaric. Yet, these tribes finally superseded the Roman Empire. "All roads lead to Rome" was the slogan of the time, which can possibly be interpreted as another claim of "the end of history." At the height of its power, Rome was discarded out of history by the same elements it failed to recognize. Another similar claim to eternity was made by the Ottomans with the motto of *devlet-i ebed muddet* (the everlasting state). Similar to Fukuyama's thesis, this definition assumed that the Ottoman state was at its perfection and completion and that it would continue till eternity. The Ottomans undervalued Western civilization and failed to recognize its internal dynamism and, consequently, they were dissolved and defeated by its forces.

The social, political, ecological, and economic challenges against human existence, security, and freedom, however, prove that we are facing not a static end of history but a dynamic transformation responding to this comprehensive crisis. I refer to five different dimensions and manifestations of the crisis of the human condition[11]: (1) the crisis of ontological security and freedom which gave rise to ontological alienation; (2) the epistemological crisis, in which the Enlightenment epistemological formula of "reason, science and progress" ceased to function properly and the fundamentals of the Enlightenment philosophy were shaked; (3) the axiological crisis manifested in ethico-material imbalances. So long as the material and the ethical are not properly interrelated, the material will continue to create its own ethics, and this will be nothing but tyranny. Mechanisms cannot provide justice and cannot solve problems if we cannot embed them in norms and values derived from the essence of human beings (4) the ecological crisis leading to the destruction of ecological harmony; and (5) the crisis of cultural plurality leading to an exclusivist and non-egalitarian conception of the Self and the Other. If such global and comprehensive problems prove anything it is that the dynamism of history will continue and grow to search for ways to overcome them, and civilizations will be the leadings carriers and units of this dynamism.

This brief account of the concept of civilization and its historical implications lead us to three consequential points. First, the prophecies about the vaporization of non-Western civilizations in the course of modernization and globalization that underlie the use of the concept of civilization in singular did not come true. The authentic civilizational entities have not only survived but also entered into a new process of re-awakening

and revitalization. That impressive revival started to take place in the last quarter of the twentieth century despite the transformative power of globalization as a process of monopolization and homogenization of human culture, transnationalization of economic and political institutions, detraditionalization of the social and cultural forms of authentic civilizations, de-personalization of communicational links, and institutionalization of the power-centric political hegemony. In that sense, ironically, we are simultaneously observing the rise of a monolithic global culture together with a re-vitalization of the worldviews, values, institutions, and structures of authentic civilizations—not only in their traditional spaces, but also at the very heart of the Western cities. In other words, the *globe*, as a whole, is becoming the arena of historical flow. Chinese, Muslims, Indians, Africans, and Latin Americans are once again participants in the making of history due to this dynamic character of globalization. The passive objects/followers of the process of modernization are becoming the active subjects of the process of globalization. So, different civilizations are observing different processes of globalization*s* depending on their traditional structures and modern experiences although they share the same instruments of the process of globalization.

Hence, the trio of westernization, modernization, and globalization within the framework of the idea of progress should be critically reexamined in the light of this dynamic process that brings civilizations back in to the historical flow. Even the semantic roots of these three concepts reflect a shift in understanding. The process of *western*ization was seen as a historical and political imposition of the colonial powers on the traditional political structures of the non-Western civilizational basins. The process of *modern*ization, on the other hand, was seen as a natural and necessary process for the "traditional world" to adopt Western structures and values. Therefore the psychology of this conceptualization was consistent with the requirements of the era of the formation of nation-states as the new political, cultural, and economic unit of the non-Western world. *Western*ization was referring to a specific space—the West—while *modern*ization was referring to a specific temporality—the modern/current. The first generation elites of non-Western civilizations viewed westernization as a necessary evil in order to survive in the face of colonialism, while the next generation elites saw modernization as a necessary process to fulfill the requirements of the nation-state system.

Hence, that discussion necessarily leads us to the question of civilizational hegemony and pluralistic civilizational interaction as two alternative ways in the formation of future world order. There is a deeply felt need for a new understanding of global order which can accommodate these different globalization experiences of reviving civilizations. The history of civilizations teaches us that a civilization can only survive so long as it remains inclusive. In that context the calling of our time is (i) an inclusive civilizational self-perception; (ii) a new epistemological har-

monization; (iii) a new harmonious balance between values and social mechanisms; (iv) an all-embracing re-assessment/re-interpretation of the human history; (v) a multicultural re-structuring of cities; and (vi) a participatory global governance.

NOTES

1. For Toynbee, these include the Egyptian, the Andean, the Sinic, the Minoan, the Sumeric, the Mayan, the Indic, the Hittite, the Syriac, the Hellenic, the Babylonic, the Mexican, the Arabic, the Yucatec, the Spartan, and the Ottoman civilizations. See Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).
2. These include the Christian Near East, the Islamic, the Christian Russian, the Hindu, the Far Eastern Chinese, the Japanese, the Polynesian, the Eskimo, and the Nomadic civilizations.
3. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), vol. 1, 54.
4. Toynbee, ibid., 55. His conception of "egocentric illusion" should be seen not only as a critique but also as a methodological warning: "But apart from illusion due to the worldwide success of the Western civilization in the material sphere, the misconception of 'the unity of history'—involving the assumption that there is only one river of civilization, our own, that all others are either tributary to it or else lost in the desert sands—may be traced to three roots: the egocentric illusion, the illusion of 'the unchanging East,' and the illusion of progress as a movement that proceeds in a straight line."
5. Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations* (New York: Penguin, 1993), 6–7.
6. Ibid., 6-7.
7. Samual P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
8. John Alden Williams, *Themes of Islamic Civilization* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), 2–3.
9. G. S. Alitto, *The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-Ming and Chinese Dilemma of Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 344.
10. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), xi.
11. For the analysis of this civilizational crisis and transformation please refer to my book *Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World* (Kuala Lumpur: Quill, 1994).

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We are also grateful to SAGE Publications for allowing us to reprint in this volume S. Sayyid's article, "Mirror, Mirror, Western Democrats, Oriental Despots?" *Ethnicities* 5 (2005): 30-50, and Georg Sørensen's article, "Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and World Order in the New Millennium," *International Relations* 20(3)(2006): 251-72.

Introduction

Fred Dallmayr, M. Akif Kayapınar, and Ismail Yaylacı

This book is the result of an international symposium on "Civilizations and World Orders" organized by the Turkish Foundation for Sciences and Arts (*Bilim ve Sanat Vakfı*) a few years ago in Istanbul. The symposium aimed to create a cross-cultural and inter-disciplinary venue to ponder on the role of "civilization(s)" in the context of the existing and possible world order(s). As the organizing committee of the symposium stated: "Post-Cold War tensions accompanied by the phenomenon of cultural/civilizational resurgence have deepened the necessity of reflecting critically on "civilizations" and "world order(s)." This symposium aims to provide an inter-disciplinary platform to deliberate on, and search for, a just and sustainable world order in our time."

In responding to this challenge, the participants of the symposium faced a formidable task, given that the concepts of "order," "world order," and "civilization" are highly contested. Thinking through these concepts participants were compelled to try to clarify their meaning and their proper use in a given context. As a result, most of the chapters in this book offer a more or less explicit conception of civilizations and their role in the geopolitical setting. The chapters differ in their respective emphases on political, economic, cultural, ideological, and philosophical dimensions of social life.

In his foreword, Ahmet Davutoğlu offers a broad conceptual panorama of the meaning of civilization(s) and their role in world politics. For him, "civilizations" designate distinct paradigms of human and social existence, comprising cognitive, normative, aesthetic, and spiritual aspects. Accordingly, differences between civilizations derive from differing epistemic, normative, and ontological premises undergirding them. Civilizations in this view develop distinctive perceptions of space and time, and of the meaning and purpose of human and social life. For Davutoğlu, civilizations are not instant creations, but slowly growing fabrics acquiring through historical challenges and experiences their particular character and quality. The question then is how the diversity of historical constellations can find ways of meeting productivity and assemble into a global order.

Mainly for purposes of convenience, the symposium was divided into three thematic parts: with the first part focusing on the geopolitical and power-political context of civilizations; the second part exploring cultural differences against the backdrop of "postcoloniality" and "Orientalism"; and the third taking into account ideological and regional differences as factors supporting or obstructing the functioning of world order. Although favoring a reasonable partitioning of themes, the organizers did not want to impose a conceptual straitjacket on participants. Hence, the boundary between the three themes is fluid, and the arguments of the different chapters often overlap across themes.

The first part is opened by Richard Falk's chapter on "Geopolitical Turmoil and Civilizational Pluralism." In his chapter, Falk coins the term "mono-civilizationism" to designate the "Euro-Westcentric" approach to world politics, which has been increasingly dominating the world since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The Euro-Westcentric model was anchored in Europe until the early part of the twentieth century, and then shifted substantially to the United States. Falk points out that the essential quality of Euro-Westcentrism is that it is and always has been hierarchical and hegemonic with respect to other civilizational traditions. As exemplified in the case of Euro-Westcentric human rights, derived from Western secular thought rather than reflecting an inter-civilizational synthesis, the Euro-Westcentric world order repudiates the reality of other civilizational heritages. As far as the reception of this Euro-Westcentric attitude is concerned, Falk calls attention to the rising civilizational consciousness around the world. Toward the end of the twentieth century, particularly in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, he observes, civilizational identities began to be increasingly influential in the foreign policy choices of the non-Western nations. Furthermore, non-Western intellectuals are now more eager to break the mono-civilizational monopoly control being exercised over the non-Western mind. The United States, the sole leader of the Euro-Westcentric world order, on the other hand, has to rely more and more on military measures to maintain its political dominance. However, as Falk notes, this is a sign of the decline of a previously hegemonic political actor. He concludes that what we need is not a mono-civilizational world order, but an effective and legitimate world governance based on civilizational pluralism.

In the next chapter, Hans Köchler calls attention to the political abuse of the term "civilization" in the post-Cold War era. Historically speaking, he notes, those powers who considered themselves as the guarantors of the world order appealed to various conceptual instruments in order to provide justification for the exercise of their vital interests beyond their borders. In the European context, from the Middle Ages up to the nineteenth century, it was religion that supplied such justification. During the era of colonial rule, on the other hand, besides the Christian missionary doctrine, "civilizational mission" was invoked by the European powers

to legitimize the exercise of control in their colonies. During the Cold War, ideological premises replaced religion and civilizational mission. The underlying rivalry between two superpowers was sustained through the clash of two ideologies, capitalism and socialism, both of which were the products of the European Enlightenment. With the end of the Cold War ideological rivalry, we have entered into a new unipolar phase of world order. In this unipolar world, the idea of civilizational superiority of the West and the Western way of life is used to legitimate the New World Order. In this framework there is room for other civilizations only in so far as they accept their subordinated and marginalized position vis-à-vis Western civilization. The threat to world order, concludes Köchler, could disappear only with the emergence of a multipolar world in terms of civilizations.

The prospects, and also the problems, involved in the emergence of a multipolar order are explored by Raymond Duvall and Çiğdem Çıdam in their chapter on "Power in the Analysis of World Order." Basically, their chapter problematizes the workings of power and the practices of exclusion in the current world order. Instead of reducing the complex workings of world politics to a single foundational structure, they analyze how different principles interact in a mutually constitutive way in creating the world we live in. In that sense, they deliberately abstain from any monocausal reductionism and incorporate in their analysis the realists' focus on the structural logic of Westphalian anarchy, the liberals' focus on liberal cosmopolitanism that manifests itself in myriad forms, the globalization theorists' emphasis on the logic of global capitalism, and critical theorists' stress on Empire that conceptualizes sovereignty in decentralized and deterritorialized forms. In so doing, Duvall and Çıdam make a theoretical case for the need to see multiple sites and faces of the workings of power in world politics. As they make clear, we have to have a nuanced understanding of power if we are to understand the social constitution and dynamic interaction of the world orders they identify—namely, global humanitarian governance, Empire as "decentered apparatus of biopolitical rule," and American empire as centralized control of one sovereign over others. Basically, civilizations understood as "socially organized and socially meaningful totalities" of "institutionalized systems of signification" are, for them, both producers and effects of world order. Thus they defy approaches that essentialize civilizations as if they were static primordial units as well as approaches that erase differences among them.

The problems, both theoretical and practical, involved in cultural differences are highlighted in the chapter by Chris Brown, titled "International Society, Cultural Diversity, and the Clash (or Dialogue) of Civilizations." Drawing on the case of the "cartoon crisis," where a Danish newspaper's publishing of Prophet Mohammad cartoons had provoked a massive outcry throughout the Muslim world, Brown provides a critical

look at the notions of inter-civilizational clash and dialogue. By first developing a critique of Huntington's clash paradigm for its reification of broader cultural identifications such as civilization and for its treatment of civilizations as physical material entities that have clear boundaries and that enjoy agency in world affairs, he argues that there can be no authoritative representative and authentic voice for any civilization that can assume monopoly over the discourse. By doing so, he disaggregates the totalizing concept of civilization into its constituent parts—individual agents. For him, precisely because civilizations are broader systems of ideas within which different in-group actors can have claim over authority for representation, they cannot enter into dialogue, but they cannot clash either. He goes on to delineate the "appropriate participants" who ought to take part in dialogue, and to establish the "ground rules" for interaction. For that end, he comes up with two necessary steps. The first is reviving a notion of common human nature that finds its roots in natural law, classical ethics, and evolutionary psychology so as to find an answer to the question of human ends, and the second is developing an Aristotelian ethics that respects the particularities of different cases. From the latter, Brown develops a model of "practical-minded thinking" that pays attention to the concrete local particularities and differences, as opposed to the "theory-centered thinking" which is in search of universal abstract principles and axioms deduced through formal logic. In his view, it is the theory-centered thinking that has exacerbated tensions between Western secularists and Muslims, both of whom have universal claims. Finally Brown points out that an anarchic and pluralist scheme modeled after the Westphalian international order might still serve as an exemplar for coexistence of different civilizations.

The chapters assembled in part II explore the issues raised above against the backdrop of postcolonialism, Orientalism, and East-West tensions. In his chapter on "The Formative Parameters of Civilizations: A Theoretical and Historical Framework," Ahmet Davutoğlu investigates the foundational dimensions of individual and social life that constitute civilizations as meaningful historical categories. In that vein, he probes the ontological, epistemological, and ethical orientations of civilizations along with their imaginations of time, space, and order. Pointing out the paradoxical simultaneity of the processes of the homogenization of human culture on the one hand and the revival of authentic civilizational identities on the other, Davutoğlu goes on to explicate the parameters around which civilizations attain the distinct features that they embody. Drawing on examples from various civilizational traditions, he argues that the ways in which one conceives being, knowledge, and value as well as their historical manifestations in temporal, spatial, and institutional settings are influenced by, and in turn constitute, civilizations as historical structures. Davutoğlu argues against the Eurocentric conceptions of history by unsettling the latter's claims and projections about non-

Western civilizations. In particular, he points at the potentials unleashed by globalization that destabilizes the Eurocentric narratives about unidirectional flow of history, which, he suggests, fails to account for civilizational difference. With the dynamic process of globalization, Davutoğlu argues, non-Western civilizations—the supposed 'receivers' of modernization—are increasingly becoming the active subjects in the making of their own history. He concludes by the urgency of developing an inclusive vision of world order that would achieve civilization coexistence and interaction.

In his chapter on "Western Democrats, Oriental Despots?" Salman Sayyid examines the colonial and postcolonial insistence on the superiority of Western categories. The flawed discourse on "democracy" particularly when it comes to the non-Western world is the point of departure in Sayyid's investigation. He argues that the notion of democracy is relational and contrastive, rather than being based on substantive qualities. The sharp distinction drawn between the Athenian polis and the Persian Empire signified in the self-perception of the Western mind a contrast between Western democracies and Oriental despotisms. Accordingly, "Democracy" (with a capital 'd') began to refer to a particular way of life and culture rather than an institutional and procedural arrangement. The frontier between "Democracy" and despotism was drawn in a way that reproduces the frontier between the West and the Orient. This demarcation is so constitutive in the Western discourse that Western historiography has tended to ensure that the link between the West and "Democracy" remains unbroken. The narration of "Democracy," continues Sayyid, "is also the means by which Western identity is narrated." Thus, he elaborates, any attempt to develop an Islamic paradigm of good government, as an endeavor of the Orient, should take into consideration this mobile, relational, and culturally prejudiced nature of the notion of "Democracy." The first step, he concludes, would be to divorce the notion of good government from the discursive term of "Democracy," by articulating its presumed substance (e.g., freedom from repression, de-militarization of public life, possibilities of non-violent, and routinized transformations of government) under a different signifier rather than using the loaded logo of "Democracy."

Another dimension of neo- or post-colonialism is taken up by Cemil Aydın in his chapter "The Ottoman Empire and the Global Muslim Identity in the Formation of Eurocentric World Order, 1815–1919." This chapter examines the relation between competing conceptions of global and regional order(s), especially between the European order after the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the Ottoman Empire at the doors of Europe. Was Europe after the Congress an order of "Christian" states, Aydın asks, and was it therefore not able to accommodate the Ottoman multiethnic and multi-religious empire ruled by a Muslim dynasty? And why did the Ottoman system ultimately come to be perceived as a "Muslim

empire" and even as the leader of a "Muslim" world order? In exploring these questions, Aydın reaches the following conclusions: first, that the European system initially was not a closed system independent of the Ottoman Empire, and that the exclusion emerged in the late nineteenth century; secondly, that due to the globalization of the European system a competing vision emerged in terms of a Muslim or "Pan-Islamic" global order; and thirdly, that the competition between empires and civilizations was replaced in the twentieth century by the conflict of nation states—only to be overshadowed again more recently by civilizational categories.

The competition between Eurocentric and Islamic conceptions of global and regional order carries over into the broader tension between Europe and Asia or between West and East. In his chapter "Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality: An Anthropocosmic Perspective," Tu Weiming points out the premises and limitations of the European or Western conception of enlightenment. As he observes, this conception would fail to provide adequate guidance for human survival in the twenty-first century unless it went through a substantial change in its presumptions—namely anthropocentricism, instrumental rationality, and aggressive individualism—that gave rise to most of our contemporary social mechanisms, as well as to our theoretical social frameworks such as liberalism and socialism. Instead of pushing the Enlightenment project further, Weiming offers an alternative way of thinking, which he calls "New Humanism," and which is based on an "anthropocosmic" vision. The significance of his voice lies in the fact that New Humanism envisages a world order based on a universal ethic and inspired by traditional civilizational values, yet does not abandon fully the liberating ideas and practices of the Enlightenment. The realization of such a world order, for Tu, requires a genuine dialogue among civilizations and religions.

The discussion of different civilizational visions continues in part III where the focus is placed on the influence of modern ideologies and worldviews on global and regional orders. In his chapter on "Globalization, Civilizations, and World Order," Robert Gilpin ponders the impact of modern economics, and especially modern market economies, on the shape and content of global and regional interactions. For Gilpin, globalization basically means the creation of a global capitalist economy characterized by free trade, generally unrestricted foreign investment and relatively open national borders. From the angle of neo-liberal economic doctrine (which he largely supports), the role of government is basically restricted to promote a stable economy at both the global and domestic levels. The goal of the doctrine is to create a "borderless" global economy capable of promoting peace and universal prosperity. Although successfully establishing a global financial system—Gilpin acknowledges—the promise of the ideology has not been fully realized, because of the unresolved issues of "poverty and global inequality." Instead of considering

this a shortfall of the doctrine itself, the chapter prefers to trace the issues to flawed national or domestic policies.

While Gilpin's chapter examines mainly the political economy of globalization, Georg Sørensen probes the liberal political ideas supporting this process. His paper discusses the current internal tensions and future prospects of the liberal world order. Basically he presents a fairly positive view of the current "thin liberal" order, as he rejects the skeptic's view about liberal progress and makes a contrary argument invoking the data provided by Freedom House. He agrees with Fukuyama that the "common marketization" of world politics after the end of the Cold War driven by liberal democratization and economic globalization has opened the way for a "world of peace, cooperation, and prosperity." Despite his orthodox reading of liberal IR theory, Sorensen addresses the tension built in the liberal outlook which complicates its progress. This tension lies, according to him, in the transfer of Isaiah Berlin's dual categories of negative and positive freedom onto international politics as "liberalism of restraint" and "liberalism of imposition," respectively. Relying on the sovereignty principle, liberalism of restraint emphasizes the non-intervention principle for the sake of granting to each and every state legal equality and autonomy. Yet, this kind of a liberal conception is not a remedy for human suffering and not adequate for development. Liberalism, for Sørensen, ought to be also liberalism of imposition which seeks positive intervention in order to liberalize polities. Although aware of his proposal's affinity with liberal imperialism, he does not clearly detach himself from that vision. Although he sees liberalism of restraint as too weak due to inaction, and liberalism of imposition as too strong due to the danger of overreaction, his "balanced liberal order" ultimately leans more toward an impositionist understanding of liberalism.

In his paper on "The Rise of a Neo-medieval Order in Europe," Jan Zielonka shifts the accent from global liberalism to the regional level. In his view, the emerging integration of Europe deserves special attention in international relations theory since it presents a challenge as well as an alternative to the Westphalian international system. Zielonka discusses this aspect of the EU, arguing that the emerging system in Europe resemble the one that existed there throughout the Middle Ages. To highlight this aspect, he introduces an alternative term, "neo-medieval international system." He enumerates several points of variance between the Westphalian and neo-medieval international systems, the most significant being that the Westphalian system is anarchic while the neo-medieval system is geared towards the empire's power center, however weak and dispersed. Despite its similarity to the medieval international order, concludes Zielonka, it is a grave mistake to assume that the new order in Europe necessarily leads to international conflict or war.

In his concluding chapter on "Japan, the United States, and the East Asian Renaissance," John Welfield turns to conceptions of global and

regional order in East Asia, with a focus on Japan and China. His chapter raises a number of important questions: Will China be a new global power challenging the global supremacy of the United States? What are the assets and liabilities of China as a global or regional player? How will Japan respond to the re-structuring of international order? Will Japan deepen its ties with the United States or, rather, distance itself from the United States? Does Japan see a rising China as a threat to its regional interests? If so, what will be Japanese foreign policy preferences in the near future? In exploring the future political-economic developments in East and South East Asia, Welfield deals with these and related questions, placing Japan into the center. He points out that there are principles which underlie Japan's foreign policy, strategic posture, and military doctrines. These principles constitute a pattern which exhibits extraordinary continuity and consistency over centuries and is based on the interaction of geopolitical circumstances, historical experience, and cultural traits. However, as Welfield points out, stressing a pattern does not mean that Japan is following only one policy. Rather, based on regional and international circumstances, Japan has always followed three different policies: "splendid isolation," alignment with the hegemonic power or group of powers, and imperial expansion. Thus, in accordance with its historical tendency, Japanese political elites, impressed by the unilateral global political undertakings of the United States, preferred unquestionably to stand along with the United States in the post-Cold War era, but particularly in its global re-ordering attempts launched in the aftermath of 9/11. However, this policy may change in line with changes in the global and the East Asian regional order.

What the assembled chapters demonstrate is that conceptions of global and regional order are everywhere intermeshed with cultural and civilizational traditions and aspirations. At the same time, this volume shows the immense fluidity of political and civilizational conceptions in our time—which means that political visions of order on the global and regional levels will reflect and have to take into account the shifting fortunes and energies of competing civilizational trajectories in the world.

I

Geopolitics and World Order

ONE

Geopolitical Turmoil and Civilizational Pluralism

Richard Falk

I. MONOCIVILIZATIONALISM AND ITS FRIENDS AND ENEMIES

Civilizational Hierarchy, the United Nations, and Power Politics

Up to this point, the *global* civilizational experience in the modern era has been and continues to be primarily shaped by Eurocentrism (or perhaps more accurately, although also more awkwardly, by Westcentrism), that is, by values, ideas, hegemonic perceptions, and organizational categories that derive directly or indirectly from the West. This monocivilizational dominance has led, ever since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, to an undisclosed civilizationally specific framing of such root concepts of world order as power, law, sovereignty, nation, state, and justice. This framing has not been static, although it has been carried on without adequate representation, participation, and input from non-Western civilizations. This EuroWestcentric framework has changed over time and place, as well as with respect to context, so as to reflect emergent ideational and material tendencies, as well as exhibiting the influence of technological innovations.

This collective understanding of ordering reality in world politics has also responded throughout its history to a variety of challenges and cleavages from within and without the EuroWestcentric domain, which itself should not be conceived in strictly geographical terms, but more as a distinctive civilizationally defined zone of influence. This domain was certainly anchored spatially in Europe until the early part of the twenti-

eth century when it substantially shifted to the United States. In addition to Europe itself, the domain always included a variety of European settler communities in all regions of the world, and especially spread throughout North America, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Of course, these non-European civilizational settings also exerted an array of reactive and interactive influences, giving the "Euro/Westcentric" geopolitical zone of influence an actuality that was always culturally rather diverse, even hybrid.[1] In this sense, globalization became real long before "globalization" became the defining identification for world order in the 1990s.[2] As well, EuroWestcentric intra-civilizational tensions and diversities render complex and contested any attribution of a mono-civilizational character. For instance, is Europe to be conceived as Christian, secular, or some combination?

Despite this interactive and dynamic character of EuroWestcentricism, its essential character continues to be hierarchical and hegemonic with respect to other civilizational traditions. As the colonial era exemplified, it was the intention of the European/Western powers to exert control, but also to claim a legitimating rationale of universalist scope, often in the racist language of "white man's burden," and more recently, as the vehicle for liberating forms of modernization derived from the Enlightenment beliefs in reason and science.[3] During the Bush II presidency the validating claim for the global projection of American power has been its self-assigned mission to spread democracy, resorting even to military intervention in selected instances.

Colonial and post-colonial hegemonic practice has always reflected a self-conscious sense of cultural superiority, as well as the denigration of non-European civilizations as inferior, backward, primitive, and even barbaric, as well as evil. These attitudes encouraged patterns of economic exploitation, abusive political rule, coerced religious conversion, and a variety of interventionary initiatives. The history of the EuroWestcentric phase of world order reinforces the impression that attitudes of civilizational superiority if linked to military dominance are likely to produce disastrous results for non-European peoples and their belief systems along with some useful understandings of how to improve the situation of all the peoples of the world.

From this preliminary perspective, there are two negative implications of EuroWestcentric world order, which are particularly ill adapted to the needs and aspirations of the early twenty-first century. First of all, there exists a persisting Euro/Westcentric denial of civilizational *equality* that no longer corresponds, even geopolitically, to the circumstances of a post-colonial world order in which sovereign states now *formally* represent the non-Western peoples of the world. At the same time, this formally anachronistic legacy of Euro/Westcentrism is embodied with distorting consequences in the structure of the United Nations. Four of the five permanent members of the Security Council must be considered to be

primarily associated with the EuroWestcentric domain, with China being the fifth, and only non-Eurocentric political actor enjoying this status. It can be pointed out that the General Assembly gives each state the same status regardless of size or wealth, but needs also to be noticed that the General Assembly was deliberately subordinated to the hierarchical Security Council. Whereas the Security Council can make decisions, mandating even war on occasion, the most that the General Assembly can do is to make recommendations, and exhibit its support or opposition to proposed courses of action.

Taken together this institutional arrangement has resulted in a deficient pattern of representation that has tarnished the legitimacy of the United Nations to the extent that it purports to be a universal organization that acts on behalf of all persons on the planet. This claim is given a spurious and grossly misleading legality by the endorsement in the United Nations Charter of the principle of *the equality of sovereign states*, which is supposedly furthered by the prohibition of any right by the UN to intervene in matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of a state. Such a Westphalian concept of world order seems *juridically* incoherent when put up against the more geopolitically oriented features of the UN system. The Charter accords dominant states an exceptional status, via the veto, which effectively confers an unrestricted right to exempt themselves (and their friends) from obligations under international law. This capacity to block decisions in the UN Security Council that are perceived as adverse to their strategic and ideological interests is a radical denial of the equality of states as an organizing principle of world order. It places the mantle of UN constitutionalism on the geopolitical governance of the planet. And behind this constitutional move lies the even more hierarchical character of power relations, giving the United States a degree of influence that far exceeds what derives from its status as one of five permanent members of the UNSC.

It can be argued that this deference to *geopolitical* forces is a necessary acknowledgment of the actuality of inequality among the members of the United Nations that potentially allows the Organization to operate effectively because its affirmative decisions will necessarily enjoy support from the political actors with implementing capabilities. It is often argued that the League of Nations failed, in part, because of its refusal to accommodate geopolitics. It was Franklin Roosevelt's vision during the early years of World War II that a future world security undertaking would only succeed if it combined idealistic goals with realistic mechanisms that were sensitive to the historical distribution of power and influence. But the cost of such a move to make the UN more likely to be effective was to risk that it would become an exclusive club of the largest states, rather than a beacon for the rule of law, thereby imperiling its legitimacy. Roosevelt hoped, and seems to have believed, that the great power antifascist alliance that won the war, would also cooperate to keep the peace.

Given the onset of the Cold War this optimistic approach lost all credibility, and the efforts at the UN were continually hampered by superpower rivalry. At least with respect to peace and security, this attempt to somehow reconcile power and law, led the UN to be often neither effective nor legitimate.

Secondly, there exists a geopolitical hierarchy among the leading states that is more directly responsive to relative power than is the formally established hierarchy of the UN. For instance, the United States as a hegemonic actor has exerted an influence on the manner in which the UN operates that extends far beyond its status as a permanent member of the Security Council. It not only possesses the benefits of its formal status, but it relies on its political and financial leverage to distort political reality in its favor. For instance, in the Lebanon War of 2006 in which Israel escalated a border incident into the unlawful initiation of a full-fledged war that had a devastating impact on Lebanese civilian society, American influence in the Security Council successfully, yet shockingly, resisted a call for an immediate ceasefire for thirty-four days, or until Israel had completed their military campaign. The United States was also principally responsible for crafting a unanimously supported resolution, S.C. Res. 1701, which misleadingly attributed responsibility to Hezbollah for initiating the war. Further, 1701 called for Hezbollah to be completely demilitarized while Israel was instructed only to refrain from *offensive* uses of military force. Since Israel always claims to be using force in a defensive mode, and is assured of virtually unconditional American support in making the claim, even this apparent limitation has virtually no operative content. What is illustrated here is the role of the United States in this period after colonialism, after the Cold War, in sustaining a geopolitical hierarchy that is mostly responsive to EuroWestcentric perspectives and priorities. It is true that during the Bush II presidency there has been some serious tactical friction between the United States and several leading European states that believe that their interests are better served at this stage by a more law-oriented approach to global policy than by the imperial geopolitics practiced by the United States since 2001.

This geopolitical posture has been expanded and made explicit after the 9/11 attacks that established political support for a much more assertive American role around the world, but especially in West Asia. The main features of this neoconservative grand strategy had been set forth in authoritative form in a report, titled "Repairing America's Defenses," prepared by the Project for a New American Century in the period *before* Bush came to the White House. But this neoconservative approach to global policy did not become official policy until the issuance of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America in 2002, as revised in 2006, by the White House.

EuroWestcentric Human Rights

The second principled inadequacy of a Eurocentric world order arises due to its implicit repudiation of an ethos of human solidarity except as defined by its own ideological and normative instruments. For instance, the liberal, individualist orientation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and subsequent instruments encoding rules and standards, reflect a set of views that are unabashedly derived from Western secular thought rather than reflecting an inter-civilizational synthesis so far as the establishment of the normative foundations for a post-Westphalian world order. As a result, the claimed universality is an exercise in *false* consciousness, given a tenuous credibility because of the continuing geopolitical dominance of EuroWestcentric actors, exhibiting military and media power of the West as compared to non-Western perspectives. In contrast, genuine initiatives seeking to encourage a dialogue among civilizations or an alliance of civilizations seek to create a *true* universality, affirming human solidarity, but based on a multi-civilizational process of reflection, respect, and reconciliation.

These concerns have achieved most of their recent prominence due to the 9/11 attacks on the United States, and especially in light of the American response, which has used the occasion to solidify by means of war and threat, as well as ideology, its claimed dominance over global security and world order. There are a variety of self-serving justifications for this American response, which express a fear of and opposition to the resurgence of Islam, and combine geopolitical ambitions with ideological warfare to mount a campaign to reestablish EuroWestcentric control over the new nexus of geopolitics, West Asia. American geopolitical ambitions cannot be reduced to materialist or strategic goals alone, but their articulation explains the depth of the commitment: maintaining maximal control over the oil reserves in the region during a period of rising demand and peak or near peak production; sustaining a Western-oriented oligarchy in relation to nuclear weapons; ensuring Israeli regional security, as well as insulating Israel from the demands of the Palestinian people and neighboring states for a just resolution of long-festering conflicts. The ideological warfare involves Washington's indictment of several governments in the region as "rogue states" or as part of "the axis of evil," rationalizing an ill-defined "war on terror" in the name of counterterrorism, and intervening to achieve "regime change" in targeted countries. The Iraq War is a vivid instance of this American post-9/11 approach, as is its support for Israel in the recent Lebanon War. The creation of growing tension in relation to Iran's nuclear energy program is a further move to impose EuroWestcentric regulation as part of the war on terror. The underpinning for such claims is pure EuroWestcentricism, given its unabashed rationale by such advocates of the American neoconservative project for West Asia as Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami.

My argument, then, is that a EuroWestcentric world order does not now, and never did, benefit the vast majority of the peoples of the world. It was psychologically harmful because it failed to appreciate diverse civilizational traditions, exploiting the peoples and resources of these traditions by constructing self-serving rationalizations for dominance, and it refused to explore the multi-civilizational foundations of genuine universality and human solidarity. In this regard, the contemporary need for effective and legitimate global governance based on civilizational pluralism has been obscured, and dangerously delayed, by this latest attempt to achieve a monocivilizational framework of world order administered by the U.S. government. This need arises from the growing borderlessness of human activity and its effects, whether it is related to protecting the human habitat from global warming and extreme weather phenomena (tsunamis, severe storms, heat waves, drought) or the growing dangers of wars fought with nuclear and other weaponry of mass destruction. Global governance is also needed in a robust form to deal with the problems of massive migration, human trafficking, financial flows, transnational crime, and disposal of toxic wastes.

II. THE HISTORICAL MOMENT FOR EUROWESTCENTRIC RENEWAL

The great wars of the last century were essentially ideologically grounded internal to the EuroWestcentric historical experience, as was the Cold War, finally allowing liberalism (as an ideology of free market constitutionalism) to triumph over, first, fascism, then, communism, and finally, social democracy. And so from this purely EuroWestcentric perspective it was understandable, if not acceptable, in the early 1990s for ideologues of the West to proclaim "the end of history." At the same time, such an occluded conception of the historical circumstances in the 1990s demonstrates the distorting impact of civilizational myopia, that is, seeing the *whole* (of planetary reality) through the lens of one *part*, the EuroWestcentric experience. It was particularly misleading in this instance as the post-colonial situation was giving rise to a series of fundamental challenges to this secularist and modernist reading of the global setting. To begin with, the changing geopolitical landscape meant that even in strictly Westphalian terms it was increasingly important to take into consideration the role and outlook of China and India, and the growing weight of Asia in world affairs. Beyond this, there were a variety of signs of non-Western civilizational vitality that were asserting claims to become shaping forces of contemporary history. Rather than the end of history, from a more cosmopolitan perspective, this was actually the time of a new beginning of history, or more modestly, of a new phase of multicivilizational history.

If the contemporary historical reality is to be understood multicivilizationally, as it should be, then it is awkwardly parochial to the point of embarrassment to confuse the resolution of a deep intra-civilizational struggle (as between the materialism of capitalism and that of Marxism-Leninism) with the totality of world history. Perhaps, it would have been more perceptive, and certainly more prophetic, if Fukuyama had taken the occasion to note the coming end of EuroWestcentric ideological hegemony, and what this might portend for future sites of struggle with respect to ideational tensions at the global level. This kind of cosmopolitan interpretation was not a possibility in American policy advising circles, tilting then toward an ardent embrace of what was being celebrated as "the unipolar moment," purportedly a time of unique opportunity for the United States to organize global security in a manner that would serve its interests and embody its values. Fukuyama was at the time a prominent member of this rising ideological formation that was soon to be in a position to shape American foreign policy during the presidency of George W. Bush. Fukuyama himself later broke ranks, on grounds of prudence, with the neoconservatives over the decision to invade Iraq, but has not reconsidered his own monocivilizational understanding of world history.

American foreign policy advisors were at the time deeply divided between those who were covertly disappointed to lose the cohering benefit of a geopolitical enemy provided for so long by the Soviet Union. This mainstream group dominated the U.S. government during the Clinton presidency, as it had for the entire Cold War era, reflecting a realist turn of mind that sought mainly to convert American global leadership into a vehicle for the promotion of economic globalization based on neoliberal ideology. Because it had been so accustomed to conceiving of the world by reference to the challenge mounted by an enemy state or states, it seemed at a loss to fashion a new strategic focus for American energies in a world that lacked a serious challenging state. It was this lack of focus and sense of drift that made the *realist* search for new enemies seem so important. Samuel Huntington, in particular, was preoccupied with positing a new enemy that could restore a sense of purpose and direction to American foreign policy.[4] It is well to ponder this quest for an enemy that seemed at first to be clutching at straws immediately following the abrupt and unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. The first candidate was Japan with Huntington making a strained argument that Japan in the 1980s was so successfully challenging U.S. economic primacy by encroaching on its markets and investment opportunities to ensure almost certainly a collision that would produce a future war between these two Cold War allies. This scenario of strategic encounter had little resonance, especially in the United States, and seemed absurdly irrelevant as soon as Japan began to falter economically in the 1990s. Huntington quietly aban-

doned this line of interpretation, but not his determined search for an enemy.

He shifted notoriously to Islam as posing a deadly challenge to the West, and proposed seeing the future of world politics as beset by civilizational conflict rather than as a sequence of shifting patterns of alliance and conflict among sovereign states. This time Huntington hit the target of public consciousness, not only in America but also around the world. His article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1992 evoked an immediate worldwide response, suggesting that he had struck a raw geopolitical nerve. The negative reaction to this presentation was so strong, especially outside the EuroWestcentric zone of influence, because Huntington was viewed (wrongly) as an unofficial government spokesperson, expressing opinions that prevailed among American leaders. It was also the case that Huntington's politicizing of non-Western civilizational identities, especially that of Islam, seemed to denigrate the upsurge of what was being called "identity politics" as well as to belittle the dramatic rise of religious consciousness in all parts of the world, including, of course, the United States. Many criticisms of Huntington were made from all points on the political spectrum, attacking him for provoking dangerous civilizational tensions and exaggerating the political significance of civilizational identities at the expense of a continuing role of dominant sovereign states. Despite this repudiation of the specifics of the Huntington outlook, it is undoubtedly true that his reformulation of the global circumstance in civilizational terms rather than by reference to states has encouraged commentators on world order to give far greater weight to civilizational orientations than was previously the case. In effect, whether deliberately or not, Huntington had persuasively challenged the utility of the Westphalian template of world order.

Somewhat surprisingly in view of this, when Huntington later extended his argument about the "clash of civilizations" into book form he cunningly, without any acknowledgement, slipped China into the geopolitical mix in place of Islam, now anticipating a war between the United States and China sometime around 2010. In this sense, Huntington has not yet clearly indicated his own orientation toward world order as China can be treated as either a state or a civilization, or as some combination. But the war with China that he projected seemed to have the characteristics of a twentieth-century conflict pitting the United States and its allies on one side, with China and its friends as challengers to American hegemony. These efforts to provide a new enemy on the horizon produced debate and consternation throughout the world, especially the clash hypothesis. Nevertheless, this conflictual approach was never explicitly endorsed by political leaders. It seemed unnecessarily belligerent, overlooked the lure of investment and trade opportunities, and lacked a supportive political climate. And so Huntington's efforts went nowhere so far as the official policies of the 1990s were concerned. For one thing,

political leaders around the world continued to represent states, and tended to perceive reality through a Westphalian lens, and they were also mostly not comfortable with such a pessimistic view of the future as suggested by these various scenarios of conflict depicted by Huntington.

In this post-Cold War, pre-9/11 period, the neoconservative opposition was operating energetically on the sidelines in Washington, comfortable within a unipolar Westphalian framework, but insisting on a twist that was unusual in American politics, especially as emanating from right-wing sources. Their grand strategy reflected a visionary view of the future in which the world has been pacified, subject to an American "benign empire."[5] This vision was posited as necessary for national and global security, and its pursuit was deemed worth any cost, although its most persuasive advocates claimed that it was attainable with minimum sacrifices of lives and resources.

Such an intellectual and geopolitical conditioning of political consciousness relative to world order continues to be largely a EuroWestcentric artifact, with non-Western actors continuing to be mainly reacting and thinking under the monocivilizational spell that has been cast over their political identities in the course of several centuries. Of course, there have been a variety of recent efforts to break the spell. A major assault on the EuroWestcentric edifice was associated with the anti-colonial movement, which broke the juridical and formal political hold of EuroWestcentric world order over the non-Western world, but did not initially question the *civilizational* dominance of the West. Indeed, anti-colonialism was generally expressed in normative language developed in the West, especially the right of self-determination and norms relating to sovereignty, nonintervention, political independence, the equality of states, and territorial unity. As well, the goals and outlook of the newly independent states were almost totally derivative from EuroWestcentric models whether liberal capitalist or Marxist in form. Even countries with great non-Western civilizational traditions, such as India, Turkey, and Iran, initially opted of their own free will to abandon their own civilizational heritages and emulate Western models of modernity, thereby deliberately turning away from their own past glories, traditions, and accumulated wisdom. This dynamic was actively encouraged by non-Western elites who were mainly educated and civilizationally shaped in the West to think that liberalism and Marxism offered the only historically relevant competing visions of technocratic progress available in the entire world. Deformed applications of these visions led to the excesses of oppressive government in the Shah's "white revolution," Kemalism in Turkey, and the perversions of Marxist thinking during Stalin's long and brutal rule of the Soviet Union.

The one shining exception to this pattern was undoubtedly the extraordinary anti-colonial movement led by Gandhi, based on his rendering of Hindu traditions, and giving the world an enduring lesson regard-

ing the potency of nonviolent challenges to an abusive power structure. Gandhi's own exemplary life represented an exposure to and rejection of the monocivilizational mainstream, and an intense and profound engagement with Hinduism as the foundation for an independent India that he favored. The legacy of Gandhi remains a valuable resource for future politics, and continues to have an inspirational value within India, and beyond. It needs also to be appreciated that Gandhi's assassination by a Hindu nationalist who wanted India to be a powerful and "normal" state was motivated by extreme opposition to the traditionalist side of Gandhi's political vision for India. This reaction was reinforced by Nehru's turn away from the Hinduist core of Gandhiism when governing an independent India. Nehru opted for an acceptance of the logic of Western modernity as the *mandatory* basis for Indian social, economic, and political progress. It is true that Nehru refused to submit India to the prevailing pattern of Cold War geopolitics, positioning India in such a way as to encourage the formation of a non-aligned movement of non-Western states that favored Cold War neutralism. Such non-alignment was essentially a prudent geopolitical move, as well as an affirmation of the fruits of independence, rather than an affirmation of Indian civilizational identity or a challenge to EuroWestcentricism.

All along there were culturally grounded efforts by intellectuals to break monocivilizational monopoly control being exercised over the non-Western mind. The poignant plea of Gayatri C. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" was a sophisticated acknowledgement that the *authentic* voices of colonized peoples had been hitherto silenced by a mixture of domination and cooption, and were not set free merely by achieving political independence and the international status of a sovereign state.[6] Other manifestations of moves away from the Eurocentric mindset arose as part of what came to be called "identity politics" in which civilizational roots were acknowledged with growing pride as in Trinh-T. Minh-Ha's *Asian, Woman, Other.* Edward Said's enormously influential *Orientalism* and *Culture and Imperialism* persuasively showed the extent to which a part of the EuroWestcentric project was to rely on a biased scholarly apparatus to disvalue other cultures, to inculcate a sense of civilizational inferiority among the colonized and the dominated, and to endow the Western developmental and civilizational path with universal validity and civilizational superiority.[7] The religious resurgence in non-Western civilizations, although paralleled by the rapid growth of evangelical Christianity in the United States, is also a manifestation of civilizational pluralism that entails a repudiation of EuroWestcentricism. For the Islamic world the radical rendering of this pre-political refusal to be coopted by the West is vividly depicted in Roxanne Euben's *The Enemy in Your Mirror.*[8] On a more mundane level the various debates about the content and universality of human rights as exhibited in writings and discourses associated with "Asian values," "African values," and "Islam-

ic values" also expresses a refusal to accept uncritically the Eurocentric mindset that prevailed well into the Cold War period. This mindset presupposed that the West was the sole source of a universally valid framework and code of conduct for the entirety of the human species. It is an irony of the current times that the most popular personality in most of the Islamic world, country by country, remains Osama Bin Laden, who now is being challenged by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and since the end of the Lebanon War by the Hezbollah leader, Sheikh Nasrallah. This popularity of radical anti-Western figures is perceived in the West as a perverse confirmation of EuroWestcentric superiority, but it is more accurately interpreted as showing the societal appeal of civilizational formats even if only presented in pseudo-authentic forms, as well as reflecting the historical impotence of non-Western challenges when grounded in the Western paradigm of statecraft. It also suggests an outpouring of populist support given even to extremist politics of violent resistance when directed at grievances that are essentially civilizational in nature, and long neglected by the major governments, especially in the Arab world. Such grievances in the wider Islamic world include several distinct issues: first, the ordeal of the Palestinian people; second, interventionary diplomacy in Western Asia prompted by strategic ambitions in Washington to control oil reserves and safeguard Israel, policies that have brought the disastrous Iraq War to the region and now threaten to widen the orbit of war by way of a military confrontation with Iran; and thirdly, subsidizing of corrupt, autocratic agents of EuroWestcentric geopolitics that have passively endured these grievances inflicted for decades by extra-regional actors while suppressing their own people. It is a matter of urgency, of benefit to all of us who seek justice in human affairs, to find plural civilizational foundations for a more humane world order that are emancipated from EuroWestcentrism, but at the same time repudiate reliance on terrorist and extremist modes of resistance even if these purport to derive from civilizationally authentic sources.

Intercivilizational discussions of these issues, especially if located outside the West, can be understood as contributing to the non-Western civilizational confidence needed to oppose injustices associated with the current phase of a Eurocentric world order, as well as to challenge the retention of a monocivilizational basis for world order. One goal of such confidence is also to avert a clash of civilizations while reconstituting world order for the twenty-first century on a plural civilizational foundation while seeking a more unified form of global governance to address the practical problems posed by intensifying globalization.

III. THE EUROPEAN UNION ALTERNATIVE AND THE QUESTION OF TURKISH MEMBERSHIP

The experience of the European Union (EU) can be understood as an experiment in post-Westphalian geopolitics that accepts, at least tacitly, the political implications of a non-EuroWestcentric world order. It is notable that the European core of modern world order should have moved significantly in another direction. By stages European regionalism has fashioned a culture of peace within a regional domain formerly treated as the crucible of world wars. The EU as a political setting has nurtured the ideas and practices associated with sovereignty of states. In keeping with its secularist outlook the EU has set limits on the political influence of religious institutions.

The idealistic dimension of the rise of the EU also included questioning Machiavellian reliance on a political absolutism that sheds pretensions of law and ethics. The distinctively EU ethos is premised on the importance of compromise, diplomacy, and cooperation beyond its borders, on the benefits of international law and the UN, and on the minimization of war and militarism as the means of achieving change and resolving disputes. As a political actor on the world stage this EU orientation offers a potentially radical alternative to hard-power Westphalian geopolitics that rarely could do better than produce intervals of stability and moderation based either on post-war fatigue or the countervailing power alignments that yielded more or less stable balance of power arrangements for *Europeans*, providing relatively peaceful intervals between wars. The EU orientation responds to the fragility and complexity of the contemporary global setting with a greater commitment to substantive regimes based on international institutions, procedures, and norms both within Europe, but more innovatively in relating the EU to the rest of the world.

Of course, there is no assurance that this EU approach can sustain itself even regionally, much less provide a model for a genuinely post-Westphalian world order premised on the global extension of a culture of peace. All along the EU experiment has been generally more popular in Europe with governing elites than with the public, which in the large countries remains more attached to the Westphalian centrality of nation and state. The current tensions in Europe associated with immigrants exhibit the reluctance, if not unwillingness, of many Europeans to accept an EU that is not civilizationally homogeneous. But if civilizational pluralism cannot be managed on a regional level, how can it possibly serve as a model for a humane world order? It will then be an essentially disappointing aspiration that is stymied in practice by crosscurrents of contradiction.

Externally, as well, it is the distinctive outlook of the EU since the end of the Cold War to emphasize the potentialities of international law as a

normative currency capable of regulating the behavior of political actors in a manner that produces outcomes consistent with the general public interest. Such an approach has occasioned praise and scorn, either regarding the EU as an inspiring model for future world order or as a naïve shirking of international responsibilities in a global setting threatened by anti-Western extremists.[9]

There is no doubt that Europe has since World War II avoided the extreme over-reliance on military capabilities that has led the United States astray. It is an expensive and delegitimizing over-reliance on military power as demonstrated both by the temptation to embark upon dysfunctional wars, as in Vietnam, Iraq, and by the tendency to arouse intense anti-American sentiments due to a refusal to use its leadership role in world affairs to resolve outstanding conflicts in accordance with law and justice. In this regard, the unwavering American support for Israel in relation to the beleaguered and suffering Palestinians is deeply discrediting in this pivotal region of West Asia. In contrast, Europe has consistently adopted a more balanced approach, which if reinforced by the U.S. government, might have created an entirely different political atmosphere in the region. Of course, the rigidity of American foreign policy in the Middle East cannot be understood apart from appreciating the intensity of pro-Israeli influence in American domestic politics, and even more so, on foreign policy.

This EU model, with or without an abandonment of imperial geopolitics by the United States, will not be able to realize its external potential, or provide inspiration to other regions, if it fails to admit Turkey to membership. In this crucial respect, the Turkish presence within the EU, particularly if Turkey continues to enrich its own cultural identity by reviving its Ottoman past, offers a decisive test of whether Europe is prepared to abandon a EuroWestcentric worldview and identity, and take the risks of a genuine commitment to a multicivilizational identity as part of its contribution to the struggle to establish a more humane and effective world order. Admittedly, at present, after the `No' votes in France and The Netherlands of 2005, the French urban riots, the Danish cartoon controversy, the electoral success of anti-immigration political parties, the outlook in Europe is currently not favorable at all with respect to Turkish accession. If this remains the case, then the EU will find itself, at best, a post-Westphalian enclave of EuroWestcentric nostalgia, or even the scene of failed revivals.

IV. GLOBALIZATION AND THE ENDGAME OF MONOCIVILIZATIONALISM

There is little doubt that the American aim in the aftermath of the Cold War was to promote a monocivilizational solution to an emerging

circumstance of globalization. Both the Bush I and Clinton presidencies favored an economistic geopolitics. This involved reliance on a soft-power approach emphasizing self-organizing markets, facilitated by international financial institutions, but reinforced by American military dominance, a realist foreign policy, and the spread of American popular culture. These policies were reinforced by the ideological promotion of what was then known as "market-oriented constitutionalism," that is, a special brand of democracy that is organically fused with capitalism. This approach to world order in the 1990s was sharply criticized by neoconservatives. They insisted that the success of monocivilizationalism required a far greater willingness to impose "democracy" by means of force, particularly in West Asia. They also believed it was necessary to achieve "regime change" in countries throughout the region that were perceived as opposed to the American agenda. The neoconservative critique focused on West Asia for various reasons as the central arena of geopolitical contestation that would shape the next phase of world history. Their program lacked a political mandate even after Bush II was elected president until 9/11 happened. In this regard, 9/11 changed nothing ideologically except it altered the political atmosphere, immediately giving a spurious credibility to the views of such EuroWestcentric monocivilizationists as Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami. Such individuals emboldened the White House and Pentagon with their inflammatory interpretations of "what went wrong." These authors insisted that the problems for the West were a result of the civilizational failure by Arab countries to make a successful transition to Western-style modernity.[10]

A monocivilizational orientation dominated the covering letter signed by President Bush to introduce the important grand strategy document, NSS 2002:

> The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity. People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children—male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages.

This passage sets forth the universalizing claims of a monocivilizational geopolitics. The United States claims that there is one and only one model for "national success," and that this model has been vindicated by the outcomes of the great struggles of the twentieth century. It is also af-

firmed that the U.S. government stands ready to help realize the embodiment of its own exemplary form of governance everywhere in the world. Such an undertaking follows directly from the Lewis/Ajami views that to get things right in the future countries must move toward modernity by adopting an essentially American mode. There is no room left for civilizational pluralism, or for alternative modernities except in matters of cultural detail. This vision of the future is reinforced in the body of the NSS document by a statement of resolve to maintain or extend existing levels of military dominance on a scale that would enable an American instantaneous use of decisive force anywhere on the planet.

Neal Smith in the *The Endgame of Globalization* calls attention to fundamental continuities between the Clinton approach to world order and that of Bush, but there are also several critical discontinuities with grave policy consequences.[11] Two of these are worthy of our attention: first, the abandonment of the realist tradition as a guide to diplomacy with its stress on the statist virtue of prudence;[12] and secondly, seeking to implement policies of regime change and counter-proliferation in West Asia by aggressive uses of force in Iraq, Lebanon, and possibly Iran.

There are several developments that suggest that an American effort to sustain this monocivilizational project will fail, and these can be briefly identified:

- the failure of aggressive war to achieve intended results despite overwhelming military superiority;
- the financial vulnerability arising from enormous trade and fiscal deficits;
- the changing geopolitical landscape, especially the rise of China and India, the embodiments of great non-Western civilizations, as potential world actors;
- an emerging situation of ecological urgency requiring globally oriented solutions that are sensitive to the rights of future generations;
- an energy squeeze that is likely to intensify in coming years, making control of West Asian oil reserves of even greater significance, but also requiring an eventual transition to a post-petroleum political economy;
- the political trends in Latin America exhibiting a renewed willingness in democratic societies of the citizenry to seek more compassionate forms of political economy than associated with neoliberal variants of capitalism;
- the awakening of non-Western civilizations to their own distinct heritages as potential foundations for a world order premised on civilizational pluralism.

In the face of these developments adverse to monocivilizational forms of world order, there is a great danger of implosion arising from a refusal by

the United States to abandon its addictive dependence on militarist approaches. It is a sign of impending collapse when a previously hegemonic political actor is increasingly reliant on *military* instruments to address challenges to its position of leadership. In this respect, it is of crucial importance for the world that the United States, in particular, and EuroWestcentricism more generally, move toward civilizational pluralism voluntarily and nonviolently.

NOTES

1. For a brilliant inquiry into nineteenth-century Ottoman and Japanese responses to what I am calling EuroWestcentricism, see Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). This sense of interactive hybridity is well-expressed by such notable scholars as Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993), and Homi K. Bhaba, *The Location of Culture* (London, UK: Routledge, 1994).
2. For elaboration see R. Falk, *Predatory Globalization: A Critique* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1999).
3. The basic argument of such notorious Westcentric voices as Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and the Middle East Response* (New York, Oxford, 2002); and Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, rev. ed., 2000).
4. For Huntington's most extended presentation see Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); also, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs* 79/2 (1999).
5. Robert Kagan, "Benevolent Empire," *Foreign Policy* 111 (Summer, 1998).
6. See Gayatri C. Spivak, *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (New York: Methuen, 1987).
7. T. Trinh Minh-ha, *Women, Native, Other. Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989), and Said, *Culture and Imperialism*.
8. Roxanne Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
9. Compare Mark Leonard, *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century?* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005) and Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) for praise and Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Random House, 2004) for scorn.
10. See Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004); Barnett, *Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2005); for the straight neoconservative foreign policy agenda in the aftermath of 9/11 see Richard Perle and David Frum, *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2003).
11. Neal Smith, *The Endgame of Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
12. See Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966); Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

TWO

Civilization as Instrument of World Order?

The Role of the Civilizational Paradigm in the Absence of a Balance of Power

Hans Köchler

(I)

The unipolar power constellation at the beginning of the twenty-first century appears having brought about a paradigm change in regard to the legitimation of world order. In view of the predominant power's claim to civilizational supremacy, which is documented not only in public relations, but also military campaigns, we intend to analyze that country's strategy of "commanding obedience" vis-à-vis an increasingly "restive" world.

With the disappearance of the political and ideological rivalry of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar balance of power, "civilization" has become the buzzword in contemporary discourse about world order, and in particular about the reshaping of that order.[1] Since the beginning of the century, the world has witnessed the renaissance of a "holy alliance" in secular form whereby the civilizational paradigm—with the fundamental values associated with it—has replaced that of religion. The demands for the reshaping of the global order are now made in the name of an "international community" that is exclusively defined according to criteria set by the self-proclaimed architects of that order. This state of

affairs, and in particular the hegemonial discourse associated with it, necessitates an analysis of the underlying paradigm of world order.

The often-diagnosed "moralization" of international relations[2] has to be understood in the wider context of the question of global order. In the absence of a balance of power, "Western values"—with their inherent exclusivist interpretation of democracy, human rights, the rule of law[3] — are declared of transcultural relevance and instrumentalized for the purpose of commanding obedience from the part of the global polity. Morality has indeed become an instrument of world order whereby "Western civilization" has presented itself as the paradigmatic one. It is a characteristic feature of this hegemonial system that the social and political order in entire regions (such as the Middle East) is proclaimed as requiring *remodeling* according to those values. The tone has been set, among others, by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who, in a public debate at Ohio State University in 1998, referred to the United States as the "indispensable nation."[4]

In order to unravel the discourse of legitimation underlying the claim to civilizational supremacy, which is a corollary of global dominance, we first have to clarify the notion of "world order" itself.

In the context of this chapter, we understand "order" as a neutral system of relations with distinct rules that may vary according to the areas of social life to be governed. For the purpose of this analysis, we provisionally define "world order" as a system, comprising mankind as a whole, of interdependent relations between various collective actors, whether those are states as subjects of international law, economic entities (national as well as transnational), peoples in the socio-cultural sense (i.e., "nations"), or specific social groupings that are formed beyond the confines of ethnicity or religion. Most frequently, "world order" has been referred to as a system of relations between states whereby the rules (more specifically: legal norms) are set and enforced in materially and structurally different ways, whether unilaterally or multilaterally—the overriding goal being that of stability.

In our general orientation, we follow the concise definition suggested by Hedley Bull who conceives *world* order as "those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole"[5] and distinguishes it from *international* order as "order among states," understood simply as groups of people.[6] The latter, according to Bull, can be defined as pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains the elementary goals of the society of states.[7] For the purpose of this analysis, we would like to refer to Bull's enumeration of these goals that helps us understand the specific role of "civilization" in the instrumental sense we shall try to work out here. Those specific goals are: (a) the "preservation of the system and society of states itself," (b) "maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states," (c) the "maintenance of peace in the

sense of the absence of war," and (d) the "limitation of violence resulting in death or bodily harm."[8]

In view of Bull's distinction, we understand "international order" as a facet of "world order," albeit the most important one. When we refer to world order in this chapter, we mean "international order" as defined above. The power of states is the main structural element of this order. Thus, world order, as understood in this context, reflects the global power constellation at a given time, whether this is a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar one.

Ideally, the stability of the order is ensured through the enforcement of legal norms agreed upon among the community of states ("international rule of law")—which is the case when a balance of power, whether bipolar or multipolar, exists. In the absence of a balance of power, the cohesion of the global order is simply maintained by acts commanding obedience, including the use of military force. In a unipolar system like the contemporary one such acts of power are not based on norms generally agreed upon—a situation which challenges the priority of the law as framework of the conduct of international affairs. *Stability* of a given order and *legality* of the means for achieving or maintaining that order are two entirely different matters.

Stability of world order is, *inter alia*, a function of its *legitimation*. History tells us that those who considered themselves, in different epochs and under different political and socio-economic conditions, as guarantors of the global order, thus claiming the role of "enforcers," have resorted to either *religion*—as in the era of the crusades—*ideology*—as during the Cold War—or *civilization*—as in the colonial period—or a combination of these, when they felt a need of justification for the exercise of their vital interests beyond their borders. The explicit goals of the enforcers of world order—namely, the exercise of power and the assertion of national interests—have rarely been declared openly; they have almost always been veiled in idealistic language. In the context of world order—and according to the logic of its enforcers—a legitimation strategy, if it is to be effective, has to provide a cover for undeclared goals that would otherwise not be acceptable in the eyes of those whose obedience is required to guarantee the stability of a given order.[9]

In European history since the Middle Ages we basically can discern four schemes according to which the predominant powers of the time tried to assert their authority for the sake of what they declared a "just" world order:

(a) From the Middle Ages up to the nineteenth century the dominant powers resorted to religion as basic source of legitimation of the existing order and of the expansion of their domain. The crusades against the Muslims in the Holy Land have been the most drastic expression of a strategy of enforcing an imperial order in the name

of God. The rules of that era's world order were proclaimed, on behalf of the Supreme Being, by the self-declared guardians of the Christian faith, something which excluded in and of itself any form of co-operation among equals (as far as non-Christian nations were concerned). The purported religious motive was also apparent in the compact of the nineteenth century's Holy Alliance and in the acts of interference—indeed early forms of what today is termed "humanitarian intervention"—conducted by European powers on the territory of the Ottoman Empire.[10] Religion also served as legitimation tool for the European conquests in the Western and Eastern hemispheres; those expeditions negated the rights of indigenous civilizations in an *absolute* sense, including the most brutal use of force.

(b) The rationale of the European powers' colonial rule—particularly from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries—was based on a combination of Christian missionary doctrine and a supposed civilizational mission (somehow related to the discourse of European Enlightenment). This hybrid form of legitimation of the rule of European imperial powers was only disposed of following the upheavals of the Second World War.

(c) In the bipolar era of the Cold War—during the second half of the twentieth century—the global claim to power by the two major competitors for the role of enforcer of the international order was based on ideological premises. Their secularized versions of imperial legitimation were characterized by competing views of the dignity of man and conflicting versions of human rights, including mutually exclusive political ideals. The antagonistic systems of "socialism" (communism) and "capitalism" determined a balance of power that only ended with the collapse of one competitor's imperial domain. In a certain sense, both rivals claimed for themselves a civilizational mission according to which their respective ideology represented a higher level of humanity.

(d) At the beginning of the twenty-first century a paradigm change appears taking hold again. With the end of the Cold War era, brought about by the events of 1989, a unipolar world order has emerged, at least as regards the power-centered relations between the nation-states. What has euphemistically—and possibly prematurely—been termed the "New World Order" in the years following the collapse of communism,[11] has been idealized by references to a supposed superiority of the Western vision of man, including human rights and the economic and political system of liberalism. In the absence of a balance of power, the dominant actor increasingly resorts to the propagation of its own civilization as a system of values by which humanity is supposedly expressed more fully than in other civilizational systems. The "Western" way of life,

portrayed as superior in terms of human dignity, is considered as being of exemplary nature. This particular civilization is used as source of legitimacy for the policies, including economic as well as military measures, of the global hegemon. In the meantime, and particularly since the events of the year 2001, the emphasis on the norms inherent in this civilization has acquired the form of a missionary ideology the essence of which is the belief in a *dichotomy of good and evil*. In the newspeak of our unipolar world, "civilization" has effectively taken the role of religion, that is, filled the vacuum left by religion in the West's secularized environment. The construct of the "axis of evil," for instance, serves to demonstrate the new—secularized[12] —moral antagonism on which the dominant power bases its hegemonial claim.

(II)

Before we proceed with the analysis of the civilizational paradigm of world order, we have to clarify the use of the term "civilization." For the purpose of this chapter, we define "civilization" in the sense of a universal worldview and underlying comprehensive system of values that comprises "culture" as a sub-category. We do not understand these two terms in the sense of an earlier (particularly German) discourse on "culture" and "civilization," namely, as two distinct forms of human self-realization.[13] We follow the description used by Samuel Huntington according to whom civilization means "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species."[14]

In the context of the unipolar world order referred to under (d) above, all civilizations—with their eventually competing claims to universality—are measured against the standard of the dominating (Western) civilization. The latter's value system is declared as of paradigmatic nature. The underlying rationale is one of "self-immunization," which is obvious in the following circular scheme: on the one hand, Western civilization serves—i.e., is instrumentalized—as a source of legitimacy of the international order enforced by the global hegemon; on the other hand, the power of the dominant actor commands acceptance of that very civilization. Although this is not a *circulus vitiosus* in the sense of formal logic, it is one that affects societal credibility and that has been at the roots of an increasing number of international confrontations. The "clash of civilizations" Western intellectuals have begun talking about shortly after the end of the Cold War may well have its origin in this circular scheme.

The logic of self-affirmation, inherent in this essentially Eurocentric position, is accompanied by a strategy of "civilizational expansion" which can be interpreted in analogy to the colonial expansionism of the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Unlike in previous periods, the guarantor of the world order is—at least in official terms—not conveying a *religious* message, but claiming a (secularized) *civilizational* mission, making secularism the new religion.

With notable exceptions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, religion was a cohesive element of Western (essentially European) order *internally* and a tool of imperial order *externally*. Such was the role of Christianity up to the nineteenth century. It helped legitimize colonial expansion, including rule over the Muslim world; a doctrine of religious and moral supremacy was instrumental in stabilizing that era's international order in favor of the European powers.[15]

In the secularized Western system of today, civilization—that is, civilizational doctrine—has quite obviously replaced religion as tool of global hegemony. The Western understanding—or self-interpretation—of its worldview in the sense of an "enlightened" civilization, based on specific anthropological assumptions (which are not necessarily universal), serves the purpose of legitimizing and, subsequently, stabilizing an increasingly fragile global order: an ever more complex system of relations between states and non-state actors in which different cultures and civilizations exist simultaneously *without* an explicit consensus on the mode of co-existence. The submission to Western supremacy (considered essential for global stability) is induced by an insistence on civilizational superiority. Unlike as purported by commentators in the West, that consent is not obtained in a space of free and open discourse or "dialogue."[16] Walter Lippmann's much earlier theory of the "manufacture of consent," although not designed for a transnational polity, might lead the researcher into the right direction.[17]

A long-term strategy of reshaping the globe—that is, other civilizations—according to the Western model is at the roots of major foreign policy projects of the United States and the United Kingdom in particular. (To a lesser degree, this is also the case with the collective foreign policy and security agenda of the European Union.) The undeclared goal appears to be that of absorption—or "amalgamation"—of other civilizations through a form of political domination.

In the unipolar world order of today, this hegemonial claim is backed up by military force—when and where the leading power deems it appropriate. After the end of the Cold War, the global interventionist policy of the United States is veiled in the robe of a civilizational mission. The actual military hegemony is indeed legitimized by reference to a supposed superiority of Western values: this constitutes what we call the *vicious circle of self-assertion* of Western civilization at the beginning of the twenty-first century.[18]

Against this background of rationalization of an otherwise indefensible claim to civilizational, political, and military supremacy, the dominant power has embarked on a "global war against terror" in the very

name of (Western) civilization. This has had far-reaching repercussions on the position of Islam in the contemporary world order. In many instances, acts of terror are summarily being attributed to Islam as a civilization whereby individual acts of violence are attributed to an entire religion.[19] This has resulted in a distorted image of Islam that in turn is being instrumentalized for "modern" forms of humanitarian intervention.[20]

In a kind of "hermeneutical imperialism," the global hegemon, with increasing self-assertion, claims the power, albeit implicitly, of exegesis of the holy scriptures of another civilization. Western leaders such as the President of the United States or the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom have repeatedly presented themselves as *de facto* interpreters of the Holy Qur'an by publicly defining criteria of "true"—or genuine—Islam.[21] This attitude makes honest dialogue between Islam and the West almost impossible. One should not be surprised if fragile co-existence turns into confrontation if one side insists on choosing the partners on the other side—declaring *ex cathedra* who is a "good" Muslim. Engaging in "dialogue" only with partners who are handpicked by the Western political establishment is not only an exercise lacking credibility, but a dangerous undertaking. Such an exclusionary—or discriminatory—strategy has been most obvious in the West's dealing with the peoples of Palestine, Iran, and Iraq in particular.

However, in view of the socio-cultural dynamic in the Muslim world, it is tantamount to a denial of reality if the West—including the European Union as a new, though relatively timid, global actor—tries to arrogate the role of *arbiter* in internal affairs of Muslim countries, supporting, for instance, one religious tendency or political group against the other (as in the cases of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, etc.). This attitude of denial is nurtured by a colonial mind that is blinded by the absence of a balance of power in terms of military and media potential. A "colonial mind" will always work in tandem with a "colonized mind," which implies a policy of *divide et impera*. This is particularly true for the West's dealings with the Muslim world. Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, has most candidly drawn our attention to this reality of an (at least officially) post-colonial world. In his Special Address on Globalization, delivered on the occasion of the Malaysian Human Rights Day 2005, he acknowledged an often ignored reality: "We have gained political independence but for many the minds are still colonised."[22]

In tandem with the military expeditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, a project of "reinventing" Islam appears to be under way the goal of which is to redefine the core elements of Islam—in terms of religion as well as civilization—according to the criteria and on the basis of the terminology of the Western-Christian tradition. The discourse on a so-called "Euro-Islam"—a secularized version of Islam according to European standards—falls into this patronizing category.[23] The notions of "democra-

cy," "rule of law," "human rights," to mention the buzzwords of the new global debate about civilizational renewal and political reform, are introduced in the specific meaning they have acquired in the development of Western civilization, with special emphasis on the contribution of European Enlightenment to their philosophical foundation. Thus, the anthropocentric world view of the West—particularly its highly cherished humanist tradition dating back to the Renaissance period—is not merely propagated in a framework of free and open discourse—"in good faith," so to speak—but *imposed* upon the rest of the world, first and foremost that of Islam for part of which the blueprint of a "New Middle East" has been designed. The contribution Muslim civilization has made to the development and clarification of those very principles is neglected—or deliberately overlooked.[24]

This quasi-missionary approach has led and will further lead to a cycle of violence that may spin out of control and acquire a global dimension. Action will provoke reaction and the "clash of civilizations," conjured up by intellectuals and politicians since the end of the Cold War, is about to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.[25]

The "democratization" of Iraq by means of armed force—namely invasion, occupation, and colonization through the setting up of social and political structures under the control of the occupiers—is a case in point.[26] The "colonization of the mind" is an essential part of this long-term strategy within the framework of the ambitious project of creating a "New Middle East" that is designed to pacify the region on the terms of the Western world.[27]

Furthermore, there is no point in propagating civilizational dialogue with Islam if the West neglects the justified grievances of Muslims as in the cases of Palestine or Iraq more recently. One simply cannot speak of dialogue while slapping one's partner in the face. No one should be surprised if the tacit support of the military occupation of Palestine, including the building and extension of settlements, the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the use of forbidden arms such as depleted uranium in Iraq, the torturing and mistreatment of Muslims in jails in the Middle East and elsewhere (some of which are secretly maintained), etc., are interpreted by Muslims in such a sense. A delicate co-existence of the logic of war with the rhetoric of dialogue has been characteristic of the imperial newspeak of the unilaterally declared "New World Order."

Ironically, the forceful reinvention of another civilization is implemented within the official framework of a "dialogue of civilizations." This phenomenon of the "split tongue" raises the question as to the integrity and moral credibility of the proclaimed effort at a comprehensive dialogue. In view of the West's speaking with different voices, it is no surprise that many of those to whom the initiative is addressed have considered this notion as a smokescreen. While lip service is being paid to dialogue and co-operation, the (undeclared) agenda is that of subjuga-

tion of one civilization by another—for purposes other than civilizational advancement.[28] The credibility problem of the European Union and the United States in their dealing with the Muslim world lies exactly in the insistence on conducting dialogue *on their terms*, that is, according to the canon of Western values. In that regard, the West is even resorting to measures of censorship of Muslim media as the banning of the Lebanese satellite station *Al-Manar* by the United States[29] and the European Union has demonstrated; at the same time, Western countries refuse to take legal measures against acts of blasphemy directed at Islam.[30] As far as the European Union is concerned, this puts into question its commitment to genuine dialogue within the framework of the so-called "Barcelona process."[31] The "Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures," established by the European Union, will neither be credible nor effective in its professed agenda of dialogue between the countries and peoples of the Mediterranean basin if it does not address the basic issue of the right of Muslims to express their identity and values *without* Western censorship.[32]

As far as the Muslim world is concerned, one of the underlying publicly declared aims of the "educational" approach of the United States and her allies vis-à-vis the Muslim world is to succeed in the self-declared "global war on terror" although, in its generality, this has become a mission impossible. This "war," perceived by many in the targeted countries as a new crusade, is being waged in a misleading manner and on wrong premises insofar as it deliberately confuses acts of terrorism with acts of resistance against foreign occupation[33] and portrays the worldwide military measures, including intelligence operations outside all norms of international law, as a defense of Western civilization, of good against evil.

On the occasion of its sixtieth anniversary, the United Nations Organization has tried to set the record straight, making it more difficult, at least in terms of international doctrine, to use civilization as a smokescreen for waging imperial wars, particularly those under the label of the "global war on terror" to which there is no end in sight. The UN Security Council, in a resolution adopted on 14 September 2005, emphasized "that continuing international efforts to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent the indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, and addressing unresolved regional conflicts and the full range of global issues . . . , will contribute to strengthening the international fight against terrorism."[34] A similar emphasis has been made by the United Nations General Assembly which, further to commending efforts at civilizational dialogue as part of a consistent strategy against terrorism,[35] reaffirmed the "Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations" and welcomed the "Initiative of the Alliance of Civilizations" announced by the Secretary-General on 14 July 2005.[36]

It is of crucial importance not to confuse the United Nations' references to the "fight against terrorism" with the United States' "global war on terror"—in view of what agenda is subsumed to the latter by its main protagonist. The United Nations Organization must not sacrifice the commitment to mutual respect among all religions and civilizations, resulting from the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and its system of collective security[37] for the sake of accommodating the most influential permanent member in the Security Council. For this reason, the terminology has to be chosen very carefully and the nexus between issues of civilization on the one hand and terrorism on the other must not be construed in a simplistic manner.

Under the conditions of hegemonial rule, "civilization"—in the sense of an emphasis on the supposedly superior values of a singular civilization—has become the prime instrument for commanding obedience to, that is, for stabilizing the international system. The decision-makers in the West are well aware that the long-term sustainability of today's global order—as a system of power relations controlled by one major player—depends on the success of the self-declared civilizational mission of the Western world's predominant power.

The underlying strategy, carefully draped with references to the universality and trans-cultural nature of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, is one of the Western civilization absorbing all "competing" civilizational identities, particularly that of Islam with its alternative world view and anthropology. The global discourse enacted in connection with the West's—more specifically: the United States'—ongoing "restructuring effort" in the Middle East has brought about a climate of public opinion in which other civilizations are deprived of their self-esteem, only being accepted insofar as they are prepared to define—or redefine—themselves and reorganize their hierarchy of values according to the codex of the dominant civilization. The *definitional power*, that is, the effective capability to set the civilizational criteria and identify the *fundamental* values of each civilization, rests with the dominant one. Implicitly, other, potentially competing, world views, with differing value systems, are treated as "lesser" civilizations and denied their right to recognition—unless they accept being "reinvented" on the basis of Western values which are, *ex cathedra*, declared as universal.

(III)

This Eurocentric strategy, paired with cultural arrogance which resembles that of the former colonial rulers vis-à-vis their subjects, not only negates what we have characterized as the dialectic of cultural—or civilizational—self-comprehension and self-realization,[38] but threatens the

stability of the very order the dominant powers are publicly committed to.

As long as the dominant civilization—the one that has acquired the largest potential in terms of economic, military, and informational power—insists on a *definitional privilege*, claiming for itself the exclusive right to set the standards by which the "moral legitimacy" of a given civilization is being measured, the world will be confronted with the prospect of a state of permanent confrontation. It may be accurate, as Bernard Lewis argues, that "[e]very dominant civilization has imposed its own modernity in its prime" and that in "every area of human history, modernity, or some equivalent term [such as human rights, democracy /H.K.], has meant the ways, norms, and standards of the dominant and expanding civilization."[39] However, the qualitative difference between the present and earlier such constellations lies in the *global* outreach of the dominant civilization, with a military potential including arms of mass destruction the use of which has been threatened recently by a Western leader. In our era of globality,[40] the unilateral insistence on unified "civilizational standards" breeds a climate of a "clash of civilizations" that may not be containable within the confines of merely "cultural" disputes—although everyone, at least in declarations for public consumption, tries to distance himself from this confrontational scheme.

The threat to world order as such will only disappear when the predominant global actor ceases to insist on the exemplary nature of its own civilizational model and will give up its strategy of using "civilization" as a tool to de-legitimize different, and potentially competing, worldviews. This implies that the privileged global power will not anymore try to command obedience by "civilizational subordination," that is, will desist from using civilization as instrument of world order. Such an "enlightened" approach requires that civilization will be accepted as a general framework of *world perception* that may be related to different religions and socio-cultural traditions with their specific systems of values and distinct hierarchical order of those values. Under the conditions of a *multipolar* world in terms of civilization,[41] tolerance, on the basis of mutual respect, is the *conditio sine qua non* of peaceful co-existence not only in the cultural, but also in the political sense. A stable and sustainable world order cannot be envisaged outside a framework of multipolarity.

Each civilization has an intrinsic value that cannot be absorbed by another civilization. The acknowledgment that there can be no "lead civilization" is one of the preconditions of world peace in the era of globality. In that regard, the Islamic civilization—like any other—has to be recognized and respected as a world view *sui generis* instead of as a system to be "reinvented" according to criteria formulated within the framework of another civilization. A civilization's inclusion of religion—as an integral part of civilizational identity—must not be dismissed as lack of enlightenment. The Western civilization does not possess the right

to demand from others to follow it on the path of its specific form of secularization nor has it been able to give the philosophical reasons for such a demand.

Any civilization's claim to exclusivity and superiority—in the sense of negating the intrinsic value of other civilizations—is a recipe for war. Such an approach negates the very idea of world order as a system of norms agreed upon—on the basis of mutuality—by states and peoples that represent different civilizations. Only acceptance of this basic truth of peaceful co-existence will assure that agreement on fundamental norms that are common to all civilizations can be reached.

Under the perspective of universal hermeneutics,[42] the contemporary *Islamic renaissance* is to be seen (as would be the case for any other civilization) as an essential contribution to the emergence of a better balanced world order—one that is not exclusively based on a particular civilizational "model" (with all the fragility of political relations and instability of economic exchange that is inherent in this kind of exclusivism). The historical experience with Eurocentrism, in tandem with colonialism, has sufficiently demonstrated the dangers of such an approach to global stability.

Only civilizational multipolarity can bring about a just and stable world order. In this regard, "civilization" must not be instrumentalized as a tool of forcing obedience to a hegemonial power's vision of the world. Civilization is a *constituent part* of world order as such—whereby the latter is understood as being based on norms of human dignity and mutual respect that are the fundament of co-existence between distinct perceptions of the world as represented by different civilizations. In our understanding, this is what is meant and aspired to by the *Alliance of Civilizations* launched in July 2005 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the initiative of Turkey and Spain.[43] Only a radical departure from the notion of "dominant civilization"—with all that this entails in terms of political and military hegemony claimed by a self-defined "indispensable nation"[44] —will prevent permanent confrontation on a global scale. The unipolar approach that instrumentalizes civilization for the purpose of legitimizing hegemonial rule has to give way to the acknowledgment of civilizational multipolarity as precondition of peace. "Civilization" is not an *instrument* of world order, but—as an expression of that order's diversity—*an integral element* of it.

NOTES

1. On the relation between world order and civilization see also Hans Köchler, "The Dialogue of Civilizations and the Future of World Order. The 43rd MSU Foundation Day Address," *Mindanao Journal* Vol. XXVIII (2005), online publication, Mindanao State University, http://www.msumain.edu.ph/mindanaojournal/pdf/mj1_2005.pdf .

2. Cf., *inter alia*, Helmut Dubiel, *Global Civil Society As A Community of Memory*, University of Michigan, Center for European Studies, Conversations on Europe, 5 November 2001, http://www.umich.edu/~iinet/euc/PDFs/2002%20Papers/Dubiel.pdf . For a general description of the tendency in the context of the development of international law, see Sienho Yee, "Towards an International Law of Co-progressiveness," in Sienho Yee, *Towards an International Law of Co-progressiveness* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 1–26.

3. For an analysis of the underlying doctrinary assumptions see Hans Köchler, *Democracy and Human Rights*, Studies in International Relations, XV (Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1990).

4. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, and National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger—Remarks at Town Hall Meeting, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, February 18, 1998. As released by the Office of the Spokesman, February 20, 1998. U.S. Department of State.

5. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*. 3rd ed., Houndmills (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 19.

6. Ibid.

7. Op. cit., 16.

8. Op. cit., 16–18.

9. As far as American-style democracy is concerned, Walter Lippmann has analyzed the social techniques of what he called the "manufacture of consent." Those may now be applied at the global level. (Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion. With a New Introduction by Michael Curtis* New Brunswick [NJ]/London: Transaction Publishers, 1991. Reprint; originally published: New York: Macmillan, 1922.)

10. For details see Hans Köchler, *Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics. Is the Revival of the Doctrine of "Just War" Compatible with the International Rule of Law?* Studies in International Relations, XXVI (Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2001).

11. For details see Hans Köchler, *Democracy and the New World Order*. Studies in International Relations, XIX (Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1993).

12. However, this dichotomy is secularized only up to a certain extent. The phraseology used by the President of the United States ever more frequently, and even more so since the Iraq war of 2003, contains open references to Christian religion.

13. In German sociological terminology "culture" is often understood as totality of a society's knowledge, religious beliefs, expressions of art, etc. The realm of culture is distinguished from the material means by which the respective culture is realized; "civilization" is understood as the sum total of these means, that is, in a mere technical or instrumental sense.

14. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 24.

15. So-called "interventions d'humanité" (humanitarian interventions) were practiced with reference to the supposed civilizational mission of Christianity. For details see Hans Köchler, *The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics*. Studies in International Relations, XXVI (Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2001), 7ff.

16. Consent by dialogue appears to be the expectation of, among others, Martin Coward in his "Tutor's Notes" for the course *Global Politics and Violence*: University of Sussex (UK), Spring Term 2005, Seminar 4, Chapter "Hegemony."

17. Walter Lippmann, op. cit.

18. See also Hans Köchler, "The Dialogue of Civilizations and the Future of World Order. The 43rd MSU Foundation Day Address," loc. cit., 5.

19. The confrontations, since September 2005, between Muslims and Western (European) media and governments over the publishing of cartoons that are defamatory of Islam and Prophet Mohammad have drastically demonstrated this arrogant attitude identifying Islam with terrorism. No one should be surprised if the creation of such enemy stereotypes will further fuel the so-called "clash of civilizations." See the news

release: *International Progress Organization condemns anti-Muslim hate propaganda and calls upon European Union to take a firm stand in defense of the rights of all religious communities*. International Progress Organization, Vienna, 6 February 2006/P/RE/19543c-is.

20. See the lecture by the author: "The Image of Islam in the West." International Workshop "Images of Islam: Terrorizing the Truth," Just World Trust (JUST), Penang, Malaysia, 7 October 1995.

21. See, for instance, Tony Blair's interview for *Newsweek* (3 December 2001) or George W. Bush's comments on Islam made on 16 October 2001. For details see, *inter alia*, Benedict Brogan and Inigo Gilmore, "Blair urges Islam to wrest back 'hijacked' faith," *Daily Telegraph*, London, 2 November 2001; Robin Millard (Agence France Press), "Blair Praises 'Moderate' Islam," *Arab News*, 12 July 2005; Daniel Pipes, "What's True Islam? Not for U.S. to Say," *New York Post*, 26 November 2001; Andrew Davison, "Karol Rove and 'True' Islam," *Common Dreams News Center*, Common-Dreams.org, 22 July 2005.

22. Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, *Special Address on Globalization*. Malaysian Human Rights Day 2005, "Human Rights and Globalization," Kuala Lumpur, 9 September 2005, published at www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10305.htm, last visited 4 February 2006.

23. On the notion of "Euro-Islam" see, *inter alia*, Bassam Tibi's books: *Der Islam und Deutschland. Muslime in Deutschland*. Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2000, and *Europa ohne Identität? Leitkultur oder Wertebeliebigkeit* (Munich: Siedler, 3rd ed. 2002).

24. On the influence of Muslim civilization on the development of the European mind, in particular the European Renaissance, see Hans Köchler, *Muslim-Christian Ties in Europe. Past, Present and Future* (Penang, Malaysia: Citizens International, 2004).

25. Cf. Hans Köchler, "The Clash of Civilizations Revisited," in: Hans Köchler and Gudrun Grabher (eds.), *Civilizations: Conflict or Dialogue?* Studies in International Relations, XXIV (Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1999), 15–24.

26. On the legal aspects of the war on Iraq see Hans Köchler (ed.), *The Iraq Crisis and the United Nations: Power Politics vs. the International Rule of Law. Memoranda and Declarations of the International Progress Organization (1990—2003)*. Studies in International Relations, XXVIII (Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2004).

27. For details see, *inter alia*, Trudy J. Kuehner, "A New Middle East? A Report of FPRI's History Institute for Teachers," *The Newsletter of FPRI's Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education,* Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 2005), Foreign Policy Research Institute, USA, http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/101.200501.kuehner.newmiddleeast.html.

28. On the overall geopolitical implications, see International Progress Organization. Baku, Azerbaijan, 9 November 2001.

29. "U.S. Bans Al-Manar, Says TV Network Backs Terror," *The Washington Post*, 22 December 2004, A04.

30. . Cf. the I.P.O. news release of 6 February 2006, op. cit.

31. On the problematic aspects of the "Barcelona process" see, *inter alia*, Hans Köchler, "U.S.-European Relations and Their Impact on Europe's Policy vis-à-vis the Mediterranean and the Arab World," *IKIM Journal*, vol. 6, no. 2 (July-December 1998): 1-21.

32. According to its statute, the Foundation "will promote the dialogue between cultures" and "knowledge, recognition and mutual respect between the cultures, traditions and values which prevail in the partners." (Objectives and Tasks, Art. 1) Text published by the European Commission at www.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/euromed_foundation/, last visited 3 February 2006. This formulation evidently implies the recognition of each culture's (civilization's) intrinsic value on an *equal* level.

33. On the problem of the definition of terrorism see Hans Köchler (ed.), *Terrorism and National Liberation*. Studies in International Relations, XIII (Frankfurt a.M./Bern/Paris/New York: Peter Lang, 1988). On the question of terrorism and the global order see also Hans Köchler, "The United Nations, the international rule of law and terror-

ism," in: Hans Köchler, *Global Justice or Global Revenge? International Criminal Justice at the Crossroads* (Vienna/New York: Springer, 2003), 321-349.

34. Resolution 1624 (2005) adopted by the Security Council at its 5,261st meeting, on 14 September 2005.

35. United Nations, General Assembly, Draft Outcome Document, 13 September 2005, Art. 82.

36. Loc. cit., Art. 144.

37. On the challenges to the United Nations system of collective security in today's unipolar environment see Hans Köchler (ed.), *The Use of Force in International Relation: Challenges to Collective Security*. Studies in International Relations, XXIX (Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2006).

38. Hans Köchler, *Philosophical Foundations of Civilizational Dialogue. The Hermeneutics of Cultural Self-comprehension Versus the Paradigm of Civilizational Conflict*. International Seminar on Civilizational Dialogue (3rd: 15-17 September 1997: Kuala Lumpur), BP171.5 ISCD. Kertas kerja persidangan/conference papers (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Library, 1997). See also Hans Köchler, *Cultural-Philosophical Aspects of International Cooperation. Lecture held before the Royal Scientific Society, Amman-Jordan*. Studies in International Cultural Relations, II (Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1978).

39. Bernard Lewis, "The West and the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1997): 129.

40. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad has drawn our attention to the intrinsic connection between globalization and a neo-colonial, imperial world order. Speaking about the era of European colonialism, he asked: "Would today's globalisation not result in weak countries being colonised again, new empires created, and the world totally hegemonised?" (Loc. cit.)

41. On the dichotomy between unipolarity in terms of powers relations and multipolarity in terms of civilizations, see Hans Köchler, "The 'Clash of Civilizations': Perception and Reality in the Context of Globalization and International Power Politics," in Felix Kalandarishvili et al. (eds.), *Materials of the Tbilisi International Forum " Globalization and Dialogue between Civilizations "* (Tbilisi, Georgia: International Forum "Globalization and Dialogue between Civilizations," 2004), 62–70.

42. In the context of this paper, we understand hermeneutics in the sense as defined by Hans-Georg Gadamer (*Hermeneutik I: Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 5th ed. 1986). For the application of this method in the field of civilizational dialogue see the author's paper: *Philosophical Foundations of Civilizational Dialogue. The Hermeneutics of Cultural Self-Comprehension versus the Paradigm of Civilizational Conflict*, loc. cit.

43. "Secretary-General announces launch of 'Alliance of Civilizations' aimed at bridging divides between societies exploited by extremists." United Nations, *Press Release*, SG/SM/10004, 14 July 2005.

44. See the statement (February 1998) of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, loc. cit.

THREE

Power in the Analysis of World Orders

Raymond Duvall and Çiğdem Çıdam[1]

Theorists of International Relations expend a great deal of energy in arguments over the primacy of one or another structuring principle. Many realists today rest their entire theoretical analysis on the conviction that the anarchy of the modern states system is singularly foundational.[2] Globalization theorists, whether of Marxian or liberal stripe, often allege that the logic of global capitalism (or, in more conventionally liberal terms, free markets), together with the globally extensive technologies of communication and transportation that are products of and attendant to it, is replacing the anarchy of the sovereign states system with the anarchy of the market.[3] Some liberals see an emergent structure of liberal cosmopolitanism, expressed in such forms as the human rights regime, intensification of international legal jurisdictions, and a vibrant global civil society, as increasingly foundational to world order.[4] And others, mostly critical theorists, such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, argue that a new constitution of sovereignty—"a *decentered* and *deterritorializing* apparatus of rule"[5] which they call Empire—defines a world order of biopolitical production without boundaries. In contrast to these views, we argue that it is desirable for International Relations theorists now to abandon the endless fights over putatively singular foundations, and to recognize instead the mutually constitutive interaction of these—and perhaps others—in producing contemporary world order.

According to our account, the contemporary international system is not easily described, because it is not the product or expression of a single structure. A logic of anarchy is operative; but so too is a logic of global

capitalism, and a logic of liberal cosmopolitanism and humanitarianism, among others. Thus, scholars must acknowledge that today's world order is produced by the simultaneous action and complex interaction of multiple forms of "world ordering" logics. Contemporary world order is not only, or perhaps even primarily, a Westphalian states system of competing sovereignties, although it is that in part. It is also not only or primarily a globalized/globalizing world political-economy sometimes claimed to be undoing the foundations of the Westphalian system, although again it is partly that. Accordingly, if we, as analysts of global politics, are adequately to understand and theorize the world order of our time, it is imperative to move beyond intellectual commitments that tie us to singular conceptions of allegedly foundational principles. We must instead adopt a new perspective that can enable us to see and analyze the mutual constitutive logics of multiple structures.[6]

In this chapter, we attempt to take a small step in that direction by setting up the conceptual framework necessary for such a perspectival change. The need for this conceptual work emerges from two core assumptions: first, that world order is a product—it is socially constituted and produced; it doesn't simply exist exogenously—and that the production of world orders is intimately tied to the production of civilizations, which are part and parcel of those orders. Second, that social construction is an on-going, open-ended process always defined and shaped by relations of power. The first of these assumptions, that is, the claim that world orders and civilizations are not "natural," or "pre-given," essential categories that merely denote what exists "out there," compels attention to the social processes through which world orders are constituted and produced. The second assumption points to the necessity of addressing the basis and implications of power as an essentially contested complex concept.

We address those two tasks in turn. Specifically, the chapter proceeds first with a brief discussion on world orders and civilizations. In this section, working through our conception of multiple world ordering logics we highlight how and to what effect the social production of world orders and civilizations relate to one another. The second part of the paper brings to light the complexity of the concept of power by focusing on its essentially contested character. In this section, through a critical analysis of the existing literature on multiple conceptions of power, we propose to re-think power as a structural concept whose core meaning is, to borrow as phrase form Jacques Derrida, constituted as "indeterminacy."

WORLD ORDERS AND CIVILIZATIONS AS PRODUCTS OF POWER

If the contemporary world order is not simply given to us by nature—if it is not a natural fact but is instead a product of social relations and social processes—then our ability to theorize it adequately, to comprehend its form, its genesis, its reproduction and/or transformation, and its effects is dependent on the ways in which we see and understand those productive relations and processes. In an important respect, all socially productive processes operating through social relations and affecting the capacities of social subjects are matters of power, because power, in the most general and abstract terms, "is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate," and "the conditions of their existence."[7] It is for this reason we suggest that above everything else theorizing contemporary world orders requires an inquiry into the question of how *power* is to be seen, understood, and analyzed as it operates in the production of world orders.

If the discipline of International Relations[8] is to effectively understand and explain the inseparably linked processes of making and production of the worlds that people inhabit (world orders) and people's conditions of existence and modes of being in those worlds (civilizations),[9] International Relations scholars need to see the complex interconnections of the workings of multiple types (or concepts) of power. In order to be able to discern the workings of different types of power, however, it is necessary to work through a series of conceptual questions. For instance, what are the multiple types of power? In what ways are they different from each other? How and to what effect do they interact?

In an attempt to build on and extend the contributions of Stefano Guzzini[10] and others[11] who have led the recent charge to improve theoretic sophistication of the study of power in international relations, Michael Barnett and one of the current authors have argued for recognizing the importance of employing in analysis multiple types (or concepts) of power.[12] Influenced by the literature on the so-called "four faces" of power[13] but somewhat discontented by its relatively unsystematic conceptual development,[14] Barnett and Duvall have addressed these questions by arguing that four concepts of power should be systematically distinguished and analyzed in relation to one another.[15] The four concepts that comprise their taxonomy derive from the conjunction of two dichotomous dimensions of the social relations through which social subjects are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their conditions of existence. One dimension concerns the *kind* of social relation (interaction versus constitution), and juxtaposes relations of interaction through which subjects differentially exercise control over one another to relations of social constitution of differentially empowered subjects. The other dimension concerns the *specificity* of social relations in either direct

or diffuse forms. On the basis of those two analytical dimensions the taxonomy distinguishes: (1) social *interactions* through which one subject *directly* exercises control over another, which is *compulsory power*; (2) socially *diffuse* or mediated *interactions* of control over subjects, which is *institutional power*; (3) social *constitution* of subjects who are differentially empowered in *direct relation* to each other, which is *structural power*; and (4) socially *diffuse* relations of *constitution* of subjects with differential social capacities, which is *productive power*.

This taxonomy of different forms of power is helpful not only because it introduces a high degree of conceptual clarity but also because it has considerable analytical utility. Working in its terms, theorists of the production of world orders and/or of their consequences for civilizations can begin to inquire systematically into how each of the four types of power simultaneously operates within and through the multiple world ordering logics constitutive of contemporary world orders and civilizations. How are, for instance, compulsory and institutional power conjointly implicated in the workings of "American empire" in producing world order? How is that imperial world ordering logic sustained and/or challenged through the linked operations of structural and productive power? Or, recognizing the complexity with which this paper began, how do the conjunctions of institutional or structural power operate in the context of and through the mutually interactive relationships between the world ordering logics of humanitarian global governance and bio-political rule of Empire in global capitalism? All of these are crucially important questions and must be carefully addressed if we are to have an adequate understanding of the production and consequences of contemporary world order as a complex totality of multiple world orders and civilizations.

If contemporary world order is, as we have argued at the outset, a product of the interactions among at least the three structural, or world ordering logics of Empire, (American) empire, and global governance, then our analytic frameworks must permit us to see the productive effects of the simultaneous existence and dynamic interaction of all of the different types of power. Across the three world orders, the four forms of power identified in the typology presented in this section play central roles.

Liberal humanitarian global governance, which is considered to be the outgrowth of an unprecedented increase in the number of intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, is in many respects a project of governmentality, taken to the global scale. As such it pivots on diffuse forms of power, that is, on productive and institutional power, particularly in their disciplinary and bio-political expression. It is the contemporary international manifestation, par excellence, of what Foucault was concerned about at the scale of national societies three decades ago when he directed his readers attention to the political significance of the emer-

gence of a complex, new form of power which takes the form of managing of a population—conceived as "a mass of living and coexisting beings"—through the production of a set of subjects.[16]

By contrast, American empire, as extension and projection of sovereign power, pivots most basically on compulsory power, which is central to its (re)production, exercised sometimes brutally and nakedly (as the United States' current worldwide use of drones in "targeted killings" as a part of the so-called "war on terror" powerfully demonstrates) and other times more subtly under the guise of so-called "soft power" (as it is the case in its rhetorical support for "democracy" and "free trade").[17] Nevertheless, as Barnett and Duvall have already argued, American empire depends on all four forms of power.[18] The United States sustains its dominance in international affairs by having recourse institutional as well as compulsory power. That is to say, even though compulsory power plays a crucial role in the U.S. attempt to directly shape others' actions, the United States, which has been the primary beneficiary of global institutions, still exercises control over other states through indirect institutional means. At the same time, however, the United States is "the imperial center" which is "structurally constituted and discursively produced through a complex of imperial relations that are not themselves fully under the control of U.S. state as actor."[19]

Finally, Empire rests on constitutive forms of power, of both socially diffuse (productive power) and directly relational (structural power) forms. Empire is a bio-political regime of rule, and as such is a system of productive power, which permeates into every aspect of social life and extends throughout the depths of consciousness and bodies of the population producing and reproducing new figures of subjectivity.[20] As a bio-political regime the world ordering logic of Empire is closely related to the logic of humanitarian global governance. At the same time, however, it is distinct from humanitarian global governance in also being a regime of rule tied to the now global system of relations of production; it is an expressly capitalist system of rule, and as such is based in the structurally constituted subject positions in relations of production—structural power, conjoined with productive power, is its defining character.

Thus, in our analysis of the production of world orders, we must be prepared to see the crucially important workings of each of compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive power. The contemporary world order is very much shaped by the conjoined operations of many forms of power within and through the production of multiple world orders. And it is in this sense we conclude that there is no single structuring logic and no particular type of power that is determinative of the world in which we now live, nor of the world orders that are yet to come.

Just as contemporary world order is not easily described, so too are the "civilizations" resident within and conjointly productive of it not readily identified. If, by civilizations, reference is to totalities of socially

organized and socially meaningful ways of being—the relatively enduring, institutionalized systems of signification in terms of which people interpret and make sense of their world—then it must be acknowledged, we believe, that the boundaries distinguishing one from another today, more so than ever, are somewhat porous and fluid. Such socially encompassing, institutionalized systems of signification affect one another, particularly as they co-exist in relation to one another in the production of world orders. That is, civilizations are not static, fixed, primordial units out of which world order is composed—Samuel Huntington and the U.S. Defense Department's (the Pentagon's) "map of the world" are wrong in treating them as such. Instead, civilizations are products of the operation of world-ordering logics, and, hence, are always potentially changing, at the same time that they are the sites and sources of the power dynamics through which those world-ordering logics work. Civilizations in relation to one another are simultaneously makers of and made by world orders.

In saying this, we are not claiming that the contemporary world is an un-textured, entirely fluid context of freely floating signifiers. The argument here is not that there are no civilizational differences of importance today. Pluralities of modes of society characterize our time; we do not want to dispute that. Indeed, as post-colonial theorists compellingly remind us, it is only the destructive arrogance of colonial discourse at work that enables some to fail to acknowledge that everyone is not just like "us" (i.e., sharing "our" hopes and aspirations, sharing with us the bases of judgment and evaluation, etc.), differentiated solely by resource endowments, capacities, and levels of achievement. One does a terrible injustice, and risks considerable peril, if s/he proceeds with assumptions that refuse to see profound differences across civilizations. The erasure of difference is as wrong—both ethically and theoretically—as is the view of civilizations as fixed, static, well-bounded entities along whose borders "clashes" are ineluctable. The challenge for theorists of world orders, then, is to resist the temptation to sidestep differences while developing the necessary conceptual tools to grasp the fluidity of civilizations as makers and markers of the multiple world ordering logics.

Consider the following example: On May 25, 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan surprised many of his listeners when he suggested that "every abortion is a murder."[21] In doing so, the Prime Minister not only opened the door to a debate that many feminists in Turkey considered to be over since the legalization of abortion in 1983, but also, and more importantly, supported his position through a set of arguments imported from, of all places, United States' Christian right. The pro-life slogan "abortion is murder" has hardly ever received any attention in conservative circles in Turkey before, mainly because as Seyla Benhabib argues "Islam, like Judaism, gives priority to the mother's life and health over that of the fetus."[22] In the same speech, Prime Minis-

ter Erdoğan also argued against the increasing numbers of C-section births, this time, however, he borrowed his arguments from the "alternative birth movement" of second wave feminists, who have struggled against the medicalization of birth in North America and Europe since the late 1970s by advocating "natural" birth.[23] This unexpected hybridization of very different intellectual and political traditions, that is, the tradition of moderate political Islam, of North American Christian Right, and that of a particular strand of feminism, in Prime Minister Erdoğan's speech is crucial because it demonstrates both the porous boundaries of civilizations and the multiple meanings of the same signifier, for instance "natural birth," in different civilizational contexts. While an adequate analysis of Turkish government's current reproductive policies requires an inquiry into the workings of compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive power within the contemporary global context, an example such as this also points to the possible shortcomings of such a taxonomy of different forms of power.

While the taxonomy of four concepts of power does help us to come to terms with the complexity of the concept of power by pointing to its multiple meanings, in its quest for clarity and logical rigor, such a taxonomy at the same time runs the risk of undermining that very complexity that it demonstrates so well in the first place. Put differently, by the virtue of being a taxonomy, which aims to provide a useful tool to navigate within the contested conceptual terrain of power, four faces of power, perhaps inadvertently, can itself become a means to "resolve" the ambiguity of power by attempting to fix its meaning once and for all. To that extent, an unreflective appropriation of the four faces of power, which takes the conceptual distinctions among different faces of power to be rigid and stable, for the purposes of analyzing world orders and civilizations can lead to an oversimplified account despite its emphasis on the contested nature of the concept of power.

In many ways, it is now almost commonplace to acknowledge that power is an essentially contested concept. Few treatments of the concept in recent years fail to note and comment on that contested condition. Perhaps even fewer, however, go much beyond that to grapple with either the *bases* or the *implications* of power's essentially contested character; most, instead, acknowledge the conceptual contestation and then move ahead with the analysis of a preferred conceptual form.[24] For this reason, we suggest that perhaps one of the most important challenges facing the theorists and analysts of power in contemporary international relations remains precisely to address those bases and implications. Only after such an analysis, which uncovers the bases and implications of the multiple meanings of power, can we benefit from four faces of power as a way to adequately comprehend the complexity of the production of world orders.

BEYOND FOUR FACES: POWER AS "UNDECIDABLE"

Despite being essentially contested, power is also, at least implicitly, recognized to have a common core of meaning. To put it in Stefano Guzzini's words, this is necessary because—as it is the case with many other rich concepts of political vocabulary—"Otherwise communication would not work."[25] That meaningful communication is possible, however, does not suggest that the common core is an unambiguous abstraction, that is, a more or less simple but broad definition. Reducing the core meaning of power to a broad definition, which is more or less universally agreed upon in a given linguistic community, would, albeit mistakenly, imply that the meaning of the concept is stable. Contrary to this, we suggest that the core of power's meaning is constituted and marked by a structural indeterminacy. In what follows, drawing on Derrida's discussion of indeterminacy, we will propose to think of the core meaning of power as a malleable unity of two supposedly distinct opposed meanings, namely power as a capacity of becoming and power as productive of effects. We will, then, argue that these two "poles" of meaning can never be understood within the terms of a pure binary opposition; the opposing terms, as we will see, not only presuppose one another but also are deeply implicated in each other. It is, for this very reason, possible to suggest that power is, using Derrida's words, undecidable. None of this means that analysts of power are doomed to a lack of conceptual clarity. It rather suggests that whenever we work on power and employ the concept in our analysis of social relations we are compelled to make a decision. In our concluding remarks, we will explore the ethical and political implications of such a decision within the field of academic research.

To use a term coined by Derrida, power is undecidable, much like Plato's *pharmakon* is in his analysis of *Phaedrus*. In a highly complex deconstruction, Derrida highlights the "malleable unity" of *pharmakon* as simultaneously poison and remedy.[26] Since *pharmakon* can mean both remedy and poison, it opens up the way to a condition of undecidability, which involves vacillation between the poles of a thing and its opposite. For Derrida, within a particular context this condition, that is to say, the fact that the same word can embody two opposing meanings, compels a decision—thus, for instance, while translating Plato's dialogue from ancient Greek to English, the translator inevitably finds herself in a position to choose one opposing meaning of *pharmakon* over the other one. Such a decision, however, can never fix the meaning of the word once and for all. This is because the opposing meaning, although erased, always leaves a trace. And this trace constitutes the basis of the instability of the decision, thereby sustaining the endless vacillation. That instability, that is to say, the fact that although the meaning of a concept can be stabilized, it can never be completely fixed, however, is not a sign of arbitrariness. As Camil Ingureanu puts it with exceptional clarity "undecidability as the

precondition of decision" derives from a "double bind" namely the requirement to follow already established *general* norms and rules in a *particular* case without having any guarantees of "mediation and ultimate foundations" at one's disposal.[27]

The core meaning in use of power is similarly undecidable/indeterminate in being simultaneously potentiality (capacity of becoming) and effective cause (productive of effects).[28] To put it differently, power is simultaneously counter factual and factual, the thing and its opposite. This irreducibly indeterminate, or undecidable, character underlies and animates many, perhaps most, of the debates about power in IR. Similar to Derrida's suggestion, analysts of power in IR seem compelled to (unstable) decision, always vacillating between the poles of the binary, sometimes focusing on power as effective cause in the production of effects, and sometimes as potentiality. It is almost as if we are caught in an endless swinging back and forth between a tendency to choose one or the other: influence versus capabilities, power as control versus power as constitution, power over versus power to, actual versus latent power, active versus inactive power, power as factual versus power as counter factual. While pointing to power's undecidable character in such stark terms, these either-or battles, at time same, also signal a failure in coming to grips with the irreducibly indeterminate core meaning in use, which includes both poles simultaneously.

As Derrida's analysis of *pharmakon* suggests, the poles, which constitute the malleable unity of a concept, can never be separated from each other in a clear and total way; their meaning is never pure since one always involves the trace of the other. For Derrida, the structure of language, which generates binary oppositions such as inside-outside, male-female, good-evil, etc., at the same time constantly undermines the view that such oppositions are composed of pure poles distinguished from one another through a single, invisible, clean line. Plato's *pharmakon* illustrates this point in utmost clarity. For indeed, what is used as poison in one instance can simultaneously be the remedy for another condition; similarly drugs, which are used to overcome an illness, do at the same time have poisonous effects. The same is true for power as well.

Causal effectivity, that is, the production of certain effects, which is not expressive of underlying potentiality is not power—it is accident, or fate, or luck. Conversely, potentiality, that is, the capacity of becoming, which can *never* be actualized in effective cause isn't power—it is pure abstraction, a logical proposition that is literally beyond political imaginary.[29] Given the ambiguity of the concept of power and the fluidity, as well as the impurity of the poles that are constitutive of it, the challenge that we, as analysts of power, face seems to be the following: How can scholars of International Relations analyze power without losing sight of its indeterminate core? Or to put it differently, in what ways can we undertake an analysis of power without attempting to "master" the am-

biguity of its meaning by way of choosing one pole over the other in the hopes that we can fix its meaning once and for all?

What is at stake here is not to find a way to avoid making a choice or to try to push the moment of decision to an indeterminable future. That would be a goal that is impossible to achieve; in order to act, and in our case to analyze power, we need to decide. In fact, whenever we use a particular conception of power we do make a decision and inevitably choose one pole over the other. That moment of decision is inescapable.[30] As Derrida reminds us, the undecidable "is not merely the oscillation between two significations"; it is at the same time the difficult experience of coming to a decision in the absence of a list of pre-given rules and procedures.[31] A decision is not a "programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process,"[32] it is rather an act in "in the night of . . . non-rule."[33] Since it does not rely on any pre-given rules, a decision is a totally indeterminate and hence free act undertaken by a free individual, who is in no way constrained by existing norms and rules.

Such an act, which emanates from the experience of undecidability, by the virtue of the fact that it requires one to go beyond the given norms, necessarily has ethico-political repercussions. Those repercussions, however, can never be fully determined at the moment of decision. This lack of knowledge, however, does not exonerate the person who makes a decision of responsibility. Quite the contrary, the risk that decision-making involves constitutes the "sole condition of possibility of a decision" without which "there would neither responsibility nor ethics, neither right nor politics."[34] This is because, unlike what is the case in the blind application of a pre-given set of norms, where the outcomes are more or less expected and the burden of responsibility lies on the norms that are being applied rather than on the individual who merely applies them, a decision taken by a free individual brings with "a responsibility that is personal and which cannot be taken up by others."[35] It is precisely for this reason that Derrida constantly differentiates his conception of decision from a conception that theorizes it as an arbitrary, voluntaristic act that is immune to ethical considerations. For Derrida, decision is not about "deciding anything at any moment." Thus, he argues, "One must know as much as possible, one must deliberate, reflect, let things mature. But, however long these process lasts, however careful one is in the theoretical preparation of the decision, the instant of the decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the person taking the decision not know everything."[36]

The close connection between concepts such as ethics, politics, responsibility, and decision in Derrida's account of undecidability implies that the stakes in analyzing power without losing sight of its indeterminate core are much higher than one might think in the first place. In fact, in the light of the discussion above it is possible to argue that every time we use

a particular conception of power, we make an ethico-political decision and that the ignorance of this fact is deeply problematic. By failing to acknowledge that in our accounts we always *decide* to utilize one particular conception over the others, we fail to come to terms with the complexity, and multiple meaning of the phenomena that we try to analyze through the concept of power. In doing so, we also lose our ability to recognize the ethical and political effects of the conception of power that we choose to deploy in our analysis. Our challenge, then, is to think of power in such a way that we can *both* take into account its malleable unity *and* be ready to take full responsibility of the ethico-political effects of our decision to make use of a particular conception of power in our analysis.

We think that this challenge calls for theorizing power as potentiality actualized—but never fully, always remaining additional capacity for becoming, *and* power as effective cause expressive of potentiality, but never fully so. Such a theoretical approach can help us to analyze power in its full complexity, that is, without ignoring its undecidable core, which constitutes it as an ambiguous unity. It also requires us to critically scrutinize those instances when analysts of power think of the concept of power on the basis of oppositions as such and attempt to overcome the ambiguity of power by turning the task of theorizing power into a "conversion problem" between potentiality and effective cause. The importance of this theoretical endeavor becomes clear when taking into account the fact this recourse to "conversion problem" is a common practice among many IR scholars, who, as Guzzini powerfully argues, encounter a dilemma: "faced with the difficulties of pinning down a concept, scholars decide to go for its more easily operationalisable aspects, but they thereby incur the risk of neglecting its most significant aspects, thus voiding the concept of the very significance . . . which it had . . . in the first place."[37]

What this means in practice is that many IR scholars attempt to capture the simultaneously potential and actualized character of power through analysis of actors' resources and attributes and their episodic deployment in behavioral influence or control. The indeterminate relationship that is power simultaneously as potentiality and effective cause is thus simplified and turned into a question of, "how are certain actor attributes and recourses converted into effective cause?" The theoretical imaginary is thereby restricted to a particular (and narrow) picture of the social and political world of power. A restricted theoretical imaginary of this kind, which reduces the role of political analysis to finding ever more efficient ways to convert one form of power to another, prevents us from grasping the complexity of the phenomena that we try to analyze through our conception of power.

The ethico-political effects of this theoretical move are important. For by relegating politics to a technical problem of conversion and by redefining the role of political scientist as a technical expert, such a theoretical

account not only puts a limit on our political imaginary but also aims to divest the political scientist from taking on the responsibility of her/his theoretical decision by covering up its political implications. This is especially important today given the degree to which, as Christopher Norris pointedly puts forward, "every academic discipline is compromised by 'outside' interests, by its resources of funding (direct or indirect), its relationship with other disciplines, or its possible long-term application in fields far beyond its original research-domain."[38] Such circumstances, as Derrida reminds us, makes it more difficult than ever to "distinguish between scholars and technicians."[39] For Derrida, rather than generating a nostalgic yearning for those times, which were characterized by a supposedly pure scholarly enterprise, this further blurring of the boundaries demonstrates that the search for truth has never been a purely "disinterested" endeavor. In doing so, it also creates an urgent demand for a more reflective scholarly practice that critically engages with its own efforts of "furthering the interests of truth and justice."[40] A self-critical approach of this kind involves both a willingness to take responsibility of the—at times unintended and unexpected—political implications of one's scholarly decisions and a cognizance of the necessity to directly engage with issues and conflicts that exist in the wider socio-political sphere.

With these considerations in mind, we opt for a new approach to the study of power, which aims for a conceptual rethinking of power so as to grasp its multiple significations without ignoring its indeterminate core and without shying away from the ethico-political responsibility that it necessarily entails. This does not mean that we should totally discard the taxonomy of four faces of power. Nor does it mean that we cannot systematically analyze different forms of power. The analytical utility of distinguishing compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive forms of power in analyzing world orders is undeniable. It is for this very reason we decided to deploy that taxonomy in our analysis of world orders while highlighting the crucial point that power is in any of its forms indeterminate. In other words, our goal here is not to create a new taxonomy by adding new dimensions to four faces of power. It is rather forcing us to inquire into how one can think about coercive, productive, institutional, or structural power without foreclosing the indeterminacy that constitutes power simultaneously as potentiality (capacity of becoming) and effective cause (productive of effects). For indeed, acknowledging that indeterminacy is essential if we aim to explore the simultaneous operation of four different forms of power in producing world orders and civilizations and to analyze the effects of their dynamic interplay in an adequate way.

NOTES

1. Initially prepared for presentation at the International Symposium "Civilizations and World Orders" organized by the Center for Global Studies at the Foundation for Sciences and Arts in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 12-14, 2006.

2. See, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999); John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 2001); Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

3. See, for example, Danielle Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Köhler, *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999); Robert Cox, *Production Power and World Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Thomas Friedman, *Lexus and the Olive Tree,* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1999); Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Global Governance* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995).

4. See, for example, John Boli and George Thomas, *Constructing World Culture: International Non-Governmental Organizations since 1875* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999); Andrew Linklater, *Transformation of Political Community* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998); John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, Evan Schofer, Gili S. Drori, *Science in the Modern World Polity: Institutionalization and Globalization,* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003); Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law in a World of Liberal States," *European Journal of International Law*, 6 (1995): 503-38.

5. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), xii.

6. It is tempting here to invoke Althusser's concepts of overdetermination and structured totality, but we will refrain from doing so for two reasons. First, the abstractness of those concepts calls for more extended explication than is sensible in this paper, which concerns conceptual tools for analysis of the concrete reality of contemporary world orders, rather than the explication of abstract concepts per se. Second, Althusser has been nearly entirely discredited over the past three decades; while we believe strongly that that is an unfortunate development because it results in the dismissal of some extremely important conceptual and theoretical insights, we are not prepared to devote extensive space in this paper to engage in the intellectual battles necessary to resuscitate some of his contributions.

7. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," *International Organization* 59 (2005): 42.

8. We refer to the academic discipline as International Relations (capital letters), and to the subject matter to which it refers as international relations (lower case letters).

9. Here it is crucial to note that the distinction that we introduce between "world orders" and "civilizations," does not lend itself to a view that posits an irreducible distinction between material and ideational factors. To put it differently, as our discussion of multiple forms of power will make it clear, in our account "world orders" is not a term that simply refers to the material conditions of living, just as "civilizations" is not a term that only refers to the cultural differences among peoples.

10. Stefano Guzzini, *On the Measure of Power and Power of Measure in International Relations* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009).

11. See, for example, the special issue on the analysis of power in international relations, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 33, no. 3 (2005).

12. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in Global Governance" in *Power in Global Governance*, eds. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press, 2005) and Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," 39-75.

13. Peter Digeser, "The Fourth Face of Power," *Journal of Politics*, 54 (1992): 977-1007.

14. The several "faces" of power were developed separately, in critical reaction to the putative inadequacies of previously identified "faces." As a result, the lines of distinction are rather ad hoc. A systematic conceptual typology does not exist in the form of clearly explicated conceptual dimensions according to which the four types are distinguished.

15. Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics."

16. Michel Foucault, "Security, Territory and Population," in *The Essential Foucault*, eds. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New York, London: The New Press, [1978] 2003), 262.

17. See Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

18. Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics."

19. Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," 66.

20. Hardt and Negri, *Empire,* 23-4.

21. Didem Ünal and Dilek Cindoğlu, "Reproductive citizenship in Turkey: Abortion Chronicles," *Women's Studies International Forum,* 38 (2013), 22.

22. Seyla Benhabib, "Turkey's Authoritarian Turn," *New York Times,* June 3, 2013, accessed December 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/opinion/turkeys-authoritarian-turn.html?_r=0. As Azer Binnet makes it clear, it is precisely because of Islam's emphasis on family planning and mothers' health that the most restrictive abortion laws in the Middle East today have their origins not in Islamic law but in European jurisprudence of the nineteenth century—as a relic of their colonial past (see Azer Binnet, "Kürtaja Gittik, Döneceğiz," *Radikal,* June 6, 2012, accessed December 2, 2013, http://www.radikal.com.tr/radikal2/kurtaja_gittik_donecegiz-1090118.)

23. See Katherine Beckett, "Choosing Cesarian: Feminism and the politics of childbirth in the United States," *Feminist Theory,* 6 (2005): 251-275.

24. Certainly there are some who *do* grapple with the contested character of power. In quite different ways, for example, Stefano Guzzini, Ned Richard Lebow, and Steven Lukes do so in their articles in 2005's special issue of *Millennium* devoted to power (see Steven Lukes, "Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds," *Millennium,* 33 (2005): 477-494; Stefano Guzzini, "The Concept of Power: a Constructivist Analysis," *Millennium,* 33 (2005): 495-522; and Ned Richard Lebow, "Power, Persuasion and Justice," Millennium, 33 (2005): 551-582).

25. Guzzini, "The Concept of Power," 503.

26. Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination,* trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 71.

27. Camil Ungureanu, "Derrida on Free Decision: Between Habermas´ Discursivism and Schmitt´s Decisionism," *The Journal of Political Philosophy,* 16 (2008): 317.

28. In using the term "effective cause" we are not operating on the basis of a particular conception of teleology, which reduces potentiality to a post-facto explanation of change. In such an account one can talk about potentiality *only* in terms of the antecedent of what has already come into being. Contrary to this deterministic view, and in line with Aristotle according to whom "what is potential can both be and not be" (See Aristotle, *The Metaphysics,* trans. Hugh Lawson-Trancred [London: Penguin Classics 1999], 1050b10), we think of potentiality as present, even in the absence of its actualization. In doing so, using Giorgio Agamben's words, we reject the idea that "potentiality exists only in the act" and thereby "affirm the autonomous existence of potentiality" Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereignty and Bare Life,* trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 44-45. To put it differently, in our account potentiality is able "*not* to pass over into actuality," for potentiality is "constitutively… potentiality *not to be"* (ibid). The significance of this discussion will become clear later on in the chapter.

29. We call this "pure abstraction" because although—as it is mentioned earlier—potentiality is always and simultaneously a potentiality to be and not to be, to suggest that something can *never* be actualized requires a degree of certainty that can only be *assumed* in a purely logical argumentation. One can, of course, think that it is highly unlikely that a certain capacity of becoming can be actualized. In that case, potentiality to be might become nothing other than "a mystical source of hope," or a "matter of faith," which can still be productive of effects. For instance, such a conception may become a part of political imaginary. One can think about the idea of "total revolution" in these terms.

30. We can further elaborate this point through an example that has been mentioned earlier on: The translator of the *Phaedrus* has to make a decision when he translates *pharmakon* as poison or as drug. As a result of this decision we, as the readers, will surely lose some of the complexity of the text but this does not mean that such a decision is avoidable. It rather means that both the translator and the reader who is responding to the translator's work need to acquire an awareness of the fact each translation involves a decision, which has unexpected effects on our understanding and reception of the meaning of the text in question.

31. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: 'The Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" in *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, eds. Drucilla Cornell and Michael Rosenfeld (New York: Routledge, 1992), 24.

32. Ibid.

33. Derrida, "Force of Law," 26.

34. Jacques Derrida, "Deconstructions: The Im-possible," in *French Theory in America*, eds. Sylvere Lotringer and Sande Cohen (New York: Routledge, 2001), 27.

35. Ungureanu, " "Derrida on Free Decision," 316.

36. Jacques Derrida, "Nietzsche and the Machine," in *Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews,* ed. and trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002), 231.

37. Guzzini, "The Concept of Power," 502.

38. Christopher Norris, *Deconstruction and the 'Unfinished Project of Modernity'* (London: The Athlone Press, 2000), 73.

39. Derrida, "Force of Law," 16.

40. Norris, *Deconstruction,* 73.

FOUR

International Society, Cultural Diversity, and the Clash (or Dialogue) of Civilizations

Chris Brown

INTRODUCTION: "CARTOON WARS AND THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS"[1]

Theorists of international relations often look to current affairs in order to illustrate points they wish to make; most of us find it easier to relate to broad theoretical issues if we have some empirical reference point in mind.[2] Students of modern war, sadly, do not usually find it difficult to illustrate their concerns, but international political theorists interested in multiculturalism often have to turn to the inside pages for their illustrations. Not so in February 2006, where the front pages of most papers positively demand an academic commentary. The fracas occasioned by the publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in Denmark in September 2005 and, especially, their re-publication as a gesture of solidarity with Denmark by a number of other European newspapers in late January 2006, dominates the news coverage of even those papers that are not immediately implicated in what is being perceived in the Muslim world as a deliberate insult. The story itself here is of some interest—and will be returned to below—but for the moment what I want to draw attention to is the way in which the trope of a "clash of civilizations" is being so widely employed in the press and other media.[3] Interestingly, after 9/11, the same term was widely employed, but directly attributed to Samuel Huntington, whose work was, for example, described as "uncannily prescient" and reprinted in the (London) *Sunday*

Times on 14 October 2001. This time round the term is being used without reference to its originator, an indicator of the extent to which it has become central to the way in which inter-cultural problems are framed nowadays; it has become a term the meaning of which every one thinks they are familiar with, and so can be used as simple shorthand.

This particular case illustrates the point so well, precisely because the facts of the cartoon wars do not actually fit what is usually seen as the basics of Huntington's article, and yet the term is still widely used. A brief account of these facts of the case may be helpful here; in the summer of 2005, three potential illustrators of a sympathetic account of the Islamic faith written for children in Denmark turned down the commission because the author wished for there to be a portrait of the Prophet on the cover and they believed they would be in danger were they to oblige. The editor of the largest circulation Danish newspaper, the right-wing *Jyllands-Posten*, thinking this an interesting story and in order to explore the limits of freedom of speech, commissioned a number of cartoonists to draw caricatures including the Prophet, and published them on 30 September 2005. Some of the cartoons were quite pointed, but the real offence seems to have been the defiance of the universal Islamic ban on making representations of the Prophet.[4] This led to simmering low-level protests by the Muslim community in Denmark and elsewhere, until in January 2006 it was taken up by Islamic clergy in the Middle East, leading to widespread demonstrations and boycotts of Danish products in the region. There is some reason to believe that this outrage was, at least in part, manufactured; several months ago the cartoons had been republished in Egypt (by the newspaper *Al-Fager* on 17 October 2005) without arousing such protests. In any event, at this point a number of other continental European newspapers printed the cartoons as gestures of solidarity with the Danes, leading to further demonstrations—and some other news outlets then showed the cartoons in order to explain to their readers or viewers what the fuss was about, thereby leading to even more demonstrations.[5] The death toll is currently in excess of one hundred. Meanwhile, a Teheran newspaper decided to test the commitment to free speech of the West by running a competition to find the best cartoons on the Holocaust.[6]

The point about this sequence of events is that it contradicted the usual reading of Huntington's thesis in two ways. In the first place, this was not a conflict that was taking place on the borders of the Islamic world, in areas such as Bosnia, Chechnya, or Kashmir identified by him as the sites of future clashes, but rather in the heartlands of European and Islamic culture. Second, neither "civilization" spoke with one voice. A ferocious argument has broken out in Europe as to whether the Danish newspaper was right to publish the cartoons and others to support it; governments have generally condemned the decision in practice while supporting the principle of freedom of speech, Christian church leaders

have, almost without exception, condemned publication, and editorial page pundits and bloggers have been quite evenly divided on the issue. In the Islamic world freedom of the press is less apparent and so divisions of opinion are not as easy to spot, but a Jordanian newspaper editor very bravely argued that Islam was more deeply insulted by the spectacle of Islamic militants beheading the innocent in Iraq than by the cartoons—admittedly he was sacked for making this point but it is unlikely that he was alone in feeling this way; certainly Islamic gadflies such as Irshad Manji have expressed similar sentiments.

In Britain, a small demonstration of extremists calling for murder and a repetition of the July 7 bombings in London was countered by a much larger, peaceful rally condemning the cartoons but also condemning the violent rhetoric of the extremists. This affair occurred almost simultaneously in the UK with a number of other manifestations of a putative "clash of civilizations." First, there was the statement on the BBC on 3 January by Sir Iqbal Sacranie—an Islamic radical whose leadership of the largely self-appointed and highly political Muslim Council of Britain has been turned into a representative position for all UK Muslims by the Blair government, to the distress of those British Muslims who have a less political view of their faith—to the effect that homosexuality was not acceptable in any form and harmful to society, this in the context of a recent British decision to allow homosexuals to form civil unions. These views were referred to the police under the Public Order Act, and although the Crown Prosecution Service declined to proceed with the case, the issues generated by Sacranie's remarks fed into debates on the government's proposal for a Religious and Racial Hatred Bill, at that time before Parliament. Appeals by Muslim community leaders for toleration of their views on homosexuality were widely regarded as in bad faith, given their own apparent lack of toleration in other respects. Adding further fuel to the fire, the conviction of the radical cleric Abu Hamza for incitement to murder on 7 February was accompanied by a widespread feeling that he had been allowed to carry out his activities for as long as he had because of the establishment's desire to avoid affronting Muslim opinion. Meanwhile, in a kind of counterpoint, two leaders of the British fascist party, the National Front, were acquitted by a jury in Leeds on charges relating to offensive statements about British Muslims allegedly likely to stir up racial hatred; the acquittals were probably on the basis that the remarks amounted to preaching to the converted since they were made at a small, secretly filmed, party meeting, but the underlying sense that ordinary Britons were not prepared to endorse the double standards that official Britain had seemed to come to take for granted was also, no doubt, present.

These events hardly compare to the murder in the Netherlands of Theo Van Gogh on 2 November 2004 or, for that matter to the burning cars in the suburbs of Paris in the summer of 2005, but they do offer some

reasons why the notion of a "clash of civilizations" might have resonance in contemporary Britain. Perhaps the most disturbing news report on these incidents presented on 12 February the results of a poll of 1,600 people conducted for the *Sunday Times* by the respected polling organization *YouGov*. In this poll a predictably high 86 percent regarded the Muslim protests at the cartoons to be a gross overreaction, but much more worrying were the answers to the general question, "Can Muslims in Britain coexist peacefully with other religions?"; 63 percent said no, with only 17 percent saying yes. The same question asked about global coexistence revealed that only 34 percent saw this as possible, while 45 percent disagreed.

All of this suggests very strongly that notions of inter-civilizational clash and dialogue require close attention, certainly when it comes to relationships between the secular West and contemporary Islam, and this necessity becomes even more pressing in the context of other events in the world which, while not "civilizational" as such, certainly add to the sense of crisis. The video footage apparently showing British soldiers beating up Iraqi civilians in Basra two years ago, and the publication of new and horrifying images from Abu Ghraib of a similar vintage raise different issues to the publication of the cartoons because no one in the West defends or excuses the actions involved, but they certainly add to the general atmosphere of mistrust and mutual disregard.

The issue of the cartoons will be returned to at the end of this chapter, but, first, the notion of a clash of civilizations, and its alleged antidote, a dialogue among civilizations, will be examined; it will be argued that neither "clash" nor "dialogue" are useful tropes for examining the relations between cultures unless heavily modified. Instead, the need is to move away from theory-centered reasoning towards a practically minded negotiation of the terms under which co-existence is possible in a world characterized by pluralism and cultural diversity.

NEITHER "CLASH" NOR "DIALOGUE"?

As has been established in the introduction, the "clash of civilizations" is now a term that has entered the political lexicon. It originated in an article with that title by Samuel Huntington in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, subsequently turned into a book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.[7] The burden of Huntington's thesis is that, with the end of the Cold War, a new basis of division has emerged in the world; the ideological conflicts of the past will be replaced by conflicts between "cultures" or civilizations. Huntington identifies as the major contemporary civilizations the Sinic (sic), Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, and Western, with Orthodox and Latin American civilizations as possible derivations of Western civilization with identities of their own, and Africa (perhaps)

making up the list. There is, to put it mildly, a certain element of the *ad hoc* about this, as Huntington concedes. In any event, on his account, there are three civilizations which are likely to generate serious potential problems in the near future—the declining West, the rising Sinic, and the unstable Islamic.

As this formulation might suggest, the first two components go together; economically, demographically, and, ultimately, militarily, the West is losing power to the Asian civilizations and in particular to China (Huntington anticipates that China will come to dominate Japan and that the Japanese are likely to accept, tacitly, a subordinate status). This was, of course, written before the collapse of the Asian economic boom in the late 1990s, but the seemingly inexorable rise of China remains a factor in most people's geo-strategic calculations. Huntington argues that an increasingly successful and powerful China will not accept a world in which its values are regarded as inferior to those of the West and will not accept global socio-economic institutions which limit its possibilities—and he acknowledges that the existing structure of international institutions is indeed a product of Western/American hegemony and reflects Western values. Only by the West adopting a policy of co-existence and recognizing the legitimacy of the Confucian way will violent conflict be avoided between these two civilizations.

Chinese civilization will pose, indeed is posing, problems (particularly for the West but also for Japan) because of its success; the world of Islam will pose, indeed is posing, problems for all its neighbors because of its failure, Huntington argues. Demographic pressures in Islam and the lack of any core Islamic state with the potential of China, or even the "baby tigers" of south-east Asia, will lead to frustrations; moreover, Islam is a proselytizing religion and Islamic civilization has borders with most of the other world civilizations. These borders ("fault-lines") will be, indeed already were in some cases, the site of many cross-civilizational conflicts, from Bosnia and Chechnya to Kashmir and the Sudan. Ending such conflicts may be virtually impossible, certainly is far more difficult that the daunting enough task of promoting co-existence between Chinese and Western civilizations. Such, in a nutshell, was Huntington's argument in 1993/1996.

Academic critics have found it easy to pick holes in Huntington's work, especially the book-length version of his argument, which, precisely because it contains so much more detail is much more open to criticism—broad generalizations which pass muster in the enclosed context of a short article are less tolerable when more space is available. Leaving aside for the moment *ad hominem* criticisms which accuse Huntington of wishing to find a new enemy in order to validate an essentially realist conception of the world, the most basic line of argument has been that Huntington reifies the notion of a civilization. Civilizations are systems of ideas not physical entities; they are not located in physical space and

do not have borders. Moreover, these systems of ideas are not now, nor have they ever been, self-contained or impermeable, a fact that Huntington acknowledges, but the significance of which he, perhaps, underplays. All the great civilizations are now, and always have been, influenced by each other; this is true at a trivial level (chicken tikka marsala, an "Indian" dish unknown on the Sub-Continent has now displaced fish and chips as British comfort food, while the most famous public space in London has a name of Islamic derivation[8]) as well as on a more exalted plane—think of the migration of philosophical concepts backwards and forwards between Mesopotamia, classical Greece, India, the world of Islam, and medieval Christendom. Equally, civilizations themselves are systems of thought that inevitably contain contradictions and defy summary. To take just one example, Amartya Sen has spent much of the last twenty years attempting to undermine the stereotypical account of Indian civilization as a realm of mysticism and spirituality, arguing for the strength of a native Indian rationalist tradition. His recent book *The Argumentative Indian* pulls together his writings on this subject and ought to be compulsory reading wherever civilizational matters are under discussion.[9]

The most important respect in which Huntington reifies civilizations concerns agency. Very obviously, civilizations cannot, in fact, "clash." Equally obviously, individuals and groups claiming to represent civilizations can and do clash, both physically and verbally, but that is not at all the same thing. The key point here is not simply that civilizations, systems of ideas, cannot clash, but rather that neither are they capable of authorizing individuals to clash on their behalf. There are no authentic representatives of civilizations, although there are many who wish to claim this status. To illustrate the point with a parochial example, in the UK the Muslim Association of Britain, the Muslim Council of Britain, Al-Muhajiroun, and numerous other groups all claim the allegiance of Muslims, and there is much controversy as to which of them actually has the most support in the Muslim community—but although an answer to this latter question would have quite a lot of significance politically, it would tell us nothing about who actually represents "Islam" as a civilization, because there is no way in which a system of ideas can authenticate some one or some group to act on its behalf. The Sufi mystic who wants no part in any Islamicist agenda is as authentic (or inauthentic) a voice of Islam as the radicals who wish to re-establish the Caliphate and impose Sharia law universally or the moderates who simply want to make the community's voice heard by official Britain. Civilizations at such cannot be authentically represented.[10]

These arguments have been regarded as quite compelling in academic circles, and there have been relatively few favorable scholarly responses to Huntington's work. On the other hand, as noted in the introduction, the idea of a coming "clash of civilizations," especially as between the

West and Islam, obviously resonates with the general public.[11] This has been especially so since 9/11 and the declaration of a "war on terror" which, however generically framed, has been in practice a war against radical Islam. In effect, the notion of a clash of civilizations has actually shaped the way in which this strange "war" has been understood; by describing the murders of 9/11 as an act of war, rather than as a crime, the U.S. administration actually made it easier for Osama Bin Laden to claim that his group represented a civilization—after all, one does not go to war with a criminal gang. As suggested above, the proposition that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda are actually the authentic voice of Islam can neither be validated nor refuted but the rhetoric of a clash has been powerful nonetheless.

Understandably, those unhappy with this situation—a large group of people—have looked for a different rhetoric, and most have plumped for the idea of a "dialogue" of civilizations. In November 1998 The UN General Assembly proclaimed 2001 as the "United Nations Year of the Dialogue among Civilizations." Islamic leaders were particularly associated with this project. President Muhammad Khatami of Iran was a significant proponent of the notion of dialogue, and the Teheran Declaration on Dialogue among Civilizations of May 1999 was a core document in the UN's thinking on the issue.[12] In 2001 and since, UNESCO has sponsored a large number of conferences on the theme, as have the EU and other international bodies. An emphasis on dialogue chimes equally well with modern notions of discourse ethics and with the positions of many defenders of multiculturalism; Bikhu Parekh, for example, places a great deal of emphasis on the notion in his writings on the subject.[13] All told, it is easy to see the attraction of an idea which has such a wide range of supporters.

Unfortunately, many of the points directed against the notion of a clash of civilizations apply with equal force to the idea of a dialogue among civilizations. Jaw, jaw is better than war, war, as Churchill put it, but in point of fact civilizations are no more able to talk than they are to fight. Who should take part in the dialogue of civilizations? The Teheran Declaration announces that "representatives of contemporary civilizations should be enabled to participate in the process of dialogue, mutual understanding and mutual enrichment" and that "scholars, thinkers, intellectuals, scientists, economists and peoples of art and culture are the primary engines for the initiation and sustaining of dialogue" (section C, 1 and 2). This latter list is impressive, but simply enumerating the types of individuals who might be involved does not get round the problem of representation. Unless someone takes it upon themselves to decide who is an authentic voice—a role that no one is entitled to fill although one that many have adopted—all voices are equally authentic or inauthentic.

Whereas the notion of a clash of civilizations gives a kind of spurious legitimacy to those who resort to confrontation, the idea of a dialogue of

civilizations may empower those who prefer the pen to the sword, and, in principle, of course, this is to be welcomed, but even here there is a difficulty. Dialogues take place between those who want to talk, while many of the problems of contemporary world politics arise when one or more parties has no interest in discourse. This is hardly a new problem; at the very beginning of the Western tradition of political philosophy Socrates' attempt to tease out the meaning of justice is confronted by the assertion of Thrasymachus that "the just is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger."[14] Socrates ties Thrasymachus into knots, and demonstrates to everyone's satisfaction that this is an incoherent, self-defeating position—but Thrasymachus simply leaves the dialogue without admitting defeat. Those who are sufficiently sure of themselves to pursue their positions with the sword are rarely interested in allowing themselves to acknowledge the moral force of dialogue.

Stanley Fish makes a not-dissimilar point in a recent *New York Times* op-ed piece on the cartoon crisis, lambasting what he regards as the fetishization of free speech by the "religion" of liberalism. Liberals, he remarks, smugly rely on dialogue, but

> The belief in the therapeutic and redemptive force of dialogue depends on the assumption (central to liberalism's theology) that, after all, no idea is worth fighting over to the death and that we can always reach a position of accommodation if only we will sit down and talk it out. But a firm adherent of a comprehensive religion doesn't want dialogue about his beliefs; he wants those beliefs to prevail. Dialogue is not a tenet in his creed, and invoking it is unlikely to do anything but further persuade him that you have missed the point—as, indeed, you are pledged to do, so long as liberalism is the name of your faith (*New York Times* 12 February, 2006).[15]

Former President Khatami would no doubt be rather disturbed by the thought that by promoting dialogue he was echoing a characteristically liberal theology, and, indeed, Fish's post-modernist approach comprehensively misrepresents what most people would understand as the liberal position, but the central point that there are some people for whom dialogue is not simply meaningless but positively scurrilous in so far as it involves the thought that their own position is corrigible, is surely correct.

The point of these comments is not to suggest that dialogue is impossible but rather to suggest that framing the goal of promoting dialogue within the context of a "dialogue among civilizations" is to create problems of agency that are insoluble, and probably unnecessary. Individuals from different cultural (civilizational) backgrounds can indeed engage in dialogue, and the dialogue may be fruitful in terms of advancing mutual understanding, but they will not be representing civilizations when they do so. The more interesting question concerns not so much the notion of

dialogue, but more the public space within which dialogue can take place. What do the participants in a dialogue need to have in common before they can talk to one another with some prospect of being understood? Some universalist notions are implicit (and sometimes explicit, for that matter) in the very idea of advancing mutual understanding via dialogue, but what kind of universalism is involved here? What are the ground rules? Once the more flamboyant and attention-getting aspects of Huntington's original formulation are set aside, it can be seen that he actually has something interesting to say on this subject.

THE WEST AND THE REST?

As noted above, Huntington's "clash of civilizations" was regarded by some as an exercise in "othering," a product of and contribution to the search for an enemy to replace the recently defeated Soviets.[16] In fact this misses the point; the real protagonist of Huntington's article is neither the rising Chinese civilization nor the failing Islamic, but rather the West itself. Much of the world, he argues, sees inter-civilizational politics as a matter of "the West versus the Rest" and this is a tendency reinforced by the habit of Westerners to use the terms West and "International Community" as synonyms.[17] It is the West's tendency to regard itself as the universal civilization that, as much as any other factor, promotes the clash of civilizations; opposition to this self-description by other civilizations is essentially regarded by Huntington as understandable.

An interesting re-statement of this point is offered in another *Foreign Affairs* article, by the rather less well known Eisuke Sakakiba, a bureaucrat in the Japanese Ministry of Finance, "The End of Progressivism."[18] Progressivism, for Sakakiba, is the belief that there is only one ideal end, a unique path for all human beings; both socialism and neo-classical capitalism are progressivist ideologies, and the former Soviet Union and the United States are both experimental progressivist states. *Pace* Fukuyama's notion of an "End to History," the demise of socialism—the ending of the Cold War, which was a civil war within the Western ideology of progressivism—has not produced a victory for political liberalism and "neo-classical capitalism."[19] Instead, it is progressivism as such that is under threat, made outdated by more fundamental issues, the need to control environmental pollution and establish the peaceful coexistence of civilizations. As to the first of these points, the dream of neo-classical capitalism that the problems of consumption could be solved on a long-term basis, and that the appeal of progress and the spread of mass consumption would perpetuate the domination of one kind of civilization on a long-term basis has proved an illusion in the face of problems of economic management, experienced in different ways by all the advanced industrial societies, and the emergence of environmental constraints to

continued growth. What is required today is an ending of the belief that there can be a technological fix for these problems, the development of a less anthropocentric approach to nature, and, most of all, the recognition of the worth of different civilizations. The West must abandon sectarian progressivism in favor of respect for the environment and tolerance for other civilizations. Coexistence of civilizations is possible and existed in pre-modern time; "the clash of civilizations is not the unavoidable result of co-existing civilizations, but rather the result of contact with Western progressivism."[20]

Sakakiba appears to believe that this position contradicts Huntington's thesis but it would be, I think, more accurate to say that it complements it—Huntington does not use "progressivism" to describe the Western perspective on the world, and would, I think rightly, reject the reductionism inherent in the term (both liberalism and communism mean or have meant rather more than simply the assertion of one unique path for humanity) but, as noted above, he does criticize the tendency of the West to regard itself as the universal civilization, regarding this tendency as at the root of many of today's problems. Huntington would also part company with Sakakiba in respect of the latter's suggestion that not only is liberalism not a suitable model for the rest of the world, it is not, in fact a suitable model for the West itself. Sakakiba takes the problems of environmental degradation to provide a general challenge to contemporary capitalism, not simply a comment on the future of capitalism in the non-Western world. It may well be that he was right to do so, but this was not part of Huntington's analysis. Still, Huntington's analysis is consistent with Sakakiba's position that it is not simply the case that liberalism fails to provide a universal model for the rest of the world—rather it is the very idea that there could be such a model that is under attack.

There is, I think, much substance to this critique, especially if shorn of its inessentials; just as Fish's description of liberalism as a religion adds little to the point he wants to make, so Sakakiba's conflation of communism and liberalism, although revealing in terms of Japanese official opinion, is not central to the main point here, which is that a large part of the normative agenda of the post-1945 world has been dictated by a Western set of values that, quite patently, do not nowadays attract universal assent. Although the committee that drew up the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 contained representatives of all the main world religions and cultures, the Declaration itself was clearly the product of mainstream Western thinking. Still, the UDHR was sufficiently general in terms that it attracted quite wide support; the subsequent development of the international human rights regime has been in the direction of ever greater and more elaborate detail. The very idea of human rights implies limits to the range of variation in domestic political regimes that is acceptable internationally, but post-1945 human rights law, if taken seriously and at face

value, would create a situation where all states would be obliged to conform to a quite rigid template which dictated most aspects of their political, social, and economic structures and policies. In fact, of course, most states do not take these obligations seriously—to take one glaring example, the International Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 has been ratified by every country in the world with the exception of the United States and Somalia, without any of its signatories making a serious attempt to put its provisions into practice. States ratify this kind of treaty because they feel they ought to, because ratification conveys a kind of normative status and, most important, because it is a cost-free exercise—since the international human rights regime lacks enforcement mechanisms, gestures of support do not have to be carried through.

Such, at least, was the case during the era of the Cold War, but, post-1989, attempts have been made to change this situation. The Vienna Conference of 1993 was intended to lead to a major drive towards tightening up the enforcement mechanism of the international human rights regime, and this, combined with the Clinton administration's apparent interest in "democracy promotion" generated the so-called "Asian Values" movement, and provided the context for the contributions of figures such as Mahbubani, Huntington, and Sakakiba.[21] In fact, democracy promotion in the Clinton years led nowhere, the Vienna Declaration was relatively anodyne, and the East Asian challenge to human rights petered out with the economic crises in the region in the late 1990s, but while the particular elements of this controversy have faded away, the underlying issue remains. One of the features of the international human rights regime of recent years has indeed been the attempt to improve enforcement mechanisms, specifically by changes in international law, notably the development of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, and the establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC). These moves, which have been welcomed by human rights activists and many national governments in the West (although not that of the United States), have attracted increased opposition outside of the Western world. It is striking that no major Asian state has ratified the Rome Treaty of 1998, which established the ICC, and only Japan is actually a signatory. In the Middle East and Muslim world, only Jordan has ratified. Only two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are signatories, Britain and France. Support for the ICC comes predominantly from Europe, Latin America, and the old Commonwealth, although—perhaps revealingly—the first cases the independent prosecutor is investigating concern alleged offences committed in Africa.

The unwillingness to pay lip service to the ICC, as opposed to the pre-1989 willingness of many states to give formal endorsement of treaties they had no intention of actually honoring gives substance to Huntington's point that non-Western countries will be increasingly resistant to allowing the Western countries to dictate the normative agenda of world

politics—although, interestingly, in this case it is not the United States but Western European countries that are in the vanguard of Western universalism.[22] This is not, it should be noted, a matter of civilization or culture—the United States, which is opposed to the ICC, is every bit as much part of Western culture as Belgium or Italy, and within the Muslim world and the emerging Asian superpowers of China and India there are many individuals who would like to see their countries adhere to the broad approach to human rights that Asian governments reject, and these individuals have as much right to think of themselves as authentically Chinese or Muslim as those who take the opposing point of view. The core point is the absence of a consensus on these matters—and this position is not, I suggest, likely to change as a result of an unfocused dialogue. Instead we need to establish more clearly what the ground rules for dialogue are, and who the appropriate participants ought to be.

A PRACTICAL-MINDED DIALOGUE

So far, the aim of this chapter has been diagnostic and descriptive rather than prescriptive, but a change of gear is now called for. Starting from the uncontroversial position that inter-cultural relations between the Muslim world and the secular West are now in some disarray, I have attempted to show that the framing of these relations in terms of a clash of civilizations is defective—civilizations can neither clash, nor authorize others to clash on their behalf. I have also argued that the common alternative to a clash, a "dialogue among civilizations" is equally problematic; it suffers from the same problems of agency and is likely to involve only those who are already predisposed to attempt to settle their disagreements through discourse. A real dialogue can take place between individuals, but is likely to lead to mutual understanding only if it takes place on ground equally acceptable to all of the many parties involved. Part of the problem today, I suggest, is that it is difficult to find such ground; ideas that originated in the West have dominated the post-1945 normative agenda and this situation is no longer acceptable (if it ever really was) to many of the potential partners in a dialogue. The apparent global consensus that underwrote extensive human rights legislation in the past may have been based on little more than a willingness to make cost-free gestures; the move towards attempting to find ways of actually enforcing human rights standards has revealed the true dimensions of this global consensus—in practice only European and Latin American states have been willing to sign up to this project.

What, then, is to be done? How can we find the common ground that would enable a real dialogue to take place? In past articles I have argued that to find this common ground two steps are necessary.[23] First, we—and in this context I mean, first and foremost, Western political theorists

such as myself, because this is advice thinkers in other traditions are less in need of—should revive the notion of a common human nature. One of the most striking, and, on the face of it, strange, features of the "human rights culture" that has developed since 1945 is the way in which thinkers have defended the notion of human rights while regarding the idea of human nature with a certain amount of distaste, describing it as "essentialist," which is a bad thing to be in the context of twentieth-century Western political philosophy. This, I suggest, is a mistake. Without some explicit account of what constitutes human flourishing defenders of liberal values have found themselves at a disadvantage when confronted by critics who themselves have a very clear idea of what they think is entailed in being human. There is every reason for Western thinkers not to return to the unthinking ethnocentrism of the nineteenth century, when the Victorian gentleman was seen as the highest form of life experienced on the planet, and European states presumed to lay down "standards of civilization" for the world at large—but the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction, towards a defenseless relativism which can no longer find good reasons embedded in the heart of what it is to be human to defend such practices as freedom of speech and religion. The resources for a revival of the idea of human nature are ready at hand in older notions of natural law and classical ethics, and even perhaps in the newer discourse of evolutionary psychology. Christian catechisms, in common with their equivalents in other religions, ask, "What is the chief end of man?" Modern Western secularists need to have a rather better answer to this question than they have in the past.

The second (and, in the context of this chapter, rather more important) step also involves a different way of thinking about ethics, in this case the need to follow the Aristotelian proposition that sound moral judgment always respects the detailed circumstances of specific kinds of cases. I follow here Stephen Toulmin's judgment that "modernity" involved forgetting this injunction.[24] He describes the ways in which, in the seventeenth century, the insights of renaissance humanism (drawn, of course, from the wisdom of the classical world) were put aside: formal logic displaced rhetoric, general principles and abstract axioms were privileged over particular cases and concrete diversity, and permanence was valued more highly than the transitory. It can well be argued that it has been the search for formal logic, general principles, abstract axioms, and the permanent that has bedeviled so much of Western thinking about cultural diversity, and not simply Western thinking. In this case the "we" who should move away from theory-centered towards "practical-minded" thinking, focusing on the particular, concrete, local details of everyday human affairs rather than spending too much time in the higher realms of abstract principle and general laws, includes many non-Westerners.

What does it mean to be practically minded when it comes to thinking through the idea of a genuine dialogue on cultural/civilizational issues? The answers to this question can be found at different levels, involving both substantial issues, and the conditions under which the dialogue itself takes place. To illustrate the point, let us return briefly to the affair of the cartoons. Substantively, freedom of speech is not just a policy-preference to be found in the West, it is actually a pre-condition for responsible, democratic government; no one has the right not to be offended—but, at the same time, as Britain's Foreign Secretary has pointed out, no one has an obligation to offend. One can—I would—simultaneously assert that *Jyllands-Posten* had the right to publish the cartoons, and *Die Zeit* the right to re-publish them, while considering it wise of British newspapers not to follow suit.[25] The idea that in order to defend freedom of speech it is necessary to publish something which is certain to be misunderstood as an attack on a minority religion seems to me to be a good example of the kind of theory-centered reasoning it would be good to get beyond.

Rather more interesting is the issue of the practical-minded approach to the conditions of dialogue. I want to suggest that a first, modest but important, step here is for everyone to understand that the distinctions between states, societies, civil society organizations, and individuals are drawn differently, if at all, in different parts of the world. It is clear that in many parts of the world the distinction between state and civil society is blurred or non-existent. The citizens of countries with controlled media apparently find it difficult to understand that a Western European government simply is not in a position to give orders to a newspaper or TV station (much as they would occasionally like to be able to). As a result, what is actually a decision made by a private individual or a group looks like an insult by a whole country and it becomes regarded as legitimate to boycott all Danish produce even though workers in the Lego factory and on Danish farms had nothing to do with the matter. Looking at the matter from a different direction, in those countries with controlled media and effectively no independent civil society, governments cannot plausibly claim that such actions as boycotts or newspaper campaigns are out of their control. The point I want to make here is that there are two theory-centered ways of looking at the world here, both of which lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Societies where a comprehensive religion unites state and civil society imagine that other societies really ought to have the same arrangement and indeed that, below the surface, they do, whereas countries where they are separated believe that this provides a model for the world. Both theoretical positions are mistaken—instead it is necessary to look at the particular, concrete details in each case.

More generally, the kind of differences revealed by the affair of the cartoons will not be resolved or mitigated by appeals to competing gener-

al principles. Western societies are not going to adopt Islamic laws and the attempt to frighten editors and legislators into behaving as though such laws already existed may bring short term victories for Islamic radicals, but in the long run will provoke a backlash—indeed already has done so if the poll quoted in the introduction to this chapter is to be believed. By the same token, while there is much to be said in favor of the spread of democracy in the Middle East (and elsewhere), there is no reason to believe that the form of democracy that will emerge will be liberal—evidence from Iraq and Palestine suggests the contrary—and even if the anger over the cartoons is partly stirred up by governments and radical politicians, the emotions involved are still genuine and would not disappear if the latter took a back seat. Rather than looking for agreement on general principles, we—all of us—need to focus on negotiating the consequences of an *absence* of agreement.

In terms of interstate relations, this is a less difficult task that may initially appear to be the case. We do actually have a model of inter-state relations based on the absence of agreement on general principles—it is called the Westphalian international order, or pluralist international society.[26] This is the way the European world was organized before 1945. It was not a great success in so far as destructive wars occurred every so often, and the European states that made up the system were not prepared to extend the tolerance they exhibited towards each other in the direction of the rest of the world, but the latter at least is a fault that it ought to be possible to correct without too much difficulty—and as to the former the system that replaced the old European order post-1945 has also not been conspicuously successful at abolishing war. The point is that the old order asked of its members only that they respected the rules of co-existence—it did not attempt to lock them into a common domestic template, it accepted, indeed valued, difference.

The main problem associated with this political arrangement today is that societies are rather more permeable than they once were, or, perhaps to be more accurate, the consequences of their permeability are rather different now from what they were a century ago. The old order adhered to the general principle "when in Rome do as the Romans do," albeit with some modifications—the treaties of Westphalia in 1648 did, after all, make some provision for the protection of minorities. The difficulty nowadays is that many of the inhabitants of "Rome" do not want to think of themselves as Romans. Immigrant communities which once might have accepted local mores without too much difficulty are today much less willing to let go of their past and have the ability not to do so. Indeed, Arjun Appadurai suggests that the key feature of globalization today is the combination of mass migration and mass mediation, which makes this situation possible.[27] The large-scale movement of peoples whether as refugees, migrants, or guest workers, which is not, in itself, unique creates a situation which is genuinely new when it is combined with

revolutions in information technology and the mass media. Large-scale Diaspora communities have formed throughout the world, no longer isolated from their homelands and destined to merge with the majority population, but now directly connected to home by satellite television (both the globally owned networks and local stations), fax machines, cheap telephone calls, imported DVDs, and, most recently, the Internet. Using these resources Diaspora communities are able to participate in homeland politics, and indeed, may, on occasion, offer a political lead; more to the point in terms of dialogue across cultural boundaries, these communities have the ability to preserve their old ways of life even when the latter contradict the norms of the host community.

It is amongst these immigrant communities, I suggest, that the real dialogue of peoples will take place. The French writer Gilles Kepel has opined that the Muslim communities in Europe may eventually act as a bridge between the European world and the world of Islam.[28] Alternatively, they may form a bridgehead in the West for radical Islam, with little hope of achieving their ends, but a great deal of capacity to spread disorder and inter-communal strife. Which way this situation will evolve is still in doubt; the poll in the introduction to this chapter suggests that the host community in Britain is not optimistic that the "bridge" metaphor will supplant the "bridgehead," but there are other straws in the wind that are more hopeful. Ironically, the July 7, 2005, bombings in London provided one such straw; these bombings were carried out in the name of Islam, but the fifty-two victims included many Muslims, mostly young men and women, working in the city, committed to their religion and yet making their way very successfully in British society until their careers were cut short by their co-religionists. Such figures are the best hope for a peaceful practical-minded dialogue.[29] Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London, made the point with precision: speaking directly to the terrorists, he said, London is a city of immigrants.

> [They] choose to come to London, as so many have come before because they come to be free, they come to live the life they choose, they come to be able to be themselves. They flee you because you tell them how they should live. They don't want that and nothing you do, however many of us you kill, will stop that flight to our city where freedom is strong and where people can live in harmony with one another. Whatever you do, however many you kill, you will fail.[30]

The view that all the Muslim inhabitants of London want to be able to exercise these freedoms is clearly optimistic; an ICM Poll reported in the *Sunday Telegraph* (19 February 2006) suggested that while an impressive 99 percent of British Muslims opposed the bombings on 7 July, 20 percent had some sympathy for their feelings and motives, and 40 percent backed introducing Sharia law in parts of Britain. Still, the 91 percent who de-

scribe themselves as remaining loyal to Britain make up the potential constituency for Livingstone's hope.

CONCLUSION

Huntington's original article was not predominantly about relations between Islam and the West; the rise of China played as significant a role. China has continued to rise since 2003, and the implications of this rise are much discussed—but not in terms of a "clash of civilizations." Rather, the geo-strategic implications of Chinese power are much on the minds of Western decision-makers (and probably those in Beijing as well). The matter is framed politically rather than culturally; many Western analysts foresee conflict ahead, but of a traditional, manageable kind, as opposed to the potentially unmanageable conflicts with the world of Islam.[31] Why is that? Largely, I suggest, because of a deliberate attempt on both sides to handle relations within the old framework of pluralist international society. China's human rights record is still embarrassingly bad as far as the West is concerned but is no longer used as a reason for not normalizing relations with the PRC. The latter finds U.S. support for Taiwan irritating, but all concerned seem to understand the limits of that support—the PRC will not provoke a conflict unless Taiwan declares itself to be independent, and the United States will not support such a move. Relations between the West and China are correct rather than cordial and there are still many points of friction, but no noticeable cultural clash. The Chinese Diaspora, whether in the West, or in independent states such as Singapore, has played a positive role in this relatively benign state of affairs, encouraging co-operation with the homeland, but also seeking success in the host countries, and often achieving it—Singapore is now a wealthy OECD member, and Chinese communities in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have been markedly successful.

It would be a mistake to see direct parallels here for relations between Islamic states and communities and the West. No avowedly Muslim state has the kind of power that China already possesses or will possess—indeed the most successful Muslim communities outside of the West are to be found in secular states, in Turkey and India. Muslim grievances, real and imagined, are greater than those of Chinese civilization, or at least more current, and the mutual fear between Islamic states and peoples and Western states and peoples is more tangible than is the case as between China and the West. And, perhaps, Islam and both the Christian and the post-Christian West are actually closer culturally than either is with China, which may be a source of friction—sometimes one can understand the other only too well. Both Islam and Western secularism are universal ideologies; Chinese nationalism patently is not, and once Western governments ceased proselytizing too openly for human rights

many problems disappeared. Still, for all these differences, there are potential lessons to be drawn from the different trajectories of these two potential clashes of civilization—if China and the West can negotiate their many difficulties, so perhaps can Islam and the West, if we put our minds to it, set the big picture aside, and concentrate on managing the everyday tensions. If the juxtaposition of the terms "civilization" and "world order" is not to provoke wry humor, some such accommodation will have to be arrived at.

NOTES

1. Headline, *Times* (London), February 3, 2006, 1.
2. I am grateful to Kirsten Ainley for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
3. Apart from the *Times*, it has been employed by BBC Radio, Channel 4 News and several other newspapers.
4. This prohibition echoes a ban on the making of graven images common to all three of the religions of the Book, but is taken more seriously in Islam than in Judaism or, especially, Christianity, partly because of some specific Koranic verses. In Medieval Persia and early Ottoman times depictions of the Prophet were quite common but more recently the rule has been seen in absolute terms. In some versions of Islam the ban extends to any human (or animal) portraiture, but practice here is more diverse.
5. No British news outlet published the cartoons as a gesture of solidarity with the Danes, but both the BBC and Channel 4 News showed them as part of their regular bulletins while reporting on the demonstrations.
6. Hardly necessary to run a competition, one might have felt, given the routine anti-Semitism on display in Middle Eastern media. The publisher of *Dimona Comix Publishing* in Tel Aviv has the perfect answer, calling for anti-Semitic cartoons drawn by Jews themselves; "We'll show the world we can do the best, sharpest, most offensive Jew-hating cartoons ever published! No Iranian will beat us on our home turf!" See *Haaretz*, February 20, 2006, accessed, 20 February 2006. http://www.haaretz.com/culture/arts-leisure/no-iranian-will-beat-us-on-our-home-turf-1.180612.
7. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations," *Foreign Affairs* 72, (1993): 22-49; S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisation and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). Immediate reactions to Huntington's text, and his response "If Not Civilizations, What," are conveniently collected in a *Foreign Affairs* Reader, *The Clash of Civilizations: The Debate* (New York, 1996).
8. Trafalgar Square, from the Arabic *Taraf Al-Gharb*, Cape of the West.
9. Amartya Sen, *The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity* (London: Allen Lane, 2005).
10. A concomitant of this argument is that those who argue that Osama Bin Laden is not the authentic voice of Islam in the twenty-first century are as mistaken as those who argue he is. There is no single authentic voice of Islamic or of any other civilisation; it is always possible to make an argument that some voices are more authentic than others, but such a position can never be conclusively demonstrated.
11. Huntington's article and book focus as much on China as on the Islamic world, but although the rise of China has been both a popular and an academic focus in recent years, it has not been framed in civilisation terms, but rather in terms of the growing economic, and eventual political-military power of China. Nor has it attracted much public as opposed to scholarly attention. This framing is significant and will be returned to below.
12. See Muhammad Khatami, *Hope and Challenge: The Iranian President Speaks* (Binghamton, NY: Institute of Global Cultural Studies, 1997), and *Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society* (Canberra: Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National Univer-

sity, 1999). For the text of the Teheran Declaration see http://www.isesco.org.ma/English/Dialogue/Teheran.html.

13. E.g. B. Parekh, "Non-Ethnocentric Universalism" in *Human Rights in Global Politics,* ed. Tim Dunne and N.J. Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and *Rethinking Multiculturalism,* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

14. *The Republic of Plato*, translated by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 15. Book 1, 338c.

15. Hat-tip to Norm Geras for this reference, as they say in the world of bloggers.

16. See, for example, W.E. Connolly, "Speed, concentric circles and cosmopolitanism," *Political Theory* 28 (2000): 596-618.

17. Kishore Mahbubani's essay "The West and the Rest," *The National Interest* 28 (1992): 3-13, makes a similar point.

18. "The End of Progressivism: A Search for New Goals," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1995): 8-15.

19. Actually, Fukuyama's essay, as well-known in its day as Huntington's, is in no sense a celebration of the West's victory, as Sakakiba seems to assume; "The End of History," *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 3-16.

20. Sakakiba, "The End of Progressivism," 13.

21. The single best study of the Asian Values debate is Daniel Bell, *East meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

22. Which, equally interestingly, is also the case in the affair of the cartoons.

23. See, for example, Chris Brown, "Cultural Diversity and International Political Theory," *Review of International Studies* 26 (2000): 191-213.

24. Stephen Toulmin, *The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

25. Ronald Dworkin reaches the same conclusion by a somewhat different route in "Even Bigots and Holocaust Deniers Must Have Their Say," *The Guardian,* February 14, 2006.

26. This order is best described in Terry Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), and Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

27. Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

28. Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (New York: The Belknap Press, 2004).

29. Let me name just one victim, to symbolise the rest—Shahara Islam, age twenty, whose family said of her, "She loved London, she loved Britain, she loved her religion."(*Times,* July 7, 2006).

30. Mayor's statement, accessed 7 July 2006, http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/mayor_statement_070705.jsp.

31. See, for example, the discussion in *Foreign Policy,* "An FP Special Report: China Rising," (Jan/Feb 2005): 43–59.

II

Eurocentrism and Cultural Difference

FIVE

The Formative Parameters of Civilizations

A Theoretical and Historical Framework

Ahmet Davutoğlu

What are the paradigmatic constituents of civilizations as historical structures? What makes "civilization" a unit of analysis in history? What explains the endurance of authentic civilizations under the pressure and dominance of modern Western civilization? These are some of the questions we have to address if we are to endorse the following three assumptions: (i) the plural use of civilization*s*, (ii) different experiences of globalization*s*, and (iii) the need for a global governance of civilizational plurality.[1]

What follows has no pretensions to provide a complete answer to these grand substantive questions. Yet, here I will discuss civilizations as products of comprehensive processes pertaining to six fundamental dimensions of individual and collective life: (i) ontological re-definition of the self-perception (*selbstverstandnis*) of individual human being, (ii) epistemological re-formulation of human knowledge, (iii) axiological re-valuation of human norms, (iv) re-construction of time consciousness and historical imagination, (v) re-shaping of space, particularly in the form of restructuring the city as a reflection of "being-knowledge-value" paradigm, and (vi) re-establishment of a world order as a new way of administering political and economic affairs.

These parameters are immanent to the formative processes of civilizations. Among them the first three constitute the philosophical and ethical foundations of the being-knowledge-value paradigm and the last three

represent the historical manifestations of particular being-knowledge-value paradigms in social, economic, and political structures. Now I want to elucidate what I mean by these categories.

1. ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION: RE-DEFINITION OF THE SELF-PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEING

One of the main formative parameters of a civilization is its provision of a distinct comprehension of the ontological status of an individual human being. Through providing a new self-perception based on a new world-view, civilizations offer a meaningful basis of existence. A new self-perception is possible only with a new consciousness of being, which determines the relation between the ego, *lebenswelt* (where the ego perceives itself), and the Absolute Being (God or the association of God with the nature as in the cases of pantheism and materialism).

In *Upanishad*s, for instance, the indwelling all-pervading Supreme Being, or *Brahman*, is identical with the individual self, or *Atman*, and through the cycles of birth every individual being moves toward the realization of the identity of *Atman* and *Brahman*. That main message in *Upanishads* formed the basis of a new self-perception as the constitutive and distinctive characteristic of Indian civilization. The realization of the identities of Atman and Brahman in Being (*Sat*), Consciousness (*Chit*), and Delight (*Ananda*), the belief in reincarnation, and the social order of the caste system can only be understood through this self-perception.[2] The doctrine of reincarnation and the doctrine of *varna*—which stipulates that all men are naturally divided into four castes—became the main sources of self-perception of an Indian individual person and the justification for the social order in Indian civilization.[3]

Similarly, the Jewish self-perception based on the covenant with God as a nation with a special mission and a privileged ontological status has been the unique characteristic and foundation of Hebrew civilization in history and also of Judaic tradition in different cultural zones. The great metaphysical and political order of King Solomon as the historical peak of Hebrew civilization was linked to such a strong Jewish self-perception as the biblically justified subject of the earthly order. The same self-perception became the source of resistance and protection in Judaic tradition when Jews were exiled and forced to live in ghettos under inimical political settings. As it has been underlined by Hans Küng, "Israel understands itself as the people freed by God and moreover 'people' (Hebrew 'am, goy) is the term used most frequently by the Israelite tribes to describe themselves: God's people—or in line with the logic of this experience—God's chosen people."[4]

Greek civilization provided a new self-perception for its citizens that differentiated them from slaves and foreigners not only politically but

also ontologically. In other words, the difference between a citizen and a slave was not only a difference in socio-political status but also a difference in ontological substance. The order of Greek city-states and the Hellenic civilization were a reflection of this self-perception of the Greek citizen. This exclusivist conception of the citizen, however, fell short of sustaining the legitimacy of political order when the ruling elite became a tiny minority in a society made up of many different ethnic, religious, and cultural communities reaching from Macedonia to India. The transformation from an organic city structure into a mechanic imperial structure was accompanied with a psychological transformation of self-perception. Stoic, Cynic, and Epicurean responses to this transformative process were illuminating examples of the relationship between self-perception and political order within a civilizational tradition. A similar process was at work in the Roman civilization. The transformation from city politics of Rome into the cosmopolitan politics of *Pax Romana* was linked with the transformation of Roman self-perception from polytheistic city religion into the sophisticated philosophico-theological self-perception of Marcus Aurelius, the Stoic philosopher Emperor.

The self-perception of the Islamic personality as a civilizational prototype is the psycho-ontological counterpart of a particular imagination of God, man, and nature. The Qur'anic monotheistic revolution and man's ontological status and role on earth formed a new consciousness of being. The ontological hierarchy and differentiation between the Creator and the created and Allah's absolute sovereignty has been persistently stressed by the Qur'an within a tightly knit monotheistic framework. Yet this emphasis on Creator's sovereignty never leads to a peripheralization of the human being since the human is the *raison d'etre* of the entire creation. The Islamic doctrine of *Tawhid* (Unity) engenders a new civilizational self-perception founded on the principle that there is a clear ontological hierarchy between God and all creation, and that human beings share the same ontological level as vicegerents of Allah on earth (*Khalifatullah*).[5]

The Qur'anic conception of the ontological status of man in his relationship with Allah as his Creator and with nature as his existential environment influences both the individual consciousness of a Muslim and the institutionalization of his social relations. This new self-perception not only revolutionized the ontological consciousness of Muslims but also had a lasting impact on the intellectual and social life of the Islamic civilization. The inclusive, egalitarian, and easily accessible nature of Islamic self-perception was the main reason behind Islam's swift spread in different civilizational zones comprising different ethnic and sectarian communities. With the conquests of Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Iran during the reign of the Caliph Omar, Muslims became neighbors with the Indian civilization on one side and the Roman civilization on the other. Within that process, the Islamic belief transformed into a civilizational

form as a byproduct of the rapid expansion of Islam into almost all areas previously unified by Alexander the Great.

In the West, on the other hand, a new self-perception was in the making starting with the early Renaissance period. The radical intellectual transformations such as the Reformation and the Renaissance, the Copernican and the Newtonian Revolutions in cosmology, Mercantilism and Industrial Revolution in economy, and the American and the French revolutions in the political field have all contributed to the formation of a new self-perception in the West leading to a new ontological consciousness of being an *individual*: an intelligent agent who can comprehend and control the mechanistic structure of Nature, an ultimate factor of economic production and consumption, and a rational actor in political processes and administrative mechanisms.[6]

This new self-perception has generated a new hope to attain ontological security and freedom—the most fundamental objectives of human kind throughout history. That hope was best expressed in Enlightenment's magical formula of "reason-science-progress": reason as the source of ontological freedom, science as the instrument and form of its achievement, and progress as the deterministic future. Western civilization developed a new self-perception based on the idea of *the perfectibility of man* and hence contravened the authoritative character of the Christian conception of God and its institutionalized doctrine. The idea of a destined paradise of absolute freedom enabled by the control of nature (and man) with machines—"the new slaves"—reached its zenith in the nineteenth century. This Euro-Christian psychology of a secular paradise on earth was the motivating impetus for colonialism, which can be observed in its paradigmatic example, Rudyard Kipling's *White Man's Burden*.[7]

Thus, civilizational self-perception is one of the basic building blocks in the formation, development, and resistance capacities of civilizations. Civilizational self-perception fosters a civilizational prototype. A civilizational prototype arises less for the institutional and formal reasons and more for the worldview that provides an individual with a meaningful basis of existence. A civilization can become a living form only if it can assert its self-perception in a way comprehensive enough to influence *lebenswelt*. Western socio-economic constructs, Islamic cities, Chinese social order, or Indian social hierarchy are all closely linked with the differing self-perceptions of the respective civilizational traditions. Civilizations that can build a healthy relationship between their self-perception and *lebenswelt* experience revival, whereas those that cannot go through crises, get weakened, or may even vanish.

2. EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION: RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PARADIGM OF KNOWLEDGE

The emergence and interactions of civilizations cannot be adequately understood without understanding their ways of constructing and reconstructing knowledge. In different civilizational traditions, differing answers given to the basic questions about (i) the sources of knowledge, (ii) the theoretical systematization of knowledge in the form of theology, philosophy and science, (iii) the practical use of knowledge in the sense of technology, and (iv) social hierarchy based on the authority of knowledge gave birth to different epistemological characteristics.

The question of the sources of knowledge necessarily brings up the issue of the ontological relation between man, god(s), and nature. The striking symbolic reflection of this epistemological question in Ancient Greece is Prometheus who steals the fire—knowledge—from Zeus. Some suggest that the name Prometheus etymologically comes from the combination of the Greek words *pro* (before) and *manthano* (learn), which carries the epistemological connotations of the myth. Similarly, In *Protagoras* Plato narrates that gods created humans and animals, but it was Prometheus and his brother Epimetheus who had the power to give attributes to them, and that Prometheus attributed fire and other arts to humans.

It is interesting to note that consubstantial stories of stealing fire/knowledge have been imagined in other civilizational traditions such as the Mataricvan myth in Vedic Indian tradition, Nanabozho myth in authentic North Mexican Ojibwa culture, and in several Northern American cultures. The similarity between mythological and etymological backgrounds of Greek and Indian traditions might be interpreted as an outcome of common challenges as well as an indication of civilizational interaction. The etymological connection between Prometheus and Vedic term *pra math* (to steal) and *pramathyu-s* (thief) is quite interesting from this perspective.[8]

The mythology that the knowledge of nature (fire) was stolen from god gives us three dimensions about sources of knowledge: god(s), man, and nature. Civilizations define sources of knowledge based on their ontological premises. Accordingly, some civilizations represent knowledge as being stolen from god(s) as a challenge to them and some others perceive knowledge as being given to humans out of divine grace. In that sense, the fundamental question of the compatibility between the divine and human sources of knowledge is addressed in all civilizational heritages.

The Abrahamic tradition in general, and the Islamic civilization in particular, posits the harmony between divine and human sources of knowledge as the epistemological backbone of the new civilizational paradigm. This had two broad consequences. First, various schools of Islamic thought have developed a common conception of knowledge based on

the notion of the unity of truth and harmonization of the sources of knowledge.[9] This prevented religious knowledge from becoming a set of dogmas restricting observation and reason, and it did not allow the formation of a secular sphere that excludes religious knowledge. In other words, as opposed to Western historical experience, religious epistemology did not culminate in an anti-scientific discourse, and scientific epistemology did not lead to an anti-religious disposition; rather, they together constituted a common epistemological ground and discourse that underpinned Muslim self-perception.

One classic statement of Islamic civilization on the issue of the harmony between divine and human sources of knowledge is Ibn Tufail's *Hayy ibn Yaqthan*[10] written in the twelfth century, which is a philosophical narrative of a man living alone on a desert island without any contact to institutionalized knowledge. *Hayy*'s intellectual development from ignorance to knowledge/truth is achieved solely through his reason, and his later acquaintance with divine knowledge and civilization through *Absal*, a scholar of religion, aims to prove the ultimate compatibility of human and divine sources of knowledge. Almost all leading scholars from various intellectual schools in Islamic civilization paid special attention to the epistemological question of the harmony of divine and human sources of knowledge. The systematization of the epistemological paradigm in Islamic intellectual tradition has been congruent with its conception of the ontological status and role of the human being on earth.

The same question of the compatibility of divine and human sources of knowledge, however, created a long-lasting controversy between religion and science in the West and prepared the ground for the emergence of Enlightenment philosophies that formed the foundation of modern Western civilization. The Church's self-identification with the divine essence of Jesus, its claim to be the sole authority and source of knowledge, and its legitimizing role and central position in the socio-economic structures of the Middle Ages rendered the knowledge produced by it power-dependent and power-oriented. This led to the development of its own alternative, the scientific knowledge, as a challenge not only to the epistemological claims of the Church but also to the power structures it bolstered. While ecclesiastical epistemology legitimated feudalism and aristocracy, scientific knowledge developed in line with the rise of capitalism and bourgeoisie. These two paradigms of knowledge, in that sense, developed not in harmony but rather in binary opposition to each other.[11] Hume's categorical differentiation between the divine and human spheres of knowledge was transformed into a structure of linear and hierarchical historical flow under Comtean positivistic epistemology. Comte claimed that the human mind developed from a theological/fictional stage whereby facts were explained by supernatural powers to a metaphysical and abstract stage in which abstract notions were built without an empirical foundation, and finally reached to a positive and

scientific stage whereby the world started to be understood through observable facts. This axial shift from ecclesiastical dogmatism to scientific absolutism is an epistemological characteristic of the formation of modern Western civilizational paradigm, which distinguishes it from other civilizational experiences. The trinity of the Enlightenment philosophy—reason-science-progress—formed the backbone of the modernist epistemology that limits knowledge to human-based sources and claims to achieve absolute truth and constant progress.

The epistemological dimension of civilizational formations regulates the systematization of knowledge as a consistent intellectual paradigm and fosters the emergence of a new intellectual prototype. The transition from mythology to philosophy in Greek civilization marks the process of rational reconstruction of knowledge. The *Ayurvedic* Medicine as a scientific system originates from the Vedic metaphysics (*Charaka Samhita*) in Indian civilization. Taoist philosophy and Chinese traditional medicine form a holistic system in Chinese civilization. Similarly, in Islamic civilization the re-classification of both religious (*Tafsir*, *Hadith*, and *Fiqh*) and rational sciences (mathematics, medicine, physics, etc.) in a comprehensive framework around the principle of *Tawhid* (unity), and the emergence of modern scientific disciplines in Western civilization are but corollaries of the epistemological formations of civilizations.

The emergence of a new intellectual prototype as one who systematizes and carries the intellectual tradition is another dimension of the formative processes of civilizations. The figure of the *sophist* in Greek civilization, the *brahman/brahmin* in Indian civilization, the '*alim* in Islamic civilization and the *intellectual* in modern Western civilization attest to the formation of these respective civilizational entities. *Sophist* was the name given to the Greek Seven Sages including Solon and Thales in seventh and sixth centuries B.C., and had an ideal to carry *sophia* (wisdom). *Brahmin*, a member of the highest four major castes of traditional Indian society, was responsible for officiating at religious rites, for studying and teaching the Vedas, and had the epistemological potential to realize *Brahman*, that is the supreme cosmic spirit and absolute reality as the source and essence of material universe. The figure of '*Alim* is the special intellectual prototype of Islamic civilization who has the epistemological and axiological responsibility to understand, discover, and interpret '*ilm* (knowledge) that originates from one of the ninety-nine holy names of God ('*Alim*). The *Intellectual* of modern Western civilization, on the other hand, is the prototype who assumes the centrality of the "*intellect*" as the absolute and legitimate source of knowledge.

3. AXIOLOGICAL DIMENSION: RE-STRUCTURING OF VALUE SYSTEM AND STANDARDIZATION OF ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

The axiological formation of civilizations has two major levels. The first level comprises the restructuring of a value-system as the foundation of a new relationship between ethics and law. The second level is about providing the individual human being with basic norms to standardize behavior in daily life. Constructing the categories of good and bad, ethical and unethical, legitimate and illegitimate is essential to interpret the meaning of life and to establish a social order. This normative foundation establishes a bridge between ontological and political existence of individual human beings as well as between natural and social order in and through providing a meaning for life. Such an attempt for meaningfulness is an indication of the emergence of a new civilization or of a re-awakening of an old one. Civilizations posit certain values that guide human behavior and constitute the normative basis of a legal system.

The philosophical tradition of the Greek civilization wrestled with this question extensively. In *Nichomachean Ethics*, one of the first systematic texts on ethics, Aristotle strives to demonstrate why happiness should be the goal of humans and why a virtuous character is necessary for it. The book begins with a clear statement about the relation between action and objective as an ethical issue and its relation with social and political order:

> Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. (. . .) since it (politics) legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state. That of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or preserve; though it is worth while to attain merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or city-states.[12]

The rise of Stoicism within the process of the transition from Greek city-states to Alexandrian empire and its impact on the cosmopolitan structure of both Alexandrian and Roman imperial political orders is a striking example of the role of moral philosophy in interlinking natural and political philosophies and orders. Stoic doctrine of active relationship between cosmic determinism and human freedom became the foundation of individual moral well-being through the assumption that virtue consists in a will, which is in agreement with Nature. It is not a coincidence that Stoic belief in individual moral potential regardless of whether one is a citizen or a slave has been developed in a historical juncture

when Alexander the Great's empire aimed to establish a moral standard for a cosmopolitan political order. Epictetus' formulation in his *Discourses* that "each human being is primarily a citizen of his own commonwealth; but he is also a member of the great city of gods and men, where of the city political is only a copy" provided imperial structures in general and Roman Empire in particular with necessary moral premises. It is also not coincidence that Marcus Aurelius, a great Stoic philosopher-king, tried to revive and deploy this philosophy to respond to the crisis Roman Empire faced.

The Taoist and Confucian moral philosophies had a similar impact in the formation of Chinese civilization during Han dynasty. As the key concepts of moral philosophy, Greek *Logos*, Roman *Reason,* and Chinese *Tao* posited similar ethical norms for happiness, such as the stress on inner nature, human will, and virtue. The three jewels of Tao, namely, compassion, moderation, and humility, are the normative backbone not only of individual happiness but also of social harmony and political order. The conceptual web of *Tao Te Ching* and *Zhuangzi*,[13] such as *wu-wei* (non-action), peace, vitality, kindness, and spontaneity, shapes the mind of the Chinese civilizational prototype and defines the standards of behavior in ordinary life.[14] The harmony of the psychological and political—*nei-sheng wai wang*—as ''the balance between inner cultivation and outer manifestation, on the other hand, is crucial to the flourishing of the empire."[15]

Confucius's re-codification of Chinese heritage from the time of Xia and Shang dynasties (twenty-first to eleventh centuries B.C.) was not solely a neo-traditionalist effort to reinvent a historical tradition, but also a purposeful futuristic attempt for theoretical and practical restructuring of Chinese moral philosophy. The Analects of Confucius became the standard canon of Chinese ethics till today: "Zizhang asked Confucius about humanity. Confucius said, 'if an individual can practice five things anywhere in the world, he is a man of humanity.' 'May I ask what these things are?' said Zizhang. Confucius replied, 'Reverence, generosity, truthfulness, diligence and kindness.'"[16] Such examples of identification of humanity with moral norms created standards of behavior that guaranteed the continuity of Chinese civilization under different dynastic and ideological rules, including the destructive decades of Maoist Cultural Revolution.

The Indian civilization bears a distinctive characteristic in the history of civilizations in terms of the relationship between cosmological determinism, ontological existence, and ethical responsibility. The belief that human beings wander in *samsara*, the endless cycle of birth, suffering, death, and rebirth, brings up the question of human will. The doctrine of *karma*[17] stipulating that actions in this life affect all future lives in the chain of reincarnation renders future ontological status dependent on the ethical attitude of the existing life, which in turn calls for human will to

lead to perfection through releasing from *samsara* (*moksha*), that is degradation via returning to life as animal. This dynamic possibility of stretching from the lowest ontological status to Brahma in Hinduism or nirvana in Buddhism provides the framework for individual norms of behavior, social hierarchy (caste system) and political order.

The ethical premises of Islamic civilization, on the other hand, originate directly from the special ontological status of human being as *khalifatullah* (vicegerent of God) on earth. Muhammad Iqbal, the leading Muslim thinker of the twentieth century, underlines three qualities of man's individuality and uniqueness with reference to the Qur'an: (i) that man is the chosen of God; (ii) that man, with all his faults, is meant to be representative of God on earth; and (iii) that man is trustee of a free personality which he accepted at his peril.[18] This sense of special responsibility by virtue of being human provides the prototype of Islamic civilization with a strong self-perception filled with self-respect. In line with that, the doctrine of *tawhid* (unity) guarantees that a Muslim can perceive his being and fulfill his ethical responsibility without any intermediary institution or a group of clergy. The Qur'anic text and historical practices of the Prophet bestow clear codes of conduct that ensured the integrity and historical continuity of the moral dimension of Islamic civilization. Qur'anic concepts such as *al-khayr* (goodness), *al-'adl* (justice), *al-haqq* (truth and right), *al-'amal al-salih* (good action), *al-birr* (righteousness), *al-qist* (equity), *al-taqwa* (piety), and *al-hilm* (gentleness) are the benchmarks for Islamic normativity and social ethics. This normativist dimension has become philosophically more sophisticated after the encounter with the pre-Islamic traditions of Greek, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Iranian, and Indian civilizations. The corpus of Islamic ethical philosophy centered around the concept of *sa'adah* (happiness) developed by al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd testify to this sophistication.

The Islamic value-system has two distinctive characteristics, one theoretical and one practical. The theoretical one is the existence of very strong interlinkages between ontological, epistemological, and axiological premises that lead to the control of social mechanisms by the value-system. Al-Hazini's *Kitab al-Mizan al-Haqq* provides a typical example for this tight connection between being, knowledge, and value. The essential aim of this book is to explain how the mechanism of the water-balance works, but it begins with a very sophisticated part on the philosophy of justice and its relationship to the cosmic balance under the control of Allah's absolute sovereignty.

> Justice is the stay of all virtues and the support of all excellences. For perfect virtue, which is wisdom in its two parts, knowledge and action, and in its two aspects, religion and the course of the World, consists of perfect knowledge and assured action; and justice brings the two (requisites) together. It is the confluence of the two perfections of that virtue, the means of reaching the limits of all greatness and the cause of

> securing the prize in all excellence. In order to place justice on the pinnacle of perfection, the Supreme Creator made Himself known to the Choicest of His servants under the name of the Just; and it was by the light of justice that the World became complete and perfected, and was brought to perfect order—to which there is allusion in the words of the Blessed: "by justice were the heavens and the earth established."[19]

The practical characteristic is the rhythm of rituals in daily, weekly, yearly, and life-long cycles which cultivates a sense of self-control through regularly reminding the human being his special responsibility on earth. Five times of prayer a day, weekly prayer on Friday, month-long fasting in Ramadan every year, and performing *hajj* (pilgrimage) once in lifetime provides a way of individual ethical control and socializes basic modes of behavior. These rituals and their social reflections unite Muslims from different ethnic origins in different parts of the world.

The axiological dimension of modern Western civilization, on the other hand, relies on the secularization of life through a rational value system that forms the basis of ethics and law. We can pinpoint three influential trends in this process: (i) Machiavellian and Hobbesian frameworks that understand politics as a subject of rational theory and practice; (ii) utilitarian approaches that take individuals as rational agents trying to maximize their own interests; and (iii) Kantian re-systematization of ethics through replacement of theological morality with moral theology, marking a clear departure from the traditional belief that morality is possible only with religion. This rationalist re-construction of the value-system was consistent with the historical context shaped by the rise of capitalism and industrial revolution, which necessitated a secular individualization of the human being as a factor in the cycle of production and consumption. This had a radical impact on both the codes of behavior of the civilizational prototype and his rhythm of daily life. The standardization of working hours and the weekly and yearly holidays are natural results of this axiological and socio-economic transformation. The formation of the rational value-system prepared a suitable axiological framework for the establishment of a socio-political order based on secular institutions and of an economic structure based on free markets. This is a distinguishing characteristic of modern Western civilization in the history of humanity.

4. TEMPORAL DIMENSION: RE-IMAGINATION OF HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Another formative dimension of civilizations is the development of a new perception of time within a new imagination of historical consciousness. The transition from mythological to historical imagination marks an

important stage in the construction of historical consciousness in traditional civilizations. Ancient Chinese, Indian, and Greek traditions share some similarities in that respect. Firstly, all these three civilizations presume a transition from the myths of timeless creation to historical experience through god-kings, semi-divines, or demigods. Chinese mythological rulers before the Xia dynasty, *The Three August Ones and Five Emperors*, aim to create a new imagination of continuity between heavenly (*Fuxi* or *Fu Hsi*), earthly (*Nuwa*), and human (*Shennong* or *Shen Nung*) sovereigns. Because of this ambiguity between mythological and historical phases, this era has been called "unknown centuries" by some historians.[20] The successor rulers such as *Huang Di* (Yellow Emperor), *Zhuanxu*, Emporers *Ku*, *Yao*, and *Shun* interlink natural and political orders and establish a sense of continuity from mythology to history in the minds of the Chinese civilizational prototype.

The *purana*s of the Indian tradition consisting the mythological narratives on creation, destruction, genealogies of the kings, heroes, and demigods had a similar function in terms of historical imagination.[21] Five distinguishing marks (*Pancha Lakshana*) of *Matysa Purana*, namely *sarga* (the creation of the universe), *pratisarga* (secondary creations), *vamsa* (genealogy of gods and sages), *manvantara* (the creation of human race), and *vamsanucaritam* (dynastic histories) show sequential steps of this imagination in Indian civilizational self-perception.

For Greeks, on the other hand, it was almost impossible to make a categorical differentiation between mythology and history. Greeks resorted to mythology in explaining the natural order and justifying the socio-political order. Their sequential transition from the myths of the age of gods (theogonies) to the age of demigods (when gods and mortals mix and interact) and to the age of heroes resembles the Indian and Chinese experiences of transition from the mythology to historical existence. Varro's three-fold classification of gods as gods of nature, gods of the poet, and gods of the city is a Roman reinterpretation of this sense of relationship between historical imagination and political order.

Second, the textualization of the transition from mythology to historical imagination occurred parallel to the formation of a large-scale political order. *The Three August Ones and Five Emperors* and following political history was recorded in *Shiji* (The Records of the Great Historian), and the magnum opus of the great Chinese historian *Sima Qian* (145–90 B.C.) was written during the rise of Han dynasty. The earliest textualization of *purana*s in Indian civilization took place during the rise of *Gupta* (*Maurya*) dynasty (third to fifth century B.C.) when India was united under one political order. It had a very important role in diffusing common perceptions and constructing historical imaginations, ideas, and identities that legitimized common political authority. The Greek journey from *Homeros* (c. 850 B.C.) to *Herodotus* (484–425 B.C.) is another example of the shift from mythological oral tradition to textual historical tradition. *Herodotus*

had a similar impact on the rise of Hellenistic imperial order under Alexander the Great through contributing to the creation of a Greek historical consciousness especially through the textualization of the Greco-Persian wars. It is also not a coincidence that *Varro,* the compiler of the chronology of the Roman Empire, lived during the reign of Caesar who, as the leader of an imperial order, felt the need to identify Roman history with the history of humanity. "*Marcus Terentius Varro*, despite many military campaigns, found time during his eighty-nine years (116–26 B.C.) to synopsize nearly every branch of knowledge; his 620 'volumes' (some seventy-four books) constituted a one-man encyclopedia for his time."[22]

Third, all these civilizational traditions identify their historical existence with the existence of the entire humanity. The pioneers of civilizations tend to reinterpret history in a way that places their own civilization at the center and they identify the future of humanity with the future of their own civilization. Their perception of the creation of the universe, beginning of human history, and foundation of a socio-political order assume that physical existence, metaphysical maturation, and historical evolution of humanity go back to their own civilizational experience.

The Abrahamic tradition, on the other hand, develops a sense of continuity and historicity through the lives of the prophets. The uniqueness of the Jewish tradition, in that sense, is the chronological flow of its history based on the narrations in Torah. Accordingly, the Jewish people is posited as the subject of this history and God's Chosen Nation. The Exodus from Egypt marks the beginning of the Jewish calendar, which, in a sense, identifies history with the historical mission of the Jewish people. Promulgation of Torah by Ezra in 445 B.C parallels the Greek, Indian, and Chinese textualizations of holy narratives, yet without marking the a rise of a new imperial era.

Islamic civilization inherited Abrahamic tradition's sense of history based on prophetic continuity from Adam to Muhammad, which is referred to as the *Qisas-ı Enbiya* (Stories of the Prophets). Textualization started with the very emergence of Islamic belief as the Qur'an was assembled in the form of a text. The prophetic stories in the Qur'an provided the believers with a historical consciousness through the journey of all humanity and with ethical lessons derived out of these experiences.

Besides, certain unique characteristics of Islamic civilization have brought about new dimensions to this historical consciousness. First, no nation, person, or institution has been privileged as the subject of history in the form of a chosen nation, caste, or space. Unlike previous traditions neither the Prophet of Islam nor his followers or institutions claimed a meta-historic existence. In other words, Islamic civilization did not face the kinds of issues such as the question of the divinity and historicity of Jesus in the Christian tradition and as the transition from mythology to history in ancient traditions.[23] Second, Islamic civilization encountered other civilizations immediately after the emergence of its belief system.

The expansion of Islamic teachings to almost all ancient civilizational zones such as Mesopotamia, Egypt, Iran, Syria, and India in a period of only two generations created a profoundly cosmopolitan context within which a much more universal and inclusive understanding of history was able to flourish. The internalization of Greek tradition by early Muslim philosophers and the re-interpretation of Indian cultural history by Muslim thinkers such as al-Biruni[24] are interesting examples of this inclusive understanding of civilizational experiences as being part of the same human history.

The Muslim political orders from Andalusia to India under Umayyad, Abbasid, Babur, and Ottoman dynasties theoretically and practically benefited from this cosmopolitan historical vision. The Ottoman use of *Kanun-i Kadim* (the Ancient Law) in its legal structure is a practical manifestation of a historical understanding that embraces previous civilizational experiences. Ottoman rulers, for instance, did not hesitate to use the titles of the rulers of different traditions such as the *Caliph* (Islamic), *Padishah* (Iranian), *Hakan* (Nomadic/Turanic), and *Kaiser-i Rum*/*Caesar* (Roman). The purpose here was not solely to legitimize their own political order but also to stress the historical continuity of their rule in the eyes of their subjects.[25]

Modern Western civilization, on the other hand, has distinctive characteristics regarding time perception and historical consciousness such as the secularization of the perception of time leading to the idea of progress, Eurocentric conception of the flow of human history, and historical reconstruction of identities for the justification of the nation-state as a system of political order. The transitions from pagan mythology to Christian divinization of history, and from re-historicization of religion to secular understanding of history constitute the basic turning points in the transformation of Western time-consciousness.[26] Secularization of history in the sense of liberating it from theological axioms was a reaction to the meta-historic divinization of history through the imagination of a divine intervention into history through semi-divine beings such as Chosen Nation, Christ, or Church. This was a process in which "Christianity [became] historicized and history secularized," as Voegelin puts it.[27] The Enlightenment idea of unilinear secular progress did not only reconstruct historical imagination of the Western mind but also developed a new perception for the future of humanity.

Accompanying this idea of unilinear progress is the Eurocentric understanding of history that ignores not only the contributions but at times even the existence of non-Western civilizations. In this view, Western civilization as the dominant civilization of the time has a special mission to bridge the past and the future. For instance, in Hegel's periodization of history, humanity undergoes its childhood in the East, its adolescence in Central Asia, its youth in Greece, its manhood in Rome and its maturity in the Germanic races of Europe. This clearly identifies human

history with the adventure of a particular civilization or people. The monolithic representation of the historical progress of human thought in the existing educational paradigm in the sequence of Ancient Greece, Roman Empire, medieval era, Renaissance, Enlightenment, and Modern Age can be regarded as a reflection of this Eurocentricism.

5. SPATIAL DIMENSION: RE-CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE ON THE BASIS OF BEING-KNOWLEDGE-VALUE PARADIGM

There are two aspects of the spatial dimension of civilizational formations, one is about the perception of space, and the other is about the city as the geo-cultural form and the historical realization of being-knowledge-value paradigm in physical space. Civilizations develop a spatial perception in their process of formation through assuming the centrality of the locations in which they originate. Sometimes this is even reflected in the etymology of the names. For instance, the word "China" in Mandarin language, *Zhōngguo,* first appeared in sixth century B.C. during Zhou dynasty and means central/middle (*zhōng*) kingdom/country since they believed that China was the center of civilization. It is worth noting that the same concept also implied a claim for political legitimacy as a precondition of political order. The Chinese Wall, on the other hand, was seen as a boundary between the civilized spatial center and the uncivilized lands—the same concept continued to be used in modern times demonstrating the continuity of this perception.

Similarly, the Arabic name of Egypt, "*Misr,"* originally connoted civilization and metropolis parallel to the literal meaning of "the two straits." It is also interesting that Egyptians have been using the term *Umm al-Dunya* (Mother of the World) for their land. Persians, on the other hand, divided the world into seven regions (*kishver*) composed of seven equal spheres, and located their own space on the fourth, which is the central sphere. The Greek had an Aegean-centered spatial perception extending from Sicily to Caspian Sea. *Homer*, *Anaximander* of Miletus and *Anaximenes* had the same visions of space but used different methodologies to describe it. However, this perception changed in the post-Alexandrian era. The city of Alexandria became the center of a new spatial perception developed by *Eratosthenes*, *Strabo,* and *Ptolemy* in a way that included Persia and India, bridging civilizational and political domains. The fact that Romans called the Mediterranean Sea *Mare Nostrum* (Our Sea) and the idiom "all roads lead to Rome" similarly reflect the relationship between the perception of space and political order. The Jewish term *ha-Aretz ha-Muvtahat* (promised land) gave a metaphysical meaning and spirit to a particular area as the center of spatial perception. Hans Küng's comparison between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is striking in that regard: "The land, or precisely a particular 'holy' land, does not have a

special saving significance either for Christianity, which understands itself as a universal people of God, tied to no ethnic or geographical frontiers, or for Islam, despite its Arab origin and character similarly does not make any distinction between the lands. However, for Judaism, which preserved its primal bond with the land of Israel (Hebrew *Eretz Israel*) even in the time of the 'dispersion' (Greek *Diaspora*), the relation to this particular land, the 'promised' land, is quite essential."[28]

Jerusalem, on the other hand, became the spiritual and civilizational center for the entire Abrahamic tradition, including Christianity and Islam. Similarly, Cosmas Indicopleustes' *Topographia Christiana* was an attempt to develop a spatial perception compatible with Christian teachings.[29]

Islamic civilization has developed a spatial perception reflecting its teachings and its domain of political order. Balkhi School's Mecca-centered globular terrestrial maps and al-Biruni's maps connecting the Atlantic and Indian oceans exemplify the influence of Islamic teachings and symbols and also mark the political domain of Islamic civilization.[30] Ottoman Empire's self-representation as "an eternal state sovereign over seven climates (regions)" similarly connects spatial perception with political order.

Modern Western civilization's spatial perception and claims for centrality were shored up by scientific developments especially in the area of geography. In his analysis of the mentality of the Western man (homo Occidentalis), Johann Galtung suggests that in the Western perception of the space, "the Occident, and particularly Western Europe and North America, constitutes the center of the world, the rest being the periphery, with the center as the prime mover."[31] This Eurocentric conception of space formed the basis of the world maps where Europe is always located at the upper center of the world, and the categorical differentiation between the center and periphery later paved the way to the colonial world order.

The historical emergence of a civilizational space has three preconditions: a geopolitical zone suitable for the security and basic needs, geo-economic zone for the integrity of economic activity, and geo-cultural milieu for the consistency and continuity of cultural life. Historical civilizations emerged and rose in an integrated space where these conditions were met. The emergence of early civilizations in places where there are rich sources of water (Egypt/Nile, Mesopotamia/Euphrates-Tigris, India/Indus-Ganges, China/Yellow River) proves the necessity of provision of security and basic needs. The trade routes such as the Silk Road accelerated the spread of civilizational values and commodities. Cities, as geo-cultural units of civilizations, played an essential role in forming a micro-cosmic model for civilizational order and interaction.

The "pivotal cities"[32] of civilizations serve as the milestones of the history of the rise and fall of civilizations since their fate gets identified

with the fate of the civilization within which they emerge. These cities stand as the structured historical realization of civilizational parameters in time and space, sometimes in the form of architecture or in the rhythm of music, sometimes in the continuity of intellectual tradition or an efficient market at the crossroads of trade, and sometimes as the center of a political order. These pivotal cities can be classified in six groups in terms of their relationships with civilizations.

(i) The Pioneer Cities of Civilizations as the First Founding Nucleus

These cities emerge historically before the rise of the civilization they belong to and form the model for the upcoming cities and social structures. The best examples of these cities are Pataliputra in Indian, Athens in Greek, Rome in Roman, and Madinah in Islamic civilizations. Arians established Pataliputra as a microcosm of their spatial perception of the universe and also of their vision of social structure (caste system). With this character it became the capital of rising Indian political order under Mauryans. During the reign of Asoka, it reached the peak of its prosperity paralleling the rise of Indian civilization and emerged as the world's largest city with a population of 150,000–300,000. Athens did not only have a city-state structure reflecting Greek cosmological and social imagination but also played a vital role for Greek colonies as the model of political order. The city of Rome reflected all characteristics of the Roman civilization and preceded its imperial order. Madinah was established by the Prophet Mohammad himself as the spatial nucleus of a new worldview and political order. The Prophet himself, for instance, specified the principles and the structure of the market in the city. The Madinah model has been imitated and replicated by many different states, races, and cultures in different parts of the world.

(ii) The Cities Established by Civilizations as the Model and Center of Political Order

These cities are established after the emergence and sometimes even after the rise of civilizations. Some examples of these cities are Beijing, Persepolis, Alexandria, Baghdad, Semerkand, Cordoba, Paris, London, Berlin, and New York. The basic parameters of the respective civilizations had already been shaped when these cities were established. Beijing originated as a garrison town during Chou dynasty and transformed into an imperial capital city. Persepolis was established by Cyrus and became the capital of Persian imperial order during Darius the Great.[33] Alexandria carried all the characteristics of the Alexandrian era. Baghdad was established by the Abbasids during the golden age of Islamic civilization as a cultural, economic, and political capital reflecting all of its achievements. Paris, London, and Berlin developed parallel to the cultural, eco-

nomic, and political transformations of the Western civilization. New York has risen as the spatial model of late modernity—an era in which Western civilization has established world hegemony.

(iii) The Transferred City After the Completion of the Civilizational Formation

These are the cities transferred to different spaces and rebuilt as stations of civilizational expansion and as agents of the "world order" vision of the originary civilization. The cities established by and named after Alexander during the Hellenistic era carried the same characteristics to different parts of the world.[34] Likewise, the Ottoman cities in Balkans exhibited the characteristics of the Anatolian city structure, which can be observed in the similarities between Bursa and Filipov or Sarajevo. Singapore and Hong-Kong stand as two examples of the contemporary version of transferred cities that imitate New York as the hub of financial flows.

(iv) The Cities Which Were Eliminated Together with the Civilization by the Spread of Another Civilization

The elimination of Dravidian cities Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa[35] after the Arian invasion in India; and the elimination of the cities of Maya, Inca, and Aztec civilizations after the invasion of Spanish conquistadores are the examples of the cities that are annihilated altogether with their home civilizations as a result of the invasion of another civilization.

(v) The Cities Which Were Built After the Elimination of a Civilization

The best example of this category is Mexico City, which was re-established by the Spanish conquistadors in the same area after totally destructing the previous authentic capital of the Aztec civilization, *Tenochtitlan*.[36] Today there are three layers of Mexico City; first the geological layer, second the underground layer composed of destroyed Aztec city, and third the modern Mexico City as we now see it on the surface. Hence, the destruction of *Tenochtitlan* in 1521 and the rise of Mexico City after rebuilding in 1524 embodied the civilizational history of the destruction of the Aztec civilization and the rise of Western colonialism.

(vi) The Cities That Had the Experience of Being the Center of Different Civilizations

Some cities have been shaped and reshaped along with the history of the rise and fall of civilizations and served as capitals or pivotal cities of different civilizations. Their diverse and robust historical backgrounds made them active subjects of history by equipping them with the capacity to transform cultures and reshape civilizations. Jerusalem, Damascus,

and Istanbul stand as the paradigmatic examples of such cities. Istanbul, for instance, is a product of three different civilizational prototypes: a polytheist Roman, an Orthodox Byzantine, and a Muslim Ottoman. A civilizational spirit moving from Rome established the city, and another civilizational spirit coming from Jerusalem as a reflection of Christianity transformed it. Finally another civilizational spirit that originated in Madinah and matured in Damascus, Baghdad, Cordoba, and Buhara reached to Istanbul and embedded its heritage in it. Hence, Istanbul became a civilizational mixture of Rome, Jerusalem, and Madinah as different pioneer cities. A similar trajectory can be observed in the histories of Jerusalem and Damascus both of which reflect spatial perceptions of different civilizations.

6. CONVENTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION: CITY, STATE, AND "WORLD ORDER"

Civilizations do not emerge in spatial or temporal isolation, but rather the confluence of a system of being-knowledge-value with the time and space perceptions places mentality in a dialectical relationship with history, out of which civilizations flourish. This leads us to a certain notion of "order" as a conventional and institutional structure.

The cities in which law formed the foundation of social order, ethics and efficiency-based market formed the medium of economic order, and bureaucracy formed the mechanical instrument of political structure have been the focal places of order throughout history. States represent the translation of this order into a more sophisticated structure in an integrated geographical zone and cultural, economic, and political sphere. World order, in that sense, marks the most comprehensive realization of order in terms of internal social consistency, geographical prevalence, and historical continuity. Yet, it does not necessarily have to be prevailing everywhere in the world or throughout all times. Sargon's Akkadian, Darius' Achaemenidian, Alexander's Helenistic, or Asoka's Mauryan imperial orders, Pax Romana, Abbasid Caliphate, and Pax Ottomana were all different world orders established by their respective civilizational traditions.

Establishing an order is a process of reflecting a worldview unto historical existence. The close relationship between "worldview" and "world order" is an indication of the existence of civilizations as historical actors. The history of civilizations shows us that serious philosophical and intellectual transformations lead to social, economic, and political transformations after a few centuries, and lay the ground for a comprehensive understanding of world order. For instance, Darius' imperial order of Persian civilization in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. was founded upon a revival and restoration of Zoroastrian tradition in the

previous centuries. Darius himself was not only a reformer of Persian administrative system, but also a devout believer in Ahura Mazda. Intellectual and spiritual restoration, in other words, preceded political and administrative restoration and led to a particular world order.

Similarly, intellectual movements in Ancient Greece in the seventh to fifth centuries B.C. were translated into the Hellenic world order by Alexander the Great whose political system controlled the main civilizational basins of the time. The cities named after Alexander the Great in Afro-Eurasian mainland became both centers of power and locus of civilizational transfusion. In the Indian civilizational basin, an intellectual transformation that commenced in the seventh to fifth centuries B.C. and was symbolized in the personalities of Buddha and Jain created a new Indian self-perception and stirred the revival of Indian civilization. In so doing, it challenged the established order based on the previous civilizational structures. This intellectual transformation then provided the foundations for Asoka's Mauryan imperial order after two to three centuries. Likewise in almost the same period, Lao Tzu and Confucius in China created intellectual currents that prepared the ground for the rise of the order of the Great Han dynasty, which is symbolized in the building of the Chinese Wall. Roman transformation from an Italian city-state into an imperial order took place after the encounter of Roman polytheism with the sophisticated Greek philosophy, and especially with the Stoic tradition, which provided a cosmopolitan spirit to that transformation. Roman world order developed gradually in a melting pot blending the intellectual and institutional accumulations of previous civilizations and marked the pinnacle of a political order based on a common law. So much so that the succeeding traditions which tried to establish a world order adopted different versions of the name Caesar as the title of their rulers: Ottoman *Kayser-i Rum*, Russian *Tzar*, and German *Kaiser*.

The rise of Islam presents a further example of the relationship between worldview and world order. Islamic worldview based on the doctrine of *Tawhid* produced an intellectual/spiritual transformation and led to a new civilizational revival that brought together almost all authentic civilizational basins from Spain to India within a single political order. The transformation of the Islamic worldview into a civilizational world order happened as a consequence of its speedy spread. By conquering Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Iran in just a few years, Muslims, within a short period of time, took under their authority almost all areas formerly unified by Alexander the Great, and became neighbors with the Indian and Roman civilizations. Thus, they encountered with other civilizations and entered into a dynamic and profound process of civilizational interaction.

The Islamic being-knowledge-value paradigm was the basic motor force behind the new syntheses that emerged in and through civilizational interactions. Harun Rashid's Baghdad, and Cordoba and Granada in

the golden age of Andalusia were the most inclusive and accommodative examples of multiculturalism throughout human history, and they all have traces of multidimensional interactions between Islamic and other worldviews. The trade routes reaching from the eastern Mediterranean to China and Indonesia through the Silk Road contributed to that process by functioning as the artery of civilizational interaction.

The latest example of the transformation of ancient civilizational basins into a new world order through an Islamic worldview was *Pax Ottomana*. Ottoman concepts such as *kanun-i kadim* (ancient law reaching back to the beginning of humanity) and *devlet-i ebed müddet* (eternal state) are clear reflections of Ottoman vision of world order that brings together both history and future in its self-perception.

Modern Western civilization went through a comprehensive intellectual transformation between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, which induced a radical change in its being-knowledge-value system. In the first stage of this civilizational transformation, Renaissance and Reformation achieved an intellectual revolution and mercantilism generated an economic sea change, and together they created a new political order—that is the Westphalian nation-state system established after the collapse of the preceding traditional political order of the Holy Roman Empire. In the second stage, Newtonian, Industrial, and French revolutions transfigured the perceptions of natural, economic, and political order and led to two important developments: the Congress of Vienna as the European system of political order and colonialism as the new world order prevailing across the globe. The power structure of the European center expanded itself into the periphery through the colonial world order. The momentum that was brought about by these deep changes placed Europe at the center of international political and economic order in the nineteenth century.

The transition from European colonialism to *Pax Americana* took place through a new international legal system and institutional design. The declaration of the Wilsonian principles and the establishment of the League of Nations after the First World War were the precursors to the transition to Pax Americana, which was completed by the establishment of the UN and the Bretton Woods systems as the political and economic mechanisms of the new world order in the post-World War II period. The end of the Cold War with the fall of Berlin Wall was a strong indicator of the need for a new international convention along with the rise of globalization. The delay of this readjustment of the world order did not only lead to frozen conflicts in sensitive geopolitical, geo-economic, and geocultural zones, but also provoked a global level tension for power sharing.

We now stand in the midst of the most comprehensive civilizational transformation in history whereby almost all accumulated human heritage is becoming part of a complex process of interaction in the form of

globalization. With globalization, modernity's static nature has been dissolved, similar to the transformation Greek values went through when they were carried by Alexander the Great to Iran and India. On the other hand, Buddha statutes began to be built like Zeus statutes in India. We are now experiencing a similar process of differentiation and transformation. Globalization is for modernity what Alexander the Great's era is for ancient Greece. We see three reactions to this process. First is the Stoic reaction to give a new meaning to the expanding scale. This is an attempt to create a new cosmos through transitioning from the gods of Greece to one God and one single order. One can think of the discourse of the "New World Order" articulated after the end of the Cold War as a Stoic reaction. Second is the Cynic reaction epitomized in Diogenes' response to Alexander: "stand out of my sun." While Stoics seek to establish a universal order, Cynic reaction is inward-looking. Today's postmodernism can be seen as a Cynic reaction, as it posits the locality, personality, and subjectivity of reality in contrast to the universal reality of modernity. Cynic reaction fosters pluralism, but does not necessarily lead to an order. Stoic reaction, on the other hand, seeks to establish a totalistic order, yet at the expense of pluralism. The third reaction is the Epicurean search for happiness on the basis of physical existence and pleasure. It is the driving logic of global consumption culture epitomized in the worldwide symbols of consumer goods and chains.[37]

CONCLUSION: CO-EXISTENCE OF CIVILIZATIONS WITHIN GLOBALIZATIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE CHALLENGE OF WORLD ORDER

The presumption behind the singular use of the term "civilization" for the entire humanity was that non-Western civilizations would vaporize from history in the course of modernization and globalization. This prediction did not come true. The authentic civilizational entities did not only survive but also began a new process of reawakening and revitalization. This impressive process of revival is taking place despite the transformative power of globalization toward monopolization and homogenization of human culture, transnationalization of economic and political institutions, de-traditionalization of the authentic social and cultural forms of civilizations, de-personalization of communicational links and institutionalization of the power-centric political hegemony. This leaves us at a productive paradox: we are witnessing the simultaneous rise of a monolithic global culture across the world and a revitalization of traditional worldviews, values, institutions, and structures of authentic civilizations—both in their traditional spaces and also at the very core of Western cities.

In light of this dynamic civilizational revitalization, there is a pressing need to reexamine the simplistic sequentialization of westernization, modernization, and globalization that operate within the framework of the idea of progress. The shift from westernization to modernization and from modernization to globalization also evinces a psychological shift that can be detected even in the semantic roots of these concepts. The spatial emphasis in westernization is no longer there in modernization, which instead has a temporal reference. Yet, modernization was still construed as a Eurocentric process flowing unidirectionally from Europe to other places. The transition from modernization to globalization is much more comprehensive in terms of time and space. Globalization mobilizes all societies across the world in a much more multidirectional way such that it renders one-dimensional accounts of civilizational difference insubstantial. In other words, the *globe* as a whole is becoming the arena of historical flow. Chinese, Muslims, Indians, Africans, and Latin Americans are once again participants in the making of history due to this dynamic character of globalization. The supposedly passive objects/followers of modernization are becoming active subjects of globalization. Hence, despite the similarities shared in the instruments of globalization, different civilizations are going through different processes of globalizations depending on their traditional structures and modern experiences. The instruments of globalizations in our age have created the conditions for an all-inclusive process in which different civilizational experiences interact in the same time and space.

Therefore the main challenge we are facing today is one of establishing a new vision of world order that will accommodate and harmonize different histories, experiences, and understandings of reviving civilizations. What is called for to achieve this coexistence is inclusive and pluralistic civilizational interaction, not hegemony.

NOTES

1. For the analysis of these assumptions see my foreword in this book, entitled "Civilizational Revival in the Global Age."

2. For the philosophy of Upanishads, see F. Max Muller, ed., *Upanishads, The Holy Spirit of Vedas* (Delhi: Vijay Goel, 2007); and Will Durant, *Our Oriental Heritage: The Story of Civilization I* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 410-415.

3. For a detailed analysis on the rise of Hinduism and the building up castes, see William Wilson Hunter, *The Indian Empire: Its People, History, Products* (first published in London: 1886; re-printed in New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 2005), 191-228.

4. Hans Küng, *Judaism: Between Yesterday and Tomorrow* (New York, Continuum, 1999), 40.

5. I analyzed the ontological hierarchy and differentiation between the Creator and the created in Islamic paradigm in a detailed way in *Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western "Weltanschauungs" on Political Theory* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994), 47-78.

6. For the analysis of the relationship between modernity and the transformation of Christianity see Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Bunalımdan Dönüşüme Batı Medeniyeti ve Hıristiyanlık (Western Civilization and Christianity: From Crisis to Transformation)," *Divan*, No. 9 (2000): 1-74.

7. Original title: "The White Man's Burden: The United States and The Philippine Islands," *McClure's Magazine,* No. 12 (Feb., 1899).

8. Benjamin Fortson, *Indo-European Language and Culture: An Introduction* (Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 27.

9. I explicated this conception of knowledge in another article, "İslami Düşünce Geleneğinin Temelleri, Oluşum Süreci ve Yeniden Yorumlanması," *Divan,* No. 1 (1996): 28-30. I also analyzed the conception of knowledge in the Islamic tradition under the title of "Epistemological Unity of Truth: Harmonization of Knowledge" in *Alternative Paradigms*, 78–82.

10. "When he understood the condition of mankind, and that the greatest part of them were like brute beasts, he knew that all wisdom, direction and good success, consisted in what the messenger of God had spoken, and the Law delivered; and there was no other way besides this, and there could be nothing added to it." Ibn Tufayl, *The Improvement of Human Reason Exhibited in the Life of Hayy Ibn Yakzan*, translated into English by S. Ockley (Cairo: Al-Ma'aref Printing Office, 1905), 68.

11. I analyzed the conception of knowledge in the Western paradigm under the title of "Epistemological Particularization of Truth: Secularization of Knowledge," in *Alternative Paradigms*, 34–39.

12. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, in Great Books of Western World, Mortimer J. Adler, ed., vol. 8 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1990), 339.

13. For this textual and conceptual web, see Henry Rosemont, Jr., ed., *Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts* (La Salle: Open Court, 1991).

14. For the conceptual and historical analysis of Taoist philosophy see Will Durant, *Our Oriental Heritage: The Story of Civilization I* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 653-658.

15. Harld Roth, "Who Compiled *Chuang Tzu*?" in Henry Rosemont, Jr., ed., *Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts,* 102-103.

16. Patricia Buckley Ebrey, *Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook* (New York: Free Press, 1993), 19.

17. For Buddha doctrine of *Karma* see: William Wilson Hunter, *The Indian Empire: Its People, History, Products*, 141-142.

18. Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture Club Road, 1986), 76.

19. Al Khazini, *Kitab Mizan al-Hikmah*, translated into English by C.N. Khanikoff as "Book of the Balance of Wisdom: An Arabic Work on the Water-Balance," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 6:1-128 (1860): 3-4, cited in Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Alternative Paradigms*, 84.

20. For example, Will Durant, *Our Oriental Heritage: The Story of Civilization I*, 642-645.

21. See Romila Thapar, *The Penguin History of Early India from the Origins to AD 1300* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2002), 98-100.

22. Will Durant, *Caesar and Christ: The Story of Civilization III*, 159.

23. See my article regarding this comparison, "Philosophical and Institutional Dimension of Secularization: A Comparative Analysis," in *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, Azzam Tamimi and John Esposito, eds., (London: Hurst and Company, 2000), 190-201.

24. Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Biruni, *Alberuni's India,* edited and translated into English by Edward C. Sachau (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1910; re-printed in New Delhi: Rupa and Co., 2002).

25. For a detailed analysis, see Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Tarih İdraki Oluşumunda Metodolojinin Rolü: Medeniyetlerarası Etkileşim Açısından Dünya Tarihi ve Osmanlı (World History and Ottoman Empire)," *Divan*, No. 7 (1999): 1-91.

26. Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Philosophical and Institutional Dimension of Secularization," 190-191.
27. Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, John Hallowell, ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1975), 18.
28. Hans Küng, *Judaism: Between Yesterday and Tomorrow*, 45.
29. See Lloyd A. Brown, *The Story of Maps* (New York: Dover, 1977), 89-91.
30. For Islamic cartography, see S. Maqbul Ahmad, "Harita," *DİA*, v. 16 (Istanbul: TDV, 1997), 205-210.
31. Johann Galtung, "On the Dialectic Between Crisis and Crises Perception," in *Europe at the Crossroads,* S. Musto and J. F. Minkele, eds. (New York: Praeger, 1985), 11.
32. I first used the concept of "pivotal city" in "Eksen Şehirler: Medeniyetlerin Kader Göstergeleri," *İzlenim* (May-June, 1996).
33. See Ali-Sami, *Persepolis (Takht-ı—Jamshid)* (Shiraz: Musavi Printing Office, 1970).
34. See P. M. Fraser, *Cities of Alexander the Great* (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1996).
35. For the importance of the cities of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa in Indian civilization see Herman Kulke, Dietmar Rothermund, *A History of India* (Croom-Helm Australia, 1986), 2, 17- 29.
36. See Hugh Thomas, *Conquest: Montezuma, Cortés, and the Fall of Old Mexico* (New York: Toucstone Rockefeller Center, 1993).
37. I provide a more comprehensive discussion of these reactions in the process of globalization in my article entitled "Globalization and the Crisis of Individual and Civilizational Consciousness," in Hans Köchler, ed., *Globality versus Democracy?: The Changing Nature of International Relations in the Era of Globalization* (Vienna: International Press Organization, 2000).

SIX

Western Democrats, Oriental Despots?

S. Sayyid[1]

One of the difficulties of the debate about Islam and democracy is that the main terms of the debate remain rather nebulous. Islam denotes a scriptural heritage, a set of societies in which it predominates, a cultural horizon, etc.[2] Democracy also operates in a variety of registers: academic, governmental, and popular. Alongside the narrow methodological definition often found in political science textbooks, there is a more diffused generalized understanding of democracy, in which "Democracy" is a metaphor for a political regime. There is considerable slippage between the methodological and the metaphorical use of the term. It is, however, the metaphorical use of the term that draws the boundaries around the technical elements considered to be central to the understanding of democracy and those considered to be marginal.[3] There are a variety of features that are considered to be constitutive of democracy, such as elections and peaceful transitions of power, and most definitions of "Democracy" refer to some or all of these features. The presence or absence of these features can be used to determine whether a particular polity is democratic or not. This is the approach that many NGOs and think tanks follow. Freedom House, for example, has been producing a listing of democratic countries since 1970, thus suggesting that a "Democracy" that lacked these key features would no longer be considered to be a "Democracy." There are, however, a number of difficulties with this conclusion. The literature is replete with various examples in which there is considerable muddying of the democratic waters. For example, was Hitler democratic because he was elected to power? The Enabling Act, which under-

wrote much of the Nazi take-over of power, was a piece of legislation legitimately passed. Was the United States democratic before the passing of the Civil Rights Acts that guaranteed adult African Americans the right to vote? Was Switzerland democratic before 1970, when women were given the right to vote? What are we to make of the "freedom of the press," in an age of oligopolistic media moguls, and to what extent is voting an exercise of autonomous individuals or the product of manipulation through clever advertising? What is interesting about these anomalies is that they do not seem to undermine the democratic status of some countries, whereas other anomalies are considered to be sufficient to discredit the democratic credentials of others. It could be argued that the difference is in the nature of the anomalies or it could be argued that the difference is in the nature of the different countries. The understanding of democracy, which sees it as typified by a list of key features, is inadequate; since the identity of "Democracy" is not based on substantive qualities, but, rather, like all identities it is relational and contrastive. In the case of "Democracy" its identity is derived from its negation of despotism. The elements that constitute "Democracy" gain their significance from being contrasted with elements that are considered to be constitutive of despotism. This frontier between "Democracy" and despotism has a long history.

Democracy begins in ancient Greece.[4] This is the dominant view of the genealogy of "Democracy"; but one, which immediately calls for a series of caveats. Firstly, it is not certain that democratic form is not a property of other city-state formations—for example, Sumerians or Phoenicians.[5] Secondly, not all of ancient Greece was democratic; it is principally Athens during the third to fifth centuries B.C. that is typified as democratic, and even in democratic Athens, women, slaves and foreigners were excluded from political participation.[6] The identification of "Democracy" with the Greeks proceeds, not from an enumeration of forms of governance by various Greek communities, but rather, from the Greeks' perception of themselves as free in contrast to the enslaved subjects of the Persian Great King. Greek freedom versus Persian slavery is one of the first instances of a trope within Western political thought, which is played as a variation on the theme of the opposition between Western "Democracy" and Oriental despotism.[7] The distinction between Greek democracy and Persian despotism arises most clearly in the wake of the Greek-Persian wars, and is one of the means by which the various anti-Persian, Greek city states forge a common identity facilitating the formation of a united front against the Persian invasions. The claim that Greeks were free, ruled by their peers, while Persians were slaves ruled by the first Oriental despot is like many of the claims that the Greeks made, taken to be historical rather than historiographical.[8] Many subsequent writers took this division between Greek democracy and Persian despotism seriously—so that this dichotomy between "Democracy" and despot-

ism has come to be seen as one of the great divides between the West and the Rest.[9] Since the "roots" of the West are most often traced to the formation of Greek civilization, democracy thus became a component of Western identity.[10] Democracy is articulated by its opposition to the supposed despotism of the Persian monarch (and behind the figure of King of Kings, a metonymic chain of monarchies and absolute rulers: from the Pharaohs of Egypt to the Great Kings of Assyria and by extension, the "Sons of Heaven" of China and India, the Caliphs and Sultans of Islam and the General Secretaries of CPSU). The other of "Democracy" was despotism, and despotism is found not in Sparta but in the sprawling Persian Empire. The freedom of the West is guaranteed by its contrast with the slavery of the Orient. As long as the West and the Orient are distinct, the West can always be freer than the Orient, and thus always more democratic than the Rest.[11] It is difficult to find any historical period in which the West is considered less free than the Orient (regardless of the evidentiary basis).[12] This of course allows the West to present its imperium as a form of liberation so that we could continue to call the leading members of the West (e.g., Britain, France) democratic even when they held direct sway over millions of people denied rights of self-determination (for example, French North Africa, British India).

There is, however, another possible reading in which we do not associate the quality of freedom with the designation of a society as being "Western" or "Oriental," but, rather, with a consideration of the ways in which agrarian societies were disciplined and regulated. A comparison of ancient Athens, with a population of perhaps a quarter of a million and a "police force" of perhaps six hundred,[13] with the Persian Empire with a population at least ten times larger and a permanent military establishment numbering in the tens of thousands, in terms of their respective capacity to regulate their societies, suggests a variance with the popular conception of Greek freedom and Persian despotism. Ancient Athens was a far more tightly disciplined society than that controlled by the Persian King of Kings.[14] The King of Kings may have had a permanent administration, a permanent military and have been able to draw on regular tributes; however, in all instances, the imperatives of imperial control entailed cooperation with and reliance upon local elites. Prior to colonial European empires, all agrarian empires lacked the skilled personnel to penetrate deeply into the communities they governed.[15] The Persian ruling elite made a virtue of this weakness by developing a discourse that allowed them to preside over complex and diverse groups and societies by following what we could call a multicultural strategy, in which the King of Kings, ruled as Pharaoh in Egypt, the vicar of Marduk in Babylon, and so on. In other words, Persian rule was based on a high level of the self-management of its constituent communities. The King of Kings ruled over peoples who believed in one God, many gods, or no

god; his concern, however, was limited to the extraction of general deference for his authority and the payment of tribute.

In contrast, it can be argued that the claustrophobia, which often features in small-scale societies (in which everybody knows everybody), can produce small town totalitarianism in the context of a politically mobilized citizenry. That is, a disciplinary society in which the pressure to conform to the conventions of that society is insistent and intrusive. The citizens of Athens lived among such a highly politicized and highly mobilized citizenry.[16] Neighbors could be a combination of informers, prosecutors, juries, and judges. A consequence of a population that is mobilized and intensely politicized is to erode any distinction between the public and the private. At the same time, the relatively circumscribed area of the Athenian state meant that there was little respite from snoopy gossipy neighbors with political axes to grind.[17] One could thus be mischievous and suggest that it is just as useful to see in Athens the dawning of "totalitarianism" as it to see the dawn of "Democracy."[18] This is perhaps one way to understand the assertions made on behalf of the Athenian polis as the place marking the emergence of politics itself.[19] The intensified capacity for surveillance, the intense mobilizations are all considered to be the hallmarks of modern totalitarianism (the major difference between Athenian "totalitarianism" and its modern counterparts has to do with the absence of a permanent bureaucracy and a permanent military). The "democratic" Athenian polity could not tolerate individuals whose beliefs did not accord with that of the polity itself, as many Athenians (including, most famously, Socrates), found to their cost. Even though the historical record does not support the idea of a clear-cut distinction on grounds of individual liberty between Greek democracy and Persian despotism, such a sharp distinction has emerged in the form of Western democracies and oriental despotisms. In other words, the distinction between despotism and democracy is too complex and too blurred in real life to be made with dogmatic certainty. It is difficult to conclude that Athenian citizens were freer than Persians subjects, simply by focusing on the constitutional form of these two political entities. To make the distinction credible, it requires that despotism and "Democracy" become over-determined as categories associated with grand cultural formations. Thus, "Democracy" is Western and despotism is oriental. This demarcation between the West and the Orient may not have been sedimented until the early modern period, but it has its roots in the retrospective construction of Western cultural identity through its contrast with an Oriental cultural formation.[20] In other words, the frontier between "Democracy" and despotism also corresponds with a frontier between the West and the Orient, and while this frontier did not stabilize until the end of what is called the early modern period, its precursors could be found in the beginning of ancient history. Not only does "Democracy" begin with the ancient Greeks, the West also begins with

the ancient Greeks. Democracy becomes a signifier of the West, within the narration of Western identity. Thus, from the very beginning, it is possible to see how the discourses of Western identity were intertwined with the discourses of "Democracy" or its cognates. As such, there is hardly a period in human history in which the regions that are considered to be the core of Western patrimony are generally considered to be less free than the realms that are associated with the Orient.[21] Western historiography has tended to ensure that the link between the West and "Democracy" remains unbroken. The narration of "Democracy" is also the means by which Western identity is narrated. Thus the instance of the non-democratic government of the Third Reich problematizes the membership of the Third Reich as a member of the West. Similarly, the racialized denial of democracy in the nation-empires of Britain or France has been made palatable by making the distinction between home and abroad almost hermetic. Thus one could always claim a democratic status for these countries because of the rights that metropolitan populations enjoyed, while excluding accounts of the denial of many of those rights to their imperial subjects. Nor is it mere coincidence that the emergence of absolutist monarchies in Europe enhances the significance of maintaining the distinction between Orient and West, hence the introduction of "despotism" as a term marking out the rule of the Ottoman empire as being fundamentally distinct from the strong monarchies of Europe.[22]

What is at stake in the distinction between "Democracy" and despotism is not merely a set of governmental procedures or styles; rather it is a way of life. The content of the difference between "Democracy" and despotism is based on the way in which the political forms refer to distinct cultural formations. (What is important is not that the boundaries of these cultural formations are fuzzy and ultimately have no essence, but rather that they operate as being "superhard."[23] Attempts to "deconstruct" the West and Orient division by, for example, showing how the roots of the West can be found in Mesopotamia or (even) Islam fail to understand that the distinction between the West and Orient is not purely an empirical one, which can be corrected by bringing in new data. The West is a discursive object, the identity of which is formed by making it distinct from other discursive objects. The logic of identification imposes the distinction between the West and non-West. Attempts to show the Near Eastern roots of Western civilization only aim to shift the boundaries between the West and the rest, rather than to abolish the distinction itself. Attempts to demonstrate that the West-Orient divide is reductive, by pointing out elements which supposedly blur these distinctions, are based on essentialist reading of West and Orient, for example, arguing that Islam in Spain was Western[24] or that Yusuf Islam (Cat Stevens) is a Westerner who is Muslim.[25] Such positions can only derive from a sense of the West that is unchanging; thus, Spain or Sicily or Cat Stevens have a Western essence, which can always be located beneath the Islamicate

surface. Neither what constitutes the West nor the Orient is immutable in itself, what is immutable is the presence of the frontier itself. In other words, as long as the discourse that specifies Western exceptionality vis-à-vis the rest of the world continues to be articulated, it will always require a frontier to determine what is included and what is excluded from that exceptionality. This is why objections as to the specific histories or societies falling on one side of the frontier or the other may vary over time, but it is the frontier that remains and constitutes the identity of both West and Orient. These identifications do not exist outside the frontier. The boundary between Western democracy and oriental despotism can shift (and has shifted) but it cannot by definition be removed without dissolving the West-Orient dyad. The contrast, however, between oriental despotism and Western "Democracy" is constant, even if the meaning of democracy as such is not fixed. In fact, it could be easily demonstrated that while various signifiers have denoted the political system of the Western cultural formation, the contrast between West and Orient has been key to determining the identity of those signifiers. The description of political regimes in Western political thought is conducted against the backdrop of the constitutive difference between the West and the "Orient," the discourse of "Democracy" is not an exception to this.

The discourse of the West is not merely (or even mainly) produced by academics and scribblers; it is a discourse that is constituted by the contemporary world order. The West is not reducible to machinations of what has been called the Western conglomerate state,[26] though this political entity is often decisive in articulating the frontier between the West and its others. Commentators, who are swift to dismiss the idea of a West as some essentialist fantasy, and keen to point to its fragmented nature, ignore the way in which the West is manifested throughout the world in a mundane and almost banal sense. There is often confusion between the nominal unity of the West and its substantive properties. The West, like other collective identities such as Islam or America, is a name that erases differences; to point to the (internal) differences that constitute the West (or any other collectivity) does not diminish the way in which heterogeneous elements which constitute these collective formations are marshalled under one signifier. The identity of signifiers (including, for example, "Democracy") arises from inclusion in a system of differences; thus to assert that the identity of democracy is a function of its contrast with other signifiers is not to engage in essentialism, since we are dealing with logical and nominal entities not substantive prosperities.[27] Within Western political thought the articulation of the West (what it is, what it means, who is part of it) is a decisive move prior to the articulation of forms of political regimes. The link between "Democracy" and the West is not purely opportunistic or merely accidental, it is part of set of sedimented (and naturalized) practices which form the identity of both "Democracy" and the West.

DEFINING THE DEMOS

The conflation between "Democracy" and the West has important implications for the way the demos is conceived and constructed. "Democracy" as a political system is often justified (in popular terms) as the expression of the will of the people; this translates, within the conceptual language of liberalism, into the will of individuals. In other words, the rule of the demos becomes the means by which individuals express their own political preferences.[28] "Democracy," by providing the means by which individuals can find political expression, becomes the political system that is most in accord with what it is be human, since it allows individuals to choose their political arrangements, and as individuals form the basis of all human social arrangements. The authentic experience of being human can only be discovered within the context of a "Democratic" regime. In other words, "Democracy" provides the arena in which the essence of being human can be acted out. The significance of this is that the idea of an essential human presupposes that there are humans who are inessential. The universal nature of a human essence is belied by the way in which any set of humans who are chosen to display that essence must do so in particular way. Humanity, as a general category, only becomes concrete in its culturally embedded form. Within Western supremacist discourse the essence of what is to be human is clearly identified by the practices of homo occidentalis, the idea being that it is only in the West that humans are truly human and everything else is either cultural accretion or a deviation from that norm. Racist ideologies have made this relationship explicit and such racist discourses continue to influence the way in which humans are conceptualized. The idea of what constitutes the authentic essence of humankind has now become related to being the same as what is authentic within Western cultural practices. Thus, "Democracy" allows true human identity to realize itself—other forms of governance, however, act as restrictions and constraints on human identity. "Democracy," by removing restrictions and lifting constraints, allows humans to be truly human. Universal values are, as such, considered to be incarnate in the West. Western supremacist discourse claims that universal values are not something that you can find everywhere; they are strictly speaking the property of the West. Thus the universal cannot be generated from every history or from every region. It has a home, it has a particular history, and for any cultural formation that wishes to partake of universal values, it has to make its way to the home of these values, by following a specific historical sequence. "Democracy" then becomes the way towards excavating these values that are hardwired into the essence of humanity by establishing a procedure through which the (essential) qualities of being human can find authoritative public expression. It cannot be understood merely as a set of institutional and procedural arrangements. The nature of "Democ-

racy" is linked to a wider horizon of what the world is like, the question of human nature and ultimately what is seen to be the destiny of the world itself. Over-determining the explicit appeals to "Democracy" are implicit assumptions that democratization is only possible via Westernization. It functions within the contemporary world as a marker of a specific cultural formation. The actual difference between "Democracy" and despotism is culturally discussed as the difference between tyranny and freedom or any of its analogues; however, it is actually more about the difference between Western culture and its others. "Democracy," therefore, operates more as a cultural marker than as a designator of a settled set of procedures and practices, and it is this convergence between "Democracy" and Western identity which makes it so difficult to imagine a regime that can be generally considered to be both simultaneously democratic and anti-Western. Accordingly an anti-Western regime cannot be a "Democracy" regardless of how many elections it may hold, how transparent its governmental procedures maybe, or how just its legal framework maybe.

The difficulty of articulating Western despotism and oriental democracies is not purely empirical; it is also dependent on the way in which "Democracy" operates as a marker of cultural identity. "Democracy" is the name by which Western political practices are staged; similarly despotism is the name given to the politics practiced by the Orient. Both the Orient and the West refer, not to geographical entities, but to complex cultural formations with mobile boundaries, which can shift as a result of changes in political practices. For example, Russia can be Oriental during the Cold War, and yet it becomes Western as soon as it introduces electoral politics, engages in the language of "Democracy," but more importantly, becomes a de facto supporter of U.S. foreign policy in relation to the periphery, for example Iraq.[29] "Democracy" is a name for a way of life beyond its specific mechanisms and procedures. The concept of "Democracy" gains its unity and its coherence by constant implicit or explicit contrast with despotism. Democracy is what despotism is not. Despotism is not, however, a category that is more secure than "Democracy," it is also given its identity by contrast to "Democracy." This game of mirrors between "Democracy" and despotism, as being formed relationally and through the negation of the other category, is over-determined by cultural signatures. It is the relative stability (the *longue duree*) of these cultural signifiers that helps sustain their signifieds, including political systems. Democracy and despotism are marked elements, where the marking takes the form of cultural prefix: Western and Oriental. The stability of these prefixes allows "Democracy" and despotism to be fixed, as part of the frontier, which divides the West from the Rest.

During the period 1945-1991, the meaning of Western democracies was given by their contrast to the oriental despotism of the Communist bloc. Thus, "Democracy" began to expand so that it was no longer simply

concerned with the political equality of those defined as citizens, but was also concerned (to greater or lesser degree) with issues of social and economic equality. The identity of "Democracy" was based on the constitutive contrast with communist totalitarianism, but is in the process of being transformed as a result of the collapse of the communist system of governance, and it is perhaps not coincidental that questions of social and economic equality are considered to be less and less central to "Democracy."

The constitutive relationship between "Democracy" and the West presents a problem for cultural formations of the world that find it difficult to be re-described as Western. For in these instances "Democracy" can be used as means of violent repression. In the name of "Democracy" (either actually existing or that is to come), many regimes have excluded and repressed Islamists, asserting that the anti-Western nature of Islamism is a threat to "Democracy."[30] A clear example here is the so-called "postmodern" coup that removed the Refah (Welfare) Party from power in Turkey, as is the military intervention which prevented the victory of the FIS in the Algerian elections. I take it for granted that all of these instances can be seen in a variety of lights, and one should not be surprised that the various champions of "Democracy" act in their own interests and thus have a rather self-serving definition of "Democracy." The politics of the deployment of the concept of "Democracy" are, however, not only reducible to opportunism and short-term tactical calculations; rather it is this opposition between the Western and the Oriental which sets the context for the Islamicate world's engagement with "Democracy." It is this engagement that I wish to examine in the next section of the chapter.

ISLAMICATE PARADIGMS OF GOOD GOVERNMENT

Historically, it is possible to identify five models of good government within Muslim political thought. The first model was that of the first Islamic state established in Medina under the leadership of the Prophet. This remains the paradigmatic model of good government for all Muslims. This model could only survive as a horizon, following the death of the Lord of Medina, since it relied upon divinely guided Prophetic interventions. In the absence of such guidance, Muslim political thought focused on the Caliphate as the crystallization of Islamicate good government, a feature recognized in classical Islamicate historiography as the rule of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs who became the models of good government. The rightly guided caliphs had to rule without Prophetic abilities (however, their role as close companions of the Prophet provided them with ontological privilege by proxy, or in case of Ali, ontological privilege by blood—at least according to the Shia) and could thus be

more appropriate models of good government. This second model eventually came to dominate what became the majority strand within Muslim political thought. Running alongside this strand was a perspective in which Islamically-sanctioned good government was only possible under the rulership of Imams, who could trace their descent directly from the family of the Lord of Medina, via issue of his daughter and nephew. In other words, the descendants of the Prophet are ontologically privileged so that they can implement divine injunctions. This position became dominant within Shia political thought, but also influenced other political positions that remained critical of actually existing Caliphate(s). With the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, the idea of good government within Islamist circles came to be constituted around the provision of an Islamic political order, expressed as an application of "*Shariah*" law or through the installation of rulers who were conversant with a knowledge of Islam. Khomeini's theory of the *Vilyat-e-Faqih* unified Sunni and Shia political thought, by arguing for an interim leader, who did not possess sacral authority, but who could work toward establishing an Islamic government that would hasten the return of the *Mahdi*. Thus Khomeini's theoretical intervention transformed Shia political eschatology, making it, for all intents and purposes, compatible with Sunni political thought. Khomeini's de-facto Caliphate opened up the possibility of reconstructing a Muslim political center.

In the wake of Khomeini's political thought, and the crisis of Kemalism, it could be argued that we are witnessing the development of a fifth paradigm of Islamicate good government, one that is based on the attempt to articulate the relationship between Islam and democracy as not only a possibility but necessity. Implicit in this fifth paradigm is development of a notion of a moderate Islam,[31] which is compatible with "Democracy." This paradigm of Islamicate good government includes former ideologues of Islamism (for example, Rached Gannouchi, or even Abdolkarim Soroush) as well as secular-liberals (such as Nawal El-Sadawi) and various technocrats. It is possible to identity four main strategies by which democracy is being aligned with Islam.

First, there is a set of arguments which, by identifying "Democracy" with a method that gives a voice to the will of the people, seems to give Islamists a way to achieve political power, since they see themselves as being representative of the people, in a way that the ruling elites who oppose them are not. Thus democracy offers a way for the Islamists to achieve power, without having to go through a violent armed struggle which, in many instances, has alienated and frightened many potential supporters. Second, there is a set of arguments which seem to accept that the end of the Cold War signals the superiority of the democratic form of governance, and as the prevailing world order is committed to "Democracy" and insists (selectively) on its imposition, it makes sense to bow to the inevitable. It is worth noting that many ideologues of the Islamist

movements were heavily influenced by the vanguardist model of political power exemplified by fascist and communist parties in the 1930s. Thus, the historic victory of liberal-democracies over fascism and communism suggests that such models of power are flawed. Third, there is a set of arguments which sees the failings of the various Islamist movements to achieve power, or, when they have achieved power, the failure to do anything to implement an Islamic order, as a general failure of Islamism as a political project. Fourth, given the degree of torture and repression that many Islamist activists have faced, and given that in the current crusade against Islamism/"war on terror," the capacity for Islamists to articulate a distinct vision is increasingly circumscribed. Consequently, the appeal to "Democracy" offers an alternative way of trying to readdress the gross inequalities and cruelties that disfigure Islamicate societies.

Currently, in most Islamicate countries, there is a wide gap between the rulers and ruled. It is the presence of such a gap that points to the absence of good government. Islamism attempts to conceptualize a closure of the gap by formulating a good government in the shape of a rather nebulous vision of an Islamic order. It is this project which an increasing body of commentary seems to think is bankrupt.[32] Thus many voices have begun to urge Muslims to accept a good government that works, instead of striving for a good government that does not deliver—that is, accept that only a democratic arrangement can provide good government in the contemporary world. Advocates of "Democracy" for the Islamicate world use the experiences of the Western countries to illustrate the benefits of "Democracy" and this often tends to follow the narratives of "Democracy," which are based on Westernese. Soroush's[33] tendency to universalize contingent historical development in Western history as necessary is indicative of this trend. This is the discourse that is still dominant within the word order (if not hegemonic). As a consequence, "Democracy" is considered to be equivalent to a set of descriptions, such as freedom of the press, the protection of human rights, peaceful transfers of power, etc. Thus, they respond to a definition of "Democracy" that is produced by particular (Western supremacist) narratives, a definition that tends to be (understandably) hazy about some anomalies of the democratic discourse (e.g., persistence of racist governmentalities).[34]

There are four major difficulties that confront any project of trying to install democracy in the Islamicate world. First, any project of transformation will be met by resistance from those who seek to maintain the status quo. In the case of the Islamicate world, there is little indication to believe the majority of regimes will be more amenable to being replaced by a democratic regime than an Islamist regime.[35] Thus, the question of democracy in the Islamicate world cannot be separated from a political question regarding the means and possibility of carrying out regime

transformations in polities in which regimes have both external and internal support that limits the possibility of their transformation. In other words, to close the gap between rulers and ruled in many Muslim polities requires not simply a proclamation of the virtues of "Democracy" but also concrete strategies as to how such a "democratic" transformation is to take place.

Second, to the extent that the difference between "Democracy" and despotism is also a difference between the Orient and the West, it is difficult to see how any "Democracy" can be established in the Islamicate world without a prior Westernization, even at a superficial level, which means a "pro-Western alignment." To the extent that Western and Islamicate identities are articulated in mutually exclusive frame, Westernization presents an ontological challenge to societies based around Islam. It could be argued that one way around this problem is to de-link the technical side of democracy from its metaphorical aspect. By using the discourse of Muslim apologia it is possible to re-describe the technical features of democracy as being compatible with and found within the practices of the Prophet. Such arguments are, however, unsatisfactory, since they take little or no account of the way in which control over democratic discourse is exercised through grossly unequal power relations. The capacity of the Islamicate world to disarticulate and rearticulate democracy is circumscribed by the way in which democratic discourse is still an important component of Western identity. Thus, the rearticulation of "Democracy" means a re-narration of Western identity—a re-narration that many forces in the Western world will (and do) resist. Until it becomes possible to go beyond the dyad: "the West and the Rest," until a vocabulary develops that does not see the "non-Western" as a residual category, until it is possible not to refer to the "non-Western" as "non-Western," the ability of Islamicate or other societies to narrate Western democracy is going to be limited. The consequence of this is that any attempt to articulate democracy in Islamicate register will have to take place in a context where commanding significations of "Democracy" comes from the West. As the gross inequalities in the world order are to some extent sustained by a political system which many actors within the West support, the Western capacity to reduce "Democracy" to a form that makes it compatible with its imperium means that democracy in the "Rest" can take a form that allows a corrupt and unjust social order to prevail. "Democracy" can become an obstacle to radical social transformation rather than assisting such an end.

Third, and following from the above point, one of the ways that "Democracy" works in the post-Cold War world is by blurring the distinction between friend and enemy, and thus bringing about a depoliticization of society.[36] Thus, "Democracy" as promise of the end of history has the effect of preventing the recognition of the political nature of the Islamicate societies and their place in the world. This generalized depoliticiza-

tion allows technological thinking to dominate. The reduction of the political to the administrative means that Muslim governance remains trapped in a mimetic methodology, unable to make meaning, and unable to construct and perpetuate the Islamicate elements of their societies except as a form of sentimental attachment. The implications of the Dengist diktat that it does not matter whether the cat is black or white as long it catches mice, means that a state which is only justified in terms of a narrowly conceived instrumental logic is unable to uphold and reflect the being of its people. If government is only about efficient administration then there is no reason why the Islamicate world should not contract out administration of its territory. The current articulation of "Democracy" means a shift from political to economic governance, which is not only seen in relation to the way in which state authority is eroded in favor of the market. The hegemonic articulation of "Democracy" at the level of the global means accepting the current socioeconomic order, and refusing the possibility of any radical transformation that challenges the neoliberal "consensus."

Fourth, and more importantly, the quest for "Democracy" forecloses the possibility for articulating good government within an Islamicate register. The implications of this not only turn on the possibility of maintaining a pluralistic world, but also a world in which the postcolonial moment is not replaced by a revamped colonial order with its attendant injustices and cruelties. Unless we believe in the possibility of articulating theories of legitimate rule from different histories and traditions, the promise of justice, prosperity and peace will remain nothing more than window dressing on a violent and iniquitous world order. Accepting "Democracy" and its Western logo works towards homogenizing the world in a way which counters the appeal of "Democracy" as an expression of the demos. If the proper demos has only one history and one tradition, it cannot be a global demos. The idea that a planetary humanitarianism could underwrite a global demos would carry greater weight if it could be demonstrated that such a demos would be truly global. It is decolonization not "Democracy" that promises a global demos, and without a global demos "Democracy" will retain all its restrictive and ultimately xenophobic features.

Some of the ambiguities of the way in which the signifier of "Democracy" can be deployed can be clearly seen in the attempt by the American occupiers to try and impose a democracy on Iraq in the wake of their conquest of the country.[37] This is not only the function of the way in which the imposition of an American proconsul and an undemocratic puppet Iraqi government, along with the apparent necessity of recolonizing Iraq as the foundation of its democratization, seems at odds with what is commonly represented by "Democracy." It is also the function of the way in which a number of writers, including the neo-conservative gurus of the current U.S. administration, see in the democratic transfor-

mation of societies, not the possibility of the often-repressed people of those societies discovering their voices, their capacity for thinking through their history, but rather a transformation into pro-Western (if not pro-American) subjects. Democratic transformation becomes the continuation of Westernization through other means. For the neo-conservatives and their European allies, the reorganization of Islamicate societies around the signifier of "Democracy" will prevent them from being antagonistic towards the West; it will allow these societies to seek their "national" interests as being compatible with Western interests. It is very likely that an Iraq which is "Democratic" will be an Iraq which will accept American bases, provide extra-territorial rights for American officials and allow American capital more or less free rein, regardless of whether the Iraqi demos is in favor or not of these policies.[38]

The expansion of the democratic revolution is limited to the extent that the frontier between the West and the Orient conditions the identity of "Democracy" itself. Thus, whereas in the context of the regions of the world which can be rearticulated with relative ease as Western, "Democracy" with its promise of liberating and empowering the demos can provide the basis for closing the gap between rulers and ruled. Here one could point to the relative success of democratization in southern Europe in the 1970s. In parts of the world where the conceptual frontier has been sedimented for a variety of historical reasons, and gives the impression of having a *longue duree*, the importation of the signifier, "Democracy," requires the rearticulation of the importing society as part of the West. In these conditions, where the demos has to be first de-Orientalized, the reliance on the signifier of "Democracy" can expand the gap between the rulers and ruled, with all its attendant repressions. The eighty-year experience of Turkey, and the largely unsuccessful attempt of its ruling elite to reclassify it as Western, at least illustrates some of the difficulties of requiring "de-Orientalization" as a necessary prior move to "Democratization." Reformers in the Muslim world may be better employed in trying to articulate the presumed dividend of "Democracy" (e.g., freedom from repression, a de-militarization of public life, possibilities of non-violent and routinized transformations of government) under another signifier of good government that does not require the detours of using the logo of "Democracy." For what such reformers may gain in support from the Western plutocracies by organizing their opposition to repression under the brand name of "Democracy," they are likely to lose in relation to their genuine aims of empowering their demos. While Western political thought may be content with its ideas of good government being organized under the signifier of "Democracy," it does not follow that all political thought should reach this conclusion.

The Age of Europe bequeathed to the world a name for good governance. This name, like other names for good government, always escaped full realization; good government can never be perfect if it can always be

called to better itself in the name of itself. The initial baptism of "Democracy" as the political form of the West at its most Western, means that the good governance that "Democracy" nominates is too often blind to the way in which Western cultural regimes have been supplemented, if not formed, by disparate assemblages of power, for example liberalism and colonialism, human rights, and racialized governmentality.[39]

Those who seek in "Democracy" hope for a more just world need to let go of "Democracy" as signifier of the West, and dare to imagine a world in which various societies and histories can produce notions of good governance which are commensurate with the fundamental pluralism of this planet. This means abandoning the colonial discourse of Westernese which sees the future and past of human endeavor in terms of the distinction between the West and Rest (and their cognates). The idea that tools for a better life can be found from any particular set of social practices ultimately means rejecting the idea that the salvation of humanity only lies only in Westernization.

NOTES

1. An earlier version of this chapter appeared as: "Mirror, Mirror, Western Democrats, Oriental Despots?," *Ethnicities* 5, no 1 (March 2005): 30-50.

2. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam, vol.1* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 57-60.

3. The question of the best definition of democracy is irrelevant for the purposes of the chapter, since the argument that I am making is that it is the deployment of the signifier "Democracy" that defines it, not its definition that determines its deployment.

4. For example, Held acknowledges that Athenian democracy is a fundamental source of inspiration for Western political thought. Similar views can be found from any cursory glance of the corpus of Western political thought.

5. Both Held and Hornblower concede that democratic elements may have Phoenician and Mesopotamian antecedents. Simon Hornblower, "Creation and Development of Democratic Institutions in Ancient Greece," in John Dunn (ed.) *Democracy: The Unfinished Journey 508 BC to AD 1993*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Also, David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 5.

6. Simon Hornblower suggests that democracy begins with Sparta and the institution of a constitution that called regular meetings of a popular assembly. Hornblower, "Creation and Development of Democratic Institutions in Ancient Greece."

7. As elegantly explored by Patricia Springborg in *Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince*.

8. The recognition of Orientalism within Classical studies has led to a number of recent works which have began to de-valorize ancient Greek experience and in particular its relationship with the Persian orient. By making use of cuneiform texts, Amole Kuhrt, Sherwin-White, and the Achemenind History Workshop have began a project of reappraising and reconceptualizing Greek historical record as part of Greek cultural conventions rather than as a transparent reading of the world of the Ancient Greeks. The hazards associated with such revision of one of the West's foundational narratives can be seen in the debate generated by the publication of Martin Bernal's *Black Athena*. Alas, social science continues to rely on versions of classical history, which someone like Weber would be familiar with and refuse to acknowledge the transformations that

have occurred in ancient history, which put into question many of the easy assumptions about the West and the rest that still continue to circulate.

9. Norberto Bobbio, *Democracy and Dictatorship* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989)

10. Throughout this chapter, I will refer to the West in the singular. This is not to deny the variety of "Wests" that constitute the West—but rather to refer to the way in which West denotes what has been called the first conglomerate state. This is a post-Westphalian configuration, which has its immediate precedents in the Atlantic Alliance during the Second World War. In this polity, the many attributes of the Westphalian model of statehood are preserved in formal spheres, but increasingly undermined, for example, in the realms of security and war-making. See Martin Shaw, *Theory of Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), and Frank Furedi's *Silent War: Imperialism and the Changing Perception of Race* (London: Pluto, 1999) for further details. Furedi points to the role of racism in the construction of international affairs, a perspective that Shaw's study strangely lacks.

11. The discourse of the "noble savage" and assumed absence of property and state in the Americas and Africa would seem to suggest that certain non-European societies were freer than the West. It is important, however, to note that even in these regions when states were encountered, for example Ethiopia or the Aztecs, the language of the oriental despot was not far behind. The freedom of the Americas and Africa could only be conceptualized in pre-political and pre-social (read, pre-civilized) terms, hence it was not true freedom but anarchy—the absence of governance rather than limited government—which remained the patrimony of the west.

12. The notable exception being narratives of "noble savages" (i.e., nomadic or stateless peoples), who enjoyed a certain rude freedom beyond that of civilized people. The contrast between state societies, however, was consistent—Western states are always freer than non-Western states.

13. Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

14. Michael Mann makes a similar point. See, *The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

15. It was not only lack of skilled personnel, but also the difficulty in preventing the personnel from "going native." The European colonial empires found a solution to this problem through the development of a racialised governmentality, in which the gap between imperial rulers and the colonial ruled could not be closed, thus imperial administrators could not be "consumed" by native societies. See Mann (1986) for problems of exerting imperial control. See Hesse and Sayyid (forthcoming) for racialised governmentality.

16. It was not unusual to have juries of 6,000 from the total citizenry (i.e., those who held full political rights) of around 30,000 during fifth century B.C. See Ober (1989) for details of the level of mobilisation.

17. Ober, "Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens," 148-51; also *The Athenian Revolution: Essays in Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

18. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

19. Moses I. Finley, *Politics in Ancient World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Slavoj Zizek, "A Leftist Plea for 'Eurocentrism,'" *Critical Inquiry* 24(4) (1998): 988-1009.

20. Patricia Springborg, *Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 1.

21. This revolving cast of regions has tended to include northern Italy, France, Britain, the United States, and Germany during most periods of its history.

22. Lucette Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot: Venice and the Supreme Porte* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 98.

23. Henry Staten, *Wittgenstein and Derrida* (Lincoln: University of Nevada Press, 1984), 150.

24. Brian Turner, "From Orientalism to Global Sociology," *Sociology* 23(3) (1989): 629-38.

25. Larbi Sadiki, *The Search for Arab Democracy* (London: Hurst, 2004), 138.

26. Martin Shaw, *Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

27. See for fuller examination of the nature of essentialism, Diana Fuss, *Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference* (London: Routledge, 1989).

28. I do not have the space in this chapter to investigate the links between liberalism and "Democracy" within Western political traditions. It should be clear that what I refer to as "Democracy" is a retrospective reading of the themes that have historically been designated by a variety of labels, reflecting local contexts—e.g., republicanism, liberalism, etc. The category of "Democracy" that I refer to is an over-arching label which has, at least at the level of the non-specialist political theorist, colonized aspects of these earlier labels. Thus, many of the features of liberalism are now considered to be intrinsic features of "Democracy." One of the difficulties of discussing a concept like "Democracy" is that in terms of the variety of circuits it operates in, none of these circuits is hermetically sealed from another. This, of course, makes the task of a critic much easier, since they can always cite another circuit, another rendition of "Democracy," which apparently does not display the same qualities in the notion of "Democracy" that are being argued for.

29. Populism can be seen as a category that emerges to explain a divergence between "Democracy" and Western identity that cannot be resolved by an expansion of the boundaries of the West. See, Salman Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (London: Verso, 1997).

30. The relationship between Islamism and the West is rather complex. For a set of arguments that see Islamism as anti-Western—in a cultural sense, not necessarily in a geo-political sense, see Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear*.

31. Yasin Aktay, "Who Needs a Moderate Islam?" accessed June 4, 2004, http://www.muslimstudies.net]/.

32. Salman Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (London: Verso, 2003).

33. Abdolkarim Soroush, *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

34. See David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), and Hesse and Sayyid (forthcoming) on racist "anomalies" of Western liberal democratic discourse.

35. See Savas S. Barkcin, "Exporting Democracy to the Muslim World", for an insightful analysis of the relationship between post-Cold War Western realpolitik and the export of "Democracy." Paper presented at the *3rd Annual Conference on 'Democratization and Political Violence in Muslim Societies'* organized by the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, Arlington, Virginia, USA, April 6-7, 2002.

36. Slavoj Zizek, *The Fragile Absolute* (London: Verso, 2000), 10.

37. Given the affinity between the neo-Conservatives of the Bush administration and Reaganism it is worth reflecting on the Reaganite project of promoting democracy in Latin America during the 1980s. Carothers points out that there is a very strong tendency within the United States to see its political institutional arrangements as the essence of Democracy itself, rather than merely one possible institutional configuration among many others. See, *In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy towards Latin America in the Reagon Years* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 249.

38. Of course, it is possible that such a scenario may not come to pass because the Iraqi people may force major concessions on the Americans. The question is, of course, at what point would the popular will of the Iraqi people be disarticulated from the

signifier "Democracy" and sutured with signifiers of "Islamic fundamentalism," or "remnants of Saddam's regime"?

39. Barnor Hesse, "Im/plausible Deniability: Racism's Conceptual Bind," *Social Identities* 10(1) (2004): 9-29.

SEVEN

The Ottoman Empire and the Global Muslim Identity in the Formation of Eurocentric World Order, 1815-1919

Cemil Aydın

The complex relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Eurocentric world order of the nineteenth century raises important questions about the civilizational identity of the global and regional world orders. Was the European international order after the Congress of Vienna a Christian one, and thus not able to accept the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire ruled by a Muslim dynasty? Where did the Ottoman Empire belong to in terms of civilizational, regional or global international orders? Was there an "Islamic" or Muslim international order that the Ottomans belonged to in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries? More importantly, why did the Ottoman empire begin to be seen as a "Muslim empire," even as the leader of the imagined "Muslim world," on the eve of World War I, almost after a century of Ottoman diplomatic efforts to be part of a European international society?

Answering these questions about the Ottoman Empire and the long nineteenth-century globalization of various regional world orders will help us understand some of the basic questions about civilizations and world orders in the formative period of the modern world.[1] Dominant narratives about this period either posit a story of a singular international order emerging in Europe and expanding to the rest of the world through the standard of civilization as its criteria of inclusion,[2] or assumes a clash or encounter between the "civilized" European diplomacy and the Islamic Ottoman values.[3] Yet, the Ottoman Empire does not fit into any of

these two historical models. The Ottoman Empire has always been a part of the European state system since the middle of the fifteenth century, and thus the rise of the modern European world of the nineteenth century can never be seen in isolation from the story of Ottoman involvement in it. Moreover, while inheriting a Muslim political tradition, the Ottoman imperial visions also included post-Mongolian Chengisid as well as European-Roman imperial legacies; and its relationship with Europe could never be reduced to Islam versus Christianity dynamic. Ottoman ruler's hybrid legitimacy claims in early modern period to be Khan, Caesar, Sultan, and Caliph at the same time also indicated their connections to multiple regional and cultural international orders. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire was engaged in the transformation of international norms of warfare and diplomacy in Europe, without compromising their Muslim identity or their links with broader Muslim societies. The Treaty of Karlowitz signed in 1699 between the Ottoman Empire and Holy League Powers under the leadership of Habsburg Empire, for example, was as important as the peace of Westphalia in terms of standard of diplomatic norms and its vision of peaceful borders among empires in Europe.

Thus, the experiences of the Ottoman elites in preserving, expanding, or ending an empire with hybrid notions of legitimacy that included strong Islamic traditions teaches us invaluable lessons about the origins of modern world order. How important was the Christian identity of the European Empires for the legitimacy structures of late-nineteenth-century imperial world order? What was the nature of Pan-Islamic vision of world order, that emerged in the late nineteenth century and attributed the Ottoman Empire a position of leadership in an imagined global Muslim community? Relying on Ottoman writings on empire, imperialism, the West, and civilization, this chapter will discuss Ottoman engagement with globally circulating notions of imperial legitimacy and the formation of contemporary world order during the long nineteenth century.

The story that emerges from this Ottoman experience suggests three major revisions to our understanding of civilizations and world order. First, we must see European regional order before the 1860s not as a closed system independent of the Ottoman Empire or even isolated from other regional world orders. The imagined border between the Ottoman Empire as predominantly Muslim political domain and Europe as predominantly Christian space was a product of the second half of the nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire was not an outsider to the formation of the regional European international society, and in fact, contributed to the imagination of a European order during the eighteenth century as well as in the first half of the nineteenth century. In that sense, the important question should be about the exclusion of the Ottoman Empire from this imagined European regional order in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, not its inclusion and incorporation. Second, just

as the European-based regional order claim to become globalized in the last quarter of the nineteenth century through a worldwide expansion in its imperial control, we see the emergence of a geopolitical vision of a Muslim international order around the notions of Pan-Islamic solidarity. Thus, visions of a Muslim world order did not precede the European expansion and globalization in the late nineteenth century, but actually was produced by its contradictions and legitimacy crisis. Third, as the Ottoman caliphate became the symbolic focus of the Pan-Islamic imaginations of the world order, the conflict between the values of Christianity-white race based European imperial order and its Muslim, Asian, and African alternatives led to a re-negotiation of the foundations of modern world order. As I will argue later in the chapter, the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 and the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 are two important turning points in this redesign of a new global international order based on nation state units rather than empires and civilizations.

EMPIRE OR CIVILIZATION? THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN RELATION TO CHRISTIAN-EUROPEAN AND MUSLIM WORLD ORDERS

Before discussing the transformation of regional world orders and the emergence of a Eurocentric imperial order from an Ottoman perspective, we should first clarify the Ottoman Empire's position with regard to both Christian-European regional order and the broader Muslim practices of empires and sultanates. There was no fixed European regional international or political system in the early modern period. Broader European geography, which included England, France, Spain, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, contained many future possibilities, including the survival of numerous small political entities under the system of Holy Roman Empire in Central Europe.[4] The vision of the European region always included lands of Russian and Ottoman empires, extending all the way to Jerusalem and Caucasia, while overseas empires carried European navies and soldiers to different corners of the world from the Western Hemisphere to Indian Ocean. There was no hegemonic power in Europe that could sustain a system of stability and in fact the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry in the early modern period was partly responsible for the creation of a balance of power in this system.[5]

Christianity was an important cultural tradition for most of the European monarchies, kingdoms, and empires, yet Christians of Europe were divided into Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox denominations, while Jews and Muslims remained a permanent part of European politics and culture. In that context, European empires' diplomatic relationship with the Ottoman Empire contributed to the formation of the international system in many ways, such as developing the idea of peaceful borders

among empires or offering Muslim minorities a level of toleration, religious freedom and protection partly in response to the success of the Ottoman *millet* system.

Christianity did shape the international visions of many European empires, though it was never a single determining factor. Spanish rule in the Western Hemisphere had strong elements of Catholic visions of the world, and the notion that European Christians had a right to emigrate, settle, and conquer non-Christian areas partly relied on the notion of the duty to bring Christianity to these areas.[6] Within Europe itself there was division among Christian sects of Catholics, Protestant, and Orthodox denominations, but outside of this European zone, a Pan-Christian solidarity was possible in relation to Muslims or natives of Americas. Even in the most liberal of European empires, in the British Empire, the Protestant Christianity's universalism was crucial in international imagination. For the Revolutionary French empire, there was a short period when anti-Catholic universalism led to experimentation with sympathies to other religious traditions over Christianity, such as the Napoleonic notion that Islam is more progressive than Christianity, but this era was short-lived and soon replaced by French pride in its secular or religious Catholic identity. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a state system within Europe emerged based on the criteria of effective control over a given territory, though the legitimacy of this system showed hybrid characteristics that included elements from Christianity as well as new post-Westphalian notions of kingly sovereignty.[7]

There was no clear civilizational border against the Ottoman lands in Eastern Europe, despite the recognition of Islamic faith traditions' importance for the Ottoman imperial vision. For example, the crucial role of Ottoman diplomat Alexander Movrocordatos (1636–1709), who had a Greek ethnic origin with an education from the University of Bologna, in the Treaty of Karlowitz of 1699 indicates that there were cultural and legal overlaps in the imperial legal visions of the Ottoman and Austrian side and we should not see the 1699 treaty as an agreement between Islamic and Christian empires.[8] This was a treaty between two empires with their universal claims. Yet, the Ottoman elites justified peace with Habsburgs to its Muslim public opinion with new interpretations of jihad by peaceful means. The frequent wars in Eastern Europe throughout the eighteenth century that mostly involved the Ottomans were highly costly for all sides, and in the end, territorial gains were not very significant for any of the sides, which strengthened the vision that peace is beneficial to all sides.[9] The Ottoman Empire and its tributary Crimean Khanate, ruled by another Muslim dynasty, were part of emerging European system in the eighteenth century. While Christian monarchs had to adjust their visions and legitimacy in their relationship with a Muslim monarch or Muslim subjects, Muslim monarchs also had to revise and adjust their political visions. Thus, throughout the eighteenth century, the Ottoman

diplomats and bureaucrats tried to create peaceful borders among various empires in the Balkans, and noted that the Muslim concept of *jihad* could also mean striving to keep stability and peace, not necessarily war.[10] Meanwhile, when the Russian empire began to incorporate their Muslim subjects, they not only gave them religious freedom, but also recognized the religious authority of the Ottoman sultans over Muslims living under the rule of Tsar.

The Ottoman Empire's relationship with the Muslim population outside of its jurisdiction was as complex as its ties with Europe. Although the Ottoman Empire had a high level of prestige among various Muslim populations in Africa and Eurasia due to its protection of Mecca, Madina and Jerusalem, there was no single Islamic international order to which the Ottoman Empire could belong to.[11] By the mid-eighteenth century, Eurasian and African lands controlled by Muslim dynasties did not constitute a single region or culture-based order. The geography extending from Mali and Nigeria to Southeast Asia was too broad and unconnected to create a single international system. Beyond the three big scale cosmopolitan empires that controlled the central lands of the Muslim societies from the early sixteenth to the early eighteenth centuries, namely the Ottoman, Persian (Safavid, Afsharid, Qajar) and Mughal empires, there were multiple medium- and smaller-scale sultanates, emirates, or kingdoms. There were more non-Muslims than Muslims living under the domains of these three big empires, while a significant portion of world's Muslim populations living outside of these empires than under their rule.

Despite the absence of an international order similar to the China-based tribute system in East Asia, there were multiple customs, rules, and values, mainly deriving from Muslim legal and faith traditions, that regulated the relationships and encouraged the mobility of people, goods, ideas, leading to higher level of exchanges among Muslim populations irrespective of the situation of dynasties. For example, there was a common understanding that Muslims living in any of these sultanates or empires has a right to travel to Mecca for pilgrimage, or to go to a madrasah outside of their domains for education. Islamic law for commercial interactions and civil life was more or less respected by all the various Muslim rulers, even though the scope for diverse interpretations and local differences in application was taken for granted. Even in times of military conflict and battles among various Muslim rulers, there were laws and principles that all had to abide by with regard to conduct of war, prisoners, civilians, and cultural relations.[12]

This Muslim cultural system facilitated not only an intense level of mobility among scholars, students, pilgrims, traders, adventurers, and migrants, it also linked different regions of the world with each other, from Europe to Africa, from Central Asia to Southeast Asia and Anatolia. Persian and Ottoman languages were highly important for the cultural vitality of these three big empires, but the Arabic language provided the

medium of communication among the educated elites from North Africa to Southeast Asia.[13] As John Voll notes, Muslim societies that lived over three continents did not form a single economic system, or an empire, or even a political system, but there was a "community of discourse" that shared similar notions of legal legitimacy and proper moral life.[14] There were various networks that linked diverse communities to each other in the broader Muslim world system, such as Sufi orders, trade network, pilgrimage and educational networks, and circulation of literary and religious texts.

Within this broader cultural world system made up of Muslim dynasties dominating Eurasia and Africa, there were multiple regional subsystems or political and imperial traditions. Turco-Mongolian synthesis with Islamic tradition that produced the three big empires of early modern period, Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughals, indicates a shared universe of kingly legitimacy.[15] Persianate court cultures of Safavid and Mughals as well as their shared lineage-based legitimacy respecting the legacy of Temarlane and Cengiz Khan is a good example of such a sub-system.[16] The Ottoman Empire partly belonged to this Turco-Mongolian imperial tradition, and in fact, at some point, paid tribute to Temarlane and proudly produced great works of Persian poetry. Yet, at the same time, the Ottoman elite appropriated new elements from Byzantine-Roman and European imperial traditions and created its own vision of legitimacy.[17] In fact, an Ottoman sultan could claim to inherit the Roman Empire and use the title Caesar (*Kayser*) without thinking of any contradiction with this imperial legacy with the Mongolian and Muslim political traditions.[18] In short, the Ottoman empire could simultaneously inherit the legacies of Turco-Mongol, Roman, and Muslim imperial traditions, while creatively engaging in its rivals and neighbors in Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, Caucasia and West Asia.[19] The Ottoman Empire did have its Christian intermediaries and elites not only in bureaucracy and diplomacy, but also in its army and navy. When a Christian prince of Moldavia, Demetrius Cantemir, shifted his allegiance to Russia in the 1711 Ottoman-Russian War, the Ottoman Empire changed its policy of indirect rule by tributary areas of Southeast European principalities to appointed rulers from Istanbul. Yet, instead of local Christian princes, the Ottoman government appointed members of Istanbul's Christian Greek elite Phanariot family members as governors of these areas.[20] At the same time, the Ottoman Empire's Christian and Jewish subjects had a higher intensity of networked relationships with European educational, cultural, and political life.

The existence of cultural commonality and a set of shared legal and religious values should not be taken as a sign of a Pan-Islamic solidarity in the eighteenth century. There was no vision of a collective jihad against the non-Muslims, and no systematic vision of converting them either. Muslim empires and sultanates were too divided with local inter-

ests and intense competitions to allow such a Muslim solidarity. During the Safavid-Ottoman conflicts, for example, Safavids tried to form alliances with Christian empires or polities in Europe against the Ottomans. Similarly, during the Russian expansion over Persian territories in Caucasia, the Ottoman Empire did not feel the need to support its Muslim dynasty neighbor. In the early sixteenth century, despite the Ottoman-Mamluk rivalry, when Portuguese maritime empire began to disrupt the Muslim pilgrimage and trade routes, and threaten holy cities of Mecca and Madina, Mamluks did ask and receive support from the Ottoman Empire, just on the eve of the Ottoman conquest of their territories. Threatening the safety of the pilgrims of Mecca was a violation of a principle of Muslim international order, and this would lead to cooperation among various Muslim dynasties. A Mamluk-Ottoman rivalry could be put aside to protect Mecca from Christian Portuguese attacks. During the peak of Portuguese threat of Muslim free trade and travel in the Indian Ocean, there were more sultanates in South East Asia or South Asia which cooperated with the Ottoman Empire, and made the Ottoman Empire a beneficiary of Muslim spice trade threated by Portuguese intervention.[21] Yet, even during this sixteenth-century Indian Ocean Muslim perception of Christian Portuguese threat, there were many Muslim rulers who could choose to cooperate with the Portuguese instead of the Ottomans, as long as Portuguese side also respected various Muslim norms.

In the mid-eighteenth century, Muslim networks of culture, education, trade and human mobility continued to be active, without the need for a protection of one single Muslim empire or an alliance of various Muslim polities. This politically un-integrated Muslim cultural world order allowed the intrusion and expansion of European maritime and land empires in different Muslim majority areas, such as Southeast Asia (that is, Malacca), South Asia (that is, Bengal), Crimea, and East Africa. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, upon the Russian annexation of the Muslim Crimean Khanate, Muslim jurists began to debate the religious and legal obligations of a life under the Christian ruler. Küçük Kaynarca Treaty of 1774 partly solved this problem by giving rights to Ottoman sultans over the Muslims in Russia in return for rights of the Russian sovereign over the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire. With Muslim Tatars living under Christian Russian rule, Muslim political visions had to adjust to the reality of practicing faith while being loyal to a non-Muslim King.[22] At the same time, Russian monarchs did make changes in their imperial vision to accommodate their Muslim subjects and offer them protection, rather than banning the practice of Muslim faith in their domains. As the Ottoman Sultan could be the ruler of Muslims, Armenians, Greeks, and Jews, appealing to different titles and traditions in relations to each community, the Russian rulers could also be the rulers of Orthodox Christians as well as Muslims.

RE-INVENTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1815–1876)

Thanks to the multiple identities of the Ottoman imperial elites and the hybrid nature of its imperial legitimacy, the Ottoman Empire continued to part of the transformation of the European international system during and after the Napoleonic Wars. The complex patterns and relations between Revolutionary France, the Ottoman Empire, its province of Egypt and the Tipu Sultanate illustrate the fact that, in the late eighteenth century, the borders of civilized and uncivilized, or Christian versus Muslim, or Republic versus Empire were not clear and settled, and this late-eighteenth-century trajectory carried in itself other future possibilities than what emerged a century later. The Ottoman imperial elites could feel no tension in their vision as both European empire and a Muslim one, because hardened borders between Christian West and Muslim Near East did not exist during the turbulent times of Napoleonic wars.

After the French Revolution, the Ottomans recognized the new French government and did not join the anti-French camp. Revolutionary French elite and intellectuals were also friendly to the Ottoman Empire due to realpolitik concerns against the British Empire, and memories of earlier French diplomatic vision of alliance with the Ottoman Empire against the Austrian rivals. This Ottoman-French diplomatic cooperation ended with the French invasion of Ottoman province of Egypt in 1798. Even though it naturally angered the Ottoman imperial elite, this French invasion of a Muslim majority territory was not made in the name of Christianity against Islam. On the contrary, revolutionary France could present itself as the enemy of Catholic Church and a friend of Muslims, though actual Muslims in Egypt or Istanbul would have a very different opinion of these credentials.[23] In this context, the Ottoman Empire formed a coalition with the Russian and British Empires against the French Republic between 1799 and 1802. It was a mistake for the French Republic to assume, before its invasion of Egypt, that the Ottoman and Russian empires would never make an alliance, but this was proven wrong when the Ottoman and Russian navies campaigned together in the Mediterranean against the navies of the French Republic. As part of the Second Coalition Wars, the Ottoman and Russian navies defeated the French forces and took over the Ionian Islands, and created a Republic in those former Venetian territories (the constitution of this republic was drafted in Istanbul).[24] It is in this context, the Sultan of the Indian Kingdom of Mysore asked the Ottoman Sultan's help against the British Empire, with which Mysore was engaged in a battle, and supported by the French republic. The Ottoman Sultan's response to Tipu Sultan made clear that the French Empire should be considered the enemy of Muslims, because of its violation of international law and respect for other countries. After urging for peace with the British forces in India, Ottoman Caliph-Sultan offered his mediation between Mysore and the British military forces in India. The

Ottoman-Mysore correspondence illustrates that the Ottoman elites could comfortably appeal to both Islamic legitimacy as well as the new European international norms. They could use Muslim discourse of jihad and peace in their letters to Mysore while they could draft a Byzantine/European-style constitution for newly conquered Ionian Islands with their Russian allies.[25]

Upon their successfully regaining the control of Egypt from French invasion, the Ottoman Empire renewed its diplomatic ties with the French Empire, and refrained from joining the rest of anti-Napoleonic wars due to its focus on important issues of internal reforms. The Ottoman Empire did not join the Congress of Vienna either, though the Ottoman elite was very aware of the new European imperial order that emerged in the aftermath of 1815. Initially based on collaboration and a delicate balance of power among the five European powers (Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Prussia), the Concert of Europe system would not seem very new to the Ottomans. After all, they were familiar and part of various similar alliances in the past.

In the period from the Congress of Vienna to the 1840s, there occurred a gradual yet radical transformation in the imperial self-image of the Ottoman elite, an image that was closely tied to their perception of both the secrets of other European empires' power and benefits of a peaceful world order. In this crucial transition period, the Ottoman Muslim elites had to face the Greek war of independence. During their attempt at suppression of the Greek rebellion, the Ottoman elite developed a keen interest in how the new European diplomacy of civilization had worked against their state's interest. Although other European empires were not supposed to support a nationalist secession according to the terms of the Congress of Vienna, European public opinion about the uncivilized and tyrannical nature of the Ottoman dynasty became politically very significant, leading to European military intervention and pressures that resulted in Ottoman recognition of Greek independence in 1829.[26] There was a new European public opinion discourse emerged during the Greek war of independence that identified the Ottoman rule with tyranny and uncivilized methods in relation to more civilized practices of European empires, and civilized Christian Greeks. With this diplomatic crisis, a group within the Ottoman bureaucracy attempt to change the image of the Ottoman Empire as an uncivilized or semi-civilized Muslim dynasty ruling over the grandchildren of Greek civilization. A new Ottoman political initiative proving the "civilized" nature of the empire could avoid further European hostility and intervention while securing European support for the process of domestic reform. The Ottoman hybrid system was reshuffled in seemingly contradictory ways during this process: On the one hand, Greek revolt increased the government's reliance on Muslims in diplomacy, and there occurred a gradual Islamization of imperial discourse. On the other hand, the Ottoman elites awareness of the "civil-

ization" as a new criteria of superior level of imperial legitimacy led them to balance this Islamization with a focus on a discourse which stipulated that "the civilized Ottoman empire" is the empire of all of its subjects irrespective of religion or ethnicity.

The Gülhane Imperial Edict (Gülhane Hattı Hümayunu) of 1839, later known as the Tanzimat Proclamation, became the clear indication of an Ottoman imagination of a new European regional imperial international society and its legitimizing discourse of universal civilization. By this time, the Ottoman orientation in grand strategy was clearly towards its neighbors, allies, and rivals in the concert of Europe system established at the Congress of Vienna. This edict declared a set of legal, administrative, and fiscal reforms in order to strengthen the Ottoman Empire and make it a member of the new European diplomatic order. The edict was proclaimed on the accession of the new sultan, Abdülmecit I (1839–1861), on November 3, 1839. Tanzimat Proclamation was read by Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşit Paşa to an audience that included the sultan, ministers, top civilian and military administrators, religious leaders of the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities, and the ambassadors of foreign countries. After its proclamation, the edict was published in the official state newspaper, and its French translation was sent to various European states and the embassies in Istanbul.

By issuing the Tanzimat Proclamation, the Ottoman elite both imagined a new European imperial order and the Ottoman Empire's membership in it. It was obvious for them that their multiethnic and multireligious empire, which occupied most of Eastern Europe, should be a part of the European state system despite the fact that it was ruled by a Muslim dynasty. The Ottoman elites were in favor of a diplomacy based on civilizational principles, not on Christian solidarity. Ottoman Muslims shared both the Hellenistic legacy and a monotheistic faith with contemporary civilized Europe and believed that civilization was the common heritage of humanity, not an exclusively European ideal.[27] A new vision of universal civilization, based on progress and development, was formulated by leading Ottoman bureaucrats as a new imperial vision that would solve both the questions of domestic self-strengthening and international legitimacy. In *A Treatise on the Circumstances of Europe*, leading Ottoman reformist bureaucrat Sadık Rıfat Paşa even used the French word "*civilization*," without translation, to explain the political, economic, and social secret behind new European power and superiority.[28] In that sense, the Ottoman elite were not imagining to enter into a European society from a position of an outsider: they were themselves contributing to the imagination of a new European regional order.

As the 1840 still preceded the formation a rigid European Christian identity in contrast to a Muslim identity, Ottoman reorganization and reform on European lines did not seem contradictory or offensive to their Muslim faith tradition. Two of the key Ottoman bureaucrats who played

important roles in drafting the Gülhane Imperial Edict, Sadık Rıfat Paşa and Mustafa Reşit Paşa, had experience as ambassadors in European capitals. They had had the chance to consult and discuss issues of civilization, religious identity, and international relations with leading European diplomats such as the Austrian foreign minister, Prince Metternich, and the British foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston. The latter supported the Tanzimat reforms, confidently asserting that "there is no reason whatsoever why [Turkey] should not become a respectable power" with ten years of peaceful reorganization and reform.[29] Despite the fact that Metternich championed a conservative European system while Palmerston was a liberal, they both agreed on the question of dealing with the Ottoman Empire as part of the European imperial system. Both of these statements may have opinions on Christian superiority over Muslims or other religions and they may have imagined a future Christian Europe, but it is clear that, for them, there were no hardened borders between empires with Christian dynasties and the Ottoman Empire in Europe.

At the same time, the frequent and underlined references to Shari'a and Islamic universalism in the Tanzimat Proclamation, the foundational text of Ottoman Westernization, are not paradoxical. This was no double language intended to prevent negative reactions from conservative elements. The Ottoman elite always had hybrid notions of legitimacy appealing to the values of multiple political and universalist traditions, and not seeing contradictions among them. Thus, references to Islamic ideals in seemingly European-inspired reform texts are an indication that, in the mind of the Ottoman reformist group, certain aspects of the European imperial civilized polity, such as the rule of law, equality of religious minorities, and protection of property, did not contradict the traditions of Islamic legal thinking and the Ottoman practices. The convergence between reinterpreted Islamic universalism and Europeanism was characteristic of the era. In Egypt during the same time period, Rifaah Rafi al-Tahtawi (1801–1873) formulated a universal vision of liberal civilizationism in Islamic terminology, based on his observations during a long period of stay in Europe.[30] Similarly, Khayr al-Din Tunisi (1810–1889) implemented liberal reform ideas with the strong conviction that parliamentary government and modern European ways were compatible with the Islamic tradition.[31] Precisely because of the Ottoman agency in the construction of the image of universal West and the global consciousness underlying this image, Ottoman reforms based on European models were never an unfiltered mimicry of European culture at the expense of betraying tradition, especially Islamic tradition. Most of the Muslim reformers ruling the Ottoman Empire saw values, institutions, and international norms in Europe as universal, not peculiarly Christian. The issue of hard civilizational boundaries between the "Muslim World" and the "Christian West" is a major geopolitical question of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, but it will be a mistake to attribute this duality to an

earlier period. Geopoliticization of Europe's Christian identity and the Ottoman Empire's Muslim identity will be a challenge for the Ottoman Empire's relationship with other empires in Europe and in relation its Muslim societies in Asia and Africa should be historicized in the context of the high age of imperialism, after the invasion of Tunis and Egypt.

In short, the Muslim leaders of the Ottoman Empire thus believed they should not encounter religious, cultural, or racial obstacles to being as civilized as the other European empires, as long as they completed a set of reforms that would allow them to reach a higher level on the universal ladder of progress. In that context, the Ottoman reformist elites from 1839 to the 1870s found their civilized image and their close cooperation with the leading power of European international society, Great Britain, working to their advantage in international affairs. The alliance with the European powers against Russia during the Crimean War (1853–1856) became the biggest achievement of Ottoman diplomacy. Just two decades after the Greek rebellion, when the European powers had sided with the Greeks, the Ottoman government was in alliance with Britain and France against Russia. Ottoman generals were fighting beside British and French generals in amazingly similar military uniforms. Ottoman membership in the club of European empires provided a sense that the Tanzimat policies actually worked, and the Ottoman state gained a legitimate right to international existence as a recognized member of the Concert of Europe at the Treaty of Paris, signed at the end of the Crimean War in 1856. Some international history scholars such as Hedley Bull makes a distinction between European regional system and European international society to note that perhaps the Ottoman Empire was part of the system but not the society. Yet, this distinction reads early nineteenth century from the geopolitical visions of the early twentieth century.[32]

On the other side of this coin, the Ottoman Muslim leaders did not support the Great Indian Revolt, led by Muslims, against the British forces in 1857. Indian mutineers reportedly planned to send a delegation to Istanbul asking for Ottoman support against the British. However, the Ottoman Empire supported its British allies and even congratulated the British side for its victory at the end.[33] As other European empires recognized the Ottoman Sultan's civilized rule over its Christian populations, the Ottomans would also recognize the British, Russian, Dutch, or French Empires' rule over various Muslim populations. Pan-Islamism was not on the agenda of any intellectual at that time. As a reflection of this imperial logic, the Ottoman administrators in Mecca would describe the pilgrims from Dutch or British colonies as Dutch or British Muslims.[34]

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODERN "MUSLIM WORLD" IDENTITY AND THE QUESTION OF OTTOMAN CALIPHATE

Given the Tanzimat vision of the Ottoman elite about integrating the Ottoman empire into a network of European empires based on the notions of "civilization" and "progress," the increasing importance of the Ottoman Sultan's title as a Caliph after the 1870s should not be seen as a continuation of a centuries-long relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim communities beyond the Ottoman borders. The Ottoman Empire of the nineteenth century never denied its Muslim identity or credentials, but in the tradition of its hybrid legitimacy, it had a more European-oriented grand strategy and imperial identity. The Ottomanist view of civilizationism not only included a desire to be part of the Eurocentric world order but also inclusion of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire in the administrative structure. However, during second half of the nineteenth century, despite the lack of any support by the Ottoman rulers for various Muslim resistance movements against Western colonialism, the Ottoman Sultan's title as a Caliph of Muslims was becoming more popular in colonized Muslim societies. This was due to two main reasons, none of which was theological. First was the emergence of a new "Muslim world" identity whose content will be discussed below. The second was the image of the Ottoman Sultans, who also carried the title of caliphs, as the head of a civilized Muslim empire with full and equal diplomatic relations with the European powers. In other words, it was partly the Ottoman Empires' perceived membership into the club of civilized empires of Europe that increased its prestige among the Muslim societies in Asia. Yet, this balance between voicing the demands for justice and dignity for Muslims in Asia and Africa with a membership into a European club of empires would become impossible to sustain for the Ottomans.

As early as 1873, Acehnese leaders in the eastern edge of the Indian Ocean asked for the support of the Ottoman government against Dutch attacks.[35] This was more of a request for diplomatic support, demanding Ottoman declaration of protection of Aceh under the Caliph and thus asking the Dutch Empire to stop its attacks. This increasing sympathy for the Ottoman Empire, always tied to the new notion of the Caliphate as the symbol of the Muslim world's demands for reform and justice, did not necessarily contradict with other imperial identities. In an amazing text written in support of the Ottoman caliphate and reforms in 1883, Indian Muslim intellectual Cheragh Ali (from the Princely State of Hyderabad) combined his admiration for the Ottoman Empire with his loyalty to the British Empire. In fact, he described the British Empire as the greatest Muhammadan empire in the world as they ruled over more Muslim populations than any other empire in the world. For Cheragh Ali, the Ottoman caliph symbolized the compatibility between the mod-

ern civilization and the Muslim faith tradition, and proved that Muslims were not inferior to Christians in their capacity for progress.[36] Muslim could have their own civilized empires ruling over Christian subjects, as Christian monarchs of Europe were ruling over Muslim subjects.

The Ottoman Empire's increasing identity ties with the Muslims beyond its borders have mirrored the relationship between the European Empires and the Ottoman Empire on the one hand, and colonized Muslim societies on the other. While the Ottoman Empire was seen as a symbolic leader of the colonized Muslims in Asia, the European empires began to intervene in Ottoman politics for the liberation of Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, with the main argument that the rulers of the latter were not civilized enough to deserve to rule over Christians. Yet, this claim to liberate the Christian subjects of a "Muslim Empire" was occurring at the same time when more and more Muslims societies were being subjected to the rule of European Empires with Christian rulers. This contradiction had been emphasized and utilized especially by the Indian Muslim supporters of the Ottoman Caliphate. While the post-Gladstone era Eastern Question discourses depicted the Ottoman reforms as futile and ineffective and argued that the Ottoman Muslims could not create a civilized empire, Muslim supporters of the Ottoman Empire insisted on the opposite: that the Ottoman Caliph was a reformist and civilized leader, and their treatment of the Christian subjects had always been better than the British, French, and Russian Empires' treatment of their Muslim subjects.[37] While European public opinion saw the Ottoman Empire as the "sick" man of Europe, Muslims in India, Central Asia and Southeast Asia began to depict the Ottoman Empire as the civilized leader of the global Muslim community, representing their dignity and equality in a globalizing imperial world order. As European public opinion asked for humanitarian interventions into the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire to liberate the Christian Bulgarians, Romanians, and Serbians, Muslims in India or Southeast Asia hoped to have the Ottoman humanitarian intervention to help them against their Christian colonizers. This Muslim sympathy for the Ottoman Empire began to be described as Pan-Islamism by the European observers, while the European hostility towards any notion of Muslim solidarity and their colonial rule began to be described as a "modern crusade" of imperialism by increasing number of Muslim public opinion leaders. In this context, from the 1880s onwards, there emerged a transnational debate on the meaning of Muslim solidarity and the ideals of Pan-Islamism, with some imagining a new Muslim internationalism and global order free from European-Christian hegemony. While European circles describe it as a reactionary movement against Western civilizing mission at the instigation of the Ottoman rulers, Muslim reformist leaders both denied the existence of a Pan-Islamic conspiracy and recommended a broad Muslim solidarity to overcome the subjugation of the Muslim world by "immoral" European

imperial order. The fears of British, Dutch, Russian, and French Empires about the potential rise of Muslim solidarity and revolt against their rule were translated into Muslim anti-colonial hopes that this could indeed be a feasible and necessary thing to do.

GEOPOLITICS OF CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM IN THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF MODERN IMPERIALISM

The political demands associated with the idea of the Muslim World exhibited all the complexities of identity politics, religious hermeneutics and imperial rivalries. For the broader Muslim public sphere, Pan-Islamism meant demands for equality and dignity or expressing discontent about the injustice and humiliation in the hands of Western imperialism. The search for justice was closely tied to the notion of re-gaining Muslim dignity by establishing the racial and civilizational equality with the Christian West parallel to the demands for political autonomy.

Pro-Ottoman Muslim intellectual's battle with British Prime Minister William Gladstone illustrates the complexity of this politics. Gladstone's hostile remarks about Muslims and Turks, such as calling them an "anti-human specimen of humanity," reflected both a larger European sentiment about "infidel Muslims" and a more refined European Orientalist discourse on Muslim inferiority.[38] The tensions between the "rights" of minorities and the legitimacy of an empire in international law can best be seen in Gladstone's accusation that Ottoman Muslim rulers were committing atrocities against its Christian populations in the Balkans. Here, the evangelical Gladstone appeared as a champion of human rights (in the form of rights for Christian minorities in Bulgaria) and the Ottoman rulers appeared to champion the rights of imperial sovereignty and international law. Indian Muslims intellectuals consistently underlined that, in reality, since 1839, Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire did always have more rights and privileges than the Muslim subjects of the British and French empires.[39] For them, anti-Ottoman discourses in Europe could only be about Christian biases against Muslims. Meanwhile, Indian Muslims did try to advance their own rights in British India by showing the contrast that Christians in the Ottoman Empire had more rights than Muslims in the British Empire.

The thesis of Islamic solidarity surged after the Ottoman loss of large territories in the Balkans and Eastern Anatolia in 1878, suggesting that the Ottomans could compensate for the loss of the Christian-majority areas in the Balkans by attracting Muslim-majority lands in South Asia into its orbit of international influence. It is at this juncture that a transnational network of anti-colonial Muslim figures began to interact with several figures in the Ottoman capital city, even though the Ottoman empire officially could not endorse any anti-imperial activity. In 1880, an

Indian Muslim, Nusrat Ali Khan, succeeded in convincing Ottoman authorities to provide financial support for a journal, named *Peyk-i Islam* (Courier of Islam), addressing Indian Muslims from Istanbul. Although the British authorities in India did not find *Peyk-i Islam* dangerous, the British Foreign Office branch and embassy in Istanbul strongly protested its publication and pressured the Ottoman government to close the journal down.[40]

For the Ottoman Empire, Pan-Islamism meant something different and risky. They were more interested in their sovereignty and legitimacy as an Empire that included non-Muslim populations. Global Muslim sympathies gave Ottoman elites a sense of pride; and they would be interested in fostering new ties with the Sultan of Muscat and Zanzibar, or Muslims of Central Asia and Southeast Asia. What especially frustrated the reformist Ottoman elite was the fact that, while they were not allowed to use their Muslim credentials in international affairs, European empires would often intervene in Ottoman domestic affairs or use forces under the pretext of protecting the rights and privileges of Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the Ottomans had to balance their relationship with Muslims outside of their territories with their legitimacy over Greek, Bulgarian, or Armenian subjects. How could a caliph of all Muslims also be the emperor of Armenian Christians? Other European emperors asked the reverse of this question: How could Queen Victoria be an emperor of Indian Muslims or the Russian Tzar be a ruler of Tatar Muslims? In an age of rising nationalism, continuing the tradition of hybrid legitimacy was becoming more difficult for all the empires. Ideally, being a big brother and model for the rest of the Muslim societies was something that the Ottoman elite would want for idealistic reasons and realpolitik calculations. But this would have the danger of provoking further suspicion and hostility in the eyes of their European imperial counterparts while bringing additional responsibilities. Could the Ottomans voice the new global Muslim public opinion's discontent about the Eurocentric world order while remaining a part of it?

Meanwhile, from the 1880s to the 1920s, the prestige of the Ottoman caliphate reached a global peak, partly beyond the intentions and policies of the Ottoman government. New racialized notion of the Muslim world solidified the religious as well as geopolitical significance of the Caliphate, even though there were powerful arguments against the theological validity of the Ottoman claim to Sunni caliphate since the publication of William Blunt's *the Future of Islam* in 1883.[41] Thanks to the politicized notion of global Muslim identity, the pro-Ottoman camp won this intellectual argument decisively to the extent that by WWI legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate was rarely questioned.[42]

In the context of Ottoman response to European interventions to its imperial sovereignty, international law became a favorite subject in Ottoman law schools and among Muslim intellectuals, as it was seen as a

means to defend their position.[43] Ottoman international lawyers were not passive in defending the notions of sovereignty in international law, as Arnolf Becker illustrates.[44] It is important to note that, while Gladstone was declaring the Ottoman Empire to be illiberal and inhuman, Irish nationalist were calling him the "Anglo-Saxon Grand Turk."[45] This title suggests that the British Empire's Christianity based anti-Ottoman and anti-Muslim rhetoric should not be seen as a critique of an illiberal empire by a liberal one.

Muslim defenders of the Ottoman Empire faced a contradiction in their values and their identity similar to their British imperial opponents, when the issue came to the rights of Armenians. During the pro-Armenian Christian agitation in Europe and America during the late 1890s, pro-Ottoman Muslim figures such as British Abdullah Quilliam and American Alexander Russell Web (as well as all the Indian Muslim intellectuals) rushed to the defense of Ottoman actions. Once Quilliam noted that the Ottoman Empire has many more provinces with populations of diverse ethnicity or religion like "Ireland" and the British should appreciate the Ottoman Empire's right to control Armenian separatists in its various provinces.[46] He further noted that the white Christian British supporters of the Armenians said nothing about the lynching of Blacks by Whites in the United States.

From the early 1880s on, the Ottoman government encouraged attendance of leading Muslim intellectual at the Orientalists' congresses and other intellectual gatherings to deliver their messages of dialogue and self-explanation directly to the European intellectuals whose misperceptions they were trying to correct. Ahmed Midhat Efendi's attendance at the 1889 Orientalist congress in Stockholm facilitated dialogue between him and various European Orientalists.[47] Sometimes, the Ottoman government would dispatch a bureaucrat to attend an Orientalist congress in Europe to present a semiofficial paper. For instance, Numan Kamil Bey went to the tenth Orientalist congress in Geneva in 1894 to read a paper that was later published in the Ottoman language under the title *İslamiyet ve Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye Hakkında Doğru bir Söz* (A True Remark Concerning Islam and the Ottoman State).[48] Kamil's presentation focused on proving the compatibility between Islam and modern civilization, as well as the modern image of the Ottoman caliphate. He first presented a summary of Islamic history with the agenda of refuting the European image that Islam was spread by the force of sword and violent jihad. In his narration of Islamic history, Kamil underlined the civilized behavior of powerful Muslim states toward their Christian adversaries. He describes the conduct of Salahuddin al-Ayyubi (Saladin) toward the defeated European commanders during the Crusades as conforming to both the international law (*hukuk-i beyne'l-milel*) of the time and the requirements of Islamic principles.[49] The concluding sentence of this text almost invites European Orientalists to accept the arguments of Muslim

modernists by asking them to be "objective" in their responses to the question of whether Islam is the "destroyer of civilization" or a "servant of civilization."[50] Here, Kamil's thesis on Islam and civilization was clearly about the politics of the Ottoman Empire's international relations with the European powers according to the diplomacy of the "standard of civilizations." The very fact that the Ottoman government sometimes picked a state official, instead of funding a scholar, to give a paper at an Orientalist congress indicates their awareness of the politics of Orientalist literature in Europe.

ANTI-COLONIALIST DEFENSE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE PAN-ISLAMISM OF THE YOUNG TURK GENERATION

Ottoman Caliph Abdulhamid II's constitutionalist opponents, who were mostly in exile in European cities, also diagnosed international affairs as a dangerous encirclement of Muslim populations by an aggressive Christian West. Despite their admiration for the civilizations of France, England, and Germany, the Young Turk intellectuals condemned the Western powers' violation of the standards of civilization in international affairs, even while they were trying to achieve a revolution to implement some of the standards of civilization, especially a constitutional regime, in the Ottoman Empire. When the Young Turks came to power in 1908, they first followed policies that would keep the Ottoman Empire intact by turning it into a constitutional empire. Once that policy did not produce the expected results, Young Turk elites chose a strongly anti-imperialist and Pan-Islamic strategy, ironically to save the Ottoman Empire, by joining Germany in WWI.

Realist Ottoman bureaucrats insisted that the Ottoman state had to focus on solving its own problems and give priority to its relations with the European powers before it could think of other Muslims. After all, "while dreaming to save India from the British rule, the Ottoman State could lose Western Thrace just fifty miles away from its capital city."[51] This cautious policy of avoiding direct challenges to the Eurocentric imperial world order in the Muslim world and focusing on the security and territorial integrity of the Ottoman state reflects the legacy of Tanzimat diplomacy until the 1910s.

On the eve of WWI, however, and especially after the Ottomans joined the Great War, the liberation of colonized Muslim lands was cited as one of the aims of the war, and the Ottoman government utilized pan-Islamic networks and ideals extensively in its war effort. It was obvious that the Ottoman political elite, known for their realist assessments of world trends and the European balance of power, had abandoned the legacy of Tanzimat diplomacy and adopted a pan-Islamic discourse.

By 1914, the Ottoman Empire became synonymous with the Muslim world, to the extent that Arnold Toynbee, as a British intelligence analyst during WWI responsible for writing reports on the Ottoman Empire, often wrote about the awakening and revolt of the Muslim world with the assumption that the Muslim threat and the Ottoman threat would mean the same thing for the British Empire. This was a very contradictory discourse given that Abdullah Yusuf Ali, a prominent Indian Muslim, was in the same office trying to define a Muslim world identity loyal to the British Empire.[52] The influence of Pan-Islamic ideas, especially the diagnosis of international relations as a modern crusade of the West against the Muslim world under the pretext of civilization, became crucial for gathering Ottoman public support for entering WWI on the side of Germany.[53] In the aftermath of the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 and the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, the Ottoman Muslim elite became convinced that there is a new— modern crusade against the last Muslim empire. They also foresaw the population politics, confirmed in their eyes by the expulsion of Muslims in the Balkans by the Christian armies, as the future direction of international affairs—a diagnosis that will help shape the ethnic cleansing policies towards Armenian populations in 1915.[54]

Many Ottoman public opinion leaders reasoned that they had to use the intra-European rivalry as a chance to take their revenge against the Christian alliance of the British, French, and Russian Empires. This was a drastic change from the general nineteenth-century Ottoman foreign policy of cooperation with the leading Western powers while implementing reforms to fulfill the "standards of civilization." Yet, even as late as 1914, the Ottoman elite did not see a vision of its leadership in global Muslim solidarity due to Ottoman sultan's status as a caliph contradicting the Ottoman Empire's belonging to European club of empires. After all, the German empire was also interested in utulizing Pan-Islamism against its rivals. In some ways, the Ottoman insistence on securing a formal alliance with Germany as a precondition for entering the Great War was their confirmation that the Empire was still part of Europe. Even if the German side would lose in the war, an Ottoman German formal alliance was a symbol that the Empire belonged to European system of imperial alliances, rather than being outside of European diplomacy, and thus being treated like the colonies in Africa and Asia.

While securing the Ottoman diplomacy firmly in the European alliances, popular notions of Pan-Islamic solidarity provided Ottoman policy makers with the vision that, upon entering the war, they could utilize the contradictions and weak points in the legitimacy of the imperial world order through encouraging Muslim disobedience and if possible open revolt against it. All of the rival European empires took this threat, epitomized by the Ottoman Caliph's declaration of *jihad* against the British, French, and Russian empires, very seriously. Ottoman agents could

not provoke any mass scale revolt of Muslims against Western colonialism, despite the strategic benefits of Pan-Islamic propaganda for the Ottoman and German Empires. The British, French, and Russian Empires implemented their own counter-propaganda, symbolized by the successful British plan to gain Arab nationalist support against the Ottoman Empire with promises of an Arab caliphate. More importantly, however, the propaganda battles between the Ottoman-German alliance and the British-French-Russian alliance, in which both sides were emphasizing that they were fighting for civilization and freedom, deepened the legitimacy crisis of imperial order in Asia.

NEITHER A CHRISTIAN NOR A MUSLIM INTERNATIONAL ORDER: POST-WWI BARGAIN AND THE ABOLISHMENT OF THE OTTOMAN CALIPHATE

After the Ottoman Empire lost the war, the rise of the Bolshevik and Wilsonian internationalism at the end WWI affected the destiny of Pan-Islamic internationalism. There were now new viable "Western" alternatives to the earlier imperial world order in the form of socialist internationalism or liberal internationalism. Initially, the Bolsheviks tried to benefit from the accumulated anti-Western sentiments of Asian societies and the tide of Pan-Islamic activism by organizing the 1920 Eastern People's Congresses in Baku, where leading Pan-Islamic personalities such as Enver Paşa appeared and argued for self-determination for the Muslim world.[55] The new Bolshevik government in Russia was supporting the anti-colonial nationalist movements in the Muslim world. Yet, the Bolsheviks could not accept the idea of an alternative Islamic world order entrenched within Pan-Islamic discourses, and gradually Bolsheviks distanced themselves from Pan-Islamic movements, due to their fear that instead of using them, they could become instruments of these two rival internationalisms. On the other side, the initial positive Pan-Islamic interest in the Bolshevik revolution, which depicted the new Russia as a sign of the awakening dynamic East against the West, also gradually turned into a sense of animosity and competition, although many former Pan-Islamists continued to cooperate with the Bolshevik government until the 1930s.[56]

In the context of the Ottoman defeat in WWI, Muslim leaders of the Ottoman State found Wilsonianism to be a means to gain independence and secure a new national state in areas where Muslims were a majority. For them, Wilsonianism was offering a new path away from cosmopolitan empires, which was already being challenged by nationalist movements, and they could ask for the self-determination of Muslims living in the remaining parts of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, some of the most articulate advocates of Pan-Islamism in the Ottoman State, such as Celal

Nuri İleri, became founders of the "Wilsonian Principles Society" in Istanbul and asked for American intervention and mandate for a national Turkey against the potential imperial division of Ottoman lands.[57] Yet, the demands of the Ottoman Muslim leadership to have the Ottoman State recognized as the national home to its Muslim majority was rejected by the Paris Peace Conference, again with arguments about the civilizational inferiority of the Turkish Muslims. Soon afterward, victorious powers of WWI endorsed a Greek invasion of Anatolia in May 1919, a step that completely shattered the remaining hopes for a Muslim-Greek coexistence in Anatolia as Greek residents have to make a choice between their loyalty to Istanbul and invading Greek armies. It is in the context of the Paris Peace Conference's endorsement of demands by Greek, Armenian, and Kurdish nationalism and its rejection of Ottoman Turkey's Wilsonian demands that the Turkish national movement became the focus of a new post-WWI era Pan-Islamism, best embodied in the Khilafat Movement of India.

Established and led by Indian Muslims, the Khilafat movement symbolized a creative merger between the ideals of Muslim solidarity, anti-colonial nationalism, and Wilsonian notions of legitimacy. While collecting enormous sums of material donations for the Turkish war for independence, the Khilafat movement leaders asked the British government, the colonial rulers of India, to recognize the right to self-determination of the Muslim majority in Turkey. Even though the name of the movement was Khilafat, implying that it aimed to liberate the seat of the Muslim caliphate in Istanbul from allied occupation, it was sending its aid to the national government in Ankara, not the palace of the Caliph Sultan in British occupied Istanbul.

Ultimately, the Turkish national movement achieved its goals through a series of military victories, partly due to moral and material support from the Pan-Islamic movement. At the Lausanne Treaty negotiations that concluded a peace treaty between the Turkish national government and the Allied powers, one could clearly see the several-decades-long experience of Ottoman Muslim diplomats and lawyers in dealing with the issue of Christian minority rights and population politics. Thus, the Turkish delegation at Lausanne were very persistent in minimizing the Christian minorities to an insignificant number, and receiving absolute rights of sovereignty in domestic affairs. When Turkey received most of their demands at Lausanne, the news of this diplomatic victory was perceived as a victory of Muslims against the modern crusade of Christian imperialism. This was also the high moment of the Khilafat movement, and perhaps the historical peak in the popularity of an Ottoman Sunni caliph among Muslim populations all over the world.

At this crucial moment, however, the terms of the Lausanne Treaty were already eliminating the meaning of a politically influential caliphate outside of national and sovereign territories of the new Turkish Republic.

Ottoman Turkey could get its full sovereignty, but not as the leader of the colonized Muslim societies. In return for European empires not interfering in the internal affairs of Republic of Turkey, the Caliphate in Istanbul could not have any right to interfere in the affairs of Muslims outside of Turkish borders. Given the mobilization of the Indian Muslims through the Caliphate movement, and their pressure on the British Empire, the existence of the Ottoman Caliphate was complicating the new plans for the new post-WWI international order. Turkish diplomats had to sign documents assuring that they had no political and economic claims over former Ottoman territories. Even though post-Lausanne Turkey became a majority Muslim sovereign state with the Turkish-Greek population exchange, the institution of caliphate and its imperial implications posed challenges to the new national government in Ankara as well. How could a new Republic with only 8 million Muslim population host an institution that is also respected by 80 million Indian Muslims? What would and could Ankara government do if Indian Muslims asked the Caliph in Istanbul to help their freedom or autonomy requests against their British colonial rulers? Yet, without the caliphate as a symbolic institution of all Muslims, how could colonized and humiliated Muslims of the world represent and formulate their shared demands against the imperial world order? It is in this context, the elite of the new Turkish Republic decided to abolish the caliphate in March 1924 and disavow Turkey's Pan-Islamic claims to leadership in the Muslim world, thus indicating their own self-conscious preference for a Wilsonian direction in the interwar international order.[58] The diplomatic and military achievements of the new Republic of Turkey symbolized Muslim dignity and liberation in one country and other Muslim populations could get inspiration from it. Yet, the legitimacy of the Wilsonian language of self-determination, coupled with the abolishment of the caliphate, meant that there was no way of asking for a collective deal for justice and dignity for the Muslim world. Strong intellectual trends imagining an alternative Muslim international order against the Christian European international society had quickly faded away after the abolishment of the caliphate. Despite the trauma and shock of losing a powerful symbolic institution of caliphate that could tie them to each other, many Muslims continued to embrace the intellectual legacy of Pan-Islamic thought of the late Ottoman period. In fact, in all the later independence struggles by Muslim populations, Pan-Islamic ideas of solidarity and historical consciousness were invoked not only by nationalist groups, but also by the colonial regimes who would try to suppress this nationalism. For example, as late as the early 1960s, the French government depicted Algerian nationalism as a Pan-Islamic reactionary revolt against Western civilization. Yet, there was still no legitimate international venue or legal framework to express Pan-Islamic (or Pan-Asian and Pan-African) demands for dignity, equality, and justice for a collective unit of Muslim world anymore.[59]

CONCLUSION

Seeing the globalization of the European-Christian international society in the long nineteenth century from the perspective of the Ottoman imperial experience would allow us to make several important observations. Ottoman imperial cosmopolitanism and its hybrid legitimacy initially allowed its reformist elites to envision a European international society decoupled from Christianity and capable of including the Ottoman Empire in it. The Ottoman elites in the post-Congress of Vienna period did not see any contradiction between its historic, religious, and cultural links with broader Muslim societies on the one hand, and its membership to concert of European empires ruled by Christian dynasties. After all, the Ottoman Empire also included large populations of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, and from the perspective of 1840s, the Ottoman elites could envision to continue their hybrid Muslim-European-civilized imperial legitimacy.

As the European empires expanded their hegemony to the rest of the world and thus globalizing the Eurocentric regional system to a truly global world order, however, civilizational borders between Christian Europe and the imagined Ottoman "Muslim world" hardened in the process. It is in the last quarter of the nineteenth century that we see the emergence of a new vision of a Muslim international order, in the form of a global solidarity, to overcome the European imperial hegemony, seen as unjust, Christian, and crusading. The Ottoman elite ended up developing an ambivalent and dual image of the European international society, a Christian Europe as well as a Europe composed of civilized empires.

It is only during the last quarter of the nineteenth century that the Ottoman Empire experienced alienation from the concert of Europe while being seen as the leader of an imagined Muslim world as the seat of a caliphate. It is the globalization of European claims of civilization through imperialism and racism in the second half of the nineteenth century that created new geopolitical and "invented" understanding of multiple civilizations and associated world orders. There were some continuities between the cultural universalism of early-modern Islamic world system and the late-nineteenth-century Pan-Islamic discourses on Ottoman caliphate, but it is important to underline that the latter was more geopolitical and indicative of the anti-colonial challenges to European imperial hegemony than reflecting any traditional religious values. The shifts that the Ottoman elite perceived in the imperial game, in their diagnosis that race and religion would play more central roles in determining who deserves to be empire and who do not, led gradually to their alliance with anti-imperial Muslim critiques of the Western hegemony, and appropriation of Pan-Islamic visions as a solution ironically in order to still keep Ottoman polity as a great empire within a European alliance of empires. This contradictory process also turned the Muslim elites of

the late Ottoman empires to imagine themselves as an anti-imperialist empire, sympathetic to the liberation of the Muslim and non-white subjects of the other empires. It is no coincidence that Pan-Islamism and Pan-Asianism emerges as alternative visions against the imperialist world order in an ambivalent relationship to two empires, namely Ottoman and Japanese, who could use these transnational notion of solidarity to bolster their imperial strength.

The complex relations between the Ottoman grand strategy and Muslim world identity makes it clear that the transition from a world of empires to a new world composed of multiple nation-states (from the Vienna to the Paris System) was not a story of the triumph of liberal global values of nationalism over the illiberal imperial notions of sovereignty and dynastic rights. We have to recognize the significant but forgotten role of the identity of the Muslim world and globalization of the respect for the Ottoman caliphate from the 1870s to the 1910s. On the eve of WWI, a significantly higher percentage of the world's Muslim populations looked at the Ottoman caliphate as a spiritual and political center in their lives compared to the 1850s. There have always been empires in world history, some more successful than others, and it was usual that these empires grew stronger or became weaker and then ended or were transformed into a republic. What is noteworthy about the last fifty years of the Ottoman Empire is that it became a symbol, embodiment, and focus of global Muslim aspirations for dignity and justice. This surprising Ottoman success in its soft power over Muslims living under the rule of other empires in central Asia, or South Asia and North Africa, was also a sign of its weakness. It was becoming more difficult for an Ottoman Sultan celebrated as the caliph of all Muslims to be also a legitimate ruler of Christians Greek and Armenian populations at home. During WWI, when the Ottoman imperial elites could find the realpolitik reasons to declare a Pan-Islamic jihad against their rivals in the name of a Sultan-Caliph, the implications of this move for the remaining Armenian and Greek populations' loyalty to the same Caliph as their emperor would become an problem. A similar problem existed for the Russian Tzar's claim to lead Orthodox Christianity in relation to his Muslim subjects as well as for the Christian identities of the French, British, and Dutch empires in relation to their Muslim subjects. Politicization of religious and civilizational identities in the late nineteenth century in very new and modern ways was challenging the hybrid legitimacy claims of all empires, not just the Ottomans. In that context, as the Ottoman Empire tied its destiny to the idea of Muslim "humiliation" and "dignity" in response to European imperial discourses on Islam, its story has been kept alive not only in the imperial nostalgia of modern Turkey, but also in the current transnational Islamism, some of whose members came from outside of the Ottoman lands. Abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924

did not end the search for a transnational Muslim order that could end their feeling of humiliation and offer a sense of protection and dignity.[60]

NOTES

1. Christopher Alan Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
2. Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
3. M. S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919* (London: Longman, 1993).
4. Peter Halden, *Stability Without Statehood: Lessons from Europe's History before the Sovereign State* (Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2011).
5. For the hegemonic stability thesis, see John Hall, *International Orders* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
6. Anthony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 13-31.
7. For the transformation in the European state system in early modern period, see Pater Halden, "From Empire to Commonwealths(s): Orders in Europe, 1300-1800," in *Universal Empire: A Comparative Approach to Imperial Culture and Representation in Euroasian History*, ed. Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kolodziejczyk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 280-303. See also Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations* (London: Verso, 2003).
8. For a comprehensive treatment of the importance of Ottoman diplomacy in Karlowitz, see Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, "Otoman Diplomacy in Karlowitz," *Journal of American Oriental Society*, Vol: LXXXVII (1967): 498-512.
9. For the best treatment of the values underlying the Ottoman vision of world order in the nineteenth century, see Virgina Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged* (Longman Publishing Group, 2007).
10. Virginia Aksan, "Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25.1 (1993): 53-69.
11. For an example on how Ottoman control of Mecca and Medina in 1517 giving this empire a new level of prestige and credibility in far away sultanates in south east Asia, see A. Reid, "Sixteenth-century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 10/3 (1969): 395-44.
12. We should not attribute an image of stagnant and standard Islamic world to these societies, and many leaders and populations exhibited seemingly contradictory and paradoxical behaviors, which also existed in the European system. For example, the Ottoman Empire blamed the Mamluk Sultanate for cooperating with infidels before they conquered the Mamluk territories, when, in fact, the Ottomans always had their own Christian allies. See For Halil Inalcık, "A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy: The Agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan," *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional* (1979): 209-33. And Christine Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris &Co. Ltd, 2011).
13. For a broader perspective on Muslim societies in world history, see Hodgson, Marshall G. S. "The Role of Islam in World History," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1, no. 2 (April 1970): 99-123. See also Edmund Burke III, "Islamic History as World History: Marshall Hodgson, 'The Venture of Islam,'" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (May, 1979): 241-264.
14. Voll, John Obert, "Islam as a Special World-System," *Journal of World History* 5, no. 2 (October 1, 1994): 219-220.
15. Azfar Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Lisa Balabanlılar, *Imperial Identity in the Mugh*

al Empire: Memory and Dynastic Politics in Early Modern South and Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012).

16. Ebba Koch, "How the Mughal Padshahs Referenced Iran in their Visual Construction of Universal Rule," in *Universal Empire: A Comparative Approach to ımperial Culture and Representation in Euroasian History*, ed. Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kolodziejczyk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 194-209.

17. Cornell Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali, 1541–1600* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).

18. Gulru Necipoglu, "Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry," *Art Bulletin* (1989): 401-427.

19. Dariusz Kolodjiejczyk, "Khan, Caliph, Tzar and Imperator: The Multiple Identities of the Ottoman Sultan," in *Universal Empire: A Comparative Approach to ımperial Culture and Representation in Euroasian History*, ed. Peter Fibiger Bang and Dariusz Kolodziejczyk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 175-193.

20. For the Greek elites of the Ottoman Empire, see Christine May Philliou, *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

21. For the broader story of the Ottoman expansion in the Indian Ocean and utilization of both Caliphate and ideals of Muslim solidarity against its Portuguese rival, see Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

22. Kelly Ann O'Neill, "Between Subversion and Submission: The Integration of the Crimean Khanate into the Russian Empire, 1783—1853" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2007).

23. Juan Cole, "Playing Muslim: Banoparte's Army of the Orient and Euro-Muslim Creolization," in *The Age of Revolutions in a Global Context*, ed. Sanjay Subrahmanyam and David Armitage (Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2010), 83-100.

24. For the most comprehensive assessment of this period of Ottoman diplomacy, see Kahraman Sakul, "An Ottoman Global Moment: War of Second Coalition in the Levant," (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2009).

25. Kate Brittlebank, *Tipu Sultan's Search for Legitimacy: Islam and Kingship in a Hindu Domain* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).

26. Martin Bernal, *Black Athena: Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

27. Aware of shared Hellenistic legacy with Europe, Ottoman intellectuals even translated Arabic versions of classical Greek texts during the 1718–1730 period to understand better the scientific developments in contemporary Europe. See Salim Aydüz, "Lâle Devri'nde Yapılan İlmi Faaliyetler," *Divan: İlmi Araştırmalar* 1, no. 3 (1997): 151–152.

28. Sadık Rıfat Paşa, *Müntehabat-i Asar* (Istanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1858), 1–12.

29. Henry L. Bulwer, The *Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston*, 3 vols. (London, 1870–1874), 2:298, quoted in Malcolm E. Yapp, "Europe in the Turkish Mirror," *Past and Present* 137(1) (November, 1992): 155. For the connection and comparisons between Metternich and Ottoman reformists, see Ilber Ortaylı, "Tanzimat Bürokratları ve Metternich," in *Osmanl ı İ mparatorlu ğ u'nda İ ktisadi ve Sosyal De ğ i ş im: Makaleler*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2000). Ortaylı rightly emphasizes that Tanzimat reformists were less reactionary and conservative than Metternich.

30. Rifa'a Rafi' Tahtavi [Rifaah Rafi al-Tahtawi], *Paris Gözlemleri*, ed. Cemil Çiftçi (Istanbul: Ses Yayınları, 1992).

31. For a recent reassessment of Khayr al-Din Tunisi, see Syed Tanvir Wasti, "A Note on Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 2000): 1–20.

32. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 32.

33. For the Ottoman response to the Great Indian Revolt of 1857, see Azmi Özcan, "1857 Büyük Hind Ayaklanması ve Osmanlı Devleti," *İ . Ü. Islam Tetkikleri Dergisi* (Istanbul) 9 (1995): 269–280. Similarly, the Ottoman government did not support the

Muslim resistance to the Russian Empire in the Caucasus, except during the Crimean War. Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan* (London: Cass, 1994).

34. Selim Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol: 45-2, (2003): 311-42.

35. On the Aceh rulers demand for aid from the Ottoman Empire, see Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia," *Journal of Asian Studie*s 26, no. 2 (February 1967): 275-276. Reid's article demonstrates the role played by pilgrims, students, scholars, and merchants who connected Indonesia with Mecca, Cairo, and Istanbul and revived the notion of Islamic solidarity during the 1860s and 1870s. For the broader context of the Indonesian-Ottoman links during the colonial era, see Engseng Ho, *Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility in the Indian Ocean* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

36. Moulavi Cheragh Ali, *The Proposed Political, Legal and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and Other Mohammadan States* (Bombay: Education Society's Press, Byculla, 1883).

37. For the Central Asian and South Asian admirers of the Ottoman Empires, see Adeeb Khalid, "Pan-Islamism in Practice: The Rhetoric of Muslim Unity and its Uses," in *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 201-224. See also Adeeb Khalid, "Central Asia between the Ottoman and the Soviet Worlds," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 12, no. 2 (2011): 451-476.

38. W. E. Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* (London: John Murray, 1876).

39. In various Indian Muslim defenses of the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman Empire's inclusion of Greek and Armenian bureaucrats in high-level positions is often compared to limitations on Muslims and Hindus for social mobility in British Empire. Cheragh Ali lists almost a hundred Christian officers working for the Ottoman Empire at that time to make this point. See Cheragh Ali, *The Proposed Political, Legal and Social Reforms,* 40-43.

40. See Azmi Özcan, "Peyk-i Islam: 1880'de Istanbul'da Çıkarılan Bir Gazete ve İngiltere'nin Kopardığı Fırtına," *Tarih ve Toplum*, no. 99 (March 1992): 169–173.

41. William Scawen Blunt, *The Future of Islam* (London: Kegan Paul, 1882).

42. For many texts on the validity of Caliphate and the trajectory of this debate, see İsmail Kara, ed., *Hilafet Risaleleri* (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2002), 1:65-67.

43. Almost all the major international law books of the late nineteenth century were translated and taught in the Ottoman Empire. There were also original works written by Ottoman Muslim intellectuals. For an example, Celal Nuri, *Kendi Noktai Nazarımızdan Hukuk-i Düvel* [International Law from Our Point of View] (Istanbul: Osmanlı Şirketi Matbaasi, 1911).

44. Arnulf Becker Lorca, "Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition and Appropriation," *Harvard International Law Journal 51(2)* (Summer 2010): 475-552.

45. Selim Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* vol. 45-2 (2003): 342. Deringil quotes this term from Karl Blind, "Young Turkey," *Forthnightly Review* 66 (London 1896): 840.

46. Ron Geaves, *Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life and Times of Abdullah Quilliam* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 2009). For an example of Quilliam's defense of the Ottoman Empire, see William Henry Quilliam, *The Troubles in the Balkans. The Turkish Side of the Question. Verbatim report of the speech delivered by the Sheikh-ul-Islam of the British Isles (W. H. Quilliam) on the 22nd October, 1903, at the Town Hall, Liverpool* (Liverpool: Crescent Printing Co., 1904).

47. Findley, "An Ottoman Occidentalist in Europe," 49.

48. Numan Kamil Bey, *İslamiyet ve Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye Hakkında Doğru bir Söz* (Istanbul: Tahir Bey Matbaasi, 1316/1898). For a current edition of the text, see Numan Kamil Bey, "Islamiyet ve Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye Hakkında Doğru bir Söz: Cenevre'de Müsteşrikin Kongresi'nde İrad Olunmuş bir Nutkun Tercümesidir," in İsmail Kara, ed., *Hilafet Risaleleri* (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2002–2004), 1:353–371.

49. Numan Kamil Bey, "Islamiyet ve Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye Hakkında Doğru bir Söz," 361.

50. Ibid., 371.

51. Celal Nuri, *İttihad-i İslam: İ slamin Mazisi, Hali, İ stikbali* (Istanbul: Yeni Osmanlı Matbaası, 1913), 10–11. For an example of how Ottoman intellectuals perceived pan-Islamism as unrealistic around 1904 and 1905, see Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), 39–40. In his work *İ ttihad- ı İ slam* (Muslim unity), Celal Nuri describes the objections of realist politicians of the Ottoman state to the rising tide of pan-Islamic ideas after the Balkan wars. Those against Ottoman leadership in the Muslim world saw the Ottoman state as an "old and sick grandfather [perhaps referring to the European notion of the 'sick man of Europe'], in need of help himself" (ibid.) and believed that the Ottoman state was in no position to help liberate other Muslims.

52. M. A. Sherif, *Searching for Solace: A Biography of Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Interpreter of the Quran* (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1994).

53. Mustafa Aksakal, "Defending the Nation: The German-Ottoman Alliance of 1914 and the Ottoman Decision for War" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2003).

54. Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

55. John Riddell, ed., *To See the Dawn: Baku, 1920- First Congress of the Peoples of the East* (New York: Pathfinder, 1993).

56. For an interesting example of sympathy for Bolshevism among Pan-Islamic activists, see Mushir Hosain Kidwai, *Pan-Islamism and Bolshevism* (London: Luzac, 1937).

57. Mine (Sümer) Erol, "Wilson Prensipleri Cemiyeti'nin Amerika Cumhurbaşkanı Wilson'a Gönderdiği Muhtıra," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, vol. III/4-5 (Ankara, 1966): 237-245

58. For examples of the post-WWI Pan-Islamic movement and its ideas, see S. M. H. Kidwai, *The Future of the Muslim Empire: Turkey* (London: The Central Islamic Society, 1919); S. M. H. Kidwai, *The Sword against Islam or a Defense of Islam's Standard-Bearers* (London: The Central Islamic Society, 1919). Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

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60. Syed Ameer Ali, "Address by the Right Hon. Syed Ameer Ali on Islam in the League of Nations," *Transactions of the Grotius Society*, vol. 5, Problems of Peace and War, Papers Read before the Society in the Year 1919 (1919): 126-144.

EIGHT

Beyond the "Enlightenment Mentality"

An Anthropocosmic Perspective

Tu Weiming

Enlightenment can be perceived as a cultural movement originating in the West since the eighteenth century, as an ideal for the human community yet to be fully realized, or as a mentality characteristic of the modernistic *modus operandi* throughout the world, especially in Cultural China. The focus of this chapter is the Enlightenment mentality, arguably the most powerful ideology in world history. Both socialism and capitalism grew out of the Enlightenment, so did market economy, democratic polity, and civil society. As the advanced economies move into "knowledge society," the dominance of science, especially information and communication technologies will be even more pronounced. Max Weber's prophetic view that modern society will be controlled by experts and managers seems self-evident and the rise of technocracy in the military, governments, multi-national corporations, social institutions, and even non-governmental organizations seems inevitable. Furthermore, the underlying values, such as liberty, rationality, human rights, due process of law and the dignity, independence, and autonomy of the individual, are widely recognized as universalizable, if not necessarily universal. The rhetoric of the Enlightenment mentality, suggesting that there is only one option for the future of the human community, seems apparently true.

However, the Enlightenment mentality is also seriously flawed. Rooted in anthropocentrism, dictated by instrumental rationality, and driven by aggressive individualism, it is a form of secularism which suf-

fers from inattention to religion and destructiveness of nature. With a view toward the future, without a fundamental restructuring of its worldview, the Enlightenment can hardly provide guidance for human survival, let alone for human flourishing. A comprehensive reflection on and critique of the Enlightenment, especially the pervasive mentality it has engendered throughout the world, is in order. Building upon the insights already accumulated by the feminists, environmentalists, postmodernists, communitarianists, and religionists, I intend to offer a humanistic vision, both as a sympathetic understanding of the contemporary significance of "the age of reason" and as a judicious assessment of the blind spots of this de-natured and de-spirited mentality. The purpose is to explore the authentic possibility of a new world order based on a continuous and sustained dialogue among civilizations.

It is vitally important to note that in the *cultural tradition* of the modern intellectual, Enlightenment mentality is so much ingrained in the life of the mind that *traditional culture* has been relegated to the background, as merely a distant echo, in the habits of the heart. Since the struggle to develop a full-fledged market economy, a publicly accountable democratic polity, and a vibrant civil society is far from complete, the political and cultural elite in societies such as China is committed to the Enlightenment project. It is hardly ready to go beyond the Enlightenment mentality. Indeed, in its developmental strategy, it takes the traditional Western model as the point of departure. As the widely accepted rhetoric goes, for a developing society it is too much of a luxury to hark back to the cultural legacy for inspiration. Yet, ironically, the spirit of the time demands that, for the survival and flourishing of the global community, it is imperative for intellectuals, including Chinese intellectuals, to go beyond the Enlightenment mentality. In a historical and comparative civilizational perspective, the surest and soundest way to accomplish this challenging enterprise is to tap all the spiritual resources available to the human community in order to formulate a humanistic vision which can transcend anthropocentrism, instrumental rationality, and aggressive individualism without losing sight of the liberating ideas and practices of the Enlightenment, as a movement, an ideal, and a mentality.

The upsurge of interest in the Axial-age civilizations symbolizes a "spiritual turn" in philosophy. The "epistemological" and "linguistic" turns have been successful in making the academic study of philosophy in the English-speaking world a truly respectable professional discipline. However, by consigning aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy of religion to the marginal position of analytical concerns, professional academic philosophers consciously and inadvertently confined themselves to the cocoons of technical competence for decades. Not surprisingly, their style of philosophizing does not have much relevance to issues defining the human condition. As a result, very few philosophers became public intellectuals and for those who had the aspiration to perform public service their

voice was often overwhelmed by theologians, cultural commentators, social critics, and political economists. The time is ripe for a fundamental philosophical re-orientation. Comparative philosophy can play a significant role in this critical moment.

Historically, none of the major Axial-age civilizations in Asia—Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism—made a clear distinction between philosophy and religion. Virtually all philosophical contemplation is embedded in religious insight and cultivation. Indeed, without spiritual disciplines, sophisticated intellectual reflection is impossible. The interplay between philosophy and religion, or more precisely the confluence of disinterested analysis and experiential understanding, is a defining characteristic of the Axial modes of thinking. Actually, as philosophically seasoned historians, such as the French academician Pierre Hadot have convincingly demonstrated, to the Greeks philosophy is a way of life exemplified by spiritual exercises. This is also how the Harvard professor, Hilary Putnam, approaches Maimonides, Rosenweig, Buber, and Levinas in his lecture course on the "Four Jewish Thinkers." This is obviously true with major Islamic philosophers since Avicenna and Al-Ghazzali. Professor H. Nasr is a contemporary exemplar. It seems obvious that the revival and flourishing of philosophy as a humanities subject in the liberal arts education is in part predicated on its renewed attention to spiritual traditions. Philosophers in close collaboration or friendly competition with colleagues in religion can be a highly productive way of thinking in the twenty-first century. Needless to say, this is also a wholesome practice of returning to the core and source of the philosophical enterprise: self-knowledge.

The New Humanism rooted in self-knowledge, beyond the secular humanism of the Enlightenment mentality, is historically significant as the spirit of our time. It addresses the ideal of universal ethic in the context of cultural diversity. At least eight general principles are involved:

1. As a comprehensive and integrated anthropocosmic vision it encompasses nature and religion in its humanistic concerns.
2. It assumes that a concrete, living person is a center of relationships. As a *center*, the dignity, independence, and autonomy of the individual is an essential feature of the person; as *relationships*, sociality is indispensable for personal identity.
3. The concrete living person is rooted in body, home, community, world, and cosmos and yet it seeks to transcend egoism, nepotism, parochialism, racism, and anthropocentrism to reach the highest level of self-awareness. This interplay between rootedness and public-spiritedness characterizes the richness and complexity of the human condition.

4. Nature is, in Thomas Berry's felicitous phrase, "not a collection of objects" but a "communion of subjects." We cultivate a sense of reverence for all beings without imposing the exclusive dichotomies of body/mind and spirit/matter on our lifeworld. There is continuity and consanguinity among all people and all things.
5. Our life in its lived concreteness embodies self, community, nature, and Heaven in an ethic of care and responsibility.
6. Humanity as the core value "embodies Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things" in its sensitivity and consciousness.
7. Although cultural diversity is taken for granted, our quest for "harmony without uniformity" enables us to be an integral part of the "great unity" (the human community) in which all people are recognized as global citizens.
8. Global citizenship signifies primarily a political idea but it is suffused with spiritual values and grounded in nature. The humanism that sustains the world order is informed by spiritual and naturalistic values.

Global citizenship, predicated on the anthropocosmic vision, is neither utopian idea nor wishful thinking but a common aspiration, indeed a practicable idea with profound ecological, ethical, and religious implications. In this vision, all four dimensions of the human experience: self, community, nature, and Heaven are incorporated in a holistic approach to the lifeworld. Integration of the body, heart, mind, soul, and spirit of the person, fruitful interaction between self and community, sustainable and harmonious relationship between the human species and nature, and mutuality and mutual responsiveness between the human heart and mind and the Way of Heaven are standards of inspiration for the human community as a whole. They are not abstract ideas but defining characteristics of the necessary path for human survival and human flourishing. This path is diametrically opposed to closed particularism. It also rejects abstract universalism.

The belief that there is a single way to establish a world order is impractical and dangerous. It is likely to generate tension and conflict detrimental to international peace. Unilateralism is ill-conceived in both theory and practice. It fails to understand that economic globalization enhances as well as homogenizes cultural diversity. The imposition of secular humanistic ideas on the rest of the world, without understanding and appreciation of other core values equally desirable and necessary for cultivating global citizenship is short-sighted and misinformed. Liberty without justice, rationality without sympathy, legality without civility, rights without responsibility, and individual dignity without social solidarity cannot bring about an enduring world order nurtured by a richly textured culture of peace. All five core values in the Confucian tradition—humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and trust are relevant

as reference for universal ethics. Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and other spiritual traditions, notably indigenous religions, also offer rich resources for global citizenship. Only through "dialogue among civilizations" can a thick description of universal ethics emerge. Dialogue as mutual learning is the best practice.

Ordinary human experience tells us that genuine dialogue is an art that requires careful nurturing. Unless we are intellectually, psychologically, mentally, and spiritually well prepared, we are not in a position to engage ourselves fully in a dialogue. Actually, we can relish the joy of real communication only with true friends and like-minded souls. How is it possible for strangers to leap across the civilizational divide to take part in genuine dialogue, especially when the "partner" is perceived as the radical other, the advisory, the enemy? It seems simple-minded to believe that civilizational dialogue is not only possible but also practicable. Surely, it may take years or generations to attain the maximum realization of the fruits of dialogue. Yet, as a minimum condition, the benefits of dialogical relationships at personal, local, national, or inter-civilizational level are readily available and fully recognized in our ordinary daily existence.

If these common experiences are conscientiously cultivated and universally shared, we can learn to transform a common sense into a good sense of guardianship for global public goods. Ecological consciousness is an obvious example. Our sense of urgency, dictated by our concerns for and anxieties over the sustainability of the environment and the life prospects of future generations enables us to take not only an anthropological but also a cosmological attitude toward all our resources—mineral, soil, water, and air. Through education, this ecological sensitivity can encourage the positive forces of globalization to enhance material, moral, aesthetic, and spiritual well-being of those, perhaps in the beginning a tiny minority, to take special care of those underprivileged, disadvantaged, marginalized, and silenced by current trends of economic development. Dialogue among civilizations also encourages wholesome quests for personal knowledge, self-understanding, individual identity, group solidarity, and communal trust.

We have learned from a variety of inter-religious dialogues that *tolerance* of difference is a prerequisite for any fruitful communication. Yet, merely being tolerant is too passive to go beyond the self-indulged egoism. We need to be acutely aware of the presence of the other before we can actually begin communicating. *Awareness* of the presence of the other as a potential conversation partner compels us to accept our co-existence, with an ever-expanding network of human relationships as an undeniable fact. This leads to the *recognition* that the other's role (belief, attitude and behavior) is relevant and significant to us. In other words, there is an intersection where the two of us are likely to meet to resolve divisive tension or to explore a joint venture. As the two sides have built enough

trust to see each other face-to-face with *reciprocal respect*, a meeting of the hearts and minds becomes possible. Only then can a productive *dialogue* begin. Through dialogue, we can appreciate the value of learning from the other in the spirit of *mutual reference*. We may even *celebrate the difference* between us as the reason for expanding both of our horizons.

Dialogue, so conceived, is neither a tactic of persuasion nor a strategy of conversion but a way of generating mutual understanding through sharing common values and creating a new meaning of life together. As we approach civilizational dialogues, we need to suspend our desires to sell our ideas, to persuade others to accept our beliefs, to seek their approval of our opinions, to evaluate our course of action in order to gain agreement on what we cherish as true, or to justify our deeply held convictions. Rather, the purpose is to learn what we do not know, to listen to different voices, to open ourselves up to multiple perspectives, to reflect on our own assumptions, to share insights, to discover tacit agreements, and to explore best practices for human flourishing. A salient feature of civilizational dialogue is inter-religious communication.

The advent of modernity has fundamentally transformed virtually all religions. Max Weber defines modernization as rationalization. A distinctive marker of rationalization is secularization. Unlike premoderns, the overwhelming majority of contemporary societies are managed by secular governments. The United States, perhaps the most religious country in the West, maintains the separation of church and state. In the political process of the modern West, religion is perceived of as a matter of the heart and therefore as a private affair inappropriate for public debate. Educational institutions are wary about religious advocacy and they jealously protect their neutrality in religious disputes. But this situation is undergoing a fundamental transformation with substantial consequences for politics and the civil society at large.

In this new situation, religious leaders are obligated to become bilingual. It is natural that they be proficient in the language of their respective faith communities. In addition, they must also learn to be proficient in the language of global citizenship. In other words, they cannot abandon their responsibility to assume the role of a public intellectual. Ideally, bilingualism enables them to bring their own spiritual resources to bear on the vital issues of the global village: protecting the environment, alleviating poverty, eliminating gender inequalities, and abolishing torture, just to mention a few. In the information age, even if religious leaders choose to concentrate on the spiritual well-being of their respective communities, they cannot be immune to the urgent events confronting the world.

Indeed, religious leaders are confronted with a major challenge. The new human condition dictates that religious leaders become proficient in two languages: one specific to their faith fellowships and one for global citizenship. Similarly, experts and professionals should also feel obligat-

ed to become bilingual. One is the expert language relevant to their profession and the other is the language of the public intellectual. They must be able to address themselves to two overlapping communities. Unless they are capable of rising beyond their own interest groups, they cannot properly situate their expertise or professionalism in a knowledge economy and society. The comparative advantage of religious leaders is that, having been seasoned in the language of global citizenship, they can bring the ecumenical language of the heart to public discourses. In so doing, they can help to create a new ethos of communication, networking, and negotiation, with profound significance for market economy, democratic polity, and civil society.

One of the necessary conditions for shaping a world order through dialogue among civilizations is the demand that religious leaders assume their responsibility as public intellectuals. The term "intellectual" first appears during nineteenth-century Russia. On the surface, it does not seem to have any antecedent in the Hindu, Buddhist, Judaic, Greek, Christian, or Islamic traditions. The Hindu quest for union of the real self with the cosmic reality, the Buddhist salvation as delivery from worldly attachments, the Jewish covenant with God as the source of all values, the Greek search for truth through the contemplative life of the mind, the Islamic devotion to Allah, and the Christian faith in the Lord in Heaven presuppose the existence of a spiritual sanctuary essentially different from, if not diametrically opposed to, the world here and now. The engagement in and management of worldly affairs is often either by choice or by default relegated to the background.

Actually the intellectual, as we understand it today, is not the functional equivalent of the guru, monk, rabbi, philosopher, priest, or mullah. The minimum requirement for an intellectual—politically concerned, socially engaged, and culturally sensitive—is fundamentally at odds with a person passionately devoted to the service of a higher reality beyond the mundane concerns of the secular world. Surely, all spiritual traditions are inevitably intertwined with the ordinary lives of their devotees. But in all of the aforementioned religions the rupture of the chain of being by privileging the "Pure Land" or the "Kingdom of God" outside of the daily routine of human existence is undeniable.

The return of the study of religion to liberal arts education has significantly enriched the humanities and social sciences in modern universities. The continuous presence of spiritual sensitivity in economic, political, and social discourses can also be immensely meaningful for human flourishing. However, religious leaders must be able to address the global community as concerned global citizens. The UN Millennium Conference of religious leaders in the year 2000 was a disappointment because the overwhelming majority of the participants used the forum to preach the superiority of their distinctive approaches to life and salvation rather than to articulate a shared vision of spirituality indispensable for peace

on earth. The time is ripe for religious leaders to become engaged in a joint venture to bring the spiritual dimension to economic, political, and social discourses. Public intellectuals should be sensitized to become religiously musical in their consideration of critical global issues. Today, major international organizations have already become more sensitive to religious matters. For example, religion has featured prominently in the recent annual meetings of the World Economic Forum at Davos. Even the World Bank is not immune to religious inputs in their regular programs. The preparatory work of the UN Secretariat for the 1995 Social Summit initiated a process whereby ethical and religious dimensions are integrated into discussions of development. This good practice features prominently in the final report of the Copenhagen Seminars devoted to a multidisciplinary inquiry on social progress. Obviously, by becoming public intellectuals, religious leaders can help bring religious concerns to bear on policy discussions of economic, political, and social issues. Furthermore, they can sensitize other public intellectuals to become musical to religious voices. UNESCO's decade-long commitment to inter-religious, comparative philosophical and cross-cultural dialogues is promising in fostering a new humanism inspired by an anthropocosmic vision.

Decades before the rhetoric of the coming of the clash of civilizations became prevalent in international politics, religious scholars and leaders had already been involved in inter-religious dialogues. Those seasoned in religious discourse are acutely aware of the great potential for peace or violence in virtually all religious traditions. As sites of contestation of powerful forces, religions are never neutral. They are confluences of dynamic processes of human self-realization and concentrations of creative energies for human self-transcendence, but they are also instruments of mass destruction and vehicles of persistent violence. Without harmony among religions, the chances for a culture of peace are slim. Our quest for universal ethics, a common ground for peaceful existence among divergent cultures, must take inter-religious dialogue as a point of departure.

The world order evolving from dialogue among civilizations is time-consuming and painfully difficult. Yet, as the politics of domination is replaced by the diplomacy of communication, interaction, negotiation, and conversation, a dialogical civilization based on tolerance, recognition, respect, mutual reference, and mutual learning is emerging. The anthropocosmic vision underlying this new humanism is a way of life and a worldview indispensable in our troubled and promising age.

III

Liberalism, Global and Regional Orders

NINE

Globalization, Civilizations, and World Order

Robert G. Gilpin

Globalization, along with worldwide concerns with world order and the increasing importance of civilizations and their interactions, has become a major concept helpful in explaining and understanding the dynamics of the contemporary era as well as a key to understand recent world history. I believe that the role of globalization today must be understood and recognized as an important factor affecting the development of civilizations and of world order. Unfortunately, various commentators around the world define "globalization" very differently, and this term can be and is used in a very misleading way. Moreover, whereas some writers regard globalization as a positive step toward the creation of a more equitable and just world, others consider it to be a mechanism used by the richer and more developed countries to exploit and impoverish less developed countries. Furthermore, whereas some commentators interpret globalization as an inevitable and unstoppable array of technological and profitable forces that are leading mankind to a unified and improved world, critics argue that the long-term success of the process of globalization is ultimately dependent upon political developments and other unpredictable forces.

WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION?

When I use the term "globalization" in this chapter, I am referring to the creation of a global economy characterized by free trade, generally unrestricted foreign investment (especially by multinational firms), and na-

tional borders that are open to the flow of commerce. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the United States has attempted to support the development of a world economy based on market principles and on the neo-liberal precepts of economics: deregulation, privatization, and minimal government intervention in the economy. This neo-liberal doctrine maintains that the principal function of government is to promote a stable macroeconomy (e.g., to employ anti-inflationary policies) at both the international and the domestic levels and to facilitate the effective functioning of the micro-economy. The goal is a borderless global economy in which free and unrestricted markets will rule and will foster a world that promotes international peace and universal prosperity.

The present era of economic globalization began in the years immediately following World War II. Throughout most of the latter half of the twentieth century, the Cold War and the American alliance structures in Western Europe and East Asia provided the political framework within which the world economy evolved. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, the scope of the international economy greatly expanded as more and more countries were brought into the system. One particularly significant feature of this shift away from the Cold War system was that economic issues and markets became more central to both international economic and political affairs.[1]

The market's increased importance has been reflected in increased international flows of goods, capital, and services. Such developments have been encouraged by a decline in the cost of both transportation and communications, the collapse of command-type economies, and the increasing influence of a conservative economic ideology (neo-liberalism) based on the policy prescriptions of mainstream economics. The economic role of the state declined and economic barriers to the free flow of goods, services, and capital fell. In brief, supported by American leadership, economic globalization has been driven by political, economic, and technological developments.

Although the term "globalization" is used broadly, economic globalization has entailed just a few key developments in trade, finance, and foreign direct investment by multinational corporations. Since the end of World War II, a number of rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and subsequently the ITO (International Trade Organization), have significantly decreased trade barriers. International trade has greatly expanded to become a much more important factor in both domestic and international economic affairs than it was in the past. Indeed international trade has grown much more rapidly, and global economic output has doubled. Over the course of the postwar era, trade has grown significantly and the value of world trade has increased many times. In addition to the great expansion of merchandise trade (goods), trade in services (banking, information, etc.) also significantly increased during the final decades of

the twentieth century, and with this immense expansion of world trade, international competition greatly increased. Although consumers and export sectors within individual nations have benefited from increased openness, many businesses have had to learn how to compete against foreign firms if they were not to disappear. Even though the major competitors for almost all firms are other domestic firms, this has brought new challenges to many firms.

There have been a number of developments underlying the expansion of global trade. Trade barriers have declined significantly due to successive rounds of trade negotiations; average tariff levels of the United States and other industrialized countries have dropped significantly and barriers to trade in services have also decreased. Beginning in the late 1970s, deregulation and privatization further opened national economies to imports while technological advances in communications and transportation reduced costs and thus significantly encouraged trade expansion. Taking advantage of these economic and technological changes, more and more businesses expanded their horizons to include international markets. Despite these developments, most international trade still takes place among the triad of the three advanced industrialized economies—the United States, Western Europe, and East Asia, that is, China and Japan plus a few emerging markets in East Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. Most of the less developed world lies outside this trade, except as exporters of food and raw materials. It is estimated, for example, that Africa south of the Sahara accounted for only about one percent of total world trade in the 1990s.

Moreover, the removal of capital controls, creation of new financial instruments, and technological advances in communications have contributed to a much more highly integrated *international financial system*. This so-called "financial revolution" has linked national economies more closely to one another and significantly increased the capital available for developing countries thereby accelerating economic development. However, as a large portion of international financial flows have been short-term, highly volatile, and speculative, international finance has become the most vulnerable and unstable aspect of the global capitalist economy. It is important to recognize that the immense scale, velocity, and speculative nature of financial movements across national borders have made governments more vulnerable to sudden shifts in such movements. Governments can therefore easily fall prey to currency speculators and to large "hedge" or speculative funds as happened in the 1992 European financial crisis (which caused Great Britain to withdraw from the European Monetary System), in the 1994–1995 punishing collapse of the Mexican peso, and in the devastating East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. Whereas many consider that financial globalization exemplifies the healthy and beneficial triumph of global capitalism, others believe

that the international financial system is "out of control" and in need of better regulation.

The term "globalization" itself achieved popular usage in the second half of the 1980s in connection with the huge surge of foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs). The modern multinational firms had come to public notice in the 1960s with the rapid overseas expansion of American firms, especially into Western Europe, following the creation of the European common market. In the 1980s, the multinational firms of other countries, especially Japan and Western Europe, also established overseas subsidiaries. As a consequence, FDI increased much more rapidly than did world trade and economic output. The largest portion of FDI has been and still is invested in the industrialized countries, especially the United States and Western Europe; much of this investment has been in such high tech industries as automobiles and information technology. However, FDI in newly industrializing countries also increased significantly. As early as the late 1990s, the cumulative value of FDI had reached hundreds of billions of dollars.

These general statements, however, hide noteworthy aspects of FDI and of MNC activities. Despite much talk of corporate globalization, FDI is actually highly concentrated and distributed very unevenly around the globe. Most FDI takes place in the United States, China, and Western Europe, because firms are attracted to large or potentially large markets. FDI in less developed countries, with a few notable exceptions, remains modest. Most FDI in developing countries has been placed in the emerging markets of East and Southeast Asia and in extractive industries. By far the largest recipient among the developing economies has been China. Therefore, when one speaks of corporate globalization, only a few countries are actually involved.

The expansion of corporate globalization has made multinational corporations and FDI important features of the global economy, and the increasing importance of MNCs has profoundly altered its structure and functioning. These giant firms and their global strategies have become major determinants of trade flows and of the location of industries and other economic activities around the world. Substantial investment is in capital-intensive and technology-intensive sectors, and such firms have become central in the expansion of technology flows to both industrialized and industrializing economies. As a consequence, multinational firms have become extremely important in determining the economic, political, and social welfare of many nations.

The United States has played a key role in all aspects of the increasingly globalized world economy. It has assumed leadership in trade liberalization, in opening financial markets, and in increasing receptivity to the international activities of multinational corporations. However, counterforces also operate upon the international economic order and in many cases have been stronger. For example, international cooperation has

been severely limited regarding trade in agricultural products from less developed to more developed countries. The United States, Europe, and Japan continue to protect domestic agricultural producers, especially through generous government subsidies to such important sectors as rice and sugar.

IN WHOSE INTEREST IS ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION?

It is exceptionally difficult to formulate an answer to the frequently debated question: Who benefits from globalization and the new international economic order? While it is generally assumed that the United States is the principal beneficiary of the new international economic order, this is not necessarily the case. For example, although it was Great Britain that led the way in establishing the international economic order of the late nineteenth century, today we recognize that the United States reaped many if not most of the benefits. Similarly, it is China, India, and other rapidly industrializing countries today that are benefiting greatly from a more open global economy. The increased access of these dynamic economies to international capital, the immense American market, and their ability to import advanced technologies are certainly among the principal benefits of the contemporary period of economic globalization. Nevertheless, the debate over "who benefits" continues unabated, making it necessary to assess the issue.

The United States has obviously benefited politically and economically from an open global economy. As the world's largest trading nation, the United States gains enormously from both imports and exports, and America's financial and other service sectors benefit greatly from economic openness and from access to foreign markets. Despite American worries in the 1980s concerning a Japanese "take-over" of the American economy, direct investment by foreign multinational firms in the United States has, on the whole, proven to be very beneficial.

A more open world economy also benefits many firms and producers in other countries. Indeed, the belief held by many critics of globalization that it benefits only the large or developed economic powers is quite wrong. Tiny Finland has established itself as a leader in wireless telephony (Nokia) and in other high-tech industries, Israel is a world leader in many technological developments, and Ireland has reversed a century and a half of economic stagnation by making itself an attractive site for investment by high-tech firms of the United States, Japan, and Europe. Among industrializing and less developed countries, China is a major beneficiary; a substantial portion of the Chinese economy has been globalized through trade and foreign direct investment, and India has become a major international player in computer software and other high-tech developments. Taiwan has a flourishing semi-conductor and

computer industry, and Singapore and Hong Kong have an outstanding record of economic success. In fact, the rapid development of the industrializing economies of East Asia has been dependent upon their active participation in the global economy.

However, if a developing economy is to join the league of small but very successful countries, it must fulfill certain prerequisites. Most importantly, it must have a relatively honest and competent government. The society must invest heavily in education at all levels, respect international property rights, encourage entrepreneurship, support an excellent and diversified national program of research and development, and pursue sound macroeconomic policies. A nation that is unwilling to assume these crucial responsibilities is quite unlikely to succeed economically in the global economy. Unfortunately, many less developed and post-communist economies do not fulfill these requirements for economic success.

Individual consumers around the world are also beneficiaries of economic globalization. Regardless of exaggerated worries about the McDonaldization of the globe, a more open world economy has been a boon to consumers everywhere. Although some observers, including myself, are concerned that huge multinational firms could one day pose a threat of monopoly and economic domination, this has not yet happened and is unlikely in the future because it could be prevented through anti-trust and competition policy at national, regional, and global levels. The problem of excessive corporate power has, of course, long existed at the national level where monopolies and collusive arrangements have led to the exploitation of consumers. A decrease in monopoly power and in collusion and an increase in consumer choice have been among the great benefits of the opening of domestic economies to trade and investment by foreign firms.

A critic of globalization could respond that capitalism harms the *true* interests of people and is guilty of many evils: gross economic inequalities, crass commercialization, creation of unnecessary wants through advertising, worship of greed and wealth, consumerism, self-centered behavior, and other blemishes on our social well-being. But, to the extent that they are true, these charges are criticisms of capitalism itself and not of globalization as such. Nor is it reasonable, at least in my judgment, to argue that American capitalism is especially noxious or that globalization enables American firms to impose America's inferior tastes and values on the rest of the world. There is certainly much truth in these allegations, but my own travels around the globe have convinced me that the United States does not have a monopoly either of bad taste or of the other less attractive aspects of contemporary, consumer-oriented society.

Critics of economic globalization such as *Le Monde Diplomatique*, protestors against the World Trade Organization (ITO), right-wing nationalists, and trade unions go too far in rejecting every aspect of globalization.

On the political left, economic globalization is denounced as serving only the interests of international capitalism and its principal contemporary manifestation, the multinational corporation. Critics condemn the triumph of a ruthless capitalist system characterized by exploitation, domination, and growing inequalities within and among national societies. They denounce globalization for abuses of human rights, environmental degradation, and a global "race to the bottom" resulting in the elimination of social welfare programs. They charge that organizations—such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund do the bidding of multinational firms and work to make the world safe for "evil capitalism." On the political right, globalization is blamed for most of the social, economic, and political ills afflicting the United States and other industrialized societies. Some critics like Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan fear the loss of national sovereignty and the "Mexicanization" of the American economy. In Western Europe, both neo-fascists and socialists have expressed antipathy toward economic openness and fear the loss of national self-determination. Even such a successful capitalist as the late French-British financier James Goldsmith warned against the dangers of free trade with the low-wage countries of East Asia and advocated erection of high barriers to restrict their exports from entering Western Europe. Critics of globalization on both the left and right advocate trade protectionism and restrictions on the activities of multinational corporations in order to reverse the process of economic globalization.

Most of the criticisms of economic globalization are either untrue or excessive. Both the extent of globalization and its impact have been repeatedly exaggerated. Economic globalization is much more limited than many believe and therefore, its negative consequences cannot be nearly as great as critics allege. Furthermore, many and perhaps most of the social, economic, and other problems ascribed to globalization are actually due to technological and other developments that have nothing to do with globalization. In addition, many problems like environmental pollution (rightly emphasized by the critics of globalization) are actually due to irresponsible national policies. Most of the charges against economic globalization are either inappropriate or quite weak.

When evaluating the impact of globalization it is important to recognize that the integration of the world economy has been highly uneven, restricted to particular economic sectors, and not nearly as extensive as many believe. The largest portion of trade, foreign investment, and financial flows is restricted to the major economic powers (the United States, Western Europe, and the rapidly industrializing countries of East and South Asia). Unfortunately, much of the world remains marginal to the global economy. And even though the industrial economies have become much more open, imports and investments from abroad are still small compared to the size of these economies. Indeed, in many ways the world is less integrated today than it was in the late nineteenth century.[2] Under

the gold standard and the influential doctrine of laissez-faire, for example, the decades prior to World War I were an era when markets were truly supreme and governments had little power over economic affairs. When considered in relation to the size of national economies and the international economy, trade, foreign direct investment, and financial flows were greater in the late nineteenth century than they are today.

The conjuncture of globalization with a number of other political, economic, and technological changes transforming the world has led critics to blame globalization for many disturbing developments that have nothing to do with globalization. For example, the shift of industrialized countries from manufacturing to services and the growing importance of the computer and information economy are of particular significance among recent far-reaching economic and technological changes. Therefore, the charge from organized labor that imports from low-wage countries are threatening American wages is largely unfounded. Although intensified competition from low-wage countries has had some negative consequences for American workers, the decline of wages among unskilled and low-skilled American workers has been due primarily to the computer and the rise of the service economy; these developments have greatly reduced the demand for, and hence the wages of, unskilled and low-skilled workers who do not have the skills and education required for the best jobs in an increasingly high tech economy. Nevertheless, as trade between the industrialized countries and the industrializing low-wage economies increases, trade-induced declining wages could become a more serious problem.

Many of the problems alleged to be the result of economic globalization are really the consequence of unfortunate national policies and government decisions. Environmentalists rage against globalization and its evils, yet most environmental damage is in reality the product of the policies of local, state, and national governments. Air, water, and soil pollution result primarily from the lax regulatory policies of individual nations and/or from poor enforcement practices. In the United States, the destructive practice of forest clear-cutting has been promoted by generous government subsidies to logging companies. Small farmers in France, the United States, and elsewhere blame globalization for their economic troubles even though small farms are victims of economic/technological changes that have increased the importance of economies of scale in agriculture; frequently, only large farms and agri-businesses have the means to take full advantage of such economic/technological changes. In the United States, large farms also benefit from generous government subsidies.

Many of the environmental issues raised by critics of globalization are serious and must be addressed. However, with a few possible exceptions such as global warming, pollution of the oceans, and trade in endangered species, most environmental issues are basically domestic or regional

problems; the serious problems of nuclear and other hazardous wastes, water contamination, air pollution, and toxic dumps are not primarily international issues; they must be dealt with at the local, national, or regional levels. Emission of CO2 and other greenhouse gases does constitute a very serious global problem because these gases do cause global warming. However, it is not international trade but the heavy dependence of industrial society on fossil fuels and the irresponsible policies of national governments that are responsible for this serious problem.

THE ISSUE OF POVERTY AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY

One particularly important issue among the many raised by the critics of globalization must be addressed in this paper. This is the charge that globalization is responsible for increasing poverty and inequality in the world. This criticism can refer either to the distribution of wealth within countries or to the distribution of wealth among countries. It is the latter that will be considered here, that is, the charge that rich nations are getting richer while the poor nations are getting poorer. To consider this criticism of globalization one must distinguish among three separate issues: (1) Is it true that poverty is increasing in the world? (2) Is it true that inequality is increasing? (3) If true, is globalization responsible for these unfortunate developments?

Poverty and inequality are frequently confused with one another and are equated by critics of globalization. However, it is possible for poor nations to get richer at the same time that inequality between rich and poor nations is actually increasing. And it is also possible for inequality among nations to decrease at the same time that both poor and rich are getting poorer. Moreover, the issue of the relationship of poverty and globalization is especially difficult to settle in part due to a dispute among experts over the extent and distribution of world poverty. The data needed to resolve this issue are inadequate, and no simple way exists of measuring and comparing wealth across societies. For example, wealth must be measured either in terms of national currencies (and they have different and changing values) or by using what economists call "purchasing power parity"; unfortunately, neither measure is very satisfactory, and while health or similar statistics may be useful, they alone cannot settle the argument.

The emerging economies of East Asia are among the many developing countries that are becoming richer. Some have become quite wealthy during the past half-century; indeed, South Korea is now ranked as the world's eleventh-largest economy. At the same time there are vast regions of severe poverty that have made scant economic progress or have even, in some cases, actually grown poorer in both relative and absolute terms. The three outstanding examples of impoverishment are rural In-

dia, rural China, and much of Africa. Measured by gross population, therefore, it is reasonable to argue that poverty has been increasing.

Evidence also supports the conclusion that overall global inequality has been increasing. Although more and more developing economies around the globe are getting richer, the rich in general are getting richer faster than the relatively poor are getting richer; as a consequence of this disparity, the wealth gap among societies and within societies has been increasing. For this reason, it can be said that, on the whole, the rich industrialized economies benefit in *relative* terms from economic globalization more than do the less developed economies even though the less developed countries are in fact getting richer in *absolute* terms. The former grow faster because producers in these countries tend to have large economies of scale, higher rates of productivity growth, and superior human capital, for example educated workers. As a consequence of their larger endowments of physical capital, technology, and especially human capital, the richer countries are generally better positioned than producers in less developed countries to take advantage of economic openness. As a result, their national wealth has been increasing more rapidly than has that of the less well-endowed developing economies. These, then, appear to be the facts. But is globalization to be blamed for these differences?

If, as critics allege, globalization is in some way responsible for the manifestly uneven distribution of wealth and poverty around the world, what is the causal connection? A classical or neo-liberal economist would respond that the rich are rich because they have pursued sound economic policies conducive to economic growth. A critic of globalization, on the other hand, would no doubt argue that the poorer nations grow more slowly because they are held back by global economic forces; in other words, they are poor because globalization makes them poor. But why does globalization cause or increase poverty? Despite the widespread condemnation of globalization as the cause of poverty around the world, it is difficult to find an answer to this question in the anti-globalization literature.

In a search of recent writings on the subject, I have found only one proposed causal mechanism that in theory might explain the negative relationship between globalization and impoverishment. In his article entitled "Winners and Losers," Robert Wade, a respected scholar of economic development, has placed the blame for global wealth inequalities on what dependency scholars of the 1970s called "unequal exchange."[3] Wade himself does not accept the quasi-Marxist ideas of dependency theory, but he does use their terminology and principal argument that "the prices of industrial goods and services exported from high-income countries are increasing faster than the prices of goods and services exported by low-income countries, and much faster than the prices of

goods and services produced in low-income countries that do little international trade."[4]

Although Wade provides no convincing evidence to support his contention, it is reasonable to believe that his argument has considerable merit, at least in some cases. The prices of exports from less developing countries have been low for a very long time relative to the export prices of industrialized countries. However, this unequal exchange is hardly credible as a general explanation of global inequality and widespread poverty; it cannot possibly account for the enormity of the poverty problem in so many countries. At best, Wade's argument could help explain the continuing existence of inequality between the rich and some poor countries. However, explanations that focus on domestic factors such as differences in economic policies and the huge discrepancy in productivity growth between rich and poor countries have much greater explanatory power.

It is difficult to understand, for example, how the relatively small amount of trade between rich and poor countries could account for the depth and extent of poverty in so many less developed economies. Most importantly, the theory of unequal exchange cannot possibly explain the depth of poverty noted earlier in the three major regions of global poverty: rural India, rural China, and Africa. One common and very significant characteristic of these impoverished regions is that they are *not* significantly integrated into the global economy. For geographic and other reasons they are actually largely disconnected; Africa, for example, accounts for a very small fraction of total world trade. It is also worth noting that those African countries such as Angola and Nigeria that have earned billions of dollars from the export of oil and are certainly not victims of unequal exchange, yet they are among the most impoverished countries in the world. Obviously, factors other than globalization are major determinants of poverty in these nations.

Integration into the global economy normally is a positive factor in economic development and provides an escape route from centuries of poverty; many less developed economies have gained significantly from their participation in the global economy. Even though a particular less developed country may not catch up to or close the gap with the industrialized world, it can still enjoy the benefits associated from being an active member of the global economic system. It can learn from the experience of the developed and developing world, it can borrow the most advanced technology, and can import capital to raise itself out of poverty.

In other words, less developed countries can benefit in absolute terms from economic globalization even though they may not be gaining in relative terms when compared to the rich or richer economies. Although international inequality between rich and poor will still exist, perhaps for centuries to come, people in less developed countries could experience a rise in their standard of living and be more prosperous. It is important to

recognize this crucial distinction between relative and absolute gains. Although it is very important to recognize the continued inequality among nations, it is equally important to understand that inequality itself constitutes a serious source of political tension and even of conflict in a more closely integrated world, thus threatening the future of civilizations and world order.

It is also crucial to appreciate that even though globalization may provide an opportunity for economic development, this opportunity alone does not guarantee economic success. Many less developed countries have failed to take advantage of globalization due to a number of obstacles. Impediments to economic success include war and political instability, corrupt and incompetent governments, disease and poor nutrition, unsound economic policies, trade protection, rigid economic structures, and serious social or political restrictions on wealth-producing activities. Indeed, nature itself imposes limitations on, or at least serious obstacles to, economic development. For example, most of the poverty in the world is concentrated between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. This unfortunate region astride the equator is seriously hampered by soil conditions, temperature extremes, and water supplies that are not conducive to economic development. The industrialized economies can help speed development of these destitute lands through debt relief, provision of extensive economic and technical assistance (especially to improve tropical agriculture), and elimination of import restrictions against their exports.

Even those who reach a favorable assessment of globalization should be very cautious. It is risky for a nation to open itself to the outside world until after it has created a legal system and an institutional structure that will withstand the powerful forces unleashed by the opening of markets. The East Asian economies failed to complete this step, and that proved to be a serious mistake that limited their development for years. Largely in response to American pressure, they opened their economies to international capital flows before they had created an adequate regulatory framework to prevent corruption and questionable speculative behavior; the result was the 1997 financial crisis and its attendant serious social, political, and economic damage. A similar development took place in Eastern Europe where, strongly influenced by the neo-liberal doctrines of American economists, the former command economies liberalized before they had put into place an appropriate legal and institutional system.

There are also serious domestic economic, social, and political obstacles to economic development. Preparing to become part of the global economy is a wrenching, difficult, and costly experience for a society. Although the society as a whole benefits, at least over the long term, from openness to the international economy, many inefficient and non-competitive businesses and social groups will be harmed in the short term. Powerful interests who benefit from the status quo resist losing

their privileged position and strongly resist opening the economy. In addition, successful participation in the global economy also requires creation of what Swedish economist Gunner Eliasson calls a "competitive state" or a society able to renew itself continuously in response to economic, political, and technological developments, a task that has immediate costs as well as long-term benefits.[5] Despite the arguments of globalization enthusiasts who predict the end of the nation-state and of national sovereignty, successful participation in the rapidly changing and highly competitive global economy actually requires the creation of a strong and competent state.

CONCLUSION

The existence of an open international economy is a rare and positive feature in world history. Because the prevailing pattern of history unfortunately has been one of closed economic blocs and imperial systems, there is no basis in historical experience for confidence that the new international economic order of the twenty-first century will endure into the indefinite future. Economic globalization is neither inevitable nor irreversible. The contemporary global economy has been built upon a stable social and political foundation; if it is to survive, that foundation must be maintained and even strengthened. Yet there is no guarantee that this foundation will endure; its continuance requires, for example, a United States that is attentive to the concerns and interests of other countries, and American behavior during the opening years of the twenty-first century has raised serious questions in this regard.

As the economic historian William Parker reminds us, the international capitalist system of the late nineteenth century, which rested on British power, began to break down in the latter decades of the century.[6] The basic cause of this steady erosion and eventual fragmentation of the first attempt to create a global economy was a mismatch between large-scale global capitalism and the parochial interests of European states. Today, Parker's sober analysis of the tension between the economic and political organization of international society must be applied to a much larger world composed of diverse cultures and national interests. The contradiction between the economic organization and the political organization of the world poses an increasingly serious challenge to the prospects for a more stable and just "world order" in the foreseeable future.

NOTES

1. David B. Yoffie and Benjamin Gomes-Casseres, *International Trade and Competition: Cases and Notes in Strategy and Management* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994).

2. Paul Krugman and Harold James of Princeton University have written extensively on these matters.

3. *The Economist* (April 2001): 74.

4. Ibid.

5. The idea of the "competitive state" is discussed in my *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

6. William N. Parker, "Capitalistic Organization and National Response: Social Dynamics in the Age of Schumpeter," in *The Dynamics of Market Economies,* eds. Richard H. Day and Gunnar Eliasson (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1986), 351.

TEN

Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition

Liberal Values and World Order in the New Millennium

Georg Sørensen[1]

Great expectations accompanied the end of the Cold War. The road was now open to a liberal world order driven by liberal democratization and economic globalization, to a world of peace, cooperation, and prosperity. President Bush Senior expressed that hopefulness in his 1991 address to Congress: "Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided—a world of barbed wire and concrete blocks, of conflict and Cold War. Now we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a 'world order' in which 'the principles of justice and fair play . . . protect the weak against the strong.'" A world where the United Nations, free from Cold War stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.[2]

Following up on this, Francis Fukuyama spoke of "the liberal moment." His famous 1989 article on "The End of History?" predicted a "'Common Marketization' of world politics," meaning that a liberal world would be much more preoccupied with "economics than with politics or strategy."[3]

The liberal vision encountered skepticism from the beginning and many find that real-world events have vindicated the skeptics. Realist theorists of international relations (IR) were convinced that power politics and security dilemmas would not go away; according to them, it

remains an anarchic world out there; one neorealist even envisioned a "Back to the Future" scenario in Europe, with renewed rivalry and competition between European great powers.[4] In any event, a large number of weak states decayed, some into complete "state failure"[5]; this was accompanied by violent conflicts with massive numbers of civilian casualties (e.g., Afghanistan, Angola, Columbia, the Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan). And then came the attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York/Washington and later, in Madrid, London and elsewhere; replacing the Cold War, mass-murder terrorism emerged as a new violent threat to peaceful societies. Even if Samuel Huntington rejected that this was an instance of a "clash of civilizations" many commentators now see (radical) Islam as the major threat to a peaceful and cooperative liberal world order.[6]

This chapter seeks to evaluate the prospects for a liberal world order. For liberal hopefuls, it has both good news and bad news. The good news is that the skeptics are basically wrong; we are not being brought back to the future if this means antagonistic power balancing between liberal great powers; nor are mass murder terrorism and radical Islam replacing the Cold War as a new, overriding menace to mankind. The bad news is that this does not pave the way for a peaceful, cooperative liberal order in any simple way. There are three major reasons for this. First, there is merely a "thin" liberal order at the global level; in particular, many countries are not consolidated liberal democracies. Second, there is an inner tension in liberal thinking about order which complicates liberal progress. Third, strong political forces are pursuing a liberal order with elements that are essentially illiberal. The underlying message of the article is that there has been much too little debate about the substantial contents of liberalism, especially about what it means to have a liberal world order. The subject has been overshadowed by debates on violent terrorism, radical Islamic fundamentalism, and U.S. unilateralism. To be sure, there are eloquent proponents of "liberal empire"[7] and there are ardent critics of it, as will be documented below, but rarely does this discussion focus on the core issue: the antinomies of liberalism.

The chapter proceeds as follows. I first briefly explain why the skeptical views of the present world order are misleading. Next, the actual content of a liberal world order is identified; that leads to an evaluation of the extent to which the present order is liberal, and to a reflection on major liberal dilemmas.

WHY THE SKEPTICAL VIEWS ARE MISLEADING

With the end of the Cold War, the United States is the preponderant power. Neorealist logic dictates that other states will balance against the United States because offsetting U.S. power is a means of guaranteeing

one's own security; such balancing will lead to the emergence of new great powers in a multipolar system. The logic also dictates that NATO will not last and that there will be increased nuclear proliferation, also in Europe. Leading neorealists (Mearsheimer, Waltz, Layne) share these predictions.[8]

But since the end of the Cold War, nothing of this has happened. Waltz argues that it will eventually happen "tomorrow,"[9] but further specification is not offered. The neorealist lack of empirical precision has led to various attempts at repairing the balance of power argument. William Wohlforth argues that U.S. power is so overwhelming that balancing is too costly; the incentive to balance disappears. T. V. Paul contends that while traditional "hard" balancing of power is not taking place, other forms of "soft" or "asymmetric" balancing may be in play. Stephen Walt finds that states do not balance against any other power; what they balance against is perceived threats and few states feel seriously threatened by the United States.[10]

These may be plausible claims, but it is also clear that they weaken the parsimonious neorealist theory of power balancing; one can make the case that not much is left of the original theory.[11] As one, otherwise sympathetic, observer concludes, "realism, despite its value in explaining many aspects of state behaviour, seems not to capture current international politics all that well."[12] In sum, the relationship between the Western powers is not characterized by hostile rivalry and power balancing. The alternative, liberal view of the lack of power balancing is presented below.

Let me turn to the issue of weak and "failing" states. They have certainly posed a serious problem in the post-Cold War period, especially to their own populations, because weak states offer so little in terms of basic security, order, freedom, and welfare. But weak states are not a new, post-Cold War problem. Weak states have existed in large numbers since decolonization. Since that time international society, led by the dominant states, has decided to accept the existence of weak, postcolonial states. In earlier days, such weak entities would have been gulped up by stronger states, as has happened many times in the history of European state-making. The situation today is different. The weak entities persist because the international society of states wants it that way.[13]

Weak statehood was not predetermined, of course. But domestic and international conditions upon independence more often than not led the new state elites down that road.[14] Consequently, violent domestic conflict in weak states is not a novelty of the post-Cold War period either. Close to four million people perished in such conflicts between 1960 and 1987.[15] Weak statehood is a serious problem, but it is not a "new threat" to the international system which in some way replaces the Cold War.

Terrorism can be defined as "intermittent violence carried out for dedicated purposes by individuals or small groups."[16] The scale of terrorist

operations make them more like crime than like organized warfare; just as crime has existed in most or all types of societies, terrorism "has been around forever and will presumably continue to exist."[17] At the same time, there can be organized crime and there can also be organized terrorism. The al-Qaeda network is a case in point, and the September 11 attack was highly unusual in scale and intensity; during the entire twentieth century, "fewer than twenty terrorist attacks managed to kill as many as 100 people, and none caused more than 400 deaths. Until [September 11], far fewer Americans were killed in any grouping of years by all forms of international terrorism than were killed by lightning."[18]

Will large-scale terrorism as represented by al-Qaeda grow into a comprehensive threat against Western societies? It appears highly unlikely. First, while there are a large number of terrorist groups, especially in weak states, their ambitions remain national, not international. Only very few move to become international terrorists "attacking groups and states abroad whom they identify as allies of their local enemy."[19] Second, this kind of international terrorism is specifically connected to a radical, fundamentalist version of Islam which is not representative of Islam as such.[20] Other cultural-religious belief systems (e.g., Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity) do not exhibit a similar kind of embittered anti-Westernism. Meanwhile, Islamist terrorists can certainly bring about significant damage; clearly they must cause much anxiety in Western metropolitan areas; people must now realise that total security is impossible in a globalized world. But this is not a new, major, all-encompassing threat to Western societies.

In sum, the arguments of the skeptics are not convincing. Aggressive power balancing against the United States, or between liberal powers in Europe, is not taking place; weak and "failing" states have been around since decolonization; they pose serious problems, but not a "new threat" to international society. Finally, al-Qaeda is not indicative of organized terrorism becoming a large-scale threat to Western societies. In these respects, then, there are no overwhelming obstacles to the vision of a liberal world order. The next section discusses what the content of such an order may be.

WHAT IS A LIBERAL WORLD ORDER AND HOW DOES IT EMERGE?

We may briefly define world order as a governing arrangement among states.[21] A liberal world order is a world order permeated by liberal values; the content of "liberal values" was summarized in the Manifesto of the Liberal International in 1997: "Freedom, responsibility, tolerance, social justice, and equality of opportunity: these are the central values of Liberalism . . ." The Manifesto also had something to say about the way in which these values could be realized:

> We believe that civil society and constitutional democracy provide the most just and stable basis for political order. . . . We believe that an economy based on free market rules leads to the most efficient distribution of wealth and resources, encourages innovation, and promotes flexibility. . . . We believe that close cooperation among democratic societies through global and regional organizations, within the framework of international law, of respect for human rights, the rights of ethnic and national minorities, and of a shared commitment to economic development worldwide, is the necessary foundation for world peace and for economic and environmental sustainability.[22]

Note that according to liberals a liberal order can be pushed from below as well as from above. The view from below is stressed by sociological and economic liberalism; the view from above is stressed by republican and institutional liberalism[23]; all four traditions are present in the Manifesto.

Sociological liberalism draws on the notion that relations between people (i.e., civil society) are more cooperative and more supportive of peace than are relations between national governments. Richard Cobden, a leading nineteenth-century liberal thinker, put the idea as follows: "As little intercourse betwixt the Governments, as much connection as possible between the nations of the world."[24] James Rosenau recently argued that because of improved education and better means of communication, individuals are more important in world affairs.[25] Such a more pluralist world is more peaceful, because overlapping transnational networks of people will not easily become divided into antagonistic camps.

Economic liberalism argues that economic actors in a free market economy are the strongest forces for a truly liberal world order. Ludwig von Mises taught that in a world of privatized economic activity and free trade, international peace, and prosperity will be created, not by government, but by free men who will "naturally pursue peaceful intercourse through economic and cultural exchange."[26]

Republican liberalism is based on the claim that democracies are more peaceful and law-abiding than are other political systems. In particular, democracies do not fight each other. With an increasing number of democracies in the world, we can look forward to a more peaceful and cooperative world. Why is this so? Michael Doyle's interpretation of Immanuel Kant identifies three elements behind the claim that democracy leads to peace with other democracies. The first is the existence of domestic political cultures based on peaceful conflict resolution. Democratic institutions are controlled by their citizens, who will not support violent conflict with other democracies. The second element is that democracies hold common moral values; peaceful ways of solving domestic conflict are seen as morally superior to violent behavior. Finally, peace between democracies is strengthened through economic cooperation and interdependence.[27]

Institutional liberalism emphasizes the role of international institutions in promoting cooperation among states. They provide flows of information and a forum for negotiation; they also help ensure that commitments are respected. By alleviating the potential lack of trust among states, institutions help "create a climate in which expectations of stable peace develop."[28]

It ought to be clear why there can be some confusion as to whether or not a liberal world order is in existence. There are various sources of liberal progress: it can be seen to come from civil societies (below) or from governments (above); it can come from primarily political or primarily economic sources; and it can come from a transformation within states as well as from changing relations between states. In all of these cases, different combinations of particular liberal values are emphasized. An additional difficulty is that even if one can agree on a specific dimension—say, the progress of liberal democracy or the support for human rights—the exact measurement of such progress is no simple task.

One example of these difficulties is the question of whether or not there was a liberal world order in the nineteenth century. According to one view, liberal democracy (considered in Freedom House terms)[29] was not at all consolidated in any region around the world; consequently that core basis for a liberal world order was not in place and a liberal world order therefore impossible. According to another view, there was a "predominantly liberal world order" because "Europe and much of the rest of the world were based on the rule of law, individual liberty, private property and freedom of trade."[30]

The standard liberal answer to these problems is that "all good things go together"; that is to say, liberal progress on one front helps push liberal progress on other fronts; for example, economic liberty supports and pushes political liberty, and so on. What we saw in the nineteenth century were the beginnings of a liberal world order which has grown much stronger since then. This may well be the case, but there may also be inbuilt dilemmas and contradictions in the liberal project, as we shall see in due course.

A LIBERAL WORLD ORDER TODAY?

In spite of these difficulties, it is possible to record liberal progress on a number of different counts and tentatively evaluate whether the present order is liberal. Liberal world order was defined above as a governing arrangement between states, permeated by liberal values. In consideration of the different forces for liberal order listed above, there are two major elements in a movement towards liberal order. One is improvement of the basic preconditions, that is, civil society relations, a free mar-

ket economy, democratization, and international institutions. The other is the liberal order proper, based on these preconditions.

If we look at the preconditions first, the situation is one of qualified progress. Connections across borders between people have certainly intensified as suggested by several concrete analyses.[31] But the benign liberal vision of people getting together and cooperating has not always been realized. In particular, the increasing immigration to the liberal states in Western Europe and North America have produced social, political, and cultural tensions that are not always easy to master.

On the economic front, there is now almost universal support for a capitalist state-market arrangement based on private property and "free" market exchange. Only very few countries have not adopted this model. Of course, countries will differ widely in the specific make-up of their state-market arrangements. Even so, these are varieties within the same basic capitalist model. Near universal support for the "free market" arrangement helps strengthen the foundation for a liberal world order.[32] At the same time, the capitalist market economy not merely produces growth and welfare; it can also produce unemployment and marginalization. Furthermore, these problems may be most serious in countries that are already poor.[33]

The progress of democracy is monitored by Freedom House. At the end of 2010 there were eighty-seven Free countries, "in which there is a broad scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media."[34] Free countries represent close to 46 percent of the world's population. Fifty-four countries (with some 28 percent of the global population) were Partly Free (i.e., with limited respect for civil rights and political liberties); and forty-nine countries with 26 percent of the world's population were Not Free.[35] This is great progress since the Cold War days; in 1972, there were forty-three Free, thirty-eight Partly Free, and sixty-nine Not Free countries. Today, popular support for democratic ideals is strong, even in Islamic and Asian societies that have often been thought to embrace different values.[36] Yet liberal democracy is certainly not consolidated worldwide; in the Partly Free and even in several of the Free countries, democracy is restricted and frail, and plagued by acute social and economic problems.[37]

In terms of international institutions there have been two "liberal moments" in the last fifty years; one was the end of World War II; the other was the end of the Cold War. In both cases, the United States was the leading liberal power, and in both cases (more in the first than in the second), the United States sought to create an institutionalized order. This was particularly the case among the liberal democracies; NATO was not merely a mutual defense arrangement, it also locked the dominant U.S. military power into an institutional arrangement of joint force planning, coordinated military command structures, and a network for mak-

ing political and military decisions.[38] The Bretton Woods institutional system created an environment of "embedded liberalism"[39] where liberal democracies could pursue growth and welfare. And the United States also pushed a global institutional network of the United Nations family of organizations, the GATT trade arrangement, and a number of regional defense organizations.

After the end of the Cold War, the United States appeared again to respond with attempts at international institution-building; "across a variety of economic and security areas, the United States pursued an expansive agenda of institution-building: enlargement of NATO and the creation of NAFTA, APEC, and the WTO."[40] Many observers claim that this has changed since September 11, 2001, and they surely have a point; I shall argue below that these changes indicate a deeper dilemma in liberalism which has been present in international order for a much longer time.

On the basis of this, what can be said about the liberal order proper? There is a "thick" and robust liberal order among the consolidated democracies in the North Atlantic area (potentially including other consolidated democracies in East Asia and Oceania). It is based on identity, institutions and interdependence. Identity means common Western support for the values of political and civil liberties, and a liberal market economy. Institutions means that cooperative relationships are heavily institutionalized. And interdependence means social and economic interaction that is seen to be for mutual benefit.[41] The transatlantic relationship has been strained by the Iraq invasion, but it is not broken.[42]

On the global scale, there is a "thin" liberal world order. It is based on the global liberal progress recorded above; in that sense it is founded on interdependence, institutions, and common values. But interdependence is less developed and contains less mutual benefits and more problems than in the Western order. Institutionalization is also relatively weak; the UN system is based on the realities of the post-World War II world; there is comprehensive agreement that it is in need of reform, but less willingness to push ahead with significant changes. And most importantly, common liberal values are agreed upon in principle, but this does not reflect a deep commitment to such values in the states (many of them non-democratic) that have agreed to them.

The principled commitment to a liberal world order is expressed in the Millennium Declaration endorsed by more than 150 states at the UN General Assembly of September 2000. The Declaration identified "certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century"; they include: Freedom (democratic and participatory governance based on the will of the people); Equality (opportunity to benefit from development; equal rights of women and men); Solidarity (equity and social justice; those who suffer deserve help from those who benefit); Tolerance (respect for diversity of belief, culture, and language);

Respect for nature (unsustainable patterns of production and consumption must be changed); Shared responsibility (for managing economic and social development and threats to peace and security; a central role for the UN).[43]

A "thick" liberal order in the North Atlantic area; a "thin" liberal order on a global scale; and no overwhelming obstacles to further liberal progress. This all sounds as the liberal optimists have it right. What they do not sufficiently appreciate, are the dilemmas within liberalism itself.

THE ANTINOMIES OF LIBERALISM

Liberal political thought contains an inner tension which first came forward in liberal thinking about the relationship between the individual and the state, but is repeated in liberal ideas about international affairs. That tension has to do with what it means for individuals to enjoy freedom and the "good life." We saw earlier that the Liberal International identified the following basic liberal values: freedom, responsibility, tolerance, social justice, and equality of opportunity; the Millennium Declaration emphasizes similar values. But the liberal idea of freedom is an essentially contested concept. In what follows, my discussion will focus on the basic distinction between negative and positive liberty introduced by Isaiah Berlin.[44]

Freedom, in the classical liberal tradition, is an individual sphere of autonomy, of non-interference by state authorities of any kind; the core element here is property rights; liberty is a right that flows from property in one's own person; property of person and possessions is a crucial condition for liberty and happiness. The critical task of government is to ensure these rights. The autonomy of individuals has been defined by Isaiah Berlin as "negative liberty": "the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others."[45] Negative liberty ensures self-determination, freedom from outside interference. Classical liberalism thus fundamentally embodies a Liberalism of Restraint; "there is a sphere of action which is one's own,"[46] interference with that sphere of liberty can only be justified, according to John Stuart Mill, if the purpose is to prevent harm to others.

Modern liberals, however, have pointed out that the unconditional protection of property rights advocated by classical liberals has in fact led to debasement of large sections of the population. T. H. Green argued that "a man who possesses nothing but his powers of labour and who has to sell these to a capitalist for bare daily maintenance, might as well, in respect of the ethical purposes which the possession of property should serve, be denied the rights of property altogether."[47] In other words, unrestricted property rights come in the way of other basic values for

liberals, emphasized in the declaration above, such as social justice and equality of opportunity.

Green's solution to the problem was to claim that the state has the responsibility to provide for a distribution of property which is to the benefit of all citizens. This requires that the state takes "positive steps to see that the national wealth does not become concentrated in so few hands that others are deprived of its moral benefits."[48] This is "positive liberty" in Isaiah Berlin's terms; the liberty of "being one's own master." Positive freedom is only possible when certain conditions are met: one must have health, economic resources, education, and so on. In other words, to be really free, individuals must have more than negative liberty affords and the state should take care to provide such conditions for all.

Modern liberalism thus fundamentally expresses a Liberalism of Imposition; it requires active interventions by the state to secure the proper conditions for real freedom. How much intervention? Green was at pains to emphasize that the state's role remained limited; it should only remove the ". . . obstacles to the realization of the capacity for beneficial exercise of rights."[49] Yet Green offers no clear-cut way of deciding the precise limitations for the state's intervention and there is no liberal consensus as to how far the state can go.

Individuals are not states and domestic conditions in liberal states are not like the conditions in the international system. But it was argued above that significant elements of a liberal order have emerged in the international realm. That makes it relevant to speculate about the ways in which the tension between a Liberalism of Restraint and a Liberalism of Imposition plays out in the international realm.

Both the Liberal International and the Millennium Declaration endorse the quest for freedom, justice, and equality of opportunity. But these goals can be interpreted both in the way of a Liberalism of Restraint and in the way of a Liberalism of Imposition; that is the tension in international liberalism. Emphasizing restraint risks jeopardizing the liberty of modern, positive liberalism; emphasizing imposition risks jeopardizing the liberty of classical, negative liberalism. Before pursuing this further, it is necessary to trace the presence of the two liberal value systems in the international realm.

The autonomy and freedom from interference that negative liberty embraces is a core element in the institution of sovereignty as it developed after Westphalia. Sovereignty included the negative freedom of non-intervention, of autonomy for states to conduct their affairs without outside interference. The state decides for itself "how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not so seek assistance from others. . . . States develop their own strategies, chart their own courses, make their own decisions about how to meet whatever needs they experience and whatever desires they develop."[50] The negative liberty of non-intervention is not a guarantee that states will be successful,

of course. They can fail, even miserably so; negative freedom is no guarantee of the good life. The freedom is one of choosing your course, not one of assured success.

The institution of sovereignty is a first step towards the rule of law in international relations. It has been a primary goal for liberals to replace war and power-politics with peace and the rule of law in an international society of states. This requires international institutions; hence the liberal ambition of creating such institutions. Woodrow Wilson argued that "a general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity of great and small nations alike."[51] The liberal Wilsonian conviction is that through a rational and intelligently designed international organization, it would be possible to put an end to war and to achieve more or less permanent peace. In this respect, Wilson echoes the most famous classical liberal IR theorist: Immanuel Kant. Further American attempts at international institution-building in the second half of the twentieth century were recorded above.

Institution-building is a Liberalism of Restraint in the sense that raw power is at least to some extent replaced by institutional networks involving rules and moderation. Why would leading states create orders based on institutions that place constraints on their power? There can be major advantages for dominant states in an institutionalized order. Over time, then, leading states have indeed tended to create such durable orders based on institutions; when the dominant state is democratic, this outcome is even more likely because the domestic order is already based on institutional restraint. And when the leading state is massively dominant, other states have higher incentives to attach themselves to an institutionalized order that will reduce the risk of domination or abandonment by the hegemon. Both of these conditions applied to the post-1945 situation and help explain the exceptional stability of the institutional order among the liberal democracies.[52]

In the economic sphere, the classical liberal market economy also represents a Liberalism of Restraint. An unhampered market economy in a context of free trade, private property, and the rule of law creates an economic realm characterized by reciprocity or symmetry, of giving and taking for mutual benefit. The economic actors in the marketplace enjoy equal opportunity to benefit from bi- and multilateral transactions. Reciprocity in this sense is expressed, for example, in the 1947 adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT). The basic norm of that organization is the "most-favored nation" rule which stipulates equal treatment in commercial relations between states, regardless of their size, power, or location. Political intervention is restricted to creating the necessary regulatory framework facilitating free market exchange.

In sum, a major aspect of liberal internationalism has been the pursuit of a Liberalism of Restraint, in seeking the establishment of the international rule of law, of international institutions, and of an unrestricted liberal market economy. But from early on, liberal internationalism also included the Liberalism of Imposition. Woodrow Wilson entered the United States into World War I because, "the world must be made safe for democracy." His Fourteen Points plan from 1918 clarified, "what we demand in this war": "It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in. . . . All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us."[53] Roosevelt's "grand design" for the post-World War II era included close cooperation between the five major powers that fought the Axis. Together, they would be very active, "policing the post-war system, each power (more or less) within its own regional sphere of influence . . ."[54] This points in the direction of the much more activist Liberalism of Imposition, seeking to enforce a certain set of rules in the behaviour of member states.

Wilson's Liberalism of Imposition was restrained by congressional isolationism and by his lack of willingness to develop U.S. military capability to support a global security arrangement. Roosevelt's grand design was translated into the Truman doctrine of 1947 aiming at the containment of communism: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." John F. Kennedy's inaugural speech of 1961 declaring U.S. willingness to "pay any price, bear any burden . . . to assure the success of liberty," as well as Ronald Reagan's "evil empire speech" of 1983 both reiterated the quest for a free world in the face of communist threat.[55] In more general terms, the Cold War period embraced a defensive Liberalism of Imposition, ready to defend liberty where it was threatened, but accepting power balancing against the (militarily) powerful Soviet Bloc.[56]

The process of decolonization further increased the demands for liberal activism because the newly independent countries were often unable to play by the classical rules of sovereignty which emphasize the negative liberty of non-intervention. Instead, they needed economic and other assistance from the international society and they have requested this ever since independence; a recent example is the appeal for "solidarity" and "equality" set forth in the Millennium Declaration mentioned above. During the Cold War, many weak state elites were skilled in obtaining assistance while preserving a large degree of autonomy. But with the end of the Cold War, demands on the weak states have increased; they have been exposed to economic as well as political conditionalities.[57] Instead of non-intervention, the donors now increasingly practice some form of intervention in order to make sure that the resources they provide are used according to plan. The clearest cases of intervention are the so-called

"humanitarian interventions" in "failed states" such as Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. This can be seen as an additional case of the Liberalism of Imposition: the argument is that in order to save lives and preserve basic human dignity, classical negative liberty is not enough in the face of weak states. A Liberalism of Imposition is required.

In the economic sphere, the weak states have never been able to play by the rules of reciprocity which characterize a Liberalism of Restraint. They have asked for special, preferential treatment in order to make up for their deficiencies. This is the basis for development assistance regimes where economic aid flows from rich to poor countries; in a similar vein, the GATT/WTO regime has special provisions for weak states. However, substantial deviations from an unhampered free trade market economy has long characterized the developed world as well. They are reflected in special subsidy systems for agricultural products; they are also reflected in patterns of government—business relations which are characterized by anything but a "hands-off" attitude.

In the United States, the current Bush administration's rhetoric strongly supports an economic Liberalism of Restraint, that is, of support for the free reign of market forces. But actual politics presents a much more mixed picture. There has recently been a dramatic change

> in the direction of the government-business coordinated policymaking classically associated with the idea of Japan Inc. The empowerment of new federal agencies to lead the U.S. market enlargement drive into foreign jurisdictions; the rise of a highly organized private sector and its institutionalized participation in policymaking; the entrenchment of an aggressive Buy American orientation and policy; and the full-blown emergence of an ideology of foreign unfairness to legitimate the changes, including a retreat from competition rules and the rules of the market.[58]

In short, strong elements of a Liberalism of Imposition has been at work both in economic relations between rich and poor, and between and inside the developed countries.

It is in the area of U.S. security policy after September 11, 2001, that the Liberalism of Imposition has been defined most sharply. The National Security Strategy of 2002 vows to "defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere."[59] This is combined with a high-profile U.S. activism in the wake of 9-11. It is emphasized that the United States must be unconstrained in responding to threats and in the pre-emptive use of force against threat. There is also a commitment to maintaining American military preponderance. It is against this background that many commentators[60] see the NSS as a promise of unilateralism in a unipolar world, even if the document also contains formulations about international cooperation.

President Bush declared in a fall 2003 speech at Whitehall that, "the United States and Great Britain share a mission in the world beyond the balance of power or the simple pursuit of interest. We seek the advance of freedom and the peace that freedom brings." This is Liberalism of Imposition; according to Charles Krauthammer, this is the motive behind the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq; ". . .the spread of democracy is not just an end but a means for securing American interests. . . . Democracies are inherently more friendly to the United States, less belligerent to their neighbours, and generally more inclined to peace."[61]

Perhaps it is logical that the world's dominant liberal power will formulate a clear version of a Liberalism of Imposition. This may not merely have to do with preponderant power; the Liberalism of Imposition can be seen as a liberal version of a deeply entrenched American ideology of Manifest Destiny: A special people, chosen by history; a special hardship: developing the first democracy and truly free market; a special land: the first real democracy and truly free market; a special contract: the social contract of democracy and the economic contract of the free market; and, most importantly, a special mission: to bring the benefits of democracy and free markets to the world.[62]

At the same time, it is entirely misleading to consider the Liberalism of Imposition a purely American phenomenon. On the one hand, there are strong liberal voices in the United States, often connected with the Democratic Party, favoring a Liberalism of Restraint. On the other hand, liberal countries of Europe also entertain ideas about Imposition. They have perhaps been most forcefully expressed by one of Tony Blair's advisors, Robert Cooper. In speaking about the weak states, he says that

> All the conditions for imperialism are there, but both the supply and demand for imperialism have dried up. And yet the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world. A world in which the efficient and well-governed export stability and liberty, and which is open for investment and growth. . . . What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. We can already discern its outline: an imperialism which, like all imperialisms, aims to bring order and organization but which rests today on the voluntary principle.[63]

Liberalism of Imposition is about positive liberty, about actively solving problems of underdevelopment, lack of liberty, absence of human rights, and so on. Making the world safe for democracy; conducting humanitarian intervention; seeking to bring economic development through aid combined with political and economic conditionalities; in short, an active liberal policy of bringing the benefits of democracy and free markets to the world.

For quite some time, there has been a near universal consensus that a Liberalism of Restraint is not enough in the face of problems in weak

states, the abuse of basic human rights, the menace of malevolent dictators, the glaring need that half of the world's population has for security, welfare, freedom, and order. The Millennium Declaration call for equality, solidarity, and freedom is a call for action much beyond Restraint. But where Liberalism of Restraint is not enough, there is a danger that Liberalism of Imposition is too much.

In the economic sphere, Liberalism of Imposition may help guard against the market failures that may be the result of the unhampered free market advocated by a Liberalism of Restraint; but simultaneously it opens to potentially equally serious (or worse) policy failures, where the manipulation of markets lead to adverse results. Polities may be dominated by elites that do not serve public interests in any meaningful way; this is often the case in weak states, but the problem can emerge elsewhere as well.

In more general terms, Isaiah Berlin emphasized that the quest for positive liberty embodied in a Liberalism of Imposition could lead to the undermining of liberty, even to authoritarianism. This is because Liberalism of Imposition involves an element of knowing what is best for others, of knowing what others ought to want (cf. the formulation in the National Security Strategy quoted above: "defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere"). "Once I take this view," says Berlin, "I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture in the name, and on behalf, of the 'real' selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man . . . must be identical with his freedom."[64]

Fareed Zakaria recently argued that democratically elected regimes who were "routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power" can be seen as "'illiberal' democracies."[65] The Liberalism of Imposition contains such an element of "ignoring constitutional limits" in seeking to be unrestrained by international institutions and international law; in this specific sense, Imposition is "illiberal liberalism." Montesquieu famously claimed that "unlimited authority can never be legitimate."[66]

Edward Rhodes argues that a genuine liberal order must grow from within, it cannot be imposed by outsiders: "Governance based on consent rather than on force, amity between peoples, and the rule of reason and law cannot be meaningfully imposed or long sustained at gunpoint/ . . . The sort of liberal crusade preached by the Bush administration promises to lead to failure and tragedy."[67]

In sum, it would appear that the Liberalism of Restraint is too little; it does not promise to deal effectively with vast problems of human anguish and distress; it is potentially a recipe for inaction. The Liberalism of Imposition would appear to be too much; it seriously threats to undermine the very liberal values that it seeks to promote; it is potentially a recipe for overreaction. That is the core tension in liberalism; finding a

way of mastering it is an inescapable condition for further real progress towards a liberal world order.

LIMITS TO THE LIBERALISM OF IMPOSITION?

How far can a Liberalism of Imposition go? The question is being raised, of course, because the world's dominant power by far is pursuing that policy. Preponderant power would indicate that it can go very far indeed; but as the invasion of Iraq has demonstrated, even vastly superior military power can face serious obstacles and limitations. I shall focus on the United States and Iraq in discussing the limits to Imposition.

One limitation is cost. Cost of the Iraq occupation is very high, approaching a quarter-trillion dollars. Government spending on war-related budgets is currently U.S.$500 per household each month.[68] The problem is that this is too little; resources in Iraq are spread thin and an effective effort demands a substantial increase in U.S. forces and material. Zakaria calculates that "to match the number of soldiers that we have per inhabitant in Kosovo we would need 526,000 in Iraq"[69]; that is about three times the current level. And this is only Iraq; operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere are also costly. In a longer perspective of U.S. policy, there has been consistent lack of willingness to "incur the full costs and risks"[70] of a policy of imposition.

There is also human cost; even decisive military dominance translates to much less on the ground, under adverse conditions. "The closer U.S. military forces get to enemy-held territory, the more competitive the enemy will be. This arises from a combination of political, physical, and technological facts. . . . U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy [i.e., a nationalist, unilateralist version of hegemony]."[71]

Increasing cost in terms of blood and treasure will reduce domestic support for a Liberalism of Imposition. There is evidence that the Iraq war was accepted by the public because of a process of "threat inflation" involving "issue manipulation" of the public; this in turn was based on government control of the intelligence apparatus; taking advantage of presidential authority in foreign affairs; a weakness of countervailing institutions including a critical press; and the shock of September 11.[72] These are not durable conditions for long-term support for a policy of Imposition.

A further barrier to a Liberalism of Imposition is the potential loss of legitimacy. If the avowed promotion of human rights and democracy is carried out in a way that can be perceived as power-hungry militarism seeking control of oil and other resources, the country in charge will not be relied on as a true force for liberal values.[73] The "power over" of

Imposition is much less effective in the long run than the cooperative "power through." This is behind the emphasis of many liberals on "soft power," that is, "the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others."[74] Soft power requires legitimacy; a Liberalism of Imposition may squander "America's most important foreign-policy asset—its moral authority."[75]

In sum, there are real limits to a Liberalism of Imposition. The discussion here indicates that it will probably not be possible to sustain a stable liberal order solely based on a Liberalism of Imposition.

LIMITS TO THE LIBERALISM OF RESTRAINT?

The most serious charge against a Liberalism of Restraint is that it does not get the job done; it cannot promote basic liberal goals of liberty, welfare, security, and order in a sufficiently effective way because of liberal respect for sovereignty and non-intervention, for legal barriers to imposition, for necessary "permission slips" from international institutions.[76]

A Liberalism of Restraint has been at work in international society, at least to some considerable extent, for the last five decades. In spite of the qualified progress recorded above, and the existence of a "thin" liberal order on a global scale, problems of utmost severity persist: 11 million children die each year of malnutrition and preventable diseases; stark inequalities of income endure; 1.2 billion people subsist on less than one dollar per day; 815 million people are undernourished. Blatant abuses of basic human rights continue to take place in many countries, not merely in authoritarian systems, but also in restricted and frail democracies.

State elites need to be disciplined, that is, to be constrained by domestic or external forces pushing them towards developmental (i.e., liberal) objectives, or they will become overly self-serving, pursuing their own narrow interests and not delivering public or collective goods to a sufficient degree. This is true for the OECD-world as well as for the developing world. The classical liberal solution to this problem is constitutional government, that is, democratically based institutions creating checks on the power of the rulers.

But in practice it is extremely difficult to graft democracy upon weak states lacking the proper institutions and a level of trust and mutual acceptance among contending groups in the population. The problem with narrowly self-serving elites is most acute in the weakest and poorest states in the Third World. In many places, the domestic mechanisms of disciplining state elites are largely absent. That leaves the job to external forces. But because it respects the formal sovereignty of such elites and their rightful legal membership in international institutions, a Liberalism

of Restraint promises very little in terms of dramatically improving the conditions for ordinary people in poor countries.[77]

Even in emergency cases, that is true. Massive human suffering in Kosovo would have been left unattended by international society if it should have fully respected the Liberalism of Restraint. Massive human suffering is left insufficiently attended by international society today in Sudan, in the Congo, and elsewhere.

In sum, there are real limits to a Liberalism of Restraint. The question is whether it is possible to sustain a stable global liberal order, solely based on a Liberalism of Restraint.

CONCLUSION: A BALANCED LIBERAL ORDER?

I have tried to move forward the debate about liberal ideology and liberal world order by arguing that the core tension in liberal internationalism is that a Liberalism of Restraint is too little and a Liberalism of Imposition is too much. In order to establish a stable liberal world order with real global progress towards the realization of liberal values, a course has to be found which avoids the pitfalls of these liberal extremes. Those who tend to favor a Liberalism of Restraint have to think of ways to escape that this will lead to inaction and the quiet acceptance of massive human suffering. Those who tend to favor a Liberalism of Imposition have to think of ways to ensure that such policies will not lead to illiberal outcomes and illegitimate policies, that is, to the undermining instead of the promotion of basic liberal values.

There is a continuum of possible compromises between the two extremes. Those bent on avoiding Impositionist excesses will not stray far from a position of Restraint. Tim Dunne and Nick Wheeler represent this position:

> Expanding humanity's moral horizons requires recognizing both the indivisibility of human rights and security, and the concomitant responsibility to rescue those trapped in situations of violence, poverty and ill-health. This might require the use of force in exceptional cases of genocide and mass murder, but the best way of avoiding such a drastic remedy is to utilize the instrument of preventive diplomacy as soon as there is evidence of abuses. Such measures applied on a concerted and international basis might prevent a deterioration of the human rights situation, avoiding recourse to more costly action.[78]

One can sympathize with this view, but as already indicated above, "preventive diplomacy" is currently unsuccessful in confronting human suffering in a number of places.

That points in the direction of more bold liberal measures, that is, a policy closer to the Imposition end of the continuum. How can such a policy avoid the dangers mentioned earlier, of undermining instead of

promoting basic liberal values? Two conditions would appear to be crucial in this respect; one has to do with the substance of liberal policies; the other has to do with the form or process of liberal policies. As for substance, it is necessary to be able to demonstrate that core liberal values—freedom, responsibility, tolerance, social justice—is what Liberal Imposition policies actually aim to promote around the world. On a more concrete level, that means demonstrating a real commitment towards democratic and economic reform, in the Middle East and elsewhere. It means working for a sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It means demonstrating that the "war on terror" is really a commitment to the spreading of freedom and other core liberal values. It has already been indicated above that all this would require revision of current (i.e., spring 2005) U.S. policies of Imposition.

As regards form, or process of liberal policy, legitimacy is the core concern; a Liberalism of Imposition undertaken on a purely unilateralist basis risks being absent of legitimacy. Legitimacy requires cooperation and consent, at least to the extent that policy measures are understood and have some substantial measure of acceptance by others. "Others" in this respect means: (a) other consolidated democracies; (b) regional powers in eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America; (c) the international society as represented by the UN Security Council. Full acceptance might not always be possible at every level, as demonstrated by the Kosovo action undertaken by NATO and not endorsed by the UN. But in order to obtain legitimacy, acceptance should always be actively sought; leading liberal powers should always seek to define liberal policies of Imposition in ways that are acceptable to others. No manual can be given, defining when concrete measures are "sufficiently" legitimate. The Kosovo operation is an example of a measure that was basically legitimate in the eyes of international society; the Iraq operation is an example of a measure that was not.[79]

Some readers will find these suggestions for a liberal strategy anodyne at best; I am afraid I tend to agree with them. It is certainly true that at the moment, the United States and other major liberal powers are not working in a concerted and sustainable way towards a durable and effective liberal world order. That will not happen before these states define a clear, effective, and legitimate compromise between the Liberalism of Restraint and the Liberalism of Imposition. But the larger, underlying question concerns the extent to which such a clear compromise is at all possible. Berlin himself was never happy to make clear statements about practical politics; he much preferred theory. He surely sensed the difficulties in striking the appropriate, practical balance between negative and positive liberty.[80] Those difficulties also pertain to the balance between the Liberalism of Restraint and the Liberalism of Imposition. First, such a balance requires a level of commitment from and cooperation between liberal states that might not be realistic because of more narrow

national interests. Second, even in the case that such commitment and cooperation is forthcoming, it remains uncertain how much liberal forces can accomplish in the world. Can they, for example, in the case of weak and even failed states, come in from the outside and build effective and responsive states under highly adverse conditions? Earlier successes in Germany and Japan will certainly not easily be repeated in Liberia or Sierra Leone.[81] In sum, because of liberal progress in the world, the tensions in liberal thinking about world order have emerged with greater force since the end of the Cold War. They have become all the more clear in what might have been liberalism's finest hour.

NOTES

1. This paper draws on an article with the same title in *International Relations* 20(3)(2006): 251-72. For a book-length treatment of the subject, see *A Liberal World Order in Crisis: Choosing Between Imposition and Restraint* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

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18. Mueller, *Remnants* , 110.

19. Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire* (London and New York: Verso, 2003), 160.

20. Harald Müller, *Amerika schlägt zurück: Die Weltordnung nach dem 11. September* (Frankfurt Main: Fisher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003).

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ELEVEN

The Rise of a Neo-medieval Order in Europe

Jan Zielonka

What is the nature of the evolving international system in Europe? In this chapter I will try to show that the emerging system resembles the system that existed in the Middle Ages before the emergence of territorial nation states and the classical balance of power politics. Today nation states are no longer the sole and most important actors in Europe, the distinction between domestic and international affairs is extremely blurred and institutional forms of collective bargaining replaced the typical Westphalian inter-state politics of balancing, bandwagoning, and ganging up over territorial gains and spheres of influence. As Sebastian Princen and Michèle Knodt put it, we have in Europe "a polycentric system, which is split into multiple, overlapping arenas that are characterized by loose coupling."[1] In my view, this is the essence of new medievalism.

THE WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM

There is general agreement among specialists in the field of International Relations that the emergence of sovereign, territorial states following the Peace of Westphalia largely determined the nature of the international system in Europe. Medieval Europe was not divided into separate states with clear borders; it was organized horizontally according to function.[2] Empires had no fixed geographic limits and the form and scope of their political control varied.[3] But the Peace of Westphalia sanctioned the division of Europe into territorial states and laid down two basic principles determining their mutual relations: the principles of equality and sove-

reignty of states.[4] From then on states were recognized as the key international actors that were entitled to exercise absolute power within their borders without external interference. The superior rights of two universal entities, the Papacy and the empire, were no longer accepted.[5]

Of course, in empirical terms states were hardly equal, and sovereignty was never absolute even in the case of the most powerful actors.[6] Nevertheless, the new normative arrangement had profound implications for the structure of the system as such and the behavior of individual actors. A system of sovereign and formally equal states could not but be anarchic in the sense that no power could formally impose any solutions on individual states. The system was also geared to war and conflict. As Kenneth Waltz put it: "With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire—conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur."[7] The key ways of avoiding the hegemony of the strongest states have been self-help and the balance of power politics. Inviolability of borders and territorial defense became the greatest preoccupation. States formed alliances with each other in search of security, but they were often unable to prevent conflicts over real or imagined imbalances.

Throughout modern history there were numerous attempts to constrain the damaging effects of this mechanism through agreements on certain universal principles of morality and government. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, for instance, the so-called "Concert system" sought to establish an equilibrium of power through the redistribution of peoples and territories and through the mechanism of regular meetings between great powers.[8] In the aftermath of the Second World War, the United Nations system also represented an effort to introduce a mechanism for solving international disputes by peaceful means and according to several clearly defined legal criteria. However, the two Westphalian principles were never questioned. States were still regarded as being equal and sovereign.[9]

THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

For the first time in the modern history the Westphalian principles were seriously compromised in the course of European integration. The Westphalian anarchy has already been constrained by the coordination of member states' external economic relations in the early years of European integration. The Coal and Steel Community was in fact a major step away from the Westphalian prototype because the members of the Community were no longer free to make sovereign decisions in the field crucial for their readiness to fight wars. The 1957 Treaty of Rome created a common trade policy and gave the Community the power to initiate association

agreements between the EC and third countries and to conclude international treaties. Setting up the European Political Cooperation project in the late 1970s represented an extension of common efforts directly into the field of "high politics." Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty a common foreign and security policy had become an EU objective, and since the late 1990s there is even a Common European Security and Defense Policy. The CFSP/ESDP project is intergovernmental which means that the member states remain principal foreign policy actors. But the CFSP/ESDP became an important center of foreign policy and defense coordination at odds with the Westphalian logic of anarchy. Foreign and security policies of the member states are now firmly geared to the CFSP/ESDP governance center even though this center remains relatively weak. (One can argue that the ECOFIN became a similar center for interstate coordination focusing on monetary policies.)

The introduction of the principle of "qualified majority voting" (based on a system of "weighted" votes), and the granting of certain "binding" powers to the European Court of Justice also implied that states could no longer be regarded as the sole, and totally sovereign center of power within their own borders.[10] In fact, today nobody still argues that EU member states enjoy absolute sovereignty on their territory, but it is less obvious whether their formal rights are still equal. This is because uniformity of rights and duties of all members was the declared principle of European integration from the early days. However, each time the Council of Ministers decides by qualified majority, the member states' representatives are provided with unequal number of weighted votes.[11] Various opt-outs negotiated in the field of monetary integration, justice and home affairs, and common defense also introduce the element of inequality. For instance, the EMU chapter of the EC Treaty provides for only partial participation in decision-making of member states who do not adopt the single currency. EU enlargement makes the situation even more complex because the number of countries outside the "Euro group," for instance, is now larger than that of the "ins." And it is far from being clear how transitional the various "transitional" arrangements imposed on the new members will be even with regard to the four basic economic freedoms. Finally, in anticipation of enlargement, the Treaty of Nice has allowed for so-called "enhanced cooperation" initiatives to be launched by eight member states or more. This is likely to introduce even further differentiation in the legal status of individual members. In fact, the legal and institutional discourse in the Union has changed dramatically over the past few years from one of uniformity and harmonization to one of flexibility and differentiation.[12] Enlargement was again the major factor behind this change.

With growing differentiation in the legal status there has also been more assertive intervention in the internal affairs of member states. Since the Amsterdam Treaty the Union has the right to intervene not only if a

member state violates its vast body of economic and administrative *acquis*, but also if it does not comply with the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law proclaimed in Article 6(1) EU. The intrusive and open-ended nature of this right to intervention became clear in 2000 when Jörg Haider's FPÖ extremist party became part of the Austrian government and the EU decided to "punish" Austria.[13] The Union does not have provisions for intervening in member states foreign and defense policies, but these are provided by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty). Parties to this treaty have to report the location of their heavy weapons and allow their inspection. Under this treaty more than 50,000 items of heavy military equipment—artillery, helicopters, tanks, and so on—have been destroyed and the possession of the remaining arsenal has been limited and subject to verification.[14]

In sum, we have a system in which member states' budgets, administrative regulations, judicial decisions, and even the size of their military forces is subject to European scrutiny and possibly intervention. In this environment, to use Robert Cooper's expression, "security, which was once based on walls, is now based on openness and transparency and mutual vulnerability."[15] The system subsequently became less anarchic, and less geared to balancing and self-help. Member states still try to pursue their individual and often selfish visions of national interest, but they usually utilize the EU institutional framework to bargain over their differences.[16] The ongoing process of EU enlargement is likely to give another boost to this trend, because it further erodes the principle of territoriality and introduces more layers of sovereignty.

THE MEDIEVAL FEATURES

Several features of the current European system are truly medieval and they make it virtually impossible for EU members to act as typical Westphalian states.[17] To start with, there is no pyramid-like hierarchical government in Europe. Instead we have a complex interpenetration of various types of political units operating in a network system. Europe is not just governed from Brussels as is often alleged. The presidency of the European Council travels from one European capitol to another every six months, and various European institutions and agencies are spread all over the continent. Moreover, there is no single centre of authority in charge of key functional fields, but a multiplicity of various overlapping military, police, and economic regimes operating on different territories. It is a kind of multilevel and multi-centered government in concentric circles. In fact, disassociation between authoritative allocations, functional competencies, and territorial constituencies is one of the EU's characteristic features.

The relationship between the metropolis and the periphery in contemporary Europe is also medieval.[18] There is no perpetual asymmetry and hierarchy in the EU's relations with its neighbors. Moreover, borders between the European metropolis and the periphery are quite fuzzy despite the rhetoric of Schengen. Not a "fortress Europe," but a "maze Europe" is emerging as a consequence.[19] In this "maze Europe" different legal, economic, security, and cultural spaces are bound separately, cross-border multiple cooperation flourishes, and the inside/outside divide is blurred. (The linear concept of the border was not known in the Middle Ages; borders were treated more like geographical zones than lines and they were fairly open. Moreover, there was hardly any overlap between administrative, economic, military and cultural borders at the time.)

The relations between the European metropolis and periphery are not conflict free. However, the successive waves of EU enlargement make sure that the European periphery is able to gradually gain access to decision-making of the metropolis. Its sovereignty is not denied, but merely constrained by the policy of EU conditional help and accession. When a peripheral country joins the Union it does not regain fully its sovereignty but it is shared with other EU members.

The way power politics is being played in Europe also resembles the Middle Ages. Medieval rulers clearly preferred to use non-violent means in pursuing their European objectives despite regular outbreaks of violence and predatory behavior. For instance, the Habsburgs augmented their territories chiefly through marriage and inheritance. Other actors, especially the major cities pursued their objectives through trade. The Papacy relied on the Church's spiritual "power" and well-organized taxation. Armed forces were deployed rather reluctantly in medieval Europe because, as showed by Paul Kennedy, they were not predictable and reliable instruments.[20]

The instruments of power politics in contemporary Europe are chiefly economic and bureaucratic rather than military. The EU has now a nascent military capability: some fifty to sixty thousand soldiers together with a special EU Military Committee and the European Military Staff. These soldiers are said to be able to perform not only peace-keeping but also peace-enforcing operations. Only the former function has been tapped so far (in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Balkans.) Besides, the size of these forces makes it clear that the military might cannot be seen as the Union's prime policy instrument. This means that the Union's policies cannot but rely more on incentives (and their denial) rather than on coercion. The territorial acquisitions take place by invitation rather than conquest. Legitimizing strategies of the Union can hardly follow the usual imperial motto: might is right. The EU legitimizes its policies by claiming that its norms are right and that it promotes the most efficient model of economic and political integration. It does it by urging

other countries to adopt the (in)famous *acquis communautaire* containing some 20,000 detailed laws and regulations.

THE EVOLVING NATURE OF CONFLICTS

Despite all ongoing changes conflicts between EU members have not disappeared, of course. However, these conflicts are primarily about exclusion from the core and abuse of agreed procedures rather than about borders. Both old and new EU members fear that cheating by other members will put them into a disadvantageous position. They fear, above all losing control of the decisions affecting their interests. Individual member states might opt out from certain fields of integration, but they still want a seat at a table when matters affecting their interests are being discussed and decided. However, inequality is an unavoidable result of greater differentiation. With the creation of European power centers there must also come the feeling of exclusion and marginalization. Enlargement has underlined the conflict between the large and small member states of the Union as was vividly illustrated by disagreements about the new voting procedures proposed by the draft of the European Constitution.[21] Enlargement has also underlined the conflict between the most and the least developed members of the Union. Some new members are excluded from certain fields of integration not by their free choice, but by the need to catch up with the old members in terms of legal adjustment and economic development. They obviously fear that this "second rank" status will last indefinitely. They want to be full members of a Europe of equals, even if this Europe of equals can only represent the lowest common denominator.[22] However, proponents of the core do not want to become hostage to the least developed and the least pro-integration EU members.[23] This obviously creates conflicts, but they are not being dealt with in a Westphalian fashion. Collective bargaining over laws, procedures and the empire's institutional structure forms the essence of interstate politics within the EU. In present day Europe, one can hardly imagine any EU member(s) going to war against another member(s) over abused common laws and procedures, as once envisaged by Martin Feldstein.[24] It is even less conceivable for EU members going to war with each other over territorial gains and spheres of influence. Individual member states will obviously form various coalitions supporting or opposing certain projects, but there is nothing to suggest that these coalitions will be stable and comprehensive enough to resemble the Westphalian balance of power syndrome. The cleavages of national interests within the enlarged EU are simply too diversified and complex for the emergence of any firm pattern of coalitions between either large and small states, the relatively poor and rich, the Baltic and Mediterranean, Atlantic and Continental or Euro-enthusiastic and Euro-skeptic member states.

The complexity of the current and future bargaining process can be understood even better when we consider that the member states are not the only actors taking part in the European bargaining process. Various supranational, regional, and local centers of governance also participate in the decision-making system of the EU and their access to decisions varies depending on the functional field, political stature, and legal arrangements. Clearly, even Metternich and Bismarck would find it difficult to apply their Westphalian recipes for coping with the very complex and interdependent European setting of today.

THE NEO-MEDIEVAL ALTERNATIVE

One of the main reasons for embarking on the integration project was to escape from the Westphalian syndrome. As Joschka Fischer put it in his famous speech at Humboldt University: "The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance of power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648."[25] Over the past decades member states have developed a new pattern of relations with each other and the post-Cold War developments only reinforced this pattern. Table one shows how the new system differs from the classical Westphalian one.

Two Types of International System in Europe

Westphalian international system	**Neo-medieval international system**
the system is basically anarchic without a clear power center	the system is geared towards the empire's power center(s), however weak and dispersed
all states are formally equal and their authority over a certain territory is absolute	states have formally unequal participatory rights in various functional fields and their authority over a certain territory is shared
non-intervention in internal affairs of other states is the basic principle of interstate order	intervention is recognized as legitimate either in support of certain moral norms (human rights, for instance) or in order to enforce compliance with the agreed laws

national governments are prime international actors with little input of other actors in the decision-making system	various national, supranational, regional, and local governments participate in the decision-making system and their access varies depending on the functional field
balancing, bandwagoning and ganging up over territorial gains and spheres of political influence is the essence of interstate politics	collective bargaining over laws, procedures and the empire's institutional structure is the essence of interstate politics
interests are basically about national security and they are considered as given or even eternal	interests are essentially matters of policy preference and burden sharing and they change depending on political affiliations and ideological fashions
conflicts are primarily about borders and jurisdiction over them	conflicts are primarily about exclusion from the core and abuse of agreed procedures
states provide for their own security through a system of territorial defense and military forms of deterrence	security within a broader empire is sought through the process of economic integration, and "soft" conflict prevention

Of course, one should avoid any simplistic historical analogies (and the use of the term neo-medieval underlines this point).[26] Global capitalism, new technologies (nuclear weapons among them), and democracy make it difficult for Europe to return to medieval behavior. Today, the European social structure and its belief system are also quite different. That said, the emerging international system in Europe has clearly some medieval features especially when compared with the classical Westphalian system.

The question is: will it secure the minimum degree of order and cooperation? The answer depends on our normative standpoints and historical interpretations. For someone like myself writing from the medieval cities of Oxford and Florence the Middle Ages are a symbol of prosperity and enlightenment rather than chaos and misery. The patchwork of various medieval quasi-sovereignties and overlapping hierarchies was fairly orderly and stable due to the existing system of oaths and contracts, however complicated.[27] The expedient pursuit of egocentric interests have also been curbed by strong moral values and religious principles that prevailed in the Middle Ages. While a plethora of "Westphalian" analysts, from Bodin and Hobbes to Kissinger and Waltz, argued that

moral rules do not apply to states, the medieval authors such as Thomas of Aquinas or St. Augustine sought to define a concept of just war.[28]

Our evaluation of the emerging neo-medieval system also depends on normative standpoints. As Herman van Gunsteren put it: "Where one person sees plurality, the other one sees rubbish. Where one person sees variety, another sees disorder. Where the one sees monsters (unacceptable combinations such as centaurs), the other sees fascinating novelties."[29] Some believe that all social systems tend towards atomization and anarchy while others trust that even the most chaotic systems are able to generate a dynamic order.[30] Some believe that hierarchical systems are best suited for securing cooperation and peace, while others believe that "plurilateral" non-hegemonic systems perform much better despite all appearances of chaos and conflict.[31]

In short, it would be wrong to assume that the new system will generate conflicts. Whether this new European medievalism can remain prosperous and stable depends on many internal and external factors. The challenge is to make medievalism work, but this can only be done when we grasp the nature of the emerging system.

CONCLUSIONS

When in 1977 Hedley Bull speculated on a possible return to the medieval pattern of interstate politics he still considered such a prospect as relatively unlikely.[32] This is because he saw too little regional integration of states and too little disintegration of states as such. For a medieval scenario to materialize, Bull also wanted to see more private international violence, further growth of transnational organizations and the technological unification of the world. His skepticism is still justified in the global context despite the recent rise of private international violence in the form of terrorism and ever greater spread of modern technologies to even the most remote corners of the world. Nevertheless, since the 1970s the situation in Europe has gradually developed along the medieval scenario. Today we have in Europe the essence of the medieval politics identified by Bull, namely a complex "system of overlapping authority and multiply loyalty."[33] Member states have not disintegrated, but integrated accepting significant erosion of their sovereignty in various fields. Member states have ceased fighting with each other about territorial acquisitions and they have changed the ways of protecting their spheres of influence. Their present conflicts are primarily about exclusion from the European core and abuse of agreed procedures and they are being sorted out through complex institutional bargaining over laws and procedures. Intervention in the internal affairs of member states is now accepted either in support of certain moral norms (human rights, for instance) or in order to enforce compliance with the agreed laws. We do not know Eu-

rope's future, but we know that in present day Europe power is structured and exercised in a different way than is usually assumed by the Westphalian paradigm.

NOTES

1. Sebastian Princen and Michèle Knodt, "Introduction: Puzzles and prospects in theorizing the EU," in *Understanding the European Union's External Relations*, eds. Sebastian Princen and Michèle Knodt (London: Routledge, 2003), 204.

2. See, for example, Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society* (London: Routledge, 1992), 138-51.

3. Scholars often talk about concentric circles of political control in the pre-Westphalian era, ranging from complete absorption at the core to mere hegemony at the outer margins. See Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 176-82, and Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society* (London: Routledge, 1992), 14-16.

4. The peace resulting from a series of treaties negotiated in two Westphalian towns, Muenster and Osnabrueck, formally dealt with German internal affairs only. However, since most of the larger European actors were involved in the Thirty Years War, the Peace had a broader long-term significance. See E. A. Beller, "Thirty Years War," in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. IV, ed. J. P. Cooper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 306-58.

5. As Kalevi Holsti put it, the Peace of Westphalia represented "an order created by states for states." See Kalevi Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 25.

6. See, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty, Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). David Held makes a useful distinction between the concept of sovereignty and autonomy. The former refers to the entitlement of a state to rule over a bounded territory, while latter denotes the actual power a nation-state possesses to articulate and achieve policy goals independently. See David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), 100.

7. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 159.

8. Burke called this "the diplomatic republic of Europe" as quoted in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 1.

9. As David Held put it: "the UN Charter model, despite its good intentions, failed effectively to generate a new principle of organization in the international order—a principle which might break fundamentally with the logic of Westphalia." See David Held, op. cit., 88. The realist school of international relations is obviously much more skeptical about the constraining effects of ethical ideas and good government. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, op. cit., 80-85.

10. This is so even if QMV is hardly applied in practice, and especially in foreign affairs. For a more elaborate argument see, for example, James A. Caporaso, "Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty," in *Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order*, ed. James A. Caporaso (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 15-21.

11. The system of weighted votes was originally introduced for the European Economic Community with only six member states, and gradually adjusted up to the latest treaty in force agreed in Nice. This system violates the formal equality of member states although it may be seen as an effort to introduce a substantive equality of states. See Jan Wouters, "Constitutional Limits of Differentiation: The Principle of Equality," in *The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law*, eds. B. de Witte, D. Hanf and E. Vos (Antwerpen; Oxford : Intersentia, 2001), 301.

12. Bruno De Witte, "Enlargement and the EU Constitution," in *The Enlargement of the European Union*, op. cit., 241. See also Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott, eds., *Constitutional Change in the EU—From Uniformity to Flexibility?* (London: Hart, 2000).

13. This exercise of the Union's power to intervene in the domestic affairs of its member states has proved controversial and only partially successful, but it has set an important precedent. See Cramér and Wrange, "The Heider Affairs, Law and European Integration," *Europarättslig tidskrift* (2000) 28; or Happold, "Fourteen against One: The EU Member States' Response to Freedom Party Participation in the Austrian Government," 49 *ICLQ* (2000) 953.

14. See, or example, Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Jane M.O. Sharp, Lawrence Freedman, eds., *The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: The Politics of Post-Wall Arms Control* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996); or Pál Dunay, Gábor Kardos, and Andrew J. Williams, eds. *New Forms of Security: Views from Central, Eastern and Western Europe*, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995).

15. Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 55.

16. Although many other factors have also been identified as contributing to this change and the EU is only one among many institutional platforms used by European states. These factors are discussed in more detail in Jan Zielonka, *Explaining Euro-paralysis* (London: Macmillan/Palgrave, 1998), 39-43.

17. See John H. Kautsky, *The Politics of Aristocratic Empires* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 127, and 144. See also J. H. Burns, *The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c. 350-c. 1450* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 179.

18. The periphery here consists of poor and unstable EU neighbors in Eastern and South Eastern Europe and North Africa. EU policies towads these countries are spelled out in: *Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, (Brussels, 11.3.2003), COM(2003) 104 final. See also Council conclusions, "*Wider Europe—Neighbourhood"* available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/we/doc/cc06_03.pdf, 18 June 2003.

19. Thomas Christiansen and Knud Erik Jøregensen, "Transnational Governance Above and Below the State: The Changing Nature of Borders in the New Europe," *Regional and Federal Studies*, 10 (Summer 2000): 74. See also Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, "The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 37 (1999): 228.

20. According to Kennedy, "war waging" was intimately connected with the birth of the nation-state. See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Unwin and Hyman, 1988), 70-71.

21. As the Latvian President, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, put it: "I believe that most Latvians see the Europe of the future as a united continent of equal and sovereign partners, where relationships between member-states are based on partnership and mutual respect, and where the interests of all members are taken into account. This has been one of the European Union's main strengths to date. It will not bode well for Europe's future if this principle is changed, and if some of the EU's larger countries obtain a disproportionate say in important decision-making process at the expense of their smaller neighbours." See "European Integration: New Opportunities and challenges," address by Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of Latvia at the Institute of European Affairs in Dublin, June 4, 2002. Internet source: http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/speech/sp040602_en.htm.

22. This is well illustrated by Eastern European reactions to Joschka Fischer's speech at Humboldt University. See, for example, a commentary of Poland's Foreign Minister, Bronislaw Geremek quoted by PAP (Polska Agencja Prasowa), available at: http://euro.pap.pl/cgi-bin/europap.pl?grupa=1&ID=81 and an interview with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Victor Orbán, for the Austrian newspaper *Standard*, 18 June 2000.

23. See Joschka Fischer's speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000. See http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=1027, or Jacques Chirac's speech at the German Bundestag in Berlin, 27 June 2000. Seehttp://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_12732.htm.

24. See Martin Feldstein, "EMU and International Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 6 (November/December 1997): 60-73.

25. Joschka Fischer, see note 55.The implicit assumption in the Fischer argument is that the balance of power politics in the Cold War period was unworkable in the long term and quite dangerous. I cannot but agree with such reasoning.

26. Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil have shown well how medieval history could be abused in the field of International Relations. See Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History," *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (1993): 479-91.

27. See, for example, Walter Ullmann, *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1966), 215-30; or Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 34-57.

28. The works of Bodin obviously preceded the Treaties of Westphalia. In fact, Jean Bodin's influential work *De La République* published as early as 1576 elaborated the concept of sovereignty and inspired the Westphalian arrangement. See, for example, Preston King, *The Ideology of Order: A Comparative Analysis of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes* (London: Frank Cass, 1999); or Yves Charles Zarka, *Jean Bodin: nature, histoire, droit et politique* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1996). See also John Stoessinger, "The Nation-State and the Nature of Power," in *Perspectives on World Politics*, eds. Richard Little and Michael Smith (London: Routledge, 1991), 2nd edition, 24. For the medieval concept of a "just war," see Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

29. See Herman van Gunsteren, *A Theory of Citizenship* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 116.

30. For the former view, see Amitai Etzoni, *The Active Society* (New York: Free Press, 1968). For the latter view, see Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order out of Chaos* (New York: Bantam, 1984).

31. The term "plurilateralism" was used by Philip G. Cerny in the early 1990s to describe the shift in the world order from a "hierarchy of holistic actors, states, which impose order through power and hegemony, to a more complex, and diffuse set of interactive self-regulatory mechanisms or webs of power." See Philip G. Cerny, "Plurilateralism: Structural Differentiation and Functional Conflict in the Post-Cold War World Order," *Millenium*, Vol. 22, No. 1. (1993): 31.

32. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977), especially 254-55 and 264-76.

33. Ibid., 254.

TWELVE

Illusions, Dreams, and Nightmares

Japan, the United States, and the East Asian Renaissance in the First Decade of the New Century

John Welfield[1]

THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

Even today, more than half a century after the end of the Allied Occupation, which followed Tokyo's unsuccessful attempt to establish a regional hegemony under the banner of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, it is still not possible to discuss any aspect of Japan's international behavior without reference to the policies of its former conqueror the United States, now at the apogee of its global power.

The Clinton administration's Asian-Pacific strategy focused on the development of American relations with China, seen as a "strategic partner." George W. Bush entered office with a perception of China as a "strategic rival," a view not entirely dissipated by the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent American preoccupation with Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East. While the hostility of the present Republican administration towards Beijing should not be exaggerated, and the possibility of a sudden reversal of policy not ignored, President Bush and his inner circle have clearly seen Japan, not China, as the centerpiece of their grand design for the Asian-Pacific-Indian Ocean region, recommending that Tokyo be urged to play a more active military role in the alliance, to participate in collective defense and to join the United States in the development of sophisticated missile systems. These aspirations were enunciated in the Nye-Armitage report of 11 October 2000[2] and in

the 10 October 2001 *Quadrennial Defence Review.*[3] They were developed further in the *Quadrennial Defence Review* released on 6 February 2006, which characterized China as a the nation with "the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States," stressed the centrality of the American-Japanese relationship in this context, identified India as a "key strategic partner" and attached much importance to enhanced militarily cooperation among Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra.[4] The most recent Nye-Armitage report (February 2007) is founded on the same assumptions and makes essentially the same recommendations.[5]

Rhetoric should never be confused with reality. At various times in the past, United States administrations, both Republican and Democrat, have entertained similar expectations of Japan, only to see their hopes turn to ashes in the face of resistance, both overt and concealed, on the part of Japanese Prime Ministers, powerful Conservative faction leaders, the Diet, the bureaucracy, the media, and the general public. The Japanese-American relationship was simply the inevitable outcome of Japanese defeat in World War II, the breakdown of the Grand Alliance, and the onset of the Cold War. It has been viewed, from the beginning, in rather different ways by the two parties involved. Commenting on the policies of Prime Minister Sato Eisaku (1964-1972) and several of his colleagues, for example, former Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao once told the present writer:

> The Americans were always asking us to do this and to do that, to take over part of the burden of their Far Eastern policies. But all their efforts were sabotaged by one Japanese Cabinet after another. That's why Sato Eisaku got the Nobel Peace Prize. He got it for his accumulated achievements in the field of sabotage. I suppose he is the only Prime Minister ever to have got the Nobel Peace Prize for sabotage.[6]

There have been situations in which Japanese governments have seriously considered alternatives to the Security Treaty system. There have been times, too, when Japanese governments have actually gone some distance to satisfy Washington's expectations, only to find the ground collapse under their feet as the juggernaut of the American state suddenly lurched in another direction.[7]

Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's five years in office,[8] however, witnessed a steady strengthening of the Japan–U.S. relationship, moves towards the assumption of a wider, more assertive Japanese role within the framework of the alliance system, the erosion of political ties with China, Korea and several other Asian nations, a reversal of the "return to Asia" mood that had gathered momentum after the Tanaka Cabinet's restoration of Sino–Japanese ties in 1972, and the emergence of a narrow, somewhat xenophophic nationalism, with a marked anti-Asian flavor, stimulated by an increasingly superficial press, a vociferous school of revisionist historians, new social studies textbooks, and a proliferation of best-

selling novels and comics on Japan's relations with China and Korea that have taken the most extraordinary liberties with the facts. These events have coincided with an unprecedented revival in the electoral fortunes of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the domination of the party, for the first time in its history, by the tough-minded nationalist right wing, centering around the linear descendants of the old Kishi faction (founded by one of the chief architects of Japanese wartime policies in China) and the decimation of rival groups in the 11 September 2005 General Elections. These trends seem likely to continue under Koizumi's chosen heir and successor Abe Shinzo[9] (Kishi's grandson), who assumed office on 26 September 2006. This despite the fact that the new Prime Minister selected Beijing and Seoul, rather than Washington, as the destinations for his first official overseas visits, and welcomed his Vietnamese counterpart, Mr. Nguyen Tan Dung, as his first foreign guest.

Koizumi's innovations in the military-security field were nothing short of dramatic. While Japan, in response to Washington's extreme dissatisfaction over its contributions to the 1991 Gulf War, had established a legal framework to facilitate a carefully controlled Self Defense Force participation in UN peacekeeping operations in June 1992, and while Tokyo subsequently contributed forces to UN activities in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, and East Timor, the Koizumi Cabinet's dispatch of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean to assist the post-11 September, United States-led assault on Afghanistan, under new legislation enacted in October 2001, then the decision to station GSDF troops at Samawah, in southern Iraq, under an additional law passed in August 2003, represented a radical departure from all previous post-war Japanese policy. At the same time, under Koizumi's leadership, the LDP formally decided to revise the 1946 Constitution to eliminate all legal impediments to participation in collective defense and to reconfer the right of belligerency on the Japanese state.[10] Mr. Abe has made it clear that he intends to pursue this agenda forcefully and to have a new constitution adopted during his term in office.[11] Moreover, following the example of the United States and of American allies such as Australia, Tokyo has begun to insist that it enjoys the right to make preemptive strikes against countries that might be planning to attack Japan.[12] Koizumi's proposed elevation of the Defense Agency to the status of a full ministry, temporarily shelved in the wake of a corruption scandal, but realized after Mr. Abe's assumption of office, has the potential to seriously undermine the structure of civilian control of the military forces embodied in the 1954–1956 defense laws.[13] Legislation to permit the military application of the Japanese space program is currently being prepared.[14]

In February 2005 the Cabinet-level Japan-United States Security Consultative Council drew up a list of common strategic objectives, suggesting (among other things) that the two allies had reached agreement on issues surrounding the Taiwan Straits and the Korean Peninsula. In Octo-

ber 2005, the then-Japanese Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka, Defense Agency Director General Ono Yoshinori, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and U.S. Secretary for Defense Donald Rumsfeld, agreed to promote increased interoperability of the two countries' armed forces, joint use of bases, and further cooperation in missile defense systems.[15] On the basis of these agreements, Japan and the United States began to examine plans to shift Air Self Defense Force Command Headquarters inside the U.S. Yokota Air Base, outside Tokyo, where the American Fifth Air Force is stationed, and establish a joint operations center there; to move the U.S. First Army Headquarters (responsible for the Middle East as well as Asia and the Far East) from Washington State, on the American mainland, to the great U.S. army base at Camp Zama in Japan,and set up a Central Readiness Command there with the GSDF, and to relocate some 8,000 logistical support personnel, together with their families, from the U.S. Third Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa to Guam. (Washington expects Japan to defray the greater part of the relocation costs).[16]

Against this background, and in the context of Sino–Japanese friction over Prime Minister Koizumi's annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (an institution closely associated with the pre-war Imperial armed forces and the history of Japanese expansion on the Asian continent), differences over the character and purpose of China's military modernization program, the delineation of exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea and other matters, several Japanese leaders began speaking of a "China threat." Koizumi, in particular, displayed a noticeable tendency to be more Catholic than the Pope. When President Bush visited Kyoto in mid-November 2005, the Japanese Prime Minister enthusiastically endorsed every aspect of American global strategy, especially the war in Iraq. In response to his guest's suggestion that Japan make efforts to improve ties with China and South Korea, however, Koizumi, focusing exclusively on the Yasukuni issue, criticized these two neighbors vehemently, adding that "even if you tell me not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine I would still go."[17] Concern about Koizumi's visits to the shrine had been mounting in the United States itself (and several other Asia Pacific countries) for some time. Nevertheless, any irritation that Bush may have felt at Koizumi's attitude was doubtless assuaged by the knowledge that Tokyo had written off 80 percent of Iraq's Japanese debt ten days before and was preparing to grant substantial new loans to Baghdad.[18] Koizumi's last Foreign Minister Aso Taro (retained by Abe), whose comments on China, Taiwan, Korea, the possibility of an independent Japanese nuclear strike force, and other matters, frequently raised eyebrows, not only in Beijing and Seoul, but also in Washington and Canberra,[19] has consistently characterized the Japan–U.S. partnership as "the most important bilateral relationship in the world." Japan's ties with Asia, he has insisted, should be given lower priority than relations with Washington. "Japan should first con-

tinue to build strong relations with America, and based on this, deepen relations with other Asian nations."[20] What this means in concrete terms, was revealed at the East Asian Summit held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 14 December 2005, where Japan, carefully coordinating its policy with that of the United States, resisted the ASEAN approach of establishing an East Asian grouping around the ten ASEAN countries, plus China, Japan, and Korea (seen in Washington as an inward looking arrangement, potentially dominated by China) and pushed instead for a wider community, expanded to include India, Australia, and New Zealand. In the months that followed, Japan began to shift the focus of its Asian diplomacy away from China towards India, and to place great pressure on ASEAN, targeting Malaysia in particular, encouraging member states not to develop too intimate a relationship with Beijing.[21] Prime Minister Abe's interest in Vietnam should, to some extent, be viewed in this context. So, too, should his pursuit of a security agreement with Australia (eventually concluded in March 2007).

In mid-January 2006, Japan and the United States conducted, for the first time in history, joint military exercises on the North American mainland. While the Japanese officers participating insisted that they had no particular hypothetical enemy in mind, they also noted that the exercises were being held against the background of China's growing power.[22] The two allies had also succeeded in test firing an interceptor SAM-3 missile designed for launching from the Aegis-class destroyer.[23] In February 2006, American defence specialists, at a seminar held by the National Institute for Defence Studies and attended by experts from the United States, Great Britain, Korea, Singapore and Japan (including high ranking officials from the JDA and SDF), urged that Japan prepare to deploy the SDF:

1. to assist the United States in protecting its bases in Okinawa, to establish air supremacy over the Taiwan Straits, and to counter Chinese submarines in case of a Sino–American conflict over Taiwan;
2. to counter Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia;
3. to protect Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of regime collapse; and
4. to take part in an international trusteeship over Kashmir, should one be set up in the wake of a future Indo-Pakistani war.[24]

North Korea's ballistic missile tests, then Pyongyang's successful explosion of a nuclear device, have intensified American-Japanese diplomatic and military cooperation. Japan and the United States have closely coordinated their policies towards the DPRK, although certain differences between the two allies began to surface as the Six Party talks neared agreement on North Korean denuclearization in the spring of 2007.[25] Shipments of American Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles began

arriving in Okinawa on 11 October 2006.[26] It was widely anticipated that the Japanese archipelago would soon be bristling with these weapons. On 27 October the United States Ambassador, Mr. Thomas Schieffer, speaking at the Japan Press Club, requested Tokyo to state clearly whether or not it would be prepared to shoot down hostile missiles passing over its territory towards the American mainland.[27] While Mr. Abe's pronouncements on this issue have been somewhat evasive, it is difficult to imagine that he would, in a crisis, be in a position to say "No."

All this, and the fact that the Japan-United States Security Treaty system has now endured more than fifty years, twice as long as the Anglo-Japanese alliance, would seem to make any questioning of its continuing durability and relevance rather pointless. Yet as the writer of the *History of the Three Kingdoms* observed, many centuries ago, "all things under Heaven are predestined to disintegrate; with the passage of time they are inexorably drawn together again; yet, having reconstituted themselves, they will inevitably tend to break apart."[28] This, he argues, is the fundamental law of history. In this spirit, it is worthwhile speculating about the future of the Japanese-American relationship, and this speculation might lead us to conclusions not necessarily self evident on the basis of immediately observable trends and current official rhetoric.

JAPANESE APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, concluded on 19 January 1960, can be terminated by either signatory on one year's advance notice. Despite the particular emphasis in the Bush administration's global strategy, the singular importance which Tokyo attaches to the American alliance, and the powerful instruments of persuasion the United States has inserted into the Japanese political system, Japanese decisions about the future of the relationship will ultimately be made deep inside the Japanese Establishment, on the basis of traditional Japanese approaches to foreign policy and defense, within the framework of those age-old, extremely complex and secretive Japanese consensus building processes, which outsiders find so difficult to understand, even if, indeed, they are aware of their existence.

The Japanese political system has undergone many changes since the early 1990s. Some of these changes have been relatively superficial. Others may prove to be of long-term significance. To some extent the adjustments that have been taking place since the demise of unilateral Liberal Democratic Party rule in 1993 reflect alterations in the intricate balances of power within the Establishment, generational struggles, and the impact of wider socio-economic change. Nevertheless, the emergence of a new generation of leaders, not all of them blessed with vision, solid expe-

rience, and substantial knowledge of world affairs, the reorganization and downsizing of the bureaucracy, against the background of attempts to undermine its influence, the passing of the old pillars of the business community, with their corporatist, Confucian view of the Japanese state, the enfeeblement of the political opposition, the increasing assertiveness of right wing nationalist organizations, and widespread popular disillusionment with all aspects of public life, should not necessarily be viewed as harbingers of abrupt, unforeseeable, cataclysmic upheavals in Japan's basic diplomatic strategies and the defense policies which derive from them. The principles which underlie the nation's foreign policy, strategic posture and military doctrines, the parameters within which these closely interlinked, fundamental policies of state are likely to move and the nature of the domestic struggles which influence their evolution, have exhibited, over many centuries in some respects, extraordinary continuity and consistency. This persistence of entrenched behavioral patterns, which can also be observed in other old, established East Asian societies such as China, Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand, is based on the interaction of geopolitical circumstances, historical experience, and certain cultural traits. As such, it can be expected to endure, exhibiting occasional adjustments in accordance with the evolution of the global equilibrium and the vicissitudes of domestic political, economic and cultural life.

To stress continuity is not to suggest that Japan has consistently followed only one policy. Differently constituted governments, confronting different domestic situations, will inevitably view the same set of external circumstances in somewhat different ways. Nevertheless, since the foundation of the Japanese state, the external policies favored by the country's rulers have tended to shift between three coordinates. Where possible, Japan has adopted policies of "splendid isolation" and "strategic passivity," cultivating a wide range of links with other powers, where these have been viewed as beneficial, but declining to be drawn into potentially entangling political commitments and military alliances. Over long centuries, this has been Japan's policy of choice. At times, when "splendid isolation" and "strategic passivity" have been difficult to pursue, Japan has aligned with the hegemonic power or group of powers, with the dual objectives of eliminating any threat such powers might pose to Japan, and, especially in the post-Meiji era, utilizing the association to promote extension of Japanese regional influence. In cases of alignment with the hegemonic power, Japan has invariably sought to minimize its military commitments to the senior partner while maximizing its own freedom of maneuver. Japan, unlike Great Britain in Europe or Vietnam in Asia, has seldom attempted to confront the hegemonic state and only rarely attempted to play balance of power games. Very occasionally—three times in its entire history—Japan has embarked on policies of imperial expansion, usually in the context of some major disturbance in the international environment. Japan's attempts to establish itself as the center of a great

empire, or as the regional hegemon, or to unify the entire East Asian cultural sphere, have all ended in disastrous failure and appropriate lessons have generally been drawn.

The aggressive thrust of the imperial Western powers into East Asia during the mid-nineteenth century added a complicating factor to these traditional Japanese behavioral patterns in the form of endemic conflict between the contradictory impulses of "Asianism" and "Westernism." Fundamental issues, involving both perceptions of the international system and of national identity, were raised during the course of the long debates triggered by the Opium Wars (1839–1842) and the arrival of Commodore Perry's Black Ships (1853). These issues are as relevant today as they were at the time of the 1868 Meiji Restoration.

Should Japan seek its destiny in the world of East and Southeast Asia, from which it is separated by narrow straits and shallow seas scattered with strategic islands, a community of states with which it shares a common history and a common culture, and to which it is inextricably linked by growing ties of economic interdependence? If so, with which Asian powers should Japan associate most closely? Are the continental powers, China and Korea, populous, dynamic, rich in resources, the historic seats of those Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist traditions which have exerted, over the centuries, such a profound impact on Japan, the nation's natural partners? Or should Japan adopt a maritime strategy and place greatest emphasis on its links with the island and peninsular states of Southeast Asia, that vast arc of countries extending from the Bay of Bengal to the China Seas, with which it also has important historical, cultural, and economic connections? If the answer is that both are significant, what degree of emphasis should Japan attach to its relations with the continental powers, how much should it stress ties with the insular and subcontinental states? Or do Japan's true interests lie not with Asia at all, but with the advanced industrial and post-industrial societies of Europe and North America, with which it has also become deeply involved, at so many levels? If so, which particular Western country, or coalition of Western states, is Japan's most suitable partner and mentor? Here again, Japanese governments have found themselves confronted, historically, with complex, difficult choices between continental and maritime strategies, which have, in turn, tended to become entangled with policies towards Asia. Exponents of continental strategies have inclined to the view that Japan's interests would best be served by association with Germany, France, or Russia. Those who view Japan as a maritime power have insisted on the centrality of relations with the Anglo-American world.[29]

JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have left the United States, by default, as the sole global superpower. China, despite the rapid modernization of its armed forces in response to the perceived lessons of the Gulf War, the NATO campaign against Serbia, and the American invasion of Iraq, and despite its unshakeable position on Taiwan, remains preoccupied with economic growth. Beijing's global influence can in no way compare with that of Washington, despite the fact that China has come to be perceived, throughout much of the world, as a more constructive, less dangerous power than the United States.[30] The emergence of common European foreign and defense policies has been slow. The rejection of the European Constitution by voters in France and the Netherlands, the breakdown of the 2005 budgetary negotiations and the constant enlargement of the community will make the process more difficult still.

Nevertheless, during the Clinton administration, there were serious doubts in many quarters in Japan about whether the *Pax Americana* would survive more than a few years. The United States, to a far greater extent than Britain in the decades between Versailles and Munich, seemed to exhibit all the characteristics of a decaying, over-extended global imperium: a frivolous ruling class, sagging international competitiveness, mounting debt, unmanageable military commitments, a declining intellectual culture and very grave social problems. The impressive recovery of the American economy in the late 1990s notwithstanding, many of these weaknesses remain. Others will re-emerge in the future. The costs of the Iraqi War have been staggering. They will become even greater still.[31]

However, the imperial tone of the Bush administration during its first five years in office, the surge in American patriotic sentiment after the tragedy of 11 September 2001, the new sense of national unity and purpose this engendered, the awe inspiring growth in American military power, the extension of American influence deep into Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the apparent invincibility of the American-Israeli axis in the Middle East, the signs that the United States had begun to reassert its position in Southeast Asia and Washington's increasingly dismissive attitude towards multilateral institutions exerted a profound impact on attitudes within sections of the Japanese elite, if not necessarily on the general public. This may survive, for some time at least, the weakening of the President's authority as a result of the Democratic Party victories in the November 2006 mid-term elections. President Bush's unilateralism, belligerent foreign policy and contempt for all opposition have been seen, in these circles, not as misguided, disruptive international behavior, but as exemplars of strong and decisive leadership, to be admired, respected, emulated, and, as far as possible, exploit-

ed to advance Japan's own perceived interests. Prime Minister Koizumi demonstrated that he learned these lessons and applied them well. His successor seems cut from similar cloth. Many Japanese leaders, too, unlike their European counterparts, have been deeply impressed by the American neo-conservative vision of the United States as the new Roman Empire. Seen in this context, the scramble of Japanese politicians, business leaders, intellectuals, and journalists during the Bush administration to demonstrate support for the Security Treaty, understanding of American global policies and interest in American ideas, American modes of behavior, and American lifestyles, simply reflects, at one level, the traditional inclination to gravitate towards the hegemonic power, particularly when that power is in an assertive mood. For exactly the same reasons, British policies, British institutions, and British cultural forms found much favor in the period 1880–1916. In the same way, the German Reich was immensely popular in the years before World War II. Both powers were viewed as actual or potential global hegemons. The parallels between Japanese reactions to the re-emergence of Germany in the 1930s, the outbreak of war in Europe, Berlin's successful occupation of Norway, Denmark, and the Low Countries, then the fall of France, the British retreat from Dunkirk, and Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union, and Tokyo's perceptions of the American position in the world after the collapse of the USSR, the Gulf War, the Serbian campaign, the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the invasion of Iraq have often been striking.

Although Tokyo was assured that the invasion of Iraq would be successfully accomplished within two weeks, it seems increasingly improbable that the Bush administration will be able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. The President himself, however, remains optimistic and shows no signs of changing either his objectives or the assumptions upon which they have been built. The current discomfiture in Iraq, he insists, is a mere "comma" on the page of history. America's tutelary mission will ultimately be successful and its national destiny will be fulfilled.

If the United States *does* succeed in establishing itself as the New Roman Empire, on a global scale, its economy strong and vibrant, its core territory protected by a National Missile Defense system, its naval forces dominating every ocean, its air power unchallenged, its military dealing shattering blows to one rogue state after another, its imperial proconsuls reforming the Middle East, its intellectuals restructuring Islam, and its influence extending deep into Central Asia, the future of the Japanese-American Security Treaty will be assured, at least as far as Tokyo is concerned. Japan will, without any doubt, seek to establish its credentials as Washington's most loyal and cooperative client state.

As Okazaki Hisahiko, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand, one of Japan's most influential conservative diplomatic commenta-

tors, and a close confidant of Prime Minister Abe, remarked on the eve of the American invasion of Iraq:

> The Roman empire, at the time of the Pax Romana, an age when the human race enjoyed an extraordinary degree of peace and happiness, . . . dispatched its citizen soldiers as far as Britain to keep order on its frontiers. . . . Now America, it seems, is about to establish itself as a global empire. . . . If an American attack on Iraq succeeds, and if a democratically oriented, pro-American government is established in that country, the impact on international politics will be tremendous. Such a development will deliver a great shock to the Palestinians, to Iran and to the countries of the Persian Gulf. American prestige and freedom of action in the Middle East will increase enormously. In the world beyond the Middle East, Russia's tilt towards the United States will become more firmly established, North Korea, realising that an American ultimatum is inevitable, will be forced to make compromises, China will become more cautious about challenging U.S. authority. . . . The Bush Administration has no choice but to ride the tiger and do everything possible to ensure success. . . . Even at a conservative estimate there would seem to be a 70 to 80 per cent chance to success. What should Japan do? Given that [an American military operation against Iraq] has such a high chance of success, it is simple common sense [to argue] that betting on the winning side is in the national interest. . . . Within a few months the world will enter a turbulent period. It is important, at times like these, not to lose sight of the wood for the trees, to keep the big picture in view. The ultimate objective of Japan's foreign policy is to ensure the security and prosperity of its people. To that end it has no alternative but to maintain and strengthen its alliance with the United States.[32]

On the basis of its close relationship with an all conquering America, Okazaki suggested, Japan would be able to further strengthen its international position and extend its influence in the Asian Pacific region. This pattern of thinking, it will be recalled, guided Japanese decision makers at the time of the Anglo–Japanese alliance and subsequently within the framework of the Tripartite Pact.

However, like Matsuoka Yosuke in 1941, Okazaki has been, perhaps, too much impressed by the power of Japan's mighty ally. Despite the shrill chorus emanating from the flocks of hawks who have dominated policy debate in Washington during the Bush administration, it seems more likely that the United States will not be able to establish a unilateral global hegemony, that it will encounter great and increasing difficulties translating its military strength into political influence, economic vitality and cultural prestige, that it will emerge from the Iraqi war defeated, with a substantially diminished international position, a weakened economy and a fractured society, that Henry Kissinger has been correct all along, and that a new world order, in which the United States will find itself involved in complex relationships of competitive coexistence with

Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and India in a multipolar balance of power system is slowly taking shape.[33]

If this is the case, Japanese diplomatic and defense policies can be expected to develop along somewhat different lines. No doubt, if United States rivalry with China continues, the Taiwan issue remains unresolved, tensions persist on the Korean Peninsula and terrorist activity escalates in Moslem Southeast Asia, the Americans will be reluctant to reduce their presence in the Western Pacific basin and Japanese leaders, with varying degrees of conviction and sincerity, will attempt to persuade them to stay. Despite the fact that Japanese burdens under the Security Treaty have been heavy (and frequently humiliating), there is a widespread view, across the political spectrum, that the arrangement has brought Japan two important benefits, apart from its deterrent effect, the reality of which has frequently been questioned on both the right and the left of the political spectrum. First, it has helped ensure that persistent economic friction with the United States has not assumed political and strategic dimensions. Despite the ringing declarations of friendship and solidarity that reverberate across Capitol Hill on the occasion of every Prime Ministerial visit to Washington, Japanese leaders remain, at bottom, uncertain about whether they are fully trusted in the United States, and are, in any case, acutely aware of the volatility of American public opinion, of the capriciousness of Congress and of the capacity of American presidents to initiate sudden changes in foreign policy. The existence of the Security Treaty, many would argue, protected Japan from the most serious consequences of the 1970 "Nixon Shocks." Second, the existence of the Security Treaty has helped persuade Japan's Asian Pacific neighbors, from Korea and China in the north to Australia and New Zealand in the south, that the country's re-emergence as a highly nationalistic, potentially destabilizing, fully independent military power, possibly equipped with nuclear weapons, is improbable. It thus constitutes an essential underpinning of the important political and economic relationships that have been built up with all countries in the region.

Nevertheless, if the United States enters a period of relative decline in the post Iraq era, and countervailing centers of power emerge in other parts of the world, Japan, in accordance with its own traditions of strategic realism, will show a strong inclination to resurrect the omni-directional diplomacy and comprehensive defense policies that prevailed after the Indochina War,[34] and will become more and more reluctant to follow Washington's advice on political, military and economic issues. Friction between the two allies on burden sharing and military procurement, currently in abeyance, can be expected to re-emerge. American cultural influence on Japan will begin to wane.

THE EAST ASIAN RENAISSANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

These changing Japanese attitudes, many of which will be, initially, so subtle as to be virtually imperceptible, will be decisively influenced by the ongoing economic, political and cultural renaissance of the entire East Asian region, with its vast geographical extent, enormous population and immense resources, a development which has profound implications not merely for the balance of power in the Pacific but for the global equilibrium as a whole. This great historical movement will doubtless proceed at an uneven pace. Temporary setbacks, like the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis, the subsequent upheavals in Indonesia, surges of terrorist activity and natural disasters will certainly occur. Such things, however, are not uncommon in this world, and the next fifty years should see the countries of the East Asian region reassert the paramount position in the global economy, the ascendancy in literature, the arts, and the amenities of civilization, as well as the important role in international political life which they enjoyed in the centuries before the intrusion of the imperial Western powers. At some point, the Japanese, like all other participants in this unfolding drama, will be obliged to consider its implications, not merely for the fine tuning of their current diplomatic arrangements but for the overall orientation of their foreign policy, security agenda, and defense strategies.

When that time comes, Japanese policy makers will still be obliged to base their long-term planning on the assumption that the United States, like Russia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other outgrowths of the European world, will remain involved, to some degree or another, in the Asian Pacific region. United States military power, economic might, and political influence may well suffer serious reverses. They will not readily fade away. A residual Spanish and Portuguese influence in the region, after all, lingered for many centuries, long after these once-great imperial powers had entered terminal decline. Even if the United States enters a period of political introspection and strategic restraint, the most probable outcome of the impending disaster in Iraq, its economy, both by virtue of its size and the vibrancy of its technological innovation, will remain a critical element in world politics for a long time.

However, while the United States market continues to play an important role in stimulating Asian economic growth, and while there is a consensus in Washington that unimpeded, expanding access to Asian markets remains vital to America's economic future, much water has flowed under many bridges since the United States reached the apex of its economic power in 1945. The fact that both American consumption and American government debt have been increasing at extraordinary rates, that the Bush administration, preoccupied with terrorism and the war in Iraq, and, since the summer of 2005, with the impact of a devastating natural disaster, has adopted an insouciant attitude towards these

developments, and that 40 percent of foreign purchases of U.S. government debt are now made by Asian central banks (Japan being the largest and China the second-largest purchasers) means, essentially, that these nations have come to play a critical role in financing the American economy, enabling the United States to continue to act as a Great Power and permitting its citizens to live beyond their means. The full significance of these momentous changes does not seem to have been appreciated by either the Bush administration or its predecessors. President Bush's tacit decision not to address the deficit, but simply to let the dollar fall, will eventually confront America's East Asian creditors with the choice of reducing their purchases of United States government debt, which will have far-reaching implications both for America's position as a global power and for the standard of living of the American people, or of acting against their own economic interests and seeing the value of their United States assets decline.[35] They are unlikely to choose the latter alternative. In so many ways, the neo-conservatives' New Rome is beginning to look less and less like the Empire of Augustus and more and more like the Byzantium of Justinian.

At the same time, Japanese dependence on the American market has declined substantially in recent years. In 2004, for the first time in the post-war period, China overtook the United States as Japan's principal trading partner. It continued to hold this position in 2005, when trade with China increased a further 12.7 percent to a record high of ¥24.949 trillion, compared with ¥21.890 trillion for Japan's total trade with the United States.[36] This trend is likely to accelerate if the Chinese economy continues to grow at the present rate (9.5 percent in 2004, 9.9 percent in 2005). Japanese FDI in China has also been increasing rapidly. Major Japanese corporations such as Fuji Xerox, Honda, and Sony have been shifting their operations to China to cut production costs, increase their global competitiveness and gain access to the huge Chinese middle class market. This trend seems likely to continue, despite the shock to Japanese opinion delivered by the anti-Japanese demonstrations that erupted in China in the spring of 2005. In the wake of the anti-Japanese riots, in fact, the Nissan Motor Company announced that it would increase its China sales targets.[37] Not only that, but for many years now Japanese economic involvement with East Asia as a whole has been considerably more significant than that with North America. The Western Pacific basin is emerging as the center of an immense, dynamic, and potentially self-sustaining regional economy. This development, evident since the mid-1970s, was accelerated by the massive appreciation of the yen against the U.S. dollar triggered by the 1985 Plaza Accords. This, in turn, precipitated an unprecedented surge of Japanese investment throughout Asia, transforming much of the region into an integrated extension of the Japanese economy. The rise of China as an economic superpower, potentially greater and more influential than Japan, and China's deepening ties with

all economies in the region, has added a new dimension. During the decade 1996–2006, Sin–Japanese trade has increased four-fold. China's trade with ASEAN has grown 600 percent. Regional trade among Japan, China, Korea, ASEAN, Hong Kong, and Taiwan increased 52 percent during 2005 alone. This was less than the impressive 60 percent increase registered within the EU, but significantly greater than the 44 percent recorded for NAFTA.[38] The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement has laid the foundations for economic integration of the greater part of East Asia, from the Amur River to the Arafura Sea and the Bay of Bengal. The completion of the Pan-Asian Railway and new highway links between China and ASEAN will further stimulate this process. Since the early 1990s intra-regional production links have multiplied and become more intricate. Japanese corporations, in mapping out their regional trade and investment strategies, have increasingly disregarded Great Power rivalries, territorial disputes, and local political frictions. Their only concerns have been with political stability and profit. Sino–American antagonism over Taiwan, the Middle East and Central Asia, disagreements between Washington and Beijing on nuclear testing, arms exports, espionage and human rights, for example, have in no way impeded the flow of Japanese FDI to China. This continues to grow. Nor have Sino–Japanese frictions over China's military modernization program, the Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese school history textbooks, the sympathy of Japanese right wing politicians for the Taiwanese independence movement, the Senkaku islands dispute, and other issues in the East China Sea dampened the enthusiasm of the mainstream Japanese business community for broader economic engagement with the Chinese continent. At the same time, the growing economic integration of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, symbolized by the resumption of direct air services in January 2005, and the reconciliation of the CCP and the KMT, has encouraged Japanese corporations to think in terms of strategies for the entire Sinitic cultural sphere. There has also been a tendency to link up with Taiwanese companies when developing new operations on the mainland.

Against this background, moves towards the formal establishment of an Asian Economic Community, a Western Pacific counterpart of the EC, have recently become more open. China, which in 1997 joined the United States to resist Japan's proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund, is now supportive of such institutions.[39] The 2000 Chiang Mai decision on a currency swap, the subsequent suggestion of an Asian bond fund and serious discussion, in academic and business circles, of the possibility of a common Asian currency,[40] all represent attempts to distance Asia from what is seen the baleful influence of the United States and the IMF on monetary issues and to construct the institutional foundations for a regional bloc. The gradual eclipse of APEC by the ASEAN Plus Three process, and the attempt to institutionalize the East Asian Summit (despite the serious differences over the shape of the future East Asian Commu-

nity that emerged during the first summit held at Kuala Lumpur) must be seen as consolidating this trend.

Within East Asia the balance of power is also shifting. Despite the fact that the Japanese economy remains by far the largest in Asia, that Japanese military spending has consistently ranked among the world's top four and that Japanese cultural influence is growing, there are no grounds for supposing that the country's regional pre-eminence will prove permanent. Japan's extended economic crisis may perhaps have been misdiagnosed by orthodox Anglo-American economists and exaggerated by the international media. Japan retains impressive strengths. Its established institutions and the values which have underpinned them have served it well. Nevertheless, for more than a decade, growth rates have been sluggish, although the economy is currently picking up, largely under the impact of Chinese economic expansion. Even so, the consequences of Koizumi's misguided attempt to restructure the country along neo-liberal lines, an aging population, declining birth rates, the erosion of community solidarity in the great cities, increasing crime, strains on the family system and softening educational standards do not bode well for the future.

China, too, faces serious internal problems, many of them far more critical than those which confront Japan. Still, if current trends continue, the government in Beijing will, some time in the next fifteen or twenty years, preside over an economy comparable in size to that of the United Sates or the EU. It will also have at its disposal very great military power, a credible nuclear deterrent, a large modernized air force, a navy capable of operating against the maritime forces of potential antagonists in the China seas, in Southeast Asian waters and in the eastern extremities of the Indian Ocean, and a well-equipped, highly trained army, far greater in size than that of any rival regional power.

This certainly does not mean that China is poised to take over the United States' global role (a development widely anticipated in many countries),[41] or that serious conflict between Beijing and Washington will be unavoidable. Historically, China has generally been a subtle and cautious actor. The Chinese economy, too, developed by a combination of domestic, overseas Chinese, Japanese, European, and other capital, has become closely integrated with the rest of the world. Nevertheless, in the coming decades, it would not be surprising if the People's Republic were to displace the United States as the dominant power in large parts of the Western Pacific. The overseas Chinese diaspora, with a population equal to that of Germany and liquid assets amounting to several trillion U.S. dollars, has established, over many years, either in its own right or in association with Japanese interests, unequalled supremacy in trade, commercial activity and investment throughout much of East and Southeast Asia, excluding Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.[42] At the same time, widespread suspicion of American hegemonic aspirations and Washington's

preoccupation with the Middle East have provided new opportunities for Chinese diplomacy and enabled Beijing to assume, to some extent at least, a regional leadership role. Friction with the United States has been skillfully contained. Very cooperative relations have been established with Russia, at all levels, including military. Ties with New Delhi have improved to such an extent that joint naval exercises have been held. Further military cooperation is contemplated, despite the uncertainties raised by the Indo-American nuclear agreement. China's relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and other oil producing Middle Eastern countries have been strengthened. So, too, have links with Egypt, the Sudan, and North African Islamic nations. China's African diplomacy, in fact, symbolized by the gathering of more than forty African heads of state, vice presidents, and prime ministers in Beijing on 3-6 November 2006, has been a resounding success.[43] China has hosted the Six Party talks on Korea. It has played a leading role in setting up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, incorporating the People's Republic of China itself, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, to promote economic, political and security cooperation in Central Asia. China has also joined the Bangkok Agreement, designed to facilitate free trade among the South Asian countries, Russia and the Republic of Korea. As noted above, it has negotiated a Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN, designed to be fully operational by 2010. President Hu Jintao, moreover, has proposed an East Asian regional security conference, and suggested new initiatives on environmental protection, drug trafficking and intellectual property rights. Japanese diplomacy, in contrast, despite the conclusion of free trade agreements with Singapore, Malaysia, Mexico, and other countries, moves to counter Chinese influence in ASEAN and some successes in Central Asia, has become increasingly passive, focusing almost exclusively on the cultivation of the special relationship with Washington, the DPRK abduction issue, and coalition building against Pyongyang. At the time of writing, it is far from clear whether the Abe Cabinet will be able to extricate Japan from the pit dug by Koizumi.

An East Asian Community, whatever its membership and whatever form its political arrangements, economic decision making institutions and security policies might eventually take, is likely to be rather more open and outward looking than its European counterpart. These characteristics were generally evident in those vast, loosely organized trading and cultural communities that linked the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean area in ancient and medieval times.[44] In the very long term, if the membership of the community were to be confined to countries in the Western Pacific basin, the People's Republic might emerge as the *primus inter pares*, provided it consistently pursues, like the most successful imperial Chinese dynasties in past ages, domestic policies designed to promote both economic prosperity and social stability, invests heavily in scientific and technological development, establishes itself as the seat of a

brilliant and attractive culture, remains committed to foreign policies based on extreme military restraint, and adopts a flexible and generous approach to the settlement of territorial disputes. On the other hand, any attempt on the part of Beijing to forcefully impose a regional hegemony could be expected to stimulate strong resistance from old antagonists such as Vietnam, to rekindle dormant anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia, to alienate basically pro-Chinese states such as Korea and to place intolerable strains on the excellent relationships with Russia, the Central Asian countries, India, and Australia so painstakingly constructed in recent years, further consolidating the American-Japanese alliance and giving the United States an opportunity to reinsert itself into the region. Moreover, while China's future military power may be great, there are no grounds for supposing that it will be any more (or less) successful than the United States in translating that power into political, economic, and cultural influence. The lessons of the 1979 Sino–Vietnamese war were unequivocal.

What we are more likely to see, in the medium term at least, is the emergence of an intricate regional multipolar balance of power system, embracing both the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, centering around a core group comprising China, Japan, the ASEAN nations, and Korea, but also involving, in varying degrees, the United States, Russia, India, the Central Asian states, Australia, and New Zealand.

LIKELY JAPANESE RESPONSES

Tokyo's drift towards closer alignment with Washington under the Koizumi and Abe Cabinets can be seen as simply a reflection of the current global pre-eminence of the United States. A United States defeat in Iraq, the collapse of President Bush's plans for the Greater Middle East and a retreat in American global influence such as that which occurred after the Vietnam War, against the background of Japan's deepening economic involvement in China and other parts of Asia, will precipitate a significant realignment in the Japanese domestic constellation of power, touching off an incremental, discreet, circuitous shift in the relative weight Tokyo attaches to the American alliance, in the context of its own wider global and regional strategies. This will lead, in turn, to a reassessment of the value and relevance of the relationship itself. Defense Minister Kyuma's comments that the American invasion of Iraq was based on "mistaken" premises (24 January 2007),[45] that the Japanese government had not "officially" supported Washington's action, although Prime Minister Koizumi had done so, as a "private individual" (7 December 2006),[46] Foreign Minister Aso's characterization of United States occupation policy in Iraq as "childlike" (4 February 2007),[47] and Japan's reported interest in the Euro fighter "Typhoon" and the French "Rafale" as possible replace-

ments for the ASDF's aging fleet of American F-4s,[48] perhaps represent the first straws in the wind.

This kind of thing has happened many times in the past. The mechanism involved is well illustrated in the comments of Hori Shigeru, Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party during the last months of the Sato Cabinet, when the advent of Soviet–American strategic parity, the impending Sino–American rapprochement, the American debacle in Indochina, and the upheavals in the global economic system ushered in a decade characterized by relative American decline, great power détente, and multipolarity. Writing in the 7 December 1971 edition of *Jiyu Shimpo*, Hori declared:

> The pre-war world revolved around the central axis of the British Empire, whose naval power dominated the oceans. Towards the end of World War II the United States took over Great Britain's role. For almost a century the world has revolved around an American axis. Japan was able to re-emerge from the depths of misery brought on by the defeat and achieve her present position by striving earnestly to adjust her policies to those of the American dominated world order. However, the world has ceased to revolve around an American axis. The Americans themselves recognise this fact. The world, it is said, has entered a tripolar era or a five polar era. . . . For Japan, friendship with the United States remains vital. It will be necessary to consolidate this friendship even further to promote our development and prosperity. . . . At the same time, I believe it will be necessary for us to recognize, once again, that Japan is an Asian nation.[49]

While the strategic heights of the Liberal Democratic Party remain, for the present, dominated by leaders who consider the U.S. global position to be unchallengeable, the ongoing East Asian renaissance and the prospect of a post-hegemonic world have given rise to several schools of thought in other sections of Japan's conservative political élite. With one exception, all these tendencies place emphasis on the pursuit of a more autonomous, non-provocative foreign policy, distancing Tokyo somewhat from Washington, and developing closer, mutually beneficial relations with neighboring Asian countries.

Let us consider a number of specific examples.

Kono Yohei

In the January 1995 edition of the magazine *Gaiko Foramu*, the then Foreign Minister Kono Yohei (currently Speaker in the House of Representatives) set forth his views on Japan's response to the changing global equilibrium. Kono's father, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Agriculture in the Hatoyama Cabinet and one of the most formidable power brokers in the LDP until his death in 1964, had been a prominent Pan-

Asianist, with a maritime orientation, arguing, throughout his political career, that

> For reasons of geography Japan cannot be part of the European Community. If she is not to become a Communist society, she can therefore either join hands with the United States, or, in accordance with her destiny, think of forming an Asian Community. . . . Of course, it is perfectly possible to blindly follow everything the United States says. It would be quite simple to hoist the Stars and Stripes here, like they do in Hawaii, and make Japan into the fiftieth or fifty first state. If we tear down the walls between us and the United States, a quick calculation on the abacus will show us that our incomes will increase enormously. The entire nation might rapidly achieve unprecedented bliss. There may be people who think like this. . . . But we have a consciousness of ourselves as Japanese. Because of this, the only road open to us is to build an Asian Community. . . . It is certainly not too much to imagine that Japan can best fulfil its role by forming a fifth, new bloc, and through the power of this organization, strive for world peace. . .[50]

This bloc, centering on Japan and the future ASEAN nations, was envisaged as maintaining equidistant relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and China.

The younger Kono, in the context of another world order, adopted a somewhat different approach, although the influence of his father's thinking clearly remained strong. After examining the demise of the Cold War systems, the erosion of Washington's global influence, the problems in the American economy, the re-emergence of East Asia, the frictions between Japan and its major trading partners and the creation of economic communities and free trade zones in Europe and North America, Kono discussed the implications of these developments for Japan's diplomatic and security policies.

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union had precipitated a major reconfiguration of global politics, the American alliance, Kono argued, would remain for some time a core element in Japan's diplomatic and defence policies. The American presence in the Western Pacific played an important role in maintaining regional stability. The Security Treaty reassured Asian countries that Japan was unlikely to re-emerge as a threat. However,

> With the end of the Cold War, Japan's foreign policy options have clearly expanded. No longer will Japan make judgements about foreign policy based simply on the idea that it is "a member of the West." At the same time, this also means that Japan needs to have clear-cut values and principles of its own for assessing the national interest in order to make sound decisions. . . . As the coordinates for Japan's foreign policy I would like to envisage three concentric circles, the innermost comprising the Japanese-American relationship and bilateral relations of cooperation with such neighbouring countries as the People's Republic

> of China and the Republic of Korea; the second one representing cooperation with the entire Asia-Pacific region, and the third one standing for global cooperation centred on the G-7 and the United Nations.
>
> As for the circle of the Asia-Pacific, an outline has at last vaguely begun to manifest itself, centring on the APEC. Similarly, with respect to the circle of global cooperation, discussions have been under way to strengthen the functions of the G-7 and the United Nations. I believe that Japan should make use of its bilateral relations with the United States, China and so on to consolidate cooperation within the context of the two concentric circles representing regional and global cooperation.[51]

What did Kono actually mean? To "logically minded" Western readers, his article might seem replete with contradictions and inconsistencies. In one section he dwells on the central importance of the American relationship. Elsewhere, he appears to give equal weight to Japan's ties with the United States, China, and Korea. This approach, however, is not unusual in Japanese writings on diplomacy. Kono, like so many Japanese leaders before him, was endeavoring not simply to establish a hierarchy of current priorities, but also to illuminate the latencies inherent in world politics, to place Japan's diplomacy within this complex matrix of evolving realities, to reconcile the contending claims of "Asianism" and "Westernism" and to placate the demands of the several factions and interest groups constituting the then dominant LDP coalition.

Hashimoto Ryutaro

Two years after Kono Yohei published his article the then Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, until his retirement after the September 2005 General Elections, leader of the largest LDP faction and viewed as a center of backstage resistance to both the domestic and foreign policies of the Koizumi Cabinet, outlined, in a major speech to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, a project for a post-Cold War diplomatic strategy that was basically continental-Eurasian in emphasis.[52]

Stressing, like Kono, the continued relevance of the Japan-United States relationship, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the various mechanisms for Asia-Pacific cooperation, and noting that the Security Treaty had given Japan's neighbors a sense of reassurance, the Prime Minister went on to say: "However, I believe that amidst the great changes in international relations that have resulted from the end of the Cold War, we must strive to enlarge the horizons of our Asian Pacific oriented diplomacy, that the time has come to develop a new perspective. I would like to call this perspective 'Eurasian diplomacy.'"

In the Euro-Atlantic world, Hashimoto observed, a post-Cold War political, economic, and security structure was emerging, centering around the consolidation of the EC under the Maastricht Treaty and the

eastwards expansion of NATO. At such a momentous period of transition, the Prime Minister asked:

> . . . has not the time come to introduce a new dynamism into our country's foreign policy through adopting the perspective of "Eurasian diplomacy viewed from the Pacific," from the Eastern extremity of Asia? When we look out across this immense continent from our small islands on the eastern fringes of Asia . . . we see Russia, China and the Silk Road region, which encompasses the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the nations of the Caucasus.

Hashimoto pursued:

> One might even go so far as to say that the focus of global diplomacy has shifted from the Euro-Atlantic world and the age of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union to the vast Eurasian landmass, encompassing many nations, large and small, interacting in various ways. In this situation, just as Japan has always had to stress to the United States the legitimacy of our policy of active engagement in China, the time has already come for us to strive even harder to build constructive relations with Russia and with China.

The Central Asian countries, too, were crucial to Hashimoto's vision:

> Moreover, the Central Asian and Caucasian countries which have come into being in this vast space, the Silk Road region, during the post-Cold War era, have been making great efforts to achieve stability and prosperity under a new political and economic system. . . . Fortunately, these countries have high expectations of Japan as an Asian nation, and, at the same time, Japan has a deep rooted nostalgia for this region, stemming from the days of the Silk Road. In fact, there already exists a solid foundation to build strong, friendly relations with these countries.

Hashimoto proceeded to develop, in some detail, proposals to reach a territorial settlement with Russia and forge close political and economic ties with that country, especially with Siberia and the Far Eastern region, and, above all, in the energy sector. He went on to discuss the importance of China, focusing on the need to promote an atmosphere of mutual trust, the two historic neighbors cooperating to maintain peace and stability in the East Asian region, especially in the Korean peninsula, and working together on a wide range of economic, environmental, and cultural matters. Regarding Central Asia, Hashimoto saw Japan as being in a strong position to help promote nuclear non-proliferation, regional cooperation in the fields of energy, transportation systems, telecommunications, and inter-civilizational dialogue. His death in June 2006 and the marginalization of his faction under the Abe Cabinet do not imply that these ideas have gone into permanent eclipse.

Tanaka Makiko

On 25 May 2001, the then Japanese Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko, one of the pillars of the first Koizumi Cabinet, who had, earlier in the month, declined to meet the then U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage during his visit to Tokyo, and who had indicated to her Chinese counterpart Tang Jia-Xuan that she intended to move away from the somewhat pro-Taiwan stance that had characterized Japan's China policy during the last weeks of the Mori Cabinet, privately told the German Deputy Chancellor Joschke Fischer in Beijing that "it is necessary for Japan to become more independent in light of its economic power but a reactionary political mentality prevents change. I know that the U.S. presence in Japan is important. I am not against the United States and I like the country but I believe U.S.-Japan relations are at a turning point and we need to consider the issue again so we can switch course." During her talks with Fischer, with the Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini, and, subsequently, with the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer, Tanaka also criticized President George Bush's National Missile Defense System and the administration's hostile attitude to China.[53] Subsequently, as a back bencher, she was to become even more outspoken, telling the Foreign Correspondents' Club in September 2004, for example, that "Japan should not simply follow blindly in the footsteps of the United States. The Cabinet is receding but does not realize its mistake. Japan needs to speak out on issues involving the U.S. alliance before it can contemplate revising the Constitution or seeking a UNSC seat." Japanese troops, she insisted, should be withdrawn from Iraq.[54]

What did Tanaka mean by Japan "switching course?" Her father, former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, who had pushed through the normalization of diplomatic ties with China in 1972, had long been associated with the view that Japan's interests would best be served by the construction of an extensive Asian-West Pacific community, revolving around a Sino–Japanese axis.[55] It seems not at all improbable that his daughter was influenced by these ideas.

However this may be, Tanaka's remarks provoked outrage in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which had also been one of the principal centers of opposition to her father's policies. The then Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Yanai Shunji, publicly criticized his Minister at a press conference in Washington, declaring that "I have been with the Foreign Ministry for forty years and have never seen a situation more extraordinary than this."[56] Prime Minister Koizumi and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, the son of Tanaka Kakuei's old nemesis, former Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, moved swiftly to silence the Foreign Minister and limit her influence on policy formation. Tanaka herself became embroiled in a bitter conflict with her Ministry over internal corruption, misuse of official funds and the hidden links between bureaucrats and

LDP politicians. On 29 January 2002 she was dismissed by Prime Minister Koizumi. On 18 March former LDP Secretary General Kato Koichi, another prominent but more discrete advocate of an independent, Asian oriented foreign policy, resigned from the Party in the wake of a scandal involving his principal private secretary. Both Tanaka and Kato subsequently returned to active political life and can be expected to play significant roles in the future. On 7 November 2006, Kato and thirty-eight supporters organized an intra-party discussion group to oppose the domestic and foreign policies of the Abe Cabinet, focusing on measures to improve ties with China, the two Koreas and other Asian countries.[57]

Aso Taro

Foreign Minister under both Koizumi and Abe, Mr. Aso Taro, noted for his persistent references to China as a "threat," to Taiwan as a "country," for his assertion that the island's high educational standards can be attributed to the beneficent influence of Japanese imperial rule, that Koreans in the colonial era were delighted to adopt Japanese names, that the Emperor should visit the Yasukuni Shrine, that Japan should debate the development of an independent nuclear strike force, and other remarks that have irritated Japan's continental neighbors,[58] has not, at the time of writing, fully elaborated the philosophical underpinnings of the foreign policy he intends to pursue. Some indication of his thinking, however, can be gleaned from an article on the future of Sino–Japanese relations he contributed to the *Asian Wall Street Journal* on 13 March 2006.[59]

China, Aso prophesized, would soon become a democratic nation. "The question is no longer 'whether' but at what speed." "I am positive on China," the Japanese Foreign Minister declared.

> Already the biggest trading partner in our history if combined with Hong Kong, China has powered our recent economic recovery. Going forward, our coindependence will only become more pronounced. . .
>
> Imagine: In twenty years, China's influence on Japan will be enormous. Chinese holiday makers, from students to the retired, will be the largest consumers of Japanese tourism. . . . Tokyo's taxi drivers will speak Chinese, not English. China will be one of the largest investors in Japan's economy. A considerable proportion of the shares traded in Tokyo will rest in Chinese hands. Today, Japanese companies go to New York for investor marketing trips-soon, they will fly to Shanghai first.
>
> In truth, there is little new or surprising about these scenarios, considering Asia's historical context. China is not emerging afresh as a world power, as many claim; it is, in fact reclaiming its historical prominence. My hope is that China recognises that there is no longer a place for an empire. Rather, the guiding principles in today's world are global interdependence and the international harmony that it can engender.

Militarily, Aso argued, "Japan is Asia's natural stabilizer and the Japan-U.S. security partnership provides a 'common good' available to China and to all other nations in the region."

Aso's many layered complexity—he is a Catholic as well as a regular worshipper at the Yasukuni Shrine—is no greater than that of his grandfather, Yoshida Shigeru, the Foreign Ministry career China specialist, critic of many aspects of Japan's pre-war continental policies and opponent of the war with the Anglo-American powers, who as Prime Minister during and immediately after the Occupation had negotiated the Security Treaty with the United States, yet never wavered in his conviction that it was "a rather unnatural relationship for us to be in." As Prime Minister and later, as a retired but influential Elder Statesman, Yoshida had always endeavored to keep Japan's obligations to the United States to the absolute minimum, largely in order not to antagonize Beijing, which he regarded as Tokyo's most important future political and economic partner.[60]

Ishihara Shintaro

Kono, Hashimoto, Tanaka, and Aso, despite their differences in emphasis and nuance, have all seen the future in terms of cooperation with China, within the framework of some wider but as yet not precisely defined Asian Pacific Community. Ishihara Shintaro, the Governor of Tokyo, whose name was, until early 2006, often mentioned as a possible Prime Ministerial candidate, can be regarded as the High Priest of those groups advocating confrontation with the People's Republic.

Ishihara, who established his right wing nationalist credentials in the literary world, long before entering politics, has, for nearly fifty years, urged Japanese pursuit of Great Power status, large-scale rearmament, the development of an independent nuclear deterrent, and a hard-headed approach towards the United States. He has also supported the formation of an Asian community, centering around ASEAN, under Japanese leadership. He has actively encouraged the Taiwan independence movement. He has also recommended the cultivation of a close Japanese relationship with India. In addition, he has been, for many years, in the vanguard of efforts to dismantle the Occupation legacy, agitating in favor of constitutional revision, reconstruction of the Imperial System, the enforcement of "patriotic education" and other causes favored by the extreme right.[61]

Like his counterparts in the prewar era, Ishihara is impressed not by China's strengths but by its inherent weaknesses. The fragility of the People's Republic, together with its groundless pretensions to regional leadership, he considers, have provided Japan with a golden opportunity to remake the international order in Eastern Eurasia and the Indian Ocean area.

Writing in the June 2005 edition of *Bungei Shunju*,[62] against the background of the Iraqi War, China's emergence as Japan's single most important trading partner, Sino–Japanese friction over the Senkaku islands, conflict with Beijing, Seoul, and Pyongyang over the Yasukuni Shrine and revisionist history textbooks and the prolonged abduction crisis with the DPRK, Ishihara argued:

> China's military power cannot be compared with that of the United States, which has focussed on acquisition of state-of-the-art technology. . . . The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have clearly demonstrated to China the power of American military technology and make it painfully aware of the gap between itself and its [potential antagonist]. The United States always maintains two Trident class nuclear submarines, equipped with cruise missiles, capable of attacking Chinese cities, in the East China Sea. This is like a dagger held at China's throat. It is unthinkable that China would choose to go to war with Japan over the issue of the Senkaku islands.[63]

China's economic power, too, Ishihara contends, has been greatly overrated by the Japanese political and business elite. Ishihara singles out former Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and Kobayashi Yotaro, then President of Fuji Xerox, former Chairman of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives and Chairman of the Board of Directors of International University of Japan, for special criticism. Certainly, Ishihara concedes, China has a large population. Yet its economy constitutes only 4 percent of global GNP, compared with Japan's 12 percent. Despite its spectacular economic growth there is little possibility that China will emerge as a global economic power comparable with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. It has remained, essentially, an international subcontractor, exploiting its cheap labor, it's one notable resource. Even here, Ishihara argues, its performance has been questionable. China has a weak scientific base and little capacity for technological innovation. A cessation in the flow of Japanese investment would throw the country into economic chaos.[64] The domestic political and social problems confronting Beijing, too, are staggering. China, Ishihara reminds his readers, is a totalitarian state, under the draconian rule of the Communist Party, buttressed by military force, oppressing the working class, national minorities, and women. Its political experience, since the fall of the Manchu Dynasty, offers little hope for the development of liberal democracy and civil society. Popular belief in Communism has collapsed and has been replaced by vulgar materialism and the worship of money, "the historical DNA of the Chinese people."[65] The moral bankruptcy of the CCP, the ostentatious arrogance of the *nouveau riche* and the widening gap between the wealthy and the poor have been sowing the seeds for future upheavals.[66]

Despite its inherent weaknesses, China has embarked on a campaign to challenge Japanese leadership in Asia, attempting to discredit Tokyo by disseminating wildly exaggerated accounts of alleged Japanese wartime atrocities, such as the "Nanjing Massacre," complaining unreasonably about Prime Ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, revised history textbooks, generally interfering in Japan's internal affairs and questioning Japan's sovereignty over the Senkaku islands and the adjacent exclusive economic zone. At the same time, China constantly threatens the independence of Taiwan (whose democratic leaders were nurtured under the benign influence of the Japanese empire) and provokes neighboring countries such as India and Vietnam.[67] China's foreign policy, Ishihara explains, has cultural roots. "If we examine the past, we can see that China has never attempted to forge equal partnerships with other countries. At best she has seen [relationships with other states] in terms of superior and inferior, or she has simply incorporated them [within her own territory]. This is a lesson which we must take to heart."[68]

Japan should respond to this situation, Ishihara argues, on several levels.

First, maintenance of a close and cooperative relationship with the United States, which, under the Bush administration, has been extremely supportive of Japanese aspirations, is obviously essential. It is also imperative, however, that the United States continues to support Japan, above all on non-negotiable territorial issues such as the Senkakus. In the past, Washington has displayed a lamentable tendency to vacillate on this question. Ishihara bitterly recalls former United States Ambassador Walter Mondale's negative attitude towards invoking the Security Treaty over the issue of Japanese sovereignty of the islands.[69] The Senkaku issue, Ishihara insists, should be made the touchstone of the Security Treaty. If the United States displays a willingness to go to war in support of Japanese territorial claims, Tokyo can reaffirm the Security Treaty. If Washington is reluctant to support Japan militarily "Japan can demand return of American bases" on its territory. "This," Ishihara declares, "is the classical way of diplomacy."[70]

At the same time, Ishihara recommends, Japan should adopt a forward and, if necessary, provocative defense strategy, stationing the GSDF on the Senkakus, consolidating air and naval defenses from the East China Sea to the Sea of Japan, not hesitating to destroy suspicious vessels and aircraft which violate its territorial waters and air space. He cites with approval Israel's use of small, mobile, missile-equipped patrol boats against Syria and Egypt during the Third Middle East War, urging that Japan should adopt similar tactics against intrusions by Chinese submarines, North Korean drug smuggling vessels and foreign attempts to abduct Japanese nationals.[71]

Third, just as the United States worked relentlessly to engineer the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan should see its national mission as

bringing about the overthrow of Communist rule in China and the disintegration of the People's Republic. To achieve this end Japanese policy makers should carefully study the strategies implemented by the United States against the USSR during the Cold War. Regionalism, minority problems, growing class antagonisms and social frustrations provide Japan with abundant opportunities to advance its objectives. Ishihara recommends, in particular, a Japanese-led boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, extensive use of radio broadcasts, the Internet, and (more light heartedly) airborne balloon drops, launched from Eastern Europe and directed deep into the Chinese heartland, of *Playboy* and *Penthouse*, featuring photographs of nude models displaying pubic hair.[72] He had discussed this project in some detail, he recalls, with former U.S. Under-Secretary (now Assistant Secretary) of State Robert Zoellick. Ishihara also urges cultivation of a close Japanese relationship with India (from every point of view a more suitable Asian partner than China).[73]

All these projects, it must again be stressed, envisage continuation of the Japan-United States Security Treaty system. Yet the importance attached to that treaty will inevitably change as the international system develops. As the relative weight of the East, Southeast, and Central Asian nations increases, as regional organizations solidify, as the dust settles on the post-Iraq world and as the factional-policy conflicts these developments stimulate in Tokyo work themselves through to their logical conclusions, it can be expected that an interaction of Japan's traditional proclivity to align with the hegemonic power, the geostrategic and economic imperatives of the New Order, and renascent cultural Asianism will incline Japanese decision makers to look again at the American alliance. Their conclusions will, of course, be diverse, but it would be surprising if former Foreign Minister Ishii Kikujiro's assessment of the value of the Anglo–Japanese alliance after World War I ("superannuated and useless, . . . but, in view of the trend of events in the world . . . if it were retained as an ornament, some good and no harm would result")[74] did not provide food for thought.

The emergence of a stable and well integrated East Asian Community, centering around China, Japan, Korea, and ASEAN, would probably result in a progressive hollowing out of the Security Treaty system, until it eventually assumed the characteristics of a diplomatic *fata morgana*. Creation of a broader community, embracing India, Australia and New Zealand, might slow this process, but not arrest it completely. The confrontational Sino–Japanese relationship envisaged by Ishihara would not necessarily consolidate the Tokyo–Washington relationship. On the contrary, Ishihara's strategy—a recast of the pre-war militarist approach of employing an alliance with the hegemonic Western power to facilitate dismemberment of China and "management of the continent"—contains, deeply embedded within it, the germs of a renewed and potentially very dangerous Japanese–American estrangement.

POSTSCRIPT

On 12 September 2007, as this chapter was being written, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo resigned in the wake of a crushing Liberal Democratic Party defeat in the July House of Councillors election, a subsequent stalemate in the Diet over extension of the government's legislation to permit continued military cooperation with the United States in the Indian Ocean, a succession of scandals involving senior cabinet members, and increasing disenchantment, both within the party and among the general public, with his conservative nationalist domestic agenda. Abe's successor, Fukuda Yasuo, perhaps the most subtle, experienced, and moderate senior member of the old Kishi faction, made it clear that while he would continue to give high priority to fulfilling Japan's responsibilities under the Security Treaty, including its commitments in the Indian Ocean, he would place very great emphasis on consolidating and extending the Sino–Japanese relationship, on promoting a healthier climate in relations with both Seoul and Pyongyang and on developing ties with ASEAN. He also declared that he would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine and that the issue of constitutional revision would be shelved. The tide, it seemed, had begun to turn. No doubt it would turn yet again, as the ebb and flow of domestic political struggles and "culture wars" interacted with the powerful cross currents of global strategic and economic developments. The logic both of historical legacies and long-term trends, however, seemed to suggest that Japan would eventually emerge as a key member of an outward-looking, open-ended Asian Community, maintaining amicable but not excessively intimate ties with the maritime world of the West.

NOTES

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11. *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 September 2006. *Japan Times*, 4 October 2006. *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 November 2006. *Japan Times*, 2 November 2006.

12. Japan-Preemptive Strike Said to Pass Constitutional Muster, 1 April 2003, *AFP*, United Communications Group,http://global.factiva.com.

13. *Japan Times* (Editorial), 7 November 2005. *Japan Times,* 8 June 2006.

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15. *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 October 2005. *Japan Times,* 31 October 2005, 20 March 2006.

16. *Asahi Shimbun*, 29, 30 October 2005. *Japan Times,* 29, 31 October 2005.

17. "Funabashi Yoichi No Sekai Buriifingu," *Shukan Asahi*, 9 December 2005, http://www3.asahi.com/opendoors/zasshi/syukan/briefing/backnumber/700/765.html. American uneasiness about the character of Japan's "neo-nationalist" leadership entered a more serious phase when Henry Hyde (Rep. Illinois), Chairman of the House of Representatives International Relations Committee, wrote to Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, that Koizumi's worship at the Yasukuni Shrine had the potential to embarrass Congress and offend American ex-servicemen, and that the Prime Minister (who was to visit the United States in late June 2006) should not be invited to deliver a speech to the Legislature unless he promised to abandon the practice. (See *Japan Times* 26 April 2006). American concern was intensified by an article by Sasa Yukie in the December 2005 edition of *Bungei Shunju*, expressing doubts about American versions of the Bataan Death March. See also *Japan Times*, 15 January 2006.

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19. "Japan's Offensive Foreign Minister," *New York Times* (Editorial), 13 February 2006. Deborah Cameron, "The Man Who Speaks His Mind, Whether You Like It or Not," *Sydney Morning Herald,* 18 March 2006, http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/man-who-speaks-his-mind-whether-you-like-it-or-not/2006/03/17/1142582522215.html. See also *Japan Times*, 5 November 2006. Hamish McDonald, "In Japan's Ruling Party, a Perverse Mindset Lives on," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 20 March 2006, http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/in-japans-ruling-party-a-perverse-mindset-lives-on/2006/03/17/1142582522206.html. See also *Japan Times* , 5 November 2006.

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41. See the Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey cited in *Japan Times*, 14 October 2006.

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